From the time that Premier Mossadegh made his last offer in the disputed Iranian oil situation it was clear that it was not going to be acceptable to the British even in principle for good reason. The Iranian note rejected one fundamental of the British position, which is also the joint British-American position. It refused to accept the proposition that Britain is due compensation not only for the physical property which remains in Iran but for the loss of future revenue under a contract that still had 40 years to run.

Now British and American notes have been delivered to Mossadegh that say, in effect, negotiate on the basis of our assumption or not at all. They intentionally ignore the long, complicated and one-sided Iranian offer and restate, in the simplest terms, the basis on which Britain and this country will discuss the matter.

It is, with one exception, a strong position. In the first place it grants the two most important principles on which it has been clear the Iranians would make no compromise: recognition of nationalization and agreement that both the production and the selling of future oil will be free of foreign management. These formed the sticking point for the futile discussions preceding the withdrawal of the British from Iran. Second, it warns by implication that the present blockade will prevent any Iranian exploitation of the oil properties until there is agreement on a price. The strength of that point is that Iran is in somewhat more desperate need of such an agreement than Britain is. The one exception to the strength of the Anglo-American position lies in the unpredictability both of Mossadegh and Iranian politics in general.

It is conceivable that Iran could turn for succor to Soviet Russia. How much aid they could get is highly debatable, and certainly the Kremlin has shown no eagerness to do much more than keep the troubles between Mossadegh and the West stirred up. Any such course would be an act of desperation and spiteful defiance on the part of Iran, and Mossadegh has done no more than offer veiled hints that there is such an alternative. Unemotional weighing of the realities ought to convince him that the only possible solution lies in acceptance of the Anglo-American offer as a basis for discussion.