A Progress Report (State Department, 1952)
| Arash Norouzi The Mossadegh Project | May 11, 2026 |
On Sept. 13, 1951, Sen. Pat McCarran (D-Nevada) wrote Secretary of State Dean Acheson with “a series of questions on what our objectives are with regard to reaching certain groups abroad and further questions asking for an explanation
of the seeming failure to convince local peoples that their interests are our interests.”
McCarran received a response to his 13 questions on February 8, 1952 (see footnote). He made this available to the Senate subcommittee he headed, which appropriated State Dept. funding, in June.
Said McCarran, “We must learn to look through the eyes of our audience and abandon the superior, almost patronizing tones of a rich and moral uncle addressing poor relatives. Our propaganda must be directed to their interests, their
self-esteem, their hopes for the future.”
The following is excerpted from that
67-page document furnished by the U.S. State Department.
• U.S. State Department Documents | IRAN
• U.S. Congress on Iran | Archive (1951-1981)
82D CONGRESS - 2d Session SENATE DOCUMENT NO. 143
THE OBJECTIVES OF THE UNITED STATES INFORMATION PROGRAM
REPLY TO QUESTIONS ASKED BY THE HONORABLE PAT MCCARRAN IN HIS LETTER TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE, SEPTEMBER 13, 1951
PRESENTED BY MR. MCCARRAN
JUNE 9 (legislative day, June 5), 1952.—Ordered to be printed
QUESTION 6
“What effort is being made to inform colonial countries especially in the Far and Near East, that Soviet domination has nothing in common with national independence and that only the democracies can guarantee such independence?”
As all the world knows, the biggest and most successful use the
Kremlin makes of the “technique of the big lie” in the expansion of
Soviet imperialism is Moscow’s adoption of the theme that international
communism stands for freedom, for escape from exploitation,
and for anticolonialism.
This lie has been glaringly exposed over and over again, but it does
not die easily. It remains—and will remain—one of our greatest
problems in colonial and newly independent areas.
To Asians and Africans, we are part of the white-skinned “West”
from which the colonial masters of the last few centuries have come.
Some of our chief allies in resisting Communist expansion throughout
the world are also the chief colonial powers. When we step in to
prevent Communist penetration of any area, we are misrepresented
by Communist propaganda as seeking to perpetuate colonial rule or
substitute ourselves for the old rulers.
Of course, the United States has one special asset, which has won us
friendship and trust among colonial peoples: the fact that we ourselves
emerged from colonial status through revolution. This was well
demonstrated, for example, by recent editorials in Iran, which
though independent now sees itself as throwing off the economic
imperialism of Great Britain. These editorials welcomed American
participation in oil negotiations because—
“Mr. Harriman represents a nation well acquainted with the evils of
foreign imperialism” and, again:
“Mr. Harriman will not leave the path trod by his forebears
who know how to get rid of their British overlords.”
But valuable as it is, this “asset” has a corresponding major liability:
Colonial peoples and peoples who believe themselves oppressed
by any form of foreign exploitation can easily look to American for
“revolutionary” assistance. If our aim were mere popularity, rather
than an integrated defense of the free world, it would be easy to win
that popularity by encouraging the reckless throwing off of bonds and
breaking of foreign ties by peoples without sufficient military strength
or governmental experience. But by so doing we would simply
expose them to being gobbled up by the new Soviet imperialism.
[excerpted from a much longer section]
QUESTION 11
What is the explanation for our apparent failure in Iran to
convince the bulk of the Iranian people that we are interested
in them as an independent nation and are not included in the
criticism which they make about English imperialism?
Inasmuch as question 11 is in reality two questions, they will be
dealt with here in the following form:
11A: “What is the explanation for our apparent failure to convince
the bulk of the Iranian people that we are interested in Iran as an independent
nation?”; and
11B: “What is the explanation for our apparent failure to
convince the bulk of the Iranian people that we are not
(to be) included in the criticism which they make of English
imperialism?”
Turning first to question 11A, we feel strongly that the basic
premise, as stated, does not accurately reflect the point of view of
“the bulk of the Iranian people.” By and large, we are convinced
that the United States has succeeded and the USIE program has
assisted in this success in convincing Iranians that America is
“interested in them as an independent nation.”
[United States Information and
Educational Program]
The extent of this success can be ascribed, we believe, in part to
the fact that (as detailed later herein) a large part of the emphasis
of the USIE message to Iran has been placed upon material which
emphasizes our interest in Iran’s problems and our desire to help the
Iranian people. USIE has stressed the American work in aiding Iran’s
battle with the locust plague, for example, and has concentrated on
the translation and local publication of such material as United States
Government pamphlets on improvement of water supply, etc. All
such publications have been stamped “Gift of the people of the
United States,” and have been distributed over USIE imprimatur.
Actually, the bulk of the Iranian people who have had any knowledge
at all of foreign affairs, have for many years been convinced of
unselfish American interest in Iran. The Iranian “reservoir of good
will” for America extends back beyond the first Millspaugh mission,
two generations ago. [Arthur Millspaugh]
It has been the contemporary task of United States foreign policy and of the
USIE program, as an instrument of this policy, to confirm, strengthen, and
extend this basic Iranian belief in America’s friendly interest.
In Iran, unlike the picture in India, the United States has not found
it necessary to argue the disinterestedness of American motives. This
has been so widely accepted, by all Iranian factions except the extremist
left, that it is taken virtually as a postulate of political
discussion.
Thus, we find the influential moderate weekly Tehran-E-Mosavvar, [Tehran
Mosavar] in stating its hopes on July 13, for the Harriman visit, saying in passing that—
“the Iranians hope also that Americans will help them attain true independence,
because Americans always stand for justice and peace.”
Similarly, Dad, a newspaper critical of the Government, and often of
United States actions as well, in a discussion of oil talks, refers to
“American popularity in Iran,” and, in September, the influential
conservative daily Kayhan comments that—
“The United States has always come to Iran’s aid in time of crisis.”
Again, last March, in commenting on the opening of a USIE information
center, the newspaper Sahar said that—
“In a country like Iran, where England and Russia have sought only their own
interests, the entrance of a third power which has never shared the self-interest
of England and Russia is quite valuable for Iran.”
In April, Etela’at, Iran’s oldest and most influential paper, referred
to America as having—
“proved again, by being first to extend (antilocust) help; that it
is Iran’s true friend.”
Thus, too, in Shiraz, the newspaper Pars mentions that—
“Americans have been known in Iran for the past 40 years for their philanthropic
and humanitarian acts.”
The information program has continually sought to focus attention on
each new evidence of America’s sincere interest in Iran’s independent
development. Thus, for example, for heaviest sort of currency has been given
press releases and other publications concerning:
1. The surplus property agreement of July 1948, granting
Iran $26,000,000 credit for the purchase of military equipment.
2. The bilateral agreement of May 1950, concerning the mutual
defense assistance program of 1949, which granted military
assistance to Iran.
3. The Point IV technical cooperation program, under which
Iran received approximately $ 1,500,000 in fiscal 1951 (the
largest amount extended to any country in the Eastern Hemisphere)
for rural improvement, malaria control, and locust control.
4. The $25,000,000 Export-Import Bank loan, authorization
for which was given by the bank in October 1950—just 12 days
after the Iranian Government submitted its request and
accompanying documents.
5. The Mutual Security Program just enacted by Congress,
under which Iran is to receive economic aid and increased military
assistance.
Similarly, USIE takes every opportunity to refresh the memories
of Iranians as to the leading role played by America in such events
as the Tehran declaration of December 1943 on Iran, and the Security
Council action for the restoration of Azerbaijan to Iran, and the
withdrawal of Soviet troops. Again, repeated use is made of the text of
such official documents as the joint statement by
President Truman
and the Shah of Iran (December 12, 1949), reaffirming America’s
intent to stand by Iran, the joint United States and United Kingdom
statement of April 9, 1951, reiterating western concern for the wellbeing
and stability of Iran, and later statements of Secretary Acheson
and W. Averell Harriman, growing out of the oil situation, which
underlined America’s great interest in Iran’s continued independence
and territorial integrity. [Sec. of State Dean Acheson]
In brief, we feel that it would be inaccurate to state that we have
failed to convince the bulk of the politically conscious Iranian people that
we are interested in Iran as an independent nation; we sincerely believe
that the bulk of the articulate Iranians hold this conviction.
This is by no means to argue that we believe the people of Iran are
fully happy about their situation vis-à-vis the United States. Such
a contention would be unrealistic.
Iranians have looked westward and witnessed the outpouring of
funds with which the United States has bulwarked the military
and economic strength of her neighbors, Greece and Turkey, under
both the Truman doctrine’s military aid program and the ECA.
[Economic Cooperation Administration]
Iranian expressions of discontent with the apparent disparity between
America’s treatment of Turkey and her treatment of herself have been
bitter and continuing. Iranians have not looked below the surface
at the causes underlying the dissimilarity of American activity in the
two countries; they have simply weighed military aid to Turkey
against military aid to Iran; economic aid to Turkey against economic
aid to Iran and have charged us with (comparative) “disinterest in
Iran.” They continually voice resentment over the discrepancy.
Some of this resentment, perhaps much of it, is real. On the other
hand, much of the Iranian press and public complaint of “American
disinterest” can be credited to a hope of tipping the scales toward
more concrete American financial aid. It is to the interest of Iranians
to accentuate the negative.
Yet at the same time there is abundant evidence that Iranians have
a basic awareness of the sort—exemplified in the editorial quotations
above—of America’s continued interest in Iran “as an independent
nation.”
The welcome extended Mr. Harriman; the reception given various
United States official and unofficial missions—economic, military, and
other—over recent years, are a clear manifest of this awareness. The
essential Iranian attitude is demonstrated over and over again, through
such routine affairs as the universal welcome given an American
soccer team that visited Iran in March and April, 1951. The team
was greeted enthusiastically upon arrival in each city. There was
not one unpleasant incident throughout the trip. Crowds at all
games acted toward the Americans as toward their own teams. Our
Embassy in Iran summarized the visit as “characterized by the
greatest good feeling on all sides.”
Summarizing the above reply to question 11A, we do not feel that
there has been apparent failure to convince the bulk of the Iranian
people that we are interested in Iran as an independent nation; we
believe that both the Iranian masses, by and large, and the Iranian
leadership, have a basic, long-standing belief in America’s unselfish
interest in their nation. It is, however, true that Iranians have
expected more economic and military aid from the United States than
has been forthcoming, and this disappointment has led to the belief
that the United States has let Iran down. In large part this belief
stems from the disparity—fully justifiable but incomprehensible to
many Iranians—between the United States military and economic
programs in Turkey and Iran or Greece and Iran.
To combat this Iranian uncertainty as to the strength of American
interest, it is a primary objective of the Department’s information
program policy for Iran to keep straight the record of American support
for Iran’s security and independence and to drive home the truth
that Iran does not stand alone. Again, each recurring evidence of
America’s firmness in standing up to Soviet aggression, and of American
determination to prevent further Soviet encroachment on the
territory of free nations, is stressed. Simultaneously, materials to
demonstrate America’s ability—as well as her determination—to champion
the cause of the free world, are given priority treatment.
The over-all effectiveness of the Department’s program in bringing
these messages to the Iranian people has been limited, to a very real
extent, by the virtual nonexistence of an integrated Iran, knit together
by the network of roads, rail transport, telegraph facilities, and radio
which make possible sensitive, country-wide operations in more advanced
areas. In Iran it has been necessary to carry the program to the
people virtually “in person”; it has been impossible to rely on
central feeding of press and radio material or widespread distribution
of printed matter.
Under the President’s “Campaign of Truth” it has been possible to
go much further in this provincial coverage; thus we have today an
Iranian operation which includes the following country-wide activities:
1. Twenty-five mobile units carry information into the more remote
parts of the country, including provinces on the northern border.
2. USIE operations have been opened up both in Tabriz, Meshed,
Shiraz, and Isfahan. In the latter area the PAO monitors
the Voice of America, [Public Affairs Officer]
and issues a daily news bulletin in Persian, headed “The VOA Says—”.
3. Every possible use is made of collaborative activity with
Iranian Government agencies.
4. Direct distribution of news and other publications material has
been stepped up generally. For example, USIE in Teheran today
issues 7,000 daily bulletins in English, Russian, and Persian, and additionally
issues weekly bulletins in Persian on (1) agriculture,
(2) medicine, (3) science and industry, (4) United States editorial
opinion, and (5) a weekly bulletin treating, in rotation, “women’s
news,” the arts, and United States sports. Much of this material is
(11e) delivered directly to opinion-makers, by “newsboys.”
Question 11B: “What is the explanation for our apparent failure to convince
the bulk of the Iranian people that we are not to be included in the criticism which
they make of English imperialism?”
5. All media, including graphic display, are utilized in bringing to
public attention each renewed evidence of United States-Iranian
solidarity. For example, the visits of leading Iranians to the United
States are thoroughly covered in displays as well as by press, radio
and motion picture material.
The pool of good will toward America was well demonstrated in
June of 1951, it might be mentioned, in Isfahan. On June 7, Communist
Tudehs stormed into the new USIE center there, shouting
“Death! Books, books, we want bread!” The reading room, which
was filled to overflowing, remained completely quiet and in order.
Readers glanced up, then looked back to their books and continued
reading. After 2 weeks of Tudeh Party efforts to disrupt USIE
Isfahan by heckling, writing anti-American slogans on the outside
walls, and threatening violence to a USIE employee if USIE news
bulletins were distributed, the USIE center was being patronized by
more persons than before the start of the Tudeh campaign.
Here again, we must note a major degree of disagreement with the
basic premise of the question: that the bulk of the Iranian people
lump America and Great Britain together in their attitudes toward
western policy. There is a mass of evidence that the Iranian differentiates
between us.
The United States, through its information program, has been
called upon to reaffirm, strengthen, and bulwark Iranian belief in the
basic anti-imperialist nature of America and the basic independence
of American policy—while at the same time avoiding anything which
might bulwark Kremlin themes of western disunity.
We believe that there were many convincing evidences, during the
recent oil crisis, that the Iranian leadership and the Iranian masses
differentiate between the United States and Great Britain. The general
welcome given the Harriman mission, the fact that Americans
were largely untroubled by demonstrations aimed at English interests,
indicated that this awareness of United States individuality extends
down through Iranian masses. Press comment, as well as statements
of Iranian leaders, demonstrated this awareness at top level. The
following press extracts, portions of some of which were quoted
earlier, are indicative:
Bakhtar-E-Emroos (influential Government organ), July 15: [Bakhtar Emrouz]
“We welcome Mr. Harriman, because we feel sure he will be able to find a solution
to the most critical problem we are faced with. We hope Mr. Harriman
will not leave the path trodden by his forefathers, who knew how to get rid
of their British overlords.”
Kayhan (moderate daily) , July 18:
“One of the slogans of the demonstrators was “the expulsion of Harriman” Has Mr.
Harriman come to Iran to fight with us? Why should we ask his expulsion? He has
come to prevent a fight by friendly talks. He has come to solve our difficult problem
with our obstinate neighbor.”
Kayhan, July 28:
“We were glad when we heard President Truman was assigning one of his personal
advisers to Iran. We wanted a prominent and impartial American to come
and witness our plight from close quarters. Mediation has been practiced
in the world since time immemorial, and its meaning is quite clear. The
mediator is a person who is against hostility.”
Assr, July 18:
“Mr. Harriman represents a nation that is well acquainted with the evils of
foreign imperialism. We expect Mr. Harriman to do all he can to prove to the
English that further resistance on their part would only lead to a universal catastrophe.”
Tehran-E-Mosavvar (influential, moderate weekly), July 13:
“The people of Iran hope that the American [Mr. Harriman] will not be misled
by the old British imperialistic propaganda methods. Americans
should now convince the British that they should revise their policy toward
Iran and other weak nations.”
Dad (anti-Government), August 15:
“British diplomacy has been successful in taking advantage of American participations
in the recent oil talks. The Americans have remained popular in the
minds of Iranians, although the British have used the Americans against Iran.”
Kayhan (influential, conservative daily), September 27:
“The U.S. has always come to Iran’s aid in time of crisis but its efforts have been
sabotaged by British intrigue.”
Thus the Iranian press has constantly put forward the theme that
America is anti-imperialist, and has called upon the United States to
oppose “British imperialism.” It has been the problem of both our
policy and our information program to confirm this Iranian belief in
United States anti-imperialism, and this Iranian conviction that we
support Iran’s development toward fullest independence and at the
same time to avoid being “used” against Great Britain, and to avoid
lending credence to Kremlin themes of western disunity.
Kremlin efforts to identify the United States with Great Britain
in the oil dispute have unquestionably made some dent in public
opinion in Iran, but they have not to date been successful in undermining
the friendly attitude of the great bulk of Iranians toward the
United States. The situation is critical, however, and developments
in the oil situation are so unpredictable, that a major shift in opinion
can occur on short notice and with only slight provocation.
The deteriorating economic situation and the imminence of financial
bankruptcy has already had a negative effect on Iranian attitudes
toward the United States; increasing attempts may be made to club
the United States as the scapegoat for economic difficulties that result
from Iran’s own actions. Propaganda of the outlawed Tudeh Party,
now operating under only the thinnest disguise, has become blatantly
strident.
Nonetheless, as was fully demonstrated during the recent oil situation,
most Iranians do not couple the United States with England
in their criticism of British imperialism. When Iranians comment
that the United States is pro-British, they usually add the qualification
that Americans do not know or understand the British, and are
consequently being hoodwinked. Iranians, in fact, have traditionally
emphasized the differences between America and Britain, and have
not hesitated to attempt to use real or apparent conflicts of interest
between the United States and the United Kingdom for their own ends.
Recapitulating replies to both sections of question 11, we believe
that the bulk of the Iranian people remain convinced that America
is interested in Iran as an independent nation, and that Iranians, by
and large, do not include us when they recurringly denounce “British
imperialism.” We feel that we have, however, achieved only a
limited degree of success in convincing Iranians that our interest in,
and support of, their independence and stability is an “all out” interest
which will remain firm and effective regardless of international
developments.
We ascribe a part of this comparative failure to the natural difficulty
we encounter in trying to make the Iranians understand the
reasons for the apparent disparity between Iranian, Turkish, and
Greek military and economic aid programs.
The lack of integrated communications nets—press, telegraphic,
and radio—in Iran, and the consequent limited value of normal
information program media, has been another factor against us.
Finally, the Iranian is keenly aware of Iran’s 900-mile border
along Soviet Russia; of America’s many interests around the globe;
and of America’s remoteness from Iran. This awareness makes it
easy for him to be convinced that Iran is in an isolated, unprotected
position. Hence constant stress of every evidence of American firmness,
determination, and resolve is required to assure the Iranian that
he can count on our support of Iran’s security and integrity.
• [Transcribed and annotated by Arash Norouzi]
Click here for PDF of original document.
13 Questions:
1. What are the basic themes which serve as a guide to our psychological
warfare and to the Voice of America? Will you list these
themes according to the following categories:
a. Themes directed to the Russian people.
b. Themes directed to the Chinese people.
c. Themes directed to the people in the satellite countries.
d. Themes intended to influence the Soviet bureaucracy.
e. Themes intended to affect the Soviet Politbureau.
f. Themes intended to disaffect the Soviet Secret Police.
g. Themes intended to reach Communist Party members in
Russia and the satellite countries.
h. Themes intended to disaffect the armed forces in these countries.
i. Themes intended to influence the members of the Communist
Parties in Western Europe and countries outside of the
iron curtain.
j. Themes intended to inspire confidence and morale among the
people of Western Europe in nonsatellite countries generally.
2. What media are employed for this purpose ?
3. Have you published a handbook of facts and themes against
communism used by your employees as a guide in the field of psychological
warfare? If so, please attach copy.
4. What is being done to reach the ranks of (1) labor, (2) peasants,
(3) farmers in Communist countries and non-Communist countries
in order to explode the myth that the Communist movement and
Communist governments have at heart the interests of these groups?
5. What effort is being made to inform the Chinese and North
Korean peoples that they are being used as “cannon fodder” in the
interests of Soviet imperialism?
6. What effort is being made to inform colonial countries, especially
in the Far and Near East, that Soviet domination has nothing in
common with national independence and that only the democracies
can guarantee such independence?
7. What effort is being made to give the world the true facts
about our dealing with Communist infiltration and intrigue and to
warn other nations against similar dangers?
8. What is being done to insure that the peoples of the countries
receiving aid from the United States are aware of the sacrifices that the
American people are called upon to make in order to furnish such aid?
9. What is being done to popularize democratic ideas in a way
adapted to local cultures and traditions, since it is manifest that
presentation of these ideas in purely American terms may not be
effective in other countries?
10. What is the explanation for our apparent abject failure in convincing
India of our aims relative to Japan, Formosa, Nationalist
China, as reflected by India’s attitude toward us in Korea and as
regards the Japanese Peace Treaty?
11. What is the explanation for our apparent failure in Iran to
convince the bulk of the Iranian people that we are interested in them
as an independent nation and are not included in the criticism which
they make about English imperialism?
12. What is being done to lend every psychological assistance to the
peoples following the leadership of the Viet-Nam in Indochina?
13. What is the explanation for the growing feeling against the
United States among the peoples of the Philippines, and what is being
done to counteract the apparently effective Communist propaganda
in this area?
Related links:
Pres. Dwight D. Eisenhower on Iran: “We Are Not Imperialistic” (March 1953)
Military Situation In the Far East | U.S. Senate Hearings, May 1951
George McGhee on Iran Oil Crisis (Battle Report, NBC-TV 1951)
MOSSADEGH t-shirts — “If I sit silently, I have sinned”
