First Messages on Iran Oil Crisis (June-July 1951)
| Arash Norouzi The Mossadegh Project | January 12, 2021 |
The first communication between President Harry Truman and Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh occurred during a period of great tension between Iran and Britain.
On May 31, 1951, Truman wrote messages to Mossadegh and British Prime Minister Clement Attlee to express concern over the volatile oil standoff. Back in Tehran, U.S. Ambassador Henry Grady handed Mossadegh a copy of the letter the next day, but accidentally gave him a copy meant for Attlee. As the two letters were similar and impartial in tone, the only harm done was a little embarrassment.
Afterward, Mossadegh reportedly told the Majles: “Mr. Truman recognizes the principle of nationalization, but maybe the British are not bound by his recognition...I myself have heard from the British ambassador that the British are ready to agree to “a kind of nationalization,” which is quite different from agreeing to nationalization as an accomplished fact.”
Dr. Mossadegh wrote back a lengthy response on June 11th, in which he attempted to explain the hardships Iran endured during World War II and reassure the President of their aim of continuing the flow of Iranian oil without disruption.
On June 28th, Mossadegh wrote Truman again, explaining that Iran was ready and willing to negotiate in good faith, but that AIOC representatives repeatedly sought to contravene the oil nationalization law they claimed to recognize. The same day, Britain withdrew 130 of its personnel from Abadan, 60 of them high-ranking employees.
In reaction to the letter, one unnamed British official complained: “There’s not a thing new in it. There’s not the slightest inclination to try and get a reachable settlement.” Another dismissed it as “just outright propaganda”. A day earlier, Sec. of State Dean Acheson publicly blamed Iran for the “atmosphere of threat and fear”. Meanwhile, the 8,000-ton British cruiser Mauritius lingered just across the border, as British jet fighters soared nearby at the ready.
In his July 8th reply to Mossadegh, Truman strongly urged Iran to follow the recent suggestion of the World Court. And to demonstrate how seriously he took the situation, he offered to send Averell Harriman to Iran as his special representative. These suggestions had actually originated with Acheson in a talk with British Ambassador Oliver Franks and others, and were also run by Foreign Secretary Herbert Morrison.
Amb. Henry Grady delivered a Persian translation of Truman’s letter on July 9th. Reported Grady: “The Prime Minister read this document slowly and with careful attention and then, laying down the paper, burst into laughter for as long as thirty seconds. “This comes too late”, he said.” Word of Mossadegh’s reaction “deeply concerned” Acheson, who urged Grady to stress the gravity of Truman’s proposals to the Prime Minister.
Mossadegh’s response to Truman on July 11th, however, was more diplomatic. Though he reiterated Iran’s non-negotiable committment to oil nationalization in principle and law, he welcomed the offer to host Harriman in Tehran for further discussion.
Text of the first five Truman-Mossadegh messages follows. Note that despite the media publicity, the first message from Truman was not released at the time, not until the 1989 FRUS volume on Iran. However, three others were published in the State Department bulletin and some appeared in various newspapers like The New York Times.
Index to the Truman-Mossadegh correspondence on this page:
1. President Truman’s Message to Premier Mossadegh — June 1, 1951
2. Premier Mossadegh’s Reply to President Truman — June 11, 1951
3. Premier Mossadegh’s Message to President Truman — June 28, 1951
4. President Truman’s Reply to Mossadegh — July 8, 1951
5. Premier Mossadegh’s Reply to President Truman — July 11, 1951
888.2553 AIOC/6–151
No. 26
President Truman to Prime Minister Mosadeq
SECRET
I express to you the serious concern of the Government of the United States at the controversy between Iran and Great Britain concerning operations of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. The United States is a close friend of both countries. It is anxious that a solution be found which will satisfy the desires of the Iranian people for nationalization of their petroleum resources, and at the same time will safeguard basic British interests and assure the continued flow of Iranian oil into the economy of the free world.
I am convinced that both the Iranian and British Governments are willing and anxious to work out arrangements which will achieve these objectives. It is clear that they can be achieved only if the Iranian Government is willing to discuss with representatives of Great Britain all of the outstanding issues, without confining their talks merely to technical details. I earnestly hope that the Iranian Government will, in its efforts to carry out its nationalization program, do so by friendly negotiation.
I am sure you can understand my deep concern that in this situation no action be taken impeding a settlement, which is of great importance to the whole free world. I am confident that a solution acceptable both to Iran and Great Britain can and will be found. I sincerely hope that every effort will be made to accomplish this objective.
• [Abbreviations removed from opening sentence]
• Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Iran, 1951–1954, Volume X (1989)
• U.S. State Department Office of the Historian: “On June 1 Ambassador Grady reported that due to a mistake at the Embassy in Tehran, the message to Attlee (supra) had been delivered to Prime Minister Mosadeq at 11:30 that morning. (Telegram 3084 from Tehran; 888.2553/6–151) As soon as this became known the Department of State and the Embassy in London expressed to the British their sincere regrets at the error, and the Department of State undertook the drafting of a substitute message from President Truman to Prime Minister Mosadeq.
The text of the substitute, printed here, was transmitted to Tehran at 7 p.m. on June 1 in telegram 2267 with the instruction that Ambassador Grady ask Mosadeq to substitute it for the message to Attlee and retain the latter for his private information only. A copy of the substitute message was also sent to London for delivery to the British. Ambassador Grady decided that it would be unwise to attempt to withdraw the Attlee message since Mosadeq had already released it to the press, and on June 3 he delivered the substitute. Mosadeq expressed his appreciation for the impartiality of the United States in sending both sides essentially the same plea to open negotiations and released the text of the second message to the press. (Telegrams 3100 and 3109 from Tehran, both dated June 4; 888.2553 AIOC/6–451) Further documentation on the delivery of the messages, the regrets expressed to the British, the drafting of the substitute note, and its delivery to Mosadeq is in files 888.2553/6–151 through 6–451 and 888.2553 AIOC/6–151 through 6–451.
Mosadeq responded on June 11, thanking President Truman for his interest and concern, but pointing out that the negotiations over nationalization were the exclusive responsibility of the Iranian Government and the AIOC, not the British Government. (888.2553 AIOC/6–1151)”
The Honorable
Harry S. Truman,
President of the United States of America
Dear Mr. President:
I have the honor to express my thanks for your kind message, sent through His Excellency the United States Ambassador in Iran, and to emphasize that the Iranian people and their Government have always considered the United States of America as their sincere and well-wishing friend and are relying upon that friendship.
Concerning the nationalization of the oil industry in Iran, I have to assure you, Mr. President, that the Government and Parliament of Iran, like yourself, desire that the interests of the countries which hitherto have used the Iranian oil should not suffer in the slightest degree. As, however, you have expressed the apprehension of the United States, and it would seem that the matter is not fully clear to you, I ask permission to avail myself of the opportunity to put before you a cursory history of the case and of the measures which have now been adopted.
For many years the Iranian Government have been dissatisfied with the activities of the former Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, but I feel it would be beyond the scope of this letter and would cause you undue trouble if I attempted to set forth in detail the exactions of that Company and to prove with unshakable documentary evidence that the accounts of the Company have not corresponded with the true facts and that, even in their disclosed accounts, the share they have earmarked for the Iranian people, the sole owners of the soil, has been so meager as to to rouse the indignation of all fair-minded persons.
The Iranian people have suffered these events for a good many years, with the result that they are now in the clutches of terrible poverty and acute distress, and it has become impossible to continue this tolerance, especially with the situation brought into existence in this country by the Second World War.
No doubt you will recall, Mr. President, that during the war Iran collaborated fully and most sincerely with the Allies for the ultimate triumph of right, justice and world freedom, and that she suffered untold hardships and made many sacrifices. During the war all our development activities came to a stand-still, as all our productive resources were directed day and night to carrying out large-scale plans for the transfer of ammunitions, the supply of foodstuffs and other requirements of the Allied armies. These heavy burdens, borne for several years, disorganized and weakened our finance and economy and brought us up against a series of very grave economic problems, with the result that the laboring classes of this country, who had toiled for the Allies throughout the war, were faced with an unbearable rise in prices and wide-spread unemployment.
Had we been left alone, after the termination of war, we could have dealt with the situation brought about by the war, restored normal conditions and managed to move back to the depopulated villages the peasants who had been drawn toward work on roads and in factories, thus improving our agriculture.
Had we been given outside help like other countries which suffered from war, we could soon have revived our economy, and, even without that help, could have succeeded in our efforts had we not been hampered by the greed of the Company and by the activities of its agents.
The Company, however, always strove, by restricting our income, to put us under heavy financial pressure, and by disrupting our organizations, to force us to ask its help and, as a consequence, to submit to whatever it desired to force upon us.
Secret agents, on the one hand, paralyzed our reform movements by economic pressure, and, on the other hand, on the contention that the country had enormous sources of wealth and oil, prevented us from enjoying the help which was given to other countries suffering from the effects of war.
I ask you in fairness, Mr. President, whether the tolerant Iranian people, who, whilst suffering from all these hardships and desperate privations, have so far withstood all kinds of strong and revolutionary propaganda without causing any anxiety to the world, are not worthy of praise and appreciation, and whether they had any other alternative but recourse to the nationalization of the oil industry, which will enable them to utilize the natural wealth of their country and will put an end to the unfair activities of the Company.
Having thus given a short summary of the motives which have led to nationalization of the oil industry in Iran, I wish to refer you, Mr. President, to the text of the law, and I hope you will agree that the two Houses of the Iranian Parliament have not deviated from the path of right and justice, and that the law, as repeatedly announced from the tribunes of both Houses and in various interviews, does not authorize the confiscation and seizure of property, but, on the contrary, envisages and gives security for the repayment of damages and losses and that, furthermore, it gives special consideration to the continuation of oil supplies to those countries hitherto using Iranian oil, and explicitly safeguards the viewpoints of former customers.
It is now a month since the law and the method of execution of the principle of the nationalization of the oil industry were ratified by both Houses of Parliament and received the royal signature, and, although the law has decreed an immediate dispossession, and the Government is under extraordinary pressure from public opinion impatiently demanding the dispossession of the former oil Company the Government and the mixed committee appointed by the two Houses of Parliament have given careful study to the means of putting the law into force in the best possible way, so that no disruption may occur in the exploitation of oil from the various centers and in the continuity of the flow of export.
The surest evidence of the truth of this contention, and the goodwill of the Imperial Iranian Government, is to be found in the provisions which have been communicated to the representative of the former oil Company, the most important of which are mentioned below:
(1) So long as the statute of the National Iranian Oil Company is not approved by the two Houses of the Iranian Parliament, the basis of operations of the Temporary Board of Directors shall be the regulations devised by the former oil Company (except in so far as such regulations are contrary to the law of nationalization of the oil industry).
(2) The foreign and Iranian experts, employees and laborers of the former oil Company shall remain in service as before, and shall henceforth be recognized as employees of the National Iranian Oil Company.
(3) The Temporary Board of Directors will take the utmost care to execute existing programs and to increase the production of oil, so that the level of production and exploitation shall be raised above the present level.
(4) The Board of Directors are hound to invite by public notices purchasers from the former oil Company to submit documents showing their former transactions. The Board must, at the same time, provide facilities so that no stoppage or restriction in the exportation of oil shall occur before the verification of the documents and the conclusion of agreements with the purchaser.
Lastly the former oil Company has been given the opportunity to submit immediate proposals, provided they are not contrary to the principle of the nationalization of the oil industry, and the Government has promised to consider those proposals.
The aim of the Iranian Government and the mixed committee in adopting the above measures has been the continuation of the flow of oil to the consumer countries — an aim which has been your immediate concern.
You may rest assured, Mr. President, that the Iranian people are desirous of maintaining their friendship with all nations and especially with those, like the British nation, which have had age-long relations with them.
With regard to the questions of dispossession and the settlement of account with the former oil Company, which must he carried out in accordance with the provisions of the law ratified by the two Houses of Parliament, no doubt you will agree that, as they are solely affairs of an internal nature, the Government of Iran cannot enter into negotiations with anyone but the representatives of the former oil Company.
The British Government can only show its concern if Iran, in her dealings with the former oil Company, stepped beyond the limits of right and justice in the enforcement of the law of the nationalization of the oil industry, and you may rest assured, Mr. President, that no such trespass will ever take place.
We shall always strive to protect our cordial relations with the British Government and to remove, according to the law, any anxiety which that Government may have in the matter of securing Iranian oil for their requirements.
In this way there remains no cause for apprehension on the part of the Government and people of Britain in their relations with the Iranian Government and people.
I avail myself of this opportunity to offer to you, Mr. President, the expression of my highest and most sincere regards, and to wish the continuous progress and prosperity of the great American nation.
Dr. Mohammad Mossadegh
Prime Minister of Iran
• Source: National Archives
WASHINGTON
June 13, 1951
Subject: Reply by Prime Minister Mosadeq of Iran to your message of May 31
There is enclosed the reply by Prime Mosadeq to Iran to your message of May 31, 1951. [Delivered and released June 1st]
In brief, Dr. Mosadeq’s message expresses friendship for the United States and the desire of the Iranian Government to take no steps contrary to the interests of countries which have hitherto used Iranian oil. It reiterates numerous complaints against the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, which it reaffirms must be nationalized in accordance with the Iranian law. It promises that the Iranian Government will consider proposals if put forward immediately by the AIOC which are not inconsistent with the principles of nationalization.
It is believed that your message to Dr. Mosadeq served a useful purpose in bringing forcibly to his attention the position of the United States.
The question of whether the Department will recommend that a reply be made, and, in such en eventuality, the nature of the reply, will depend upon developments in Iran during the next few days.
Dean Acheson
Enclosure:
Reply by Prime
Minister Mosadeq.
[Telegram from Amb. Henry Grady]
8:29 a.m.
FROM: Tehran
TO: Secretary of State [Dean Acheson]
3466, June 28
NIACT.
SENT NIACT DEPT 3466; RPTED PRIORITY LONDON 406
Following is text of letter from Prime Minister Mosadeq to President Truman, which letter was handed to me by Foreign Minister Kazemi this morning. [Bagher Kazemi] Iranian Government is releasing text to press at 6 p.m., Tehran time, this evening.
• Source: Documentary History of the Truman Presidency: Oil crisis in Iran (1995)
Dear Mr. President:
The special interest you have shown on various occasions in the welfare of our country in general, and in the recent oil question in particular, and the personal message you were kind enough to send me on 3 June 1951, prompt me to inform you that the Imperial Iranian Government has been duty-bound to put into force the law enacted by the two Houses of Parliament concerning the nationalization of the oil industry all over Iran and the modus operandi of that law in the quickest possible time.
Notwithstanding the urgency of the matter, the measures for the enforcement of the law were taken in a very gradual manner and with extreme care and caution, both in order to ensure the success of the preliminary steps, and also in order to bring about an understanding between the Government of Iran and the former oil company, and to give ample time to the latter for negotiations between their representatives and this Government.
The Imperial Iranian Government was ready in all sincerity to make the best possible use of this opportunity and it paid great attention to this matter especially in view of your kind message and the friendly mediations of the US Ambassador in Tehran, and agreed with the request of the former oil company for the extension of the time limit originally fixed for these negotiations. Thus no measures were taken during 45 days after the enactment of the law. [Amb. Henry F. Grady]
The Imperial Iranian Government had repeatedly announced its readiness to enter into negotiations with the representatives of the company within the limits prescribed by the law fixing the modus operandi of its enforcement, and to discuss willingly various problems such as the question of the probable losses to the former oil company and the sale of oil to the former purchasers, etc. The Government, therefore, welcomed the arrival of the representatives of the former oil company, but it was found with great regret that the representatives of the former company wished to submit proposals which were contrary to the text of the laws concerning the nationalization of the oil industry and which made it unable for this Government to continue the discussions.
Since the Imperial Iranian Government has decided to prevent any stoppage, even for one day, in the exploitation of oil and its sale to the former purchasers, it has repeatedly announced its readiness to employ all foreign experts, technicians and others in the service of the oil industry with the same salaries, allowances and pensions due to them, to provide them with all encouragement, to leave untouched the present organization and administration of the former oil company, and to enforce, so far as they may not be contrary to the provisions of the law, the regulations made by that company.
It is, however, noticed with regret that former oil company authorities have resorted to certain actions which will necessarily cause a stoppage in the exportation of oil; for, firstly, they are encouraging the employees to leave their services, and are threatening the Government with their resignation en masse; secondly, they force the oil tankers to refuse to deliver receipts to the present Board of Directors of the National Oil Company.
Although the Iranian people have prepared themselves for every kind of privations in their resolve to achieve their aim, yet there is no doubt that the stoppage in the exploitation of oil machinery is not only damaging to us but it is also damaging to Great Britain and to all other countries which use the Iranian oil—a grave and serious matter which should be borne in mind by the authorities of the former oil company.
There is no doubt that the Government of Iran will take every effort with all the means at its disposal to prevent any stoppage, even temporarily, in the flow of oil, but it would be the cause for great regret if any stoppage occurred as the result of the resignation en masse of the British employees, or any delaying tactics in loading and shipping of the oil products because of the refusal on their part to give the receipts required. In such an eventuality the responsibility for the grave and undesirable consequences which might follow will naturally lie upon the shoulders of the former oil company authorities.
It must be mentioned at this stage that in spite of the public fervor in Iran there is no danger whatever to the security of life and property of the British nationals in Iran. Any spreading of false rumors on the part of the agents of the former oil company might, however, cause anxieties and disturbances; whilst if they acted in conformity with the expectations of the Iranian Government, there will be no cause whatever for any anxiety, for the Imperial Iranian Government has the situation well in hand.
Owing to the age-long and continuous cordial relations existing between the peoples of Iran and the US, I am confident that no disturbance will ever occur in that happy relation, for the world regards the great and esteemed American nation as the strong supporter of the freedom and sovereignty of nations—a belief evidenced by the sacrifices of the great-hearted nation in the last two World Wars.
Such reflections have moved me to lay before you, Mr. President, the recent developments in Iran, and I am quite sure that the free nations of the world and specially the Government of the friendly nation of America will not hesitate to support us in achieving our national ideal.
I avail myself of this opportunity to offer you, Mr. President, the expressions of my highest consideration and my most sincere wishes for the prosperity of the great American nation.
MOHAMMED MOSADEQ
• Source: The Department of State Bulletin | Vol. XXV, No. 627 • Publication 4278, July 9, 1951
"President Receives Letter From Iranian Prime Minister", pg. 72-73
“[Released to the press by the White House June 28]”
”Following is the text of a letter to the President from His Excellency, Mohammed Mosadeq, Prime Minister of Iran:”
Also in: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Iran, 1951–1954, Volume X (1989)
• The New York Times, via The Associated Press, printed this letter on June 29, 1951, pg. 5 ("Text of Mossadegh Letter to Truman").
• “Transmitted to the Department of State in telegram 3466 from Tehran, June 28, in which Grady also reported that it had been handed to him by Foreign Minister Kazemi that morning and that the Iranian Government was releasing it to the press at 6 p.m. Tehran time.” — U.S. State Department Office of the Historian
¶ The President’s News Conference of June 28, 1951
Q. Mr. President, the letter released a little bit ago from the Premier of Iran, asking for your support of the Iranian Government—do you support the Iranian Government—
THE PRESIDENT. I have the matter under consideration. I appreciate very much the Iranian Premier writing me as he did. The matter is under consideration. I can make no comment on the—as to action, at this time. I hope the matter will be settled. It is a serious situation, and there is plenty of opportunity for its settlement.
• More: President Truman’s press conference, June 28, 1951
• Source: Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1951
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Memorandum of Conversation
[Telegram from Dean Acheson]
Iran
PARTICIPANTS:
Ambassador Bonnet [Henri Bonnet, French Ambassador]
The Secretary [Dean Acheson, Secretary of State]
Mr. Merchant - FE [Livingston T. Merchant, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs]
Mr. Godley - WE [George McMurtie Godley II, Office of Western European Affairs]
COPIES TO:
NEA [Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs]
BNA [Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs]
EUR [Bureau of European Affairs]
GTI [Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs]
During the course of conversation this afternoon on other matters Ambassador Bonnet inquired as to my reactions to Mr. Mossadegh’s letter to President Truman. He said he had studied this document carefully and it appeared to him that Mr. Mossadegh was obliquely requesting American mediation for assistance in the Iranian-British troubles. I replied that although I had seen Mr. Mossadegh’s letter, I had not had a chance to analyse it and hoped to discuss it this afternoon with the competent officers of the Department.
The Ambassador then continued that he thought the Iranian situation was going from bad to worse and that it was extremely serious. I agreed with his views and said that we were studying Mr. Mossadegh’s communications which, however, I noted had been prepared prior to my statement of yesterday on Iran. We were also waiting to hear from Ambassador Grady not only on Mr. Mossadegh’s communication to the President but also on the Iranian reaction to what I said yesterday. The latter I surmised would not be favorable.
EUR:WE:GMGodley:rr
• Source: National Archives
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
My Dear Mr. Prime Minister:
I am most grateful to Your Excellency for giving me in your recent letter a full and frank account of the developments in the unhappy dispute which has arisen between your government and the British oil interests in Iran. This matter is so full of dangers to the welfare of your own country, of Great Britain and of all the free world, that I have been giving the most earnest thought to the problems involved. I had hoped that the common interests of the two countries directly involved and the common ground which has been developed in your discussions would open the way to a solution of the troublesome and complicated problems which have arisen. You know of our sympathetic interest in this country in Iran’s desire to control its natural resources. From this point of view we were happy to see that the British Government has on its part accepted the principle of nationalization.
Since British skill and operating knowledge can contribute so much to the Iranian oil industry I had hoped—and still hope—that ways could be found to recognize the principle of nationalization and British interests to the benefit of both. For these reasons I have watched with concern the breakdown of your discussions and the drift toward a collapse of oil operations with all the attendant losses to Iran and the world. Surely this is a disaster which statesmanship can find a way to avoid.
Recently I have come to believe that the complexity of the problems involved in a broad settlement and the shortness of the time available before the refinery must shut down—if the present situation continues—require a simple and practicable modus vivendi under which operations can continue and under which the interests of neither side will be prejudiced. Various suggestions to this end have failed. The time available is running out.
In this situation a new and important development has occurred. The International Court of Justice, which your Government, the British Government and our own all joined with other nations to establish as the guardian of impartial justice and equity has made a suggestion for a modus vivendi.
Technical considerations aside, I lay great stress on the action of the Court. I know how sincerely your Government and the British Government believe in the positions which you both have taken in your discussions. However, I am sure you believe even more profoundly in the idea of a world controlled by law and justice which has been the hope of the world since the San Francisco Conference. Apart from questions of jurisdiction no one will doubt the impartiality of the World Court, its eminence and the respect due to it by all nations who signed the United Nations treaty.
Therefore, I earnestly commend to you a most careful consideration of its suggestion. I suggest that its utterance be thought of not as a decision which is or is not binding depending on technical legal considerations, but as a suggestion of an impartial body, dedicated to justice and equity and to a peaceful world based upon these great conceptions. A study of its suggestion by your Government and by the British Government will, I am sure, develop methods of implementing it which will carry out its wise and impartial purpose—maintaining the operation of the oil industry and preserving the positions of both Governments. Surely no government loses any element of its sovereignty or the support of its people by treating with all possible consideration and respect the utterance of this great court. Our own government and people believe this profoundly. Should you take such a position I am sure that the stature of Iran would be greatly enhanced in the eyes of the world.
I have a very sincere desire, Mr. Prime Minister, to be as helpful to you as possible in this circumstance. I have discussed this matter at length with Mr. W. Averell Harriman who, as you know, is one of my closest advisers and one of our most eminent citizens. Should you be willing to receive him I should be happy to have him go to Tehran as my personal representative to talk over with you this immediate and pressing situation.
May I take this opportunity to assure Your Excellency of my highest consideration and to convey to you my confidence in the future well-being and prosperity of Iran.
HARRY S. TRUMAN
• Source: The Department of State Bulletin | Vol. XXV, No. 630 • Publication 4306, July 23, 1951
MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT TRUMAN TO IRANIAN PRIME MINISTER, pg. 129
“[Released to the press by the White House July 9]”
Also in: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Iran, 1951–1954, Volume X (1989)
• “Transmitted to Tehran in telegram 45, July 8, for immediate delivery. An earlier draft of this message was sent to President Truman on July 7 under cover of a memorandum for the President by McGhee. (George McGhee) The earlier draft was, except for minor differences, the same as the message printed here. (888.2553/7–751) Regarding the delivery of the message to Mosadeq on July 9, see the memorandum of conversation, infra.” (see July 11th memo, No. 38) — U.S. State Department Office of the Historian
• “The source text is not signed.” — U.S. State Department Office of the Historian
• Memorandum of Conversation with the President (July 9, 1951), part of a 7 page collection of brief notes. Source: National Archives
• Messages from Lucius D. Battle, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State
888.2553/7–951: Telegram/6–151
No. 39
The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Iran [Acheson to Henry Grady]
TOP SECRET
PRIORITY
49. Personal for Amb from the Secretary. I am deeply concerned at [the] initial reaction of Mosadeq to [the] President’s message which you reported in Embtel 109 July 9, and at [the] probable effect which [a] summary rejection by Mosadeq of [the] President’s proposals would have on US prestige in Iran, future US-Iranian relations, and [the] possibility of [the] US playing [a] constructive role in [a] settlement of [the] oil dispute. [I] Assume that you had this danger fully in mind when you presented [the] message and that [the] President’s proposals were put forward as forcefully as possible during your conversation. I am particularly concerned that [the] question of Harriman’s coming to Tehran was not raised, since this is the one new positive element contained in [the] President’s proposal and is [a] step to which [the] President and I both attach [the] greatest significance.
I cannot believe that Mosadeq’s initial reaction will, upon reflection, be his final one. Considerations of courtesy will lead him, I am convinced, to take no hasty or abrupt action, to give [the] President’s message full consideration and to receive [the] President’s personal representative who can give both you and Mosadeq the benefit of the great thought which [the] President has put to this matter and receive any suggestions which Mosadeq may have.
Therefore [I] request that you see Mosadeq again as speedily as possible and in the tactful way which I know you will employ urge these considerations upon him. You might, in this connection, point out to him the adverse effect which rejection of [the] President’s very sincere attempt to be constructive might have on [the] attitude of [the] US and other countries towards Iran. You might emphasize that [the] President’s proposal is [an] attempt to inject [a] new element into [the] situation which in our judgment is deteriorating rapidly and holds grave consequences for [the] future. If you consider [it] appropriate you might urge reconsideration by [the] Iranian cabinet of [the] reply to [the] ICJ. [International Court of Justice]
FYI, [the] intent of [the] President’s message was to link Harriman’s coming with [the] ICJ recommendation in order to emphasize our support of [the] ICJ and facilitate acceptance [of] its proposal or some variation thereof by [the] Iranian Government. [The] Wording of [the] President’s message was, however, purposely left general so that Harriman’s coming might be considered independently from [the] ICJ suggestion. We believe, even if [the] ICJ recommendation is rejected irrevocably by [the] Iranians, Harriman’s visit could perform [a] constructive role. I would, therefore, appreciate it if you would on [a] personal basis facilitate the Iranians coming to that conclusion.
ACHESON
• Bracketed text added and abbreviations removed for better readability. [Annotations by Arash Norouzi]
• Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Iran, 1951–1954, Volume X (1989)
• “Drafted by Acheson and McGhee, cleared by Matthews, and signed by Acheson.” (Dean Acheson, George McGhee, H. Freeman Matthews) — U.S. State Department Office of the Historian
888.2553/7–1151
No. 38
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Second Secretary of the Embassy in Iran (Stutesman) [John Stutesman] 1
SECRET
Participants:
Ambassador Grady called on Prime Minister Mosadeq at the latter’s residence at noon, July 9, to deliver a message from President Truman (Deptel 45, July 8). The Prime Minister was in bed as usual. His physical appearance and speech indicated that although he was tired he was still quite vigorous.
Prime Minister Mohammed Mosadeq [Mohammad Mossadegh]
Ambassador Henry F. Grady
John H. Stutesman, Second Secretary of Embassy (Translator)
Reference:
Embtel 109, July 9, 1951 2
The Ambassador handed him the Persian translation of the President’s message which had been typed in the Embassy. The Prime Minister read this document slowly and with careful attention and then, laying down the paper, burst into laughter for as long as thirty seconds. “This comes too late”, he said.
“Our reply to the Hague Court”, he continued “has been approved by the two Majlis Commissions and by the Council of Ministers and is being sent today and, possibly, is already on the way. We consider the entire question to be closed”. The Ambassador pointed out that the President’s message was written in a warm and friendly tone and he requested the Prime Minister to give it careful attention. The Prime Minister replied that he appreciated the President’s interest but that the Iranians had never expected to abide by the decision of the Hague Court which they considered had no jurisdiction in the oil dispute. He conceded, however, that the President’s message might have had “a little effect on Iranian public opinion” if it had been received before the Government had concluded its discussions and had approved the official reply to the Court.
The Ambassador said “I assume that your reply to the Hague Court is negative?” The Prime Minister said “Yes”. The Ambassador asked if the Embassy could have a copy of the reply and the Prime Minister immediately gave instructions to a summoned clerk, ordering that a copy of the message be sent to the Embassy as soon as possible. (Note: no message was received although next morning an Embassy representative was able to obtain the official Persian text and the official French translation. The English translation made at the Embassy from the Persian and checked against the French text was telegraphed to the Department in Embtel 126, July 10.) [“not printed”]
The Ambassador then asked what the Prime Minister’s intentions were in regard to publishing the President’s letter to him. The Prime Minister said that to him it made no difference, although he thought it would be better for the American position in Iran if the letter were not published. The Ambassador pointed out that the press had received releases of previous messages between the President and the Prime Minister and would certainly expect release of this message. He said further that journalists are often prone to speculation and would probably write wild stories if the message were not released.
The Prime Minister appreciated this point of view but again said that he advised the Ambassador not to allow the letter to be published as it would “anger” the Iranian people against the United States. He expanded on this theme and became bitter in his remarks about United States policy for the first time in any of the Ambassador’s conversations with him. “The message takes the British side entirely. The Americans have always taken the British side in this oil dispute and have never given aid to Iran”. The Ambassador said, “The British accuse me of always taking the Persian side”. The Prime Minister replied, “The British are mistaken.”
“Furthermore, your President’s message asks me to consider a matter which has been already settled by our reply to the Hague Court and our reply to President Truman is in our message to the Court. You will see when you read it that your President has taken the British side”.
No reference was made by the Prime Minister to the penultimate paragraph of the President’s message in which the suggestion was made that Mr. Averell Harriman might come to Iran to discuss “this situation” with the Prime Minister. The Ambassador did not raise the matter in view of the Prime Minister’s completely adamant position in refusing to reopen any discussions of the Hague Court decision. 3
• [Annotations by Arash Norouzi]
• Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Iran, 1951–1954, Volume X (1989)
U.S. State Department Office of the Historian footnotes:
1 “Transmitted as an enclosure to despatch 42 from Tehran, July 11. (888.2553/71151)”
2 “Telegram 109 transmitted Grady’s initial report on his conversation with Mosadeq. (888.2553/7–951)”
3 “The text of Mosadeq’s response to President Truman was conveyed to the Department in telegram 147 from Tehran, July 11, which also reported that it would be released to the press on the following day. Mosadeq stated that the AIOC still had not recognized the principle of nationalization, but he welcomed the suggestion of a visit by Averell Harriman. (888.2553/7–1151)”
Dear Mr. President:
I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your friendly message of 8th July handed to me by His Excellency the Ambassador of the United States in Teheran just after the government of Iran had taken its decision with regard to the findings of the International Court of Justice at The Hague. I deem it my duty to thank you once again, Mr. President, for the care you have always taken in the welfare of this country.
As I mentioned in my previous letter, the government and people of Iran recognize the government and the people of the United States as the staunch supporters of right and justice and appreciate therefore, with complete sincerity, the interest you are taking in the solution of the economic difficulties of Iran in general and in the oil question in particular.
I am extremely glad to note your reference, Mr. President, to the sympathy and interest of the American Nation in the realization of Iran’s national aspirations and the acceptance of the principle of nationalization of the oil industry; for Iran has had and is having no aim other than the acceptance of this principle by virtue of the laws ratified by the two Houses of Parliament, and has always been ready, within the terms of these laws to take any measures for the removal of the present disputes. It is, therefore, a matter of great regret that, insofar as Iran can judge, no proposal or suggestion has been made, up to the present, by the former oil company denoting their acceptance of the principle of nationalization of the oil industry in accordance with the laws ratified by the Parliament — laws which the government is duty bound to put into force. On the contrary, in their note of 29th June, the representatives of the former oil company made proposals which were against the provisions of these laws and which resulted in the termination of the discussions.
Provided, of course, that our indisputable national rights are respected in accordance with the laws concerning the nationalization of the oil industry, the government and the people of Iran are ready to enter into immediate discussions with the aim to remove all the disputes so that there may be no stoppage in the production and exploitation of oil—a situation which the government of Iran has always been anxious to avoid and which, as you have mentioned, Mr. President, is causing losses to all concerned.
With reference to your desire, Mr. President, to help our country I must state without hesitation that the Iranian nation and government fully appreciate this high intent in all sincerity and candor, more so when they find that you have shown your readiness, Mr. President, to send to Teheran as your Special Representative Mr. Averell Harriman, one of the most distinguished American citizens, for consultations.
In the light of our knowledge of Mr. Harriman’s personality and his vast experiences, and considering the fact that he will act as your representative, the Iranian government welcomes this gesture and hopes to take full advantage of consultations with a man of such high standing. In the meanwhile it would also give him the opportunity to become directly acquainted with our views and to obtain first hand knowledge of our living conditions and requirements.
May I avail myself of this opportunity to offer you, Mr. President, the expressions of my best and most sincere regards.
MOHAMMED MOSADEQ
• [Annotations by Arash Norouzi]
• Source: The Department of State Bulletin | Vol. XXV, No. 630 • Publication 4306, July 23, 1951
MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT TRUMAN TO IRANIAN PRIME MINISTER, pg. 130
“[Released to the press by the White House July 11]”
• Also in: Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Harry S. Truman: Containing the Public Messages, Speeches, and Statements of the President, January 1 to December 31, 1951
• Amb. Henry Grady: “[The] Prime Minister sent for me this afternoon at 6:00 P.M. and gave me [the] following letter for [the] President. He will release it here tomorrow morning and I see no reason why [the] Department should not release it at once: Text of message:”
• Note: this version has Mossadegh referring to Truman’s letter of “4th July”, apparently an error made while typing his letter. Truman’s letter was from July 8th and all other versions of Mossadegh’s letter are correct.
Related links:
Amb. Henry Grady Reports on Mossadegh Meeting (July 29, 1951)
Amb. Walter Gifford’s Telegram on Britain and Iran (July 29, 1951)
What Went Wrong in Iran? | Saturday Evening Post, Jan. 5, 1952
MOSSADEGH t-shirts — “If I sit silently, I have sinned”
