

**FOREIGN RELATIONS
OF THE
UNITED STATES**

**1955–1957
VOLUME XII**

**NEAR EAST
REGION; IRAN;
IRAQ**



**DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON**

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957

Volume XII

Near East Region; Iran; Iraq

United States Government Printing Office
Washington

U.S. Department of State
Office of the Historian
Bureau of Public Affairs

This ebook was generated on May 29, 2018.
Please visit the Office of the Historian [ebooks web page](#) to access updates.

About the Electronic Edition

The Office of the Historian at the U.S. Department of State has embarked on a program to release an ebook edition of the *Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS)* series, which was established in 1861. Far lighter and more portable than printed editions of *FRUS*, the ebook edition offers the full content of each volume and makes use of the full-text search and other reading features of most ebook devices and applications, including bookmarking and note-taking. Unlike the web-based edition of *FRUS*, the ebook edition, once downloaded, can be accessed even without internet connectivity.

In creating the *FRUS* ebook edition, we endeavored to maintain fidelity with the original printed edition. One challenge in this respect is representing original page numbers from printed editions in ebooks. For readers who need to cite material in this ebook, we recommend citing document numbers instead of page numbers, since document numbers are persistent, media-neutral identifiers. In older *FRUS* volumes (before the subseries covering the Johnson administration), where cross references use page numbers rather than document numbers, we append to each page number a bracketed list of the document numbers that correspond to it.

The Office of the Historian has worked to ensure that this ebook is error-free and works on a broad range of devices. Please email history_ebooks@state.gov with any feedback.

To learn about updates to this ebook, other ebooks, and the ebook initiative in general, visit our [ebooks homepage](#), and follow us on Twitter at [@HistoryAtState](#) and Tumblr at [HistoryAtState](#).

**Office of the Historian
Bureau of Public Affairs
U.S. Department of State
May 2018**

Contents

[Preface](#)

[List of Unpublished Sources](#)

[List of Abbreviations](#)

[List of Persons](#)

[General United States Military and Economic Policies Toward the Middle East](#)

[U.S. Interest in the Baghdad Pact, U.S. Response to the Egyptian-Syrian-Saudi Pact, NSC 5428 Series, Development of the Eisenhower Doctrine, and Regional Petroleum Policies](#) (Documents 1-285)

[Iran](#)

[Increased U.S. Military Aid to Iran and the Iranian Role in Middle East Defense, U.S. Economic Aid and Loans to Iran, Iran's Adherence to the Baghdad Pact, and Participation of American and Foreign Oil Companies in Iran's Oil Development](#) (Documents 286-416)

[Iraq](#)

[The Question of U.S. Military Assistance to Iraq, U.S. Interest in the Political Stability of Iraq, and the Visit to the United States of Crown Prince Abdul Il Ah](#) (Documents 417-464)

[Index](#)

Preface

The publication *Foreign Relations of the United States*, constitutes the official record of the foreign policy of the United States. The volumes in the series include, subject to necessary security considerations, all documents needed to give a comprehensive record of the major foreign policy decisions of the United States together with appropriate materials concerning the facts that contributed to the formulation of policies. Documents in the files of the Department of State are supplemented by papers from other government agencies involved in the formulation of foreign policy.

The basic documentary diplomatic record printed in the volumes of the series is edited by the Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State. The editing is guided by the principles of historical objectivity and in accordance with the following official guidance first promulgated by Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg on March 26, 1925:

There may be no alteration of the text, no deletions without indicating the place in the text where the deletion is made, and no omission of facts which were of major importance in reaching a decision. Nothing may be omitted for the purpose of concealing or glossing over what might be regarded by some as a defect of policy. However, certain omissions of documents are permissible for the following reasons:

- a. To avoid publication of matters that would tend to impede current diplomatic negotiations or other business.
- b. To condense the record and avoid repetition of needless details.
- c. To preserve the confidence reposed in the Department by individuals and by foreign governments.

d. To avoid giving needless offense to other nationalities or individuals.

e. To eliminate personal opinions presented in despatches and not acted upon by the Department. To this consideration there is one qualification: in connection with major decisions it is desirable, where possible, to show the alternative presented to the Department before the decision was made.

Principles of Selection for [Foreign Relations, 1955–1957, Volume XII](#)

This volume, originally compiled between 1977 and 1980, presents documentation illuminating the most important U.S. Government decisions and policies toward the Near East as a region and toward Iran and Iraq. The regional compilation focuses on major U.S. diplomatic, politico-military, and economic policies, particularly relating to possible U.S. involvement in the Baghdad Pact organization and the formulation and execution of the Eisenhower Doctrine. Separate bilateral compilations on Iran and Iraq detail general U.S. political and economic policies toward these two countries with a particular emphasis on their involvement in the Baghdad Pact and the question of extending U.S. military assistance. Additional documentation relating to these topics can be found in other volumes dealing with the Near East during this period ([Foreign Relations, 1955–1957, Volumes XIII through XVII](#)), in the compilation on U.S. national security policy in [Foreign Relations, 1955–1957, Volume XIX](#), and in the compilation on the stockpiling of strategic resources and on commodity agreements in [Foreign Relations, 1955–1957, Volume X](#).

In selecting the contents of this volume, the editors sought to include documents that provide insights into the foreign policy decision-making process of the U.S. Government, including the range of options considered and rationales for final decisions by the President. These include memoranda of discussions at National Security Council meetings, formal policy papers prepared for the National Security Council, National Intelligence Estimates and other important U.S. assessments of

developments within the region, memoranda defining policy options and recommendations prepared in the Department of State and to a lesser extent the Department of Defense, internal discussions within the U.S. Government concerning major policies, and conversations and communications with foreign leaders during which key U.S. policy questions were discussed. Given the importance that the United States attached to the position of the United Kingdom in the area, the editors made a special effort to document significant Anglo-American discussions on the region.

The editors selected documents that dealt with the formulation of policy rather than with the execution of policy decisions, although some coverage is given to policy guidelines sent abroad and reactions and information received from U.S. diplomatic missions. U.S. Government documentation on the Near East for this period is voluminous and the editors were able to include only a small amount of U.S. diplomatic reportage from the area, internal Department of State assessments, or details relating to policy execution including U.S. assistance programs. Records of only the most significant of numerous conversations between U.S. officials and foreign leaders and diplomats are presented here.

The editors based their selection on the documentary collections at the Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library and in the centralized and decentralized files of the Department of State. These sources were exhaustively researched. The editors also reviewed some records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff available at the National Archives and Records Administration in 1979, but they did not undertake an extensive search of Department of Defense files. A number of Department of Defense documents printed in this volume, found at the Eisenhower Library and in Department of State files, contain a detailed exposition of the Department of Defense position on several key issues.

For this volume, which was completed between 1977 and 1980, the editors have not attempted to document particular U.S. intelligence operations or any significant contribution that U.S. intelligence made to the formulation of foreign policy. The editors closely reviewed the intelligence documentation, including records originated by the Central Intelligence Agency, included in the Eisenhower Library. That research was accomplished with the full

cooperation and assistance of the CIA. It resulted in the inclusion in this volume of some key intelligence analyses that contributed to major political and diplomatic actions. The complete list of files consulted in the preparation of this volume is on pages XI–XVI [Pg. XI is part of [List of Unpublished Sources](#)].

Completion of the declassification of this volume and the final steps of its preparation for publication coincided with the development of procedures since early 1991 by the Central Intelligence Agency in cooperation with the Department of State that have expanded access by Department historians to high-level intelligence documents from among those records still in the custody of the Central Intelligence Agency. The editors chose not to postpone the publication of this volume to ascertain how such access might affect the scope of documentation available to them and the changes that might be made in the contents of this particular volume. The Department of State, however, is already making good use of these new procedures arranged by the CIA's History Staff. The editors intend to identify and publish in subsequent volumes of the *Foreign Relations* series, or in some other appropriate manner, significant declassified intelligence documentation obtained as a consequence of such broadened access.

The declassification review process for the documents originally selected for this volume, outlined in more detail below, resulted in withholding from publication approximately 7.5 percent of the original manuscript. Most of these pages concerned U.S. military contingency planning for the region. Information was also withheld relating to U.S. intelligence activities and references to nuclear weapons. The remaining documents printed here provide a full account of most of the major foreign policy issues confronting the United States in the region, but do not necessarily cover all significant details relating to these policies.

The editors wish to acknowledge the assistance of officials at the Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library, in particular David Haight; the National Archives and Records Administration; and other specialized repositories who assisted in the collection of documents for this volume.

Editorial Methodology

The documents are presented chronologically according to Washington time. Incoming telegrams from U.S. missions are placed according to time of receipt in the Department of State or other receiving agency, rather than the time of transmission; memoranda of conversation are placed according to the time and date of the conversation, rather than the date the memorandum was drafted.

Editorial treatment of the documents published in the *Foreign Relations* series follows Office style guidelines, supplemented by guidance from the Editor in Chief and the chief technical editor. The source text is reproduced as exactly as possible, including marginalia or other notations, which are described in the footnotes. Obvious typographical errors are corrected, but other mistakes and omissions in the source text are corrected by bracketed insertions: a correction is set in italic type; an omission in roman type. Bracketed insertions are also used to indicate text that has been omitted because it deals with an unrelated subject (in roman type) or because it remained classified after the declassification review process (in italic type). The amount of material not declassified has been noted by indicating the number of lines or pages of source text that were omitted. All ellipses and brackets that appear in the source text are so identified by footnotes.

The first footnote to each document indicates the document's source, original classification, distribution, and drafting information. The source footnote also provides the background of important documents and policies and indicates whether the President, his major policy advisers, or both read it. Every effort has been made to determine if a document has been previously published, and this information has been included in the source footnote. If two or more different accounts of a meeting or event of comparable value are available and one or more is already declassified and published, the editors chose to print the still unpublished one and obtain its declassification.

Editorial notes and additional annotation summarize pertinent material not printed in this volume, indicate the location of additional documentary sources, provide references to important related documents printed in other volumes, describe key events, and summarize and provide citations to public statements that supplement and elucidate the printed documents.

Information derived from memoirs and other first-hand accounts has been used when applicable to supplement the official record.

Declassification Review Procedures

Declassification review of the documents selected for publication was conducted by the Division of Historical Documents Review, Bureau of Diplomatic Security, Department of State. The review was made in accordance with the Freedom of Information Act, the Privacy Act, and the criteria established in Executive Order 12356 regarding:

- 1) military plans, weapons, or operations;
- 2) the vulnerabilities or capabilities of systems, installations, projects, or plans relating to the national security;
- 3) foreign government information;
- 4) intelligence activities (including special activities), or intelligence sources or methods;
- 5) foreign relations or foreign activities of the United States;
- 6) scientific, technological, or economic matters relating to national security;
- 7) U.S. Government programs for safeguarding nuclear materials or facilities;
- 8) cryptology; and
- 9) a confidential source.

Declassification decisions entailed concurrence of the appropriate geographic and functional bureaus in the Department of State, other concerned agencies of the U.S. Government, and appropriate foreign governments regarding documents of those governments. The principle guiding declassification review is to release as much information as is

consistent with contemporary requirements of national security and sound foreign relations.

Paul Claussen and Nina J. Noring edited the compilation on U.S. regional policy toward the Near East. Edward C. Keefer prepared the compilation on Iran and Will Klingaman that on Iraq. The volume was prepared under the supervision of former Editor in Chief John P. Glennon. Lynn Chase and Brett D. Bellamy prepared the lists of sources, abbreviations, and names. Althea W. Robinson and Rita M. Baker performed the technical editing. Barbara A. Bacon of the Publishing Services Division oversaw production of the volume. Do Mi Stauber prepared the index.

William Z. Slany
The Historian
Bureau of Public Affairs

October 1991

List of Unpublished Sources

Department of State

1.

Indexed Central Files. The main source of documentation for this volume and for other volumes on the Middle East in the 1955–1957 triennium of *Foreign Relations of the United States* was the Department of State's indexed central files. Documents in classes 200 (protection of interests), 400 (trade relations), 500 (cultural relations), 600 (international relations), 700 (internal political and national defense affairs), 800 (internal economic and social affairs), and 900 (communication, transportation, science) were searched for decimal combinations involving all countries in the Middle East (country numbers 74, 80, and 83–88) and for the Middle Eastern relationships of the United States (number 11), Western Europe (number 40), the United Kingdom (number 41), France (number 51), the Soviet Union (number 61), and Turkey (number 82).

Other files and related subfiles searched for Middle East-related materials include: 033 (official visits); 110.11–17 (Department of State senior officials files); 120.15 (special missions); 123 (Department of State personnel files); various files in class 300 (international organizations and conferences); and 601 (diplomatic representation). Other documents were located through pursuing cross-references and referenced telegrams.

More than 75 separate decimal designations from the Department of State Central Files are cited in this volume. Documentation on the major and some of the

minor themes covered in this volume are located in the following files:

033.8287: Announcement of Turkish-Iraqi Pact

110.11–DU: Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, correspondence, travel, conversations

120.1580: Richards Mission to the Middle East

611.80: General U.S. Middle East Policy

611.87: U.S. Relations with Iraq

611.88: U.S. Relations with Iran

661.80: Soviet Relations with the Middle East

680.00: General Middle East Political Relations

682.83, 683.87: Syrian Opposition to Baghdad Pact

682.87: Turkish-Iraqi Pact (Baghdad Pact)

684A.86: Arab-Israeli Dispute

688.00: General Iranian Political Relations

740.5: North Atlantic Treaty Organization Interest in Middle East

780.00: General Political Developments in the Middle East

780.5: Baghdad Pact and Middle East Defense Issues

780.5–MSP: Middle East Military Assistance

786.00: General Political Developments in the Arab World

787.00: General Political Developments in Iraq

787.5, 787.5–MSP, 787.5411, 787.5622: Military Issues and Military Assistance to Iraq

788.00: General Political Developments in Iran

788.5, 788.5–MSP: Military Issues and Assistance to Iran

880.00: General Economic Developments in the Middle East

880.2553: Middle Eastern Oil

887.2553: Oil in Iraq

888.2553: Oil in Iran

974.7301: Suez Canal

2. *Lot Files.* Documents from the central files have been supplemented by lot files of the Department, which are decentralized files created by operating areas. A list of the lotfiles used in or consulted for this volume follows:

Conference Files: Lot 59 D 95

Collection of documentation on official visits by ranking foreign officials, and on major international conferences attended by the Secretary of State, for the years 1949–1955, maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627

See entry under Washington National Records Center.

Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123

Collection of documentation on official visits by heads of government and foreign ministers to the United States and on major international conferences attended by the Secretary of state for the years 1955–1958, maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

Current Economic Developments: Lot 70 D 467

See entry under Washington National Records Center.

ICA Director's Files

See entry under Washington National Records Center.

ICA Message Files

See entry under Washington National Records Center.

INR Files: Lot 59 D 27

Miscellaneous files, including master file of minutes of the Intelligence Advisory Committee, for the years 1948–1954, as retired by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research.

INR–NIE Files

Files retained by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research.

L/UNA Files: Lot 62 D 205

Working files of the Assistant Legal Adviser for United Nations Affairs, 1945–1959.

NEA Files: Lot 57 D 616

Files of the Richards Mission to the Middle East, including general country and subject files, briefing books, and reports to the President and Congress, for the period November 1956–August 1957, maintained by the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs.

NEA Files: Lot 58 D 332

Files on Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Kuwait, Bahrain, Muscat, Qatar, Oman, and Aden for the years 1949–1956, maintained by the Office of Near Eastern Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs.

NEA Files: Lot 61 D 260

General subject files on Middle Eastern countries, including Saudi Arabia, Aden, Bahrain, Muscat, Qatar, Kuwait, and Yemen for the year 1959, maintained by the Office of Near Eastern Affairs of the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs.

NEA/GTI Files: Lot 58 D 338

Files on Iran for the years 1949–1955, maintained by the Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs of the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs.

NEA/GTI Files: Lot 59 D 3

Files on Iran for the year 1956, maintained by the Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs of the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs.

NEA/GTI Files: Lot 59 D 654

Files on Iran for the year 1956, maintained by the Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs of the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs.

NEA/GTI Files: Lot 60 D 533

Files on Iran for the years 1951–1958, maintained by the Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs of the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs.

OCB Files: Lot 61 D 385

Master set of the administrative and countryfiles of the Operations Coordinating Board for the years 1953–1960, maintained by the Operations Staff.

OCB Files: Lot 62 D 430

Master files of the Operations Coordinating Board for the years 1953–1960, maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

PPS Files: Lot 66 D 70

Subject files, country files, chronologicalfiles, documents, drafts, and related correspondence of the Policy Planning Staff for the year 1955.

PPS Files: Lot 66 D 487

Subject files, country files, chronological files, documents, drafts, and related correspondence of the Policy Planning Staff for the year 1956.

PPS Files: Lot 67 D 548

Subject files, country files, chronological files, documents, drafts, and related correspondence of the Policy Planning Staff for the years 1957–1961.

Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204

Exchanges of correspondence between the President and heads of foreign governments for the years 1953–1964, maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D199

Chronological collection of the Secretary of State's memoranda of conversation and the Under Secretary of State's memoranda of conversation for the years 1953–1960, maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

Secretary's Staff Meetings: Lot 63 D 75

Chronological collection of the minutes of the Secretary of State's Staff Meetings during the years

1952–1960, maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

S/P Files: Lot 66 D 487

See PPSFiles.

S/P–NSC Files: Lot 61 D 167

Serial file of memoranda relating to National Security Council questions for the years 1950–1961, maintained by the Policy Planning Staff.

S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1

Serial and subject master file of National Security Council documents and correspondence for the years 1948–1961, maintained by the Policy Planning Staff.

S/S–NEA Files: Lot 61 D 417

See State–JCS Meetings.

S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351

Serial master file of National Security Council documents and correspondence and related Department of State memoranda for the years 1947–1961, maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

S/S-NSC(Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95

Administrative and miscellaneous National Security Council documentation, including NSC Records of Action, for the years 1947–1963, maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

State–JCS Meetings: Lot 61 D 417

Top Secret records of meetings between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and representatives of the Department of State for the years 1951–1959 and selected problem files on the Middle East for the years 1954–1956, maintained by the Executive Secretariat.

Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas

Dulles Papers

Records of John Foster Dulles, 1952–1959, including General Memoranda of Conversation, Meetings with the President, General Telephone Conversations, and White House Telephone Conversations.

President's Daily Appointments Record

Records of Dwight D. Eisenhower as President, Daily Appointments, 1953–1961.

Staff Secretary Records

Records of the Office of the White House Staff Secretary, 1952–1961, including records of Paul T. Carroll, Andrew J. Goodpaster, L.

Arthur Minnich, Jr., and Christopher H. Russell.

White House Central Files

Records of Dwight D. Eisenhower as President of the United States, 1953–1961. Documents cited in this volume are from the Confidential File.

Whitman File

Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower as President of the United States, 1953–1961, maintained by his personal secretary, Ann C. Whitman. The Whitman File includes the following elements: the Name Series, the Dulles–Herter Series, Eisenhower (DDE) Diaries, Ann Whitman (ACW) Diaries, National Security Council Records, Miscellaneous Records, Cabinet Papers, Legislative Meetings, International Meetings, the Administration Series, and the International File.

National Archives and Records Administration

JCS Records

National Archives Record Group 218, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Princeton University Library, Princeton, New Jersey

Dulles Papers, Dulles Daily Appointment Book

Daily log of the meetings and appointments of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles for

the years 1953–1959. 23 Princeton University Library, Princeton, New Jersey

Dulles Papers, Dulles Daily Appointment Book

Daily log of the meetings and appointments of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles for the years 1953–1959.

Washington National Records Center

Conference Files: FRC 59–83–0066

Lot 62 D 181: Collection of documentation on official visits by heads of government and foreign ministers to the United States and on major international conferences attended by the Secretary of State for the years 1956–1958, maintained by the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State.

Current Economic Developments: FRC 72 A 6248

Lot 70 D 467: Master set of the Department of State classified internal publication *Current Economic Developments* for the years 1945–1969, maintained in the Bureau of Economic Affairs, Department of State.

ICA Director's Files: FRC 61 A 32

ICA Director's subject file containing correspondence, memoranda, reports, messages, and other material accumulated from 1955 through 1958.

ICA Message Files: FRC 58 A 403

Telegrams, airgrams, and eyes only cables to and from all field missions from July 1, 1956, to June 30, 1957, maintained in ICA headquarters in Washington.

Tehran Embassy Files: FRC 62 F 43

Classified and unclassified files for the years 1956–1958, maintained by the Embassy in Iran.

List of Abbreviations

A, airgram

AA, anti-aircraft

ACSP, Arab Collective Security Pact

ACW, Ann C. Whitman

AFSC, American Friends Service Committee

AL, Arab League; Arab Legion

ALCSP, Arab League Collective Security Pact

ALO, series indicator for military telegrams

Am Emb, American Embassy

AMS, Agricultural Marketing Services, Department of Agriculture

AP, Associated Press; Atlantic Pact

ARA, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State

ARAMCO, Arabian American Oil Company

ARMAIT, Army Attaché

ASRP, Arab Socialist Resurrectionist Party (Syria)

AWD, Allen W. Dulles

B/D, barrels of petroleum per day

BG, David Ben Gurion

BIS, Bank of International Settlements

BJSM, British Joint Services Mission; British Joint Staff Mission

BMEO, British Middle East Office

BNA, Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State

CA, circular airgram

CASU, Cooperative Association of Suez Canal Users

CCS, Combined Chiefs of Staff

CE, Council of Europe; Division of Central European Affairs, Department of State

CHMAAG, Chief, Military Assistance Advisory Group

CIA, Central Intelligence Agency

CINCARIB, Commander in Chief, Caribbean

CINCFE, Commander in Chief, Far East

CINCLANT, Commander in Chief, Atlantic

CINCNELM, Commander in Chief, U.S. Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean

CINCPAC, Commander in Chief, Pacific

CINCUSAFE, Commander in Chief, U.S. Air Force, Europe

CINCUSAREUR, Commander in Chief, U.S. Army, Europe

cirtel, circular telegram

comite, committee

ConGen, Consulate General

Contel, Consulate telegram

CRO, Commonwealth Relations Office

CSA, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army

CSAFM, Chief of Staff, Air Force Memorandum

CSS, Commodity Stabilization Service, Department of Agriculture

CVA, attack aircraft carrier

CVS, anti-submarine warfare aircraft carrier

CZ, Canal Zone

DA, Development Assistance

DCI, Director of Central Intelligence

DD, destroyer

DEFREPAMA, Defense Representative Army Attaché

del, delegation

Delga, series indicator for telegrams from the U.S. Delegation at the United Nations General Assembly

Dento, series indicator for telegrams sent from the Denver White House

Depcirgram, Department of State circular airgram

Depcirtel, Department of State circular telegram

Deptel, Department of State telegram

desp, despatch

DEW, Distant Early Warning

DirGen, Director General

DL, Demarcation Line

DRN, Division of Research for the Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Department of State

Dulte, series indicator for telegrams from Secretary of State Dulles while away from Washington

DZ, Demilitarized Zone

E, Bureau of Economic Affairs, Department of State

EARIS, Egyptian-American Rural Improvement Service

ECA, Economic Cooperation Administration

E-I, Egyptian-Israeli

EIMAC, Egyptian-Israeli Mixed Armistice Commission

Embdesp, Embassy despatch

Embtel, Embassy telegram

ES, Emergency Session of the United Nations General Assembly

ES-I, First Emergency Session of the United Nations General Assembly

ESS, Egyptian-Syrian-Saudi

ETW, Eden talks, Washington

EUR, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State

EX-IM; EXIM Bank, Export-Import Bank

FAF, French Air Force

FAO, Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations

FAS, Foreign Agricultural Service, Department of Agriculture

FBI, Federal Bureau of Investigation

FBIS, Foreign Broadcast Information Service

FE, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State

FinAtt, Financial Attaché

FLO, Foreign Liaison Office

FN, Division of Financial Affairs, Department of State

FOA, Foreign Operations Administration

FonMin, Foreign Minister/Ministry

FonOff, Foreign Office

FPSC, Foreign Petroleum Supply Committee

FSD, Division of Fuels, Department of State

FTC, Federal Trade Commission

FY, fiscal year

G, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of State

G-2, U.S. Army (or Marine) generalstaff section dealing with intelligence at the division level or higher

GA, United Nations General Assembly

GAA, General Armistice Agreement

Gadel, series indicator for telegrams to the U.S. Delegation at the United Nations General Assembly

GHQ, General Headquarters

GMT, Greenwich Mean Time

GOE, Government of Egypt

GOI, Government of Israel; Government of India

GOL, Government of Lebanon

GOS, Government of Syria

GSA, General Services Administration

H, Office of the Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations

HICOM, High Commission(er)

HJK, Hashemite Jordanian Kingdom

HJK-IMAC, Jordanian-Israeli Mixed Armistice Commission

HKJ, Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan

HMG, Her (His) Majesty's Government

HQ, Headquarters

IAC, Intelligence Advisory Committee

IBRD, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development

IC, Division of International Conferences, Department of State

ICA, International Cooperation Administration

ICAO, International Civil Aviation Organization

ICA/W, International Cooperation Administration, Washington

ICJ, International Court of Justice

IDAB, International Development Advisory Board

IDF, Israeli Defense Forces

IDF–FLO, Israeli Defense Forces-Foreign Liaison Office

I–E, Israeli-Egyptian

IEG, Imperial Ethiopian Government

IFC, International Finance Corporation

IG, Israeli Government

IMF, International Monetary Fund

INR, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State

IO, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State

IO/OES, Office of International Economic and Social Affairs, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State

IO/OIA, Office of International Administration, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State

IPC, Iraqi Petroleum Company

IRD, International Resources Division, Department of State

ISA, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

ISMAC, Israeli-Syrian Mixed Armistice Commission

JCS, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Jlem, Jerusalem

JSPC, Joint Strategic Plans Committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

JSSC, Joint Strategic Survey Committee

JVP, Jordan Valley Plan; Jordan Valley Proposal

K, kilometer

kw, kilowatt

L, Office of the Legal Adviser, Department of State

L/E, Office of the Assistant Legal Adviser for Economic Affairs, Department of State

L/NEA, Office of the Assistant Legal Adviser for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, Department of State

LE, Egyptian pounds

MA, Military Attaché

MAAC, Mutual Assistance Advisory Committee

MAAG, Military Assistance Advisory Group

MAC, Mixed Armistice Commission

MAAG, Military Assistance Advisory Group

MATS, Military Air Transport Service

MC, memorandum of conversation; Office of Munitions Control,
Department of State

MCM, milliard cubic meters

MDA, Mutual Defense Assistance

MDAP, Mutual Defense Assistance Program

ME, Middle East

MEEC, Middle East Emergency Committee

MEPPG, Middle East Policy Planning Group

Min Def, Minister of Defense

MSA, Mutual Security Act; Mutual Security Agency; Mutual
Security Assistance

MSP, Mutual Security Program

MSTS, Military Sea Transport Service

mytel, my telegram

NAC, North Atlantic Council; National Advisory Council on
International Monetary and Financial Problems

NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NE, Near East; Office of Near Eastern Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, Department of State

NEA, Near East and Africa; Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, Department of State

NEACC, Near East Arms Coordinating Committee

Niact, Night Action, immediately reply

NIE, National Intelligence Estimate

Noform, no foreign distribution

NSC, National Security Council

NZ, New Zealand

O, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration

OCB, Operations Coordinating Board

ODM, Office of Defense Mobilization

OEEC, Organization for European Economic Cooperation

OFD, Office of Financial and Development Policy, Bureau of Economic Affairs, Department of State

ORM, Office of Refugee and Migration Affairs, Department of State

OSD, Office of the Secretary of Defense

OSP, offshore procurement

PAO, Public Affairs officer

PCC, Palestine Conciliation Commission

P.L., Public Law

PLG, Paris Liaison Group

PM, Prime Minister

POL, petroleum, oil, and lubricants

Polto, series indicator for telegrams from the United States Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council to the Department of State

PPS, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State; *Parti Populaire Syrien*, Syrian National Party

Pri Min, Prime Minister

R, Office of the Special Assistant for Intelligence, Department of State

RA, Office of European Regional Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State

RAF, Royal Air Force

RCC, Revolutionary Command Council of Egypt

RCT, Regimental Combat Team

reftel, reference telegram

Res, Resolution

RG, Record Group

RGT, Army Regimental Combat Team

RLG, Rome Liaison Group

RMA, reimbursable military assistance

S, Office of the Secretary of State

S/P, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State

S/PV, Security Council/Procès Verbaux

S/S, Executive Secretariat, Department of State

S/S-RO, Reports and Operations Staff, Executive Secretariat,
Department of State

SA, Saudi Arabia

SAC, Strategic Air Command

SAG, Saudi Arabian Government

SC, United Nations Security Council

SCUA, Suez Canal Users Association

SEA, Southeast Asia

SEATO, Southeast Asia Treaty Organization

Secto, series indicator for telegrams from the Secretary of State or
the Secretary's delegation at Foreign Ministers meetings

SFIO, *Société Française de l'Internationale Ouvrière*

SNIE, Special National Intelligence Estimate

Socony, Standard Oil Company of New York

SPC, Special Political Committee of the U.N. General Assembly

SY, Division of Security, Department of State

SYG, Secretary-General

T/O & E, Table of Organization and Equipment

TAPLINE, Trans-Arabian Pipeline

TC, Truce Commission in Palestine; United Nations Trusteeship Council

Tedul, series indicator for telegrams to Secretary of State Dulles while away from Washington

TIAS, Treaties and Other International Agreements

Toden, series indicator for telegrams sent to the Denver White House

Tosec, series indicator for telegrams from the Department of State to the Secretary of State (or the his delegation) in connection with international conferences

TSO, United Nations Truce Supervisory Organization

TVA, Tennessee Valley Authority

TWA, Trans World Airlines

U, Office of the Under Secretary of State

U/MSA, Office of the Special Assistant for Mutual Security Affairs, Department of State

UK, United Kingdom

UKG, United Kingdom Government

UN, United Nations

UNA, Office of United Nations Affairs, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State

UNGA, United Nations General Assembly

UNMIS, United Nations Mission

UNP, Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State

UNRRA, United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration

UNRWA, United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees

UNSC, United Nations Security Council

UNSCOP, United Nations Special Committee on Palestine

UNSYG, Secretary-General of the United Nations

UNTS, United Nations Truce Supervisor; *United Nations Treaty Series*

UNTSO, United Nations Truce Supervisory Organization

UP, United Press

urtel, your telegram

USA, United States Army

USAF, United States Air Force

USAREUR, United States Army, Europe

USARMA, United States Army Attaché

USCINCEUR, United States Commander in Chief, Europe

USDel, United States Delegation

USG, United States Government

USGADel, United States Delegation at the United Nations General Assembly

USIA, United States Information Agency

USIS, United States Information Service

USLO, United States Liaison Office/Officer

USMC, United States Marine Corps

USOM, United States Operations Mission

USRO, United States Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations

USSR, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

UST, *United States Treaties*

USUN, United States Mission at the United Nations

WE, Western Europe; Office of Western European Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State

WFTU (WFTCU), World Federation of Trade Unions

List of Persons

Editor's Note: The identification of persons in this list is limited to circumstances and positions relevant to the events documented in this volume. All titles and positions are American unless otherwise indicated.

In this and in other editorial material throughout the volume, every effort has been made to provide recognizable and consistent transliterations of names of individuals from countries using non-Roman alphabets. The transliterations adopted for proper names were those commonly used by the Department of State at the time, or in documents or official publications of the countries concerned.

Abdul Ilah, Crown Prince of Iraq

Abdullah, King, late King of Jordan, assassinated July 20, 1951

Abu al-Huda, Tawfiq, Jordanian Prime Minister until May 30, 1955

Ala, Hosein (Hussein), Iranian Minister of the Court until April 8, 1955; Prime Minister, April 8, 1955–April 4, 1957

Alam, Asadullah, Iranian Minister of the Interior, April 8, 1955–April 4, 1957

Aldrich, Winthrop W., Ambassador to the United Kingdom until February 1, 1957

Ali, Mohammed, Pakistani Prime Minister and Foreign Minister until August 12, 1955; thereafter Head of the Pakistani Delegation at the United Nations, Ambassador to the United States and Mexico; also Minister to Cuba from November 8, 1955

Allen, Francis O., Officer in Charge of Syria–Lebanon Affairs, Office of Near Eastern Affairs, Department of State, until September 11, 1955

Allen, George V., Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, January 24, 1955–July 26, 1956; Ambassador to Greece, October 12, 1956–November 13, 1957; Director of the United States Information Agency from November 15, 1957

Alphand, Hervé, Representative of France at the United Nations until August 24, 1956; Ambassador to the United States from September 10, 1956

Amini, Ali, Iranian Ambassador to the United States from January 24, 1956

Anderson, Dillon, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, April 2, 1955–September 1, 1956; White House Consultant from June 29, 1957

Anderson, Robert B., Deputy Secretary of Defense until August 4, 1955; Special Emissary for the President to the Middle East, January–March 1956, and again in August 1956; Secretary of the Treasury from July 29, 1957

Ardalan, Ail Qoli, Iranian Foreign Minister from December 27, 1955

Arif, General Rafiq, Chief of Staff of the Iraqi Armed Forces

Armour, Norman, Sr., Consultant to the Senate Special Committee Studying the Mutual Security Program (part of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee) from October 1956

Armstrong, William P., Special Assistant for Intelligence, Department of State, until June 16, 1957

Armstrong, Willis C., Deputy Director, Office of International Trade and Resources, Department of State, January 15, 1955–June 1, 1957; Director, Office of International Resources, June 1–

August 6, 1957; thereafter Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs

al-Asali, Sabri, Syrian Prime Minister, February 13–September 13, 1955, and again from June 14, 1956; Minister of the Interior, February 13–September 13, 1955, and again from January 2, 1957

al-Atasi, Fayid, Syrian Foreign Minister until February 13, 1955

Austin, Vice Admiral Bernard L., USN, Director of the Joint Staff Office, Joint Chiefs of Staff, from March 15, 1956

Ayub Khan, General Mohammed, Commander in Chief of the Pakistani Army, Minister of Defense until August 12, 1955

al-Azm, Khalid Pasha, Syrian Foreign Minister, February 13–September 13, 1955

Azzam Pasha, Abdel (Abdul) Rahman, Saudi Arabian Ambassador to the League of Arab States, also Secretary General, until 1953

al-Badr ben Ahmad, Crown Prince Muhammed, Crown Prince of Yemen and Foreign Minister from August 31, 1955

Bailey, Ronald W., First Secretary of the British Embassy in the United States until October 25, 1957

Bakhtiar, General Taymur, Iranian Military Governor of Tehran until April 1957

Barbour, Walworth, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs until November 20, 1955; Deputy Chief of Mission in the United Kingdom, November 20, 1955–February 23, 1956; thereafter Minister-Counselor

Barnes, Robert G., Deputy Director of the Executive Secretariat, Department of State, June 12–August 1, 1955; Director, August 1,

1955–March 11, 1956; thereafter Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State for Mutual Security Affairs

Bashayan, Burhan al-Din, Iraqi Foreign Minister, May 8, 1955–June 20, 1957, and again from December 15, 1957

Baxter, William O., Director, Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs, Department of State, until August 26, 1956; thereafter Counselor of the Embassy in Israel

Bayar, Celal, President of Turkey

Beale, W.T.M., Jr., Officer in Charge of United Kingdom and Ireland Affairs, Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs, Department of State, until July 3, 1955; Deputy Director, July 3, 1955–September 30, 1957; thereafter Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs

Becker, Loftus E., Legal Adviser of the Department of State from June 13, 1957

Beckner, Earl R., Assistant Chief of the Petroleum Staff, Department of State, until January 29, 1956; Associate Chief of the Fuels Division, January 29–May 20, 1956; thereafter Chief

Beeley, Harold, Counselor of the British Embassy in the United States until May 19, 1955; Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, May 19, 1955–June 1956; thereafter Assistant Under Secretary of State, British Foreign Office

Ben Gurion, David, Israeli Minister of Defense from February 17, 1955; also Prime Minister from November 3, 1955

Ben Halim, *see* Halim Sayyid Mustafa Ben

Bennett, W. Tapley, Special Assistant to the Deputy Under Secretary of State, August 9, 1955–September 8, 1957

Bennsky, George M., Jr., Department of the Treasury Representative in the Middle East until August 12, 1956; thereafter Office of Near Eastern Affairs, Department of State

Bergus, Donald C., Officer in Charge of Israel–Jordan Affairs, Office of Near Eastern Affairs, Department of State

Bernau, Phyllis D., Personal Assistant to Secretary of State Dulles

Berry, J. Lampton, Special Assistant to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration, October 21, 1955–August 30, 1956; thereafter Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs

Birgi, Nuri (Nuri-Birgi, M.), Secretary General of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs until June 1957; Ambassador to the United Kingdom from June 1957

Bishop, Frederick A., Principal Private Secretary to British Prime Minister Eden from 1956

Bitar, Salah al-Din, Syrian Minister of Foreign Affairs from June 14, 1956

Black, Eugene R., President of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development

Bliss, Don C., Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, Department of State, February 13, 1955–June 22, 1957; thereafter Ambassador to Ethiopia

Boggs, Marion W., Coordinator, National Security Council Board of Assistants until 1957; Director of the National Security Council Secretariat from 1957

Bohlen, Charles E., Ambassador to the Soviet Union until April 18, 1957; Ambassador to the Philippines from June 4, 1957

Boone, Admiral Walter F., USN, Commander in Chief, United States Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean, after May 1, 1956

Bourguiba, Habib, Tunisian Prime Minister from April 14, 1956; President from July 1957

Bowie, Robert R., Director, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State, until October 18, 1957; Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning, August 10, 1955–October 18, 1957; Department of State member of the National Security Council Planning Board, August 28, 1955–October 18, 1957

Brand, Vincent, Member of the Board of Directors, Export-Import Bank

Brook, Sir Norman, Secretary to the British Cabinet; Joint Secretary of the Treasury and Head of the Home Civil Service from 1956

Brosio, Manlio, Italian Ambassador to the United States from February 3, 1955

Bulganin, Nikolai A., Soviet Minister of Defense until February 1955; Chairman, Council of Ministers, Presidium Member of the Soviet Communist Party, and Head of Government

Burdett, William C., Officer in Charge of Egypt and Anglo-Egyptian Sudan Affairs, Office of Near Eastern Affairs, Department of State, until October 9, 1955; Deputy Director, Office of Near Eastern Affairs, October 9, 1955–October 7, 1956; Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, October 7, 1956–August 11, 1957; Acting Deputy Director, Office of Near Eastern Affairs, August 11–November 3, 1957

Burke, Admiral Arleigh A., USN, Chief of Naval Operations and member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, after August 1955

Burns, Robert L., Reports and Operations Staff, Executive Secretariat, Department of State, from April 11, 1955

Byroade, Henry A., Ambassador to Egypt, March 10, 1955–September 10, 1956; Ambassador to the Union of South Africa from October 9, 1956

Cabell, Lieutenant General Charles P., USAF, Deputy Director of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency

Caccia, Sir Harold, British Ambassador to the United States from November 9, 1956

Carney, Admiral Robert B., USN, Chief of Naval Operations and member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff until August 17, 1955

Cassady, Admiral John H., USN, Commander in Chief, United States Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean, until May 1, 1956

Cassilly, Thomas A., Second Secretary-Consul of the Embassy in Iran, August 11, 1956–April 21, 1957; thereafter Reports and Operations Staff, Executive Secretariat, Department of State

Chamoun, Camille, President of Lebanon

Chapin, Selden, Ambassador to Panama until May 29, 1955; Ambassador to Iran from July 19, 1955

Clock, Philip, First Secretary-Consul of the Embassy in Iran, July 25, 1955–August 25, 1957

Cook, General Orval R., USAF, Deputy Commander in Chief of the United States European Command

Corbett, Jack C., Director, Office of Financial and Development Policy, Department of State

Cottman, James S., Jr., Reports and Operations Staff, Executive Secretariat, Department of State, until autumn 1956; Special Assistant to the Counselor of the Department of State, autumn 1956–October 1957

Coulson, Sir John E., Minister of the British Embassy in the United States from October 27, 1955

Crowl, R. Bernard, Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs, Department of State, until December 30, 1955; thereafter First Secretary-Consul of the Embassy in Iran

Cumming, Hugh S., Jr., Ambassador to Indonesia until March 3, 1957; Special Assistant for Intelligence, Department of State, May 5–October 10, 1957; thereafter Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research

Cutler, Robert, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Chairman of the National Security Council Planning Board, and member of the Operations Coordinating Board and the Council on Foreign Economic Policy until 1955 and again from 1957

Dabney, Major General John A., USA, Director, Military Assistance Division, Headquarters of the U.S. European Command, until June 1957

al-Daftari, Ali Mumtaz, Iraqi Director General of Communications and Works until June 20, 1957; Minister of Finance and Acting Foreign Minister, June 20–December 15, 1957

Daghestani, Major General Ghazi, Deputy Chief of Staff of the Iraqi Army for Operations and Intelligence

Davis, Vice Admiral Arthur C., USN, Director, Office of Foreign Military Affairs, Office of the Assistant Secretary of

Defense for International Security Affairs, April 1–October 1, 1955

Dean, Sir Patrick Henry, Assistant Under Secretary of State, British Foreign Office, until August 29, 1956; thereafter Deputy Under Secretary of State

Dickson, Air Marshal Sir William, Marshal of the Royal Air Force and Chairman of the British Chiefs of Staff Committee from October 25, 1955

Dillon, C. Douglas, Ambassador to France until January 28, 1957; Deputy Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs from March 15, 1957

Dixon, Ben F., Acting Politico-Military Adviser, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, Department of State, until August 26, 1956

Dorman, John, Deputy Director, Office of Near Eastern Affairs, Department of State, after August 28, 1957

Duke, Sir Charles Beresford, British Ambassador to Jordan

Dulles, Allen W., Director of Central Intelligence

Dulles, John Foster, Secretary of State

Eakens, Robert H.S., Chief of the Fuels Division, Department of State, January 15, 1955–April 8, 1956

Eban, Abba, Israeli Ambassador to the United States and Permanent Representative at the United Nations

Ebtehaj, Abol Hasan (Abolhassan), Managing Director of the Iranian Plan Organization

Eddleman, Lieutenant General Clyde D., USA, Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans, October 10, 1955–January 3, 1956; thereafter

Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations, Army Staff

Eden, Sir Anthony, British Foreign Secretary and Deputy Prime Minister until April 6, 1955; Prime Minister and First Lord of the Treasury, April 6, 1955–January 10, 1957

Eilts, Hermann F., Second Secretary-Consul of the Embassy in Iraq until January 27, 1957; Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, Department of State, January 27–November 3, 1957; thereafter Officer in Charge of Baghdad Pact and Southeast Asia Treaty Organization Affairs

Eisenhower, Dwight D., President of the United States

Elbrick, C. Burke, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs until February 14, 1957; thereafter Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs

Entezam, Abdullah, Iranian Foreign Minister until December 27, 1955; Deputy Prime Minister and Minister without Portfolio, December 27, 1955–April 4, 1957

Eqbal, Dr. Manoutchehr, Iranian Minister of Court, April 8, 1955–April 4, 1957; thereafter Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior

Esenbel, Melih, Assistant Secretary General for Economic Affairs, Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, until 1956; First Assistant Secretary General, 1956; Secretary General from 1956

Faisal ibn al-Aziz ibn Abd al-Rahmanal-Faisal al Saud, Saudi Arabian Foreign Minister

Faisal II, King of Iraq

Fawzi, Mahmoud, Egyptian Minister of Foreign Affairs; Chairman of the Egyptian Delegation at the United Nations and Representative at the General Assembly

Felt, Admiral Harry D., Vice Chief of Naval Operations after August 1956

Finn, Richard B., Special Assistant to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs after February 26, 1956

Fitz Gerald, Dennis A., Deputy Director for Operations, International Cooperation Administration

Flemming, Arthur S., Director, Office of Defense Mobilization, until February 1957

Frechtling, Louis E., Office of the Special Assistant for Mutual Security Affairs, Department of State

Fritzlan, A. David, Officer in Charge of Arabian Peninsula and Iraqi Affairs, Office of Near Eastern Affairs, Department of State, until August 14, 1955; Counselor of the Embassy in Iraq after July 1, 1956

Fulbright, J. William, Democratic Senator from Arkansas, member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee

Gallman, Waldemar J., Ambassador to Iraq

Gardener, Sir Alfred John, British Ambassador to Syria until March 31, 1957

Garran, Isham Peter, Commercial Minister of the British Embassy in the United States from January 7, 1955

George, Walter F., Democratic Senator from Georgia until January 3, 1957; Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, until January 3, 1957; Special Ambassador to NATO, January 3 until his death on August 4, 1957

Geren, Paul F., Counselor of the Embassy in Jordan until November 14, 1955; Officer in Charge of Egypt and Anglo-

Egyptian Sudan Affairs, Office of Near Eastern Affairs, Department of State, November 15, 1955–summer 1956

Gleason, S. Everett, Deputy Executive Secretary of the National Security Council

Glubb, Lieutenant General Sir John Bagot, British Chief of the General Staff of the Arab Legion in Jordan until March 2, 1956

Goodpaster, Brigadier General Andrew J., USA, Staff Secretary and Defense Liaison Officer to the President

Gordon, Robert L., Assistant Attaché of the Embassy in Iraq, March 10, 1955–December 1, 1956; thereafter Vice Consul at Kuwait

Gordon, Thomas S., Democratic Representative from Illinois, member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee until 1957, Chairman from 1957

Gork, Haydar, Turkish Ambassador to the United States, June 21, 1955–September 7, 1957

Gray, Gordon, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, July 14, 1955–February 27, 1957; Director, Office of Defense Mobilization, from March 14, 1957

Green, Theodore F., Democratic Senator from Rhode Island, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee from January 3, 1957

Greene, Joseph N., Jr., Director of the Executive Secretariat, Department of State, September 9, 1956–October 21, 1957; thereafter Special Assistant to the Secretary of State

Gregory, Clark S., Director, Foreign Operations Administration Mission in Jordan until March 27, 1955; thereafter Director, United States Operations Mission in Iran

Gromyko, Andrei A., Soviet First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs until February 14, 1957; thereafter Foreign Minister

Gruenther, General Alfred M., USA, Supreme Allied Commander, NATO until November 1956

Hagerty, James C., Press Secretary to the President

Halim, Sayyid Mustafa Ben, Libyan Prime Minister until May 26, 1957

Hammar-skjöld, Dag, Secretary-General of the United Nations

Hannah, Norman B., Second Secretary-Consul of the Embassy in Iran until May 15, 1955; Officer in Charge of Iranian Affairs, Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs, Department of State, May 15, 1955–March 10, 1957; thereafter Special Assistant to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration

Hannah, Colonel Thomas R., USA, Chief of the Military Assistance Advisory Group in Iraq until August 1957

Harding, Field Marshal Sir John, Chief of the Imperial General Staff of the British Army until 1955

Hardy, Porter, Jr., Democratic Representative from Virginia, Head of the House Subcommittee on International Operations

Hare, Raymond A., Ambassador to Egypt from September 25, 1956

Harlow, Bryce N., Administrative Assistant to the President

Hart, Parker T., Director, Office of Near Eastern Affairs, Department of State, until June 30, 1955; thereafter Counselor of the Embassy in Egypt

Hawrani, Akram, President of the Syrian Chamber of Deputies from October 1957

Heath, Donald B., Ambassador to Lebanon from March 9, 1955

Henderson, Loy W., Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration from January 26, 1955

Hensel, H. Struve, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs until June 30, 1955

Herter, Christian A., Consultant to the Secretary of State, January 14–February 21, 1957; thereafter Under Secretary of State

Hildreth, Horace A., Ambassador to Pakistan until May 1, 1957

Hollister, John B., Consultant to the Secretary of State, May 2–July 1, 1955; Director of the International Cooperation Administration, July 1, 1955–September 15, 1957

Holman, Eugene, Director, Chairman of the Board, and Chief Executive Officer of the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey

Home, Lord, British Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations after April 1955

Hood, Viscount Samuel, Minister of the British Embassy in the United States after September 1957

Hooper, Robin William John, Counselor of the British Embassy in Iraq until January 1957

Hoover, Herbert, Jr., Under Secretary of State until February 21, 1957

Howe, Fisher, Deputy Special Assistant for Intelligence, Department of State, until March 12, 1956; thereafter Director of the Executive Secretariat

Hoyer Millar, Sir Frederick R., British Permanent Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs after February 4, 1957

Humphrey, George M., Secretary of the Treasury

Hussein, Ahmad, Egyptian Ambassador to the United States

Hussein, King of Jordan

Jamali, Muhammed Fadil, former Iraqi Prime Minister and Foreign Minister

Jawdat, al-Ayyubi, Iraqi Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, June 20–December 15, 1957

Jennings, Brewster, Chairman of the Socony-Vacuum Oil Company

Jernegan, John D., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs until October 9, 1955

Johnson, Lyndon B., Democratic Senator from Texas, Senate Majority Leader from January 3, 1955

Johnston, Eric, Chairman of the International Development Advisory Board, Foreign Operations Administration(International Cooperation Administration from 1956)

Jones, G. Lewis, Jr., Counselor of the Embassy in Egypt until June 27, 1955; Counselor of the Embassy in Iran, June 27–November 9, 1955; Minister-Counselor, November 9, 1955–July 27, 1956; Ambassador to Tunisia from October 4, 1956

Jones, John Wesley, Director, Office of Western European Affairs, Department of State, until February 14, 1957; thereafter Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs

Jones, Owen T., Counselor of the Embassy in Turkey until August 31, 1956; thereafter Director, Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs, Department of State

Kalijarvi, Thorsten V., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs until March 14, 1957; Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, March 15–September 26, 1957; Ambassador to El Salvador from December 16, 1957

Karamanlis, Constantine, Greek Prime Minister from October 1955; also Minister of Defense, October 1955–February 1956

Kelley, Thomas R., Washington Representative of the Socony-Vacuum Oil Company, February 9–October 20, 1955; thereafter Assistant to the Chairman of the Board, Socony-Vacuum Oil Company

Kennedy, Donald D., Deputy Assistant Secretary for Economic and Regional Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, Department of State, after November 12, 1957

Kerr, Peyton, Counselor of the Embassy in Iran, September 11, 1955–August 11, 1957

al-Khalidi, Awni, Representative of Iraq at the United Nations until December 1955; thereafter Secretary General of the Baghdad Pact Organization

Khalil, Hashim, Counselor of the Iraqi Embassy in the United States

Khrushchev, Nikita S., Secretary General of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party

al-Khuri (Khouri), Faris, Syrian Prime Minister until February 13, 1955; member of the International Law Commission of the United Nations

Kirk, Roger, Reports and Operations Staff, Executive Secretariat, Department of State, until May 5, 1957

Kitchen, Jeffrey C., Deputy Director, Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs, Department of State, until July 1956

Knowland, William F., Republican Senator from California, Senate Minority Leader, and member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee

Kohler, Foy D., Counselor of the Embassy in Turkey until November 9, 1955–October 7, 1956; thereafter detailed to the International Cooperation Administration

Koprulu, Mehmet Fuat, Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs until April 15, 1955; Minister of State, April 15–December 9, 1955; Minister of Foreign Affairs, December 9, 1955–June 20, 1956

Langley, James, Ambassador to Pakistan from July 27, 1957

Laskey, Denis S., Head of the Economic Relations Department, British Foreign Office, from May 9, 1955; Counselor of the Foreign Office; Private Secretary to Foreign Secretary Lloyd from 1956

Lathram, L. Wade, Politico-Economic Adviser, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, Department of State, July 31, 1955–October 6, 1957; thereafter Director, Office of Near Eastern and South Asian and Regional Affairs

Lavrentyev, Anatoliy I., Soviet Ambassador to Iran until 1956

Lawson, Edward B., Ambassador to Israel

Lay, James S., Jr., Executive Secretary of the National Security Council

Leary, Colonel Byron V., USA, Deputy Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervisory Organization until November 1956; thereafter Acting Chief of Staff

Leonhart, William, member of the Policy Planning Staff, Department of State, from January 17, 1955; Department of State Assistant, National Security Council Planning Board, from October 1, 1956; Department of State Representative from February 20, 1957

Lloyd, Selwyn, British Minister of Supply until April 1955; Minister of Defense, April–December 1955; Foreign Secretary from December 12, 1955

Luce, Clare Boothe, Ambassador to Italy until December 27, 1956

Lucet, Charles E., Minister-Counselor of the French Embassy in the United States from June 1955

MacArthur, Douglas, II, Counselor of the Department of State until November 24, 1956; Ambassador to Japan from February 25, 1957

Macmillan, Harold S., British Minister of Defense until April 6, 1955; Foreign Secretary, April 6–December 20, 1955; Chancellor of the Exchequer, December 20, 1955–January 10, 1957; thereafter Prime Minister and First Lord of the Treasury

Macomber, William B., Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State, January 10–November 16, 1955; Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, November 16, 1955–August 15, 1957; thereafter Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations

Mahdi, Saleh, Counselor of the Iraqi Embassy in the United States from November 1956

al-Majali, Haza, Jordanian Prime Minister, December 15–20, 1955

Makins, Sir Roger M., British Ambassador to the United States until November 15, 1956

Malik, Dr. Charles, Lebanese Ambassador to the United States until October 1955; Representative at the United Nations, 1956–1957; Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister of Education from November 19, 1956

Mallory, Lester D., Ambassador to Jordan

Mann, Thomas C., Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs from September 30, 1957

Mansfield, Mike, Democratic Senator from Montana, Member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senate Majority Whip from January 3, 1957

Martin, Joseph W., Jr., Republican Representative from Massachusetts; House Minority Leader

Mathews, Elbert G., member of the Policy Planning Staff, Department of State, March 13, 1955–November 13, 1957; thereafter Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning

Matlock, Clifford C., Special Assistant to the Ambassador in Iran until May 5, 1957; First Secretary and Consul of the Embassy in Iran, March 28, 1955–May 5, 1957; thereafter Officer in Charge of Economic Affairs, Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, Department of State

Mc Cardle, Carl W., Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs until March 1, 1957

McCaul, Lieutenant General Verne J., USMC, Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps from 1957

Mc Clanahan, Grant V., Consul at Dhahran until June 15, 1957; thereafter First Secretary of the Embassy in the United Kingdom

Mc Cormack, John W., Democratic Representative from Massachusetts, House Majority Leader

Meir, Golda, Israeli Minister of Labor until June 1956; Foreign Minister from June 18, 1956

Memminger, Robert B., Special Assistant for Baghdad Pact Affairs, July 1, 1956–April 21, 1957; thereafter Counselor of the Embassy in Iraq

Menderes, Adnan, Turkish Prime Minister

Merchant, Livingston T., Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs until May 7, 1956; Ambassador to Canada from May 23, 1956

Metzger, Stanley D., Assistant Legal Adviser for Economic Affairs, Department of State

Minnich, L. Arthur, Assistant Staff Secretary to the President

Mirza, Major General Iskander, Governor General of Pakistan, August 7, 1955–March 23, 1956; thereafter President of Pakistan

Mollet, Guy, French Prime Minister, January 31, 1956–June 11, 1957

Molotov, Vyacheslav M., Soviet Foreign Minister until June 1, 1956; Chairman of the Soviet Delegation at the United Nations and Representative at the General Assembly, 1955

Monckton of Benchley, Viscount (Walter T. Monckton), British Minister of Defense, December 1955–October 1956

Moose, James S., Jr., Ambassador to Syria until June 30, 1957

Morgan, Thomas E., Democratic Representative from Pennsylvania, member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee

Morris, Brewster H., Political Counselor of the Embassy in the United Kingdom after January 27, 1957

Morris, Willie, First Secretary of the British Embassy in the United States from August 1, 1955

Mossadeq, Mohammad, former Prime Minister and Defense Minister of Iran

Mouser, Grant E., III, Second Secretary of the Embassy in Iran, February 9–August 12, 1956; Reports and Operations Staff, Executive Secretariat, Department of State, August 12, 1956–March 1, 1957; thereafter Acting Officer in Charge of Iranian Affairs, Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs

Murphy, Robert D., Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

Nasser (Nasr, Nassir), Gamal Abd'al, Egyptian Head of Government; President and Head of State from June 24, 1956

Nehru, Jawaharlal, Indian Prime Minister and Minister for External Affairs

Newsom, David D., Second Secretary and Consul of the Embassy in Iraq and Public Affairs Officer of the United States Information Agency Mission until June 27, 1955; thereafter Officer in Charge of Arabian Peninsula-Iraq Affairs, Office of Near Eastern Affairs, Department of State

Nixon, Richard M., Vice President of the United States

Nolting, Frederick E., Jr., Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Mutual Security Affairs until September 25, 1955; United States Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations (USRO) at Paris, from September 25, 1955; also Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council and Deputy Chief of USRO from October 6, 1957

Noon, Malik Firoz Khan, Pakistani Minister of Foreign Affairs, September 12, 1956–October 24, 1957; Minister of Defense from December 16, 1957

Ogburn, Charlton, Jr., Chief, Research Division for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, until spring 1957

Page, Howard, Director, Standard Oil Company of New Jersey

Pahlavi, Mohammed Reza, Shah of Iran

Pate, General Randolph M., USMC, Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps until January 1, 1956; thereafter Commandant

Pella, Giuseppe, Italian Foreign Minister from May 20, 1957

Perkins, George W., Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council, March 15, 1955–October 12, 1957

Persons, Major General Wilton B., USA, Deputy Assistant to the President

Phleger, Herman, Legal Adviser of the Department of State until April 1, 1957

Pineau, Christian, French Foreign Minister from February 1, 1956; President of the French Delegations at the United Nations, 1956 and 1957

Prochnow, Herbert V., Deputy Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, November 7, 1955–November 11, 1956

Quarles, Donald, Assistant Deputy Secretary of Defense for Research and Development until August 14, 1955; Secretary of the Air Force, August 15, 1955–April 30, 1957; Deputy Secretary of Defense from May 1, 1957

al-Quwatli (Quwaitli, Quwatly, Kuwatly), Shukri, President of Syria from August 18, 1955

Radford, Admiral Arthur W., USN, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff until August 14, 1957

Randall, Colonel (Brigadier General in 1957) Carey A., USMC, Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense and Secretary of the Armed Forces Policy Council

Raymond, John M., Acting Deputy Legal Adviser, Department of State, spring 1956–April 1, 1957; thereafter Deputy Legal Adviser; also Acting Legal Adviser, April 3–June 12, 1957

Reinhardt, G. Frederick, Counselor of the Department of State from March 17, 1957

Riad, General Mahmoud, Egyptian Ambassador to Syria

Richards, Arthur L., Operations Coordinator, Office of the Under Secretary of State, after January 15, 1956

Richards, James P., Democratic Representative from South Carolina; Chairman, House Foreign Affairs Committee until January 3, 1957; Special Envoy of the President to the Middle East, March–May 1957

Robertson, Reuben B., Jr., Deputy Secretary of Defense, August 5, 1955–April 25, 1957

Robertson, Walter S., Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs

Rockwell, Stuart W., Deputy Director, Office of Near Eastern Affairs, Department of State, July 1, 1956–August 11, 1957; thereafter Director

Rose, Michael, Head of the Levant Department, British Foreign Office, from January 17, 1955

Rountree, William M., Counselor of the Embassy in Iran with personal rank of Minister until October 9, 1955; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, October 9, 1955–July 26, 1956; thereafter Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs

Rowan, Sir (Thomas) Leslie, Alternate Governor, Board of Governors, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the International Finance Corporation

Russell, Francis H., Counselor of the Embassy in Israel until May 17, 1955; Office of Near Eastern Affairs, Department of State, May 17–September 25, 1955; Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, September 25, 1955–October 7, 1956; Ambassador to New Zealand from June 7, 1957

al-Said, General Nuri Pasha, Iraqi Prime Minister and Minister of Defense until June 20, 1957

Samuel, Ian, Head of the Security Department, British Foreign Office, from July 30, 1956

Saud, ibn Abd al-Aziz, King of Saudi Arabia

Scott, Walter K., Director of the Executive Secretariat, Department of State, until August 1, 1955; thereafter detailed to the International Cooperation Administration

Seager, Cedric, Deputy Regional Director for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Operations, Foreign Operations Administration, until May 1, 1955; Regional Director, May 1, 1955–October 8, 1956 (International Cooperation Administration after July 1, 1955); Regional Director for Near Eastern and South Asian Operations, October 8, 1956–August 15, 1957

al-Shabandar, Moussa, Iraqi Ambassador to the United States; also Foreign Minister until May 8, 1955

Sharett, Moshe, Israeli Prime Minister until November 2, 1955; also Foreign Minister until June 16, 1956

Shaw, John F., Office of Near Eastern Affairs, Department of State, July 3, 1955–new September 23, 1956; thereafter Officer in Charge of Economic Affairs

Shuckburgh, Evelyn, Assistant Under Secretary of State, British Foreign Office, until June 25, 1956

Shuqayr, General Shawkat, Syrian Chief of Staff until July 8, 1956

Sisco, Joseph J., Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State, May 22, 1955–July 1, 1956; Officer in Charge of General Assembly and Security Council Affairs, July 1, 1956–January 27, 1957; thereafter Officer in Charge of United Nations Political and Security Affairs

Smith, Gerard C., Consultant to the Secretary of State until January 1, 1956; Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Atomic Energy Matters, January 1, 1956–October 18, 1957; thereafter Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning

Smith, H. Alexander, Republican Senator from New Jersey, member, Senate Foreign Relations Committee

Smith, Harry L., Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs, Department of State, after February 12, 1956

Smith, James H., Jr., Director of the International Cooperation Administration from September 15, 1957

Sprague, Mansfield D., General Counsel, Department of Defense, 1956–1957

Staats, Elmer B., Executive Officer of the Operations Coordinating Board

Stabler, Wells, Officer in Charge of Egyptian-Sudan Affairs, Office of Near Eastern Affairs, Department of State, after April 21, 1957

Stassen, Harold E., Special Assistant to the President from March 22, 1955; Director of the Foreign Operations Administration and Chairman of the Foreign Operations Council, Foreign Operations Administration, until June 30, 1955; also member of the National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Problems, 1955

Stelle, Charles C., member of the Policy Planning Staff, Department of State, until August 26, 1956; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning, August 26, 1956–August 25, 1957; thereafter Counselor of the Embassy in Iran

Stevens, Eli, Politico-Military Adviser, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, Department of State, from August 8, 1955

Stevens, Francis B., Counselor of the Embassy in Iran, September 23, 1956–July 28, 1957

Stevens, Sir Roger Bentham, British Ambassador to Iran

Sturgill, Robert G., Executive Secretariat, Department of State

Stutesman, John H., Officer in Charge of Iranian Affairs, Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs, Department of State, until August 1, 1955

Suhrawardy, Hussain, Pakistani Minister of Law until 1955; Prime Minister from September 1956

Suwaydi, Tawfiq, former Prime Minister of Iraq

Swihart, James W., First Secretary-Consul of the Embassy in the United Kingdom

Taylor, General Maxwell D., USA, Chief of Staff, United States Army, from June 30, 1955

Templer, General Sir Gerald, Chief of the British Imperial Staff

Thacher, Nicholas G., First Secretary-Consul of the Embassy in Iraq after September 23, 1956

Timmons, Benson E. L., Director, Office of European Regional Affairs, Department of State, after September 13, 1955

Trevelyan, Sir Humphrey, British Ambassador to Egypt from August 1955

Twining, General Nathan F., USAF, Chief of Staff of the Air Force until June 30, 1957; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from August 15, 1957

Urgupulu, Ali Suat Fuat Hayri, Turkish Ambassador to the United States from September 7, 1957

Van Dusen, William, Fuels Division, Department of State

Voroshilov, Kimet Yefremovich, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet

Wadsworth, George E., Ambassador to Saudi Arabia

Waggoner, Edward L., Consul at Izmir until July 8, 1955; First Secretary-Consul of the Embassy in Syria, July 18, 1955–August 12, 1956; thereafter Officer in Charge of Lebanon-Syria Affairs, Office of Near Eastern Affairs, Department of State

Wallner, Woodruff, Counselor of the Embassy in France and Political Adviser to the European Command at Paris until April 7, 1957

Walmsley, Walter N., Counselor of the Embassy in the Soviet Union until October 8, 1956; thereafter Deputy Assistant Secretary

of State for International Organization Affairs

Warren, Avra M., Ambassador to Turkey until February 17, 1956

White, General Thomas D., USAF, Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force until June 1957; Chief of Staff from July 1, 1957

Whitney, John Hay, Ambassador to the United Kingdom from February 28, 1957

Wilcox, Francis O., Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs after September 6, 1955

Wiley, Alexander, Republican Senator from Wisconsin, member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the Senate Judiciary Committee

Wilkins, Fraser, Director, Office of Near Eastern Affairs, Department of State, July 3, 1955–July 28, 1957; Counselor of the Embassy in Iran, July 28–September 16, 1957; thereafter Minister-Counselor

Williams, Murat W., Deputy Director, Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs, Department of State, after July 29, 1956

Wilson, Charles E., Secretary of Defense until October 8, 1957

Wilson, Evan M., First Secretary-Consul General of the Embassy in the United Kingdom until September 1957

Withers, Charles D., Office of South Asian Affairs, Department of State, March 13, 1955–November 1956; Deputy Director, November 1956–August 25, 1957

Wright, Sir Michael Robert, British Ambassador to Iraq from January 21, 1955

Yasin, Yusuf Shaikh, Saudi Arabian Deputy Foreign Minister, Minister of State, and Delegate at the League of Arab States

Zahedi, Major General Fazollah, Iranian Prime Minister until April 7, 1955

Zorlu, Fatin Rustu, Turkish Foreign Minister and Permanent Representative to NATO

General United States Military and Economic Policies Toward the Middle East

Contents

[U.S. Interest in the Baghdad Pact, U.S. Response to the Egyptian-Syrian-Saudi Pact, NSC 5428 Series, Development of the Eisenhower Doctrine, and Regional Petroleum Policies](#) (Documents 1-285)

U.S. Interest in the Baghdad Pact, U.S. Response to the Egyptian-Syrian-Saudi Pact, NSC 5428 Series, Development of the Eisenhower Doctrine, and Regional Petroleum Policies¹

¹ For previous documentation, see [Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. IX, Part 1, pp. 1 ff](#)

1. Editorial Note

2. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan

Washington, January 14, 1955—7:55 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/1–1455. Confidential. Drafted by Fritzlan and approved for transmission by Jernegan, who signed for Murphy. Sent also to Beirut and Damascus; repeated to Ankara, Baghdad, Cairo, Jidda, London, and Tel Aviv.

3. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel

Washington, January 14, 1955—7:55 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 682.87/1–1455. Confidential. Drafted by Bergus and approved by Jernegan who signed for Murphy. Also

sent to Ankara; repeated to Baghdad, London, Amman, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Jidda, Jerusalem, and Paris.

4. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Egypt

Washington, January 14, 1955—7:56 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/1–1455. Secret. Drafted by Burdett and approved by Jernegan who signed for Murphy. Also sent to Ankara, repeated to Baghdad, and pouched to Amman, Beirut, Damascus, Jidda, Tel Aviv, and London.

5. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State

Cairo, January 17, 1955—3 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 682.87/1–1755. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Baghdad, Ankara, Damascus, Beirut, Jidda, Tel Aviv, Amman, and Tehran.

6. Telegram From the Embassy in Iraq to the Department of State

Baghdad, January 17, 1955—4 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 682.87/1–1755. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Cairo, London, Ankara, Karachi, Tehran, Amman, Beirut, Damascus, Tel Aviv, and Jidda.

7. Editorial Note

8. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel

Washington, January 19, 1955—6:36 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/1–1955. Confidential. Drafted by Jernegan who signed for, Dulles.

9. Telegram From the Embassy in Iraq to the Department of State

Baghdad, February 3, 1955—4 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 682.87/2-355. Secret. Repeated to Ankara, London, Cairo, Amman, Beirut, Damascus, Jidda, Tripoli, and Tehran.

10. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Lebanon

Washington, February 4, 1955—7:18 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 786.13/2-355. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by, Fritzlan, cleared with Defense, and approved by Jernegan who signed for Hoover. Repeated to Amman, Baghdad, Damascus, Cairo, Jidda, Tripoli, London, Ankara, and Tel Aviv.

11. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State

Cairo, February 6, 1955—midnight.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 120.1580/2-655. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to London, Baghdad, Ankara, Beirut, Amman, Tel Aviv, Jidda, Damascus, and Tripoli.

12. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Lebanese Ambassador (Malik) and the Secretary of State, Department of State, Washington, February 9, 1955

Washington, February 9, 1955

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/2-955. Confidential. Drafted by Francis O. Allen.

13. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions

Washington, February 15, 1955—3:49 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 682.87/2-1555. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Dixon and approved and signed by, Dulles. Sent to Baghdad and Ankara and repeated to London, Cairo, Damascus, Beirut, Amman, Tehran, Karachi, Paris, and Tripoli.

14. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iran

Washington, February 18, 1955—7:27 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 682.87/2-1855. Secret. Drafted by Stutesman and Dixon and approved by Kitchen who signed for, Dulles. Repeated to Karachi.

15. Telegram From the Delegation at the SEATO Council Meeting to the Department of State

Bangkok, February 24, 1955—11 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-BA/2-2455. Top Secret. Repeated to London.

16. Telegram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department of State

Jidda, February 27, 1955—1 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 682.87/2-2755. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Amman, Ankara, Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, London, Tehran, Tel Aviv, and Tripoli.

17. Telegram From the Embassy in Syria to the Department of State

Damascus, March 1, 1955—6 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 682.87/3–155. Confidential. Repeated to Ankara, Baghdad, Cairo, London, Paris, Amman, Beirut, and Jidda.

18. Editorial Note

19. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Syria

Washington, March 5, 1955—4:01 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/3–555. Confidential. Drafted by Francis O. Allen on March 4, approved by George Allen, and signed for Hoover by, Jernegan. Also sent to Beirut and Amman and repeated to Baghdad, Cairo, Jidda, London, Ankara, Karachi, and Paris.

20. Editorial Note

21. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions

Washington, March 8, 1955—2 a.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 700.00 (S)/3–855. Secret; Special State Distribution. Sent to Athens, Brussels, Copenhagen, The Hague, Lisbon, Oslo, Ottawa, Rome, Luxembourg, Reykjavik, and to SACLANT in Norfolk, Virginia.

22. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State

Cairo, March 8, 1955—5 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/3–855. Secret. Repeated to London, Damascus, Beirut, Jidda, Amman, Baghdad, Tel Aviv, and Tehran.

23. Telegram From the Embassy in Syria to the Department of State

Damascus, March 11, 1955—10 a.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 683.87/3–1155. Confidential; Niact. Repeated priority to Baghdad, Cairo, Ankara, and London.

24. Telegram From the Embassy in Iraq to the Department of State

Baghdad, March 16, 1955—6 a.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 682.87/3–1655. Secret. Repeated to Ankara and London.

25. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State

Amman, March 16, 1955—6 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 682.87/3–1655. Confidential. Repeated to Damascus, Cairo, Baghdad, Beirut, Karachi, London, Ankara, Jidda, Paris, and Tripoli.

26. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Syria

Washington, March 18, 1955—7:23 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 682.87/3–1255. Secret. Drafted by Burdett and Hart and approved by George Allen who signed for, Hoover. Also sent to Cairo, Amman, Jidda, and Beirut; repeated to Baghdad, Ankara, Tel Aviv, London, Paris, Karachi, and Tehran.

27. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan

Washington, March 18, 1955—7:59 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/3–755. Secret. Drafted by Dixon, Smith, and Thacher; cleared with, Baxter, Fritzlan, and the Department of Defense; and approved by George Allen who signed for Hoover. Repeated to Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, London, New Delhi, and Tehran.

28. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State

Cairo, March 20, 1955—2 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.74/3–2055. Secret. Priority; Limited Distribution. Repeated to London, Paris, Ankara, Tel Aviv, Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Damascus, and Jidda.

29. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Turkey

Washington, March 26, 1955—2:27 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 682.87/3–2655. Secret. Drafted by Burdett and approved by Jernegan who signed for, Dulles. Repeated to Cairo, Karachi, Djakarta, and London.

30. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Egypt

Washington, March 30, 1955—3:49 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 682.87/3–3055. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Burdett and George Allen who approved and signed for Dulles. Also sent to Amman, Ankara, Baghdad, Beirut, Damascus, Jidda, London, Karachi, and Tel Aviv.

31. Editorial Note

32. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Egypt

Washington, March 31, 1955—10:14 a.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/3–3155. Top Secret; Limited Distribution; Alpha. Drafted by Russell on March 30; cleared with Dulles, Hare, Allen, and Jernegan; and approved by, Russell who initialed for, Dulles. Repeated to London.

33. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Allen) to the Secretary of State

Washington, April 1, 1955.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 682.87/4–155. Top Secret.

34. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State

Cairo, April 8, 1955—4 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/4–855. Top Secret; Alpha. Repeated to London.

35. Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Murphy) to the Secretary of State

Washington, April 22, 1955.

Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 66 D 70. Top Secret. Drafted by Elbert G. Mathews of the Policy Planning Staff. A notation on the source text indicates that it was seen by the Secretary.

36. Memorandum of Discussion at the 247th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, May 5, 1955

Washington, May 5, 1955

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Prepared by, S. Everett Gleason on May 6.

37. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State

Ankara, May 21, 1955—9 a.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/5-2155. Secret. Repeated to London.

38. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State

Karachi, May 26, 1955—8 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/5-2655. Secret; Priority.

39. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan

Washington, May 28, 1955—2:32 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/5-2655. Secret; Priority. Drafted by George Allen and Jernegan who signed for Hoover. Repeated to Ankara, Baghdad, Tehran, Cairo, and London.

40. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Turkey

Washington, May 28, 1955—3:42 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/5-2155. Secret. Drafted by Dixon and approved by Jernegan who signed for Hoover. Repeated to London.

41. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State

Karachi, May 29, 1955—noon.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/5-2955. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Ankara, Baghdad, Tehran, Cairo, and London.

42. Memorandum From the Secretary of State to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Allen)

Washington, June 4, 1955.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.80/6-455. Top Secret. Copies were sent to Hoover and, Murphy.

43. Memorandum From the State-Defense Working Group on Middle East Defense to the Under Secretary of State (Hoover) and the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Anderson)

Washington, June 6, 1955.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/6-655. Top Secret. The members of the Working Group were listed at the end of this memorandum. Department of State members were John J. Jernegan, Ben F. Dixon, Elbert G. Mathews, and Leonard Unger; Department of Defense members were R. Ernest, Colonel J. Masters, Colonel R. Akers, and Lieutenant Colonel J. Patterson.

44. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson)

Washington, June 16, 1955.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/6-2255. Top Secret. The source text is a photostat copy of the memorandum that is attached to a June 22 transmittal memorandum from the Director of the Executive Secretariat, Walter K. Scott, to Murphy, Jernegan, Mathews, and Elbrick. Also attached to Scott's memorandum is a June 20 memorandum from Admiral Arthur C. Davis to Deputy Secretary of Defense Anderson with its attachment, Document 47.

45. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State

Cairo, June 17, 1955—6 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 786.00/6–1755. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Ankara, London, Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Damascus, Jidda, Paris, and Tel Aviv.

46. National Intelligence Estimate

Washington, June 21, 1955.

Source: Department of State, INR–NIE Files. Secret. National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) were high-level interdepartmental reports presenting authoritative appraisals of vital foreign policy problems. NIEs were drafted by officers from those agencies represented on the Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC), discussed and revised by interdepartmental working groups coordinated by the Office of National Estimates of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), approved by the IAC, and circulated under the aegis of the CIA to the President, appropriate officers of cabinet level, and the National Security Council. The Department of State provided all political and some economic sections of NIEs. According to a note on the cover sheet, “The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff.” It was concurred in by the Intelligence Advisory Committee on June 21.

47. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Davis) to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Anderson)

Washington, June 20, 1955.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/6–2255. Top Secret. The source text and the attachment are photostat copies attached to a June 22 transmittal memorandum from Scott to, Murphy, Jernegan, Mathews, and Elbrick. See footnote 1, Document 44. The source text indicates that a copy was sent to Admiral Radford.

48. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Elbrick) to the Under Secretary of State (Hoover)

Washington, June 21, 1955.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/6–2155. Top Secret. Drafted by Leonard Unger.

49. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, June 23, 1955

Washington, June 23, 1955

Source; Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 66 D 70. Top Secret. Drafted by Mathews.

50. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State

Amman, June 23, 1955—9 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/6–2355. Secret. Repeated to Ankara, Baghdad, Paris, Damascus, London, Beirut, Tel Aviv, and Jidda.

51. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, June 24, 1955

Washington, June 24, 1955

Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 66 D 70. Top Secret. Drafted by Mathews.

52. Telegram From the Embassy in Syria to the Department of State

Damascus, June 24, 1955—9 a.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 786.00/6–2455. Confidential. Repeated to Amman, Ankara, Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Jidda, London, Paris, and Tel Aviv.

53. Telegram From the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State

Beirut, June 25, 1955—2 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/6–2555. Secret. Repeated to Cairo, Amman, Ankara, Baghdad, Jidda, London, Paris, and Tel Aviv.

54. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State

Cairo, June 28, 1955—Noon.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 786.00/6–2855. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Ankara, London, Amman, Baghdad, Damascus, Jidda, Paris, and Tel Aviv.

55. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, June 30, 1955

Washington, June 30, 1955

Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 66 D 70, Near and Middle East. Top Secret. Drafted by Mathews.

56. Department of State Position Paper

Washington, July 11, 1955.

Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518. Top Secret. Attached to an unsigned draft memorandum to the President, drafted by Jernegan, which in turn is attached to Hoover's memorandum, *infra*. The covering unsigned memorandum to the President indicates that the paper was prepared for the President's use at Geneva. "It has the concurrence of

the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.” Hoover presumably carried a copy of the memorandum and the position paper to a meeting with President Eisenhower at the White House on July 11. Another copy of the position paper is attached to a note of July 11 from Robert C.F. Gordon to Murphy that reads as follows: “Attached is the revised copy of the Memorandum to the President which Mr. Hoover took to his meeting with the President today.” (Department of State, Central Files, 740.5/7–1155) The position paper was transmitted to 11 Middle Eastern posts, London, and Paris, in CA–2275, September 17. (Ibid., 780.5/9–1755)

57. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Hoover) to the Secretary of State

Washington, July 11, 1955.

Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518. Top Secret.

58. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iraq

Washington, July 15, 1955—12:53 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/7–1555. Secret. Drafted by Newsom and George V. Allen and approved by, Allen who signed for Hoover. Also sent to Beirut, Damascus, Ankara, Karachi, Tel Aviv, Jidda, Cairo, Amman, London, Paris, and Tripoli.

59. Instruction From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Posts

Washington, August 11, 1955.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/8–1155. Top Secret. Drafted by Dixon and George V. Allen and approved by, Hoover. Sent to Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Karachi, Tehran, and Jidda; repeated to Ankara and London.

60. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, August 11, 1955

Washington, August 11, 1955

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/8–1155. Top Secret. Drafted by Dixon.

61. Letter From the Secretary of State to the British Ambassador (Makins)

Washington, August 19, 1955.

Source: Department of State, S/S–NEA Files: Lot 61 D 417. Top Secret. Drafted by Wilkins.

62. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan

Washington, September 8, 1955—6:29 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/9–855. Secret. Drafted by Burdett and approved by Jernegan who signed for Hoover. Also sent to Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Jidda, Karachi, Tripoli, Paris, and Tel Aviv; repeated to London, Ankara, and Tehran.

63. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State

Cairo, September 11, 1955—1 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 786.00/9–1155. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution; NoFORN. Repeated to London, Tel Aviv, Beirut, Damascus, Amman, Baghdad, and Jidda.

64. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State

Cairo, September 11, 1955—5 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 786.00/9–1155. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution; Noform. Repeated to London, Tel Aviv, Beirut, Damascus, Amman, Baghdad, and Jidda.

65. Editorial Note

66. Memorandum of Discussion at the 260th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, October 6, 1955, 10 a.m.

Washington, October 6, 1955, 10 a.m.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Gleason on October 7. The time of the meeting is from the President's Daily Appointment Books.

67. Editorial Note

68. Memorandum of Discussion at the 261st Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, October 13, 1955

Washington, October 13, 1955

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Prepared by Gleason on October 14.

69. Notes Prepared by the Secretary of State

Washington, October 17, 1955.

Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 58 D 460, Arab-Israeli Situation— General. Secret. The source text bears Secretary Dulles' typed initials as drafting officer. George V. Allen's handwritten notes of a conversation between Dulles and Egyptian Ambassador Hussein on October 17 appear on the reverse side of two of the pages. Allen's

memorandum of the Dulles–Hussein conversation is printed in vol. xiv, p. 604.

70. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, October 20, 1955

Washington, October 20, 1955

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/10–2055. Secret. Drafted by Newsom.

71. Telegram From the Office of the Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to the Department of State

Paris, October 26, 1955—9 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/10–2655. Secret. Repeated to Ankara, Amman, Baghdad, London, and Geneva.

72. Circular Telegram from the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions

Washington, October 27, 1955—4:01 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/10–2755. Secret. Drafted by Newsom and Dixon and approved by Allen who signed for Hoover. Sent to London, Ankara, Baghdad, Tehran, and Karachi; repeated to Paris for USRO, Rome for Maffitt, Cairo, Beirut, Damascus, Amman, Jidda, Tripoli, and Tel Aviv. During discussions on October 26 in Paris with Foreign Secretary Macmillan and Prime Minister Zorlu, Secretary Dulles had agreed that the United States would have political and military liaison with the Baghdad Pact. Secto 41 from Geneva, October 27, conveyed Secretary Dulles' decision on the matter and his request that the Department of State take necessary steps to assure effective liaison. (Ibid., 396.1–GE/10–2755) The memorandum of Dulles' conversation with Macmillan on October 26 is printed in vol. XIV, p. 650.

73. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan

Washington, October 28, 1955—5:43 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/10–2855. Secret. Drafted by Wilkins and Burdett and approved by Allen who signed for Hoover. Also sent to Tehran, Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Jidda, Tel Aviv, Ankara, Karachi, Paris, and London.

74. Telegram From the Embassy in Iraq to the Department of State

Baghdad, October 29, 1955—noon.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/10–2955. Secret; Priority. Repeated to London, Ankara, Tehran, Karachi, and Paris.

75. Telegram From the Department of State to the Delegation at the Foreign Ministers Meeting, at Geneva

Washington, October 29, 1955—7 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–GE/10–2955. Secret. Drafted by Allen and approved by Hoover.

76. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State

Amman, November 1, 1955—6 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/11–155. Secret. Repeated to Ankara, Baghdad, Beirut, Damascus, London, and Geneva.

77. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Turkey

Washington, November 2, 1955—4:40 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/11–255. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Kitchen and Allen who approved and signed for Hoover. Repeated to London, Amman, and Geneva for Secretary Dulles.

78. National Intelligence Estimate

Washington, November 8, 1955

Source: Department of State, INR–NIE Files. Top Secret. According to a note on the cover sheet, “The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency, and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff.” It was concurred in by the Intelligence Advisory Committee on November 8. In Tosec 195 to Geneva, November 8, the Department of State informed Secretary Dulles that the conclusions of the NIE were being cabled to him and that it had been prepared “on crash basis at direction Acting Secretary.” (Ibid., Central Files, 396. 1–GE/11–855)

79. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iraq

Washington, November 16, 1955—7 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/10–2955. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Newsom and approved by Wilkins who signed for Hoover. Also sent Priority to Ankara, London, Karachi, and Tehran.

80. Telegram From the Embassy in Iraq to the Department of State

Baghdad, November 21, 1955—2 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5.11–2155. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Tehran, London, Ankara, and Karachi.

81. Memorandum of Discussion at the 267th Meeting of the National Security Council, Camp David, Maryland, November 21, 1955

Camp David, November 21, 1955

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret.
Prepared by Gleason on November 22.

82. Telegram From the Embassy in Iraq to the Department of State

Baghdad, November 24, 1955—2 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/11–2455. Secret; Priority.
Repeated Priority to London, Ankara, Amman, and Beirut.

83. Letter From Foreign Secretary Macmillan to Secretary of State Dulles

London, November 25, 1955.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/11–2955. Secret. The salutation and closing of the letter are handwritten. Forwarded to the Department of State in despatch 1233 from London, November 29. The text of the message was transmitted to the Department of State in telegram 2170, November 25. (Ibid., 780.5/11–2555) In telegram 2173, November 26, Ambassador Aldrich transmitted a report of his conversation with Macmillan on November 25 during which they discussed the contents of Macmillan's message. Aldrich reported that Macmillan had emphasized that it was of the highest importance that the United States adhere to the Baghdad Pact as soon as possible. Aldrich recommended, "I believe we should do everything possible to act favorably on suggestions made in Macmillan's message including joining Baghdad Pact as soon as possible." (Ibid., 780.00/11–2655)

84. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Allen) to the Secretary of State

Washington, November 28, 1955.

Source: Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5428 Series. Secret. Drafted by William M. Rountree and Ben F. Dixon.

85. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Hoover) to the Secretary of State

Washington, December 1, 1955.

Source: Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5428 Memos. A handwritten notation on the source text indicates that it was seen by Secretary Dulles.

86. Editorial Note

87. Memorandum From Elbert G. Mathews of the Policy Planning Staff to the Director (Bowie)

Washington, December 13, 1955.

Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 66 D 70, Near and Middle East. Secret.

88. Editorial Note

89. Despatch From the Embassy in Iraq to the Department of State

Baghdad, January 6, 1956.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 101.21–NIS/1–656. Top Secret.

90. Editorial Note

91. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, January 13, 1956, 10 a.m.

Washington, January 13, 1956, 10 a.m.

Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Middle East 1954–1957. Secret. Drafted by Geren.

92. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, January 13, 1956, 2:30 p.m.

Washington, January 13, 1956, 2:30 p.m.

Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Middle East 1954–1957. Secret. Drafted by Geren.

93. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, January 18, 1956, 10 a.m.

Washington, January 18, 1956

Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Middle East 1954–1957. Secret. Drafted by Dixon.

94. Memorandum of a Conversation, White House, Washington, January 30, 1956, 2:15–4 p.m.

Washington, January 30, 1956, 4 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 62 D 181, CF 648. Secret. Drafted on February 7, but no further drafting information is given on the source text. According to a note on the source text, the memorandum of conversation, cleared at the Assistant Secretary of State level only, was being given restricted circulation to appropriate U.S. officials on a need-to-know basis. This memorandum of conversation is one of a series that records talks in Washington between President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Eden, January 30–February 1. For additional documentation on Eden's visit to Washington pertaining to the Arab-Israeli question, see vol. xv, pp. 101 ff. Briefing and background papers prepared for the use of Assistant Secretary Allen during Secretary Dulles' briefing of President

Eisenhower on January 26 prior to the Eden visit are in Department of State, Central Files, 611.41/1-2656.

95. Memorandum of a Conversation, White House, Washington, January 30, 1956, 4 p.m.

Washington, January 30, 1956, 4 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 62 D 181, CF 648. Drafted on February 7, but no further drafting information is given on the source text. According to a note on the source text, the memorandum of conversation, cleared at the Assistant Secretary level only, was being given restricted circulation to appropriate U.S. officials on a need-to-know basis.

96. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iraq

Washington, February 8, 1956—11:20 a.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/1-3056. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Dixon and Newsom and approved by Rountree who signed for Dulles. Repeated to Karachi, Ankara, Tehran, and London.

97. Memorandum on the Substance of Discussion at the Department of State-Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting, Washington, February 10, 1956, 11:30 a.m.

Washington, February 10, 1956, 11:30 a.m.

Source: Department of State, State-JCS Meetings: Lot 61 D 417. Top Secret.

98. Letter From Prime Minister Eden to President Eisenhower

London, March 4, 1956.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Presidential Papers, International File. Secret. Delivered to the White House under cover of a note from Ambassador Makins. On March 6, Ambassador Aldrich reported in telegram 3750 from London that during a conversation with Eden, the Prime Minister had handed Aldrich a copy of this letter and emphasized the urgency he attached to taking some dramatic step to bolster friendly governments in the area and the importance of U.S. adherence to the Baghdad Pact as a deterrent to Nasser. (Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/3-656) A copy of the telegram in the Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles-Herter Series is initialed by Eisenhower.

99. Telegram From the Secretary of State to the Department of State

Karachi, March 6, 1956—10 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/3-656. Secret; Priority.

100. Telegram From the Delegation at the SEATO Council Meeting to the Department of State

Karachi, March 7, 1956—5 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-KA/3-756. Secret. Repeated to London.

101. Telegram From the Embassy in Iraq to the Department of State

Baghdad, March 10, 1956—2 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/3-1056. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Ankara, Karachi, London, and Tehran.

102. Memorandum of a Conference With the President, White House, Washington, March 15, 1956, 2:30 p.m.

Washington, March 15, 1956, 2:30 p.m.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster on March 16.

103. Telegram From the Embassy in Iraq to the Department of State

Baghdad, March 20, 1956—6 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/3-2056. Top Secret; Midmil.

104. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson)

Washington, March 23, 1956.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Sp. Asst. for Nat. Sec. Affairs Records. Top Secret. Gordon Gray sent a copy of this memorandum to Secretary Dulles on April 2. (Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/4-256) Secretary of Defense Wilson forwarded a copy of the memorandum to NSC Executive Secretary Lay on April 5 (see Document 109), who in turn transmitted both memoranda to the NSCon April 9.

105. Telegram from the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State

London, March 26, 1956—6 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/3-2656. Top Secret; Eyes Only.

106. Editorial Note

107. Editorial Note

108. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, April 3, 1956

Washington, April 3, 1956

Source: Department of State, S/S–NEA Files: Lot 61 D 417. Top Secret. Drafted by Roger Kirk of the Executive Secretariat.

109. Letter From the Secretary of Defense (Wilson) to the Secretary of State

Washington, April 5, 1956.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/4–556. Top Secret.

110. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Turkey.

Washington, April 6, 1956—8:50 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/4–656. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Newsom; cleared with Secretary Dulles, Gordon Gray, and others; and approved by Rountree who signed for Dulles. Also sent Priority to Baghdad, Karachi, and Tehran; repeated to Cairo, Jidda, Amman, Beirut, Damascus, Rome, Paris, New Delhi, and London.

111. Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation Between the President and the Secretary of State, Washington, April 7, 1956, 9:10 a.m.

Washington, April 7, 1956, 9:10 a.m.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries, Telephone Conversations. Prepared in the Office of the President.

112. Telegram From the Embassy in Iraq to the Department of State

Baghdad, April 8, 1956—1 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/4–856. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Ankara, Karachi, Tehran, Cairo, Jidda, Amman, Beirut, Damascus, Rome, Paris, New Delhi, and London.

113. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State

Ankara, April 9, 1956—4 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/4–956. Confidential. Repeated to Baghdad, Rome, Karachi, Paris, Tehran, London, Cairo, Jidda, Amman, Beirut, Damascus, Belgrade, and Tel Aviv.

114. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State

Tehran, April 9, 1956—5 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/4–956. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Ankara, Karachi, Baghdad, London, Paris, and Rome.

115. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, April 9, 1956, 10 a.m.

Washington, April 9, 1956, 10 a.m.

Source: Department of State, S/S–NEA Files: Lot 61 D 417, Omega #1. Top Secret; Omega. Drafted by MacArthur.

116. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State

Karachi, April 13, 1956—2 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/4–1356. Secret; Priority. Repeated Priority to Ankara, Baghdad, Tehran, and London; repeated to New Delhi, Kabul, Cairo, Jidda, Amman, Beirut, Damascus, Rome, and Paris.

117. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, April 13, 1956, 3 p.m.

Washington, April 13, 1956, 3 p.m.

Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518. Top Secret. Prepared in the Department of State but no further drafting information is given on the source text.

118. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State

Tehran, April 15, 1956—11 a.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/4–1556. Secret; Niact.

119. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State

Tehran, April 15, 1956—4 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/4–1556. Secret.

120. Notes on the Secretary of State's Staff Meeting, Department of State, Washington, April 16, 1956, 9:15 a.m.

Washington, April 16, 1956, 9:15 a.m.

Source: Department of State, Secretary's Staff Meetings: Lot 63 D 75. Secret. Drafted by Fisher Howe, Director of the Executive Secretariat.

121. Memorandum for the Record by the Counselor of the Department of State (MacArthur)

undated

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/4–1656. Confidential. Sent to Secretary Dulles under cover of a note erroneously dated March 16

from Fisher Howe. A handwritten notation on the note indicates that the Secretary saw MacArthur's memorandum.

122. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iran

Washington, April 16, 1956—7:49 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/4-1556. Secret; Niact. Drafted by L. Wade Lathram and Dixon and approved by Rountree who signed for Dulles.

123. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State

Tehran, April 17, 1956—2 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/4-1756. Secret; Niact.

124. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State

Tehran, April 18, 1956—11 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/4-1856. Secret. Repeated to Karachi, London, Ankara, Baghdad, Rome, and Paris.

125. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State

Tehran, April 19, 1956—7 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/4-1956. Secret. Repeated to Baghdad, Ankara, Karachi, London, Paris, and Rome.

126. Letter From the Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson)

Washington, April 23, 1956.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/4–556. Top Secret. Drafted by Rountree.

127. Draft Paper by the NSC Planning Board Assistants

Washington, May 2, 1956.

Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 66 D 487. Secret. This draft statement, marked “for NSC Staff consideration only”, was forwarded to the NSC Planning Board under cover of a memorandum by Lay on May 2. The paper was based on drafts prepared by the Departments of State and Defense in accordance with a decision by the NSC Planning Board at its April 16 meeting to request the State and Defense members each to prepare statements of the advantages and disadvantages of U.S. adherence to the Baghdad Pact. (Memorandum from Lay to the NSC Planning Board, May 2; *ibid.*; Record of Meeting of the NSC Planning Board, April 16; *Ibid.*, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1)The Department of State contribution, completed on April 25, was similar to the May 2 draft in most respects. It was drafted by Mathews (S/P) and by Wilkins and Newsom (NE). According to a covering memorandum of April 25 from Wilkins to Schwartz (S/P), the paper was cleared with SOA, BNA, GTI, NEA, and NE, and was revised in accordance with comments received from these various offices and bureaus. (*Ibid.*, NEA Files: Lot 58 D 460, Baghdad Pact, 1956)

128. Memorandum From the Secretary of Defense (Wilson) to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay)

Washington, May 15, 1956.

Source: Department of State, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 61 D 167, Near East. Top Secret.

129. Instruction From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions

Washington, May 18, 1956.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/5–1856. Confidential. Sent to Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Jidda, Khartoum, Tel Aviv, and London.

130. Memorandum on the Substance of Discussions at the Department of State–Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting, Pentagon, Washington, May 23, 1956, 11:30 a.m.

Washington, May 23, 1956, 11:30 a.m.

Source: Department of State, State–JCS Meetings: Lot 61 D 417. Top Secret. A note on the title page reads: “State Draft. Not cleared with any of participants.”

131. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, June 7, 1956

Washington, June 7, 1956

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/6–756. Secret. Drafted by Newsom on June 13.

132. Memorandum of Discussion at the 289th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, June 28, 1956

Washington, June 28, 1956

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Prepared by Gleason on June 29.

133. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions

Washington, July 25, 1956—8:42 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 880.2553/7–2556. Secret. Sent to Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Jidda, Tehran, Aden, Amman, Basra, Dhahran, Khorramshahr, Kuwait, Tel Aviv, and Tripoli. Repeated to Bonn, London, Paris, Rome, and The Hague.

134. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree) to the Acting Secretary of State

Washington, July 26, 1956

Source: Department of State, OCB Files: Lot 61 D 385, Box 2475, Baghdad Pact. Limited Official Use. Drafted by William O. Baxter and Ben F. Dixon. Sent through the Executive Secretariat.

135. Editorial Note

136. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree) to the Acting Secretary of State

Washington, August 20, 1956.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 880.2553/8–2056. Secret. Drafted by A. David Fritzlán of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs on August 16. Sent through the Executive Secretariat.

137. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State

Tehran, November 9, 1956—1 a.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/11–956. Secret; Niact. Repeated Priority to Karachi, Baghdad, Ankara, Paris, London, and Rome.

138. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State

Tehran, November 14, 1956—1 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/11–1456. Secret; Niact. Repeated Niact to Ankara, Baghdad, and Karachi, and Priority to Paris and London.

139. Memorandum From the Counselor of the Department of State (MacArthur) to the Acting Secretary of State

Washington, November 14, 1956.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.80/11–1456. Secret. Between November 3 and 18, Secretary Dulles was confined to Walter Reed Hospital in Washington following major surgery. He convalesced in Key West, Florida, and returned to the Department of State on December 3. (Princeton University, Dulles Papers, Dulles' Appointment Book)

140. Memorandum From the Director of the Executive Secretariat (Howe) to the Acting Secretary of State

Washington, November 14, 1956

Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 66 D 487, Near & Middle East. Secret.

141. Letter From the Secretary of Defense (Wilson) to the Acting Secretary of State

Washington, November 14, 1956.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/11–1456. Top Secret.

142. Telegram From the Embassy in Iraq to the Department of State

Baghdad, November 15, 1956—1 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/11–1556. Secret; Niact. Repeated to Ankara, Karachi, London, Tehran, Paris, and Rome.

143. Memorandum on the Substance of Discussion at the Department of State–Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting, Washington, November 16, 1956, 11:30 a.m.

Washington, November 16, 1956, 11:30 a.m.

Source: Department of State, State–JCS Meetings: Lot 66 D 407. Top Secret. Drafted by Richard Finn. A note on the title page reads: “State Draft. Not cleared with Defense.”

144. Memorandum by the Secretary of State

Washington, November 16, 1956.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/11–1756. Secret. Prepared in the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs and sent under cover of a letter of November 17 from Murphy to Radford that reads as follows: “Confirming our telephone conversation this morning, I attach for your personal information a copy of the Secretary’s comments of November 16, 1956, regarding the Baghdad Pact.” (Ibid., 780.5/11–1756)

145. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree) to the Acting Secretary of State

Washington, November 18, 1956.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/11–1856. Top Secret. Drafted by Newsom.

146. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iraq

Washington, November 20, 1956—9:16 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/11–2056. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Rountree and Memminger and approved by Rountree who signed for Hoover. Repeated to London, Ankara, Tehran, and Karachi.

147. Memorandum of a Conference With the President, White House, Washington, November 21, 1956, 4 p.m.

Washington, November 21, 1956, 4 p.m.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Top Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster. A memorandum from MacArthur to Hoover, November 21, indicates that during MacArthur's meeting with President Eisenhower that morning, the President directed Goodpaster to call an off-the-record meeting of the members of the NSC and certain other key government officials to discuss the Department of State's plans in the Middle East. MacArthur's memorandum also notes that following this meeting he met with Rountree and Bowie and that work was currently underway to produce two papers: one on short-term and the other on long-term plans. Attached to MacArthur's memorandum is a memorandum from the President to William Jackson directing Jackson to arrange an informal meeting at the White House to include the members of the NSC, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Director of Central Intelligence. The purpose of the meeting was to receive a Department of State outline on short-term and long-term plans in the Middle East and "to make certain that our trade and other operations are coordinated with the principal elements in the State Department planning". (Department of State, Central Files, 611.86/11–2156)

148. Memorandum From the Acting Secretary of State to the President

Washington, November 21, 1956.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles–Herter Series. Secret. The source text is undated, but another copy with the attachment is dated November 21. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.80/11–2156) A

separate copy of Hoover's covering memorandum is also dated November 21 and bears the typed marginal inscription: "Prepared for mtg at White House at 4:00 4/21/56". (Ibid., S/P Files: Lot 66 D 487, Near & Middle East)

149. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Posts

Washington, November 21, 1956—7:55 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/11–2156. Confidential Drafted by Mathews and signed for Hoover by Rountree. Sent to Baghdad, Jidda, Damascus, Beirut, Tehran, Karachi, Ankara, Cairo, and Tel Aviv; repeated to London, Paris, Tripoli, Moscow, Ottawa, Kabul, and New Delhi. On November 26, Robert R. Bowie forwarded the text of this circular telegram to Acting Secretary Hoover for his approval under cover of a note indicating that the telegram had been written in response to Document 140, which Hoover had approved. (Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 66 D 487, Chronological 1956 Jan-Dec.) A typed notation on Bowie's covering note indicates that the telegram was approved by Hoover.

150. Telegram From the Embassy in Iraq to the Department of State

Baghdad, November 23, 1956—noon.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/11–2356. Secret; Niact. Repeated Priority to London, Paris, Ankara, Karachi, and Tehran.

151. Special National Intelligence Estimate

Washington, November 29, 1956.

Source: Department of State, INR–NIE Files. Secret. According to a note on the cover sheet, "The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy,

the Air Force, and the Joint Staff.” This estimate was concurred in by the Intelligence Advisory Committee on November 29, 1956. “Concurring were the Special Assistant, Intelligence, Department of State; the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Director of Naval Intelligence; the Director of Intelligence, USAF; and the Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff. The Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the IAC, and the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation abstained, the subject being outside of their jurisdiction.” [1 paragraph (3 lines of text) not declassified]

152. Editorial Note

153. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson)

Washington, November 30, 1956.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Staff Secretary Records. Top Secret. Secretary of Defense Wilson forwarded this memorandum to President Eisenhower on December 4. See Document 159.

154. Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation Between the Israeli Ambassador (Eban) in New York and the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree) in Washington, November 30, 1956

Washington, November 30, 1956

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/11–3056. Secret. Drafted by Rountree.

155. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State

Tehran, December 2, 1956—3 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/12-256. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Ankara, Baghdad, Karachi, London, and Paris.

156. Informal Record of a Meeting, Secretary Dulles' Office, Department of State, Washington, December 3, 1956, 11:07 a.m.

Washington, December 3, 1956, 11:07 a.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.00/12-356. Secret. Drafted by Joseph N. Greene, Jr. The time of the meeting is from Dulles' Appointment Book. (Princeton University, Dulles Papers)

157. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Murphy) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree) and the Assistant Secretary's Special Assistant (Burdett)

Washington, December 3, 1956.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.80/12-356. Secret. Copies were sent to Dulles, Hoover, and Henderson. The date 12-3-56 is written in hand on the source text.

158. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, December 4, 1956, 10:30 a.m.

Washington, December 4, 1956, 10:30 a.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/12-456. Secret. Drafted by Rountree.

159. Letter From the Secretary of Defense (Wilson) to the President

Washington, December 4, 1956.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Staff Secretary Records. Top Secret. Attached to the source text is Document 153; a memorandum from Assistant Secretary of Defense Gordon Gray to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, dated October 22; four pages of excerpts from Department of State telegrams, quoting statements of foreign leaders and U.S. diplomats to the effect that the United States should join the Baghdad Pact; a paper entitled “Statement by Defense of the Reasons for U.S. Adherence to the Baghdad Pact at This Time”, printed below; and a paper entitled “Statement by State of the Reasons Against U.S. Adherence to the Baghdad Pact at This Time”, also printed below.

160. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree) to the Secretary of State

Washington, December 5, 1956.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.80/12–356. Secret. Drafted by Mathews and Burdett on December 4.

161. Paper Prepared in the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs and the Policy Planning Staff

Washington, December 5, 1956.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 661.80/12–556. Secret. Forwarded to Secretary Dulles under cover of a December 5 memorandum from Bowie and Rountree, indicating that the paper was a revised version of the one discussed at the December 3 meeting and should be considered in conjunction with the paper attached at Tab A, supra. Wilcox, Phleger, and Barnes concurred in the paper. The Bureau of European Affairs concurred in the general approach. Murphy noted on the source text: “comments forthcoming.” Henderson concurred “subject to reservation favoring Baghdad Pact.” MacArthur submitted no comments on the paper.

162. Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

Washington, December 6, 1956.

Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 58 D 460, Baghdad Pact, 1956. Secret.

163. Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation Between the President in Augusta, Georgia, and the Secretary of State in Washington, December 6, 1956, 4:50 p.m.

Washington, December 6, 1956, 4:50 p.m.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, White House Telephone Conversations. Transcribed by Carolyn J. Proctor. A note on the source text indicates that she was able to hear only Secretary Dulles' part of the conversation.

164. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree) to the Secretary of State

Washington, December 7, 1956.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.00/12-756. Top Secret. Drafted by Rountree.

165. Informal Record of a Meeting, Secretary Dulles' Office, Department of State, Washington, December 7, 1956, 11 a.m.

Washington, December 7, 1956, 11 a.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.80/12-756. Secret. Drafted by Greene.

166. Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation Between the President and the Secretary of State, Washington, December 8, 1956, 11:53 a.m.

Washington, December 8, 1956, 11:53 a.m.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, White House Telephone Conversations. Transcribed by Carolyn J. Proctor.

167. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Secretary of State and Senator William F. Knowland, Secretary Dulles' Residence, Washington, December 8, 1956, Noon–1:15 p.m.

Washington, December 8, 1956, 1:15 p.m.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Memoranda of Conversations. Secret; Personal and Private. Drafted by Dulles on December 9.

168. Memorandum From the Acting Secretary of State to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Murphy)

Washington, December 10, 1956.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.80/12–1056. Secret.

169. Memorandum of a Conversation, Ambassador Dillon's Residence, Paris, December 10, 1956, 9:45 a.m.

Paris, December 10, 1956, 9:45 a.m.

Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 62 D 181, CF 814. Secret. Prepared by the U.S. Delegation to the North Atlantic Council Ministerial Meeting. The source text bears the following marginal notation by Macomber: "OK WM." Secretary Dulles was in Paris December 9–14 to attend the 18th Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council. For additional documentation on discussions at the Ministerial Meeting pertaining to the Middle East, see vol. XVI, pp. 1278–1306.

170. Special National Intelligence Estimate

Washington, December 14, 1956.

Source: Department of State, INR–NIE Files. Top Secret. According to a note on the cover sheet, “The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff.” It was concurred in by the Intelligence Advisory Committee on December 14.

171. Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Murphy) to the Secretary of State

Washington, December 15, 1956.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.80/12–1556. Secret. Drafted by Rountree and Wilkins. According to notations on the source text, the memorandum was cleared with Henderson, Phleger, and Hoover who wrote the following comment: “The economic fund will have to be correlated with our MSA requests before the Bureau of the Budget within the next few days.” Another marginal notation reads: “Sec saw.”

172. Note Prepared by Roger G. Sturgill of the Executive Secretariat

Washington, December 18, 1956.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.80/12–1856. Confidential.

173. Memorandum by the Secretary of State

Washington, December 18, 1956.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.80/12–1856. Top Secret. Sent to Secretary of Defense Wilson on December 18 under cover of a letter that reads: “I enclose herewith a memorandum indicating what I discussed

yesterday. I am sending a copy of this to Admiral Radford. I hope that at this stage it will be kept top secret.” See supra.

174. Memorandum of a Conference With the President, Washington, December 19, 1956, 2:30 p.m.

Washington, December 19, 1956, 2:30 p.m.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster on December 20.

175. Memorandum of a Conference With the President, Washington, December 20, 1956

Washington, December 20, 1956

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Memoranda of Conversations with the President. Top Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster.

176. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, December 20, 1956

Washington, December 20, 1956

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 887.2553/12–2156. Confidential. Drafted by Rountree and Waggoner on December 21.

177. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the President and the Secretary of State, White House, Washington, December 22, 1956, 6 p.m.

Washington, December 22, 1956, 6 p.m.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Meetings with the President. Secret; Personal and Private. Drafted by Dulles. A handwritten notation on the source text reads: “No dist[ribution].”

178. Operations Coordinating Board Report

Washington, December 22, 1956.

Source: Department of State, S/S-NEA Files: Lot 61 D 167, Near East (NSC 5428). Top Secret. Transmitted to James S. Lay, Jr., under cover of a memorandum from Elmer B. Staats that indicated that the progress report was concurred in by the Operations Coordinating Board on December 19. Staats also noted: "In considering this report, the Board agreed that transmission of the report to the National Security Council be delayed about a week to permit recording the final withdrawal of the U.K. and French forces from Egypt, if that event took place as expected. This report, therefore, covers the period from May 18, 1956 through December 22, 1956." The progress report was discussed at the 310th meeting of the NSC on January 24, 1957; see Document 187.

179. Editorial Note

180. Editorial Note

181. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France

Washington, December 29, 1956—4:18 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5-MSP/12-2956. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Elbrick, cleared with Rountree, and approved by Secretary Dulles. Also sent to London.

182. Memorandum of a Meeting, White House, Washington, January 1, 1957, 2-5:50 p.m.

Washington, January 1, 1957, 5:50 p.m.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Legislative Meetings. Confidential. Drafted by L. Arthur Minnich.

183. Editorial Note

184. Editorial Note

185. Memorandum From the Secretary of Defense (Wilson) to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay)

Washington, January 10, 1957.

Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5428 Memos. Top Secret. Attached to a January 17 memorandum from Lay to the National Security Council that indicates the President approved Secretary Wilson's recommendation contained in this memorandum.

186. Editorial Note

187. Editorial Note

188. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, January 25, 1957

Washington, January 25, 1957

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 880.2553/1-2557. Confidential. Drafted by Williams.

189. Editorial Note

190. Editorial Note

191. Memorandum of a Conference With the President, Washington, March 6, 1957

Washington, March 6, 1957

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries. Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster on March 7.

192. Position Paper Prepared in the Department of State

Washington, March 8, 1957.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 120.1580/5–3157. Top Secret. The source text is marked “General Paper 11” and is part of a series of position papers, drafted in the Department of State, in preparation for the special mission of Ambassador Richards to the Middle East. In addition to 11 position papers concerning economic, military, and procedural issues in general, papers analyzing the possibilities for involvement in the President’s special Middle East program were prepared for the following countries: Afghanistan, Egypt, Ethiopia, Greece, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, and Yemen. All of these papers are *ibid*. Documentation on the Richards Mission in general is printed in this compilation. Documentation concerning those aspects of the Richards Mission pertaining to individual countries is printed in the respective compilations in volumes XIII, XVI, and XVIII. Additional documentation relating to the Mission is in Department of State, Central File 120.1580 and NEA Files: Lot 57 D 616, which contains Ambassador Richards’ personal files. The position paper printed here is a revision of a paper originally drafted on February 27. A cover sheet indicates that the paper was drafted by Burdett and cleared with Memminger, Stevens, Rockwell, Jones, and Withers in the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs; with the Office of Eastern European Affairs; and with Mathews of the Policy Planning Staff, except for recommendation 6. The paper was also cleared with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and with the Department of Defense “as appropriate guidance for the Richards Mission from a military viewpoint.”

193. Editorial Note

194. Letter From the President to His Special Assistant (Richards)

Washington, March 9, 1957.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Administration Series. The text of this letter was drafted in the Department of State by Burdett and Mathews and transmitted to the White House on March 4 under cover of a memorandum from Secretary Dulles to President Eisenhower. In the memorandum, Dulles suggested that the President meet with Richards prior to his departure, and that in order to focus attention on the mission there be a short ceremony when the President signed the Joint Resolution on the Middle East Program. Dulles also transmitted under cover of the March 4 memorandum a suggested statement for the President's possible use during such a ceremony. Notations on copies of these documents in Department of State, Central Files, 120.1580/3-457, indicate that Eisenhower initialed his approval on March 9 and that the President, Secretary Dulles, and Ambassador Richards revised the suggested statement prior to its delivery by the President. The memorandum of Eisenhower's meeting with Dulles and Richards on March 6 is printed as Document 191.

[195. Letter From the Secretary of State to the President's Special Assistant \(Richards\)](#)

Washington, March 9, 1957.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 120.1580/3-957. Secret. Drafted by Burdett and Mathews.

[196. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Turkey](#)

Washington, March 9, 1957—2:23 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 880.2553/3-957. Confidential. Drafted by Owen T. Jones and approved by Rountree. Also sent to Tehran, Baghdad, Rome, London, and Paris.

[197. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions](#)

Washington, March 12, 1957.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 120.1580/3–1257. Secret; Limit Distribution. Sent to Ankara, London, Baghdad, Karachi, Tehran, Paris, Paris (for Perkins), Jidda, Tel Aviv, Cairo, Damascus, New Delhi, Moscow, Athens, Beirut, Khartoum, Tripoli, Kabul, and Addis Ababa.

198. Agreed United States-United Kingdom Position Paper

Washington, March 16, 1957.

Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 62 D 181, CF 856. Secret. A cover sheet indicates that the paper was prepared jointly by representatives of the British Embassy in Washington and the Department of State and that, within the Department of State, it was approved in substance by Rountree, Moline, Corbett, Beckner, and Metzger. The paper was one of several agreed position papers done in preparation for the Anglo-American Heads of Government Conference at Bermuda. See the editorial note, *infra*. The paper was discussed at a meeting of Department of State and British Embassy officials on March 8. The memorandum of the conversation is *ibid.*, Central File, 880.2553/3–857. The recommended position was formally approved by the two governments on March 23.

199. Editorial Note

200. Telegram From the President's Special Assistant (Richards) to the Delegation at the Bermuda Conference

Ankara, March 21, 1957—7 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 120.1580/3–2157. Secret; Niact. Also sent to the Department of State as telegram 2169, which is the source text.

201. Memorandum of a Conversation, Mid-Ocean Club, Bermuda, March 21, 1957, 8 p.m.

Tucker's Town, Bermuda, March 21, 1957, 8 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 62 D 181, CF 861. Secret. Drafted by Rountree.

202. Memorandum of a Conversation, Mid-Ocean Club, Bermuda, March 21, 1957, 10:30 a.m.

Tucker's Town, Bermuda, March 21, 1957, 10:30 a.m.

Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 62 D 181, CF 861. Secret. Drafted by Walmsley. The Delegation at Bermuda transmitted a summary of this conversation to the Department of State in Secto 8, March 22.

203. Memorandum of a Conversation, Mid-Ocean Club, Bermuda, March 23, 1957, 10:30 a.m.

Tucker's Town, Bermuda, March 23, 1957, 10:30 a.m.

Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 62 D 181, CF 861. Secret. Drafted by Wilkins.

204. Paper Agreed Upon at the Conference at Bermuda

Bermuda, March 23, 1957.

Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 62 D 181, CF 868. Secret.

205. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iraq

Washington, March 28, 1957—1:35 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 120.1580/3-2357. Secret. Drafted by Newsom and approved by Rountree who signed for Dulles.

Repeated to Jidda, Beirut, Karachi, London, Tehran, Ankara, Cairo, and Damascus.

206. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Sprague) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Murphy)

Washington, March 28, 1957.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/3–2857. Top Secret.

207. Telegram From the President's Special Assistant (Richards) to the Department of State

Karachi, March 28, 1957—8 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 120.1580/3–2857. Secret. Repeated to Cairo, Damascus, Amman, and Jidda.

208. Telegram From the Department of State to the President's Special Assistant (Richards), at Karachi

Washington, March 30, 1957—12:40 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 120.1580/3–2857. Secret. Drafted by Newsom and approved by Rountree who signed for Dulles. Repeated to Baghdad, Cairo, Damascus, Amman, and Jidda.

209. Memorandum for the Record by the Secretary of State's Special Assistant (Macomber)

Washington, April 1957.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers. Confidential; Personal and Private.

210. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, April 4, 1957

Washington, April 4, 1957

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 880.2553/4-457. Confidential. Drafted by Dillon.

211. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree) to the Secretary of State

Washington, April 4, 1957.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 120.1580/5-1057. Secret. Drafted by Don C. Bliss. Also addressed to the Under Secretary of State.

212. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree) to the Secretary of State

Washington, April 4, 1957.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 120.1580/5-1057. Secret. Drafted by Bliss. Also addressed to the Under Secretary of State.

213. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree) to the Secretary of State

Washington, April 4, 1957.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 120.1580/5-1057. Secret. Drafted by Bliss. Also addressed to the Under Secretary of State.

214. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree) to the Secretary of State

Washington, April 4, 1957.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 120.1580/5–1057. Secret. Drafted by Bliss. Also addressed to the Under Secretary of State.

215. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree) to the Secretary of State

Washington, April 4, 1957.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 120.1580/5–1057. Secret. Drafted by Bliss. Also addressed to the Under Secretary of State.

216. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree) to the Secretary of State

Washington, April 4, 1957.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 120.1580/5–1057. Secret. Drafted by Bliss. Also addressed to the Under Secretary of State.

217. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree) to the Secretary of State

Washington, April 16, 1957.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 120.1580/5–1057. Secret. Drafted by Bliss. Also addressed to the Under Secretary of State.

218. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree) to the Secretary of State

Washington, April 16, 1957.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 120.1580/5–1057. Secret. Drafted by Bliss. Also addressed to the Under Secretary of State.

219. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree) to the Secretary of State

Washington, April 17, 1957.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 120.1580/5–1057. Secret. Drafted by Bliss. Also addressed to the Under Secretary of State.

220. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree) to the Acting Secretary of State

Washington, April 13, 1957.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 880.2553/4–1357. Secret.

221. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, April 17, 1957

Washington, April 17, 1957

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 880.2553/4–1757. Secret. Drafted by Newsom.

222. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, April 18, 1957

Washington, April 18, 1957

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 880.2553/4–1857. Secret.
Drafted by Newsom.

223. Background Paper Prepared in the Department of State

Washington, April 19, 1957.

Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 62 D 181, CF 871. Confidential. According to a note on the cover sheet, this paper was drafted by Bensusky and cleared by Rockwell and Beckner. It was one of a series of papers prepared for the Delegation to the North Atlantic Council Ministerial meeting at Bonn, May 2–4. In the records of the Delegation, the paper was designated NMB B–18/51.

224. Telegram From the President's Special Assistant (Richards) to the Department of State

Asmara, April 19, 1957.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 120.1580/4–1957. Confidential; Niact. Repeated Priority to Amman and to Cairo, Baghdad, Jidda, and Damascus.

225. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree) to the Secretary of State

Washington, April 22, 1957.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 120.1580/5–1057. Secret.
Drafted by Bliss. Also addressed to the Under Secretary of State.

226. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree) to the Secretary

of State

Washington, April 23, 1957.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 120.1580/5–1057. Secret. Drafted by Bliss. Also addressed to the Under Secretary of State.

227. Telegram From the Department of State to the President's Special Assistant (Richards), at Asmara

Washington, April 23, 1957—10:11 a.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 120.1580/4–2357. Secret. Drafted by Rountree and approved by Secretary Dulles.

228. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree) to the Secretary of State

Washington, April 27, 1957.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 120.1580/5–1057. Secret. Drafted by Bliss. Also addressed to the Under Secretary of State.

229. Telegram From the Department of State to the President's Special Assistant (Richards), at Athens

Washington, April 30, 1957—9:22 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 120.1580/4–3057. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Bergus and Rountree and approved by Herter who signed for Dulles.

230. Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation Between the President's Special Assistant (Richards) in Athens and the Acting Secretary of State in Washington, May 1, 1957, 10:10 a.m.

Washington, May 1, 1957, 10:10 a.m.

Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 57 D 616. Confidential.
Prepared in the Office of the Secretary of State.

231. Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation Between the President's Special Assistant (Richards) in Athens and the Acting Secretary of State in Washington, May 1, 1957, 10:55 a.m.

Washington, May 1, 1957, 10:55 a.m.

Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 57 D 616. Confidential.
Prepared in the Office of the Secretary of State.

232. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions

Washington, May 1, 1957—10:06 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 120.1580/5–157. Confidential.
Sent to Addis Ababa, Amman, Ankara, Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Jidda, Kabul, Karachi, Khartoum, Tehran, and Tripoli.

233. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree) to the Secretary of State

Washington, May 8, 1957.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 120.1580/5–1057. Secret.
Drafted by Latham. Also addressed to the Under Secretary of State.

234. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree) to the Acting Secretary of State

Washington, May 8, 1957.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 120.1580/5–1057. Secret.
Drafted by Wade Lathram.

235. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree) to the Acting Secretary of State

Washington, May 8, 1957.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 120.1580/5–1057. Secret.
Drafted by Lathram.

236. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree) to the Secretary of State

Washington, May 9, 1957.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 120.1580/5–1057. Secret.
Drafted by Lathram. Also addressed to the Under Secretary of State.

237. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree) to the Secretary of State

Washington, May 10, 1957.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 120.1580/5–1057. Secret.
Drafted by Lathram. Also addressed to the Under Secretary of State.

238. Memorandum of a Meeting With the Secretary of State, Department of State, Washington, May 13, 1957, 11 a.m.

Washington, May 13, 1957, 11 a.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.80/5–1357. Secret. Drafted by Fisher Howe.

239. Memorandum of a Meeting With the Secretary of State, Department of State, Washington, May 14, 1957, 3 p.m.

Washington, May 14, 1957, 3 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 790.00/5–1457. Secret. Drafted by Fisher Howe.

240. Editorial Note

241. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Murphy)

Washington, May 14, 1957.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/5–1457. Top Secret.

242. Memorandum for the File by Eli Stevens of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs

Washington, May 15, 1957.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/5–1457. Top Secret.

243. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

Washington, June 1, 1957—2:50 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 880.2553/6–157. Secret.

244. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Embassy in Pakistan

London, June 4, 1957—4 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 880.2553/6-457. Secret; Limited Distribution. Repeated to the Department of State as telegram 6678, which is the source text.

245. Briefing Paper Prepared in the Department of State

Washington, June 5, 1957.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 880.2553/6-3057. Confidential. Drafted by John F. Shaw of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs.

246. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

Washington, June 5, 1957—7:13 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 880.2553/6-557. Secret; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Karachi for Henderson.

247. Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

Washington, June 20, 1957.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.41/6-2057. Secret. Sent through the Executive Secretariat and Rountree.

248. Editorial Note

249. Memorandum on the Substance of Discussions at the Department of State-Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting, Washington, June 27, 1957, 11

a.m.

Washington, June 27, 1957, 11 a.m.

Source: Department of State, State-JCS Meetings: Lot 61 D 417. Top Secret.

250. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Egypt

Washington, July 2, 1957–6:25 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 880.2553/6–2857. Confidential. Repeated to Jidda.

251. Memorandum of a Conversation Between Secretary of State Dulles and Prime Minister Suhrawardy, Department of State, Washington, July 10, 1957, 4 p.m.

Washington, July 10, 1957, 4 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199. Secret. Prepared in the Office of the Secretary of State.

252. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

Washington, July 10, 1957—6:27 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 880.2553/7–1057. Confidential. Drafted by Shaw and approved by Dillon who signed for Dulles. Also sent to Paris and The Hague and repeated to Ankara, Baghdad, and Tehran.

253. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, July 12, 1957

Washington, July 12, 1957

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/7–1257. Secret. Drafted by Howison and Withers.

254. Memorandum From the Department of State Representative on the NSC Planning Board (Bowie) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Cutler)

Washington, August 1, 1957.

Source: Department of State, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 61 D 167, Middle East Petroleum Pipeline System, Construction of; NSC 5722. Secret. This memorandum and the attached background paper were circulated to the NSC Planning Board on August 5 under cover of a memorandum from Marion W. Boggs. After Planning Board discussion of the subject and preparation by appropriate agencies of any additional studies desired by the Planning Board, the Department of State was to prepare a draft statement of policy as the basis for a report to the NSC.

255. Editorial Note

256. Editorial Note

257. Memorandum Prepared in the Department of the Interior

Washington, August 1957.

Source: Department of State, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 61 D 167, Middle East Petroleum Pipeline System, Construction of; NSC 5722. Secret. Circulated under cover of an August 26 memorandum from Boggs to the NSC Planning Board for use in connection with its discussion of this subject on August 30. (Ibid.)

258. Memorandum of a Conversation, Washington, August 26, 1957

Washington, August 26, 1957

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 880.2553/8–2657. Secret.
Drafted by Rountree.

259. Memorandum From William Leonhart of the Policy Planning Staff to the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Kalijarvi)

Washington, August 30, 1957.

Source: Department of State, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 61 D 167, Middle East Petroleum Pipeline System, Construction of; NSC 5722. Secret.

260. Memorandum From the Director of the National Security Council Secretariat (Boggs) to the National Security Council Planning Board

Washington, September 5, 1957.

Source: Department of State, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 61 D 167, NSC 5801 File.
Top Secret.

261. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree) to the Secretary of State

Washington, September 6, 1957.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 680.00/9–657. Confidential.
Drafted by John Dorman, Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs.

262. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, September 25, 1957, 11:59 a.m.

Washington, September 25, 1957, 11:59 a.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 880.00/9–2557. Confidential. Drafted by Torbert. The time of the meeting is from Dulles' Appointment Book. (Princeton University Library, Dulles Papers) Italian Foreign Minister Pella was in the United States as head of the Italian Delegation to the 12th session of the U.N. General Assembly.

263. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, September 25, 1957, 3:35 p.m.

Washington, September 25, 1957, 3:35 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 887.2553/9–2557. Secret. Drafted by Newsom. The time of the meeting is from Dulles' Appointment Book. (Princeton University Library, Dulles Papers) See also infra.

264. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, September 25, 1957, 3:35 p.m.

Washington, September 25, 1957, 3:35 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 880.00/9–2557. Secret. Drafted by Newsom. The time of the meeting is from Dulles' Appointment Book. (Princeton University Library, Dulles Papers) See also supra.

265. National Security Council Report

Washington, September 30, 1957.

Source: Department of State, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 61 D 167, Middle East Petroleum Pipeline System, Construction of; NSC 5722. Secret. Not printed are an annex and accompanying table that set forth the probable shortfall in petroleum supplies to the Eastern Hemisphere west of Suez in 1965 under certain assumptions involving the closure of all or part of Middle East transit facilities in an emergency short of general war.

266. National Intelligence Estimate

Washington, October 8, 1957.

Source: Department of State, INR-NIE Files. Secret. According to a note on the cover sheet: "The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force and The Joint Staff." It was concurred in by the Intelligence Advisory Committee on October 8. Two tables, entitled "Importance of Middle East Oil in the Supply of Free World Petroleum Requirements" and "Production and Disposition of Middle East Oil, 1956, 1960, 1965," are not printed. The source text indicates they were taken from "Studies of the Petroleum Sub-Committee of the Economic Intelligence Committee."

267. Memorandum From the Director of the National Security Council Secretariat (Boggs) to the National Security Council Planning Board

Washington, October 8, 1957.

Source: Department of State, S/P-NSC Files: Lot 61 D 167, NSC 5801 File. Top Secret.

268. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree) to the Secretary of State

Washington, October 9, 1957.

Source: Department of State, S/P-NSC Files: Lot 61 D 167, Middle East Petroleum Pipeline System, Construction of; NSC 5722. Secret. Drafted by Shaw and concurred in by Murphy, Jones, Mann, Dillon, and Raymond.

269. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Secretary of State and the Under Secretary of State (Hoover), Department of State, Washington, October 21, 1957, 11:15 a.m.

Washington, October 21, 1957, 11:15 a.m.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Memoranda of Conversation. Confidential; Personal and Private. Drafted by Dulles.

270. Staff Study Prepared in the Department of State

Washington, October 30, 1957.

Source: Department of State, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 61 D 167, NSC 5801 File. Top Secret. A memorandum from Boggs to the National Security Council Planning Board transmitting the Staff Study for discussion at the Planning Board’s meeting of November 5 and a table of contents are not printed.

271. Memorandum on the Substance of Discussion at the Department of State–Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting, Washington, November 1, 1957, 11:30 a.m.

Washington, November 1, 1957, 11:30 a.m.

Source: Department of State, State–JCS Files: Lot 61 D 417. Top Secret. The source text indicates that the memorandum is a “State Draft. Not cleared with Department of Defense.”

272. Memorandum Presented to the National Security Council Planning Board

Washington, November 4, 1957.

Source: Department of State, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 61 D 167, NSC 5801 File. Top Secret. A November 8 transmittal memorandum from Boggs to the National Security Council Planning Board is not printed. It indicates the memorandum was presented to the Planning Board at its November 5 meeting; see infra.

273. Editorial Note

274. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, November 13, 1957

Washington, November 13, 1957

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.00/11–1357. Confidential. Drafted by Stabler.

275. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State

London, November 13, 1957—1 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 880.2553/11–1357. Confidential.

276. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, November 19, 1957

Washington, November 19, 1957

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/11–1957. Secret. Drafted by Rountree.

277. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Italy

Washington, November 22, 1957—5:08 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 880.0000/11–2857. Confidential.

278. Editorial Note

279. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, December 6, 1957

Washington, December 6, 1957

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 880.0000/12-657. Confidential.
Drafted by Engle.

280. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, December 6, 1957

Washington, December 6, 1957

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 880.0000/12-657. Confidential.
Drafted by Long.

281. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Egypt

Washington, December 9, 1957—7:28 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 880.0000/12-957. Confidential;
Priority. Also sent priority to Amman, Damascus, Beirut, Baghdad, Jidda,
Khartoum, and Tripoli. Repeated to Benghazi, Paris, and Rome.

282. Memorandum on the Substance of Discussion at the Department of State-Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting, Pentagon, Washington, December 13, 1957, 11:30 a.m.

Washington, December 13, 1957, 11:30 a.m.

Source: Department of State, State-JCS Meetings: Lot 61 D 417. Top
Secret. A note on the cover sheet reads: "State Draft. Not cleared with
Department of Defense."

283. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, December 17, 1957

Washington, December 17, 1957

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 880.2553/12-1757. Confidential. Drafted by Shaw.

284. Memorandum of a Conversation, U.S. Embassy Residence, Paris, December 18, 1957, 10:30 a.m.

Paris, December 18, 1957, 10:30 a.m.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File. Secret. Drafted by Stuart Rockwell of the U.S. Delegation to the NATO Heads of Government meeting, held at Paris, December 16-19. Another copy of this memorandum of conversation is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 947. Documentation on the NATO Heads of Government meeting is printed in vol. IV, pp. 218 ff. For text of the final communiqué, issued on December 19, see Department of State Bulletin, January 6, 1958, pp. 12-15.

285. Memorandum of a Conversation, Paris, December 19, 1957, 4 p.m.

Paris, December 19, 1957, 4 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 947. Secret. Drafted by Rockwell. The meeting took place at the Turkish NATO Delegation.

1. Editorial Note

The policies of the United States toward the Middle East in effect at the beginning of 1955 were substantially those that had been spelled out 6 months earlier in NSC 5428, “United States Objectives and Policies With Respect to the Near East.” For text, see [Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, volume IX, Part 1, page 525](#). President Eisenhower approved the paper on July 23, 1954, directing that it be implemented by all appropriate executive departments and agencies of the U.S. Government. Periodic progress reports on the implementation of NSC 5428, are printed in this compilation; several subsequent revisions of the paper with respect to the Arab-Israeli dispute are printed in [volumes XIV](#) and [XV](#).

One important aspect of U.S. policy toward the Near East not included in NSC 5428 was project “Alpha,” a joint U.S.-U.K. effort to encourage a peace settlement between Israel and the Arab States. Planning for this project, which involved a number of regional questions, began in December 1954. U.S. involvement in Alpha is fully documented in [Foreign Relations, 1952-1954, volume IX, Part 1](#), and [volume XIV](#).

At the beginning of 1955, questions of regional defense in the Middle East continued to be the subject of American interest. Following his return from a visit to the Middle East in the spring of 1953, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles had suggested the formation of a defense arrangement among the states of the “northern tier” (i.e., Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Pakistan) to contain the Soviet Union. Such a configuration began to take place in 1954. Turkey and Pakistan signed an agreement for friendly cooperation on April 2, 1954 (211 UNTS 264), and in the fall of 1954 Turkey and Iraq began to negotiate a security pact. The Eisenhower administration welcomed and encouraged these developments as the first stages of a potential joint arrangement among the northern tier states for the defense of the Middle East, and the administration took an active interest in providing military assistance to those states.

Turkey and Iraq signed a Pact of Mutual Cooperation at Baghdad on February 24, 1955. For text, see 233 UNTS 199. This pact, known as the

Baghdad Pact, was subsequently adhered to by the United Kingdom on April 5, by Pakistan on September 23, and by Iran on November 3.

2. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan¹

Washington, January 14, 1955—7:55 p.m.

275. If approached by government to which accredited re Baghdad statement² intention, Turkish and Iraqi Governments conclude mutual defense treaty you should state USG's position as follows:

1. We have always supported efforts states achieve greater degree stability and security through cooperative undertakings. In particular we have favored increased collaboration between states interested in developing Middle East defense against possible Communist aggression.
2. We welcome Turkish-Iraqi declaration intention as constructive step taken recognition need develop effective defenses in areas at present exposed and unprotected against danger Communist expansion.
3. We prepared assist Turkish and Iraqi efforts achieve realistic and effective defense arrangement.
4. We believe Arab states should welcome development as important step contributing to their own security.³

Murphy

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/1-1455. Confidential. Drafted by Fritzlán and approved for transmission by Jernegan, who signed for Murphy. Sent also to Beirut and Damascus; repeated to Ankara, Baghdad, Cairo, Jidda, London, and Tel Aviv.

² On January 12 and 13, 1955, following a week of talks in Baghdad between Turkish Prime Minister Adnan Menderes and Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Said, the Iraqi and Turkish Governments jointly issued a communiqué announcing that Iraq and Turkey would conclude a military

alliance that other Middle Eastern states would be invited to join. The text of this communiqué is in Noble Frankland (ed.), *Documents on International Affairs, 1955*, pp. 286–287. Documentation on the Menderes–Nuri talks is in Department of State, Central Files 033.8287 and 780.5.

³ The Department of State sent a similar telegram to the Embassy in Jidda with the following additional instruction: “Should you consider it desirable you may assure SAG our support of northern tier developments should in no way be construed as implying reduction US military training efforts Saudi Arabia. These efforts to be continued.”(Telegram 314, January 14; *Ibid.*, 780.5/1–1455)

3. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel¹

Washington, January 14, 1955—7:55 p.m.

401. If approached by IG re published intention Turk and Iraq Govts conclude mutual defense treaty you may take following line:

1)

Conclusion of Turk-Iraq mutual defense treaty will mark another step forward in construction of “northern tier” defenses against Soviet imperialism. This process can only result in enhancement of security of the entire region including Israel.

It is gratifying to note Iraq is entering into further arrangements committing her to cooperation with free world in resisting designs of USSR which has proved itself to be unsympathetic to Israel and active in fomenting discord and promoting instability in area.

2) Israel should also feel gratification at fact Iraq has chosen strengthen her ties with Turkey with full knowledge of Turkey’s close relations with Israel (relations recently strengthened by Israel-Turkey trade agreement)² and Turkey’s public declarations that close relations with Israel will be maintained. This

willingness on Iraq's part subordinate hostility toward Israel to compelling threat from North is encouraging sign.

3) USG is aware IG's sense of isolation resulting from fact network of security arrangements is emerging which do not as yet include Israel. You may assure IG that USG has not lost sight advantage to free world of integrating Israel into NE security arrangements at appropriate time. We feel Turkish endeavors to strengthen will to resist Soviet aggression among Arab states can go far toward hastening time IG's entry into arrangements. We ask IG take these assurances at face value and give careful consideration our considered advice that present Turkish efforts should receive tacit IG support and that IG look upon these developments from viewpoint her long-term interests in becoming fully-accepted member of the area.

Ambassador Ankara in his discretion authorized approach Prime Minister and suggest he reassure Israel along foregoing or any other lines Prime Minister considers most effective.

Murphy

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 682.87/1-1455. Confidential. Drafted by Bergus and approved by Jernegan who signed for Murphy. Also sent to Ankara; repeated to Baghdad, London, Amman, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Jidda, Jerusalem, and Paris.

² Reference is presumably to the Israel-Turkey Trade and Payments Agreements signed at Ankara on July 4, 1950 (text enclosed in despatch 67 from Ankara, August 9, 1950; *Ibid.*, 482.84A31/8-950), and to the agreement relating to the sale of Turkish wheat to Israel signed at Ankara on April 4, 1953 (text enclosed in despatch 830 from Ankara, June 24, 1953; *Ibid.*, 484A.8231/6-2453).

4. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Egypt¹

Washington, January 14, 1955—7:56 p.m.

1100. FYI: We hope Turk-Iraq announcement re defense agreement will lead soon to signature treaty and plan extend appropriate encouragement. We desire minimize adverse Egyptian reaction already evident preventing setback to new cordiality between Turks and Egyptians and avoiding adoption by RCC extreme public stand from which difficult retreat in future. Our intent is foster eventual Turkish-Egyptian treaty; ideally first step would be taken during, Menderes visit in March. Conceivably Iraq-Egyptian rivalry will assist in including Egypt move forward. End FYI.

In response to any GOE inquiries Embassy Cairo in its discretion may take following line.

1. We believe announcement significant step towards assuring security of area including Egypt against aggression from any quarter. We hope Turkey and Iraq win move rapidly to translate declaration into firm treaty. Nasser has specifically stated he recognizes threat could develop only from USSR. Treaty envisaged specifically designed to meet this contingency.
2. We aware Egyptian belief Arab states should act as bloc but think treaty described can provide more quickly and effectively for real area strength without impairing or conflicting with role of Arab League.
3. We note statement in communiqué re participation other states in position contribute to area strength. Egypt may wish explore with Turkey desirability taking lead this connection.
4. We believe would be unfortunate for Egypt adopt negative attitude towards project and counsel moderation. Opposition

would have adverse effect on public attitude towards Egypt in US where strong support exists for such security arrangements. Also could embarrass GOE if Government later decided Egypt's interests best served by similar agreement.

Embassy Ankara at its discretion should suggest Menderes may wish send appropriate message to Nasser re announcement and possibility discussing defense arrangements during, Menderes visit in March. General views given Deptel 548 to Ankara² remain valid.

Murphy

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/1-1455. Secret. Drafted by Burdett and approved by Jernegan who signed for Murphy. Also sent to Ankara, repeated to Baghdad, and pouched to Amman, Beirut, Damascus, Jidda, Tel Aviv, and London.

² Telegram 548 to Ankara, November 11, 1954, is printed in, [*Foreign Relations, 1952-1954, vol. IX, Part 1, p. 557.*](#)

5. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State¹

Cairo, January 17, 1955—3 p.m.

956. 1. foreign Minister Fawzi sent for me today to make clear Egypt's "unfavorable first reaction" Turk-Iraqi pact. Fawzi said Egypt would have to learn more about pact from Nuri (whom he expects to see January 22) and would have to consult its Arab friends, but he wished to make it distinctly clear Egypt does not approve of "the way, the timing and some other ingredients of what Iraq has done". Nuri's move in Egypt's view goes counter to what Egypt considers is the normal sequence of events, i.e., each Arab State should be strengthened and then coordinated into a larger unit of strength. He felt that, "parallel to military unreadiness of Arab States, there is a politico-psychological unreadiness for Iraq's move among the Arabs". He feared pact would cause a "retrogression in the improving atmosphere in the Arab States towards the West" and remarked that "it is not wise for anybody to try to force the kicking and screaming Arab world into a position for which it is unready". He said pact idea was "very badly timed" and reminded him somewhat of the "clumsy MEDO proposals in the autumn of 1951".

2. Fawzi said he hoped that whatever Egypt did in this matter would not be considered unfriendly by, "our Western friends". There would be no such intention. While Egypt did not like the method and timing of pact it had no quarrel with its ultimate objective.

3. He feared that West would experience some loss of popularity as a result of new development since many Arabs will believe pact has been, "fomented by the West" and is Western effort to destroy Arab unity.

4. I then gave Fawzi substance paragraphs 1 through 4 Department's 1100, January 14,² laying particular stress on paragraph 2 and on Egypt not assuming a position from which it might be embarrassing to move later. I reminded Fawzi of our attitude towards Northern Tier (Embtel 980, January 8).³ I suggested that dynamics of situation should not be overlooked and

said that a wholly negative attitude by Egypt at meeting of Prime Ministers would not create a good impression in US or, I thought, in Arab States.

5. Fawzi assured me that “Egypt hopes to do something constructive”. He said “Nuri wants to come and talk to us and that may be very helpful. We will avoid freezing our position.”

Jones

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 682.87/1–1755. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Baghdad, Ankara, Damascus, Beirut, Jidda, Tel Aviv, Amman, and Tehran.

² [Supra](#).

³ Not printed.

6. Telegram From the Embassy in Iraq to the Department of State¹

Baghdad, January 17, 1955—4 p.m.

456. Nuri, who is again somewhat indisposed, asked me to call at his home this morning.

He said he was disturbed over the campaign being conducted against him by Nasir. He felt it was wholly unjustified.

Turkish-Iraq relations, he went on, have been close since the early 20s. The closeness of these direct relations was underscored and their scope defined in the treaty of 1946.² What he had done last week in his talks with Menderes was in keeping with traditional Iraq-Turkish relations and within the spirit and framework of the 1946 treaty. "I have done no wrong," Nuri stressed at this point.

Continuing, he said that he was responsible only to the people of Iraq and to parliament. He was not responsible to any other country or government. He was sensitive, though, to Iraq's relations with her Arab neighbors. For that reason he had asked Turkish Prime Minister on his visits to Arab capitals to explain the nature of the agreement reached between the two countries.

Egypt, he said, has on occasion acted independently in the past. She had a right to do this and he had not objected. The most recent occasion was the agreement that Egypt worked out with British on Suez. Neither Iraq nor any other Arab country had been consulted by Egypt on that occasion.

Regardless of the opposition from Egypt, Nuri said he was going to push ahead with the formulation of the treaty with Turkey.

He now had a request to make. He had earlier today made a similar request to Hooper, British Chargé.

He wished our respective Governments to instruct our representatives in Cairo to approach the Egyptian Government with a view to arresting this

campaign against him and the proposed treaty with Turkey. It would help to have our two Governments tell the Egyptian Government that we regarded what was done in Baghdad last week as normal and constructive. He hoped this could be done before Arab League meeting called by, Fawzi for January 22.

I have seen Hooper and confirmed that Nuri spoke to him substantially along the same lines as he did with me and that Hooper is telegraphing the Foreign Office.

I suggest that, unless Cairo Embassy has already done so, it immediately make known to the Egyptian Government US views as outlined in Department's 1 100 January 14 to Cairo.³

Gallman

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 682.87/1-1755. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Cairo, London, Ankara, Karachi, Tehran, Amman, Beirut, Damascus, Tel Aviv, and Jidda.

² For text, see 37 UNTS 226.

³ [Document 4](#).

7. Editorial Note

Military planning discussions on Middle East defense began in London on January 18 among representatives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the British Chiefs of Staff, and the Turkish General Staff. The JCS representative was Admiral J.H. Cassady, USN, Commander in Chief, U.S. Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean (CINCNELM). Bilateral U.S.-U.K. talks were also held. The tripartite phase of the talks was concluded on February 21.

Admiral Cassady reported on the military planning discussions at a State–JCS meeting on April 15; the memorandum on the substance of discussion at that meeting [5 *pages of source text*] was not declassified. (Department of State, State–JCS Meetings: Lot 61 D 417) Additional documentation on the talks is in Department of State, Central File 780.5, and in National Archives and Records Administration, JCS Records, CCS 381 EMMEA (11–19–47) sees 19 and 22.

8. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel¹

Washington, January 19, 1955—6:36 p.m.

406. In conversation with Secretary January 19 Ambassador Eban reviewed Israeli hopes and fears along lines his presentation to Hoover on December 17. (See memorandum of conversation.)² Although he did not specifically warn against attempt at over-all peace settlement, he strongly implied that first and indispensable step should be satisfaction to Israel on three points:

1. Assurance balance of military power between Arabs and Israel would not be changed to disadvantage of latter;
2. Incorporation of Israel in some form of security arrangement;
3. Clear-cut and binding guarantee of Israel against Arab aggression.

The Ambassador emphasized that Israel did not oppose in principle development of security system such as that forecast by Iraqi-Turk announcement of January 13 but did feel anxious when such arrangements deliberately excluded Israel. Israeli Government did not agree with theory that association of Arabs with Turkey would bring benefits to Israel. On contrary, feared that Arabs would influence Turkey away from friendship with Israel. Pointed out Pakistan was linked to Turkey and to West but nevertheless had taken lead in opposing Israeli inclusion Afro-Asian Conference to be held Indonesia. Also pointed out Turkey had recently declined to speak in Security Council on *Bat Galim* case for fear of straining its new relations with Arabs. In any case Israel did not believe any splits in Arab League over collective security matters would affect solid front of Arab hostility toward Israel.

Eban concluded presentation by saying main elements of problem had now been clearly defined in course his talks with Department and he thought time had come to make effort to formulate solutions. Wondered whether he

and Secretary could not work together on this. Believed our differences not so great as might appear even though we probably could not agree immediately.

Secretary commented that we placed very different emphasis on proposed Iraqi adherence to pact with Turkey and consequent filling in of northern tier. He thought this was extremely important and constructive development which should be warmly welcomed by Israel. Considered it would tend to weaken solidarity of Arab League against Israel. Sharp adverse reaction of Egypt was better indication of significance this development than attitude expressed by Israelis. Did not suggest that Israel should publicly rejoice; for diplomatic reasons it would probably be best that she maintain her present public attitude, but he was confident that as things developed Israel would realize this trend was to her benefit.

The Secretary continued that he had been giving Arab-Israel problem much personal thought and attention. Was not yet in position to say anything concrete, since matter was very difficult and success required balanced approach. We were reviewing all angles and trying to map out an approach which might be new in some respects. Until we could decide on certain moves, less known about our thinking the better. We did not want public to get excited and start trying to guess our plans. He believed we would come up with something useful but could not yet say precisely when.

Eban spoke of need for early action because of difficulty Israeli Government having in restraining extremist elements. Secretary replied he understood problem and appreciated restrained policy Israelis have followed past several months. Considered this real contribution to peace prospects and compared it to restraint being shown by US in case of Chinese imprisonment of American flyers. Ambassador made point that stories in American and Middle Eastern press recently had indicated US contemplated no new action re Israeli-Arab problem. He indicated this made things even more difficult for his Government. Secretary said he would consider whether at his next press conference he might answer question in way which would show Department actively studying matter and not just coasting.

It was agreed Ambassador and Secretary would meet again either just before latter's departure for Manila Pact Conference Bangkok³ or just after his return. Secretary warned however he would probably still be unable say anything concrete at that time.

You are authorized convey to Sharett substance of Secretary's remarks, with emphasis on our appreciation Israeli restraint and need for its continuance.⁴

Dulles

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/1-1955. Confidential. Drafted by Jernegan who signed for, Dulles.

² [Foreign Relations, 1952-1954, vol. IX, Part 1, p. 1720.](#)

³ Secretary Dulles attended the initial meeting of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization Council of Ministers in Bangkok February 23-25.

⁴ Lawson reported on his subsequent discussion with Israeli Prime Minister Sharett in telegram 609 from Tel Aviv, January 22. (Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/1-2255) Ambassador Eban further explained the Israeli position on the proposed Turkish-Iraqi Pact in a letter to Secretary Dulles, January 31. (*Ibid.*, 682.87/1-3155)

9. Telegram From the Embassy in Iraq to the Department of State¹

Baghdad, February 3, 1955—4 p.m.

522. I called on Nuri at his home this morning (Embassy's telegram 519, February 2).² I found him looking better than for some weeks and in very good spirits.

I told him at the start that we continued firmly to look upon the course outlined in the communiqué of January 13 as very constructive and as a real contribution to area defense. "And what is going to happen now?" I asked.

Nuri thanked me warmly for our continuing support. He said that immediately on meeting with the Cairo Conference delegation he told the

delegates: “I have been given hell and now I am going to give you double hell.” He said, having particularly the Egyptians in mind, he asked whether it wasn’t time to come down from “the stars to earth.” The threat to their common security was real and immediate. The Communists, he told them, might be in Formosa tomorrow and the next day, “right here in our midst.” The door was open to them all to join in an agreement to meet this threat. He was not going to be told by any outsider, however, when Iraq should sign the proposed Turkish-Iraq pact. He was going to move ahead with the drafting of the pact and its signing. He would, however, be prepared to accommodate his moves to reasonable wishes of neighboring states if they showed a real willingness to become associated. He said he took particular pains to point out to Salah Salim how inexplicable Cairo’s recent behavior has been. Egypt, he reminded Salim, had just signed an agreement with Britain providing for cooperation with British forces in case of danger—a line, in other words, with NATO—and yet in these past few weeks the Egyptian Government had in effect served notice on the world that her words could not be taken at their face value.

I then asked Nuri when he thought his meeting with, Nasser in Lebanon, mentioned in the communiqué covering the Baghdad talks, might take place.

Nuri’s answer was that perhaps it might never take place. He had made Iraq’s position clear and frankly did not attach much importance to such a meeting.

Going back over what has happened during the past few weeks, Nuri said, he has been very much encouraged by the Syrian stand. The Lebanese, however, particularly the Lebanese Prime Minister, had in his view been acting very badly. He said he would like our representatives in Damascus and Beirut to know just how he felt. He said he wanted also to make very clear that he wished very much for Egyptian association in the pact envisaged in the January 13 communiqué and he would like also very much that his strong feeling in this respect be made known by our representative in Cairo [to] the Egyptian Government.

Nuri then said that in order to make his position entirely clear he wanted to reiterate that he would like eventually to see a general pact, but he would not be diverted from pushing the consummation of a bilateral pact with Turkey as a first step.

Associated with that pact he wanted to emphasize again he would like to see the Egyptians, and the Syrians as well. Iran's participation was essential, and he hoped indication of what steps Iran is now prepared to take would be given as soon as the Shah got back to Tehran. He said "I sacked the Russians to give the Shah courage." Association by Pakistan, he felt, need not be pushed immediately. He hoped, of course, to have US and UK association with any general pact, but not French.

I asked him what the status was of the draft pact as envisaged in the January 13 communiqué. He said he was awaiting word from Ankara on the draft he had submitted. This was a short, simple draft, he said, based upon the preamble of the 1946 Turkish-Iraq treaty, and it provided for two things: (1) exchange of military information and (2) waiver of customs and other regulations in order to assure the free movement of arms across the two frontiers.

As I was taking my leave, Nuri said that his doctor wanted him to take a few days rest, and he thought he might be able now to do that. I said that I would be hoping and praying for his full recovery. "That is fine," he said jovially, "But what I would also like from you are some big guns."

Gallman

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 682.87/2-355. Secret. Repeated to Ankara, London, Cairo, Amman, Beirut, Damascus, Jidda, Tripoli, and Tehran.

² Telegram 519 from Baghdad reported on talks between Nuri and a delegation from the Conference of Arab League Prime Ministers that began meeting in Cairo on January 22 to consider the implications of the proposed Turkish-Iraqi pact. (*Ibid.*, 682.87/2-255) Reports concerning the Conference are *Ibid.*, 780.5.

10. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Lebanon¹

Washington, February 4, 1955—7:18 p.m.

1072. Beirut's 766 and Ankara's 858.² Lebanese Embassy has been pressing Department for clear statement on US views on Middle East defense, current debate over defense policy Arab States and attitude which Lebanese could constructively assume.

Department today advised Ambassador Malik as follows:³

1. Department has already stated publicly it welcomed proposed Turkey-Iraq agreement as constructive development. We see it as step toward building up realistic defense organization which may eventually include Turkey, Pakistan, Iraq, Iran and also certain other Arab States.
2. After defense organization has further developed we foresee distinct possibility that Lebanon, and other Arab States located in what in military terms is "rear area" behind "Northern Tier" States, could assume important role in relation to defense organization. Under these circumstances, and if Lebanon should desire associate herself with such organization, we would be disposed give every consideration to strengthening her defenses as well as those of other Arab states, including Egypt, which might similarly desire associate themselves with realistic defense plans.
3. Development of such realistic defense arrangements, together with improvement in Arab-Israel relations, is essential to effective US contribution to area defense. We cannot dissipate resources in support for uncoordinated forces nor can we assist and encourage Arab-Israel arms race with resultant increase in area tensions.

4. We recognize constructive value of Arab League in contributing to welfare Arab States in economic, social and technical fields. Unfortunately, however, Arab League collective security pact does not constitute type of effective defense organization we consider necessary. It does not contain adequate strength within its own membership nor does its policy seem to permit relations with neighboring countries which could provide effective support. We do not foresee US Government ever likely be able extend military aid to ALCSP or any member state for purpose of strengthening ALCSP as such. Same reasoning would apply to any successor organization having same general objectives and character.

5. It is possible that under certain circumstances we might make partial exception to policy stated above by furnishing military assistance to Egypt. Such exception however would be more apparent than real, since Egypt already has ties with West through Anglo-Egyptian Suez base agreement and assistance furnished her would be intended to strengthen defense of Suez base. We would of course have to have normal military assistance agreement with usual guarantees against aggressive use of equipment and assurances of cooperation for collective defense.

6. As to what course Lebanon should follow in current discussions over Arab defense policy, we of course cannot give advice; Lebanon should determine for herself her course in light her own best interests as she sees them. For our part we hope Lebanon will not associate herself with any effort make things more difficult for Iraq, and that Lebanon will so act to leave open possibility her own association with developing defense organization in future.

Embassy may if appropriate repeat this information to Chamoun.

Embassies London, Ankara and Baghdad should inform respective governments Department's views, and state these expressed to Lebanese Government.

If Embassies Damascus and Amman questioned as to our attitude they may reply along lines foregoing. Embassy Cairo should exercise its own discretion re use this information.

Embassy Baghdad authorized in its discretion inform, Nuri we believe early action on treaty best method countering Egyptian maneuvers.

Hoover

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 786.13/2–355. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by, Fritzlan, cleared with Defense, and approved by Jernegan who signed for Hoover. Repeated to Amman, Baghdad, Damascus, Cairo, Jidda, Tripoli, London, Ankara, and Tel Aviv.

² Neither printed. (*Ibid.*, 786.13/2–355 and 674.82/2–255, respectively) ³ A memorandum of this conversation between Ambassador Malik and Jernegan is *Ibid.*, 780.5/2–455.

11. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State¹

Cairo, February 6, 1955—midnight.

1120. When Ambassador Johnston and I paid courtesy call on Prime Minister Nasser this morning visit ran to fifty minutes. Johnston thanked Nasser for the help of Fawzi, Dr. Selim and General Riad. Nasser agreed to keep Riad here for extra day to work with Johnston and colleagues. After some talk re economic future of Egypt (Johnston's visit to High Dam et cetera) Nasser introduced subject Iraq-Turkey Pact which took up three quarters of time. In friendly but determined and self-assured way, Nasser spoke in following sense:

1. Announcement of Iraq-Turkey pact had been "shock" to him. He had thought that US understood and shared his point of view and his concern re timing. To his disappointment, US had decided to move independently by instigating pact; he felt free now to move independently also.
2. Nasser said, "It is possible that you may get away with pact and that Nuri may remain in power for a few months, but your pact will be only a piece of paper and will gain you nothing from point of view of area defense because you have not taken into account the "internal front" about which I have talked to you so often and which I have been so carefully moving along the road to believing in good faith of the West". Nasser predicted that within six months pact would have caused Communist and nationalists in Iraq to be drawn together by same old fears of foreign domination, British and American "imperialism" and "colonialism" et cetera, as in past. He said, "Everyone thinks of Nuri as a British agent. The Turks are under your influence. The result is inevitable". He went on: "What happens in Iraq in this regard will also happen in Syria, Jordan and in Egypt. We though will hear the old cries against foreign domination and interference. It is in interest of all that I should work to prevent

the re-awakening of anti-West and anti-US sentiment by trying to get Arab States to keep within bounds acceptable to their nationalists”.

3. Although it was not easy to interrupt him, I made clear the Department’s position (paragraph 1 Department’s 1251, February 4)² about pact being welcome as realistic constructive development and necessity for realistic defense arrangements in ME. I said that Department failed to see how pact could conflict with role of Arab League.

4. Nasser nodded and said, “That is just what Nuri says. I am a soldier, a politician and a psychologist and I cannot agree that this pact is the way to assure a realistic defense system. Such a system must have genuine support of ME people and such support will only be forthcoming for a defense system based on ACSP without foreign participation.” Re foreign participation he said, “Why should you worry? Egypt, Iraq and Jordan have treaties with UK”.

5. I said that he had given Nuri six months but what if popular reaction in Iraq did not turn out to be in accord with this estimate? Would it not be better for Egyptian press to cease incitements to rebellion in Iraq in terms very close to those of Communist lexicon and to let matters take their natural course in Iraq. I said that in a sense he was predicting what would happen and then trying to make sure that it did happen. He did not seem impressed.

6. In sum Nasser appeared to be as devoted as ever to his “thesis” that “internal front” must be solidified before “external front” can be dealt with. He feels US has let him down and is responsible for what has happened. He is convinced that his way is only way from point of view of psychology of ME “people” and he seems confident that his stand has captured for him profound support among Nationalists of Egypt and other ME countries.

7. *Comment:* Interview caused Johnston and me to agree that, however wrong or right his ideas may be, Nasser displayed this morning sincerity, honest devotion to his principles and a sense of leadership which must be rare among heads of state in ME.

Jones

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 120.1580/2-655. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to London, Baghdad, Ankara, Beirut, Amman, Tel Aviv, Jidda, Damascus, and Tripoli.

² Printed as telegram 1072, [*supra*](#).

12. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Lebanese Ambassador (Malik) and the Secretary of State, Department of State, Washington, February 9, 1955¹

Washington, February 9, 1955

SUBJECT

The “Northern Tier” Defense Organization and the Relation to it of the Arab States; Arab-Israel Relations

After preliminary discussion of the current situation in Soviet Russia, Ambassador Malik raised the subject of recent developments in the Near East affecting the organization of the defense of the area. He said that “things are moving” in the Near East, a development which is in his belief due primarily to the policies and actions of the Secretary. Current developments, he said, are a direct consequence of the Secretary’s trip to the area in 1953, and his emphasis on the “Northern Tier” defense concept which had been formulated as a result of that trip. Ambassador, Malik then described briefly the clash of views in the Arab world after the announcement of the proposed Turkey-Iraq Pact and referred to Lebanon’s effort at mediation between Egypt and Iraq, and to Lebanon’s support in the Arab meetings of Iraq’s right to make a defense treaty with Turkey.

The Secretary said that he had been surprised at the vehemence of the Egyptian attack on Iraq’s action, since he had supposed that it had been widely understood throughout the Arab world that the association of Iraq with the “Northern Tier” was a logical and reasonable development. He asked what was the explanation of Egypt’s strongly adverse reaction. Ambassador Malik replied that the Egyptian attitude was due to a combination of a deep strain of neutralism in that country of a type which did not exist in any significant way in Iraq or Lebanon for example, coupled with Egyptian rivalry with Iraq and Turkey, the latter a rivalry which went back to the days of the Byzantine Empire.

Ambassador Malik then said that there were five questions which he had been instructed to ask the Secretary in connection with the statements of U.S. policy made to him by Mr. Jernegan on February 4:

1. With reference to the statement of U.S. policy made to Ambassador, Malik on February 4, what is the precise nature of the “improvement in Arab-Israel relations” which will be necessary before the U.S. can contribute effectively to area defense?
2. Would the United States look with favor or disfavor on the joining of all the Arab states in defense arrangements for the Middle East, with Iraq and Turkey proceeding with their own presently-proposed defense pact?
3. Would the United States have any objection to, or would it have any comment to make, on the calling of a Middle East conference composed of the Arab states concerned, Turkey, Pakistan and Iran to elaborate a comprehensive scheme for Middle East defense, if Lebanon could persuade Egypt to call such a conference?
4. Would the United States be willing to proceed immediately with economic and military aid to Lebanon, “short-circuiting our usual extensive red tape,” especially with regard to planning for the enlargement of the Port of Beirut and the development of a network of international highways which the Lebanon Government has had very much in mind?
5. What would be the attitude of the United States toward Lebanon as an individual member of a defense organization, whether that organization was all-embracing or included only some Arab states together with the non-Arab states of the area excluding of course Israel?

Mr. Dulles replied that he could not give an offhand answer to these questions. He said we are sympathetic in general to the idea of mutuality in defense matters, since no country, not even the United States, can stand

alone in the world today. However, as to precise details of the type about which the Ambassador was inquiring, he would have to consider these questions carefully before formulating a reply.

The Secretary then said he wished to ask the Ambassador one question. The state of Israel is constantly stressing its isolation, and the fact that it alone has no security guarantees when all these developments, defense arrangements and military aid programs, are taking place in neighboring states. What would the Ambassador do if he were in the Secretary's position? Ambassador Malik replied that in his personal and unofficial view what the Secretary should do was to continue trying to achieve peace between the Arab states and Israel, but that these moves should be made slowly. Too much haste would not be as productive of results as moving at a slow pace. The Secretary replied that he agreed that if conditions in the area alone were considered, this might justify a slow pace, but that there were other factors— e.g. political factors in the United States.²

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/2-955. Confidential. Drafted by Francis O. Allen.

² An earlier draft of this memorandum indicates that, as originally drafted, the last sentence was different and was followed by three additional sentences. The original language reads as follows: "The Secretary replied that he agreed that conditions in the area required slow rather than rapid efforts to achieve peace, but there was one factor that could not be forgotten. He wished to explain to the Ambassador on a personal basis, as he would not to anyone he did not know so well that our coming elections in 1956 posed a most difficult problem. Both political parties during that year will be under strong pressure to favor Israel, and it is therefore most important to make as much progress as possible this year under our current policy of impartiality. He felt it was to the advantage of the Arabs to move as far as possible now, in 1955, since in 1956 the atmosphere is likely to be such that it will be difficult or impossible for the Administration to act towards the Arabs in such ways as it is now in a position to do."

The draft was sent by the Executive Secretariat to John Hanes for the Secretary's approval. Secretary Dulles made the changes that are reflected

in the text printed here. (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Memcons)

13. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions¹

Washington, February 15, 1955—3:49 p.m.

463. Re Nuri's suggestion² that US and UK might wish consider becoming original signatories to proposed Pact with Turkey suggest following line be used in replying Turkish and Iraqi Governments: As we have indicated US Government strongly supports a Turco-Iraqi Pact. However we question advisability US becoming original signatory or adhering at early date. Although realize Turkey and Iraq would welcome US adherence at this time, our experience has been such as to make us wary of taking action which might give rise impression that Pact is imposed from outside of region. While we have encouraged development Pact it is essentially expression indigenous recognition of true threat to area and willingness to meet that threat if necessary, which fact we would not wish to cloud. Furthermore decision on accession to Pact would require mature consideration within US Government which would inevitably take time. We do not believe problem is urgent one since US already has security arrangements with both Turkey and Pakistan through NATO and Manila Pact. This indirect association with Northern Tier combined with US military assistance agreements with Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Pakistan is clear and concrete evidence of strong US interests in security of area.

Question UK accession to pact is of course for British to decide. We would however see no objection their adherence. Considerations mentioned above are largely inapplicable to UK because of its existing special links with both Turkey and Iraq. However we understand UK prefers adhere after Pact signed by Turkey and Iraq. We concur this preference.

British Embassy Washington already advised of foregoing as our tentative views and reports Foreign Office raises no question. Embassy London

should confirm to Foreign Office that communication has been sent.

Embassy Paris may wish inform Foreign Office neither US or UK wish become original signatories Pact.

Dulles

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 682.87/2–1555. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Dixon and approved and signed by, Dulles. Sent to Baghdad and Ankara and repeated to London, Cairo, Damascus, Beirut, Amman, Tehran, Karachi, Paris, and Tripoli.

² In telegram 533, February 5, Ambassador Gallman reported that Nuri Said had proposed to British Ambassador, Wright that the projected Turkish-Iraqi pact be signed initially only by Turkey, Iraq, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Gallman added: “It will have been noted from my telegraphic reports of talk with, Nuri that whenever, Nuri touched on a defense pact between Iraq and Turkey he invariably said he would like to see as well participation of some neighboring countries along with US and UK. I think his reiteration of this shows that he attaches considerable importance to our eventual participation. The latest statement to me of his views on a defense pact was reported in my telegram 522 of February 3. US association, I am convinced, would be warmly welcomed by most Iraqis.” (*Ibid.*, 682.87/2–655) Telegram 522 is [Document 8](#).

14. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iran¹

Washington, February 18, 1955—7:27 p.m.

1587. All parties concerned advised keep you informed developments re Turco-Iraqi Pact. Summary follows.

Statement of intentions issued by Iraqi and Turkish Prime Ministers conclusion visit latter to Baghdad mid-January indicated two Governments would conclude security arrangements. This development unexpected as we had understood no such action in offing. Iraqi draft later submitted to Turks however fell far short of statement intentions. Turks counter-suggested Pact providing for cooperation to meet threat aggression Middle East and for military planning and other steps necessary carry out this purpose. Iraqis showed considerable hesitancy in agreeing to such firm alliance. Compromise version, reportedly final, Nuri point of view recognizes possible threat to Middle East and provides for cooperation in interest defense and security. No specific action authorized in this draft but agreement to agree subsequently on measures to be taken pursuant to pact included. Also has provision for adherence other Arab countries and those concerned with Middle East defenses. Seems reasonable expect conclusion Pact in near future.

Egyptians whose leadership Arab nations threatened by Iraqi step reacted violently in denouncing Pact with Saudi and Yemen backing. Lebanon, Jordan and Syria attempted mediate between Egypt and Iraq or have supported Iraq. More recently French sought discourage Arab support in Damascus and Cairo and both US and UK are approaching French as allies to change this position. In facing this opposition Prime Minister Nuri has maintained firm position though more recently he has shown some signs wavering. For this reason we have agreed with Turks early conclusion Pact desirable even though it may be defective in some respects.

Pakistani Government welcomes the Pact. Knitting Turco-Pakistan and Turco-Iraqi arrangements is most important and might best be done through

Pakistan adherence Turco-Iraqi Pact which appears somewhat more suitable as basis security arrangement. Pakistanis based on statement intentions have expressed interest. It is to this agreement Iran's attention should be directed rather than to Turco-Pakistan Agreement.

We have told Shah we would welcome Iran adherence such step. He has not committed himself but appears likely he will take some action this direction when he returns home. Turks would like Iran's adherence soon as practicable and expect Iran eventually become member. For present however their policy is not push Iran into Pact. Nuri believes Iran's participation essential and hopes indication of what steps Iran is now prepared take would be given soon as Shah returns Tehran.

Dulles

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 682.87/2-1855. Secret. Drafted by Stutesman and Dixon and approved by Kitchen who signed for, Dulles. Repeated to Karachi.

15. Telegram From the Delegation at the SEATO Council Meeting to the Department of State¹

Bangkok, February 24, 1955—11 p.m.

Secto 11. At lunch today (February 23) with Secretary Eden² referred to UK–US–Turkish talks re ME defense. He said UK wished, after conclusion these talks, have further bilateral talks with US aimed at reaching agreement on governmental level re overall strategy Middle East. Sir John Harding³ explained that present US-UK-Turkish military talks were covering specific aspects ME defense but that moving ahead on overall problem was difficult until there was general agreement between US–UK on overall strategy. This was emphasized by recent Commonwealth talks in London. When UK had discussed various aspects ME defense plans with some Commonwealth countries, latter, particularly South Africa, while indicating general agreement, had said they wanted to be sure US was in agreement ME defense strategy. Therefore, UK believes US-UK military talks on overall strategy ME should be held as soon as US-UK-Turkish talks completed. US-UK talks should result in agreement on strategic concept subsequently to be endorsed by governments. On this basis it would be possible to start building ME defense, solidly tying in when possible other states in area. Building defenses would then be based on sound concept and solid logistical system taking into account both UK and US capabilities.

Secretary said he regretted Admiral Radford had been unable to come to Bangkok as his presence would have made possible fuller discussion this matter. However, with delicate situation Formosa Straits, Radford had felt it necessary revise his earlier plans to accompany Secretary to Bangkok. Secretary said he appreciated reasons for Eden's suggestion but would wish discuss this matter more fully in Washington on his return.

Eden suggested that Harding should give US memorandum setting forth British ideas and reasons for desiring US-UK talks. Will telegram Harding memo when received.

In further general conversation Eden and Harding remarked that whole ME picture looked considerably more encouraging. [4 lines of source text not declassified]

Dulles

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–BA/2–2455. Top Secret. Repeated to London.

² During this meeting, Eden also informed, Dulles of his recent conversation with, Nasser in Cairo, during which Nasser had voiced opposition to the Turkish-Iraqi Pact. Dulles reported on this portion of his conversation with Eden in Secto 13 from Bangkok, February 24, printed in [vol. XIV, pp. 71–72](#).

³ Field Marshal Sir John Harding, Chief of the Imperial General Staff of the United Kingdom.

16. Telegram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department of State¹

Jidda, February 27, 1955—1 p.m.

416. 1. Official Saudi reaction to signature Turk-Iraqi Pact,² as we may expect it to be enunciated, can I believe be best estimated from remarks made by Prime Minister Prince Faisal during courtesy call I paid him February 23. There has as yet been no published comment.

Faisal had returned February 21 from Cairo where, according information given Embassy's Arab consultant by reliable palace source, he and Deputy Foreign Minister had negotiated with Egyptian Prime Minister Nasser and Foreign Minister Fawzi draft text of bilateral defense agreement with view its signature should Turk-Iraqi Pact be consummated.

Faisal's remarks to me seemed harsher version of Government of Egypt line reported by Embassy Cairo. I interrupted several times to argue strongly fundamental logic and benefit to Arabs of our position. Full text by air pouch.³ Highlights his position follow: Cairo Conference was not failure. On contrary we gained much from full if sometime heated discussions.

Arabs and US are not enemies. On contrary we seek same end, defense against Communist Russia, though by different means. Now, with your backing, Nuri Said has set back Arab relations with West by 30 years.

Last December Arab League for first time recognized possibility of Arab-Western cooperation. Then, as we were considering means to implement new policy, Menderes-Nuri bombshell fell. Today whole atmosphere is inflamed against you.

Arabs are again asking: What have we had from US entering Near East? They answer: Palestine. They believe policy of US and its allies is to break ACSP in interest of Israel.

They believe too its aim is to make Arab states appendages of Turkey and Pakistan. We have been willing cooperate with Turkey but not as her tail.

We have lost confidence in the West. To regain it you should drop this plan, strengthen and have confidence in Arab unity, work directly with Arab states and not behind the scenes through Turkey.

We can cooperate both with northern tier of Turkey, Iran and Pakistan and with West. Why cannot you build northern tier without Iraq, strengthen Arab League and tier both into strong structure area defense?

If there be war, we know Near East will again be battlefield. So strengthen this second line of defense. It is to common interest. That is all we ask of you.

Harmonize your strategic view with Arab feelings. If you insist on Iraq joining northern tier, you will have lost Arab confidence. Surely you do not want to fight in unfriendly countries. And what we want is to cooperate with you. If we do not do so, fault will be yours.

2. Read in this form there is much that is persuasive in, Faisal's argument, and I felt he was for most part sincere in advancing it, so far as it went. He spoke, however, with such unwonted vehemence and was so impervious to my counter plea (in essence that Iraq could join northern tier and continue loyal member Arab League) that I could not but sense bitterness in defeat which boded ill for future Saudi-American relations and an underlying jealousy rooted in Saudi-Hashemite rivalry.

Support for this analysis is given by discussions I have had with several of my colleagues and by two further reports from Embassy's Arab consultant. Visiting in Riyadh ten days ago, he found strongly anti-American sentiments in palace circles: They had offered friendship and collaboration; we had replied with policy which was wrecking Arab League. Again in Taif February 25, day after signature Turk-Iraqi Pact, he found Defense Minister Prince Mishaal outspokenly critical US foreign policies North Africa and Near East.

3. On both latter occasions Mohammad Effendi gathered too impression that question of Dhahran Airbase as raised by Bashayan in Iraq Parliament (paragraph 2, my telegram 392 February 14)⁴ was still rankling King and Royal Councillors. He believes it likely King will raise question with me when, as already arranged, I present Admiral, Cassady in Riyadh March 10.

I plan play this by ear but would welcome Department comment. Jernegan's letter February 10 gives helpful background.

Wadsworth

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 682.87/2–2755. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Amman, Ankara, Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, London, Tehran, Tel Aviv, and Tripoli.

² Telegram 618 from Baghdad, February 24, reported that the Turkish-Iraqi Treaty was signed at 11:45 p.m. on February 23 and formally announced during the morning of February 24. (*Ibid.*, 682.87/2–2455) On March 1, Secretary, Dulles sent the following message to Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri Said:

“I have received news of the conclusion of the Iraqi-Turkish Mutual defense pact with much pleasure and I ask you to accept my felicitations and all good wishes in your endeavors on behalf defense of international peace and security.”

The message was transmitted to the Embassy in Baghdad in telegram 551. (*Ibid.*, 682.87/3–155) On March 2, a similar message from Dulles was sent to the Embassy in Ankara to be delivered at Ambassador Warren's discretion to Prime Minister Menderes. (*Ibid.*, 682.87/3–255) ³ Transmitted in despatch 133 from Jidda, February 27. (*Ibid.*, 682.87/2-2755) ⁴ Paragraph 2 of telegram 392 described a Saudi press report that quoted statements made by Iraqi Senator Bashayan about the Dhahran airfield. (*Ibid.*, 780.5/2–1455)

17. Telegram From the Embassy in Syria to the Department of State¹

Damascus, March 1, 1955—6 p.m.

447. Called on Prime Minister Asali February 26. After brief talk we were joined by Foreign Minister Azm so I acquainted them both with USG position re Turko-Iraqi agreement and area defense, expressing hope GOS (1) would do nothing embarrass Iraq and (2) might later find it possible associate Syria with developing defense organization (Deptels 348,² 388,³ 428⁴). Ignoring first point (cf paragraph 6, Embtel 441)⁵ and without reference to Prime Minister who speaks almost no French, Azm immediately replied that GOS will act in accordance its own interests; that public statements Syrian foreign policy should not be construed too narrowly; that present government has sufficient latitude to permit conclusion agreements found to be in Syrian interest; and that any such agreement will of course require parliamentary approval.

Foreign Minister noted that GOS and USG could not agree on certain matters (presumably he had Palestine question chiefly in mind) but opined that on other subjects agreement could be reached. He expressed belief both sides should work towards agreements on these subjects rather than emphasizing points of disagreement.

I replied I was glad to hear GOS possessed latitude re foreign policy and apparently intended to use it. Foreign Minister then turned and informed Prime Minister in Arabic of what he had told me. At their request I afterward sent Prime Minister and Foreign Minister an aide-mémoire.⁶

Comment: Though I stated Department had instructed me inform them US position at early opportunity, Asali and, Azm probably thought my call timed to coincide with arrival Salah Salim⁷ which occurred hour earlier. Azm's remarks may represent his personal views, and were no doubt intended to offset neutralistic ministerial declaration. Embassy doubts Azm can impose own interpretation on Cabinet, in view of government's dependence on ASRP parliamentary support. Foreign Minister has in any case committed himself to nothing since (a) Syrian "interest" not defined

and (b) likelihood approval defense aid agreement by present Syrian Parliament is remote. Department will note in this connection similarity Azm's position to that of former Prime Minister Khuri who was unsuccessful in attempting modify his initial uncompromising public position against foreign agreements (Embassy despatch 325).⁸

Moose

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 682.87/3–155. Confidential. Repeated to Ankara, Baghdad, Cairo, London, Paris, Amman, Beirut, and Jidda.

² Printed as telegram 275, [Document 2](#).

³ Printed as telegram 1072, [Document 10](#).

⁴ In telegram 428, February 21, the Department of State instructed the Embassy in Damascus to inform Asali and Azm of the U.S. position on the Turko-Iraqi agreement as contained in telegrams 348 and 388 to Damascus. (Department of State, Central Files, 682.87/2-2155) ⁵ Telegram 441 from Damascus, February 25, contained a report received from British Ambassador Sir John Gardener concerning six points made by Azm during a conversation with Gardener. Under the sixth point, Gardener had asked, Azm to prevent the Syrian Government from taking a hostile attitude toward Iraq regarding the Baghdad Pact. Azm had given an evasive response, but said he was urging Egypt not to withdraw from the Arab League Collective Security Pact and to moderate its anti-Iraqi propaganda. (*Ibid.*, 783.00/2-2555) ⁶ Enclosed in despatch 365 from Damascus, March 15. (*Ibid.*, 682.87/3–1555) ⁷ The Embassy in Damascus reported on March 1 that Major Salah Salim, Egyptian Minister for National Guidance, had arrived in Damascus on February 26 to discuss an Egyptian proposal for a new defense pact among those Arab States opposed to alliances with non-Arab powers. The plan provided for a unified army under a joint command, a unified foreign policy based on a prohibition of alliances outside of the proposed pact, and a unified economic policy enabling member states to finance the unified army from their own resources. (Telegram 451 from Damascus; *Ibid.*, 786.00/3–155) ⁸ Not printed. (*Ibid.*, 786.00/2–1055)

18. Editorial Note

On March 3, at the 239th meeting of the National Security Council, Allen W. Dulles, Director of Central Intelligence, reviewed developments affecting U.S. security, and presented a report on the Middle East. The memorandum of discussion reads as follows:

“Mr. Dulles described the Middle East as ‘in a boil’ at the present time. While the United States might be inclined to take developments in the Middle East more seriously than was really necessary, the situation was currently very complicated. In the first place, Colonel Nasser, the chief power in the Egyptian Government, was taking the signature of the Turkish-Iraqi pact as a hard blow to himself and to Egyptian interests. The same attitude was being taken by the Government of Saudi Arabia. The latter government had even been talking about the possibility of cancellation of its airbase agreement with the United States, but Mr. Dulles thought it was unlikely that such a threat would actually be carried out.

“On top of this had come the incident in the Gaza area of Egypt. This action had been apparently precipitated by the Israelis, though their reasons for doing so at this particular time were difficult to fathom. The resort to force, thought Mr. Dulles, might simply reflect the return of the strong man, Ben-Gurion, as Minister of Defense; but again, there was no clear and precise motivation which could be cited.

“Mr. Dulles then referred to a message by Lebanese Ambassador Malik to his home government, whence he had just been recalled for consultation. Malik described the signature of the Turkish-Iraqi pact as marking the end of an era and the disappearance of the influence of the Arab League in Middle Eastern affairs. Concurrently these events would mark the rise of Western influence in the several Arab states.

“Mr. Dulles described the situation in Syria as ‘ripe for a military coup d’etat’.” (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)

19. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Syria¹

Washington, March 5, 1955—4:01 p.m.

460. Re Egyptian-sponsored defense pact precluding members from concluding alliances with non-Arab powers (Damascus Tels 451² and 452 to Department³) you may in your discretion make clear to Government authorities and others as appropriate our attitude toward such a pact as stated Paras 3 and 4 Deptel 1072 to Beirut.⁴ In your discretion you may stress particularly that we could not in foreseeable future extend grant military aid to such a pact or to any member for purpose of strengthening it.

Hoover

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/3–555. Confidential. Drafted by Francis O. Allen on March 4, approved by George Allen, and signed for Hoover by, Jernegan. Also sent to Beirut and Amman and repeated to Baghdad, Cairo, Jidda, London, Ankara, Karachi, and Paris.

² See [footnote 7, Document 17](#).

³ In telegram 452, March 2, Moose conveyed to the Department of State a report from British Ambassador Gardener concerning the Egyptian proposals for a new Arab pact. In addition to the contents of the proposals described in telegram 451, Gardener noted that Egypt was offering unconditional and unlimited military and economic assistance to Arab States joining the proposed arrangement, and that the Syrian Government's attitude toward the proposal was still uncertain. (Department of State, Central Files, 682.87/3–255) ⁴ [Document 10](#).

20. Editorial Note

On March 6, the Governments of Egypt, Syria, and Saudi Arabia jointly announced that their armed forces would be placed under a unified command. The announcement followed signature by the Syrian and Egyptian Governments on March 2, at the conclusion of Salah Salim's talks with Syrian leaders of a communiqué which indicated that the two governments had agreed not to join the Turkish-Iraqi alliance or any other alliances, to establish a joint Arab defense and economic cooperation pact, and to advance these objectives with other Arab States. Following his stay in Damascus, Salim visited Jordan and Saudi Arabia. The Saudi Arabian Government also subscribed to other parts of the Egyptian-Syrian communiqué of March 2, the text of which was simultaneously made public. The arrangements reached through these agreements was subsequently known as the Egyptian-Syrian-Saudi or ESS Pact. The text of the March 2 communiqué is printed in *Documents on International Affairs, 1955*, pages 326–327.

21. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions¹

Washington, March 8, 1955—2 a.m.

Infotel. We have instructed our representative on North Atlantic Council that when Turkish-Iraqi Agreement is presented to Council he should indicate our warm support of Pact emphasizing importance of contribution to NATO that it represents by opening way to strengthening NATO's defense on its seriously exposed southeastern front. He is to inform Council that we hope other countries of Middle East will recognize value of Pact to them all in providing forward line of defense against possible Soviet aggression and will see their way to acceding to it or where this is not appropriate working with it. We urge NATO members give this development their support where opportunity arises.

Dulles

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 700.00 (S)/3-855. Secret; Special State Distribution. Sent to Athens, Brussels, Copenhagen, The Hague, Lisbon, Oslo, Ottawa, Rome, Luxembourg, Reykjavik, and to SACLANT in Norfolk, Virginia.

22. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State¹

Cairo, March 8, 1955—5 p.m.

1312. 1. Following Embassy comment re Nasser's proposal to British Ambassador (Embtel 1294)² and general problem organization ME defense.

2. We are now faced rather acutely with old dilemma of role of Egypt in our Middle East defense thinking. This problem occupied much time at Istanbul Conference of ambassadors in May 1954 but conference ended without clear-cut decision re Egypt's role. We have hoped Egypt would acquiesce, with some grumbling, in northern tier approach to Middle East defense and, without joining, accept supporting role. Egypt could, under these conditions, be termed eligible for modest military assistance in view of her base agreement with West, her task of protecting canal and fact she would serve as general base area for northern tier.

3. We now know how deeply Egypt has been disturbed by attraction of northern tier for other Arab states. Egypt has applied great pressure to prevent them from joining. On our side we have not been eager to see states other than Iraq and Iran join at an early date as, while it looks good on paper, it would cause further drain upon our limited resources and be awkward in view of Israeli problem. What we wished rather was an increased orientation of these states toward West, an increase in stability of governments and a general improvement in their economic conditions. As these conditions are important in the rear area of the northern tier we have thus had a plan of action in which limited military assistance could be extended to northern countries plus Egypt and in which certain essential economic development would be stimulated in these and the other Arab states.

4. I believe this policy thinking has been and still is logical and in the best interests of the United States. I see no reason for change in view of recent developments.

5. Although Egyptian press has made great fuss reflecting attitude of RCC, the Iraq-Turk pact has not aroused great feeling among many educated Egyptians. Most intellectuals are attracted by idea that what Turkey and Iraq do is of no concern to Egypt. Unfortunately these people are of little influence. I make this point only in case Department may have assumed from press that there is general mass feeling against pact here in Egypt. There is feeling but it is primarily among men governing Egypt and opposition elements.

6. As Department knows, present government, while sincere and undoubtedly working very hard for what they consider to be best interests of Egypt, is still doctrinaire and inexperienced. Iraq's challenge to Egypt's ME leadership came as surprise and shock, Iraq-Turk pact was contrary to Nasser's own area defense planning based upon Egypt and premature for GOE. (He sincerely considers his ideas advantageous to general interests of US in Middle East). The pact caused RCC to go into tantrums and get so far out on limb that some action became necessary on their part. The desire to save as much of Nasser's own plan (Embtel 1120)³ as possible and for Egypt to resume its Arab world leadership has caused Egypt to embark on idea of the new club which Salah Salem has been attempting to sell to Arab states. We believe that once Egypt considers it has regained initiative and restored its prestige, it will be more inclined think and act reasonably.

7. We do not believe Egypt is particularly enthusiastic about new club or that she has any illusions regarding its military potency.

8. Question now is how bad this all is from viewpoint of our own interests. New club as a substitute for Arab collective security pact is likely be even less effective than ACSP. Nevertheless, Egyptian propaganda and political action against Iraq-Turk pact has probably made it unlikely that Jordan or Lebanon, and certainly Syria, will adhere at early date to northern tier arrangements. As stated above, this delay may not be serious since our thinking has not been towards haste in this direction in any event. Egypt certainly will not join pact, but we have never been certain that we wanted this even in long term. (It is an interesting thought that a northern tier arrangement tied to West plus a general grouping under leadership of Egypt in south would probably be the best possible organization of ME from

viewpoint of US interests were it not for problem of Israel. We must, of course, include security of Israel in our thinking. This among other things causes our logic to be different from that of Arabs who, having entirely different concern re Israel, do not take into account our own concern and are therefore baffled by our lack of support for unified Arab forces.) 9. One thing seems certain here. While we cannot give the new organization Egypt is attempting to form our blessing and support for many reasons, any attempt at this juncture to meet it head on with public disapproval would be counter-productive. This would greatly react to our disadvantage by arousing all-out counter-attack on US in much of Arab world and only increase Egyptian-Syrian-Saudi determination to proceed as now planned. Our best course would seem to be one of caution and display of relative disinterest. Reaffirmation of our support for northern tier can be done as necessary to meet situation in north but this should not be accompanied by condemnation of indigenous action here in the south. If we can avoid public opposition, the new club may be brought around in time to offer something to build upon. To get our support they would have to agree to moves re Israel; with time and disillusionment with efforts of club to achieve strength they might seek our aid and this would be opportunity for US to use lever. Any immediate effort to present this southern arrangement as being in support of northern tier (paragraph 3, Embassy reference telegram) would fail but even this may become possible as time moves on.

The above line of thought suggests following courses of action:

- (A) Refrain from public comment re new club.
- (B) Advise Jordan and Lebanon quietly and in conjunction with UK to stay out of the new arrangements;
- (C) Tell Egyptians we take realistic and practical view of Middle East defense problem and are adopting a wait and see attitude as to how new arrangements will shape up and under what rules.

In meantime we strongly disfavor efforts to undermine Iraq.

If we can follow something along above lines it is my belief that general fuss here will blow over. I find British Ambassador thinking in similar vein.

In meantime this official position would of course be supplemented by private efforts with Nasser to try to get us back in step on whole range of ME problems.

Byroade

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/3–855. Secret. Repeated to London, Damascus, Beirut, Jidda, Amman, Baghdad, Tel Aviv, and Tehran.

² In telegram 1294 from Cairo, March 7, Ambassador Byroade reported that during a conversation of March 5, Nasser had described the ESS Pact “as good a foundation for ME defense arrangements as is now possible”, and asked whether the United Kingdom would be willing to back the ESS Pact. Nasser reportedly said that the agreement was not directed against Iraq, but was a result of the Iraqi-Turkish treaty. (*Ibid.*, 774.00/3–755) ³ [Document 11](#).

23. Telegram From the Embassy in Syria to the Department of State¹

Damascus, March 11, 1955—10 a.m.

478. Foreign Minister Khalid Al-Azm explained to me last night purpose of Syro-Iraqi[-Egyptian] declaration of March 2 and pact it foreshadows.

According to Foreign Minister pact aims solely at common defense of Arab States most threatened by Israel. It is neither anti-Iraq nor anti-Turkish nor anti-Western. Syria recognizes right, even duty, of Iraq and Turkey to prepare against principal threat to their security (i.e. USSR) but claims right to do likewise (i.e. to prepare defense against Israel).

Syria is in agreement with Saudi Arabia and Egypt on unified foreign, military and economic policy and hopes for adherence of Lebanon. After conclusion of three-state or four-state pact, effort will be made to arrange cooperation between the resulting organization and Turkish-Iraqi grouping with which Pakistan, Iran, US and UK will probably be associated. Such cooperation, while desirable, will necessarily be limited by sources from which the principal threat comes. (Proposed link between defense organization may supersede bilateral Syro-Iraqi tie suggested by Prime Minister; cf Embtel 465.)²

There is no new urgency in the Israeli threat, but it is continuing and present moment appears to Syria, Saudi Arabia and Egypt propitious to make defensive arrangement.

Arab League Collective Security Pact was abandoned because it included states not immediately threatened by Israel (Iraq), states neither threatened nor able to assist in common defense (Yemen, Libya) and states which by virtue of treaty engagements had lost full liberty of action (Jordan).

After presenting foregoing explanation, Foreign Minister asserted he would go to Baghdad on Monday March 14 to promote second stage of plan, his party to consist of General Shuqayr, one other Syrian Cabinet Minister, three Syrian Deputies and perhaps one Lebanese official. Foreign Minister expressed hope US Government would be able to approve aims of new pact. I replied that I would be glad to transmit Foreign Minister's statements to Department and endeavor to secure Department's views before Foreign Minister's departure March 14 (rather than merely repeat to Prime Minister previous instructions already known to him, I believe it more effective be able give him authoritative statement from Department directly responsive his remarks).

Comment: Similar statement made by Foreign Minister to Turkish Chargé same day. In my opinion Foreign Minister and Prime Minister are beginning to feel effect of US, UK and Turkish representations as well as visible public distrust of a project which divides rather than unites Arab States. Foreign Minister's statement that proposed arrangement is not anti-Iraq should not be taken seriously. Origin, timing and architects of March 2 declaration provide more reliable indication of intent of project than of Foreign Minister's statements. These factors may be interpreted to show that having failed to prevent signature Turko-Iraqi pact, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and a Syrian Government now amenable to their influences are attempting to isolate Iraq by drawing other Arab States into rival organization. This can explain use of, "defense against Israel" as rallying cry.

According to pro-Western Deputy, Saudi, Syrian and Egyptian authorities are using direct threats against Lebanese business communities and trade in Syria, Dhahran and Cairo and against Lebanese employees of Saudi Arabian Government in effort bring Lebanon into line.

Action requested: It is requested that Department instruct me to reply to Foreign Minister and repeat later to Prime Minister the following:

- (1) Views of US Government on problem of ME defense and re Turko-Iraqi pact were communicated to Syrian Prime Minister and Foreign Minister February 26 (Embtel 447, March 1);³

(2) US Government still adheres to those views;

(3) Foreign Minister's attention is particularly called to the expressed hope of US Government that Syria would not associate in any effort make things difficult for Iraq nor act to preclude future Syrian association with Turko-Iraqi defense organization;

(4) US Government, in view of origin and timing of Syro-Egyptian declaration of March 2, finds it difficult to believe that declaration's principal purpose is other than that of embarrassing Iraq because Iraq has taken step toward effective regional defense;

(5) Declaration if published, by its own terms, precludes Syria from adhering to Turko-Iraqi arrangement;

(6) US Government does not regard the Syro-Saudi-Egyptian project as one which offers hope of an effective defense organization even within area to which it applies;

(7) US Government foresees no US approval of, nor support for, project at any time;

(8) While US Government has already stated that it expects Syria to act in accordance with its own interests, US Government doubts that Syria's hasty reversal of policy after Asali Cabinet came into power is in Syrian national interest, in interest of Arab States or in the general interest;

(9) In view of quick leak to hostile local press of American Ambassador's aide-mémoire⁴ and a similar prompt leak of the Turkish Chargé's aide-mémoire of March 7,⁵ American Ambassador has been instructed to deliver this message by word of mouth only;

(10) Anything else Department believes useful.

Prompt instructions are requested preferably, for greatest effect, in time to enable me to reply to Foreign Minister before his March 14 departure.⁶

Moose

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 683.87/3–1155. Confidential; Niact. Repeated priority to Baghdad, Cairo, Ankara, and London.

² See [vol. XIII, p. 519](#), [footnote 2](#).

³ [Document 17](#).

⁴ Reference is to an aide-mémoire presented by the Embassy in Damascus to the Syrian Government on February 26 describing the U.S. position on the Turkish-Iraqi Pact. (Enclosed in despatch 365, March 15; Department of State, Central Files, 682.87/3–1555)⁵ On March 5, the Turkish Government issued a statement expressing its concern over the trend of events in Syria and Syria's apparent hostility toward Turkey. (Telegrams 1009 and 1012 from Damascus, March 5 and 6; *Ibid.*, 682.83/3–555 and 682.83/3–655) On March 7, Turkish Chargé Ismail Soysal, acting on instructions, delivered orally to Prime Minister Asali an additional statement protesting what Turkey believed to be the anti-Turkish nature of the recent Syrian-Egyptian agreement. (Telegram 475 to Damascus, March 10; *Ibid.*, 674.83/3–1055)⁶ In telegram 473 to Damascus, March 11, the Department of State concurred in Ambassador Moose's proposed reply to, Azm with the following changes: 1) in paragraph 6, add at the end "and therefore cannot support it"; 2) omit paragraph 7; 3) change paragraph 9 to read: "In view of leak to local press, and distortion, of American Ambassador's Aide-Mémoire, Ambassador instructed deliver message by word of mouth only". (*Ibid.*, 683.87/3–1155) Moose subsequently made the approved presentation to Azm on March 12. According to Moose's report, Azm again denied that the Syro-Saudi-Egyptian pact was aimed at Iraq. Azm also reaffirmed that Syria recognized Iraq's right to make arrangements for its own defense, but believed that the Syrian situation required different arrangements. Moose, in turn, replied that the circumstances surrounding the Egyptian-Syrian statement of March 2 justified the U.S. fear that the ESS pact was aimed at Iraq. (Telegram 486 from Damascus, March 13; *Ibid.*, 683.87/3–1355)

24. Telegram From the Embassy in Iraq to the Department of State¹

Baghdad, March 16, 1955—6 a.m.

713. We have given careful consideration to desirability of US adherence at an early date to Iraq-Turk pact. Consensus is that we should do so for following reasons.

1. We are originators of northern tier concept and it is we who gave inspiration and encouragement which resulted in Iraq-Turk pact. Indigenous interest has now been adequately proved. Yet task of forging paper northern tier into effective northern tier defense organization has still to be accomplished and we do not see how this can be done without US adherence. Psychological value of our adherence now would also serve as potent centrifugal force in winning additional adherents including perhaps fence-straddlers such as Lebanon and Jordan.

2. Our adherence along with British would give this part of the world a telling example of how British and we are cooperating for common defense of free world. It would provide too a stimulus for Britain and US informally and quietly to resolve problem of our respective roles in area war plans and arms aid.

3. Our adherence is certain to enhance considerably overall US influence in area. This might eventually prove useful too in working towards Arab-Israeli settlement.

4. US adherence need not materially enlarge our commitments in the area. Thru membership in NATO we already have certain commitments. Similarly we are already extending military aid to Iraq and have let it be known that reasonable requests for stepping up this aid would receive our careful consideration. Our aid commitments therefore even after adherence could continue as at present. If on other hand we should ever find it desirable to

increase our commitments we would in Iraq-Turk pact have the framework at hand within which we could.

5. US association with Iraq-Turk pact might well help allay current Israeli fears that pact may be used to her detriment. In adhering without accepting accompanying [garble] as British are thinking of doing Israeli doubts could be further dispelled.

6. US adherence would help allay possible fears which have not entirely disappeared from minds of Nuri and other Iraqi political leaders of possible Turkish irredentist designs on Mosul. If these fears whether they be real or imagined can somehow be exercised [*exorcised?*] effective cooperation in sphere area defense will be immeasurably facilitated.

7. Nuri showed great courage in taking initiative to align Iraq with Turkey and West risking much at home and in relations with Arab neighbors. We gave him considerable encouragement. We think we should therefore make some really significant move of recognition of his statesmanlike act as soon as possible. In our opinion early adherence would be most effective step we could take. It would meet wishes of, Nuri, palace, ex-Prime Minister and of a sizable segment of the Iraq people. It would of course be well received by Turk Government.

8. We have already publicly endorsed Iraq-Turk pact and privately expressed our disapproval of Egyptian-Syrian-Saudi arrangement as ineffective and ill-contrived area defense association. Our adherence to the Iraq-Turk pact would give substance to these words and would leave no one in doubt as to where we stand. At best such action might even cause Egyptian-Syrian-Saudi arrangement to die aborning. At very least our membership in Iraq-Turk pact would provide yet another link, when considered along with our air base agreement with Saudi Arabia, between the two apparently emerging rival defense organizations. British Suez Canal agreement with Egypt would constitute another such link. We might under such circumstances be able to exert an assuaging influence in Saudi Arabia with a

view to seeking to bring the two groups into at least some sort of working arrangement.

Timing of US adherence it seems to us might well follow British adherence but there seems no good reason why it should have to await Iranian or Pakistani adherence as well. Indeed US adherence might serve to stimulate interest of Iran and Pakistan and expedite their adherence.

In view of considerations cited above I would urge upon Department that we adhere to Iraq-Turk pact as soon as possible.

Gallman

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 682.87/3-1655. Secret. Repeated to Ankara and London.

25. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State¹

Amman, March 16, 1955—6 p.m.

302. King Hussein summoned me today. After usual exchange he expressed hope I was pleased with manner in which Jordan was emerging from present contretemps. In reply said I had been concerned during Cairo meeting but now that important foreign matters in sure hands Prime Minister,² was much reassured. As gambit I added hope and expectation Egyptians would quiet down in reasonably near future but with weak Government Syria still a matter of preoccupation. He picked this up agreeing generally and added really disturbing Government was Saudi Arabian which he expected would so continue. [*1¾ lines of source text not declassified*]

Hussein said Jordan fortunately had emerged from family fracas quite well and not compromised in any direction. He said with emphasis even Egypt does not now expect or is pressing Jordan to join its collective arrangement.

King then said Jordan prepared to listen to any request from US to join in agreements and the conditions involved. (I know he is personally interested in some air force which British discouraged in December.) I gave him another review our position stressing we not asking much less urging any state which we feel should exercise its free will in its own interests. However, we are interested in strengthening regional defense and again discussed arms aid to Iraq, et cetera. I was surprised at his ready acceptance and appreciation of our view which apparently I had poorly presented before or which had not penetrated his thinking. I am advised by trusted LC member that on visit to Pakistan from which he returned Monday night that King and party much impressed by Pakistan's hard work, spirit, martial training and US assistance. It appears Pakistan visit excellent antidote to previous Egyptian visit and pressures. His Majesty has elsewhere noted that while Pakistan army of British tradition air force largely American.

King saw British Ambassador³ immediately after me. Conversation followed same line. We believe main purpose is concern for arms if not coordinated at least springs from same motivation as Prime Minister's inquiry Embassy telegram 288, March 9.⁴ Prime Minister also asked British Ambassador what advantage including arms would accrue in event Jordan joined Turco-Iraqi Pact. British Ambassador has sought instructions. It is hoped Department may concur.

I am as yet unable fully assess possibilities raised today or whether they may eventuate in further reorientation Government policy. Positive attitude by King always important component in formulation ultimate Government line.

Mallory

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 682.87/3–1655. Confidential. Repeated to Damascus, Cairo, Baghdad, Beirut, Karachi, London, Ankara, Jidda, Paris, and Tripoli.

² Tawfiq Abu al-Huda.

³ Charles Beresford Duke.

⁴ In telegram 288, Chargé Geren reported that Jordanian Prime Minister Abu al-Huda had inquired as to what U.S. intentions were regarding arms assistance for Jordan in case Jordan joined the Baghdad Pact, and whether the United States would give military assistance to Jordan separately from the British. Geren replied that the United States sought to avoid competition with the United Kingdom in these matters and would be making decisions in this area as required by the developments of the Baghdad Pact situation. (Department of State, Central Files, 682.87/3–955)

26. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Syria¹

Washington, March 18, 1955—7:23 p.m.

489. Cairo telegrams 1342, 1312,² Damascus telegram 484,³ Deptel 473 to Damascus.⁴ Department believes its policy on Middle East defense

developments should continue to be expressed by: (1) continued firm support Turco-Iraqi Pact; (2) clear unwillingness support projected Egypt-Syria-Saudi Arabia alignment as now conceived and oriented; (3) discouragement actions by Arab states prejudicial eventual further development acceptable defense arrangements; (4) avoidance open clash with Egypt prejudicing long term Egyptian cooperation on defense and short term cooperation on other matters, including Afro-Asian conference. These are not mutually inconsistent.

Important consideration in foregoing is assumption that if Syria, Lebanon or Jordan go along with Egypt and Saudi Arabia in condemning directly or by implication Iraq's moves to associate itself with Turkey and West for defense purposes, Iraq's difficulties will be increased and chances for ultimate rear-area defense system will be set back.

Missions at Damascus, Beirut and Amman should continue in their discretion and as opportunities arise make clear privately to local governments:

- a. Firm US support Turco-Iraqi Pact.
- b. While US fully respects sovereign right all NE states make such agreements with each other as they wish, US unable support or assist in any way arrangement such as proposed Egyptian-Syrian-Saudi Arabian agreement, which appears concentrate on intra-area quarrel and be in no way directed at formidable external threat whole area.
- c. We hope, in assessing own best national interests, countries concerned will make no undertakings rendering difficult their eventual association with effective defense arrangements.

Because opinion in Syria sharply divided on merits of following Egyptian anti-Iraqi course, we believe Embassy Damascus explanations our views to Syrian Government and others have been useful and effective (Damascus tel 484).

Because of concentration authority and nature of attitudes GOE and SAG Department wishes leave full latitude Ambassador Byroade in handling this issue with, Nasser and Ambassador, Wadsworth with SAG. They should be guided by points given above.

During discussion March 15 of instructions to Stevenson described London's 3987⁵ British Embassy expressed London belief Egyptian-Syrian-Saudi arrangements doomed to failure, and that desirable avoid head-on clash with Nasser. However equally important forestall spreading of inspired rumors UK support Turk-Iraq Pact weakening. Instructions to Stevenson read to Department as well as Stevenson's report resultant conversation with, Nasser and Fawzi. Department agrees tenor London's instructions Stevenson as given London's 3987. We are encouraged by Cairo Embassy view proposed Egyptian arrangements likely wither away and feel we should encourage this process. Public statements or other actions tending keep matter in public eye would probably have opposite effect Egypt and Department would like avoid public stand this question provided US views not further publicly distorted.

Hoover

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 682.87/3–1255. Secret. Drafted by Burdett and Hart and approved by George Allen who signed for, Hoover. Also sent to Cairo, Amman, Jidda, and Beirut; repeated to Baghdad, Ankara, Tel Aviv, London, Paris, Karachi, and Tehran.

² In telegram 1342, March 14, Ambassador Byroade expressed the Embassy's concern in regard to the exchanges with Syria that a valid charge could be made that the United States was using pressure to force adherence to the northern tier arrangements. (*Ibid.*, 783.00/3–1455) Telegram 1312 is [Document 22](#).

³ In telegram 484, March 12, Ambassador Moose affirmed the Embassy's belief that the suggested position presented in telegram 1312 from Cairo was inconsistent with the Department's instructions of January 14 and February 4 ([Documents 2](#) and [9](#)) which had already been acted upon, as well as with positions taken by the British, the Turks, and the French. Moose advised that the adoption of the Embassy in Cairo's suggestion would undermine Embassy efforts to encourage a pro-Western position in

Syria. (Department of State, Central Files, 682.87/3–1255) ⁴ See [footnote 6, Document 23](#).

⁵ In telegram 3987, March 11, Ambassador Aldrich reported that the British Foreign Office had telegraphed instructions to British Ambassador Stevenson in Cairo to avoid a head-on collision with Egypt but to take no action which might hamper Anglo-Iraqi relations. Specifically, Stevenson was to inform Nasser that the Damascus communiqué and Syrian and Saudi interpretations of the Pact were not consonant with Nasser's statement that the proposed ESS Pact was designed to complement the Iraqi-Turkish Pact. Nasser was also to be told that the British Government was opposed to efforts to isolate Iraq. (*Ibid.*, 674.83/3–1155)

27. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan¹

Washington, March 18, 1955—7:59 p.m.

1368. Embtel 1193.² Recent reports from Karachi on GOP attitude toward Middle East defense organization suggest GOP clearly interested further steps toward such goal. Department would be interested your opinion as to what steps Pakistanis may be considering in addition those mentioned reftel.

Our position is as follows:

1. US wishes to see Northern Tier nations, as principal element ME defense, drawn more closely together but we do not wish to exercise pressure to this end. The more local inspiration there is for collective security arrangements, the more effective they are likely to be. Moreover too much initiative by US tends inevitably to increase demand for additional military and economic support which we may not be in position to accord. At the same time any interest Pakistan shows in strengthening ties with Iraq, Iran and Turkey should be encouraged, since if present inchoate defense arrangements are to evolve into an effective security system maintenance of present momentum by achieving earliest full membership seems advisable.

2. As regards procedure, we feel Turco-Iraqi Pact more suitable vehicle than Turk-Pakistan Pact as basis ME defense because it provides wide latitude for taking defensive measures jointly or among certain of the parties and importantly reflects a more immediate intent to undertake these measures. It provides also for eventual establishment of a ministerial council as another means of implementing its provisions. Thus it would seem desirable Pakistanis adhere Turco-Iraqi Pact. (FYI latter is adequate though not entirely satisfactory instrument for basis security system. It may be that with new membership some additions to instrument may strengthen it. FYI.)

3. Re US and UK accession Turco-Iraqi Pact see cirtel 463.³

In your discretion you may discuss with Pakistanis our views set forth above indicating our general endorsement Governor General's views re desirability of military staff talks as proposed Embtel 1 193.

Hoover

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/3-755. Secret. Drafted by Dixon, Smith, and Thacher; cleared with, Baxter, Fritzlan, and the Department of Defense; and approved by George Allen who signed for Hoover. Repeated to Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, London, New Delhi, and Tehran.

² Dated March 7, not printed. (*Ibid.*, 780.5/3-755) ³ [Document 13](#).

28. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State¹

Cairo, March 20, 1955—2 p.m.

1373. Yesterday Nasser invited me for unannounced and locally quite secret meeting with him today outside Cairo. Conversation, almost entirely on matters arising from defense organization, lasted 6 hours without interruption. Had set as my goal convincing Nasser unwisdom from Egypt's point of view of pursuing Saudi-Syria-Egyptian Pact. While am certain he convinced move unwise was unable devise with him any method by which proposed pact would be called off. He reiterated, almost in sadness, Egypt now too committed to change course and meetings for finalization would probably be soon.

Salah Salem was invited for part of meeting and proved utterly incorrigible. He sees everyone conspiring against Egypt. Many phrases of Damascus aide-mémoire were quoted to prove we following two policies re ME. He raved on our schemes to force an Israeli favored type of peace in area. Am afraid I responded with quite undiplomatic clobbering of the rascal which according to local etiquette should at least await greater personal acquaintance and several Turkish coffees. Discovered later Nasser had asked his presence to (1) hope I could get him somewhat out of his severe case of suspicion and persecution complex and (2) let me see type of problem he had to contend with.

My appraisal of Nasser personally rises with each meeting. Unfortunate part of all this is that he is basically pro-West and certainly anti-Communist. I reiterate my belief that Nasser is not hostile to northern tier approach nor Turk-Iraqi Pact in itself. Fact that we may choose to expand this by picking off one by one the rear area states understandably distasteful to him. Believe however, that but for Syria factor could even persuade him to indicate publicly he not opposed. The brutally strong démarche recently by Turkey to Syria upset him greatly.

Believe we might get Nasser soften language Egyptian draft new pact although I did not at this meeting hold this out as important. Stressed that world opinion would draw its conclusions on manner and atmosphere in which new pact came into being. I told him my personal opinion that Secretary would have no alternative, when questioned by press after pact signed, but to be critical as American opinion would be convinced that arrangement neutralist and aimed at sabotage of realistic defense arrangements. He said this would be disastrous and hoped Secretary, knowing more of true nature of things than appeared on surface, could find way of not being politically critical.

Nasser once went so far as to say if we would agree to put no pressure on Syria to join Iraq and northern tier and agree to consult him in advance should we change our minds perhaps new pact sponsored by Egypt would not be necessary. However, his advisers told him in Arabic they thought this unwise as Turkey and Iraqi effort would continue and Syria "must be committed quickly" before it became too late. Nasser replied in Arabic he not sure they were correct. Did not follow up on this idea as, while I believe best results in area require that Egypt be consulted, and that status quo in fact be maintained for awhile if possible, we cannot appear to give Egypt a veto. Also do not see how we can appear to assume the responsibility for what Syria herself may or may not decide to do in present unstable situation. Perhaps from vantage point of Department some idea may emerge from this.

Nasser now very much in a box and he knows it but cannot see his way out in near future. Frankly neither can I. Know he is still searching for alternatives and something may emerge. It would be great pity if regime should fall into discredit and fail because of all this as, in spite of childish behavior this item of foreign policy, and ravings of Salah Salem, this basically the best that Egypt has had in our lifetime. Neither am I discouraged re future cooperation if way can be found around present difficulties.

Until further developments, can only reiterate my previous recommendations re distinction between private and public efforts. Have left no doubt our feeling re northern tier, Egyptian efforts interfere internal

affairs other ME countries, nor our lack of support for their new pact arrangement. If at all possible, however, let us work at this without public condemnation.

Byroade

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.74/3–2055. Secret. Priority; Limited Distribution. Repeated to London, Paris, Ankara, Tel Aviv, Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Damascus, and Jidda.

29. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Turkey¹

Washington, March 26, 1955—2:27 p.m.

1214. Department encouraged by improving situation Cairo and slackening of attacks on Turkey and Iraq Cairo's 1385.² Points set forth Deptel 458 to Ankara³ on Turkey-Arab relations remain generally valid. Department wishes make special effort secure resumption Turkish-Egyptian rapprochement evident last fall. RCC remains best foreseeable Egyptian Government and retains major potential usefulness as instrument through which to further US policies NE.

Immediate requirement is cessation Turkish attacks on Egypt especially efforts undermine RCC Ankara's 1067 and 1112.⁴ (See separate telegram)⁵

Department believes we may be able use Asian-African Conference⁶ to advantage with respect to Egypt. If Nasser feels "betrayed" by West and isolated he may take extreme neutralist line at Conference harmful to West and making future cooperation difficult. On other hand Conference affords opportunity to broaden his understanding world problem and establish working relationships between Nasser and nations friendly to West (especially Turkey and Pakistan) which could later be extended to other fields. Conference may also be used to rebuild Nasser's prestige and self-confidence and faith in West. Therefore Department planning suggest nations friendly to West make special effort with Nasser.

Embassy instructed immediately approach Turkish Government on following lines:

1. Refer to general US views on Turkish-Arab relations outlined to Turkey last fall as given Deptel 548.
2. US pleased to note general improvement Egyptian situation and diminution attacks on Turkey and Iraq. It hopes Turkey will resume efforts at cooperation which showed such promise last

fall. Because of her recognized position Turkey can well afford pursue course which most likely result in long term benefits thus increasing further her own stature and reputation.

3. Asian-African Conference in US view provides special opportunity resume cordial relations with Nasser. Success could result in Egypt's adopting Conference position helpful West and lay foundation for cooperation on ME area problems.

4. US suggests Turkey provide Nasser opportunity participate in discussion among anti-communist countries both before and during Conference and generally facilitate any inclination Nasser may show to play important constructive role.²

5. US making similar approach other friendly countries.

Additional guidance to be provided Cairo.

Dulles

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 682.87/3–2655. Secret. Drafted by Burdett and approved by Jernegan who signed for, Dulles. Repeated to Cairo, Karachi, Djakarta, and London.

² Dated March 22, not printed. (*Ibid.*, 774.00/3–2255) ³ Reference should be to telegram 548 to Ankara, November 11, 1954, printed in [*Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. IX, Part 1, p. 557.*](#)

⁴ Telegram 1067, March 15, reported that during a television interview Prime Minister Menderes had expressed the view that except for Egyptian and Saudi Arabian pressure and threats, other Arab countries would have immediately joined the Baghdad Pact. (Department of State, Central Files, 033.1100–SM/3–1555) Telegram 1112, March 21, reported that the Turkish Foreign Office had released a statement indicating among other points “that Turkey has been subject to the present Egyptian Government’s unfounded and hostile actions.” (*Ibid.*, 682.83/3–2155) ⁵ In telegram 1216 to Ankara, March 26, the Department of State instructed the Embassy to discuss with Turkish officials Turkey’s recent, “intemperate” criticism of Egypt and

Syria and to urge a policy of moderation. (*Ibid.*, 682.87/3–2655) ⁶ Reference is to the Afro-Asian Conference held at Bandung, Indonesia, April 18–24, 1955. For documentation on U.S. interest in the conference, see [vol. XXI, pp. 1](#) ff.

⁷ On March 30, Warren reported that the substance of telegram 1214 was discussed with Nuri Birgi on March 29 and that Birgi saw no possibility of developing working contacts with Nasser prior to the Bandung Conference and was dubious about the prospects of making such contacts at the conference itself. Birgi noted, however, that if the United States could stimulate an approach by Nasser to Turkey, Turkey would not rebuff it and would take advantage of any opportunity that might develop for effective personal contact with, Nasser at Bandung. (Telegram 1165 from Ankara; Department of State, Central Files, 682.87/3–3055)

30. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Egypt¹

Washington, March 30, 1955—3:49 p.m.

1636. Egyptian Ambassador called at Department Mar 29 to request US make representations to Turkey to soften harsh attitude towards certain Arab states particularly Syria over Turk-Iraq Pact. He was informed Embassy Ankara already instructed make appropriate representations.²

Department also made following points to Ambassador:

1. US not endeavoring prevent Egyptian arrangement with Syrians and Saudis although it would regret see any alignment directed against one Arab state or which appeared to have neutralist connotation. American people naturally would regard more favorably Turk-Iraq Pact which directed at communist menace than Syrian-Egyptian-Saudi Pact which appeared have other objectives.
2. Nasser at present has great opportunity and might wish broaden his horizon and consider matters reaching beyond area upon which he has concentrated in past. Perhaps three-pillared defense

arrangement could eventually develop including Turkey, Egypt and Pakistan.

3. Preservation status quo with respect adherence additional Arab states to Turk-Iraq Pact desirable. Although in order find means of replacing Anglo-Jordanian treaty Jordan might wish adhere to pact US in no way encouraging any such tendency.

Dulles

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 682.87/3–3055. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Burdett and George Allen who approved and signed for Dulles. Also sent to Amman, Ankara, Baghdad, Beirut, Damascus, Jidda, London, Karachi, and Tel Aviv.

² [Supra](#).

31. Editorial Note

Speaking before the House of Commons on March 30, Prime Minister, Eden announced that the United Kingdom would accede to the Turkish-Iraqi Pact on April 5, thereby terminating the Anglo-Iraqi treaty of 1930. In his statement, Eden stressed the British policy of “cooperation between equal partners” in relations with Middle Eastern countries. The Embassy in London transmitted reports of, Eden’s statement to the Department of State in telegram 4298, March 30, and despatch 2884, March 31. (Department of State, Central Files, 682.87/3–3055 and 682.87/3–3155) The Embassy in London transmitted copies of the British White Paper issued on March 30, entitled “Accession of the United Kingdom to the Pact of Mutual Cooperation between Turkey and Iraq signed at Baghdad on February 24, 1955 with Special Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of Iraq and Exchanges of Notes” in despatch 2879, March 31. (*Ibid.*, 682.87/3–3155) A Special Agreement between the United Kingdom and Iraq, under which the United Kingdom among other points acceded to the Turkish-Iraqi Pact of Mutual Co-operation was signed at Baghdad on April 4. The agreement came into force on April 5. For text, see 233 UNTS 236.

For text of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of Alliance, signed at Baghdad on June 30, 1930, see League of Nations *Treaty Series*, volume 132, pages 363–403.

32. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Egypt¹

Washington, March 31, 1955—10:14 a.m.

1643. Verbatim text. Since receiving Embtel 1373² Dept has been considering at top level possible measures which would provide Nasser way out of impasse resulting from his attack on Turk-Iraq Pact, permit him to gain new prestige and influence in Middle East, and thus enable him to take initiative in launching Alpha. Obviously area defense arrangements are involved in such a review. We would hope to convince Nasser that we attach great importance to Egypt's position in the Middle East and to his influence and cooperation; that we are desirous of extending our support and assistance—political, economic, and military—to Egypt and in general of assisting Egypt to achieve the international standing to which she is entitled to aspire.

There are two basic prerequisites to our extending such support:

(1) There must be continued progress toward firming up the Northern Tier (Turkey, Iraq, Iran, Pakistan). This is required by the interest of the Free World in maintaining the integrity of the Middle East against assault from the Soviet Union.

(2) There must be a realistic and reasonably early prospect of a settlement of the major issues between Israel and Egypt as US cannot otherwise adequately help Egypt.

In other respects there is wide flexibility and we would welcome suggestions by Nasser. One approach which you might suggest to him before his departure for Asian-African Conference or after his return would be that Egypt and US and UK cooperate along following lines:

1. Northern tier concept to continue as grouping of Turkey, Iraq, Iran, Pakistan and UK. Adherence of additional Arab states at this

time to Turk-Iraq Pact will not be sought by US directly or indirectly.

2. Egypt to participate in Middle East defense, possibly through adherence to Turk-Pakistan Pact. Since this agreement more loosely worded than Turk-Iraq Pact and poses less specific obligations on parties, it more likely prove acceptable to Nasser.

3. Nasser initiate steps towards settlement principal Arab-Israel issues (Alpha). In your presentation you would include considerations mentioned para 2 Deptel 1531.³

4. In any conference of Arab states (Damascus Embtel 524)⁴ US would hope GOE would work for a constructive orientation which would make possible increased US support for Arab states.

Basic pattern would thus be: (a) tightly-knit military cooperation by states along northern tier; (b) association by Egypt with Turkey and Pakistan in a looser form of association appropriate to remoter area; (c) concentration on Arab development through constructive inter-Arab cooperation.

The above would be put to Nasser not as definite US policy but as response to his request for suggestions for way out of his impasse (Embtel 1373). It could be pointed out that such a program would achieve his objectives of increasing solidarity Arab world and orientation of Arabs toward Free World (Embtel 1261).⁵

Dept is informing British Embassy here of this message and you are authorized in your discretion to discuss it with Stevenson. You should not, however, make any approach to Nasser along above lines without further instruction which would follow your comment.

Dulles

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/3–3155. Top Secret; Limited Distribution; Alpha. Drafted by Russell on March 30; cleared with Dulles, Hare, Allen, and Jernegan; and approved by, Russell who initialed for, Dulles. Repeated to London.

² [Document 28](#).

³ [Vol. XIV, p. 114](#).

⁴ Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 786.5/3–2555) ⁵ [Vol. XIV, p. 78](#).

33. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Allen) to the Secretary of State¹

Washington, April 1, 1955.

SUBJECT

The Question of Discouraging Adherence by Jordan or other Arab States to the Turk-Iraqi Pact; Memorandum from Eden

I have been giving considerable thought to our discussion of the problems which will confront us if Jordan, responding to an urge to follow Iraq's example, should seek to revise its military relationship with the UK by joining the Turk-Iraqi Pact, with the possible result that Lebanon and even Syria might later swing in the same direction. After our first meeting with you on this question, I discussed with the Counselor of the British Embassy our apprehension that such moves would greatly complicate Alpha by tending to isolate Egypt and thereby weaken Nasser, and would intensify Israel's agitation. I indicated to him that we were considering steps to quietly discourage Jordan from adherence.

The attached instruction (Tab A)² from Sir Anthony Eden to the British Embassy is in response to this discussion and urges strongly that we not weaken in our support for the Turk-Iraqi Pact as "the foundation for an effective defense system for the Middle East". [2 lines of source text not declassified] A policy of neither encouraging nor discouraging adherence to the Pact is consistent with our NSC 5428, paragraph 17d, which states that the U.S. should: "Neither encourage nor discourage other Arab states from asking to participate in regional security arrangements."

I would agree with Sir Anthony that there are real dangers involved in our taking positive steps to discourage Jordan's adherence to the pact since any such steps, however quietly made, would rapidly become known in all Arab

states as well as in Turkey, and be interpreted, rightly or wrongly, as a change in what is believed to be our basic position: support for the Turk-Iraqi Pact as a nucleus of an area defense system. Because such a change would be regarded as a victory for Egypt over Iraq, deep resentment and disillusionment would ensue in Baghdad and Ankara. Iraq took its courage in its hands in concluding this Pact and successfully rode out a tidal wave of Egyptian-Saudi pressures. Iraq's corollary efforts to promote adherence of Syria and other states to the Pact have their basis in the long-standing "fertile crescent" concept as well as in a desire not to be the only Arab state linked with the West in a defense arrangement. There is no doubt that Iraq both challenges Egypt's leadership and fears to be alone. In this connection, Jamali may have some reason to believe since he talked with you last July that you would not vigorously oppose the "fertile crescent" concept, provided Iraq first joined the Northern Tier (Tab).³

While Iraq has a concept of her own for Arab unity and ambitions to play a leading role therein, resentment over Egypt's long-standing pretensions to hegemony in the Arab world are by no means limited to Iraq. The failure of Salah Salem's recent heavy-handed attempts to scold and threaten the Arab states into action against Iraq was certainly regarded with some satisfaction in much of the northern Arab community.

[1 paragraph (41/2 lines of source text) not declassified]

At the same time, with respect to our Alpha telegram 1643 to Cairo (Tab C),⁴ I think it important to avoid giving Nasser the impression that we are underwriting his attainment of undisputed leadership over other Arab states. It was for this reason we used advisedly the expression "permit him to get new prestige and influence in the *Middle East*" in paragraph 1. His influence in the Arab world will be a natural by-product of substantial U.S. aid, but we would not wish him to be in a position to demand our unswerving support in the vagaries of intra-Arab politics.

Recommendations:

1. That we continue adherence to the excerpt of NSC policy above cited.

2. That we try to work out with the British a compromise arrangement [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] with Jordan involving the latter's adherence to the Turk-Iraqi Pact [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*]; and that we continue to take the position with respect to other Arab neighbors of Israel that because we are opposed to an arms race, U.S. grant military aid must depend primarily upon, "substantial improvement" in Arab-Israel relations.

3. That after receipt of comments from Cairo and London (Tab C), you call another meeting to discuss this general problem.⁵

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 682.87/4-155. Top Secret.

² Not printed. Tab A is the text of an instruction from Prime Minister Eden to the British Embassy in Washington.

³ Not attached.

⁴ [Vol. XIV, p. 127](#).

⁵ Dulles initialed his approval of all three recommendations. Tab D, a copy of a telegram from London was also attached to the source text. A summary of the telegram was not declassified.

34. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State¹

Cairo, April 8, 1955—4 p.m.

1502. During period of expected quiet regarding foreign affairs matters while Nasser and Fawzi absent from Egypt, will review Embassy conclusions with view towards furnishing any possible new recommendations regarding general Arab States situation. In general discussions with Nasser all aspects of Deptel 1643 repeated London 4997,² naturally developed except suggestion that Egypt might adhere to Turko-Pakistani Pact. While we might eventually find such association by Egypt useful, am very doubtful idea should be broached in near future.

While it is tempting here to seek authority inform Nasser we will use our influence prevent additional Arab State adherence to northern tier, believe this would be mistake and that Department's "hands off" position is correct. Nasser now believes this to be our position. Considering however how things may develop in future, have sought to leave impression Nasser's mind that it would be most difficult for United States to discourage further participation if states concerned voluntarily decided such to be in their own best interests. He understands logic of this and that we would not desire do anything dampen enthusiasm for northern tier approach. Believe, unless Department has other views, this best way to leave things for present.

Byroade

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/4-855. Top Secret; Alpha. Repeated to London.

² [Document 32](#).

35. Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Murphy) to the Secretary of State¹

Washington, April 22, 1955.

SUBJECT

Middle East Defense

Discussion

The “northern tier” concept has materialized rapidly since the approval last July of NSC 5428 (U.S. Objectives and Policies with Respect to the Near East) and has taken a turn not then contemplated in that the U.K. has adhered to the indigenous Turk-Iraqi Pact. Pakistan apparently will adhere to the Pact in the near future, and the Shah of Iran has shown a keen interest in the “northern tier” concept and has proposed military staff talks among Iran, Iraq, Pakistan and Turkey. Meanwhile, we are proceeding with military aid programs in all four of these countries.

We are not reaping the full benefit of these developments because we lack a comprehensive political-military strategy for the defense of the Middle East. On the one hand, the “northern tier” countries do not know what is required of them; on the other, we are undecided as to our own role and have inadequate criteria against which to measure the effectiveness of our country programs of military aid in terms of regional defense.

There is accordingly an urgent need for us to reexamine the problems of Middle East defense and our own capabilities of contributing to their solution. Political and military aspects are closely intertwined. For example, the best defense line in the area is hinged on the Zagros Mountains in Iran. If this is the line to be held, the Iranians must accept temporary Soviet occupation of the greater part of Iran. Another problem would arise if it were determined on military grounds that Turkish troops must be stationed in Iraq. Despite the recent Turk-Iraqi rapprochement, the Iraqis are not wholly convinced that Turkey has lost all imperial ambition and the

presence of Turkish troops in Iraq would be resented and feared. Arab-Israeli differences will present their own special and inevitable difficulties.

We must carefully consider British capabilities and intentions. You will recall that Eden spoke to you in Bangkok on February 23 of the British desire for bilateral political-military talks in Washington on Middle East defense.² On March 15 the Under Secretary wrote to the Deputy Secretary of Defense expressing the view that it would be desirable to accede to the British request and solicit Defense views. We have had no reply to this letter.

At the time that Eden approached you, Admiral Cassady, representing the JCS, had just concluded military talks on Middle East defense with the British and the Turks in London. Cassady submitted his report to the JCS shortly thereafter. The Department has attempted to obtain the substance of his report through the State-JCS meetings and the JCS member of the NSC Planning Board but has been given only very general information.

At the State-JCS meeting on April 15 there was a general discussion of Middle East defense from which emerged a JCS view that may be summarized as follows: U.S. political-military policy with respect to the Middle East should be reviewed by the NSC; thereafter, it might be useful to have informal bilateral discussions with the British but we should avoid formal talks as these might offend the Turks. Admiral Radford suggested that a State-Defense working group be established to formulate policy recommendations with respect to Middle East defense.

We support Admiral Radford's proposal of a State-Defense working group which we believe should be established at or near the Assistant Secretary level. The terms of reference of the group should be broad, including inter alia the identification of principles, effective and practicable from both political and military points of view, governing the strategy of Middle East defense, an assessment of the nature and extent of U.S. participation that may be required, an examination of the advisability of expanding the geographic scope of the "northern tier" concept, a determination of the quantities and types of forces needed for effective defense and a consideration of ways and means of bridging the gap between available indigenous forces and force requirements for effective defense.

Although we favor the establishment of the working group supported by Admiral Radford and thus far accept the JCS position that a review of our Middle East policy is needed before talking with the British, we believe that U.S.-U.K. talks are essential and not merely— as the JCS seems to assess them—of possible utility. Our view seems to accord more than that of the JCS with paragraph 17b of NSC 5428 which states that the U.S. should conduct secret military-political conversations with the U.K. regarding the development of the “northern tier” concept.

Because of the importance that we attach to talks with the British, we consider, in contrast to the JCS view, that the findings of the working group should not be formally submitted to the NSC before we talk with the British. The group’s report would, therefore, serve in the first instance as a basis for these talks. After the talks and in the light of the further information derived therefrom, the group would make such revisions of its recommendations as might seem advisable and this revised report would be formally submitted to the NSC for its consideration.

In view of the urgency of this matter, we believe that the working group should be established as soon as possible and should be instructed to produce its recommendations not later than June 15.

Recommendation

It is recommended that you and the Under Secretary meet with Secretary, Wilson, Deputy Secretary, Anderson and Admiral, Radford and approach them along the following lines:

1. Emphasize the Department’s belief that it is essential for State and Defense urgently to review U.S. political-military policy with respect to the defense of the Middle East as a whole.
2. Endorse Admiral Radford’s proposal of a State-Defense working group to formulate appropriate policy recommendations, with the reservation that these recommendations should serve first as a basis for talks with the U.K. and only thereafter be formally submitted to the NSC, and urge that this group be established at a

high level as soon as possible with instructions to report not later than June 15.

3. In order that State may prepare itself for participation in the working group, request that Admiral Cassady's report of the tripartite military meetings in London be made available to the Department as soon as possible.

4. Seek Defense agreement to the holding of informal political-military talks with the U.K. as soon as practicable after the completion of the working group study and to an interim reply to the British informing them that we would be prepared to have informal discussions after we have completed a review of our own position.

¹ Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 66 D 70. Top Secret. Drafted by Elbert G. Mathews of the Policy Planning Staff. A notation on the source text indicates that it was seen by the Secretary.

² See [vol. XIV, pp. 70-72](#).

36. Memorandum of Discussion at the 247th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, May 5, 1955¹

Washington, May 5, 1955

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and items 1–4 on the status of the internal security program, significant world developments affecting U.S. security, the Austrian State Treaty, and Yugoslavia.]

5. United States Objectives and Policies With Respect to the Near East (NSC 5428; Progress Report, dated April 7, 1955, by the OCB on NSC 5428²) Mr. Anderson briefed the Council on the main points made in the reference Progress Report, and inquired whether the Planning Board should proceed forthwith to a revision of NSC 5428 or delay the matter for a time.

The President said that for the moment he would hold up on revising the present policy on the Near East. The Planning Board should await word from the State Department as to timing. If the State Department decides that a revision should be undertaken, the Planning Board could proceed.

Secretary Hoover said that the United States was confronted with many difficult problems in the Middle East. One of the most difficult was our over-all military and political objectives for the area. The Departments of State and Defense, he added, were setting up a committee, at the Assistant Secretary level, to study this matter.

Alluding to the US-UK military conversations on the defense of the Middle East, Secretary Hoover stated that two British objectives had become apparent in the course of these conversations. In the first place, the British desired to assure themselves of command responsibility in the area in the event of difficulties. Secondly, the British expected the United States to foot the bill required to place the area in some posture of defense.

In view of these transparent British designs, Secretary Hoover said that the United States henceforth was proposing to confine further conversations

with the United Kingdom to a purely political level, avoiding further discussion on the military level. For this among other reasons he agreed that it was wise to postpone for a time any decision to revise NSC 5428.

*The National Security Council:*³

- a. Noted and discussed the reference Progress Report by the Operations Coordinating Board on the subject.
- b. Agreed that a review by the NSC Planning Board of the policies set forth in NSC 5428 should await the advice of the Secretary of State as to timing.

Note: The action in b above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of State.

S. Everett Gleason

¹ Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Prepared by, S. Everett Gleason on May 6.

² The Progress Report was dated April 6. (Department of State, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 61 D 167, Near East (NSC 5428)) ³ Paragraphs a–b and the Note that follows constitute NSC Action No. 1394. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, NSC Records of Action)

37. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State¹

Ankara, May 21, 1955—9 a.m.

1462. Re Embtel 1461, May 20.² While Turks have not been explicit on subject, we have received impression from recent talks on Mid-East matters they are becoming discouraged, and increasingly perplexed, by what seems to them an inexplicable indifference on our part toward Middle East defense. Discouragement arises mainly from “hands-off” attitude, on one

hand, towards extension Turco-Iraqi pact, as regards both our own participation and use of our influence with others, and on other hand, towards frustration ESS rival pact. Puzzlement arises from contrast our present indifference with earlier fervent support “northern tier” concept, as demonstrated by our active role in development Turco-Pakistani and Turco-Iraqi pacts, which they regard [as] practically disowning our own child; and from even greater contrast our disinterest in present practical developments with our willingness participate actively in less realistic—and in the event, abortive—MEC and MEDO projects. Turks’ perplexity has obviously been enhanced by our recent initiative, on military level, in inviting them to participate in London tripartite staff talks on Middle East defense.

Though reiterating that foregoing has not yet been articulated by Turks, I am confident it is accurate analysis present trend their thinking which Department will want to take into account in reviewing and deciding our future course of action in this area. It would, of course, be helpful if I could send a positive and encouraging statement as regards our policy before the Turks do articulate their present uneasiness on the subject.

Warren

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/5–2155. Secret. Repeated to London.

² In telegram 1461 from Ankara, Warren reported that Nuri Birgi had informed the Embassy of Turkish concern over Saudi pressure on Lebanon and had referred to a previous Turkish memorandum, given to the United States and the United Kingdom, concerning the Syrian situation. (*Ibid.*, 780.5/5–2055) The Embassy in Ankara transmitted a summary of the April 28 Turkish memorandum to the Department of State in telegram 1346, April 29. (*Ibid.*, 783.00/4–2955) The Turkish memorandum expressed concern over the ESS Pact and urged a dual line of action: strengthen the Baghdad Pact as soon as possible, thus increasing its attraction to other Arab States; take steps to help Syrian opposition to the ESS Pact. The full text of the memorandum was transmitted to the Department of State in despatch 563, April 29. (*Ibid.*, 780.5/4–2955)

38. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State¹

Karachi, May 26, 1955—8 p.m.

1846. At Prime Minister's request called late this afternoon. Summary of conversation his principal point follows: Question: Will your Government join Turk-Iraq Pact; General Ayub has submitted his views to Cabinet on its request re GOP joining Pact and recommends against it unless United States joins.

I replied I was quite sure I had seen cables go over my desk at time United Kingdom joined and United States Government took strong position it would not join. I could not remember the reasons but felt certain United States position was strong and could hold out little hope. The Prime Minister asked me cable Department requesting answer.

Prime Minister pointed out Pact would really be strong if United States joined and Cabinet sceptical about backing until United States joined to make it effective Pact. I replied it obvious any Pact would be stronger by United States joining, but why did he intimate Pact would not be effective if United States did not join? Prime Minister at first replied did not know, that was simply Ayub's recommendation. He then read Ayub's written recommendation to Cabinet. Ayub pointed out SEATO took care of GOP on East, but GOP not taken care of on West and although GOP had plenty of competent manpower, unless United States came into Turk-Iraq Pact and made materials available, the start on protection of GOP in West made by Turkish-GOP Pact would not be effective. Until United States joined Turk-Iraq Pact it would be shadow and not substance and GOP should make clear it favors joining Turk-Iraq Pact and is in sympathy with its principles and objectives but GOP should use its refusal to join as a means of putting pressure on United States to make up its mind what it is going to do in Middle East and GOP should tell Iraq and Turkey exactly that. (*Embassy comment: I have strong suspicion Prime Minister did not intend to read that to me, but he had started reading and went on gallantly.*) Turk-Iraq Pact will be up for action again at Cabinet meeting next Wednesday and Prime Minister would like position of United States prior to that time.

I told Prime Minister I had suspicion Pakistan reason for delay joining Pact was desire not annoy Saudi Arabia and Egypt at time when those countries might be effective in mediating GOP-Afghan dispute. Prime Minister replied that was no concern and reason for delay in first instance had been pressure of internal business; that it was necessary consult General Ayub.

Comment: Of course Ayub has now pushed for well over a year for US to make up its mind on general plans for Middle East and disclose them to GOP and to give aid in accordance with those plans. Every indication up to today including flat statements by Prime Minister and Mirza have been that GOP would surely join Turko-Iraqi Pact. At moment am puzzled in own mind how far there is honest doubt in mind Pakistan Cabinet and how far Ayub has merely been successful in convincing Cabinet to use this problem as one more effort to force decision by United States on plans for Middle East and extent of GOP role and ultimate price United States would pay GOP for role assigned.

Department may wish to pass this message certain other posts but suspect any leak to Turkey, Iraq, or even United Kingdom at this time could be risky and irritating to GOP.

Following country team meeting tomorrow will cable any further assessments and conclusions.

Hildreth

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/5-2655. Secret; Priority.

39. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan¹

Washington, May 28, 1955—2:32 p.m.

2050. In response to GOP inquiry whether US prepared join Turk-Iraq-UK Pact (urtel 1846)² you may in your discretion say:

1. US support for Northern Tier concept remains strong and we hope to see its steady and even rapid fulfillment. We appreciate special situation existing in Iran and Pakistan which governments those countries must take into consideration but we would welcome their adherence as early as they feel situation is propitious. At same time, we do not desire to urge them act faster than their respective situations justify and we recognize importance of timing.

2. As re US adherence, we are not contemplating it at moment, due partly to uncertain relations among Arab states and our desire to effect improvement in general Middle Eastern stability. While we have made no decision possibility our adherence at later stage is by no means excluded.

3. UK adherence to Iraqi-Turk Pact was chiefly to regularize UK-Iraq relations but we have no such requirement. Our treaty relations with various states of area do not require urgent readjustment. We believe our reiterated public statements of support for this type regional arrangement make our favorable attitude toward it adequately clear and that our existing ties with its present and prospective members (through NATO, Manila Pact, military and economic aid agreements) are sufficient enable us give as much support as our resources likely to permit in near future.

4. It has been and remains our view that Middle Eastern defense arrangements should spring from indigenous initiative and that

cooperative approach by Middle Eastern states themselves is first essential. While Turk-Iraqi Pact is excellent step in that direction, it is still far from constituting regional organization. Adherence Pakistan and Iran is needed give it substance.

5. We think security position of all members such regional organization would be improved whether or not US was also member.

6. To extent possible, US aid to Middle East countries will in future be based on development of plans for regional defense rather than on separate country-by-country estimates of individual defense needs. This will be true whether or not US itself becomes member of regional organization. Therefore Pakistani Government should not be influenced in its decision re adherence to pact by expectation that US membership or non-membership in same pact would influence amount of aid provided Pakistan.

7. We believe Pakistani adherence to Turk-Iraqi pact is logical and wise next move toward greater regional security but this is matter which Pakistan must decide entirely for itself. We do not desire to exert pressure nor to hold forth special inducements.

If Pakistani reluctance results in some part from desire to avoid offense to Egypt and Saudi Arabia during Afghan dispute, you might suggest that GOP reconsider after mediation efforts have been concluded.

FYI only: Current review of US budgetary position indicates it likely be extremely difficult provide increased military aid Pakistan. In view of this plus precarious state Pakistani economy it seems unwise give any encouragement to Ayub's grandiose ideas re expansion Pakistani military establishment. While Pakistani adherence Turk-Iraqi pact is desirable from political viewpoint we cannot afford to pay or promise high price for such adherence.

Question eventual US adherence to regional pact is under study at working level. Decision in principle likely be deferred at least two months and even

if favorable decision then taken, actual adherence itself likely to be further delayed for various reasons. End FYI.

Info posts should not discuss foregoing with respective governments unless further instructed.

Hoover

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/5–2655. Secret; Priority. Drafted by George Allen and Jernegan who signed for Hoover. Repeated to Ankara, Baghdad, Tehran, Cairo, and London.

² [Supra](#).

40. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Turkey¹

Washington, May 28, 1955—3:42 p.m.

1536. Embtels 1461 and 1462.²

1. Reasoning behind what may have appearance of hands-off attitude re ME Defense is actually tactics and timing, a) Next logical step development Northern Tier is accession Pakistan to Turco-Iraqi Pact which move we have sought encourage as strongly as believe expedient. In fact we do wish see most rapid possible progress towards realization effective ME defense system and strongly support Pact, b) As previously stated believe would be counter-productive press for immediate Iranian accession which we believe will be forthcoming in due course, c) Continue believe unwise for states bordering Israel join Northern Tier at this time and we pursuing policy neither encouraging nor discouraging re joining Pact, d) Believe existing security treaty relationships with Turkey and Pakistan along with military assistance is clear indication of strong US interest in security of area, therefore question US participation not urgent, e) Closely watching proposed ESS Pact developments and taking course which in our judgment would slow down, frustrate, or render innocuous such a Pact.

2. Re Turk memo April 28, you should inform Foreign Office Department has studied with much interest Turks' analysis of situation and views as to possible courses of action, and greatly appreciates their sharing their thinking with us. You may in your discretion inform Turks substance paragraph 1, stressing this deliberate course intended bring about maturity of Northern Tier organization on sound political basis. Turks should be assured we continue have very strong interest in development ME defense.

Hoover

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/5–2155. Secret. Drafted by Dixon and approved by Jernegan who signed for Hoover. Repeated to London.

² Telegram 1462 is [Document 37](#). Regarding telegram 1461, see [footnote 2](#) thereto.

41. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State¹

Karachi, May 29, 1955—noon.

1864. Re Department's telegram 2050.² Mirza last night told me he had been surprised and concerned at nature of Ayub's memorandum to Cabinet. He felt Ayub was bargaining too often and too hard. Said Cabinet hesitancy largely due to fear Turk-Iraq pact without US would likely be British-dominated. (*Comment:* I am sure Mirza feels strongly on this himself.) Mirza anxious for us to join pact, but willing for Pakistan to take step now, leaving it to US to make up its mind in due course. He expressed hope that I would receive instructions before Wednesday meeting of Cabinet which would enable me inform Prime Minister that US hoped Pakistan would join and encourage them to take step.

Reftel (with which Embassy concurs) provides adequate guidance, and I will pass on to Prime Minister position as outlined.³ I am concerned that Pakistanis will interpret any encouragement as implied commitment to give them support required to make effective their contribution to Middle East Defense. Embassy suspects that Ayub's basic purpose is not so much to secure US participation in defense organization as to get commitment to raise additional army corps. Having failed to win latter objective in direct negotiation, he may now be approaching it by indirect route. As Embassy understands situation, some further expansion of Pakistan forces will probably be required if northern tier arrangement to assume area military significance. Pakistan participation in such arrangement not likely to be militarily meaningful unless such further expansion ultimately undertaken, since agreed that forces being raised under presently approved forces goal will be required home defense and internal security even assuming friendly India. If this understanding correct, Pakistan participation in defense arrangement under present circumstances considered desirable for political rather than military purposes. If this understanding not correct, please advise.⁴

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/5–2955. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Ankara, Baghdad, Tehran, Cairo, and London.

² [Document 39](#).

³ Hildreth subsequently handed to Prime Minister Mirza an aide-mémoire that summarized the contents of telegram 2050. A copy of the aide-mémoire was transmitted to the Department of State in despatch 782 from Karachi, June 3. (Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/6–355) ⁴ On June 22, Ayub arrived in Ankara for high-level talks with Turkish and Iraqi officials. On June 28, the Embassy in Ankara reported that Ayub had instructed that a cable be sent to Karachi recommending prompt Pakistani adherence to the Turco-Iraqi Pact. Ayub's decision reportedly was made following two sessions with Turkish and Iraqi leaders, including President Bayar, Prime Minister Menderes, King Faisal, and Nuri Said. (Telegram 1629 from Ankara; *Ibid.*, 682.87/6–2855) On June 30, the Embassy in Karachi reported that the Pakistani Cabinet had agreed to adhere to the Turkish-Iraqi Pact. (Telegram 2081 from Karachi; *Ibid.*, 780.5/6–3055)

42. Memorandum From the Secretary of State to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Allen)¹

Washington, June 4, 1955.

I have been concerned over our inability to resolve the problems facing us in the Middle East and South Asia, some of which are admittedly incessant. While I recognize the frustrations which we bear in tackling these issues, we must make every effort and apply our maximum resourcefulness to shape events in this area to our advantage. Therefore I feel that we must pursue a more arduous and expeditious re-appraisal of our policies and plans than ever before.

I therefore propose that we begin at once to analyze each of the problems facing us in this area and formulate policies and courses of action for their resolution. This undertaking merits your personal direction to the very

maximum. I have set aside the major portion of Tuesday afternoon, June 14, to consider with you the results of this appraisal.²

I am aware of the extraordinary nature of this assignment. I am therefore asking Mr. Murphy to insure that all possible cooperation and assistance is furnished you and your staff by other areas of the Department. [*1¾ lines of source text not declassified*]

The many problems posed for us throughout the Middle East and South Asia are only highlighted by the following

Greece. Demands high-level aid be restored; pursues disruptive Cyprus policy.

Turkey. Demands extraordinary loan; dissatisfied with our area defense policy.

Egypt, Syria, Saudia Arabia. Covet neutralism and a harmful pact.

Israel. Threatens military action over Gaza; demands security guarantee (What action should we take to forestall hostilities and perhaps a renewal of the Israel-Arab war? The time may have come for the President or myself to make a policy statement on the Israel-Arab issue, constructively reviewing our position in the entire situation. If so, what lines should such a statement take?).

Iraq, Iran. Anxious for a clearcut statement of our military policy regarding this area. Want us to join in staff talks (What should our area defense policy be?).

Afghanistan. Looking to Moscow; friction with Pakistan progressively worse (mediation results an unknown quantity).

India. Disruptive neutralism; no Kashmir settlement in sight; numerous issues causing us trouble (charges of covert subsidization; unpredictable supply of monkeys for polio vaccine; controversial shipping charges, etc.)

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.80/6–455. Top Secret. Copies were sent to Hoover and, Murphy.

² There is no record that such a meeting ever took place. Dulles' Appointment Book contains no entry for a meeting between Dulles and, Allen on or around June 14. (Princeton University, Dulles Papers)

43. Memorandum From the State-Defense Working Group on Middle East Defense to the Under Secretary of State (Hoover) and the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Anderson)¹

Washington, June 6, 1955.

SUBJECT

U.S. Position Regarding Middle East Defense

1. The State–Defense working group which you established has prepared a report on the above subject which is contained at Tab A.² The key points made in this study are:

a. U.S. security interests require the development of a Middle East defense arrangement and an effective military capability in the area.

b. The U.S. should induce the Iranians to participate in the Turk-Iraqi Pact by offering to support Iranian military programs, including possibly an infantry division, if called for in regional defense plans. Pakistan adherence is expected shortly.

c. The U.S. should adhere to the Turk-Iraqi Pact. A Manila Pact-type of commitment may be required.

d. Under the proposed Pact an organization would be set up consisting of a Ministerial Council and such

subordinate functional agencies as are appropriate.

e. [2¾ lines of source text not declassified] Preliminary estimates indicate that ground force requirements can be provided by the nations of the area and the U.K., with U.S. and U.K. assistance; that naval forces might be supplied by the U.K. and the indigenous countries; but that the bulk of the air force requirements will have to be provided by the U.S. or U.K. from military resources available at the time.

f.

Potentially, U.S. military assistance in support of the defense effort might amount to \$1.5 to \$2.0 billion. If programmed over a five year period, the annual amount required would be \$300–\$400 million. While this is considerably higher than presently contemplated programs for the five year period beginning in FY 56, it is close to the present levels of military aid for the area. The total of all other forms of U.S. assistance to the area is estimated at \$2.2 billion for a five year period, \$1.9 billion of which is, however, required to satisfy existing commitments or plans, including aid to Turkey, not directly related to the defense of the Middle East.

Thus, taking \$4.0 billion as the probable gross cost over the five year period, the gross annual amount for all forms of U.S. aid would be \$800 million. However, approximately \$500 million would be required even if no regional defense plan were undertaken. The net cost of the plan, therefore, would be about \$300 million annually.

2. The report at Tab A has been reviewed in terms of existing NSC policy (NSC 5428,³ 5510/1,⁴ 5504,⁵ 5409⁶) and found to be generally consistent therewith although in many instances it develops further the courses of action contained in the basic

policy. A requirement, however, does exist for NSC agreement prior to actual participation in a Middle East defense arrangement. An analysis of the relationship between the working group study and NSC policy is contained at Tab B.⁷

3. In view of the forthcoming conversations with the U.K. on this subject, Tab C⁸ contains an analysis of the probable U.K. position and Tab D contains suggestions as to the tactics to be followed by the U.S. in such discussions.

4. The working group study as outlined above will require considerable activity on the part of the U.S. and other governments if there are to be set in motion international actions leading toward the attainment of U.S. objectives on a timely basis. Specifically, it is considered that U.S. adherence to the Turk-Iraqi Pact should be consummated at an early date. This means that prompt action will be required to:

- a. Determine U.K. views and obtain assurance of their cooperation.
- b. Secure NSC agreement to U.S. adherence.
- c. Conduct necessary preliminary Congressional consultations.
- d. Secure Pakistani and Iranian adherence to the Turk-Iraqi Pact.
- e. Negotiate the terms of U.S. adherence.
- f. Take measures designed to avoid Israeli opposition to the above arrangements, including possibly a U.S. offer to enter into a defense pact against aggression from outside the region.

5. *Recommendations:* It is recommended that you:

a. Approve⁹ the working group paper at Tab A as a suitable basis for preliminary, informal discussion with the U.K. as outlined in the tactics paper at Tab D.

b. Accept the working group report, subject to amendment following the discussions with the U.K., for submission to the NSC and agreement by the NSC on U.S. participation.

c. Inform the President, prior to discussions with the U.K., of the possible developments outlined in this memorandum.

Tab A

U.S. POSITION REGARDING MIDDLE EAST DEFENSE¹⁰

Introduction and Summary of Conclusions

On the instructions of Under Secretary of State Hoover and Deputy Secretary of Defense, Anderson, the working group, composed of representatives of State, Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has made a survey of the political, economic, and military problems involved in planning a defense of the Middle East. It has endeavored, first, to determine what our political and military objectives should be in that region and, second, what political, economic, and military measures would be necessary to achieve those objectives, so far as they relate to the security of the area. Finally, it has attempted to estimate the resources which would be required, in terms of manpower, military equipment, construction, and economic support.

The group has kept in mind current U.S. policy, commitments, and existing limitations on U.S. military and economic resources but has assumed that it was not estopped from suggesting additional commitments or envisaging the possibility of new allocations or reallocations of resources.

The group has understood that while its primary function was to assist in clarifying U.S. policy and plans for the defense of the Middle East, its secondary function was to prepare for informal general political talks with the British Government on this subject.

The full results of the group's work are contained in the attached study. Its essential conclusions are summarized below.

Conclusions

1. Objectives

The political objectives of the United States in the Middle East are to deny control of the region and its resources to the communists and to assure its cooperation with the West, and the availability of its resources, in time of peace and war. Additional objectives should be to give the Middle Eastern states a sense of security, to develop a defense arrangement which would deter aggression from outside the area, and ultimately to assure the effective defense of the region.

The military objectives are to protect the right flank of NATO, defend the Turkish Straits, assure the use by the West of Middle Eastern base sites, control the eastern Mediterranean, defend the Cairo-Suez-Aden areas, and hold the Persian Gulf and contiguous oil-bearing areas.

2. Strategy

[2½ lines of source text not declassified] Successful execution of this defensive strategy would also facilitate the execution of subsequent strategic actions.

Such a strategy would be compatible with the achievement of our political objectives. Close political and military coordination with and among the several states of the area would be required.

Desirable extensions to this strategy would include the defense of West Pakistan and defensive delaying actions to the north and east of the Zagros.

3. Forces Required.

Preliminary analysis indicates that a minimum of 7-1/3 divisions plus substantial tactical air forces and naval forces are required. Five divisions, in varying stages of equipment, training, and manpower are currently available in the area or committed, from Iraq, Jordan, and the United Kingdom. Very little of the necessary air and naval forces is currently available in the area or committed. (See Section IV of the study.)

4. Sources of Additional Forces Required

The deficit in ground forces can be made up by raising additional units in Iraq and Iran. Jordan, Egypt, Pakistan, Ethiopia, and South Africa are other potential long-term sources. [*3¾ lines of source text not declassified*]

A small portion of the air deficit could be provided by a build-up of indigenous forces; most of the air units, however, would have to come from U.S. and U.K. forces available at the time. The U.K. and indigenous states might be able to provide naval forces.

5. Base and Other Facilities Required

Two primary lines of communications will be required to support the defensive operations envisaged, one from the head of the Persian Gulf and one from the eastern Mediterranean (Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon). Air bases will be required in most of the countries of the area, secondary naval bases in several.

6. Political Requirements

U.S.-U.K. participation and cooperation are essential. The participation and cooperation of Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Jordan are also required. To provide the necessary bases and lines of communication, the eventual cooperation of Lebanon, Syria, and Egypt will also be required and that of Saudi Arabia would be desirable. The cooperation of Israel would be helpful but not essential. The cooperation of Pakistan [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] is not only desirable from the military point of view but is also important politically to complete the “Northern Tier” and to contribute to the developing regional defense consciousness of the area states.

A regional defense organization is necessary to coordinate planning and eventual execution of the defense. It is important to bring its members into planning at an early stage, in order to realize the full potential of each Middle Eastern participant.

An overall command structure is neither essential nor desirable in the initial stages of development of this defense organization.

7. Political Feasibility

It should be politically feasible to obtain the cooperation required. A nucleus already exists in the Turk-Iraqi Pact and the Turk-Pakistani Pact. This is supplemented by the Anglo-Jordanian treaty, the Anglo-Egyptian treaty, and the existence of British-controlled territories at Cyprus, in the Persian Gulf, at Aden, and in East Africa. The “Northern Tier” can be completed in the fairly near future by the adherence of Pakistan and Iran to the Turk-Iraqi Pact.

The Arab-Israel dispute poses an obstacle, but it is not an insuperable barrier to the development of an effective regional organization. Israel’s cooperation is not essential and that of the Arabs (other than Iraq) can be deferred to a later stage. If significant improvement in Arab-Israel relations could be obtained in the next six or eight months, the problem would largely disappear. If not, it should still be possible to offer sufficient inducement to the Arab States (Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and Egypt) to get them either to join the Turk-Iraqi pact or to agree to some other formula for cooperation in defense matters.

8. U.S. Participation

It will be politically necessary for the U.S. to adhere, probably within a year at most, to a Middle East defense organization. It will also be militarily necessary, so that we may be in a position to influence defense planning and preparations. (See Section VI, paragraph 2, of the study.) The best procedure is to adhere to the existing Turk-Iraqi Pact.

The timing of U.S. adherence depends upon political developments, primarily in connection with the Arab-Israel dispute. It should, in any case, follow that of Pakistan and Iran. If there were prospects of a real relaxation of Arab-Israel tensions, our adherence should be delayed until that had been achieved, in order not to arouse Israeli resentment or reduce the inducements we might be able to offer to both sides. If there were no such prospects, we should adhere without too much delay, in order to maintain momentum in the regional defense build-up. Simultaneously with our

adherence to the regional Pact we should offer to enter into a defense arrangement with Israel against aggression from outside the area.

9. Costs

The costs may be divided into four categories: a. those involved in building up indigenous regional defense forces; b. those involved in construction of bases, LOCs, and other facilities; c. those involved in current military and economic aid programs in Turkey, Pakistan, and other states in the area, which will probably be continued regardless of regional defense planning; and d. those involved in extending special military and economic aid to certain states (Syria, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Israel) as inducements to obtain their cooperation or acquiescence in the defense arrangements.

The costs to the U.S. are roughly estimated in Section VII of the report. They come to an approximate grand total of \$4.0 billion, or an average over a five-year period of \$800 million per annum. If we eliminate those which the U.S. would expect to incur in any case, for political or military reasons not directly related to Middle East defense, the total directly chargeable to Middle East defense is reduced to approximately \$1.5 billion and the annual average to \$300 million.

10. General Conclusions

It is politically and militarily feasible and necessary to plan for and carry out a defense of the Middle East.

The cost to the U.S. is low in comparison to the advantages which can be achieved.

It is in the security interest of the United States to establish a defense in the Middle East, in cooperation with the British and the states of the area. Even though considerable time and effort will be required to create such a defense, there are substantial advantages in making a prompt beginning. These include:

- a) rational and efficient utilization of U.S. aid funds in the area;
- b) an improved political orientation of the area;
- c) maintenance of the newly achieved momentum in the area toward regional defense;
- d) greater resistance to Soviet pressures and subversions;
- e) a further deterrent to Soviet aggression.

[Here follow the 57-page report containing a discussion of each of the items mentioned above; Annex I, text of the Turko-Iraqi Pact of February 24, 1955; and Annex II, text of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty of September 8, 1954.]

Tab B

RELATIONSHIP TO APPROVED NSC POLICY STATEMENTS^{[11](#)}

This study is based upon the general courses of action set forth in paragraph 13 and the specific courses of action with respect to area defense set forth in paragraph 17 of NSC 5428, "United States Objectives and Policies with Respect to the Near East." The policy proposals contained in the study are consistent with the cited paragraphs except that—

1. the military assistance proposed for Iraq may exceed the "limited military assistance" contemplated by paragraph 13.g.,
2. certain proposals reflect the fact of U.K. adherence to the Turk-Iraqi Pact although paragraph 17.b envisaged the "development of the 'northern tier' concept as an indigenous movement, not linked formally at this time with the Western powers",
3. the Turk-Pakistani Pact is displaced by the later Turk-Iraqi Pact as the framework of the "northern tier" although paragraph 17.c. contemplated that Iraq and Iran would adhere to the former pact, and
4. the proposal for U.S. adherence to the Turk-Iraqi Pact requires consideration by the NSC at a later stage pursuant to paragraph 17.g.

The working group is of the opinion that the inconsistencies indicated in 2. and 3. preceding are of form rather than of substance. The U.K. adherence to the Turk-Iraqi Pact is not wholly incompatible with the indigenous character of the "northern tier" development in view of the existence of British colonies in the area and the British role of protecting power for the Persian Gulf sheikhdoms. The Turk-Iraqi Pact was not in existence when NSC 5428 was approved. Had it existed, it would certainly have been chosen as the framework of the "northern tier" in preference to the Turk-Pakistani Pact as the provisions of the Turk-Iraqi Pact provide a better foundation for regional defense arrangements. Nothing proposed in the study is inconsistent with the terms of the Turk-Pakistani Pact or with its continued existence.

The proposals in this study are not directly related to, but do not conflict with, the courses of action with respect to the Arab-Israeli problem set forth

in paragraphs 10, 11 and 20.c. of the Supplementary Statement of NSC 5428.

Those portions of the study relating to Turkey are in accord with NSC 5510/1, "U.S. Policy on Turkey", and particularly with paragraph 16 concerning the encouragement of Turkish participation in regional security agreements. Similarly, proposals affecting Iran are consistent with NSC 5504, "U.S. Policy Toward Iran", particularly paragraphs 20, 21 and 22 dealing with Iran's military strength and participation in regional defense arrangements.

In so far as the study relates to Pakistan it is compatible with paragraphs 27, 28, 49, 50 and 51 of NSC 5409, "United States Policy Toward South Asia".

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/6-655. Top Secret. The members of the Working Group were listed at the end of this memorandum. Department of State members were John J. Jernegan, Ben F. Dixon, Elbert G. Mathews, and Leonard Unger; Department of Defense members were R. Ernest, Colonel J. Masters, Colonel R. Akers, and Lieutenant Colonel J. Patterson.

² The report consists of a six-page "Introduction and Summary of Conclusions", 57 pages of text, and two annexes. The, "Introduction and Summary of Conclusions" is printed below as Tab A. Comments made on this report by various bureaus in the Department of State and by other agencies are *Ibid.*, 780.5.

³ [Foreign Relations, 1952-1954, vol. IX, Part 1, pp. 525-536.](#)

⁴ [Vol. XXIV, pp. 620-628.](#)

⁵ [Document 291.](#)

⁶ [Foreign Relations, 1952-1954, vol. XI, Part 2, pp. 1089-1117.](#)

⁷ Printed below.

⁸ Neither Tab C nor Tab D is printed.

⁹ It is considered appropriate that the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff be solicited prior to the approval of this report. [Footnote in the source text.]

¹⁰ Top Secret.

¹¹ Top Secret.

44. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson)¹

Washington, June 16, 1955.

SUBJECT

U.S. Position Regarding Middle East Defense

1. In response to the memorandum from the Deputy Secretary of Defense, dated 6 June 1955, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed a report prepared by a State-Defense working group, entitled "U.S. Position Regarding Middle East Defense."² As requested in the above memorandum, the Joint Chiefs of Staff submit herewith their comments on (a) the substance of the report, (b) the tactics suggested for discussions with the United Kingdom, and (c) the general procedure outlined in the covering memorandum to the report dated 6 June 1955.

2. *Substance of the Report*

a. Politico-Military Objectives in the Middle East (ME), Strategy for the Defense of the Middle East, Related Strategic Considerations (Sections I, II, and III). The statement of United States politico-military objectives in the ME, of the strategy for the defense of the ME, and of the related strategic considerations is considered to be consistent with current United States policies and conforms to United States military assessments.

b. Force Requirements, Possible Sources of Forces, Military and Political Considerations (Sections IV and V).

(1) The estimated force requirements in the report reflect the conclusions of preliminary

studies on a broad basis by U.S., U.K. and Turkish military representatives. They should not be viewed as definitive but rather as an indication of the general order of magnitude of the forces required. The estimate of the force availabilities to meet the estimated requirements, the sources from which the force deficits might be made up, and the concept of the logistic complex which might be required represent possible solutions, provided the United States and the United Kingdom were to underwrite the programs and if the political aspirations of the ME states concerned could be brought into harmony.

(2) With regard to the deficit in air forces for the area, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that, while it would be desirable to provide a D-Day indigenous air component adequate to realize the fuller effectiveness of the ground forces contemplated, a program to accomplish this would be too ambitious in the light of its cost and of the low technical capacities of those countries to operate and maintain such forces. The Joint Chiefs of Staff therefore do not foresee the possibility of developing locally-stationed air forces of the size and type visualized in the report. [4 lines of source text not declassified] In addition, United States plans now contemplate air operations which should result in substantial reduction in the capabilities of the Soviet air forces which might be committed to the area, and thereby assist the Allied ground defense. Further, while it would not be possible to provide from outside sources on D-Day the

air support contemplated in the report, it is probable that after completion of their initial and primary missions, United States air forces from bases contiguous to the area would be in a position to render more direct support to the Middle East ground forces. A careful analysis of all of the foregoing factors would be necessary before any definitive determination could be made as to the minimum essential air forces required in the area on D-Day.

(3) In determining the costs for providing deficits in the ground forces the report assumes the availability of one and one-third Jordan divisions and a United Kingdom armored division. The present commitment of the Jordan division on the Israeli border and the widely dispersed locations of the United Kingdom armored division in Libya and Cyprus raise some doubt as to the eventual ready availability of these divisions. If equivalent forces had to be obtained from other sources in the ME it would result in a substantial increase in the cost of the ground force requirements. Iran is considered to have a greater potential for providing the required ground forces than the report indicates. In view of Iran's key position in the strategic defense concept, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the United States should plan to extend material support to Iran with a view to preparing her forces for a more important role than is contemplated in the report. The results attained by the Army training groups with the Iranian forces should indicate the extent of Iran's capacity to furnish additional ground forces.

(4) The narrative of the political considerations which would bear upon the contribution of forces and the furnishing of facilities and base rights, etc., by the countries in the area is considered to be a satisfactory appraisal of the present attitudes of the ME states and of some of the obstacles to be overcome if an effective defense arrangement is to be achieved.

c. Political Action Needed to Implement the Strategy
(Section VI)

(1) The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the progressive steps delineated in the report would constitute an acceptable pattern for the eventual establishment of a comprehensive regional defense organization, should future developments indicate that the establishment of such an organization were both feasible and necessary for an effective defense of the ME. While the Joint Chiefs of Staff appreciate that without United States moral and material support the bilateral pacts, or a multilateral pact, might well lapse into innocuous formalities, they feel that, in the final analysis, the effectiveness of a Middle East defense organization would largely rest upon a mutual recognition by the member states of the threat to their security and upon the degree of their determination to combine in preserving that security. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that such a cooperative approach should spring largely from initiative by the ME states and that the United States should encourage and support their efforts in this direction, while continuing

to place major reliance on Turkey and Pakistan to further this movement. The completion of the "Northern Tier" (Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Pakistan) is considered to be a suitable goal for the immediate future and, to this end, the accession at a propitious time of Pakistan and Iran to the Turkish-Iraq Pact should be encouraged.

(2) The Joint Chiefs of Staff would be opposed to the establishment now, or in the future, of a ME defense organization with an elaborate superstructure patterned along the lines of the NATO. Further, they consider that promotion by the United States, at this time, of a comprehensive Middle East defense arrangement, involving combined planning by constituent countries and consideration of command arrangements, would be premature and would entail or imply the acceptance by the United States of commitments which, in the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, should await further developments. As to whether the United States should adhere to a "Northern Tier" pact, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that should such a pact be consummated and hold real promise of viability, the United States, having from the outset stimulated its development, could not indefinitely abstain from adhering to it in some form. It is envisaged that our adherence would be on the broadest basis possible, carrying no obligations for the earmarking of United States forces for the area, nor any implied commitment as to the order of financial or material support we might extend.

(3) The United States military aid program for the area should be designed to provide first for the internal security of selected ME countries; beyond that it should be based on the development of plans for the regional defense and of the prospective roles of the recipient countries in that defense, rather than on separate country-by-country estimates of individual defense needs. In this connection, the Joint Chiefs of Staff feel there may be a need for the establishment in the area of a small United States joint agency to supervise the Military Assistance Advisory Groups and Missions in the ME, to coordinate their programs on a regional basis. This matter will be the subject of a separate memorandum in the near future.

d. *Magnitude of Possible Military, Economic, and Construction Programs* (Section VII). In the absence of a detailed analysis and an actual survey, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have no firm basis for revising the costing of the force deficits, of the supporting construction, and of the other minimum military programs contemplated in the report. However, on the basis of a limited review, it is considered that the concept of requirements is on a more elaborate scale than the prospective evolution of a ME defense arrangement would now justify. As indicated in subparagraph 2 b above, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the program for the air forces, particularly, would require substantial downward revision. As regards the program as a whole, the Joint Chiefs of Staff feel it is highly unlikely that funds of this magnitude would be forthcoming from the Congress for these purposes.

3. *Tactics for Discussions with the U.K.* (Tab D). The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that, since the proposed talks with the United Kingdom are to be informal, exploratory, and of a political nature involving no commitments, the United States tactics suggested in the report would be generally acceptable from the military point of view, provided that the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff contained in this memorandum are reflected, where pertinent, in the presentation of the United States position.

4. *General Procedure Outlined in the Covering Memorandum.*

a. In their comments on the substance of the report, the Joint Chiefs of Staff presented a number of factors which they consider should be weighed in determining the procedures to be followed in the approach to a ME defense arrangement. In general, the Joint Chiefs of Staff contemplate a more deliberate approach to the establishment of such an organization than the proposed procedures suggest. Their views may be summarized as follows:

(1) Commitments for other theaters and the lack of suitable bases and storage facilities do not permit the earmarking of specific United States military forces for employment in the ME at this time.

(2) There is not at present nor is there likely to be a future requirement for an elaborate ME defense organization along the lines of the NATO.

(3) While the eventual establishment of a comprehensive defense arrangement for the ME appears to be a desirable objective, it is considered that, in view of the present Arab-Israel tensions and the uncertain relations among the Arab States themselves, the United

States should not stimulate the establishment of such an arrangement at this time nor undertake a United States-Israel defense pact.

(4) The completion of the “Northern Tier” is a suitable goal for the immediate future. The next logical step in its development would be the accession of Pakistan to the Turk-Iraqi Pact followed at a propitious time by the accession of Iran to that pact. The United States should encourage this development without a commitment as to the form of eventual United States association with the pact.

(5) The United States should decide now, in principle, to adhere to the, “Northern Tier” pact after such a pact is consummated; the timing of our actual adherence should be decided in the light of future developments in the ME, but should not be too dependent upon developments in the Arab-Israeli controversy. Such adherence, if undertaken, should be on a broad basis not involving commitments as to the earmarking of United States forces or as to the order of financial support the United States might extend.

(6) For reasons indicated in subparagraph 4 a (3) above, measures toward an expansion of the “Northern Tier” pact, so as to include other Middle Eastern states, should be deferred.

(7) While continuing to place reliance upon Turkey and Pakistan to further our plans in the ME, the United States should cooperate closely with the United Kingdom in moving

toward the establishment of a ME defense arrangement.

(8) United States military aid programs for the ME should be designed to provide, first, for the internal security of selected countries of the area; beyond that they should be based on plans for the regional defense rather than on separate country estimates.

b. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the procedures proposed in paragraph 4 of the covering memorandum be modified to reflect the foregoing views.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Arthur Radford³
*Chairman,
Joint Chiefs of Staff*

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/6–2255. Top Secret. The source text is a photostat copy of the memorandum that is attached to a June 22 transmittal memorandum from the Director of the Executive Secretariat, Walter K. Scott, to Murphy, Jernegan, Mathews, and Elbrick. Also attached to Scott's memorandum is a June 20 memorandum from Admiral Arthur C. Davis to Deputy Secretary of Defense Anderson with its attachment, [Document 47](#).

² [Supra](#).

³ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

45. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State¹

Cairo, June 17, 1955—6 p.m.

1929. Nasser and I discussed at great length last night current situation in Arab world. Although we covered much the same ground as previously it clear Nasser is near brink of deciding there is no solution satisfactory to Egypt. His only response to my repeated questions as to why he felt it necessary to carry things so far is that he could think of nothing else to do. There was he said a “great debate” going on in the Arab world. Everywhere in the north there was a question as to whether a state would join the Turk-Iraqi Pact or the ESS Pact or what. This conversation was going on incessantly. It was disrupting the affairs of every nation. It must be stopped but he could not see how to do so without incurring a defeat which would lead in the long run to Egypt’s being left alone with Israel.

I told him I could see one solution. That was for Egypt to decide to stay out of Arab quarrels. Instead Egypt should concentrate on matters really affecting her developing her economy and formulating constructive policies regarding Sudan, Israel and the West. He felt this would separate him from the Arab world and could not believe that to Egypt’s advantage at present time. Replied that I had no intention of implying Egypt did not have religious and other ties with Arab States but that I thought Egypt was squandering her energies in useless quarrel.

I inquired as to what he meant by “unity” in the Arab world. The Arab States although linked by culture and religion seemed to have as many difficulties and rivalries as the historic European scene. He stated this was true but that was no fault of the Arab people. Everywhere there were govts in power who merely looked out for their own political interests. He hoped to see an Arab world eventually in which this sort of thing could be replaced by men dedicated to the good of the people.

In connection with his repeated question as to whether Lebanon or Jordan would join the north I replied I obviously did not know. The United States

would not put pressures on those states to do so. It could not however act in any way to deny their right to make up their minds to join arrangements of which we were not a member.

I asked status of ESS Pact. He replied he honestly did not know whether there could be such a pact. He had completely lost faith in Azm in Syria who was opportunist merely seeking Presidency.

One thing seems certain here. For the good of everyone the “great debate” as Nasser calls it should be stopped by the Arab world and promptly. The answer I gave Nasser above seems to me the best but he obviously will not turn aloof from Arab matters at a time when he is so preoccupied with Israel. Have been wondering if there is not another way out that could be acceptable to United States. We are not as far as I know particularly eager for states south of northern tier to join that arrangement. What we wish I suppose is a hinterland not hostile but willing to cooperate with developments in the north. Would it therefore make sense to my colleagues in this area and Department if we were to try to persuade Egypt to shift from ESS Pact to something along following lines: Egypt would seek not a complicated treaty of alliance but merely an agreement among Arab States on an expression of opinion which should not prove at least textually too difficult to negotiate. It could be along line that Arab States desired to strengthen their unity and to conclude at a later date agreements to strengthen security arrangements between them; the Arab States recognize however the benefits to the Middle East in the move being made in the north and while, with the exception of Iraq, they are not active members, they desire to cooperate in the rear with this effort to strengthen the defenses of the M.E.

A formula along these lines might on the one hand solve dilemma here as it would in effect say that states other than Iraq were not contemplating joining the northern tier. On other hand it would say as far as we (and Turks and Iraqis) are concerned that the struggle had been ended since area as whole wld have dropped hostility and tactics of disruption as regards movement in north. With such solution we could without hard feelings reemphasize our very great interest in backing northern tier. In order Egypt

(and Saudi Arabia particularly) to accept this idea it might be necessary for Iraq to make some convincing gesture (perhaps in form of letter) to effect it had no designs on Syria. Restoration of Iraq to "Arab community" might make this worthwhile. It may seem that the above approach tends bring Arab world back together when some argument at least can be made for letting it drift farther apart. Doubt however Arab unity is in any case going to mean very much. What we are looking for is some document to stop charges and countercharges and arrest deterioration of United States position in at least large part of Middle East, as well as to arrest obvious Commie advantages present situation. With all propaganda of past few months we have been placed publicly in position of opposing symbol of Arab unity. [2 lines of source text not declassified]

Sponsoring such new approach would be rather abrupt about-face for Egypt but I would be willing to try to persuade Nasser to do so if idea seems to have merit. I am convinced if some means can be found which will reassure Egypt and enable her extricate herself from present disruptive position we could then rely on Nasser's cooperation in working constructively toward solving other Middle East problems not excluding that of settlement between Israel and the Arab States.

Byroade

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 786.00/6-1755. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Ankara, London, Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Damascus, Jidda, Paris, and Tel Aviv.

46. National Intelligence Estimate¹

Washington, June 21, 1955.

NIE 30–55

MIDDLE EAST DEFENSE PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS

The Problem

To re-examine certain problems involved in the development of regional defense arrangements in the Middle East and to estimate: (a) probable developments in the regional defense field; (b) the effect of these developments on the states of the area; and (c) the consequences of possible US courses of action.²

Conclusions

1. With the signature of the Turkish-Iraqi defense agreement in February 1955 and the subsequent adherence of the UK, a basis for establishing a formal regional defense organization in the Middle East now exists. Pakistan signed a similar pact with Turkey in April 1954, and will probably go through with promises to adhere to the new agreement, in which case provisions for establishment of a joint defense council will go into effect. Moreover, there is at least an even chance that Iran will in time adhere. (*Paras. 10, 10–22, 36*)

2. It is uncertain how effective such a “northern tier” grouping will be in attracting the cooperation of other Middle East states and in generally furthering US and UK politico-military aims in the area. Although Iraq’s signature of a Western-supported defense agreement with Turkey broke down the wall of solid Arab opposition to defense cooperation with the West, it aggravated a sharp cleavage within the Arab world. Egypt has

viewed the move both as a challenge to its leadership in the Arab League and to the concept of Arab unity. Saudi Arabia has also opposed the pact because of its dynastic rivalry with Iraq and its suspicions of US–UK intentions. The resultant crisis in Arab affairs has been further complicated by growing Israeli restiveness over the prospective increase in the military strength of Iraq and possibly of other Arab states, by French maneuvers to safeguard the, “special” French position in the Levant, and by efforts of neutralist and anti-US and UK elements to block further defense progress. The UK, although accepting the established fact of US participation in Middle East affairs, remains concerned with protecting as much as possible of its special interests and influence in the area, particularly its strategic position and oil interests in the Persian Gulf. (*Paras. 11, 13–15, 22–23, 36–37, 45*)

3. At least for the next few months, and possibly for considerably longer, Egypt and Saudi Arabia will probably continue their efforts to check the spread of Iraqi influence and to undermine the Turkish-Iraqi pact. In practice, France will continue to resist any extension of Iraqi, UK, and US influence in Syria and Lebanon. These various efforts will tend to restrain the adherence of such states as Lebanon and Jordan and will contribute to continuing instability in Syria. Although in time even Egypt might be willing to participate in regional or related bilateral defense arrangements, if only out of fear of being left behind, the danger exists that Egypt may become a prisoner of its present policies and be unable to modify them. (*Paras. 24–30, 33–34, 45*)

4. Although further development of a “northern tier” defense grouping would provide a better geographical basis for realistic defense planning, and might serve to deter Soviet aggression, the military effectiveness of such a grouping will remain limited for some years to come. The defense of the Middle East will continue for sometime to hinge almost entirely on the willingness and ability of the US and UK to commit the necessary ground, naval, and air forces. The lack of effective indigenous forces will remain

a basic handicap requiring a long and costly effort to overcome. Efforts to develop a tighter and militarily more effective organization will continue to be impeded by the distracting influence of current tensions and rivalries within the area. Such efforts may in fact stimulate new differences over questions of command and subordination. Finally, any defense organization would be impeded to some extent unless Egypt and other states in the near area were associated in some fashion, and would be critically handicapped without US participation. (*Paras. 47–55*)

5. Effective Western participation in Middle East defense would depend in large part on arrangements for base and operating rights. However, regional participants in a defense grouping (other than Turkey and possibly Pakistan) would almost certainly resist granting additional peacetime rights in the foreseeable future. They might in time agree to the construction and at least wartime use of military facilities. (*Paras. 50, 54–55*)

6. In the last analysis, the course of developments in Middle East defense will depend in large measure on the actions of the US, which is generally regarded as the prime mover in such enterprises. US military and budgetary assistance will almost certainly provide the principal incentives both to continued cooperation by present participants in Middle East defense activity and to the adherence of additional states. Moreover, there is likely to be increasing pressure for direct US participation or some other form of security guarantee. At the same time, the widespread belief will persist that in case of Soviet aggression in the Middle East, the military moves of the US and UK would be made with little regard for regional security commitments or the interests of local states. This feeling will contribute to continued cynicism about US–UK commitments under any defense arrangements, and will increase the tendency of each state to react to such arrangements in terms of its own maximum political advantage. US involvement in defense efforts is thus likely to increase pressures on the US to become more involved in intraregional political controversies, and in particular will sharpen

the problem of Israel's position in relation to regional defense. (*Paras. 56–59*)

7. The USSR will almost certainly continue its efforts to discredit a Middle East defense grouping and to discourage the adherence of additional states. It will continue to strengthen its position in Afghanistan, in part as a means of exerting counterpressures on Pakistan and Iran. The USSR would be particularly sensitive about Iranian adherence to a defense pact, and if such adherence appeared to be in prospect, would probably apply pressures, including threats to invoke the 1921 Irano-Soviet Treaty. We believe, however, that the USSR will not feel itself sufficiently threatened by the Middle East defense grouping to undertake major retaliatory actions such as invasion of any of the member states. (*Paras. 35, 41–44*)

Discussion

I. Present Situation

8. For nearly ten years after World War II, the Western strategic position in the Middle East was deteriorating almost everywhere but in Turkey. With British power on the decline in the area, the old British system of alliances and base agreements came under challenge from rising nationalist forces and grew inadequate to meet the postwar Soviet potential. Nationalist anti-Westernism, intensified in the Arab states by the creation of Israel and by the North African problem, made difficult the development of any alternative form of politico-military cooperation between the Middle East states and the West as a whole. Between 1951 and 1952, two Middle East defense proposals sponsored by the US, UK, France, and Turkey, failed of acceptance by the states of the area.

9. Within the last year, the situation has improved in certain respects, although it has deteriorated in others. The long-drawn-out Anglo-Egyptian dispute over the Suez base has now been settled on terms which offer some hope that the base can be

effectively reactivated in event of emergency, and the Anglo-Iranian oil controversy has been resolved. Moreover the US, supported by Turkey and the UK, has made some progress in a new approach to regional defense, dispensing with French sponsorship. In April 1954, Turkey and Pakistan—occupying the anchor positions under the US-sponsored “northern tier” concept—were persuaded to join in a loose agreement providing for limited defense cooperation between the signatories, and inviting the adherence of other interested states. In February 1955, Turkey took the initiative in concluding a somewhat more binding pact with Iraq.³ This agreement was subsequently adhered to by the UK, which at the same time entered into a subsidiary base agreement with Iraq to replace the outmoded Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1932.

10. This series of agreements has established a geographical and political framework for at least some degree of planning for area defense. Moreover, these agreements, and particularly Iraq’s decision to participate, have exercised some psychological attraction within other Middle East states. The Shah of Iran, in some contrast to his government, has displayed growing impatience to procure greatly increased US military aid and firmer US commitments toward Iran, though even he has not changed his position that Iranian adherence to a, “northern tier” grouping would now be premature. The Shah has also proposed joint staff talks with Turkey, Iraq, and Pakistan. The decision of Iraq, the second strongest Arab state, to enter into US–UK backed defense arrangements, has posed a challenge both to the prevalent Arab tendency toward inaction and neutralism, and to the politically potent dogma of solidarity against regional defense arrangements not sponsored by the Arab states.

11. On the other hand, Iraq’s decision has roused the opposition of anti-Iraqi and anti-US and UK elements and brought to the surface a vast complex of intraregional rivalries and tensions. Iraq’s decision to make a defense agreement with Turkey was preceded by months of tortuous maneuver and discussion

designed largely to insure the acquiescence of the other Arab states. Nevertheless, announcement of the pact was taken by Egypt as a direct challenge to its dominant role in Arab League councils and as an indication that the US and UK no longer regarded Egypt as the key Arab country. Together with King Saud, who reacted at least equally strongly because of his bitter rivalry with the Hashemite dynasty in Iraq, the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) regime in Egypt has made vigorous efforts first to prevent and later to offset the Iraqi move.

12. Egypt was unsuccessful in its initial efforts to marshal the rest of the Arab League in condemnation of Iraq and to drum up effective internal opposition to the Iraqi government. Thereafter it attempted to promote a new Arab alignment based initially on Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Syria, aimed at isolating Iraq and reaffirming under Egyptian leadership a unified Arab position against defense agreements with the West except on Arab terms. The result has been a struggle for influence over government leaders and important political elements in the uncommitted states, with Egypt and Saudi pressures and inducements ranged against those of Iraq and Turkey. The contest is most intense in Syria, where the weak and opportunistic government is under heavy pressures from both sides, but is unwilling to commit itself unequivocally against Iraq.

13. The Turkish-Iraqi pact has also intensified Israeli alarm at the developing pattern of defense arrangements. Israel is concerned that Turkey, the only Middle Eastern state with which it has enjoyed friendly relations, has now entered an agreement with one of its Arab enemies which provides for mutual assistance against aggression from any source and which, by the terms of an accompanying exchange of notes, pledges Turkish cooperation in carrying out the UN resolutions on Palestine, many of which are quite unacceptable to Israel. Israel is further alarmed lest Turkey and Iraq succeed in extending this agreement to include Israel's neighbors, Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan. Israel would be particularly alarmed if a union between Iraq and Syria resulted in

a stronger hostile Arab state along its border. Finally, Israel feels endangered by any arrangement involving arms aid to Arab states which is not counterbalanced by military support and firm guarantees to Israel.

14. Generally speaking, the outlook for development of a US and UK-oriented Middle East defense grouping has improved in recent months, but moves in this direction have at the same time contributed to area instability by disturbing the precarious balance of inter-relationships within the region. In particular, the Turkish-Iraqi pact has, in the eyes of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, France, and Israel, posed challenges to their prestige and their interests. This in turn has had some adverse effects on the standing of the US, which is generally regarded as the principal backer of the defense effort. Israel almost certainly regards US encouragement of Iraqi participation in Middle East defense as an indication that US concern for Israel's interests is decreasing. The RCC regime in Egypt has also become embittered against the US over recent developments in the defense field and has even voiced the suspicion that the US is attempting to undermine the regime's domestic position.

II. Positions and Intentions of the States Involved

15. *Iraq.* We believe that Iraq intends to make the agreement with Turkey an effective instrument and that it will refuse to be swayed from this course by opposition on the part of other Arab states. However, Iraqi cooperation in the regional defense sphere will continue to be influenced by a number of motives other than that of developing an effective defense arrangement. Although Iraq's signature of a defense agreement with Turkey reflected some appreciation of the Soviet military threat, it was largely motivated by such collateral factors as: (a) the desire to replace the old Anglo-Iraqi Treaty with an arrangement more acceptable to nationalist sentiment; (b) the wish to promote Syro-Iraqi union; (c) the recognition that some positive step toward area defense was necessary to obtain further US military aid; (d) the wish to

increase Iraq's prestige among the Arab states at Egypt's expense; and (e) the weight of Turkish insistence. Iraq will of course welcome security guarantees and support from Turkey and the UK, and it will also continue to urge US adherence to the arrangement and to hope for additional US military aid. At the same time, it will seek to employ such support to foster its leadership aspirations in the Arab world.

16. In return for its efforts to lead the way toward Arab alignment with the US and UK, Iraq may be expected to seek outside support for its regional aspirations. Thus for some time, at least, Iraq will probably place a higher priority on bringing Syria into the existing loose arrangements than on developing firmer military ties with its present partners. Iraq will continue financial and other encouragement to Syrian elements which might work for closer ties with Iraq, either directly or through Syrian adherence to the Turkish-Iraqi pact. If confronted with a coup by anti-Iraqi elements in Syria, Iraq might seek UK, US, and Turkish diplomatic support for, or at least acquiescence in, military intervention.

17. Iraq's ambitions will probably not inhibit the consolidation of existing defense arrangements, but may prevent the early inclusion of other Arab states. So long as the UK continues to believe that Iraqi armed intervention in Syria is contrary to British interests, Iraq will probably not undertake such a venture. Iraq will also almost certainly be sensitive to US wishes in this respect, as a result of its desire for further US military aid and for US adherence to the pact. In addition, the strong likelihood of violent Israeli reaction will tend to deter an open Iraqi move to absorb Syria. Iraq may try to prevent the other Arab states from joining a hostile group rather than actively seek their adherence to present defense arrangements at any early date.

18. *Turkey.* Turkey's primary concern is with the defense of its frontiers with the Bloc, to which end it is interested in strengthening its NATO ties and the Balkan Alliance. However, it

has also shown increasing interest in protecting its exposed southern flank from a Soviet thrust through Iran and the Arab states, and it will probably continue to seek the addition of Iran, Syria, and Lebanon to a defense grouping. This policy will probably continue to involve political and propaganda conflicts with Egypt and Saudi Arabia. The Turks will be tempted to side with Iraq in advocating forceful means to end the unsatisfactory situation in Syria. The further development of Arab ties will also strain Turkey's relations with Israel. Turkey will continue, however, to hold a low opinion of Iranian and Arab military capabilities, and to seek UK and US commitments to defense arrangements.

19. *Pakistan.* Pakistan has promised to adhere to the Turkish-Iraqi pact and will probably join in the near future. Under its present leaders, Pakistan will probably continue to cooperate with the US in furthering anti-Communist defense arrangements in the Middle East. In doing so, however, it will be motivated primarily by hopes of insuring continued and, if possible, increased US aid, cultivating its prestige in the Islamic world, and strengthening its position vis-à-vis India and Afghanistan. Pakistan is not likely, therefore, to favor much more than planning and consultative arrangements. At least for some time, moreover, Pakistan's attention is likely to be diverted from Middle East defense questions by its immediate and pressing political and economic problems, its strained relations with Afghanistan, and its suspicions of India.

20. *Iran.* During the past year, prospects for open alignment of Iran with the West have been improved by a number of factors: (a) restoration of friendly relations with the UK; (b) settlement of the oil dispute and revived hopes for economic improvement; (c) suppression of Tudeh activities; (d) consolidation of political control by the Shah and generally pro-Western elements; and (e) continued reliance on US aid and guidance. Since March, 1955, when the Shah returned from Europe and the US, he has shown intensified interest in entering defense arrangements which would

be backed by the US. Although denying any intention to join regional defense arrangements in the near future, Iran rejected a Soviet protest that such a move would infringe its 1921 treaty with the USSR.⁴

21. While Iran will probably be willing to cooperate with its neighbors in limited and contingent planning for defense, such as might result from the staff talks which have been proposed, its overriding defense objective will almost certainly continue to be that of securing increased military and budgetary aid and firm security commitments from the US. Without these, Iran will remain reluctant to risk the Soviet displeasure which formal adherence to anti-Communist defense arrangements would bring. Moreover, the Shah's genuine desire to join a regional defense grouping will continue to be qualified by his fear that Iran's military weakness would relegate it to a subordinate role as compared to Turkey, Iraq, and Pakistan. Iran is thus likely to continue a cautious policy involving: (a) approval in principle of defense arrangements; (b) limited cooperation, such as staff talks, designed to demonstrate Iran's interest in defense efforts and establish its claim to US military support; and (c) reluctance to adhere formally in the absence of substantially increased US aid and guarantees. Should increased instability preoccupy the Shah's attention or actually weaken his position, or should the pressure of neutralist sentiment increase in Iran, the chances of Iranian participation in defense arrangements would decrease.

22. *The UK.* Despite some initial reservations about the "northern tier" approach, the UK now appears to have accepted it as the best available means of providing for the defense of the Middle East and of retaining rights of US and UK access to bases in event of war. Although the UK accepts the established fact of US participation in Middle East affairs, it remains deeply concerned with protecting as much as possible of its own special interests and influence in the area. The UK promptly adhered to the Turkish-Iraqi pact chiefly because it provided a framework for a new base agreement with Iraq. British views on developing the

pact, as well as British policy toward associating other states in area defense arrangements, will continue to reflect the UK's overall political and economic interests in the area as well as military concern over the Soviet threat.

23. The UK will almost certainly favor making the present agreements effective instruments for cooperation with Middle Eastern states, and will desire US aid and commitments in consolidating defense arrangements. In general, the UK will favor the expansion of such arrangements in order to increase stability and UK influence in Syria and Lebanon, and to strengthen its special position in Jordan. If Jordan joins the new defense pact, the UK might consent to a revision of the Anglo-Jordanian treaty somewhat along the lines of its new arrangement with Iraq. If seeking to retain its influence in the Fertile Crescent area, while making formal arrangements less offensive to nationalist sensibilities, the UK will also have an eye on protecting its strategic position and oil interests in the Persian Gulf which were weakened by the British withdrawal from India and Palestine, and by British reverses in Egypt and Iran. In the Egyptian-Iraqi controversy, the UK will probably continue to counsel moderation, in the hope of eventually bringing Egypt around and of avoiding a crisis which would imperil UK-Egyptian cooperation in Suez. So far as Iran's adherence to a defense grouping is concerned, the UK may remain relatively cool, primarily out of concern for the Soviet reaction to such a development.

24. *Egypt.* Egypt, like Iraq, aspires to leadership of the Arab states. However, where Iraq sees the path to such leadership through cooperation with the US and UK in area defense, Egypt now regards such cooperation as largely inconsistent with its own aspirations. Egypt will look with disfavor on any policies that unduly favor Iraq, or that undermine the idea of Arab solidarity which is symbolized in the Egyptian dominated Arab League. At the same time, the RCC regime remains aware of its dependence on the West for economic aid, for military supplies, and for some

measure of protection against Israel. Hence Iraq's agreement with Turkey and US-UK support of the move have placed Egypt in a dilemma. The RCC's strong negative reaction indicates that for some time at least Egypt will continue to place its desire for Arab leadership above the advantages of cooperation with the West. This disposition may lessen Egyptian willingness to live up to the spirit of the Suez Agreement with the UK.

25. For some time to come, Egypt, although unlikely to attempt seriously to assert a positive leadership role over the other Arab states, will probably continue to take negative measures to prevent Iraq from organizing other Arab states in line with the Turkish-Iraqi pact. Supported by Saudi Arabia, Egypt will probably continue at least to go through the motions of trying to establish a new Arab defense alliance based initially on Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Syria (the ESS pact). Even though the RCC is unlikely to develop much confidence in the military effectiveness of such a grouping, Egypt will for reasons of prestige feel obliged to support the project. Egypt itself sponsored the scheme, and it appeals to politically influential nationalist and anti-Western elements in Egypt. Moreover, it serves as an instrument for keeping alive Egyptian pretensions to Arab leadership, and it supplies to other states, which might be tempted to follow Iraq into defense arrangements with the US and UK, a purely Arab alternative.

26. While Egypt's most urgent short run concern in its relations with other Arab states is to keep Syria out of the "northern tier" grouping, it will also regard the adherence of any other Arab state as a setback to its interests. Egypt would prefer to create an Arab alliance which prohibited members from entering arrangements with non-Arab powers without the consent of all, thus excluding Iraq unless the latter repudiates its agreement with Turkey. However, Syria has sought to have these anti-Iraqi aspects omitted from the proposed ESS agreement, and if it remains firm in this respect, Egypt may give way.

27. So long as Egypt has hopes of preventing other states from following Iraq, its vigorous opposition to defense ties along "northern tier" arrangements were to render such policies futile and perhaps harmful to Egypt's interests. This danger would increase if the RCC continued to suspect that the US and UK are promoting the "northern tier" scheme in order to weaken and isolate Egypt. Egypt's feeling that it is entitled to an important regional role has probably been strengthened at least temporarily by the recognition given Premier Nasr at the Bandung Conference.

28. In the long run, it is possible that Egypt in its own self-interest will become more reconciled to US and UK defense efforts. Increased tension with Israel, the growing necessity for building an effective working relationship with the Sudan, and increasing internal political pressure for progress in land development schemes and for some form of normalization of political life, may compel Egypt to give more attention to problems closer to home at the expense of its role in Arab affairs. Under these circumstances, it might give greater heed to its continuing need for limited cooperation with the US and UK. The possibility of Egypt's following this course would be enhanced by indications that the states aligned with the US and UK were receiving tangible benefits from this association. In any event, Egyptian actions are likely to be determined less by fear of the Soviet threat than by the desire to improve the internal position and international prestige of the regime, to strengthen Egypt against Israel, and to advance its policy in the Arab world and Africa.

29. *Saudi Arabia.* The Saudis' extreme preoccupation with parochial concerns, particularly their desire to prevent strengthening the Hashemite house in Iraq, will almost certainly continue to outweigh broader considerations of strengthening the area as a whole. Saudi Arabia will probably continue to subsidize elements in Lebanon, Jordan, and especially Syria in an effort to prevent defense ties between those countries and the US and UK which might strengthen Iraqi influence. It will also continue to

maintain close ties with Egypt and to favor a new anti-Iraqi alignment. However, if Egypt should abandon or fail in this project, Saudi Arabia alone would be ineffective in promoting it. In negotiations with the US over the Dhahran air base agreement, due for renewal in 1956, the Saudis will probably cite US support of the Turkish-Iraqi pact as an instance of aiding Saudi enemies, and use this argument to seek a higher price for renewal.

30. *Syria*. In no other state have the tensions resulting from the new defense developments been so clearly felt as in Syria. After the fall of the Khuri cabinet which was favorable to the Turkish-Iraqi pact, Syria, led by the new anti-Iraqi Asali-Azm government, agreed to join Egypt and Saudi Arabia in the proposed new anti-Iraqi alignment. Under strong Turkish-Iraqi counterpressures, Syria has since adopted a temporizing policy. These vacillations reflect an unresolved struggle, with considerable participation by interested external parties, for control of the Syrian government. So long as this struggle continues, Syria will remain a highly unstable state and the main arena of the power contest among the other Arab states.

31. In this situation, one Syrian faction or another may attempt a forceful seizure of power, probably with outside encouragement. At present, the most likely source of such a coup is the anti-Iraq faction. This group is composed of some influential army officers led by Chief of Staff Shawkat Shuqayr, some elements of the Nationalist Party, various opportunistic political independents, and the militantly anti-Western Arab Socialist-Resurrectionist Party of Akram Hawrani, which has been infiltrated to some extent by Communists and which exerts considerable influence both in the army and in parliament. In general, this faction is backed by Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and France. A successful coup by this faction would increase Syrian neutralist and anti-US-UK tendencies. It would also weaken Iraq's prestige in the Arab world. The pro-Iraqi and largely pro-US-UK elements in Syria, which include President Atasi, a large segment of the Populist Party, and probably some army officers, have shown little

initiative. If confronted with a coup, the pro-Iraqi group might seek outright Iraqi intervention on the plea of protecting the legal government.

32. Even if one faction should gain sufficient control of the Syrian government to commit it clearly to one side or the other in the Arab power struggle, deep-seated divisions within the country itself would continue to limit its effectiveness as an ally. The emotional and political attractions which draw some elements toward the Egyptian-Saudi alignment will continue to be counter-balanced by the pro-Iraqi and pro-US and UK sympathies of other factions. Syria's trade ties with Iraq, which are far more extensive than those with Egypt, make a clear break with the Iraqis economically undesirable. And if Jordan and Lebanon were to join Turkey and Iraq, even Syria's pro-Egyptian elements might have misgivings about aligning themselves with geographically remote Egypt and Saudi Arabia at the cost of isolation from their immediate Arab and Turkish neighbors, and consequent exposure to Israel. By the same token, however, a formal Syrian alignment with Iraq would be weakened in practice by strong domestic opposition which would be encouraged by Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and at least covertly by France.

33. *Lebanon and Jordan.* These states also find themselves in the middle of the Egyptian-Iraqi controversy. Both are weak states, whose independence in foreign policy is extremely limited. Jordan's preoccupation with Israel, and the sentiments of the former Palestinians in Jordan, would make an open stand against Egypt appear politically hazardous. Lebanon's economic needs, and the influence of its Moslem elements, make it fearful of alienating Saudi Arabia or Egypt. Both states, however, are heavily dependent on the West—Jordan through its UK treaty ties and subsidies, Lebanon because of its trade patterns and the conviction of its Christian elements that friendly relations with the West are necessary to continued Lebanese independence and to their own survival in a Moslem world. Both states have accordingly temporized in the present controversy in the hope that

a solution will be found which will preserve some degree of Arab unity while permitting beneficial relations between Arab states and the US and UK.

34. Lebanon and Jordan will almost certainly seek to prevent an open break between Iraq and Egypt. Both states would probably be inclined to side with Iraq if a choice became necessary, partly in view of Iraq's growing strength, but mainly because they cannot afford to side with an openly anti-US and UK group. However, they will continue to hope that the choice can be avoided. If Egypt persists in fostering a new Arab pact, Lebanon and Jordan will be under continuing pressure to join in the interests of Arab unity, but they will probably try to stay out so long as the pact is not open to Iraq. Jordan will continue to place its main reliance on bilateral ties with the UK. However, ever, the UK treaty is not popular within Jordan, and Jordan would probably be willing to join the Turkish-Iraqi pact as a means of revising its bilateral relations with the UK, even over Egypt's protests. Lebanon too would be strongly tempted to join the pact if this appeared the best way of assuring its continued independence, though it will also probably seek bilateral US guarantees for this objective as well.

35. *Afghanistan.* Afghanistan is unlikely to [choose] membership in any "northern tier" defense grouping in the foreseeable future because its exposed and isolated position, its long-standing belief in the wisdom of remaining uncommitted to either Russia or the West, and its persistent quarrel with Pakistan over the Pushtunistan issue. Afghanistan's chief importance in Middle East defense efforts, therefore, is likely to be as a focus for Soviet counterpressures designed in part to intimidate Iran and Pakistan.

36. *Summary Outlook.* With the signature of the Turkish-Iraqi agreement, and the subsequent adherence of the UK, some form of Middle East defense organization now appears very likely. If Pakistan goes through with promises to adhere to the new agreement, provisions of the pact for establishing a joint defense

council will go into effect. Moreover, there is at least an even chance that Iran will in time adhere, thus fulfilling the original “northern tier” concept. In addition, Iraq’s successful defiance of Egypt on the issue of defense agreements has shaken resistance in certain other Arab states to US and UK-sponsored area defense, and has improved the prospects for eventually forming a more inclusive regional defense organization. The inclusion of additional Arab states, however, depends in part on the outcome of the struggle for Arab leadership between Egypt and Iraq. At least for the next few months, and possibly for considerably longer, Egypt and Saudi Arabia will probably continue their efforts to check Iraq and undermine the Turkish-Iraqi pact. Even though Egypt is unlikely to regain undisputed leadership of the Arab states, many of the latter may be unwilling to take any definitive step toward entering defense arrangements with the US and UK in the face of Egyptian and Saudi objections. In the short run, at least, continued US encouragement of the “northern tier” grouping would be likely further to strain US-Egyptian relations.

*III. Defense Developments and the Arab-Israeli Situation*⁵

37. The Turkish-Iraqi pact, following on the heels of a US MDAP agreement with Iraq and Egypt’s assumption of control over the Suez base, has intensified a feeling of isolation in Israel and a fear that time is working against Israel. Since David Ben-Gurion’s return to the cabinet as defense minister in February 1955, Israel has adopted a tougher border policy, particularly in the Gaza area.

38. Israel will continue to make every effort, both through Zionist and diplomatic channels, to dissuade the US, the UK, and Turkey from strengthening the Arab states. It will also seek Western arms aid and security guarantees in order to counter any increases in Arab strength and to demonstrate to the Arab states that it still enjoys Western support. While it recognizes that the Tripartite Declaration of 1950 provides some deterrent to Arab aggression, Israel is likely to argue increasingly that the Declaration offers

inadequate guarantees to Israel and that the US and UK are themselves violating the commitment contained in that document not to upset the military balance between Israel and the Arab states. Israel's diplomatic and propaganda activities will be aimed principally at influencing UK and US policy. In addition, it will probably seek to exploit the apprehensions of the French, who are anxious for a greater voice in the formulation of Western policy in the Middle East, and whose misgivings about Syrian and Lebanese association with Middle East defense activities give them a certain identity of interest with Israel. Failing satisfaction of its desire for arms aid and firm security guarantees from the UK and US, Israel would probably look increasingly to France for military supplies.

39. In the short run, at least, US-UK defense efforts in the Arab states area are likely to exacerbate Arab-Israeli tensions. In Israel, such efforts will lend considerable support to the view of the "activists" that diplomacy has failed and that Israel's interests call for a more forceful line toward the Arab states. It appears that present Israeli efforts are directed toward forcing a settlement with the Arabs based generally on the territorial *status quo*, either through direct negotiations or through Western or UN mediation, while Israel still enjoys military superiority and the Arab states are divided and quarreling. Accordingly, Israel is unlikely to moderate its policy of organized border reprisals, which could expand into wider hostilities, and some military and even civilian elements may become increasingly tempted to risk a second round of hostilities with the Arab states rather than permit what they consider unfavorable trends to continue. However, deterrents to major military aggression by Israel will continue to be: (a) the risk of losing the moral and financial support of the US and of US Jewry; (b) the UK treaties with Iraq, and particularly with Jordan; and (c) the Tripartite Declaration of 1950.

40. On the part of the Arabs, a desire to strengthen themselves vis-à-vis Israel will continue to be a major motivation for accepting US-UK defense ties and military aid. Arab states which

cooperate in defense arrangements are likely to bargain for greater US-UK diplomatic support vis-à-vis Israel. Moreover, with any increases in their own military strength, they may feel even less inclined to reach a peaceful settlement on the basis of the status quo. Arab leaders who favor ties with the US and UK may also be intimidated from pursuing a more conciliatory policy toward Israel by the charges of their opponents that US-UK-backed defense efforts are in reality devious moves to divide the Arab states and bring about a settlement between them and Israel. Nevertheless, in the long run it is possible that Arab states which accept defense arrangements with the US and UK may, as a result of US-UK influence, be induced to become less intransigent toward Israel, provided Israel itself becomes less intransigent.

IV. Probable Reactions of Other Interested Countries

41. *The USSR.* The Soviet Union will almost certainly continue its efforts to discredit a Middle East defense grouping and to discourage the adherence of additional states, particularly those adjacent to the USSR. Soviet propaganda in the area will probably continue to argue that Western-backed defense arrangements represent a disguised form of imperialism which involves Middle East countries in provocations against the Soviet Union. It will probably stress the advantages of a neutralist course, and will point to its own efforts at “coexistence” in Europe. It will probably continue its efforts to demonstrate support of the Arab states vis-à-vis Israel, and will oppose any Western guarantees to Israel.

42. Soviet attempts to prevent individual states from joining Western-backed defense arrangements will probably involve both inducements and threats. In Syria, local Communists will continue to associate themselves with the anti-Iraqi element. The USSR will encourage Syrian adherence to an anti-Iraq Arab grouping; official Soviet policy will probably be expressed in terms of support for Syrian independence. Forceful Iraqi intervention in Syria would call forth a strong Soviet reaction,

which would probably include raising the issue in the UN. The Soviets will encourage Egypt's resistance to its own and other Arab states' defense ties with the West, and may supplement their diplomatic efforts with offers to barter Bloc military supplies for Egyptian cotton.

43. The USSR would be particularly sensitive about Iranian adherence to a defense pact. Iran's exposed position and its special treaty relations with the USSR give the Soviets considerable leverage for efforts to prevent such adherence. In the diplomatic field, the USSR has recently been courting Iran by settling long-standing border and financial disputes, but it has also shown that it is prepared to apply diplomatic pressures to prevent Iranian participation in a "northern tier" grouping. Such pressures probably would include threats to invoke the 1921 Irano-Soviet Treaty, which the USSR construes as permitting it to introduce troops into Iran in case of threatened invasion from Iranian territory; they might also include the creating of difficulties over recently ratified border and financial agreements between Iran and the USSR, and the instigation of incidents or a show of force along the borders. The extensive uncovering and suppression of Tudeh infiltration in the Iranian government and armed forces during the past year have reduced Soviet ability to promote internal disorders.

44. Soviet inroads in Afghanistan through the provision of economic aid and the introduction of Soviet personnel during the past year reflect the growing importance attached by the USSR to the maintenance of a favorable position in Afghanistan. Any Afghan tendency to align with other nations in a Middle East defense arrangement would almost certainly result in strong Soviet pressures on Afghanistan.

45. *France.* Although France insists that it approves strengthening the Middle East against Soviet aggression, its attitude toward the Turkish-Iraqi pact in practice continues to be negative. The French were offended at being left out of the preparations for the

arrangement, and have been even more concerned that a British plot was being hatched to establish Iraqi hegemony over Syria and Lebanon, where France maintains claims to “special interests.” [2½ lines of source text not declassified] France has assured the US and UK that it does not oppose the pact, and at higher policy levels it will probably support, at least in theory, the development of a “northern tier” defense grouping. However, France will urge that it should participate in the planning and leadership of such an organization. At the same time, concern for the maintenance of French influence in the Levant states will probably be reflected in continuing French covert activity designed to hold Iraqi, UK, and US influence in check.

46. *India.* India’s opposition to regional defense groupings will almost certainly continue, particularly so long as, Nehru believes that “power blocs” constitute a threat to peace. Pakistan’s ties with the “northern tier” grouping, and accompanying US military aid to Pakistan, will continue to be especially distasteful to India. India will oppose Arab and Iranian adherence to Western-backed defense arrangements, and in particular will encourage Egypt to take a neutralist position. Nevertheless, a critical rift between India and the US over the issue of Middle East defense arrangements remains unlikely, and it is highly improbable that disagreements with the US over this issue would cause India to move significantly closer to the Bloc.

47. *Greece and Yugoslavia.* Greece is piqued at what it regards as excessive Turkish initiative, and uneasy at British, “encirclement.” Yugoslavia has opposed the Turkish-Pakistani and the Turkish-Iraqi pacts as running counter to Yugoslav efforts to decrease tensions between East and West. These reactions may in some measure weaken the Balkan Alliance and strengthen Egypt’s position.

V. *The Military Outlook*

48. From the military standpoint, recent developments have done little to reduce the area’s vulnerability to Soviet aggression.

Turkey's agreements with Pakistan and Iraq involve little more than general provisions for limited cooperation which may eventually develop into more effective joint military arrangements. Except for Turkey, and possibly Israel, the states of the Middle East still have almost no ability to withstand a Soviet attack, and their political and military weaknesses continue to constitute a strategic liability for US and its allies. The UK-Egyptian agreement on Suez ended a troublesome political conflict between the two countries, but at the military cost of dispersing the only powerful concentration of British military power in the Middle East, and of breaking up the organization and part of the facilities of the great military base on which Western defense plans for the area have long hinged. And while Egypt is pledged to grant base re-entry rights to the UK in case the Arab states or Turkey are attacked, effective Western use of the base in event of emergency is now subject not only to Egyptian agreement that such an emergency indeed threatens, but also to the delays involved in restoring the base to operations once Egyptian agreement is secured.

49. Except for Turkey, Israel has the most effective military force in the area. However, present political circumstances preclude integration of Israeli forces into area defense arrangements. Israel is anxious to secure US military aid, and in event of war would be disposed to side with the West if it were convinced that an effective effort to defend the area could be made. However, its willingness to resist a Soviet invasion would depend in part on timely action by the US and UK demonstrating their readiness to provide prompt military assistance.

50. The defense of the Middle East will continue for some time to hinge almost entirely on the willingness and ability of the US and UK to commit the necessary ground, naval, and air forces.⁶ Recent defense agreements are of military value to the West because in some measure they improve the long-range prospects for: (a) building up indigenous defense forces; (b) developing a coordinated command structure; and (c) facilitating the

development of Western bases and Western access to the area in the event of war.

51. *Prospects for Improving Indigenous Forces.* US-UK military aid and support will continue to be necessary to effect any significant improvement in the defense capabilities of Middle Eastern states. And even if such support is forthcoming, its effective utilization would be a slow, costly, and arduous process, requiring close US or UK supervision and budgetary support. Even if the Middle East countries cooperated to the fullest extent with US training and planning groups, and if the US provided the matériel and budgetary support necessary, it would take at least three to five years to correct current deficiencies even in existing Middle East ground forces. Given the conditions that are likely to prevail, it is probable that the process actually would take considerably longer in most cases. Moreover, such an effort would require a far higher level of military aid than is now being provided Iran, Pakistan, and Iraq. The development of effective naval and air forces would be even more expensive, difficult, and time-consuming.

52. *Prospects for Developing a Unified Command Structure.* The Turkish-Pakistani and Turkish-Iraqi agreements represent little more than expressions of willingness to cooperate, and many problems remain to be solved before even these states are likely to participate in effective joint defense planning, force deployment in accordance with over-all regional requirements, or the establishment of a unified command. Nevertheless, the Turkish-Iraqi pact provides at least the basis on which Turkey and Iraq can begin to coordinate policies for defense of their eastern flank in cooperation with the UK. Once a joint defense council has been established following the adherence of a fourth state, the UK will probably work to develop a tighter, more formal defense organization.

53. The “northern tier” states which enter a defense grouping will almost certainly be willing to support at least the principle of

military cooperation. However, the extent to which they are likely to engage in serious joint defense planning, and eventually to make commitments to an over-all defense plan, will depend in large measure on US and UK policies and on the degree of US participation and support. Any real or apparent conflict of aims between the US and UK with respect to defense efforts would almost certainly impair cooperation among the Middle East states.

54. *Outlook for Western Military Access to the Area.* Although timely and effective Western participation in defense of the Middle East depends in large part on some form of arrangements for base and operating rights, the idea of such rights or of the presence of Western troops in peacetime remains offensive to most states of the area. The Suez agreement and the termination of the Anglo-Iraqi treaty have served to confirm nationalist feeling that vestiges of Western military occupation are outmoded. Overt British control of bases in Iraq has been exchanged for less open working arrangements. Even Jordan's extreme dependence on UK subsidies and military support has not prevented the growth of considerable domestic discontent over the military rights which the UK enjoys in Jordan. In Iran, widespread opposition to granting military rights to the Western Powers in peacetime would be re-enforced by fear of the probable Soviet reaction.

55. Given this pervasive feeling, Middle East states (other than Turkey, and possibly Pakistan⁷) which have or may become members of a Western-backed regional defense grouping would almost certainly resist granting additional peacetime base or operating rights to Western forces in the foreseeable future. However, having accepted the idea of a defense grouping, they might permit construction of militarily useful roads and other communications facilities with Western assistance, and might in time agree to the construction of purely military facilities. While they would seek to have such facilities remain under their own control their association in area defense would offer the West greater opportunities to effect some form of working

arrangements for wartime use of these facilities, and in most cases also for limited peacetime access, such as Iraq affords the UK.

VI. Consequences of Possible US Courses of Action

56. While the US has thus far refrained from open participation in current regional defense arrangements in the Middle East, the belief that the US was a principal though silent partner in the enterprise has figured importantly in the calculations of the other interested parties. The attitude and actions of the US will continue to have an important bearing on future developments.

57. The character and amount of military aid, including budgetary support, made available by the US will almost certainly remain the principal factor by which the advantages of participating in Middle East defense activities are judged. It is also likely to have a determining influence both on the willingness of present members of the pact to move ahead in the field of defense cooperation and on the desire of other Middle East states to participate. As progress is made toward a more effective regional defense grouping, there is likely to be increasing pressure for some more direct form of US commitment, since it is recognized that the area cannot be effectively defended without active US participation. Turkey has already called on the US to take a more active role in developing defense arrangements, and the Pakistanis, before committing themselves, have attempted to get assurances that the US will adhere. The present signatories are also likely to seek open US diplomatic support in their efforts to win additional adherents among the Arab states.

58. The extent of US aid to states participating in defense arrangements will also be closely watched by the uncommitted states. A demonstrable build-up of Iraqi forces, for example, would help to convince other Arab states that material benefits were to be derived from cooperation with the US. Eventually, it might even draw Egypt toward a more cooperative attitude, if only through fear of being left behind. Conversely, long delays in implementing arms promises, or the provision of clearly obsolete

or only token quantities of matériel might persuade the undecided states that association with defense arrangements was not worthwhile, and would provide opponents of the idea with additional propaganda weapons.

59. On the other hand, the belief is widespread in the Middle East that in case of Soviet aggression in the area, the military moves of the US and UK would be made with little regard for regional security commitments or the interests of local states. This feeling will contribute to continued cynicism about Western commitments under any defense arrangements and to the tendency of each state to view such arrangements primarily in terms of maximum political advantage. US unwillingness to participate or to make commitments would probably retard expansion of a defense grouping and would almost certainly increase the emphasis on parochial interests among participating states.

Appendix A

SUMMARY OF THE TURKISH-IRAQI PACT

The stated aim of the Pact of Mutual Cooperation between Iraq and Turkey, which was signed February 24, 1955, at Baghdad, is the further improvement of good relations between the two countries in order to contribute to world peace and security, particularly in the Middle East. Specifically, the parties pledge themselves to “cooperate for their security and defense consistent with ...⁸ the UN Charter.” They agree to determine specific measures to realize this aim as soon as the pact enters into force.

A permanent council at the ministerial level is to be set up to implement the pact when at least four powers have become parties to it. The pact is open for accession to any member of the Arab League or any other state actively concerned with the security and peace of the Middle East. Acceding states may conclude special agreements with other parties to the pact.

The pact remains in force for five years and is renewable for five year periods. Any signatory may withdraw, after giving notice, at the end of a five year period, in which case the agreement remains in force for the other members. The document contains such standard phraseology as an undertaking not to interfere in each other's internal affairs, and a pledge to settle disputes in accordance with the UN Charter.

An exchange of letters between the Iraqi and Turkish Prime Ministers at the time of signing the pact recorded their understanding that the pact would enable their countries "to cooperate effectively in resisting any aggression directed against either of them" and "to work in close cooperation for effecting the carrying out of the UN resolutions concerning Palestine."

¹ Source: Department of State, INR–NIE Files. Secret. National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) were high-level interdepartmental reports presenting authoritative appraisals of vital foreign policy problems. NIEs were drafted by officers from those agencies represented on the Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC), discussed and revised by interdepartmental working groups coordinated by the Office of National Estimates of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), approved by the IAC, and circulated under the aegis of the CIA to the President, appropriate officers of cabinet level, and the National Security Council. The Department of State provided all political and some economic sections of NIEs.

According to a note on the cover sheet, "The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff." It was concurred in by the Intelligence Advisory Committee on June 21.

² This estimate is supplementary to the broad discussion of Middle East defense questions in NIE 30–54, "Prospects for Creation of a Middle East Defense Grouping and Probable Consequences of Such a Development," 22 June 1954. Much of the earlier estimate remains valid, notably the general discussions of underlying political attitudes, and basic military problems and conditions. The present estimate focuses on new problems and prospects raised by the Iranian oil and Suez settlements and particularly the

Turkish-Iraqi pact and its consequences. Like NIE 30–54, this estimate does not consider the problems of defense of Turkey against attack from the north, which is a NATO responsibility, nor the defense of the lines of communication into the area. [Footnote in the source text. For text of NIE 30–54, see [Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. IX, Part 1, pp. 516–520.](#)]

³ The significant provisions of the Turkish-Iraqi agreement and an accompanying exchange of notes appear as Appendix A. [Footnote in the source text.]

⁴ League of Nations *Treaty Series*, vol. 9, p. 384; or *British and Foreign State Papers*, volume 114, p. 901.

⁵ This question will be examined in greater detail in the forthcoming NIE 30–2–55, “Probable Developments in the Arab-Israeli Situation,” scheduled for early completion. [Footnote in the source text.]

⁶ The Union of South Africa has made a commitment to supply an expeditionary force, possibly consisting of two small armored divisions, for the defense of the Middle East in the event of war. [Footnote in the source text.]

⁷ We have estimated that Pakistan’s present leadership would probably be favorably inclined toward US peacetime developments of bases for US use in Pakistan, but that its actual agreement to such development, and the extent of rights which Pakistan would give the US for use of bases in peace or in war, might depend on such factors as its current relations with India, the state of public opinion, the probable Soviet response, and the extent of US aid and guarantees it might expect to receive. NIE 52–55, “Probable Developments in Pakistan,” 15 March 1955. [Footnote in the source text. For text of NIE 52-55, see [vol. VIII, pp. 423–425.](#)]

⁸ Ellipsis in the source text.

47. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Davis) to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Anderson)¹

Washington, June 20, 1955.

SUBJECT:

U.S. Position Regarding Middle East Defense

1. Attached hereto is an analysis relating the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, attached at Tab I, to the Report of the State-Defense working group.²

2. In addition to the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Bonesteel has reviewed the Working Group Report. He considers it to be, “a thorough and adequate analysis of what appears to be the ‘optimum’ plan for the defense of the Middle East and of the U.S. position with respect thereto”. He believes the concept may be somewhat “optimistic politically as well as from the standpoint of the budget”, and suggests that consideration might be given to the formulation of a somewhat less comprehensive plan, together with an assessment of its desirability should the optimum position prove to be unfeasible. Mr. McNeil’s office prepared the military cost estimates contained in the report and has reviewed the non-military cost estimates, and has found them satisfactory as orders of magnitude.

3. Three questions appear to remain for your consideration and judgment. They are critical:

(1) The need for, willingness, timing, and terms of U.S. adherence to the Turk-Iraqi Pact. A corollary is the need for and willingness of the U.S. to enter a US-Israel Defense Pact.

(2) The need for and timing of the establishment of multilateral defense organizational arrangements bringing the Northern Tier countries, the U.K. and the U.S. together in a combined effort at an early date.

(3) The need for the U.S. to recognize that Middle East defense— an acceptable political orientation and a potentially effective military posture—will require U.S. effort and expenditures. The expenditures may run as much as \$300 million per annum, more than is presently projected for the area for the next five years.

4. It should be recognized that an affirmation position on the questions immediately above would not *immediately* involve the U.S. in specific financial or strategic commitments, since the program suggested will, under even the most favorable circumstances, take at least a year to launch and up to 8 years for implementation.

5. A meeting has been set up for you with Mr. Hoover in the latter's office at 2:30 on Tuesday, June 21. It is understood that Admiral Radford will accompany you. I suggest that you discuss with him in advance the differences between the Joint Chiefs of Staff views and those in the Working Group report, which are as indicated in the attached analysis, generally that the Joint Chiefs of Staff approach is more conservative, which I am inclined to think is a good thing. At your meeting with Mr. Hoover I suggest you inform him of the views of the Department of Defense regarding the State-Defense Report and the tactics to be employed in the conversations with the United Kingdom. In addition, the names, status, and authority of the Defense observers should be determined.

6. For your information the first session of the talks with the United Kingdom is scheduled for 2:45, Thursday, June 23. This seems to me to be somewhat hasty and I believe a later date would permit development of a firmer U.S. position.

[Attachment]

AN ANALYSIS OF THE RELATION BETWEEN THE JCS VIEWS AND THE STATE-DEFENSE REPORT ON MIDDLE EAST DEFENSE

The views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the Report of the State-Defense Working Group on Middle East Defense are attached at Tab A. Significant points are as follows:

a. The JCS find acceptable Sections I, II and III of the Report dealing with politico-military objectives, strategy, and related strategic considerations.

b.

The JCS and the Report view the estimated force requirements as indications of a general order of magnitude and not as definitive. The JCS correctly state that US/UK underwriting will be required if the force deficits are to be made up and the logistic complex provided.

[1 paragraph (5 lines of source text) not declassified]

In connection with ground forces, the JCS properly point out that committed Jordanian and United Kingdom units may not be readily available. The Working Group assigned an additional Infantry Division each to Iran and Iraq. The JCS believe that Iran should be given a more important role. There is no reason why such cannot be accomplished through US planning and in any multilateral Middle East planning which may take place.

c.

With regard to political action needed to implement the strategy, the JCS considered that the steps delineated in the Report would constitute an acceptable pattern for the eventual establishment of

a comprehensive regional defense organization, should future developments indicate that the establishment of such an organization were both feasible and necessary for an effective defense of the Middle East. They further believe that the completion of the Northern Tier is a suitable goal for the immediate future and that upon consummation of the Northern Tier Pact the United States “could not indefinitely abstain from adhering to it in some form”. On this issue the Working Group Report diverges, positing the essentiality of US adherence in the near future. The Working Group believed that for a variety of reasons the United States should join. Among these reasons are:

1. The UK has already joined and thus will have an unduly strong voice in influencing developments in the area including how US aid will be utilized.
2. Adherence at some later indeterminate time after the Pact has been established would make it extremely difficult for the United States to influence the language of the Pact. The precise phraseology may be of great importance to United States Senate ratification.
3. Finally, it was the view of the Working Group that non-adherence might be interpreted in the area as a reversal of US policy and a decision that the Middle East could not or would not be defended, thus precipitating a move by the area toward a neutral or pro-Soviet position.

Regarding organization, the JCS and the Working Group are in agreement opposing the establishment of an elaborate superstructure patterned along the lines of NATO. The JCS, however, state that they consider “a comprehensive Middle East defense arrangement, involving combined planning,” ... [to be] ...⁴ “premature”. The Working Group felt that there were important political and military benefits to be derived from commencing combined planning in the area. Such action would give the indigenous peoples a sense of solidarity, and would

contribute to the developing regional defense consciousness of the states, those most aware of the Soviet menace being able by their participation in combined planning to influence other states less aware of the Soviet menace.

The JCS suggest that ultimate US adherence would be on the broadest basis possible, carrying no obligations for the earmarking of forces nor any implied commitment as to the financial support we might extend. The Working Group does not disagree with this, but believes strongly that the United States Government should enter into the Pact with its eyes open as to the probable amount of US effort and expenditure which would be required to create a viable defense structure in the Middle East, looking toward ultimate military effectiveness.

d. The Joint Chiefs of Staff state they have no basis for the revision of the costing of the force deficits and construction, etc. outlined in the report. They believe, however, that the whole concept is more elaborate than is now justified. They further believe that it is highly unlikely that funds of the magnitude suggested would be forthcoming from the Congress. The Working Group, contrarily, has suggested that for a maximum of approximately \$300 million per annum, in addition to present aid program levels, a viable Middle East defense could be achieved. The Working Group has suggested in its covering memorandum that preliminary Congressional consultation should be undertaken *prior* to the negotiation of the terms of US adherence to the Northern Tier Pact. In view of the magnitude of expenditures made or contemplated in other major areas of the world, it is not unreasonable to assume that the Congress might be favorably disposed toward those suggested in the Working Group Report.

e. Regarding tactics for discussion with the United Kingdom, the JCS consider that Tab D of the Working Group Report is acceptable, provided the views of the JCS, where pertinent, are reflected in the presentation of the US position.

f. Regarding the general procedure outlined in the covering memorandum to you, the JCS recapitulate their views. Points not previously discussed in this memorandum meriting mention are:

US-Israel Defense Pact—The JCS do not believe that the United States should undertake at this time a US-Israel Defense Pact. The Working Group concurs but believes that as a matter of political reality it may be absolutely necessary to secure the requisite votes in the US Senate for the United States to enter into a Pact with Israel simultaneously with United States entry into the Northern Tier.

Adherence to the Northern Tier Pact—The JCS believe that the United States should encourage the development of the Northern Tier without commitment as to the form of eventual US association. The Working Group view that such encouragement could only be provided by US willingness to adhere, after Pakistan and Iran have joined. Additionally, the Working Group believed the US should be prepared for a commitment formulated along the lines of the SEATO commitment.

Role of Turkey and Pakistan—The JCS believe that the United States should continue to place reliance upon these countries to further our plans in the Middle East while cooperating closely with the UK. The Working Group agrees but came to the conclusion that the actual military contribution of Turkey and Pakistan to the direct defense [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] would have to be limited. You are familiar with the current Turkish economic difficulties; Pakistan's situation is no better.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/6-2255. Top Secret. The source text and the attachment are photostat copies attached to a June 22 transmittal memorandum from Scott to, Murphy, Jernegan, Mathews, and

Elbrick. See [footnote 1](#), [Document 44](#). The source text indicates that a copy was sent to Admiral Radford.

² [Document 43](#). The memorandum containing the JCS views is [Document 44](#).

⁴ Ellipses and brackets in the source text.

48. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Elbrick) to the Under Secretary of State (Hoover)¹

Washington, June 21, 1955.

SUBJECT

Middle East Defense Study by State-Defense Working Group²

The recommendations of the Middle East Defense study are aimed at achieving two objectives both of which we support strongly:

1. to foster the internal stability and Westward orientation of the Middle Eastern countries, and to strengthen their determination to resist Communist aggression and subversion;
2. to help the region to develop its military strength so that it will be able to defend itself against attack.

As we see it, these objectives have direct bearing on the security of the United States since their accomplishment would deter the Soviets from aggression in Europe as well as the Middle East. In case of war the right flank of NATO, the Mediterranean and North Africa would be secured against Soviet attack, a possible springboard for counter-attack would be provided, and some of the oil resources of the Middle East might be saved for the West.

In present circumstances we believe that the first objective deserves high priority. For that reason we fully endorse United States adherence to the Turk-Iraqi Pact at the appropriate time, and after preparation of our NATO partners. We also endorse continued economic assistance, related wherever possible to programs of social and economic reform which are essential to the internal stability of the Middle Eastern countries. Finally, we recognize that some measure of military aid is also required to achieve the first objective.

However in the implementation of the second objective we believe that any United States program of assistance for the build-up of Middle East defenses should be worked out in a balanced relation to the other security arrangements in which the United States is participating. It is essential that the continued build-up of the strength and effectiveness of established defense arrangements, like NATO for example, should not be prejudiced by the diversion of essential resources away from them. This inter-relationship among the various United States programs should be made clear in any eventual presentation of a Middle East military aid program to the Budget Bureau and the Congress.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/6–2155. Top Secret. Drafted by Leonard Unger.

² [Document 43](#).

**49. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State,
Washington, June 23, 1955¹**

Washington, June 23, 1955

SUBJECT

Middle East Defense

PARTICIPANTS

United States

The Under Secretary of State

Mr. Murphy, Deputy Under Secretary of State

Mr. Jernegan, Deputy Assistant Secretary, NEA

Mr. Elbrick, Deputy Assistant Secretary, EUR

Mr. Mathews, Policy Planning Staff

Observers

Mr. Roger Ernst, Defense

Col. George T. Powers, 3rd, JCS

Great Britain

The British Ambassador

Mr. Ronald Bailey, Counselor, British Embassy

Col. Fitzgeorge Balfour, British Representative, NATO

The Under Secretary opened the meeting at 3:00 p.m. with a brief statement indicating that the U.S. welcomed the UK initiative for the present talks, emphasizing the importance of US-UK collaboration in the Middle East and expressing US interest in UK views concerning the Middle East in view of the UK's long and intimate association with the area. He stated that the US had been reviewing its own position toward the problems of Middle East defense but had as yet reached no firm conclusions. He suggested that the discussions begin with the presentation of UK views pursuant to the agenda which the UK had proposed earlier and which was acceptable to the US. In conclusion, the Under Secretary pointed out that these talks were informal, explanatory, and secret and that neither Government would be committed by them.

The Ambassador agreed to begin the discussions by presenting the UK position on the several agenda items and said that it was clearly understood on the UK side that the talks were informal, explanatory and secret. Although it was also understood that the talks were primarily political, it would be necessary to refer to strategic and military aspects of the Middle East defense problem. Points of US-UK disagreement could be identified, and the Ambassador hoped that it would be possible to reach some understanding on steps to be taken to create an effective defense capability in the Middle East.

The Under Secretary said that the US would like to have a recess of about a week after the presentation of UK views in order that further consideration could be given to the US position. The Ambassador indicated some concern, stating that in the UK view some of the issues that he intended to raise required attention in a matter of days rather than weeks.

Agenda Item 1(a): The Soviet Threat to the Middle East in Peace

The Ambassador then began his exposition of the UK appreciation of the situation in the Middle East under agenda item 1(a). Communist activity in the area had increased during the past two years, the emphasis being on the development of Soviet bloc-Middle East trade and the exploitation of united front tactics. The USSR is, however, not yet in a position to make a major effort in the area, and there is no evidence that it intends to resort to military action. The ultimate Soviet objective is to absorb as much as possible of the

area into the Communist orbit. The presence of foreign (i.e. UK) forces in the Middle East is an impediment to this objective, and the USSR accordingly is working to eliminate those forces. It is also resisting the formation of defensive systems in the area and cooperating with extreme nationalist elements to reduce Western influence.

The Ambassador cited as factors favoring the USSR the establishment of the state of Israel which had created bitter and lasting Arab resentment against the US and UK, the political backwardness and lack of effective governmental organization, particularly in the field of internal security, that characterizes the area and the prevailing social conditions—mal-distribution of wealth, lack of land reform, etc. Factors favoring the West are the historic ties between the area and various Western powers—e.g. UK-Jordan, the generally prevailing Moslem religion and Arab solidarity. The last two factors are of doubtful value as Islam is probably not a lasting bulwark against Communism and Arab solidarity expresses itself in hostility to Israel rather than in awareness of the Soviet threat.

The Ambassador briefly reviewed the UK appreciation of the situation in certain of the Middle East countries: *Iraq*: The Government is stable and Communist subversion is not a present danger.

Israel: The Government is stable and strongly anti-Communist. Internal security against Communist subversion is good, but Israel is susceptible to Soviet pressure because of its concern for the Jews still behind the Iron Curtain.

Syria: The situation is generally unstable and unsatisfactory. There is a possibility of a left-wing coup with Communist participation. The USSR has been giving particular attention to Syria.

Jordan: The UK is a little concerned. Social conditions are bad, and the presence of large numbers of Palestine refugees is unsettling. The Arab Legion is, however, a solid anti-Communist factor.

Lebanon: The situation is fairly satisfactory. The Communist Party is illegal but internal security is not too good.

Egypt: Although Nasser and the RCC seem to be in control of the situation, disquieting possibilities exist. The Communists and the Moslem Brotherhood may make an alliance against the Government. The failure of the Government's economic policy to raise the standard of living may lead to increasing unrest.

Iran: The situation is better than it was. However, although the Tudeh Party has been suppressed, the Government has not attacked the social conditions that favor the appeal of Communism.

The Ambassador commented that he had not covered Saudi Arabia, which seemed in any case to be peripheral in terms of Middle East defense, but he would welcome US views.

The Ambassador concluded his presentation under agenda item 1(a) by suggesting that the USSR may step up its activities in the Middle East as a consequence of possible concern over the implications of the Turk-Iraqi Pact. The two countries that will probably be most worrying to the US and UK in the near future are Syria and Jordan.

The Under Secretary stated that the US estimate of the situation in the Middle East was much the same as that of the UK although there were perhaps some variations in detail. He went on to say that the US had been giving some thought to *increasing counter-subversion activities in the area including the training of internal security forces*. This might be a cheaper way of buying security in the Middle East than building up the military forces. UK capabilities would probably be greater than those of the US in some countries and *this subject might be further explored in the course of these talks*.

Mr. Jernegan commented that he agreed almost 100% with the UK appreciation. He said that the US had received some reports indicating increased Communist activity in Kuwait and Bahrein and asked whether the UK had any pertinent information. Mr. Bailey replied that Kuwait and Bahrein were important transit points and that a number of Communists did pass through. Mr. Jernegan also commented on the fact that the USSR seemed to be holding back on the exploitation of the Israeli issue in the Middle East. He wondered whether the Kremlin was awaiting the proper

moment when circumstances might appear to make the full-scale exploitation of the Israeli issue decisive in swinging the Arabs away from the West. The Ambassador thought this very likely.

With reference to Saudi Arabia, the Under Secretary and Mr. Jernegan indicated that there were evidences of Communist activity in the country but these did not in the US view constitute a serious current threat.

Mr. Murphy inquired concerning the activities of the Soviet Ambassador in Cairo with particular reference to Nasser's intimations that Egypt might buy arms from the USSR. The ensuing discussion revealed that the US considers Nasser and his associates somewhat more susceptible to Soviet diplomatic blandishments than does the UK, and that the UK seems generally less disturbed than the US by Soviet diplomatic activities in the area. The Ambassador did, however, remark that the UK had no complacency about the existing situation in any part of the Middle East.

Agenda Item 1(b): The Soviet Threat to the Middle East in War

After briefly recapitulating the agreed US-UK estimate of the global Soviet threat in war, the Ambassador stated that the UK considered that Soviet war-time objectives in the Middle East would be to reduce the air threat to the USSR posed by Western bases in the area, to prevent the build-up of Western forces in the area, to secure the Bosphorus and Dardenellas and to deny Middle East oil to the West. The USSR would pursue these objectives by air strikes against Western bases, a campaign against Western Turkey and Thrace (this would be a NATO concern), a campaign against Iran and Iraq and a holding attack against Western forces in eastern Turkey. The UK assumes that there would be strong Western opposition in Turkey and Iraq but weak opposition in Iran where only Iranian forces would be engaged. The UK also assumes that both sides would use nuclear weapons from the outset but has not estimated the effects of Western nuclear attacks on the USSR. The Ambassador concluded by recapitulating the estimate of Soviet forces and capabilities contained in the US-UK-Turkey military study on Middle East defense completed in London in February 1955.

Mr. Jernegan pointed out that the London report did not deal with the Soviet capability in eastern Iran and Pakistan and inquired whether the UK had

any pertinent estimates. Colonel Balfour replied that the UK did not.

Mr. Murphy asked what use the USSR was expected to make of strategic bombing in the Middle East, referring specifically to Turkey as a possible target. The Ambassador replied that the UK considered that the USSR would use its strategic air force only against Western air bases and possibly the Suez Canal and the Turkish port of Iskenderun. Elsewhere in Turkey, the USSR was expected to rely on tactical air forces. The Under Secretary remarked that the USSR would hardly use its strategic air force against oil fields.

The Under Secretary raised the possibility of localized Soviet aggression in the Middle East, citing as an example Soviet intervention in the event of internal disturbances in Iran. The Ambassador said that the UK does not foresee such limited Soviet military designs in the area and, in the specific case of Iran, does not consider that the USSR would intervene in internal disturbances by direct aggression across the frontier.

Agenda Item 2: Political and Strategic Aims in the Middle East

The Ambassador stated that the Middle East is of extreme importance to the UK for the following reasons:

- (1) It is the focal point of commonwealth land, sea and air communication;
- (2) It is a good base area against the USSR in war;
- (3) It has large oil resources;
- (4) It protects NATO's right flank;
- (5) It denies the Soviets access to the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean;
- (6) It bars the way to Africa; and
- (7) The UK has great economic interests in the area.

UK aims in the area are twofold: to resist Soviet expansion and to promote orderly and stable conditions, good relations among the countries of the area and between them and the West, and a drawing together of the area states for common defense. The last aim will not, in the UK view, be achieved unless the US and UK support indigenous initiatives for common defense by action in the Middle East.

The Under Secretary asked whether supporting action in other areas could not meet the need. The Ambassador replied that he was not referring to war but to necessary action in peace. The UK believes that the area states will require visible evidence of US and UK support which could take the form of association with a regional defense pact or the supply of arms.

The Under Secretary said that although US interests and aims in the Middle East might be stated somewhat differently, they would come out generally about the same as those outlined by the Ambassador. The latter added that it had been the UK view for some time that the achievement of effective defense and other aims in the Middle East depended upon US-UK collaboration. The Under Secretary remarked that aside from the general and obvious need for US-UK collaboration there was in the Middle East the additional reason of preventing the area states from playing us off against each other.

Agenda Item 3: The Political Factors in the Establishment of a Defense Organization The Ambassador stated that the UK purpose in the present talks is to reach general understanding with the US on the political framework of Middle East defense, the roles of the area states and the roles of the US, the UK and France.

As regards the political framework, two existing arrangements to defend the Middle East against aggression, the Arab League Security Pact (ALSP) and the Turk-Iraqi Pact, must be considered. There might, the Ambassador pointed out, be a third, the Egypt-Syria-Saudi Arabia Pact (ESS), although the UK had the impression that this was still in the realm of talk. Mr. Jernegan said that information available to the US indicated that ESS was in difficulties and might not materialize.

The Ambassador continued in the sense that the UK wrote off ALSP as ineffective, held together only by hostility to Israel and not open to Western membership. The Under Secretary and Mr. Jernegan indicated US concurrence.

The Turk-Iraqi Pact, the Ambassador said, provides a much better foundation for effective Middle East defense. It is linked to the West through Turkey and the UK, already members; its terms provide for special agreement among the members; it covers the Russian front; and it has in Iraq air fields and bases available to the UK including provision for prestocking. The UK wishes to build up the pact by the adherence of other area states.

The Ambassador went on to say that the Turk-Iraqi Pact in fact carries on the "northern tier" concept originally suggested by the US. The UK fears that the momentum behind this concept and the Pact is slowing down. There have been no recent adherences to the Pact and because of sharp adverse reaction to its creation from Egypt and Israel, the US and UK have not encouraged Lebanon and Jordan to join. The initial area enthusiasm is waning, and the impression is growing in the Middle East that the US is not as strong in its support of the Pact as it was at the outset. *The UK considers that there is immediate need to give renewed momentum to the Pact and desires further discussion of this point during the present talks.*

The Ambassador referred to the importance of obtaining the adherence of a fourth state to the Pact in order that the Ministerial Council provided for by the Pact might be established. Pakistan seems the most likely fourth member, to be followed later by Iran. Although the UK was aware of the difficulties confronting the US, both in the Middle East and domestically, in reaching a decision on US adherence to the Pact, *the UK hoped that the US would find it possible to adhere and would welcome any indication of US intention that could be given in the course of the present talks.*

The Under Secretary said that the US was at this time unable to express any view on the possibilities of its adherence.

[1 paragraph (3½ lines of source text) not declassified]

With reference to ESS the Ambassador commented that this would be even more of a minus than ALSP. ESS would be directed not only against Israel but also against Iraq and the Turk-Iraq Pact. There would be no possibility of Western participation. [1½ lines of source text not declassified] The Ambassador asked that it might be desirable, however, *to discuss later in the present talks what the US and UK should do if ESS did come into being.*

Regarding Pakistani accession to the Turk-Iraqi Pact, the UK believes there would be some help from Pakistan in the Middle East in time of war, and that there are important political values involved, particularly in influencing the Arabs. The UK is willing to disregard the inevitable Indian reaction. In response from a query from the Under Secretary as to the role the Pakistanis could play in Middle East defense, the Ambassador expressed the opinion that they might provide a division for the Zagros defense line although this would depend on the state of the Kashmir problem. In any case, the UK thought Pakistan could play a part and should be encouraged to do so. Mr. Jernegan stated that the US was urging the Pakistanis to adhere to the Pact.

The UK would like Iran in the Pact but would leave the timing to Iran. Great political advantages would flow from Iranian adherence, particularly in giving the Pact a greater area coloration and in influencing the Arabs. The UK would, however, want to see Iranian forces considerably strengthened before it got involved in extensive military commitments in Iran. Clearly, the Shah expects to get additional military aid from the US and commitments from his neighbors before he joins. The Pact won't gain much from Iranian forces. In case of an attack, the Shah would probably leave the country and the civil government collapse. The West could probably not get bases or prestocking rights in Iran in view of the Shah's recent assurances to the Soviet Ambassador regarding foreign bases in Iran. The UK would not want to give its war plans to Iran. Although the prospects of Iranian adherence would not cause any Soviet military action, the USSR might try to frighten Iran and might cause the Shah to back away from the Pact, resulting in an end situation less good than the present.

After a brief discussion of US and UK participation in the forthcoming Turk-Iraq-Iranian-Pakistani staff talks, *the Under Secretary and the*

Ambassador agreed to exchange views on the appropriate rank of US and UK observers when the Embassy has received instructions from London.

The Under Secretary, Mr. Murphy and Mr. Jernegan indicated some dissent from the UK appreciation of Iran. The Under Secretary suggested that Iran might be on the verge of a rebirth and that the Iranian economic position would probably soon be better than that of Turkey, or Pakistan. He had noted, however, that the Soviet peace offensive seems to have had more effect in Iran than elsewhere in the area. He said that the US hoped to keep the Shah bolstered although we recognized that he was getting himself in an exposed position by appointing a personal Prime Minister like Ala. He also emphasized that Iran's political posture depends on the backing Iran feels it has and that participation in the Turk-Iraqi Pact would have an important psychological effect.

Mr. Murphy pointed out that the Shah does not expect that all of Iran would or could be defended in war. Mr. Jernegan asked whether now might not be the time to move for Iranian adherence to the Pact and expressed puzzlement at the low UK military rating of Iran since the vital Zagros passes are in Iran. He thought that there were significant advantages in close military relations with Iran that would permit prearrangements for the defense of the passes, and that the UK military commitment to Iran could be limited under the terms of the Pact.

The Ambassador commented on the foregoing US views in the sense that the UK is concerned over symptoms of drift in Iran and feels that the Shah is not doing too well. The UK Ambassador to Iran has been instructed to prod the Shah. Mr. Bailey observed that the Zagros passes were practically in Iraq, but the Ambassador agreed in principle with Mr. Jernegan's views on the desirability of prearranging the defense of the passes through close military relations with Iran.

Mr. Murphy asked if a supply question would arise with Iranian adherence to the Pact. The Ambassador replied that the Shah would certainly expect increased assistance. The UK could not meet this demand and the US would have to provide the aid.

The Ambassador commented that with a military training mission in Iran, the US would be better able to assess the military capability of the Iranians than the UK. He asked how the mission was getting on. Mr. Jernegan replied that the mission was now up to a strength of about 200 but it was still too early to assess results. The Under Secretary observed that the Iranians were cooperating well with the mission.

As he was departing, the Ambassador said that he was prepared to discuss the recommendations contained in the US-UK-Turkey military report of last February if the US side so desired.

The Under Secretary and the Ambassador agreed to resume the talks at 2:30 p.m., June 24.

¹ Source; Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 66 D 70. Top Secret. Drafted by Mathews.

50. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State¹

Amman, June 23, 1955—9 p.m.

461. Appreciate Ambassador Byroade's thoughtful search for usable formula. From perspective Jordan have following comments on Cairo's 1929.²

1. For immediate future it seems HKJ will try to play mediator role, stressing need for Arab unity and avoiding joining either pact. Believe Jordan leans to Turco-Iraqi pact at royal level and would welcome later opportunity to join without stigma and possibly with profit in arms assistance.

2. I doubt the long term usefulness of any formula by which states other than Iraq indicate they do not contemplate joining Northern Tier. For Jordan to give a commitment never to join would be embarrassment for Iraq, Turkey and the UK. Britain believed counting on Jordan adherence Turco-Iraqi pact to ease the Anglo-Jordanian treaty position in somewhat same fashion she did with Iraq.

3. Agree that US placed in position of opposing symbol of Arab unity but believe Egyptians are the ones chiefly to thank.

4. Do not believe US can do much either to hasten or delay deal as contrasted to sentimental Arab unification. Former must start with some combination of Syria, Jordan, Iraq. Egypt and Saudi Arabia oppose and in so doing oppose reality of Arab unity while posing as champions of the sentiment. Such championship has been of little help so far as Jordan concerned.

Mallory

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/6–2355. Secret. Repeated to Ankara, Baghdad, Paris, Damascus, London, Beirut, Tel Aviv, and Jidda.

² [Document 45](#).

**51. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State,
Washington, June 24, 1955¹**

Washington, June 24, 1955

SUBJECT

Middle East Defense

PARTICIPANTS

The Under Secretary

Mr. Murphy

Mr. Elbrick, EUR

Mr. Mathews, S/P

Mr. Dixon, NEA

Observers:

Mr. Roger Ernst, Defense

Col. George T. Powers, 3rd, JCS

The British Ambassador

Mr. Ronald Bailey, British Embassy

Col. Fitzgeorge-Balfour, British

Representative, NATO

As the Under Secretary was delayed by other business Mr. Murphy opened the meeting at 2:40 p.m. and suggested that the Ambassador continue his exposition of UK views.

Agenda Item 3: The Political Factors in the Establishment of a Defense Organization (Continued) The Ambassador referred to the problem of Turk-Iraqi relations, pointing out that the Iraqis still had lingering suspicions of the Turks. [4½ lines of source text not declassified]

[1 paragraph (3½ lines of source text) not declassified] The Ambassador then turned to Syria. Opinions concerning the Turco-Iraqi Pact in that country are divided. Leftist elements and the Army are opposed to the Pact, the Army because of its fears of a Syrian-Iraqi union and of a weakening of Arab concentration on the Israeli issue. The UK would like to see Syria in the Pact but considers that there is not much chance of this now. [1½ lines of source text not declassified]

In order to reduce Syrian opposition to the Pact it will be necessary for Iraq to give Syria assurances that it has no designs on the latter country. The UK has already passed on to Syria assurances which it has obtained from the Iraqis, but direct assurances from Iraq to Syria are necessary. The UK is continuing efforts to persuade Iraq to give these assurances.

The French have been intriguing in Syria against the Turco-Iraqi Pact and against the UK. The situation has improved recently and the French have assured the UK that they are working with and not against the Pact in Syria. The UK will continue to press France to show a positive attitude toward the Pact and hopes that the US will do the same.

The Ambassador next discussed Lebanon, which was originally favorable to the Turco-Iraqi Pact but has since cooled off owing to pressure from Egypt and Syria. However, if the US and UK were to urge Lebanon to enter the Pact it would probably do so. As there would, however, be little military advantage in Lebanese adherence, the UK is not disposed to pressure Lebanon. It considers that what is needed is a holding operation to insure that Lebanon does not cool off even more.

As regards Jordan, the Ambassador said that its reactions to the Pact had been lukewarm at the outset. There had been some criticism of Iraq for getting out of step with the other Arab states. Jordan has taken the position that although it remains faithful to its existing alliances with Iraq, the Arab League and the UK, it does not wish to make a choice between Egypt and

Iraq. The UK has not pressed Jordan to adhere but has indicated that if it did so the UK would be prepared to replace the present Anglo-Jordanian Treaty with a new agreement under the Turco-Iraqi Pact.

In summary, the UK considers that pressure should not be applied on Syria, Lebanon and Jordan to adhere to the Turco-Iraqi Pact at least until Pakistan has joined the Pact. The Ambassador said that this does not mean that the UK considered it necessary to press these three countries immediately after the Pakistani entry. The important thing was to prevent the growth of further opposition to the Pact. It should also be borne in mind that if the momentum behind the Pact fails the US and UK may have to press Lebanon and Jordan to join.

The UK considers the Egyptian situation to be very difficult and complex, but continues to regard bases in an Egypt friendly to the West and committed to Middle East defense as useful. *It assumes that the US holds the same view and would like to have this confirmed in the present talks.*

Egypt is working against the Turco-Iraqi Pact. The UK ascribes this in part to wounded vanity but a more important factor is that Nasser had wanted to move slowly in bringing Egypt into closer association with the West and the creation of the Turco-Iraqi Pact was premature in terms of his timetable. He considers that the Arabs are not yet prepared for the type of close association with the West implicit in the Turco-Iraqi Pact. A further factor is that the neutralist point of view to which, Nasser was exposed at Bandung has had some effect on his attitude.

ESS has been the Egyptian reaction to the Turco-Iraqi Pact. The UK is not disposed to waver in its support of the Pact because of Egypt's attitude. It would like Egypt to accede to the Pact and would contemplate giving Egypt a role commensurate with its position in the Middle East and its desire for prestige. The UK would not, however, weaken its support of Iraq to obtain Egyptian accession. In conclusion, the Ambassador pointed to the obvious importance of Israeli-Arab relations in determining the Egyptian position and emphasized the UK desire to maintain the Nasser regime in power.

Mr. Murphy inquired whether the UK thought that the Egyptians are now pushing ESS gently. The Ambassador and Mr. Bailey responded in the

sense that difficulties have arisen with respect to ESS, particularly as Syria is demanding economic benefits which Egypt does not wish to give.

The Ambassador pointed out that despite Israel's good military capability, it was obviously impossible for Israel to join the Turco-Iraqi Pact unless and until Arab-Israeli relations were much better. A minimum difficulty is the lack of diplomatic relations with Iraq. In any case the Israelis do not like the Pact and want the US and UK to enter defense arrangements with Israel. The UK has endeavored, without much success, to persuade the Israelis that the Pact is in their interest as it focuses attention on the USSR and away from Israel. The US and UK are currently working together on the basic problem of trying to improve Arab-Israeli relations. In the meantime it is the UK view that both the US and the UK should stay away from any defense arrangements with Israel.

Mr. Murphy commented that the US had been struck by indications that France was shifting its favors from the Arabs to the Israelis and asked how far, in the UK view, this was going. The Ambassador said that France was making quite an effort in Israel. It was supplying jet planes and tanks to the Israelis. In the UK view this was simply another attempt to bolster French presence in the Middle East. The French had apparently been able to move closer to Israel without damaging their relations with Syria.

In discussing the UK role in Middle East defense the Ambassador pointed out that the main responsibility for area security had in the past fallen on the UK. It had no desire for an exclusive position in this field and it was a central point of UK policy to enlist US support. Increased US interest in Middle East defense was welcomed. The fact remains that the UK is at present the only Western power with binding defense commitments in the area and combat personnel on the ground. In response to a query from Mr. Murphy the Ambassador and Col. Balfour indicated that at the present time the UK had in the general Middle East area one and one-half divisions plus two brigades and odd bits and pieces of ground forces. These would, over the next year or so, phase down to about one division. The UK also maintains air and naval forces in the area.

As regards the US, the Ambassador said that the UK would welcome a US sharing of UK commitments through adherence to the Turco-Iraqi Pact. The UK recognizes the difficulties for the US but considers it important that the US eventually accede to the Pact so as to play a greater part in the defense of the Middle East in peace and in war. As long as the US is not in the Pact, and despite existing US bilateral arrangements with certain of the area countries, there will exist a serious gap in the defense structure.

The French, the Ambassador said, are now standing aside in contrast to their past opposition to the Turco-Iraqi Pact. In principle, France supports the concept of collective defense in the Middle East but it has disliked the repercussions caused by the Pact. Moreover, it is the UK view that the French have subordinated their "support in principle" to narrower French interest in the Levant. Turkey and Iraq do not favor French accession to their Pact. The Turks have said that French accession should be conditioned on prior adherence by Syria and Lebanon. In response to a query by Mr. Murphy, the Ambassador said that he assumed that the Iraqi opposition to French adherence was based upon the fact that France was too far removed from the area and that French North African policy was distasteful. The Ambassador had no definite information as to the basis of the Turkish attitude but assumed the Turks felt that France had little to offer a Middle East defense organization in the way of forces.

It is the UK view that the US and UK should take no initiative to bring France into the Turco-Iraqi Pact. In the long run, and should Syria and Lebanon adhere, the UK would not wish to keep the French out, although this attitude is based more on the need for Western solidarity than on any anticipation that the French would make a significant contribution to Middle East defense.

In response to a query by Mr. Dixon as to the UK view on the participation of certain other countries, the Ambassador said that the UK does not cast Saudi Arabia for a role in the Turco-Iraqi Pact in view of its anti-Hashemite bias and the fact that it is very much on the periphery of the Middle East defense area. The accession of Greece or Italy to the Pact would add nothing. South Africa was more interested in the defense of the area south

of the Sahara than of the Middle East. In any case the UK saw no object in pursuing South African participation in the Turco-Iraqi Pact at this time.

Agenda Item 4: Type of Organization Required, Including Its Relationship to NATO

The Ambassador stated that he was giving the US tentative UK views as to the type of organization required for Middle East defense. He emphasized that these views had not been disclosed to any other country. *He said that the UK would like in the course of the present conversations to reach some broad understanding with the US as to the type of organization that would be appropriate*, even though the US might not contemplate its own membership in the organization in the near future.

Although the Turco-Iraqi Pact refers to a permanent ministerial council, and the UK had given its blessing to this concept when consulted by the Turks in the drafting stage of the Pact, the UK assumes that there would be no objection by the participants to deputies, presumably at the ambassadorial level, sitting for the ministers. Ministerial meetings might be held occasionally. The UK had thought that the permanent council might have its seat in Baghdad, although ministerial meetings might rotate among the area capitals.

Subordinate to the council would be a military planning organization located in Baghdad with representation from each Pact participant. The main function of the Planning organization would be to draw up war plans. The type of war planning desirable remains unforeseeable, but it could develop later as circumstances dictate. A small international secretariat to service the council and the military planning organization would presumably also be required. The UK had considered letting the Iraqis provide the secretariat but had concluded that an international group would be better. In the event that US adherence to the Pact were to be appreciably delayed, the UK would hope that some informal US affiliation with the military planning organization could be arranged.

The UK foresees no need for a formal connection between the defense organization under the Turco-Iraqi Pact and NATO. It believes that the overlapping of membership (Turkey, the UK and possibly the US) should

be sufficient to provide liaison between the two organizations. At the military level the UK contemplates planning and intelligence liaison between the military planning organization under the Pact and the NATO Ground Force headquarters at Izmir.

Mr. Murphy inquired whether the Turco-Iraqi Pact had any economic aspects and referred particularly to infrastructure. The Ambassador replied that there were no economic clauses in the Turco-Iraqi Pact and that infrastructure matters would be handled by the council and the military planning organization and might be the subject of subsidiary agreement under the Pact.

Mr. Ernst inquired concerning the scope of activities of the military planning organization. The Ambassador replied that the UK had nothing specific thought out at this stage but he assumed that the organization would cover the usual range of military planning subjects.

Mr. Dixon asked the British view with regard to the type of commitment in the Turco-Iraqi Pact. The Ambassador replied that it was less binding than SEATO. The Pact was very flexible and the real meaning of the commitment would depend on the special arrangements made under the Pact. As far as Iraq is concerned he believed the nature of the commitment from the UK was satisfactory. The existing relationships with Turkey and Pakistan were such as not to raise the nature of the commitment in the Turco-Iraqi Pact. As regards Iran he believed that it might be necessary to enter into some sort of special agreement in the nature of guarantees should they join the Pact.

The Under Secretary referred to the provisions of the SEACDT Pact relating to the control of subversion and asked whether in the UK view the Turco-Iraqi Pact would provide a framework for such activities in the Middle East. He said that it would be to both US and UK advantage to maximize the peacetime utility of the Middle East defense arrangement even though its predominant aspect was military. The Ambassador expressed the view that although there were no references in the Pact to the problem of subversion and despite the existence in the Pact of a clause against "any interference whatsoever" in internal affairs he thought that subordinate special agreements concerning the control of subversion could

be negotiated under the Pact. He believed, however, that it would be necessary to move very slowly and softly in this direction. The most important thing was to get Pakistan and Iran into the Pact and then make careful efforts to accomplish such an end as this.

Agenda Item 5: A Concept of Operations

The Ambassador recapitulated briefly the concept of operations set forth in the US-UK-Turkey Military Report prepared in London in February, 1955. He placed particular stress on the need for providing early warning facilities in the Middle East.

Agenda Item 6: Requirements for the Development of the Operational Concept into a Realistic Plan Including the Following: (a) Command Organization for the Area

The Ambassador stated that the UK sees no need to create a command structure under the Turco-Iraqi Pact at the present time or even in the immediate future after the fourth member has adhered and the Pact organization begins to be formed. There are various factors which militate against such a step. The countries of the area are not yet disposed to put their forces under international command. There is no immediate prospect of stationing troops of one area member in the territory of another area member. Finally, there are differing commitments as between the Pact members.

(b) Contribution Required from Middle East Countries, the United Kingdom, other Commonwealth Countries Directly Concerned and the United States.

The Ambassador's exposition under this agenda consisted in the main of a recapitulation of requirements, availabilities and deficits as set forth in the US-UK-Turkey Military Report prepared in London. He supplemented this with certain UK Chiefs of Staff comments on the report which are summarized in the following paragraphs.

Ground

1. The UK has some reservations as to the military value of an Iranian division.
2. The availability of a Pakistani division depends upon a number of extraneous factors such as a settlement of the Kashmir dispute with India.
3. The Jordanian Arab Legion would be available only if Jordan-Israel relations were improved.
4. It is doubted that Turkish divisions even if equipped could be made available for the defense of the Zagros Line.
5. A very considerable time would be required to provide an effective defense in the Middle East, and the effort would be dependent on US-UK assistance.
6. Serious deficiencies in lines of communications and administrative units would have to be overcome.

Mr. Ernst inquired whether the UK contemplated that more than three divisions could be raised in Iraq. The Ambassador and Mr. Bailey responded in the sense that the UK thought not as the age distribution of the Iraqi population would make it difficult to raise more than three divisions.

Air

[3 paragraphs (19 lines of source text) not declassified]

With respect to defensive air capabilities the Ambassador stated that the UK was going to make a determined effort to build up the Iraqi air force. It is doubted that much could be done in the other Middle East countries excepting of course Israel which was ruled out on political grounds. Agreement has been reached in principle in Anglo-Iraqi staff talks for the development of early warning facilities. This would be undertaken under the recent Anglo-Iraqi agreement.

Sea

The UK Chiefs of Staff consider that the most serious deficit on the naval side is in minesweepers which are essential to the maintenance of the line of communication to the Persian Gulf. Within the Gulf it might be an acceptable risk not to attempt to fill the deficit. However, the UK, the Ambassador said, will make every effort to build up the minesweeping capability of Iraq within the framework of the Anglo-Iraq agreement.

Standardization

The UK Chiefs of Staff place particular emphasis on the comment in the Tripartite Report that in peacetime arms should be supplied to the area states from the country which will supply arms and provide logistic support, maintenance, etc. in war.

In conclusion the Ambassador inquired whether the US JCS had made a review of the Tripartite Report similar to that of the UK Chiefs of Staff. The Under Secretary replied that the JCS had been examining the Report and would be much interested in UK views. The Ambassador said that he would arrange to have provided to the JCS on June 27 a summary of the important UK Chief of Staff comments.

(c) Supply of Arms, Equipment and Training Facilities for Middle East States The Ambassador stated that UK policy with respect to the supply of arms to the Middle East states is based upon the Tripartite Declaration of 1950. He made the following comments with respect to individual countries:

Egypt. The UK has agreed to supply only about one-half of the outstanding arms requests at the time of the embargo in 1951. It is now under pressure to meet the balance of these outstanding requests and new requirements. It believes it should go some way to meet Egyptian demands in view of Egypt's weakness vis-à-vis Israel and the Western interest in the defense capability of Egypt. The UK considers it necessary to supply a sufficient amount of arms to Egypt to maintain the morale of its armed forces.

Syria. There is very little advantage in providing any considerable quantity of arms to Syria. The UK is, however, interested in maintaining its connection with the Syrian air force, a connection which is opposed by the Egyptians and some Syrians. The UK intends to provide some obsolete aircraft to Syria and to continue its training program.

Lebanon. Lebanon is of little military importance. The UK has provided some 25-pounders and will in the future consider similar small requests in order to keep the Lebanese happy.

Jordan. The UK has no problems as regards Jordan. It can continue to meet Jordanian needs pursuant to the Anglo-Jordan Treaty from UK resources.

Israel. The Israelis clearly have a decisive advantage in air, sea and land forces over any possible combination of Arab states. Despite this, the French are supplying jet aircraft and tanks to Israel. The UK policy is to be restrained in authorizing arms shipments to Israel. It is holding Israeli applications for tanks, day and night fighters and destroyers. The UK has no immediate intention of releasing any of these items but if it should release destroyers for Egypt it might also release destroyers for Israel.

The Near East Arms Consultative Committee is, in the UK view, functioning as well as could be expected and there is no apparent need to change it radically. The US and UK should, however, try to bring France into line on the supply of arms to Israel.

In response to a query by Mr. Dixon concerning UK views on arms for Saudi Arabia, the Ambassador said that the UK did not consider that Saudi Arabia properly comes into the Middle East defense concept. It is not directly threatened by either the USSR or Israel. Moreover it is stirring up trouble in the area within and with Egypt and Syria. The UK considers that Saudi Arabia is pursuing an expansionist policy against the Persian Gulf sheikhdoms for whose protection the UK is responsible, and accordingly views with a jaundiced eye some of the arms which the US has recently supplied to the Saudis.

In an informal exchange with Mr. Ernst, Col. Balfour indicated that the UK had made no estimate of the cost of removing existing deficits in defense requirements.

In turning to Iraq, the Ambassador stressed that he was bringing up a problem of immediate and considerable importance to the UK. It had been agreed in the London Tripartite military talks that in time of war Iraq should be supplied by the UK. It followed that Iraq should be provided UK equipment in time of peace. The difficulty is that the US is in a position to supply arms free but the UK is not. The Iraqis naturally prefer to receive arms as a gift rather than to pay for them.

In February 1954 the US and UK concluded a memorandum of understanding² with respect to the supply of equipment to Iraq. This memorandum was based on the old Anglo-Iraq Treaty which has since been replaced by an Anglo-Iraq Agreement under the Turk-Iraq Pact. The memorandum provided inter alia for the supply to Iraq of certain UK equipment to be procured under OSP procedures. Since then the US has been or is supplying the items earmarked for procurement in the US, but equipment to be procured in the UK has not been going forward and only one OSP order has been placed. The position is becoming acute and the Iraqis are becoming restive. The Iraqis want Centurion tanks, the UK would like to supply them, but there is an absence of OSP orders for tanks.

The existence of the US-UK memorandum of understanding has not been disclosed to the Iraqis. The UK considers that the time has now come to inform the Iraqis. The UK accordingly requests that the policy in the memorandum of understanding be reaffirmed and that agreement be reached in the course of the present talks to let the Iraqis know in a general way of the US-UK understanding. This is a matter of urgency as it can become a crucial factor in UK-Iraqi relations and can hinder effective development of the Turco-Iraqi Pact.

The Under Secretary said that he was not familiar with the February 1954 memorandum of understanding. He would review it and discuss the problem raised by the Ambassador with Defense. With respect to the Centurion tanks, it was his recollection that the US had assured Israel that there would be no heavy build-up in Iraq. The Ambassador pointed out that

they had been training the Iraqis in the use of tanks for some time. While there were a few tanks in Iraq the time had come when more could be absorbed and were needed. Mr. Dixon commented that there were no tanks in the US military program for Iraq, which is a very modest program.

The Ambassador said that the position with respect to Pakistan was analogous to that of Iraq although the UK did accept that a much larger proportion of Pakistani equipment will come from US sources than in the case of Iraq. The UK is not asking specifically for large assistance through the OSP mechanism. A difficulty has arisen, however, because Pakistani forces have in the past always been trained and equipped on UK standards and from UK sources. It is important to avoid disruption of the pattern of the Pakistani forces and to this end there should be close coordination between US and UK activities. This coordination has been lacking. The US has not disclosed its intentions with respect to the equipping of Pakistani forces to the UK, and the latter is concerned at being left in the dark. *The UK asks that the US disclose its intentions in the course of the present talks.*

Under present plans, Pakistani forces would operate in the Middle East alongside the UK and other Commonwealth forces, utilizing UK lines of communications and workshops. If all of these forces were using the same equipment, the effort would obviously be facilitated. As far as practicable, therefore, Pakistani forces should continue to have and use UK equipment.

The trouble is that countries such as Pakistan, seeing two sources of arms supply, naturally tend to play one off against the other. The Ambassador said that his brief indicated that the Pakistanis had said they would like UK equipment. He was quite sure that the US brief reported a Pakistani preference for US equipment. This situation is generating bad feeling and friction between US and UK personnel in Pakistan and also in Iraq and the Ambassador considers it important that steps be taken to remedy the situation. Collaboration between the US and the UK he strongly believed was very much in the interest of both our governments.

The Under Secretary said he would discuss this problem with Defense.

(d) Political and Financial Aspects of Infrastructure and Stockpiling

The Ambassador dealt briefly with this agenda item pointing out that it was apparent from the Tripartite Military Report that there were major deficiencies of infrastructure, stockpiling and lines of communication in the Middle East. Its treaties with Iraq and Jordan enable the UK to relieve some of these deficiencies and the UK is talking to these two countries and to Lebanon concerning arrangements for stockpiling. It is the UK view that there should be some movement with respect to infrastructure as this would show support for the Turco-Iraqi Pact and would encourage further adherence and possibly a South African contribution. The UK is, unfortunately, already heavily committed in Cyprus, Iraq and Jordan and cannot readily increase its efforts in this field. The question of the US role accordingly becomes important.

The Ambassador stated that he had now completed his presentation, as Agenda Item 7 could not be dealt with until the US position was determined.

The Under Secretary said that it would be about a week before the US could resume the discussions. He assumed that the Ambassador's exposition had provided the general framework of the UK position but hoped that the US could request further information on specific points which might arise during its consideration of the problem. The Ambassador said that he would be available and would be glad to come to the Department for interim talks if that appeared desirable.

The Under Secretary said that the Embassy would be informed when the US was ready to resume talks, and the meeting adjourned at 6:15 p.m.

¹ Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 66 D 70. Top Secret. Drafted by Mathews.

² [Foreign Relations, 1952-1954, vol. IX, Part 2, p. 2371.](#)

52. Telegram From the Embassy in Syria to the Department of State¹

Damascus, June 24, 1955—9 a.m.

754. Cairo Embtel 1929.² For some time US Government has relied on Nasser's assurances he will eventually adopt a pro-Western attitude. Certain US decisions have been predicated on his subsequent willingness and ability promote US objectives in Arab world. Insofar as Syria is concerned, doubt US confidence justified. Proposal in reference telegram appears envisage another phase, indeterminate in length, of attempting assuage Egyptian sensibilities in hope of future benefits. Before US Government buys additional Egyptian futures this Embassy believes Department might usefully review Nasser's role in carrying out US policy this area.

Reference telegram indicates Nasser now recognizes present GOE Arab policy is getting him and other Arabs nowhere. Since recent difficulties to considerable extent "made in Egypt", calling halt would inevitably be interpreted as defeat for GOE. However Nasser's conclusion that such about-face would leave Egypt alone with Israel conveniently ignores continuing validity Tripartite Declaration and ALCSP and fact Turko-Iraqi Pact inter alia comprehends possibility Israeli aggression.

Specifically, Embassy sees following possible difficulties in suggested Arab policy statement:

1. As noted reference telegram, it would restore facade Arab unity which in past has hindered rather than helped achievement US objectives. US Government has not in Syria been criticized for opposing "Arab unity" except by out-and-out proponents ESS pact. Many Syrians regard Egyptian intransigence rather than Turko-Iraqi pact as responsible current division among Arabs.
2. Proposal requires Egypt do nothing for US Government until after US Government has found means "reassure Egypt". While Embassy Cairo in best position predict what Nasser would then

do, Egypt's recent opposition Turko-Iraqi Pact and anti-Western activities in Syria raise question whether US actions favorable Egypt should not follow and depend on Egyptian actions favorable US.

3. General terms of the suggested statement hardly likely be interpreted here as strengthening 'Arab unity'. Many Syrians who have favored ESS pact (in part because its text provides for greater degree unity than ALCSP would probably take strengthened ALCSP in preference to proposed statement).

4. Reference desire cooperate in "rear area" would probably be unacceptable present anti-Western GOS.

5. Because it contains no reference Palestine problem, proposed statement likely have limited appeal here.

6. December AL meeting attempting unsuccessfully clarify Arab attitude area defense. Effort negotiate statement along suggested lines might well prove even more difficult.

7. Phraseology acceptable to Nasser might have discouraging effect on Turks and Iraqis, who have openly declared for West. Should US appear waver in supporting them, Syria will hardly feel impelled follow their example in aligning self with West.

On balance, Embassy believes proposed statement would introduce complicating factor into situation which, with prospect diminishing Iraqi-Egyptian difficulties and reduced likelihood signature ESS pact, seems to be improving.

Message Unsigned

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 786.00/6-2455. Confidential. Repeated to Amman, Ankara, Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Jidda, London, Paris, and Tel Aviv.

² [Document 45](#).

53. Telegram From the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State¹

Beirut, June 25, 1955—2 p.m.

1373. In light of situation as seen from Beirut I submit following observations regarding suggested new approach to Nasser (Cairo telegram 1929 to Department):²

1. One of principal contributors to “great debate” on defense pacts is Egyptian press and radio. Much of wind would be taken out of debate if, Nasser and colleagues could be persuaded to take Byroade’s excellent advice and quit the field of Arab quarrels. Cannot readily understand Nasser’s contention that this would “separate him from Arab world” and lead to “Egypt’s being left alone with Israel.” As result recent Gaza tension we have seen that even in midst of Arab controversy and disunity Arab state with least reason to be helpful to Egypt, namely Iraq, is not only willing to cooperate with other Arab states in defending Egypt in event Israeli attack but also ready take initiative in organizing common effort.

2. Although we are not eager for states south of northern tier to join that arrangement and have not put pressure on them to do so, fact remains we have told Lebanese and others (Deptel 1072 repeated Cairo 1251)³ rear area states could assume role in relation to defense organization and that we hoped they would so act as to leave open possibility of their association with development defense organization in future. Lebanon at least, and I suspect others, probably still convinced that US would welcome additional Arab states joining Turco-Iraqi Pact. Feel certain Chamoun’s activity in favor of Pact based in part on that premise. For US now to encourage Egyptians in action effect of which would be to say that we do not believe other Arab states should join pact might only serve to confuse and perplex our friends regarding our aims and policies in Middle East. Such a step

would reinforce impression already being propagated in area by Saudi, Egyptian and French sources that US may be “cooling off” toward Turco-Iraqi Pact. It might also weaken domestic position of some of staunchest friends of northern tier, such as Chamoun.

3. Have we reached point where we are prepared to say definitely that development and consolidation of northern tier arrangement will not require adherence in one form or another of some of rear area states to Turco-Iraqi Pact? Also might it not be unwise to take a firm position on this question until our own relationship to pact is settled? Were we to join pact, it would probably become more attractive to certain others. If in meantime we had persuaded Egypt to embark on suggested line of action, might we not risk dilemma of having to choose between (A) discouraging Arab friends from joining ME defense organization in which we were member and (B) not discouraging them, thus appearing in Egyptian eyes to violate spirit if not letter of proposed formula?

4. While suggested declaration might tend to remove hostility and disruptive tactics toward northern tier, am inclined to doubt it would be equally effective in improving materially prospects for positive cooperation of hinterland with northern tier.

5. Appreciate considerations which have prompted Cairo’s suggestion, but I believe it may be premature unless we have definitely concluded northern tier requires no further Arab membership and unless Nasser’s domestic position such that step of this nature required at this time to bolster him.

Heath

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/6–2555. Secret. Repeated to Cairo, Amman, Ankara, Baghdad, Jidda, London, Paris, and Tel Aviv.

² [Document 45](#).

³ [Document 9](#).

54. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State¹

Cairo, June 28, 1955—Noon.

1970. Telegrams from my colleagues in area plus rumors that float downward from various nations in north lead me to wonder if position this Embassy misunderstood on certain basic issues, particularly in connection recommendations in Embtel 1929.²

This Embassy has not lost its conviction that northern tier approach and success to date of that policy is most important and far reaching development in Middle East in many a year. We do not wish that approach to falter or lose momentum. It is logical, inherently sound and in best interests of US deserving our support. Furthermore consequences of loss of momentum in context East-West matters generally and loss of prestige that would accompany show of US indecision would be very detrimental indeed.

What we have been seeking to do is find some way to turn things around down here so that the remainder of the area will openly accommodate itself to most important objectives in the north. Believe this may now be possible and it seems to me we should be willing to sacrifice things we either won't get or don't want anyway to accomplish this end.

I hear that Turks and possibly others seem to feel we weakening because of indecision (presumably in deference to Egypt) as to whether induce or pressure other Arab States to join TI Pact. It seemed to me Department views, as confirmed by NSC, were clear on this point long before this issue became bone of contention throughout area. It all comes down to fact that US, until Arab-Israeli situation greatly improved, is not in position follow through adequately on obvious follow-up requirements of military assistance these states. The disillusionment that would inevitably follow our failure of adequate follow-through, it seems to me, far better be avoided.

Would not we be in double trouble as regards Syria on this same point if she joined TI Pact and did in fact federate with Iraq or move in that direction. Should think this could not help but affect our aid program with Iraq because of its new proximity with Israel.

Believe period of no new initiative on part of US in past few months has been wise policy. Diversive [*Divisive?*] and disruptive counter-effort here had to run a certain course and develop obstacles of their own before other ideas would be seriously considered. Time now seems about here to try pull area out of dive that may develop along more and more dangerous lines, particularly as regards Soviet bloc opportunities.

If solution something along lines Embtel 1929 can be obtained (and even if unattainable and those in north feel our support northern tier weakening) would recommend US try to spur along enthusiasm by quick adherence Pakistan and such moves with Iran as may be profitable. Increased military assistance all along the lines would be good in itself if this possible. In last analysis, rather than let it falter would recommend US adherence. It seems to me these are things that really count and that we should not be forced into appearing to seek (at great detriment US position in large part Arab world) that which we do not want under present conditions merely because efforts have been made to deny those things to US.

Byroade

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 786.00/6-2855. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Ankara, London, Amman, Baghdad, Damascus, Jidda, Paris, and Tel Aviv.

² [Document 45](#).

**55. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State,
Washington, June 30, 1955¹**

Washington, June 30, 1955

SUBJECT

Middle East Defense

PARTICIPANTS

Department of State

The Under Secretary (in part)

Mr. Murphy, Deputy Under Secretary (in part)

Mr. Jernegan, NEA

Mr. Mathews, S/P

Mr. Unger, EUR

Mr. Dixon, NEA

Mr. Burns, S/S-RO

Department of Defense

Deputy Secretary Anderson

Admiral Radford

Mr. Ernst, OSD

Colonel Powers, JCS Staff

In preparation for the next session of the US-UK talks on Middle East Defense, scheduled for the latter part of the week beginning July 5, the following State-Defense positions were agreed upon concerning points raised by Ambassador Makins at the US-UK sessions June 23–24:

(1)

In view of the decision of the Secretary of State that the US is not at present in a position to formally associate itself with the Baghdad Pact, the US for the time being should establish liaison with, and coordinate its bilateral military assistance programs in the area with, the military planning organization to be set up under the Baghdad Pact. It was suggested this might be done through the US Military Attaché at Baghdad. If this procedure were followed, a senior US military officer might be assigned at Baghdad. At the same time, the Ambassador at Baghdad might be given responsibility for on-the-spot US relations with the Council of Ministers of the Baghdad Pact.

It was suggested that the US might establish, in Washington, a Middle East planning group to coordinate US bilateral military aid programs in the area with the activities undertaken by the organs set up under the Baghdad Pact. (It was noted that a telegram had just been received reporting a Pakistan Cabinet decision to adhere to the Pact, thus permitting the creation of the Pact's Ministerial Council.)

(2)

The US should inform the UK that, while the US will not at the outset become a member of the Pact, it has the following suggestions regarding organizational procedures; the Council of Ministers might meet periodically; rather than having a joint planning staff established under the Pact, the Military Representatives of the Council members might meet periodically to coordinate their country plans and exchange views (SEATO model); a small secretariat might be established, but a command organization does not seem in order.

[Numbered paragraph 3 (2½ lines of source text) not declassified]

(4) The US should inform the UK that it plans to continue its present policy of off-shore procurement of certain MDAP items in the UK for delivery to Iraq and Pakistan. The US should ask the UK to elaborate its need for information on the US military aid program in Pakistan and precisely the type of information it wishes.

(5) The US favors Iranian adherence to the Baghdad Pact in due course.

(6) Middle East Defense arrangements should be based on the Baghdad Pact.

(7) US-UK consideration of the question of command structure in the Middle East should be left in abeyance.

(8) In considering the need for infrastructure and stockpiling in the Middle East area, US bilateral military aid programs in the area should be recognized as representing the extent to which the US is presently prepared to contribute to the fulfilling of this need.

(9) US bilateral military aid programs in the area should be recognized as the US contribution towards the fulfillment of the deficit in ground forces in the Middle East area.

(10) The US realizes there are at present no sources, either within or outside of the area, of forces to fill the present air and naval deficits in the Middle East.

It was agreed that, prior to the next session of the US-UK talks, a brief memorandum should be sent to the President, outlining the background of the present US-UK discussions, pointing up the major points presented by the UK, and setting forth the recommended US position on Middle East Defense. A talking paper on this subject should also be prepared for the President, in the event Sir, Anthony Eden raises the matter at Geneva.²

¹ Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 66 D 70, Near and Middle East. Top Secret. Drafted by Mathews.

² Reference is to the Heads of Government meeting at Geneva, July 18–23, attended by the heads of government of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union. For documentation, see [volume V](#)

.

56. Department of State Position Paper¹

Washington, July 11, 1955.

DEFENSE OF THE MIDDLE EAST

1.

Under existing national policy the Departments of State and Defense have been encouraging the development of indigenous regional defense arrangements and helping to bring into being the “Northern Tier”, to be composed of Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Pakistan. While in the long run such a grouping could eventually lead to the building up of useful defensive strength, its initial importance lies in helping to keep those key countries western oriented and politically stable. A cornerstone for the “Northern Tier” was created by the signing of the Turk-Iraqi Pact at Baghdad in February 1955. The United Kingdom has acceded to that Pact and the Government of Pakistan has just decided to adhere. The Pact calls for the parties to, “cooperate for their security and defense”. We are hopeful that Iranian adherence may be forthcoming during the next several months, but this will depend upon our ability to provide military aid to Iran.

At the request of the United Kingdom, informal politico-military discussions have been conducted in Washington between Under Secretary of State Hoover and Ambassador, Makins. Preceding these discussions there were extensive military staff conversations among the United States, United Kingdom and Turkey, in which general agreement among the representatives was reached as to the military objectives, strategy, concept of operations, and other factors relating to the defense of the Middle East. In this connection it should be noted that the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider the results of these conversations acceptable as a point of departure for further consideration of the Middle East defense problem; the Department of Defense concurs in the views of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff. During the politico-military conversations in Washington held the end of June and referred to above, the United Kingdom made certain basic points. These points, and the position we propose to take with respect to them, are given below:

a. *Basis of Defense Arrangements*

British Position—Defense arrangements in the Middle East should be based on the Baghdad (Turk-Iraqi) Pact.

United States Position—The United States supports the development of a Northern Tier defense organization within the framework of the Baghdad Pact.

b. *Middle East Membership of the Pact*

British Position—Pakistan should be induced to adhere promptly to the Baghdad Pact. Iranian adherence is also desirable but its timing should be left entirely to the Iranians.

United States Position—Pakistan has already decided to adhere, and we have encouraged it in this course. Iran should also be encouraged to join in the near future, and we expect to encourage this by an offer of increased military assistance. The membership of the Baghdad Pact should therefore include Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Pakistan. It should not extend to other Arab states until Arab-Israel tensions are lessened.

c. *United States Adherence*

British Position—The United Kingdom would like the United States to become a full-fledged member, but if United States participation is delayed, as a minimum they hope for United States association with military planning in the area.

United States Position—Under existing circumstances, the United States does not think it wise to adhere or otherwise formally associate itself with the Pact, particularly because this would adversely affect our influence in bringing about a reduction in Arab-Israeli tensions. We do not, however, exclude the possibility that we shall eventually adhere, and we shall keep this question under constant review in the light of developments.

The United States will establish close liaison arrangements with the Pact organization so that we may coordinate United States plans and aid programs for the development of defensive strength in the Middle East with the plans and efforts of the other states concerned.

d. *French Adherence*

British Position—French adherence to the Pact would not be helpful but is likely to be inevitable, especially if Syria and Lebanon should join.

United States Position—We concur.

e. *Organization Under the Baghdad Pact*

British Position—Organization under the Baghdad Pact should include a ministerial council, a military planning staff and a small secretariat; the question of command should be avoided at this time.

United States Position—The United States will urge that organizational arrangements be kept as loose as possible, following the SEATO pattern. Specific views are that the ministerial council should meet periodically to coordinate plans and exchange views; possible there should be a small secretariat; no command organization should be established.

[Paragraph f and 2 subparagraphs (10 lines of source text) not declassified]

g. Increased United States Offshore Procurement in the United Kingdom for Iraq and Pakistan

British Position—The United Kingdom asked that the United States re-confirm the United States-United Kingdom Agreement of February 1954 regarding aid to Iraq, under which the United States agreed to give consideration to offshore procurement in the United Kingdom for Iraq. Additionally, they requested information regarding United States aid programs for Pakistan and maximum use of offshore procurement in carrying out these programs.

United States Position—The United States would inform the United Kingdom that the United States intends to continue the present policies on offshore procurement in the

United Kingdom for Iraq and Pakistan; the United States does not as a general rule consult third parties in advance regarding United States aid programs but will keep the offshore procurement aspect very much in mind and will advise the British as appropriate.

3. It is probable that pressures will increase on the United States for adherence to the Baghdad Pact, particularly since the United States is already allied with Turkey through NATO and Pakistan through SEATO. The position of close collaboration but non-adherence can, however, in all probability be sustained for 6 to 12 months, pending the hoped-for amelioration of the Arab-Israel conflict.

4. Finally, it is noted for your information that prospective military aid availabilities will not permit the United States to increase its total level of effort for the Middle East, except in the case of Iran where it is hoped that a moderate increase will encourage its adherence to the Baghdad Pact. It may be possible and desirable to shift funds among countries to gear our aid programs more closely to any regional plans which the Baghdad Pact planners may develop.

¹ Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518. Top Secret. Attached to an unsigned draft memorandum to the President, drafted by Jernegan, which in turn is attached to Hoover's memorandum, [infra](#). The covering unsigned memorandum to the President indicates that the paper was prepared for the President's use at Geneva. "It has the concurrence of the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff."

Hoover presumably carried a copy of the memorandum and the position paper to a meeting with President Eisenhower at the White House on July

11. Another copy of the position paper is attached to a note of July 11 from Robert C.F. Gordon to Murphy that reads as follows: “Attached is the revised copy of the Memorandum to the President which Mr. Hoover took to his meeting with the President today.” (Department of State, Central Files, 740.5/7–1155) The position paper was transmitted to 11 Middle Eastern posts, London, and Paris, in CA–2275, September 17. (*Ibid.*, 780.5/9–1755)

57. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Hoover) to the Secretary of State¹

Washington, July 11, 1955.

1. At this morning’s briefing for the President on our Middle East plans and strategy, he approved the position which we outlined would be taken in talks with the British.²
2. The President was especially emphatic that we should (a) continue our present policy and limited level of offshore procurement from British sources, and (b) make every effort to have them dig further into their own resources to help in the defense of the area.
3. I showed him the list of military items requested by the Egyptians.³ He observed that while it might appear costly to the Egyptians, it actually did not represent a particularly potent military force. Unless we felt it would raise undue complications with the Israelis, he saw no objection to selling them part or all of it. The President thought we should make a concerted effort to “woo” Nasser.
4. Secretary Anderson, Admiral, Radford, and Dillon Anderson were present.

Herbert Hoover, Jr.⁴

¹ Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518. Top Secret.

² See [*supra*](#).

³ See telegram 11 from Cairo, July 2, [vol. XIV, p. 274](#).

⁴ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

58. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iraq¹

Washington, July 15, 1955—12:53 p.m.

32. Our present position on Turk-Iraq pact as follows. Addressees may use this at their discretion in conversations with governments to clarify US views:

(1) US supports, encourages, welcomes Turk-Iraqi Pact and Pakistan decision adhere.

(2) Under existing circumstances US adherence not under consideration but we do not exclude possibility eventual adherence. It is not matter requiring immediate decision since we have already close relationship with members through NATO, Iraq MA agreement and SEATO.

(3) We should concentrate at present on completion and strengthening, "northern tier". While decision up to each state, we do not believe adherence by additional Arab states desirable at this time.

(4) We feel Egyptian-Syrian-Saudi Arabian pact will serve no useful purpose since it does not contain necessary elements area defense.

FYI: Department considering public statement at time Pakistan formally adheres.

Hoover

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/7-1555. Secret. Drafted by Newsom and George V. Allen and approved by, Allen who signed for Hoover. Also sent to Beirut, Damascus, Ankara, Karachi, Tel Aviv, Jidda, Cairo, Amman, London, Paris, and Tripoli.

59. Instruction From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Posts¹

Washington, August 11, 1955.

CA-1214

SUBJECT

US-UK Cooperation With Regard to Middle East Defense

In recent US-UK discussions on Middle East regional security matters, the question of closer collaboration between US and UK officials in the area and the desirability of avoiding improper or unhelpful criticism of each other's efforts has arisen. In the past, particularly where there has been concurrent military assistance or training missions, some rivalries, misunderstandings and sources of irritation have been generated. The principal effect of this has been that recipient countries have used such situations to their own advantage in playing off the US and the UK against each other. It is quite clear that US and UK policy are closely similar regarding the direction in which it is desirable for Middle Eastern defense to develop under present circumstances. Some difficulties exist on such secondary items as off-shore procurement where the British would wish to see greater a degree of matériel furnished by the US procured in the UK. However, such differences can best be worked out as between US and UK authorities. While giving evidence in the Middle East of close collaboration we wish, of course, to avoid the appearance of seeming to adopt a predetermined course of action which Middle East countries should accept as a *fait accompli*. However, we do wish to give the appearance of pursuing a course with common aims and similarity of policy in seeking the best defensive system possible in the area. Although we realize there has been consultation in varying degrees between the US and UK representatives in the Middle East, more consultation and less criticism is desirable on both sides.

You are requested to bring the foregoing to the attention of the US personnel in your area. The Department is requesting the UK Government to send similar instructions to its posts in the Middle East.

Dulles

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/8–1155. Top Secret. Drafted by Dixon and George V. Allen and approved by, Hoover. Sent to Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Karachi, Tehran, and Jidda; repeated to Ankara and London.

**60. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State,
Washington, August 11, 1955¹**

Washington, August 11, 1955

SUBJECT

Middle East Defense

PARTICIPANTS

United States—State Dept.

Mr. Herbert Hoover, Jr.—The Under Secretary

Mr. Robert Murphy—Deputy Under Secretary

Mr. George V. Allen—NEA

Mr. Elbert G. Mathews—S/P

Mr. B. F. Dixon—NEA

Defense Dept.

Col Russell F. Akers—JCS

Col. Frank B. Elliott—OSD ISA

United Kingdom

Sir Roger Makins—British Amb.

Mr. W. Morris—British Embassy

Col. Victor Fitzgeorge-Balfour—British Representative
NATO

These portions of the text in quotations shown below are the prepared position of the Department as presented by the Under Secretary to the British Ambassador.²

“Introduction

“I regret that so long a time has intervened since our meetings of June 23 and 24 when you gave us UK views on the problems of Middle East defense. Since then we have been applying ourselves to the issues you highlighted. Meanwhile, some of these issues were discussed by the President and the Prime Minister and by Mr. Dulles and Mr. Macmillan in Paris and Geneva. In view of the latter development it seemed advisable that we defer resuming our talks until the participants at the Summit had returned to Washington and London and we could have the benefit of their latest views.

“I shall now outline US views under the agenda headings that you suggested prior to our June meetings.”

Ambassador Makins stated that he did not expect to make substantive responses at that time but would give answers later.

“Agenda Item 1 (a)—The Soviet Threat to the Middle East in Peace

“We consider that the USSR regards the Middle East as a soft area particularly susceptible to propaganda and subversion. The Russians probably do not anticipate that any part of the area will fall to their control in the near future but they may well believe that they can capitalize on existing discontent and unrest in order to make the area of doubtful utility to the West. It is unlikely in our opinion that the USSR would attempt military adventures in the area as such.

“Undue optimism arising from the results of the Geneva meeting might lead the Middle Eastern states, excluding Turkey and less positively Pakistan, to become even less concerned about the communist threat and, as regards the Arab states, even to concentrate more on the alleged Israeli menace. We foresee that the USSR will attempt to take advantage of this situation by making further gestures of support of the Arabs against Israel and by

increasing its efforts at ideological and economic penetration in the Middle East.

“The most worrisome spots at the moment are Syria and Egypt. As regards the former the unstable internal political situation is made to order for communist manipulation. As regards the latter, we have been disturbed by Nasser’s apparent susceptibility to Soviet diplomatic blandishments and offers of trade and arms. Fortunately, the situation in Iran has improved since the fall of Mossadeq. The US is doing what it can to ensure that the Shah and other pro-Western elements maintain their determination to resist communism and develop their country.

“As regards Saudi Arabia which was discussed briefly in the June meetings, we find evidence of growing unrest in the country which could become serious. While there has been some slight indication of communist activity, actual party activity is under exceedingly strict surveillance and is not, at the moment, an important factor. More significant is the general impact on Saudi Arabia of new ideas coming from the Western world and from the more advanced Arab states. These ideas come into natural conflict with the [1 line of source text not declassified] generally backward states of political development. We consider it important, therefore, to do what we can to improve internal security and to encourage the regime to use its resources to promote healthy development, economically and politically.

“As you know we have for some time been disturbed by reports from Kuwait indicating the existence of communist-inspired propaganda and activity and suggesting the presence in the Sheikdom of unhealthy political rivalries that could jeopardize the stability of the state. In addition, the Kuwait Oil Company is experiencing increasing difficulties.

“Both of us have an important stake in Kuwait oil. Up to the present time, the protection of that stake against adverse political developments in Kuwait has been exclusively a UK responsibility. If the information we have been receiving from Kuwait is correct, and we think that in general it is, US and UK stakes in the Sheikdom might be endangered with

disconcerting suddenness. This would cause adverse reactions in both our countries.

“Let me make it clear that the US has no desire or intention to undermine UK influence and prestige in Kuwait. All that we seek is an opportunity to work with you to correct situations that threaten common US and UK interests. I do not propose to pursue this aspect of the matter further in the context of these meetings on Middle East defense, but I believe it is a subject that we should explore together at another time, and we will send you a separate note on this subject. The general problem of stability in Kuwait is, of course, relevant to our present discussions.

“In summary, the US estimate and the UK appreciation of the Soviet threat to the Middle East in peace seem to agree with respect to the general situation. As regards specific countries, the US foresees greater dangers in Egypt and Kuwait than does the UK; conversely, you are more concerned over Iran than we. Neither of us is complacent about the situation in any part of the Middle East.”

The Ambassador stated that as they had indicated before they had recently become concerned over Iran. There were many reports from British representatives that the Ala Government was not doing well. It failed to accomplish anything. It was gradually losing its control and authority throughout the country. Generally disintegration seems to have set in. The Shah seemed to be taking over many of the active government functions. Although he must be aware of the inadequate performance on the part of the present government, he did not seem alarmed. The British Government had thought at one time of coming to the United States Government with a view to considering steps which might be taken and which might have a curative effect. However, they had decided not to proceed with this for the present but were continuing to watch developments carefully.

The Under Secretary commented that the Shah obviously wished to be his own Prime Minister. It was quite possible that this was an evolutionary process during which the Shah might decide that being Prime Minister is not so much fun and return to his constitutional status.

The Ambassador said that he was interested in the Under Secretary's remarks concerning Saudi Arabia and would like to know the extent of the Communist problem. The Under Secretary replied that in large measure the oil fields were at the bottom of this problem. Because of the large scale oil operations in Saudi Arabia it was necessary to bring in people from outside Arabia. The Communists had been able to infiltrate the ranks of those being brought into the country. The Saudi Government had been ruthless in putting down such Communist activities as were noticed in the country, but we wished the Saudis to take the Communist problem throughout the Arab area more seriously.

Adverting to the Saudi [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] resources the Ambassador said that similar problems existed in the Sheikdoms. With regard to the Under Secretary's remarks concerning Kuwait, the Ambassador said that he had reported to his government the views previously expressed on this subject. He took note of the fact that the subject would be taken up again in separate channels and that he would brush up in order to be prepared for it. In this connection the Ambassador inquired as to the particulars of US fears regarding Kuwait. The Under Secretary replied that the penetration of Communists into the country through [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] unemployed intellectuals who dally with Communist ideas were potential dynamite.

“Agenda Item 1(b)—The Soviet Threat in the Middle East in War

“The US considers that Soviet objectives in war would be to destroy Western bases in the Middle East; to prevent a build-up of indigenous or Western forces in the area; to seize the outlets of the Black Sea; and to deny Middle Eastern oil to the West. With the advantage of surprise and in the absence of a strengthening of existing Middle East defenses the USSR might well have the capability of achieving all of its objectives except seizing the outlets of the Black Sea. The effects of nuclear attack would probably, however, seriously impede the Soviet effort.

“US and UK views on the Soviet threat to the Middle East in war seems to be generally in accord.

“Agenda Item 2—Political and Strategic Aims in the Middle East

“US political objectives in the Middle East are:

- a. To assure that none of the Middle Eastern states or resources fall under communist control or for any of the states to become firmly ‘neutralist’.
- b. To develop a situation giving the Middle Eastern states a feeling of confidence in their security against aggression or subversion by:
 - i. promoting internal stability and peace among the states of the area and
 - ii. encouraging, initially in the ‘Northern Tier’, the development of regional arrangements for defense against communist subversion and aggression.
- c. To bring about and maintain political and economic cooperation between all Middle Eastern states and the West; in particular to assure that Middle Eastern oil, other resources, and communications routes remain available to the West.
- d. To establish relationships assuring the continued active cooperation of the Middle Eastern states with the West in time of war.

“US military objectives in the Middle East are to secure the NATO right flank, base sites, the Turkish Straits, the Eastern Mediterranean, the Cairo-Suez-Aden area and the Persian Gulf and contiguous oil-bearing areas.

“We believe that US and UK political and military aims in the Middle East run parallel. Although it is too much to expect that we shall always see eye to eye on every issue that may arise in the area, we can and must work together to forward our common general purposes.”

The Ambassador agreed.

“Agenda Item 3—The Political Factors in the Establishment of a Defense Organization “The Baghdad Pact

“The US initiated the Northern Tier concept and encouraged the formation of the Baghdad Pact. We intend to continue to support it as the best basis for regional defense arrangements in the Middle East. We recently sent to all our missions in the area a re-statement of our position supporting the Pact and authorized the missions to use this statement in talks with local officials. We encouraged and welcome the recent Pakistani decision to accede and believe that this has served to give renewed momentum to the Pact concept. We are giving thought to an appropriate public statement at the time of Pakistan’s formal accession. We consider that Iranian adherence, which would complete the ‘Northern Tier’, would give further impetus and we hope that this may take place within the next six months to one year. The US will take such steps as it can, including a modest increase in military assistance, to encourage Iran to join but we do not intend to use pressure.”

The Ambassador said that this was very interesting and encouraging. He had had some fears that perhaps the US had not been as keen regarding Middle East defense as previously. Therefore, he was pleased that the Under Secretary had reaffirmed the previous position. Regarding Pakistan the Ambassador said he believed it would adhere to the Pact. The UK opposed the reservations which the Pakistanis proposed and believed that they were not in order. However, the UK was not having much success in convincing the Pakistanis at [on?] this point. The UK has also suggested that Pakistan not subscribe to the letter regarding the United Nations resolution on Palestine, but he believed they would do so anyway.

With regard to Iran the UK would be pleased to have the Iranians join the Pact, but they did not expect to use pressure to bring them in. He stated that the UK did not expect to enter into a military commitment to Iran and added that one could not expect the Iranians to bring any appreciable military capability to the Pact. In this connection he asked if the United States had received reports on the progress of our special training mission. The Under Secretary said that we had not, but that basically the United States was apparently more optimistic about the potentialities of the Iranian

forces than was the United Kingdom. The British Ambassador said he believed this to be the case.

Mr. Allen queried the Ambassador's statement to the effect that they would not give a special commitment to Iran under the Pact. The Ambassador pointed out that a special agreement had been made with Iraq at the time of the British accession to the Pact. He was concerned that the Iranians might also seek a commitment. The United Kingdom itself would not wish to give such a commitment. However, he could only speak for the United Kingdom in this respect, and the other Pact members are, of course, free to take such steps as they wish. His Government would like to see the Iranian Government and armed forces strengthened before they become members of the Pact. This, of course, did not mean that the United Kingdom would not welcome Iran to join the Pact if she were of a mind to do so on her own accord. The Under Secretary reiterated that the United States did not wish to press the Iranians to join the Pact.

“We believe that the US and the UK should concentrate on the completion and strengthening of the ‘Northern Tier’. Although it rests with each of the area states to decide whether or not it will accede to the Pact, we do not presently consider that the adherence of additional Arab states would be desirable until Arab-Israeli tensions have lessened. Israeli accession is, of course, out of the question in any foreseeable future. We recognize that at some later stage the adherence of Syria, Lebanon and Jordan would serve to provide lines of communication and additional base sites. We share the UK view that bases in an Egypt friendly to the West and committed to Middle East defense would be useful. We foresee, however, that for reasons of Egyptian prestige, if nothing else, Egypt's role in regional defense may have to be played outside the Baghdad Pact orbit.

“The US does not consider that French participation in the Pact would serve any useful purpose. If, however, Syria and Lebanon eventually join, it probably will be necessary to go along with French accession. It is, of course, possible that Arab emotions over the North African situation would cause Arab member states to resist French adherence. We would not favor Greek or Italian participation. At a much later stage South African participation might be considered if the other members are agreeable.”

With respect to South Africa the Ambassador said that the United Kingdom very recently concluded a new agreement with South Africa mainly concerned with the Simonstown Naval Base where the British had retained full rights. In the discussions and negotiations the British had found the South Africans very cautious with respect to extending their commitments. Presently they are primarily interested in defense arrangements in the area south of the Sahara. Eventually they might come to realize the defense of Africa lies primarily in the Middle East. In the Ambassador's opinion it is only when the South Africans arrive at this point of view that it would be useful to approach them regarding participation in a Middle East defense pact.

“The question of US adherence to the Baghdad Pact has been given the most careful consideration within the US Government. We have concluded that under existing circumstances it would not be wise for us to adhere to or otherwise formally associate ourselves with the Pact at this time, primarily because we believe such a step would adversely affect our influence in bringing about a reduction in Arab-Israeli tensions. We do not consider that this is a matter requiring immediate action on our part because we already have security arrangements with two of the Pact members, in addition to the UK, through NATO and SEATO. Furthermore, our military assistance programs to the Pact countries, and to the potential member, Iran, are clear and tangible evidence of our interest in the security of the area. We have by no means ruled out the possibility that we shall eventually accede and we shall keep this question under constant review. With the relaxation of Arab-Israeli tensions we would be prepared to adhere to the Pact and we would be willing to inform Prime Minister Nuri Said of this position at an appropriate time.”

The Under Secretary said he assumed the Ambassador had been notified of the discussion which had taken place on the last point between Mr. Macmillan and Secretary, Dulles in Paris. In response to a negative reply from the Ambassador the Under Secretary stated that the Department would send a memorandum to the Ambassador setting forth the substance of this exchange.

“As an interim measure the US will establish close liaison arrangements with the Pact Organization so that we may coordinate our plans and aid programs for the development of defensive strength in the Middle East with the plans and efforts of the other states concerned. The nature of our liaison arrangements will, of course, depend upon the type of organization created by the Pact members. We are now thinking in terms of having our Ambassador in Baghdad maintain liaison at the political level and initially our Army Attaché at the military level. Our Joint Chiefs of Staff are presently studying the question of liaison at the military level, and we will be prepared to discuss this matter in greater detail later.”

The Ambassador stated that he was very pleased that the United States would take steps to have an informal but positive liaison with the Pact after Pakistan acceded and the organization was established.

“Other Regional Pacts

“The US considers that the Arab League Collective Security Pact is wholly unsuitable as a framework for effective Middle East defense. The projected Egypt-Syria-Saudi Arabia Pact would be even worse. We have made clear to the area governments our belief that the latter pact would be non-productive. Although we still hope that it will not come to fruition, recent reports indicate that the three prospective participants are making progress in agreeing upon the terms and conditions of their association. If [1 line of source text not declassified] the Egypt-Syria-Saudi Arabia Pact is signed, we think it would be useful for the US and the UK and other Baghdad Pact members to adopt a common posture. In our view an outburst of criticism and complaint should be avoided. All of us should as far as possible refrain from public statements about the Pact; such statements as we have to make should follow the line that despite our doubts about its utility we do not intend to criticize the Pact or permit its existence to inhibit our friendly relations with the three participants.

“All of us should do what we can to direct the activities that may develop under the ESS Pact into constructive channels. As an example, the US would try to persuade King, Saud, who is showing greater awareness of the communist menace, to use Saudi influence within the scope of the Pact to

persuade the two other members to take more effective action against communist infiltration.

“Although the Turk-Pakistan Pact, which we once thought might serve as a framework for Middle East defense, has been superseded in that regard by the Baghdad Pact, the US considers that this special link between the two strongest Middle East states still has its own value particularly in the fields of cultural and other non-military relations.”

The Ambassador stated that he would not comment at this time regarding these suggestions for action should the ESS Pact come into force. His feeling was that we should not adopt any course which would give the impression that we had changed our position. This would have adverse repercussions particularly in Iraq. However, it was his view that the Pact would not materialize, principally because of the failure of the Syrians to act. The Under Secretary replied that we would, of course, be considering this matter further and would certainly consult in case the ESS Pact is signed.

“Importance of Iran

“It is clear from my comments a few minutes ago that we attach considerable importance, perhaps more than you, to Iran’s role in the ‘Northern Tier’ and in the Middle East generally. Our estimate of Iran’s importance rests largely on four considerations. First, Iran is the only country in the Middle East besides Turkey and Afghanistan that has a common frontier with the USSR, and the Russians have always found this frontier a great temptation. Second, the ‘Northern Tier’ concept cannot materialize until Iran becomes a participant in the defensive organization under the Baghdad Pact. Third, the most suitable line of defense in the Middle East lies in good part in Iran. Fourth, the availability of Iranian oil for free world markets is a very good thing for you and for us. Although its recently renewed availability created a surfeit of Middle East oil, and we in consequence have had to cope jointly with a number of problems, this surfeit is an insurance against our being held up by any of the oil producing states of the area. It is in the interest of both of us to take steps that will help

to keep Iranian oil in the market; one of those steps, in the US view, is to bring Iran into a regional defense organization. As I said earlier, we hope that Iran will accede to the Baghdad Pact within the next six to twelve months. We do not expect to use pressure to induce Iran to join.”

The Ambassador said he wished to make the point clear that the British did not rate Iran any less important than did the United States. The importance of its geographic position and its oil was fully recognized. The difference between the US and the UK views on Iran regarded what Iran was capable of doing administratively and militarily. The United Kingdom appraised the Iranian ability to take on tasks and to carry them through at a somewhat lower level than did the United States. The United Kingdom would like to be more optimistic about Iran but could not in candor be so. It was, however, very willing and anxious to do what it could to help bolster up Iran politically, administratively, economically and militarily. The United Kingdom had been somewhat alarmed at the retrogression which had taken place in these four fields in Iran. The Ambassador discussed again the recent UK reexamination made of the Iranian situation. He reiterated that they would continue to watch developments very closely and would be in touch with the United States Government in the future if things continued to worsen. The Ambassador inquired of developments in Iranian oil. The Under Secretary replied that the oil officials concerned believed that things were going fairly well. The Ambassador said that he had not received any particular news about oil recently and he assumed this to be a good sign; if developments had taken a turn for the worse he would have certainly heard of it.

“Miscellaneous

“To conclude my comments under the third agenda heading, I shall touch briefly on four points which you made in our earlier meetings.

[1 paragraph (5½ lines of source text) not declassified]

The Ambassador agreed.

“French Attitude Toward the Baghdad Pact—It is our impression that the French have recently been at least passive in their approach to the Baghdad Pact. If we had reason to believe they were resuming some of their earlier maneuvers against the Pact, we should use our best efforts to dissuade them from such tactics.”

The Ambassador said that he had the impression that the French had given up working against the Pact. [6 lines of source text not declassified]

“Jordanian Accession to the Baghdad Pact—We appreciate that there are reasons making an early Jordanian accession to the Baghdad Pact desirable, nevertheless, we believe the disadvantages in Jordanian adherence arising from Jordanian contiguity to Israel are overriding. We hope that the UK will not encourage the Jordanians to seek membership in the Pact until the Arab-Israeli situation has improved.”

The Ambassador agreed with the United States position. He pointed out that the UK view which had been expressed was that only after Pakistan and Iran had joined the Pact should the possibility of Jordanian adherence be considered. Only if the momentum of the Pact lagged and it were necessary to bolster it up again would the UK consider the possibility of Jordanian accession at an earlier date.

“Defense Arrangements with Israel—The US shares the UK view that we both should, if possible, stay away from a defense arrangement with Israel. We have no present intention to enter into such an arrangement and hope to maintain this position for a long time. We recognize, however, that it may become necessary at some stage in the development of the Arab-Israeli situation or of regional defense arrangements for either or both of us to revise our attitude.”

The Ambassador agreed.

“Agenda Item 4—Type of Organization Required Including Its Relationship to NATO

“The United States assumes that after the formal adherence of Pakistan, the fourth member of the Baghdad Pact, the permanent Ministerial Council

provided for in the Pact will be established. We also assume, with the UK, that although the Ministers might meet occasionally, the requirement of permanency would be met by the designation of deputies. We also agree that these might well be the chiefs of diplomatic missions in Baghdad plus an appropriate Iraqi official. Baghdad would seem the logical seat of the permanent council as the Pact was signed there, but we consider this a question that could well be left to the Middle Eastern members of the Organization to determine.

“In general the United States urges that the organizational arrangements be kept as loose and simple as possible. Rather than establishing a permanent military planning staff, it seems to us that it would probably be adequate to have periodic meetings of military representatives as is done in SEATO. If any Secretariat should in fact be found to be necessary it is our view that it would be desirable for it to be small.

“The United States considers that liaison between the Baghdad Pact Organization and NATO should be informal. We shall wish to keep in close touch with developments in this regard.”

The Ambassador said he had nothing to add. It was, of course, their view that the organization should be small and simple. They believed that it was necessary to have a secretariat, and they also contemplated having a small planning staff. Col. Fitzgeorge-Balfour added that although it may not be an official British view it was his own personal opinion that the SEATO model was a good one.

“Agenda Item 5—A Concept of Operations

“The US Department of Defense and Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the concept of operations set forth in the Tripartite London Military Report of last February is acceptable as a point of departure for further consideration of the nature and scope of defensive military operations in the Middle East in the event of Soviet aggression.

“Agenda Item 6—Requirements for the Development of the Operational Concept into a Realistic Plan Including the Following “(a) Command Organization for the Area

“The United States shares the UK view that it would be premature to consider the creation of a command structure under the Baghdad Pact now or in the immediate future.

“(b) Contribution Required from Middle East Countries, the United Kingdom, other Commonwealth Countries Directly Concerned and the United States “The United States considers that the Tripartite London Military Report contains a useful preliminary study of military requirements for the defense of the Middle East. We see little early prospect of meeting these requirements, particularly for defensive air and naval capabilities and for lines of communications. We hope, however, to remedy some of the existing deficiencies through our military assistance programs for Iraq and Iran. [5 lines of source text not declassified]

[1 paragraph (4 lines of source text) not declassified]

“In general we believe that the creation of the forces and facilities required for an effective defense of the Middle East against Soviet aggression would be a prolonged, difficult and expensive process. However, by continuing our present level of military assistance to the Middle East and UK assistance and sales to the area, some military strength can be developed in the Middle East. The primary objective of the US and UK military cooperation with the Middle Eastern states should in our view be to keep up their morale and while encouraging them to continue to maintain or improve their internal security, to help lay a basis for future area defenses.

“(c) Supply of Arms, Equipment and Training Facilities for Middle East States “General US Policy on Supply of Arms

“United States policy with respect to the supply of arms to Middle East states, excepting Turkey, Iran and Pakistan, is based upon the Tripartite Declaration of 1950. We have in the recent past made few and small shipments; not even Iraq has yet received substantial supplies. We are considering the possibility of meeting some Egyptian requests, primarily to dissuade Nasser from turning to the USSR for supplies. As regards Saudi Arabia we find it necessary to respond to the more urgent Saudi requests for

heavy military equipment for training purposes. We also supply other equipment for the general strengthening of its armed forces. All of this equipment is made available on a reimbursable basis. In approving military supplies for Saudi Arabia we keep in mind the problems existing with neighboring states and sheikdoms and the particular interests of the UK in the area. We do not consider that the equipment we are providing so strengthens the Saudis as to pose a threat to their neighbors.

“We have not been making arms available to Israel, and we share the UK concern at recent French deliveries of jet aircraft and tanks. We spoke rather vigorously to the French about the late model Mysteres they intended to deliver and hope that the French will hold these back. We have our own problems, however, in that if we do release some equipment to Egypt, we shall have to make some supplies available to Israel.”

Col. Fitzgeorge-Balfour said that this position seemed entirely consistent with what he had understood the United States position in the past to be. The Ambassador said that his only concern was with Saudi Arabia. While it was probably true that this equipment did not give Saudis capabilities of conducting forays against their neighbors, the neighbors didn't necessarily realize this fact. The prestige of having the equipment and display of equipment would have a bad effect on the neighboring Arab states. While understanding the reasons for our policy with regard to Saudi Arabia, the UK still remained somewhat unhappy regarding it. The Under Secretary pointed out that the Saudis had acquired the equipment on a reimbursable basis.

The Ambassador noted that the US and the UK had similar views with regard to Israel and Egypt. The UK had recently been reviewing the function of NEACC and with one exception felt that no changes should be made. In their view it did not seem necessary to request committee approval for every bullet shipped. This had been the case in the past and the Ambassador believed it was useful to divide military equipment into two types, important items and unimportant items. Only the important items in his view should be submitted to the NEACC for its consideration. The UK was not prepared at this time to make a formal proposal to this effect, but would probably do so in due course.

“US Policy on Offshore Procurement

“I believe I should preface my more detailed comments on United States offshore procurement with respect to Iraq and Pakistan with a general and frank statement. We have made provision for procuring in the UK as much equipment for these programs as is feasible within the limitations upon us and the considerations by which we must be guided. However, we realize that this has not given you full satisfaction, and that we have not been in a position to procure in the UK all the items which you would wish. We do, however, wish and intend to cooperate with you just as far as we can.

“Iraq

“In formulating and administering our military aid program for Iraq, we have sought to coordinate our activities with UK-Iraq arrangements, to avoid dislocation of the pre-existing re-equipment and expansion plans of the Iraqi forces and to minimize logistic difficulties. In determining those items to be offshore procured in the UK we have been governed by the following considerations:

- a. The desirability of maintaining the habitual sources of supply.
- b. Specific requests for UK military equipment to meet known requirements.
- c. The fact that, in some cases, the ends of the program can best be served by the purchase of UK equipment.
- d. The limitations on offshore procurement contained in the pertinent Mutual Security Legislation of 1954.

“The United States intends to continue to be governed by these considerations with regard to further offshore procurement in the UK for Iraq. Under the existing program in addition to the contract for 75 120 mm recoilless rifles valued at \$704,000, of which 12 have already been shipped, the US has now let contracts in the UK amounting to \$3,013,000. Two items, 2,000 rounds of high explosive 120 mm shells and 2,000 120 mm shells, the UK has been unable to provide. Another item of 9,000 25-

pounder shells is yet to be let. This offshore procurement has been taken out of a total program of \$10.9 millions for Iraq and includes scout cars, tank recovery vehicles, fire direction equipment, guns, ammunition, and communications and engineering equipment.

“We believe that the policy we have been following is in consonance with the US-UK Memorandum of Understanding of February 1954 as we understand it. Although that Memorandum is technically no longer in effect, as it was based on the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930 since superseded, we intend to continue our current policy.

“We are certain that the Iraqis are aware that the US is coordinating its military aid program with the UK. Because of this we doubt the utility of now stating explicitly what the Iraqis already know implicitly. We are, nevertheless, agreeable to telling the Iraqi Government, if the UK so desires, that the US and UK do coordinate their military programs for Iraq. [2 lines of source text not declassified]”

The Ambassador noted Mr. Hoover’s remarks with gratification. He would like to consult London regarding this matter and take it up again later.

“You discussed in our earlier meeting the Iraqi request for Centurion tanks and proposed that these be provided through OSP. Inasmuch as this matter was raised at a high level during the Geneva Conference, and that specific proposals are now under consideration by our respective Governments, I would not propose that we discuss it further at this point.”

The Ambassador agreed.

“Pakistan

“Our program of military assistance for Pakistan is designed to help equip 4 divisions, 3 armored brigades, 4 fighter squadrons and to supply two mine sweepers and equipment to modernize and maintain existing naval establishments. We have estimated the total cost of such a program at roughly \$170 million. Our initial annual military assistance program amounted to roughly \$50 million of which \$39 million is for military equipment and \$11 million for military support costs. In general, the items

being furnished under the program are light tanks, light artillery, motor transport, small arms and artillery ammunition, signal equipment, radar, fighter bomber jet aircraft and naval equipment. Out of the current program of \$2,018,000 originally planned for OSP for the Pakistani Navy \$1.5 millions has been contracted for in the UK. Two hundred thousand dollars is to be supplied from continental US sources in order to expedite delivery and due to changes in equipment required. Of \$544,000 programmed for OSP for Army matériel, radar and directors [*detectors?*] originally scheduled for procurement in the UK at a figure of \$515,000 were cancelled because of excesses of these items developed in UK due to the cancellation of your AAA Command. Pakistan will be supplied from these excesses generated under existing contracts or from recapture of delivered items in the UK. Ammunition, programmed at \$29,000 was purchased for \$21,000.

“In determining items to be offshore procured for Pakistan we are guided by the same considerations as in the case of Iraq. We are fully cognizant of the importance to us as well as to you of the Commonwealth link between the UK and Pakistan, and we wish to see existing close relations between the UK and Pakistani armed forces maintained.

“I was disturbed by your reports of friction between US and UK military people in Pakistan and we have reminded our missions in both Pakistan and Iraq of standing instructions that emphasize the necessity of close US-UK cooperation and the dangers of permitting the local people to play one of us off against the other. This is a problem which we both should keep under continuing review and if necessary inform each other of unsatisfactory developments.”

The Ambassador said that he was extremely grateful for our statement and he would call this to the attention of the Foreign Office. He was certain that the UK would reciprocate in this respect.

With regard to offshore procurement the Ambassador said that he was not sure that he had jotted down the entirety of the Under Secretary's remarks due to their detailed nature. He requested that a member of his staff be permitted to call at the Department and obtain a precise statement regarding this section. The Under Secretary said that this would be agreeable.

“(d) Political and Financial Aspects of Infrastructure and Stockpiling

“The United States is fully aware of the political and financial difficulties of making adequate provision for infrastructure, stockpiling and lines of communication in the Middle East. While we see no immediate prospect of substantial progress in solving these problems our aid programs in Iraq and Iran will be of some help.

“Agenda Item 7—The Program for Meeting These Requirements

“I have already said that we consider it unrealistic to anticipate the fulfillment of the total military requirements of an effective Middle East defense in the immediate future. The most likely area of relative progress is in the strengthening of indigenous ground forces. We would hope that the UK might find ways and means of doing more to this end in the area. We shall, of course, continue our efforts in the ‘Northern Tier’ countries.

“Pending the development of an effective defense structure in the Middle East, we may be able as an initial step, as I have suggested earlier, to stimulate in the area a greater realization of the dangers of communist infiltration and subversion and a greater will to counter these dangers in addition to laying the basis for future defenses. Infiltration and subversion are evidently more immediate threats than communist military aggression, and it is in the interest of both the US and the UK to do everything practicable to reduce these threats. In the countries where we have Military Assistance Programs, one of our objectives has been to foster a capability to meet internal subversion. In addition to what the US will continue to facilitate in this way, we believe the new organization might also profitably devote attention to other aspects of combatting the internal security problems.

“We have been encouraged by the progress that is being made within SEATO to focus the attention of the Southeast Asian states on the problem of subversion, and we would hope that the Baghdad Pact organization could be induced to include this problem in its terms of reference. As we see it, the types of assistance that the Pact members might render one another and

which might usefully be discussed in the Permanent Council or in some appropriate body include the following:

1. The exchange of information on communist personalities and communist subversive activities and propaganda within the 'Northern Tier' states;
2. Mutual assistance in the control of the movement of communist agents and personalities, lines of communication, or of communist propaganda materials;
3. Exchange of information on the kinds of measures that have proved effective against communist subversion;
4. Assistance in the development and strengthening of local security forces which could include (a) help in the training and indoctrination of such forces, and (b) the exchange of views and experience as to how they may be used in combatting communism;
5. Exploration of the possibility of joint political action, supported by official statements, propaganda, and other activities, to counter subversive political movements against one or more of the signatory powers, especially movements that are based outside of the territory of the nation at which it is directed."

The Ambassador said that he had reported the Under Secretary's views as presented at our first meeting regarding combatting subversion in the Middle East. As yet he had had no response from London. He was grateful, however, for these specific suggestions and his government would, of course, consider submitting them to the Council after its formation.

The Ambassador said that he was greatly encouraged by these talks. In general it appeared to him that in all issues the US and the UK see things very much the same way. There were, of course, some differences as to points of approach, but if there were no differences, it would be unhealthy. He very much appreciated the carefully prepared views which had been presented. If there were specific subjects which needed further discussion

he suggested that we could meet later to do so. He noted that separate channels would be used to discuss Kuwait and offshore procurement of Centurion tanks for Iraq. The Under Secretary said that he believed the Secretary had discussed the question of Centurion tanks with the Ambassador. The Ambassador replied that the Secretary had but it had been decided to hold the matter in abeyance and he had not reported the discussion to London.

Mr. Allen said apparently the US thought of the Baghdad Pact more along the lines of a defense organization than the UK. Ambassador Makins replied that it was, of course, a regional organization, but special agreements were necessary to put teeth into it. The UK has already made special agreement with Iraq but does not contemplate a special agreement with Iran. If after the Iranians had joined the Pact or became stronger the UK would, of course, take another look at this problem. Mr. Allen said he was afraid that from the public point of view it would appear that Iran had entered into a defense arrangement with concomitant guarantees when in fact there would be no guarantees. Ambassador Makins replied that the overtones were certainly those of a guarantee. The Pact itself was the first step in making security arrangements. Once it came into effect pressures would build up to conclude special agreements and they would come in due course. Mr. Allen asked if the Ambassador thought Iran would be willing to join the Pact without a commitment. The Ambassador replied that this was one of the problems that gave the British pause. From a military point of view Iranian participation in the Pact would, in effect, add considerable liabilities to the Pact without compensating assets. The Iranians could not contribute effective forces to area defenses at this time and the United Kingdom was unable to increase its own military forces. On the other hand there are, of course, considerable political benefits to be obtained by Iranian membership in the Pact. Therefore, the British position has been that while welcoming Iranian membership they have not pressed the point and do not foresee giving a special commitment at this time.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/8–1155. Top Secret. Drafted by Dixon.

² The portions in quotation marks are from a talking paper sent under cover of a memorandum from, Allen to Hoover, August 4. (*Ibid.*, 780.5/8–455)

61. Letter From the Secretary of State to the British Ambassador (Makins)¹

Washington, August 19, 1955.

DEAR MR. AMBASSADOR: You will recall our previous conversations and your talks with Mr. Hoover regarding the question of United States adherence to the Baghdad Pact. I also discussed this matter with Mr. Macmillan in Paris.²

It has been my thought that it was not feasible for the United States to join the Baghdad Pact until there was a relaxation of tension between the Arab states and Israel.³ At that time we would be disposed to seek formal adherence. In the meanwhile, the Arab states in the area know of our support for the Baghdad Pact and we will continue to make this support known to them. We are also prepared to establish close liaison arrangements with the Baghdad Pact organization when it is set up.

Because of Prime Minister Eden's interest in this matter I would appreciate your informing him of these views.

Sincerely yours,

John Foster Dulles⁴

¹ Source: Department of State, S/S-NEA Files: Lot 61 D 417. Top Secret. Drafted by Wilkins.

² During talks in Paris before the opening of the Geneva Conference, Secretary Dulles had told Macmillan on July 14 that the United States could indicate to Iraq that the United States could not join the Baghdad Pact or make any pact with Arab States until the Arab-Israeli question was settled. If a settlement could be achieved, Dulles maintained, the United States would be prepared to join the Pact. See the memorandum of conversation, [vol. XIV, p. 295](#).

³ In an earlier draft of the letter, filed with the source text, the following two sentences appeared at this point: "At the present moment it seems to us that current treaty arrangements between the United States and some of the

states of the area are adequate. United States adherence does not therefore seem urgent.” Secretary Dulles removed the two sentences and inserted in their place the sentence beginning “At that time”.

⁴ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

62. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan¹

Washington, September 8, 1955—6:29 p.m.

108. Dept has noted certain misconceptions re relationship Secretary Aug 26 statement² to area defense arrangements. To extent you believe desirable, you may present orally and informally to govt officials clarification on following lines: In our view Secretary's statement on Arab-Israel problem and efforts create defense arrangements in no way conflict. Northern tier concept intended meet threat aggression from outside area while Secretary's statement directed at intra-area problem. Only relationship derives from fact détente on Arab-Israel problem would greatly facilitate creation on sound basis defense structure against outside aggression.

Treaty engagements mentioned by Secretary would cover only attempts by Israel or Arab states to alter by force permanent boundaries agreed to by Israel and Arab states. Treaty would not apply to aggression from outside area and therefore would not conflict with area defense arrangements built around Turk-Iraq Pact. We do not contemplate treaty including both Israel and Arab states but envisage one treaty between guaranteeing powers and Israel and separate treaty or treaties between guaranteeing powers and one or more Arab states. Exact nature of treaties would be worked out of course in discussions with interested states.

Secretary's statement does not indicate any weakening US support for Turk-Iraq Pact. Our policy this regard remains as stated Deptel 24 to Amman.³

Hoover

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/9-855. Secret. Drafted by Burdett and approved by Jernegan who signed for Hoover. Also sent to Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Jidda, Karachi, Tripoli, Paris, and Tel Aviv; repeated to London, Ankara, and Tehran.

² Reference is to Dulles' address concerning the Arab-Israeli dispute, delivered on August 26; for text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, September 5, 1955, pp. 378–380.

³ Printed as telegram 32 to Baghdad, [Document 58](#).

63. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State¹

Cairo, September 11, 1955—1 p.m.

440. When I last saw Fawzi he said he wanted to talk about possible correlation of the Turk-Iraqi Pact and the rest of the Middle East. He stated that present situation had resulted in a kind of paralysis to Arab unity and understanding. It was difficult to foresee how Arab cooperation and coordination could ever be fruitful under present circumstances. Could they, for instance, ever discuss really important matters such as military coordination with Iraq sitting at the table? Certainly every other member of the Arab States would have the feeling that Iraq's alliance with Turkey meant that family planning by the Arabs would be immediately available to Turkey and thence probably to Israel. Replied I thought he overestimated the closeness of relations in chain he had referred to. He said nevertheless this type of psychological barrier had been created and it difficult to see how primary goal of getting Egypt and Iraq, and also Turkey, back into cooperation could be achieved unless some steps were taken.

Fawzi said objective was to take steps that would help open door to new Arab cooperation which would include Iraq—steps which would neither vitiate what had been accomplished in northern tier setup so far nor the accomplishment its ultimate objective. His suggestion was that the membership in the Turk-Iraqi Pact be “frozen” for time being. We should instead turn our attention to a build up of good will and strength in entire Middle East.

Assuming he referring to Government of Egypt position that no additional Arab States should join Turk-Iraqi Pact, I reminded him that he knew our position this regard. He replied that this was not what he had in mind. He was thinking of a delay in any additional state joining as one more adherent would bring into effect Council of Ministers organization. He felt that once this had happened it would be far harder to work out something satisfactory for the whole Middle East and for the long run. I replied that surely he would realize it impossible for U.S. to take any negative act towards build

up of southern tier. He replied he did not have that in mind but merely that we should “do nothing” for a time as regards urging Iran and Pakistan to join. I replied that even an attitude of indifference on the part of the U.S. might have the same effect as taking a negative stand because such things demand a sense of momentum, which if halted, perhaps could not be regenerated. Fawzi questioned that this was the case and thought we could do other things to indicate our continued interest in strength and security of northern states.

I told Fawzi it seemed to me he was asking that we hesitate in strengthening the north where creation of such strength was possible in exchange for rather vague assurances regarding the future in an area where such a build up of strength was most difficult if not impossible due to the Arab-Israeli conflict. His reply was two-fold. Firstly, he did not suggest we hesitate in strengthening the north. On the contrary, he would recommend, as a sign of our continuing interest, an increase of military equipment in the north if that were possible for us to do. Secondly, he stated he was including the concept of an Arab-Israeli settlement in his thinking which would produce a situation whereby southern states could be strengthened and even Israel if we felt this desirable. After an Arab-Israeli settlement it should then be possible to proceed with “further development” of defensive organization in the Middle East which would include entire area. I remarked he was now getting a lot closer to something that could be fruitfully discussed and we would give his remarks on this subject every consideration. Fawzi replied that Nasser would wish to talk to me soon on further development of these ideas.

My comments in immediately following message.

Byroade

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 786.00/9–1155. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution; Noforn. Repeated to London, Tel Aviv, Beirut, Damascus, Amman, Baghdad, and Jidda.

64. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State¹

Cairo, September 11, 1955—5 p.m.

441. In one point in conversation with Fawzi (Embassy telegram 440)² I made a side remark that Soviets would probably be greatly surprised if they knew he and I were talking about “freezing”, for a time, Turk-Iraqi pact. He replied to the contrary, they would be displeased if they knew he and I discussing way to organize entire Middle East, settle Arab-Israeli conflict, do away with dangerous friction among states of area, continuation of build-up of strength in North and attaining general atmosphere allowing for build-up of strength and confidence in rest of area so as to effectively “block them off” from Middle East. Did not say so but I thought this a very telling reply.

Have been trying to analyze Fawzi’s remarks now for some days as it seems to me they may open up possible new avenues of approach. What follows is somewhat speculative as to what Fawzi actually had in mind.

(A) An Arab-Israeli settlement which Egypt is in position to advance by valuable assistance or block by uncompromising negativism may be of more immediate interest to US than completion and expansion of Northern Tier. At this particular time when both Egypt and US would welcome a settlement but when US is under greater pressure to take positive steps in coming months Egypt could anticipate that, in return for its cooperation, it would receive the most favorable consideration from US. Against this general background he might visualize events taking somewhat the following form:

(B) We would assure Egypt that although we could take no positive steps keep other countries from joining Turk-Iraqi-British Pact we would do nothing to press for formal completion of Northern Tier at this time. (Actually military coordination involving Iran and Pakistan could, however, continue or increase.)

Our position would, however, be subject to review if concrete progress not made in very near future in direction of Arab-Israeli settlement. Egypt for her part must recognize delicacy such a position on part of US re states in north and that there was very little time move forward toward settlement.

(C) In lull created above, Egypt would take lead on Arab-Israeli settlement.

(D) Egypt would drop concept of ESS Pact and Arab States to reorganize themselves to participate in defense of area as a bloc. Eventual treaty arrangements would be made to include Turkey, Iran, Pakistan and all Arab States, with perhaps Israel associated in some way. Egypt to realize this concept of Arab participation impossible without prior Arab-Israeli settlement.

For above approach to be successful it is obvious that both Israel and Arabs must be prepared to accept reasonable settlement of boundaries question. This problem in essence resolves itself into question of Negev, as otherwise we and Egypt at least could agree on essentials of settlement. We must therefore, I think, give the fullest consideration as to what, given the stake involved, should be our position on this question. Am turning more and more to thought that Elath worthless to Israel in hostile Arab world and she would do well give up southern half of Negev in exchange for over-all settlement plus some form of international guarantee on Suez.

I would expect there would be sharp reactions to some of above yet believe this line of thought (with of course possible variations thereof) deserves consideration. If Egypt does in fact become specific along these lines we would have to be very careful not to get drawn into trap involving long delay and actual harm to Northern Tier setup if Arab-Israeli settlement does not come along readily. Certainly, however, the Arab-Israeli situation needs to be resolved without delay and I presume we can pay considerably for such settlement. Perhaps upon analysis the price we would pay in shift of emphasis of our policy toward the Middle East would not be too great. Turkey, I would presume, would strongly object. Have no feel for situation in Iran but if Shah's past philosophies prevail it not unlikely he would welcome some delay, with increased military equipment, and join

subsequently in new arrangements to cover all of Middle East. Pakistan, Fawzi stated, not too eager under present conditions and with new government, and might also welcome delay. This am unable to assess (but have feeling he had in mind they might talk to Pakistan if we could agree on some over-all approach). Iraq, I would presume, would be a special problem which others can assess far better. Perhaps her Ambassador here not representative but I am certain he would favor moves which would get Iraq and Egypt back in step. While this may be difficult given Nasser's antipathy for Nuri Said, it should be possible to find some way whereby Iraq could be given special position in view of her advanced geographical location.

Several reasons may be advanced as to why we chose some two or three years ago to organize defense of Middle East exclusively through Northern Tier approach (which decision under all conditions then prevailing still seems to me to have been correct). One factor, i.e., Suez base dispute, has now been removed. The other and certainly predominant reason was presence of Arab-Israeli situation. It may be time now consider delaying (and perhaps modifying) somewhat our present plans for completion Northern Tier, if by so doing we can be certain of rapid movement toward Arab-Israeli settlement and establishment of over-all organization of somewhat different type subsequent thereto.

Nasser is returning Cairo within day or two and Fawzi and others say he eager have long talk with me. I may then be able to find out how much of my speculation as to Egypt's thoughts is correct. Will, of course, tell Nasser I have no authority without consulting Department to express views of US Government, if he does follow lines somewhat as above.

This and preceding message labelled Noform in view of speculative nature of contents. For London Embassy: For same reason have not consulted Trevelyan³ but will do so if either Nasser or Fawzi present their ideas in more concrete fashion.⁴

Byroade

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 786.00/9-1155. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution; Noform. Repeated to London, Tel Aviv, Beirut,

Damascus, Amman, Baghdad, and Jidda.

² [Supra](#).

³ Sir Humphrey Trevelyan, British Ambassador to Egypt.

⁴ The Department of State responded to telegrams 440 and 441 in telegram 515 to Cairo, September 15, printed in [vol. XIV, p. 471](#).

65. Editorial Note

On September 23, the Government of Pakistan formally adhered to the Turkish-Iraqi Pact. The following day the Department of State issued a press release which reads in part as follows:

“The United States has continually been in sympathy with the desire of these nations to provide for their legitimate self-defense through a collective arrangement within the framework of the United Nations. In the view of the United States such an arrangement, particularly between the ‘Northern Tier’ nations of the Middle East, contains the elements needed for an effective area defense structure.

“The United States welcomes Pakistan’s adherence to the pact which will facilitate the cooperation of these nations for their mutual benefit and common defense.” (Department of State *Bulletin*, October 3, 1955, page 534)

Pakistan had announced its intention to adhere to the Pact on July 1.

66. Memorandum of Discussion at the 260th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, October 6, 1955, 10 a.m.¹

Washington, October 6, 1955, 10 a.m.

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and a report by Sherman Adams concerning the President's health and plans for future interviews by government officials with the President; and a briefing by the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, Lieutenant General C.P. Cabell, concerning significant developments affecting United States security. The portion of Cabell's briefing covering the Soviet-Egyptian arms deal is printed in [volume XIV, p. 553](#). Vice President Nixon presided at the meeting.]

2. *The Situation in the Middle East* (NSC 5428;² NSC Action No. 1394-b³)
Mr. Dillon Anderson said that the next agenda item provided an opportunity for any member of the Council to bring before it for discussion items which were not normally placed on the NSC agenda but which were discussed directly between the Council member and the President. He had had no advance notice on such an agenda item but members were free to raise such problems at this point.

At the invitation of the Vice President the Secretary of State said that he wished to discuss the recent arms agreement and the possible agreement on economic assistance entered into between the U.S.S.R. and Egypt. This maneuver had already had strong repercussions. In the first place, the government of Iran has informed us that it is prepared to join the Baghdad Pact if the United States so desires and if the United States will agree to bolster the military and the economic position of Iran. The Iranians wanted an answer to this question in a couple of days.

Secretary Dulles said that he was not inclined to give the Iranians the indications of U.S. support that they wanted. This was so primarily because Secretary Dulles was not sure that we had either the money or the matériel to provide such support. More importantly, however, he was inclined to

reject the request because there was genuine concern on the part of the Soviet government as to the direction of future relations between Iran and the Western Powers. Anything which we might now do which seemed to indicate that Iran was to be used as a military base would produce a strong reaction from the Soviet Union. We still have great hopes that the new relationship between the U.S.S.R. and Egypt can be held to a minimum of significance. Such hopes would be abruptly ended if we should urge Iran to join the Baghdad Pact.

A Soviet approach similar to that made to Egypt had now been made to Saudi Arabia. As a direct result of this approach, the Saudi Arabian Ambassador had just come up to see Secretary Dulles with a request for additional U.S. arms to be supplied to his government under the existing reimbursable contract. Secretary Dulles had told the Ambassador that he favored this additional request in principle but could not at this time pass on the details. Secretary Dulles added that he believed it to be of the greatest importance to avoid a situation in which the Saudi Arabians could say that they had tried to buy arms from the U.S. and failing in that effort, had been obliged to turn to the U.S.S.R.

On the occasion of the same visit the Saudi Arabian Ambassador had raised the question of grant aid to Saudi Arabia by the United States. In response, Secretary Dulles had pointed out that the United States had already offered grant aid to Saudi Arabia but that this had been refused because of Saudi Arabia's unwillingness to fulfill the conditions which Congress had placed on such grant aid. In reply the Ambassador had stated that his government would renew the request for grant aid and would study once again the problem of compliance with the requirements laid down by Congress.

Secretary Dulles pointed out that as a matter of fact, Saudi Arabia was in no need of any kind of economic assistance from the United States. Saudi Arabia had plenty of resources which were expended very foolishly by its government. For that matter, it had plenty of ready money to buy all the armaments which it believed it needed.

Finally, said Secretary Dulles, the government of Iraq which, he pointed out, was the most pro-Western of the Arab States and which was already a member of the Baghdad Pact, had been telling this government that in view

of the developments in Egypt, the United States would be well advised to divert to Iraq some of the assistance which it had programmed for Egypt. Moreover, Iraq was arguing that it should be permitted by the United States to interfere in the situation within Syria. Secretary Dulles pointed out that it was a long-cherished ambition of Iraq to absorb Syria. The Iraqis were now informing us that this was a good time to take this step and they were asking us to permit them a free hand to do so.

Secretary Dulles said that he was not disposed to accede to the Iraqi request. While the United States was, of course, concerned about Communist influence in the government of Syria, if Iraq actually moved on Syria it would cause serious trouble throughout the entire Middle East. For example, Israel would be greatly exercised since the absorption of Syria by Iraq would give Iraq a common boundary with Israel. Moreover, if we permitted Iraq to absorb Syria, our entire policy of military assistance to the Middle Eastern states would no longer be defensive as we intended it to be. Finally, Saudi Arabia feels that it has a vested interest in preventing any union between Iraq and Syria. Accordingly, any United States permission to Iraq to move against Syria would gravely affect existing relations between the United States and Saudi Arabia and would have an adverse effect on United States military bases in Saudi Arabia.

For all these reasons Secretary Dulles repeated that he was disposed to give a negative reply to Iraq's request for a free hand in Syria just as he was disposed to give a negative reply to the request of Iran that the United States approve Iran's announcement of entry into the Baghdad Pact. On the other hand, he was still disposed to acquiesce in the request of Saudi Arabia so that there could be no possible pretext for Saudi Arabia to seek arms and assistance from the Soviet Union. Secretary Dulles said, however, that he would be glad to have the views of the members of the Council on his proposed decisions.

Secretary Humphrey said that he had talked with the Finance Minister of Iran during his recent visit to Istanbul and believed the Minister to be both capable and reliable. As outlined to him, the financial program for Iran seemed to be well thought-out. On the other hand, Secretary Humphrey felt he should warn that each of these Middle Eastern states watched all the

others like a hawk. Every time the United States undertook to provide anything to one country, all the others expected at least as much U.S. assistance. For example, the Iranians realize that we have done a lot to help the Turks. If, therefore, we go on to provide the Turks with the additional assistance of a 300 million dollar loan, we can anticipate repercussions in Iran. Secretary Humphrey concluded by expressing his approval of the decisions on Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia proposed by Secretary Dulles.

Secretary Dulles emphasized to the National Security Council his conviction that the United States must find more money and resources to devote to its objectives in the Middle East than we had figured hitherto. Accordingly, he hoped that Secretary Wilson and the Joint Chiefs of Staff would carefully look over the situation and see where we could “loosen up”.

Referring to Secretary Dulles’ proposed answer to Iran’s request for our attitude on its joining the Baghdad Pact, Secretary Wilson inquired whether in the recent past the United States had not been most anxious to induce Iran to join the Baghdad Pact. Secretary Dulles replied that this was indeed the case and we would be willing to have Iran join the Pact this very day if the Defense Department would come across with the military supplies that the Iranians desire and that the Iranians will probably need to meet the increased danger to Iran which would result from its accession to the Baghdad Pact. Secretary Wilson said that he had yet another point. Admiral Radford had referred a while ago to the advantages which their school building program had conferred on the Communist Party of Indonesia. Would this not suggest that the United States ought to do something additional to strengthen Iran’s internal stability?

Admiral Radford informed the Council that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were very much concerned about the situation throughout the entire Middle East. In addition to the points already covered, he indicated that Pakistan also was eager for additional United States assistance and is at the moment full of recriminations against the United States for failing to supply more aid. Accordingly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were now faced squarely with the problem of finding additional financing for Pakistan. If we do attempt to find such additional financing, we shall probably have to cut aid programs

elsewhere in the world. Admiral Radford offered the opinion that our general aid program to Iran consisted at the moment of about all that the Iranian military forces could effectively absorb. To step up military assistance to the Iranian armed forces would not accomplish very much in a practical way to increase Iran's military capabilities. The British, Admiral Radford pointed out, were extremely skeptical of Iran's overall military capabilities and were much more inclined to argue that we should build up Iraq. The Turks, in turn, are also seeking additional United States support in order to build up Turkish forces which could be useful in the defense of the Middle East as a whole.

Secretary Wilson advised that we had best take a very good look at what we can do to increase assistance to the Middle East area as a whole. Apropos of Secretary Wilson's comment, Governor Stassen asked why it might not be possible to cut the forces level of the ROK Army from 20 divisions to perhaps 14 and to use the saving thus obtained to increase military assistance to the nations of the Middle East. Admiral Radford replied that such a proposal was easier said than done and that the almost certain result would be the loss of South Korea to the West. Governor Stassen replied by stating his understanding that General Taylor had actually recommended a cut in the strength of the ROK Army. He added that he understood furthermore that the Chinese Communists had withdrawn very large numbers of their forces from North Korea and adjacent areas.

General Cabell warned that despite the withdrawal of some Chinese Communist divisions, very strong Chinese Communist forces remained in and near Korea.

Admiral Radford stated that in point of fact the South Koreans, far from wanting to cut their forces, would like to go up to 36 divisions. In our recent negotiations we managed to convince the ROK Government to maintain existing levels of 20 divisions. Admiral Radford added that he personally knew nothing whatever of any recommendations either from General Taylor or from General Lemnitzer to reduce the current number of ROK divisions.

Governor Stassen said that nevertheless he believed that the relative danger to South Korea at the present time was much less than the danger to Iran

posed by the Soviet Union. Admiral Radford argued that the reverse was correct and that South Korea was actually in much greater danger than Iran.

Secretary Wilson said that what bothered him was the fact that such large untapped oil reserves existed in the Middle East area; from the point of view of natural resources Korea was no asset to the United States or to the Free World.

[Here follows further discussion of the feasibility of a reduction of South Korean forces.]

Returning to the situation in the Middle East, Secretary Dulles pointed out that in the course of the last two weeks the Soviet Union had in effect opened up a new front in the Middle East. It seemed obvious to Secretary Dulles that we could not fight the Soviet Union on this political front with the existing resources programmed for the Middle East. Accordingly, even though our arms and our military assistance to the Middle Eastern states could not be sufficient to enable these states to halt a Russian invasion, U.S. arms and assistance could have immense political importance in the area.

Admiral Radford agreed with Secretary Dulles that the United States would have to step up the level of its assistance to the nations of the Middle East. He repeated his view that the military assistance program to Iran was satisfactory but admitted that more help was required for Pakistan for example. He referred to his belief that in military qualities the Paks were equal to or better than the Turks. He said that he wished to make the additional point that if hostilities were to break out in the near future between the Israelis and the Arabs, the National Security Council would be obliged to consider what such an event would mean in terms of additional demands on existing U.S. military resources.

With reference to Admiral Radford's last point, Secretary Dulles stated that he believed it quite possible that the Israelis would launch a preventive war against Egypt. He then referred to the courses of action in the policy paper (NSC 5428) on the Middle East which referred specifically to what the United States would do in the event of hostilities between Israel and the Arab States. He explained that he believed that these particular courses of

action were now outmoded and that he did not wish to be bound by their provisions.

The Vice President said that he wished to put a direct question to the Secretary of State. Was his primary reason for saying “no” to the Iranian inquiry about joining the Baghdad Pact based on lack of financial resources to support Iran? Secretary Dulles explained again that financing was not the primary factor. The primary factor was the overall political question; namely, whether United States policy in the Middle East should be directed toward an attempt to insulate the new Soviet-Egyptian relationship or whether United States objectives would be served by seeming to enhance the significance of the Soviet-Egyptian deal by a major counter-move in Iran. The problem is complicated, moreover, by the lack of adequate “policy resources” to carry out this kind of contest with the Soviet Bloc in this part of the world. Secretary Dulles went on to state that he had warned Molotov of the dangers inherent in the Soviet arms deal with Egypt. He did not know as yet what would be the outcome of this warning to Molotov. The Soviets had replied by stating that their deal with Egypt had been a purely commercial transaction with no political overtones. It was barely so, accordingly, [*sic*] that we might succeed in holding down the Soviet-Egyptian maneuver to the status of a “one shot affair” and that the Soviet-Egyptian deal might actually result in no significant alteration of the balance of power between Israel and the Arab States. However, if we now undertook to tie Iran into a firm military alliance with the Western Powers, if we tried to set up a counter-front in the Middle East, all our hopes of guiding the Soviet-Egyptian transaction would be destroyed.

Seeming to agree with Secretary Dulles, Secretary Humphrey added that of course we could not confine ourselves to aiding Iran alone. If we are prepared to aid Iran, we must be prepared to aid all the other countries of the Middle East.

Secretary Wilson professed to be still much bewildered. Why had we been for so long so eager to get Iran into the Baghdad Pact and now that she was prepared to join, we are opposing the move? Shouldn't we rather be estimating the minimum cost, by way of U.S. assistance necessary to induce Iran to accept membership in the Baghdad Pact?

In response to Secretary Wilson's argument, Secretary Dulles again briefly summarized the political issues which counselled against Iran's accession at this time to the Baghdad Pact. In sum, he said he did not think it wise for the United States to urge Iran to take this move which would amount to casting the die—at least until we can ascertain whether our present pressures on the Soviet Union may not cause the Soviet Union to slow up its campaign to acquire additional influence in the Middle East. Secretary Wilson answered that we should certainly try to keep the negotiations with Iran in the “talking stage” for, after all, it was an important part of our long-range policy in the Middle East to induce Iran to join the Northern Tier Group of States. Secretary Dulles replied that we would certainly not discard the idea of Iran's joining in the Baghdad Pact. He warned, however, that if we do not now ask Iran to join the Baghdad Pact, another opportunity to do so may not be forthcoming for perhaps six months.

Secretary Wilson subsequently expressed another possibility. Would it be possible to increase the level of U.S. economic assistance to Iran? Would such a move also annoy and worry the Russians? Secretary Dulles doubted that it would. The Soviets were not particularly exercised about our economic aid or even our military assistance to Iran. What worried them was the possibility that Iran would join in a military pact which they regarded as a threat to their own security.

Admiral Radford said that it was his understanding that Iran was on the point of joining the Baghdad Pact whether or not it got further U.S. assurances for military assistance. Secretary Dulles replied that it was perfectly O.K. if the Iranians elected to join the Baghdad Pact on their own but he very much doubted that they would do so in the absence of a further quid pro quo from the United States.

The Vice President asked Secretary Dulles whether the time had now come for a thorough re-examination of U.S. policy in the Middle East. Secretary Dulles agreed that the time for such re-examination had come as did Admiral Radford who pointed out that the British were pushing us very hard to build up the armed forces of the Middle Eastern states. Of course, added Admiral Radford, largely at our expense. Secretary Dulles said that

undoubtedly we would have to respond to this appeal and help the Middle Eastern states to build up their armed forces.

Dr. Flemming inquired whether the situation was not one which called for an interim policy paper both on Iran and on the Middle East in general. Mr. Dillon Anderson reminded the Council that something like an interim policy paper was done with respect to Austria last spring. He furthermore informed the Council of his conversation recently with Secretary Dulles⁴ and the latter's feeling that a revision of NSC 5428 would presumably be in order. Finally, he indicated that the last time the National Security Council had considered the situation in the Middle East, it had decided to leave up to the Secretary of State the determination of the time when it would be appropriate to undertake a review and re-examination of NSC 5428 (NSC Action No. 1394-b). Mr. Anderson summed up by saying that it was his understanding that Secretary Dulles was now indicating that the time had come to review the U.S. policy paper on the Middle East either on an interim or on a broader basis.

Secretary Dulles stated that events were moving so fast in this area that he was finding himself obliged to make decisions and that he would prefer to make these decisions with more guidance than it might be possible to get from the Planning Board and the National Security Council in the time permitted. Over and beyond these urgent considerations, there was every good reason to review our basic policy toward the Middle East at the present time. Secretary Dulles again commented on the specific courses of action which, according to NSC 5428, the United States was supposed to take in the event of hostilities between Israel and the Arab States. As he looked over these courses of action, which ultimately included the possibility of physical intervention, he did not find them very attractive.

Dr. Flemming again expressed the opinion that the situation seemed to call for an interim policy paper having top priority in the Planning Board's schedule. Admiral Radford added that the Joint Chiefs of Staff would also appreciate having a firmer basis on which to plan for the contingency of Israeli-Egyptian hostilities. Things could happen very fast in this area and the main point was that the United States should be ready to stop the fighting.

Governor Stassen wondered whether a blockade of North African ports might not be an effective course of action. In his opinion, after the Egyptians began to receive Soviet arms, the Egyptians would play a role toward French North Africa very much like that played by the Chinese Communists in supplying weapons to the Viet Minh in Indo-China. Secretary Dulles pointed out to Governor Stassen that the Soviets are alleged to have said that if the Western Powers tried to interfere with the shipment of arms to Egypt, these arms would be sent into Egypt by air.

Referring to the pleas from Iran and Pakistan for additional military assistance from the United States, Secretary Wilson counseled that if, after examination, we find that there are controversies between the United States and these nations, or if we prove to be behind in promised deliveries of arms, we could certainly speed up these deliveries. Most of the arms which we have promised to the Pakistanis and to Iran could be found somewhere and in a hurry if this proved to be necessary. Admiral Radford warned Secretary Wilson that the matter of getting additional arms to Iran and Pakistan might be more complicated than this. He pointed out that these deliveries of arms were slowed up by complicated U.S. administrative procedures as well as by internal politics and arguments within Pakistan itself. He was afraid that this "hassle" had never really been settled despite lengthy conversations. Secretary Wilson replied that, nevertheless, it would be downright foolishness to let such obstacles prevent the delivery of timely American aid to these nations. Secretary Dulles also advised with emphasis that we cut red tape and get the military supplies moving. Secretary Wilson assured Secretary Dulles that he would do his best.

The Vice President warned the Council that this Middle Eastern crisis came at a very unfortunate time. If things go badly for the United States in this area, there will be many who say that our misfortunes result from the lack of leadership. Accordingly, we must think of what the President would want us to do in these circumstances. Secretary Wilson replied that he was at least sure of one thing that the President would want us to do; namely, to carry out all agreements we had made with the nations of the Middle East.

As for the three policy decisions which the Secretary of State was now facing with Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia, the Vice President said that there

were so many nuances and so many difficulties that it was best to rely on the judgment of the Secretary of State. The Vice President said he also assumed that the National Security Council Planning Board would promptly step up its review of existing U.S. policy in the Middle East and that the Department of Defense would promptly see what it could do to loosen up on additional U.S. assistance to the friendly nations in the Middle East.

Admiral Radford again stressed the fact that from the point of view of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Israeli-Arab problem had the highest priority. However, he also agreed again that the government would have to ask Congress for more money for increasing the scale of U.S. assistance to the Middle East. Secretary Wilson added that if Israel should attack Egypt, every effort should be made to secure United Nations intervention. Above all else, we must attempt to stop the outbreak of any such war.

Mr. Dillon Anderson said that he deduced from the discussion thus far that the National Security Council desired the Planning Board to study three matters; first, the general problem of U.S. military assistance worldwide. This subject was already about to be presented to the Council unless it was decided to postpone consideration of it until after the President's return. Secondly, the Council wished the Planning Board to study the broad aspects of existing U.S. policy toward the Middle East, much of which Mr. Anderson thought remained valid. Thirdly, the Planning Board should study the particular matter of Arab-Israeli tensions. This portion of our general Near East policy, continued Mr. Anderson, was one which appeared particularly hard to implement.

As to the proposed broad review of NSC 5428, Mr. Anderson thought that the Planning Board would find this a very difficult job and one which would consume considerable time. As for the specific study of the Arab-Israeli situation in the contingency of hostilities, would it not be appropriate, asked Mr. Anderson, for the Council simply to agree and note its agreement that this particular portion of the policy set forth in NSC 5428 was invalid?

Secretary Dulles pointed out that the Council was of course in no position to invalidate by its action any portion of Presidentially-approved policy. If the Planning Board found itself unable to prepare, in time,

recommendations for U.S. courses of action in the contingency of war between Israel and Egypt, the National Security Council would have to make a finding in an emergency session.

Secretary Humphrey said he wanted to stress to the Council the importance of proceeding promptly to consider the entire broad subject of U.S. military assistance programs worldwide. Some decisions in this field were essential in view of the development of the budget process for Fiscal Year 1957.

Mr. Anderson assured the Council that the Planning Board would do its best to provide recommendations to deal with the Arab-Israeli contingency as well as to get underway a re-examination of the broader subject of U.S. policy in the Middle East as a whole. He then inquired of the Secretary of State whether the latter desired to have the Council concur in the Secretary's proposed decisions with respect to Iran, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia. Secretary Dulles replied that he would be glad to have the concurrence of the National Security Council in his proposed handling of the decision noted in the Record of Actions of the Council.

At the conclusion of the discussion of this item, Secretary Wilson turned to Secretary Dulles and said that if the latter believed that the Defense Department should step up the tempo of the military assistance programs in the Middle East, he, Secretary Wilson, would find means to do so.

*The National Security Council:*⁵

a. Noted and concurred in actions which the Secretary of State proposed to take in the existing situation with reference to the current U.S. attitude toward provision of military assistance to Saudi Arabia; Iran's adherence to the Baghdad Pact; and relations between Iraq and Syria.

b. Discussed the current situation in the Middle East in the light of a report by the Secretary of State, in which he observed that recent developments in the area may have made portions of existing U.S. policy invalid and subject to urgent review.

c. Directed the NSC Planning Board to undertake an urgent review of the policy on the Near East contained in NSC 5428, with particular reference to U.S. courses of action in the contingency of hostilities between Israel and the Arab States.

[Here follows item 3, “Study of the Human Effects of Nuclear Weapons Development.”]

S. Everett Gleason

¹ Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Gleason on October 7. The time of the meeting is from the President’s Daily Appointment Books.

² [Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. IX, Part 1, p. 525.](#)

³ See footnote 3, [Document 55](#).

⁴ Not further identified.

⁵ Paragraphs a–c constitute NSC Action No. 1447, approved by the President on October 19. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, NSC Records of Action)

67. Editorial Note

On October 11 the Government of Iran announced its decision to adhere to the Turkish-Iraqi Pact. The following day the Department of State issued a press release which reads in part as follows:

“The United States has had a longstanding interest in the territorial integrity and sovereign independence of Iran. That has been amply demonstrated in the past. That interest remains a cardinal feature of U.S. policy and assures that the United States will not waver in its demonstrated purpose to assist Iran and other free nations which are making their own determined efforts to achieve defensive strength and economic and social progress.”
(Department of State *Bulletin*, October 24, 1955, page 653)

Iran formally acceded to the Pact on November 3 when instruments of ratification were deposited in Baghdad.

68. Memorandum of Discussion at the 261st Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, October 13, 1955¹

Washington, October 13, 1955

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and items 1–3 concerning the CIA Semi-Annual Report, the Geneva Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, and the Report by the Special Assistant to the President on Disarmament. Items 2 and 3 are printed in [volume XX, pages 211–221](#). Vice President Nixon presided at the meeting.]

4. *U.S. Objectives and Policies With Respect to the Near East* (NSC 5428; NSC Action No. 1447–c) Dr. Flemming inquired of the Vice President whether, in view of the hour, the Council would proceed to a discussion of the Near East which was the next item on the agenda. The Vice President suggested that the Near East item as well as further discussion of the disarmament problem should both be put over to next week's meeting. Secretary Dulles, however, pointed out that he would require the maximum possible time next week in order to have guidance for conducting the negotiations of the Foreign Ministers.² While he was agreeable to scheduling the Near East problem for discussion next week, there were one or two points in connection with the Near East that he would like to mention before this meeting was adjourned.

Secretary Dulles said that he particularly wished to comment on the situation in Iran. Following last week's Council action on Iran, Secretary Dulles had had a number of conferences and consultations on the question of Iran's joining the Baghdad Pact. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, he noted, were disposed to have Iran join the Pact at this time. Secretary Dulles said that he had sent a message to Ambassador Chapin at Tehran in which he explained to the Ambassador our apprehension over Iran's acceding to the Baghdad Pact at this precise time in view of the probable Soviet reaction. Accordingly, he had gone on to state to Chapin that if the Iranians felt that they could defer joining the Baghdad Pact without a serious loss of momentum, this would be the desirable course. Thereafter, Chapin had talked to the Shah who felt that as for the Iranians joining the Baghdad Pact,

it was “now or never”. Accordingly, Iran had announced that it would join the Pact subject to agreement by the Iranian Parliament which was assumed to be assured.

Secretary Dulles then referred to the Soviet note³ which stated the grave view taken in Moscow of the Iranian action. He added that he still retained his anxiety that the Iranian action would have grave repercussions and would face the United States and the free world with new dangers but, in any case, the record is clear that the United States had not put pressure on Iran to join the Baghdad Pact at this time and, accordingly, the United States could not be blamed for the consequences.

As for other problems in the Middle East, the Soviets have duplicated their offer of arms to Egypt by offering them next to Saudi Arabia and Syria. Both these countries have also asked the United States for additional arms. In fact, the Syrian list of armaments desired had reached the State Department yesterday. Secretary Dulles reminded the Council that we had responded to the request from Saudi Arabia by stating our agreement in principle to supply arms. Nevertheless, it was Secretary Dulles’ guess that the Saudi Arabians would turn to the Russians for the arms they thought they needed because the Russian price would be so much cheaper.

With respect to the situation in Syria, Secretary Dulles said that we had inquired of Premier Nuri Said of Iraq for advice as to how to handle Syria’s request for additional arms from the United States. Secretary Dulles said that his guess was, at this time, that we would turn down Syria’s request. Meanwhile, we were awaiting the views of Nuri Said.

Turning to the Arab-Israel problem, Secretary Dulles said that he understood that a paper with recommended courses of action on this subject was in course of preparation in the National Security Council Planning Board but that progress on the paper had been poor. Turning to Admiral Radford the Secretary said that he hoped we could get as much help on this problem from his people in the Joint Chiefs of Staff as possible. Had it not proved rather difficult to get such assistance from the Joint Chiefs of Staff people in the initial stages of the preparation of this report?

Mr. Dillon Anderson broke in to state that while progress on the preparation of the report by the Planning Board had been difficult at the outset, it was now proving much easier and he anticipated that a paper would be ready for Council consideration at next week's meeting.

Secretary Dulles continued that the heart of what we needed to study now with respect to the danger of war between Israel and the Arab states was what the United States could do in case it was unable to convince the world that one or another of the two antagonists was guilty of a clean-cut aggression. We also needed to know how vulnerable Egypt and Israel would be to a blockade and finally whether we could make use of NATO-committed U.S. forces without leaving NATO with the feeling that it was being wrecked.

Admiral Radford assured Secretary Dulles that the Joint Chiefs of Staff themselves had discussed the Arab-Israel problem. They had reached the conclusion that it would be relatively easy to establish and to maintain a maritime blockade. It would probably be also possible to establish an aerial blockade although there were no precedents to go on here. Admiral Radford also expressed the view that we would not be obliged, in the contingency of war between Israel and the Arab States, to go as far as instituting an aerial blockade.

*The National Security Council:*⁴

- a. Noted and discussed the comments by the Secretary of State on developments in the Near East since the last Council meeting, with particular reference to the Baghdad Pact, and the requests for military assistance from Saudi Arabia and Syria.
- b. Noted an oral report by the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs that the NSC Planning Board report on the subject, pursuant to NSC Action No. 1447-c (Item 2-c of the Record of Actions, 260th NSC Meeting), will be ready for Council consideration at its next meeting.

S. Everett Gleason

¹ Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Prepared by Gleason on October 14.

² Secretary Dulles met with the Foreign Ministers of the United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union at Geneva October 27–November 16, 1955. Documentation on discussions concerning the Middle East is printed in [vol. XIV, pp. 657](#) ff.

³ See [Document 340](#).

⁴ Paragraphs a and b constitute NSC Action No. 1452, approved by the President on October 19. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, NSC Records of Action)

69. Notes Prepared by the Secretary of State¹

Washington, October 17, 1955.

The basic facts are that the Arab countries are:

(1) Violently opposed to the existence of Israel and unwilling to tolerate that continuing existence except on terms, with references to territory and resettlement of refugees, which are totally unacceptable to Israel;

(2) Ardently sympathetic to the aspirations of the Arabs and Moslems of North Africa in their desire for independence and violent anti-French activities; and

(3) Opposed to the remnants of British, French and Turkish “colonialism” in the Arab area. At the moment the clash is most acute between Saudi Arabia and the United Kingdom with reference to the Persian Gulf area.

United States policy runs counter to the above desires of the Arabs in that:

(1) We were largely instrumental in the creation of the State of Israel, and both the American government and the American people give it today indispensable support;

(2) France is our ally in NATO; Algeria is part of the NATO area; our equipment is largely being used by the French in North Africa. We have bases in Morocco, and in general find it difficult to divorce ourselves from association with the French. To do so would jeopardize our European policies;

(3) Our basic sympathies are with Turkey, France, and the United Kingdom. Turkey, as an ally, is our mainstay in the Middle East, and we are unwilling to take the measures which the Saudi Arabians wish to pre-empt oil areas in the south which are claimed by local sheikdoms and supported by the British.

All of these factors combine to make the area a “natural” one for exploitation by the Soviet Union. It sees in this way the possibility of gaining control for itself, and denying to the West, the vast oil reserves of the area which represent almost two-thirds of all the known oil reserves of the world and upon which the military and industrial strength of Western Europe and the Mediterranean area depends. Also British economy is largely dependent for its foreign exchange upon the proceeds of the oil of the area. Furthermore, the Arab world, particularly Egypt, is a gateway to Africa, and the entire African continent could readily be lost to Europe through a development of the Soviet strategy to which we refer.

It is difficult to invoke the “spirit of Geneva” in a Middle East appeal to the Soviet Union because we ourselves take the position that the “spirit of Geneva” does not sanctify the status quo and we are committed, in the most solemn way, to seek the peaceful liberation of the European “satellites”. This attitude is deeply resented by the Soviet leaders. The Soviet action might be interpreted as a reply to our position with reference to the satellites. It is probably more realistic, however, to say that the Soviets now feel that they can move in the Middle East with less danger of this provoking a general war because of Geneva.

Also the Soviets doubtless resent the building up of the so-called “northern tier”, consisting of Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Pakistan. They are particularly sensitive with reference to Iran.

The stakes in the present situation are immense and raise such questions as the following:

- (1) Should we invite the Soviet Union into Middle East talks with us and the United Kingdom in the hope of arriving at some “spheres of influence” agreement?
- (2) Should we toughen our line and in effect treat the Soviet action as destroying the “spirit of Geneva” and reopening the possibility of war?
- (3) Should we shift our position on Israel and seek to compel Israel to resettle many of the Arab refugees and to surrender a substantial slice of the Negev?
- (4) Should we attempt to collapse Egyptian economy by cutting economic aid, attempting via the United Kingdom and Sudan to get control of the Upper Nile waters, competing on cotton, etc.?
- (5) Should we intensify the military and economic build-up of the northern tier?
- (6) Should we try to split the Arab world via Iraq and give Iraq a “free hand” vis-à-vis Syria?
- (7) Should we give up US bases in Saudi Arabia and/or Morocco?
- (8) Should we encourage oil companies to shift production to Iran and Iraq, and away from Saudi Arabia?

¹ Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 58 D 460, Arab-Israeli Situation— General. Secret. The source text bears Secretary Dulles’ typed initials as drafting officer. George V. Allen’s handwritten notes of a conversation between Dulles and Egyptian Ambassador Hussein on October 17 appear on the reverse side of two of the pages. Allen’s memorandum of the Dulles–Hussein conversation is printed in [vol. xiv, p. 604](#).

**70. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State,
Washington, October 20, 1955¹**

Washington, October 20, 1955

SUBJECT

U.S. Support for Baghdad Pact

PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary

Ambassador Moussa Al-Shabandar of Iraq

David D. Newsom, NE

Ambassador Shabandar said he appreciated this opportunity to see the Secretary. He said he knew how extremely busy he was preparing for the Geneva conference and wanted to wish him success. The Ambassador said he had two matters he wished to speak about.

It was nearly a year, said the Ambassador, since he had called to say farewell before returning to Baghdad. At that time, he said, the Secretary had indicated that, if Iraq joined the northern tier, it might be possible for the United States to increase its military assistance. He would now like to recall this possibility to the Secretary and to state that Iraq hoped the program would be fulfilled which called for the equipping of three Iraqi divisions.

The Secretary said he was certain that the program was proceeding as planned. Mr. Newsom said that twelve Centurion tanks, ten from the United States and two from the United Kingdom, were being loaded and would arrive in Iraq late in November.

The Secretary said this was only a part of the program and he hoped that more tanks would be furnished in the next fiscal year. He was not certain of

the number which had been planned.

The Ambassador said he hoped these would meet their requirements.

The Secretary asked what Iraq's requirements were.

The Ambassador said he was not certain of details, but he knew it included tanks and aircraft.

Mr. Newsom pointed out that the tank requirements were being met. He said there was no U.S. program for aid to Iraq's Air Force, but he understood this matter was being discussed by Iraq with the United Kingdom.

The Ambassador then said he wished to transmit to the Secretary an invitation from Prime Minister Nuri as-Said to join the Baghdad Pact.

The Secretary replied that, although the United States welcomes the Pact, supports it, and hopes to be able to strengthen it through military assistance to its various members, it is not possible for the United States formally to adhere at this time. Perhaps, said the Secretary, we can adhere at a later time. If the United States should join the Pact at this time, however, he said, it would almost certainly have to give a security guarantee to Israel. The Secretary stressed that the United States was under great pressure to give such a guarantee, but did not wish to do so at this time.

Referring to his August 26 proposals,² the Secretary pointed out that he had proposed guarantees on both sides against violent changes in the borders. He did not feel, he said, that the United States can give any such guarantees until there is some agreement on borders. The Israelis, he said, disagree, and wish a guarantee now.

Because of these attitudes, the Secretary pointed out, he did not believe the Senate would be agreeable to a ratification of a formal adherence to the Baghdad Pact at this time.

The Ambassador replied that he appreciated the problem and would report the position of the United States to the Prime Minister.

The Ambassador said he would just like to add that, if he were an Israeli, he would like to see the United States in the Pact. It is not an Arab pact, he said, and it serves as a counter to the extremists in the Arab world. He said he felt reasonable Israelis should be able to see this.

The Secretary asked the Ambassador about Syria. The Ambassador replied that Syria's difficulties, like most of those in the Near East, were due to the Palestine problem. He urged that this problem needs to be solved and solved quickly. The longer we wait, the Ambassador said, the more difficult it is going to be to solve it. It was easier a year ago than it is now; it will be easier today than it will be a year from now.

The Ambassador pointed out that the Arabs had been beaten-eight nations were beaten by one small nation. This had hurt the Arab pride deeply and this pride must be respected in approaching a settlement. His nation was willing to discuss the matter on the basis of the United Nations resolutions and he was certain other Arab nations were also willing. This does not mean the solution will be in complete accordance with the resolutions; it does mean that this is an acceptable starting point for discussion.

The reason the Arabs are turning to Russia for arms, the Ambassador said, is because it restores their pride and confidence. They are not Communists, but they want arms in order to be on an equal basis with Israel. They consider the United States is the patron of Israel. They don't understand when they read the statements of Mr. Sobeloff and Mr. Harriman that these men do not represent the State Department point of view.

We must try to settle the Palestine issue and remove this cause for trouble. Later, it may be too late.

The Secretary thanked the Ambassador for his remarks. The Ambassador wished the Secretary well at Geneva and thanked him for sparing him the time to call.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/10–2055. Secret. Drafted by Newsom.

² Reference is to Secretary Dulles' major address on the Arab-Israeli dispute, which was part of project "Alpha." See [footnote 2](#), [Document 62](#).

71. Telegram From the Office of the Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to the Department of State¹

Paris, October 26, 1955—9 p.m.

Polto 649. Geneva for Secretary Dulles. Re Washington Tosec 13,² repeated Ankara 746, Amman 175, Baghdad 297. Secretary saw Turkish Foreign Minister Zorlu at latter's request for 15 minutes this afternoon. Zorlu explained that President Bayar planned seek Jordanian adherence Baghdad pact during forthcoming visit to Jordan, and asked for Secretary's views. Secretary replied that up to present time US had opposed southward extension Baghdad pact for two reasons:

1. Would antagonize Egypt (remarked this factor perhaps less important now);
2. Adherence countries bordering Israel would be viewed as giving anti-Israeli character to pact and inhibit US support to pact. On other hand, Secretary remarked, if pact did not assume anti-Israeli character but took form of promoting settlement Jordanian border, might make a difference.

Zorlu then advanced idea of US security guarantee to Israel and simultaneous adherence Baghdad pact and went on to advance same arguments contained reftel, stressing particularly importance strengthening position Western-oriented countries such as Iraq and Iran. This connection Zorlu urged that US not offer arms or other aid to Egypt or take any other actions which Iraq and Iran could construe as indicating Egypt following sound course. Foundations Baghdad pact not yet very deep and members must see Egypt's policy does not pay.

Secretary informed Zorlu that he would give question Jordanian adherence careful consideration but could not give him an answer until he had consulted his advisers. Said that our position would be communicated to

Turks in Washington. In response to Secretary's query, Zorlu said he had discussed idea with Macmillan and that British favored it.

Secretary remarked in passing that Syria was pretty far gone. Zorlu agreed, added that situation in Libya was deteriorating and again expressed hope that US would enter Baghdad pact soon. Secretary's response was that US would have observers at pact meeting November 20.

In parting Secretary urged that Turkey go easy with Greece on Cyprus question. Zorlu responded that there was no room for compromise, without specifying on whose part. Secretary rejoined that there was always room for compromise.

Secretary left for Geneva immediately after meeting and has not seen this message.

Perkins

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/10–2655. Secret. Repeated to Ankara, Amman, Baghdad, London, and Geneva.

² In Tosec 13 to Paris, October 24, the Department of State informed Secretary Dulles that Turkish Ambassador Haydar Gork, acting under urgent instructions, had told Department officials that when President Bayar visited Jordan during the first week of November, he planned to urge Jordanian adherence to the Baghdad Pact. Gork emphasized that the action was necessary to prevent the spread of Soviet influence in the Middle East and that Turkey would do everything it could to prevent Arab aggression against Israel. (*Ibid.*, 780.5/10–2455)

72. Circular Telegram from the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions¹

Washington, October 27, 1955—4:01 p.m.

283. Paris pouch Geneva for Russell. In view imminent formation Baghdad Pact Council (Baghdad's 360)² convey following to member government to which you accredited:

1. US welcomes plans being made for early meeting Pact signatories and organization Council.
2. US considers close coordination between US and Pact powers highly desirable and should Pact governments concur is prepared establish liaison arrangements with Pact organization on political and military levels.
3. Type liaison would of course depend upon actual organization formulated. However our tentative views envisage political liaison by US Ambassador at capital where Pact headquarters located. Tentative view also is that military liaison would not be elaborate at this time in view extensive US military contacts now existing throughout Pact area. Would appreciate any comments, suggestions this subject.
4. Should Pact governments feel it desirable, US willing, as further evidence its support, consider publicity liaison arrangements upon establishment.
5. While US presently continues feel it should not adhere to Pact now, this does not exclude future adherence and question will be kept under constant review in light developments with this possibility in mind.

FYI. Addressees' comments on nature liaison also desired. End FYI.

Hoover

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/10-2755. Secret. Drafted by Newsom and Dixon and approved by Allen who signed for Hoover. Sent to London, Ankara, Baghdad, Tehran, and Karachi; repeated to Paris for USRO, Rome for Maffitt, Cairo, Beirut, Damascus, Amman, Jidda, Tripoli, and Tel Aviv.

During discussions on October 26 in Paris with Foreign Secretary Macmillan and Prime Minister Zorlu, Secretary Dulles had agreed that the

United States would have political and military liaison with the Baghdad Pact. Secto 41 from Geneva, October 27, conveyed Secretary Dulles' decision on the matter and his request that the Department of State take necessary steps to assure effective liaison. (*Ibid.*, 396.1–GE/10–2755) The memorandum of Dulles' conversation with Macmillan on October 26 is printed in [vol. XIV, p. 650](#).

² Dated October 17, not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/10–1755)

73. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan¹

Washington, October 28, 1955—5:43 p.m.

183. Paris pouch Geneva for Russell. We regard Egyptian-Syrian pact² as directed against both Iraq and Israel. British privately and publicly opposing pact on ground it is directed against Baghdad Pact. However if US also publicly opposes Syrian-Egyptian pact at this moment, we may consolidate Arab support for pact. We think it preferable for US publicly to continue give warm support to Northern Tier concept at this time and privately to suggest to Lebanon and Jordan undesirability concluding pact similar to Syrian-Egyptian pact.

Accordingly at their discretion missions may make points given below re pact in conversations with Governments. Amman and Beirut should make formal approaches to Governments only if in their judgment this necessary to prevent Lebanon and Jordan from concluding similar pacts.

1) We naturally do not question sovereign right of states to enter such pacts as they consider in their national interests 2) however we believe states involved will wish consider carefully implications of new pact particularly its effect on relations between Arab states 3) US continues support firmly Baghdad Pact and will concentrate on strengthening this grouping, since we believe Baghdad Pact contains necessary elements for area defense and 4) recent Soviet moves as in Czech-Egyptian agreement make it more

important than ever that nature of Russian Communist threat and devious tactics used by Soviet bloc be fully examined.³

Hoover

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/10–2855. Secret. Drafted by Wilkins and Burdett and approved by Allen who signed for Hoover. Also sent to Tehran, Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Jidda, Tel Aviv, Ankara, Karachi, Paris, and London.

² On October 20 in Damascus, representatives of Egypt and Syria signed a Mutual Defense Pact. Under the terms of the Pact, armed aggression against either signator was to be considered as directed against both, and each signator was to come to the aid of the other in case of attack, Text of the Egyptian-Syrian Mutual Defense Pact is printed in Frankland (ed.), *Documents on International Affairs*, 1955, pp. 328–331. On October 27, Saudi Arabia signed a Mutual Defense Pact with Egypt which contained language almost identical to the Egyptian-Syrian Pact. Documentation on the subject is in Department of State, Central Files 674.83 and 674.86A.

³ In telegram 193 to Amman, October 31, sent also to Tehran, Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Jidda, Tel Aviv, Ankara, Karachi, Paris, London, and Tripoli, the Department of State instructed: “US position given Deptel 183 to Amman re Egyptian-Syrian Pact applies equally to Egyptian-Saudi Arabian Pact. At their discretion addressees may use in conversations with governments points given in ref tel with respect to Egyptian-Saudi Arabian Pact.” (*Ibid.*, 780.5/10–3155)

74. Telegram From the Embassy in Iraq to the Department of State¹

Baghdad, October 29, 1955—noon.

409. I gave Nuri substance of Department circular 283, October 27² at his home this morning. He was genuinely pleased. “You have come a long way” he said with obvious relief and satisfaction. He would pass the good word on to the King immediately and after talks with Foreign Minister,

Under Secretary Foreign Affairs and Chief of Staff he would have some observations to make on nature of liaison and timing of publicity.

Nuri told me agreement has now been reached among all signatories to hold first meeting of Council on November 20 in Baghdad. British, Turks and Pakistanis have given their assent to establishing permanent seat of Council in Baghdad. Iranians have not yet replied on this point but he anticipates their concurrence too.

Nuri's present thinking is to have first meeting establishing Council on government level and then between meetings on that level to carry on the work through the Ambassadors of member countries accredited in Baghdad.

Nuri is meeting later today with Chief of Staff to discuss various items that he would like to see put on agenda for first meeting. In 2 or 3 days he said he would be able to give me his full views on agenda.

We are formulating our views on nature of liaison that we think should be established and will telegraph them within next few days.

Gallman

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/10-2955. Secret; Priority. Repeated to London, Ankara, Tehran, Karachi, and Paris.

² [Document 72](#).

75. Telegram From the Department of State to the Delegation at the Foreign Ministers Meeting, at Geneva¹

Washington, October 29, 1955—7 p.m.

Tosec 81. From Acting Secretary. Turkish authorities are anxious to obtain more definite indication US views on question of bringing Jordan into Baghdad pact. President Bayar arrives Amman next Thursday, November 3.

If you agree, I suggest we inform Turks we think President Bayar will have difficulty in persuading Jordan to adhere at this time. However, we will not advise Jordan against adherence, and if our views are requested by Jordan, we will say Baghdad pact continues to enjoy our full support and we consider it useful instrument in development of collective security of area.²

Hoover

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1-GE/10-2955. Secret. Drafted by Allen and approved by Hoover.

² Secretary Dulles replied as follows: “Agree but would add that if Jordan adheres prior to settling boundaries with Israel this would be an added obstacle to US adherence.

“Our purpose is to get Jordan if possible to agree on boundaries with Israel; this would be a big break for us and is an idea which Macmillan informally greets with favor.” (Dulte 31 from Geneva, October 30; *ibid.*, 396.1-GE/10-3055)

76. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State¹

Amman, November 1, 1955—6 p.m.

214. Geneva for Secretary. Re: Department's circular telegram 290.² Available information indicates Jordan presently would not join Turco-Iraqi pact even if pressed. She is not, however, completely unsympathetic. HKJ has informed Turkish Ambassador it has no thought joining Syrian-Egyptian axis. There are indications some HKJ resistance to Turks because supposed support of France on North Africa. Believe this will straighten out and I have taken quiet steps with Turkish Ministry remove misconceptions.

In view of changed [*charged?*] public opinion here and rising Russian strength and popularity growing out of Egyptian arms deal, believe our purpose of obtaining Jordan agreement on boundaries with Israel presently unattainable. This need not deter effort redress broader situation, and viewed from here believe build-up for Turco-Iraqi pact desirable. Suggest possibility usefulness President Bayar outlining advantage HKJ adherence without pressure, consciously laying groundwork for subsequent discussions.

Mallory

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/11-155. Secret. Repeated to Ankara, Baghdad, Beirut, Damascus, London, and Geneva.

² Circular telegram 290, October 31, repeated the text of Tosec 81, *supra*, and Dulte 31 (see [footnote 2, supra](#)).

77. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Turkey¹

Washington, November 2, 1955—4:40 p.m.

801. Department informed Turk Ambassador November 1 US will not advise against Jordanian adherence Baghdad Pact and if Jordan asks our views we will state we consider Pact useful instrument in development collective security for Middle East area and that we continue fully support it. However we pointed out that if Jordan adhered prior to settlement Jordan-Israeli boundary this would create an additional difficulty in connection with possible US adherence and that our purpose is to seek agreement on boundaries.

Turk Ambassador expressed appreciation for forthcoming US attitude which he characterized as “important step forward”. He was concerned however over possibility that Jordanian adherence might make US adherence less likely. He was informed that US adherence not immediately foreseeable in any event and we saw no reason why Turkish President should not sound out situation in Amman.

Hoover

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/11–255. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Kitchen and Allen who approved and signed for Hoover. Repeated to London, Amman, and Geneva for Secretary Dulles.

78. National Intelligence Estimate¹

Washington, November 8, 1955

NIE 30-4-55

THE OUTLOOK FOR US INTERESTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

The Problem

To estimate the outlook for US interests in the Middle East, the implications of Soviet policies in the area, and the probable consequences of possible US courses of action in dealing with the situation.

Conclusions

1. The present Soviet drive for economic and diplomatic influence in the Middle East poses serious dangers for US interests. Through its arms deal with Egypt, the Bloc has opened a new theater of operations in its struggle with the West and has radically altered its strategy in the area. From now on the USSR will probably offer tough competition to Western aims and policies in the area. (Para. 10)

2. The new Soviet moves almost certainly have as their goal the exclusion of Western military bases from the relatively exposed southwestern flank of the USSR and the extension of Soviet influence in the area. The USSR has capitalized on: (a) inter-Arab rivalries; (b) Arab hatred and fear of Israel; and (c) Arab mistrust of the West. It has by one stroke of giving arms support to Egypt sharpened these antipathies and sought to divide the US and UK from one or even both sides in these quarrels. The USSR probably anticipated that the US, in reaction to the arms deal, would strengthen both Israel and the "northern tier," but that the resulting accentuation of area tensions would more than offset the effectiveness of these moves. Further offers of assistance to Arab states and Afghanistan and a more active support of the uncommitted states on political issues could, with a minimum of effort, considerably embarrass the West. (Para. 11) 3. The most immediate threat to US interests in the area lies in the increased likelihood

of major Arab-Israeli hostilities. Failure to avert such hostilities would place the UN and especially the Tripartite Powers in an extremely difficult position. Unless they acted promptly and effectively to prevent Israel from seizing and holding Arab territory there would be a strong Arab feeling of revulsion against the West and a corresponding tendency to look to the Bloc for assistance. Israeli victory in a "second round" would almost certainly create strong pressures for the rupture of remaining military and political ties with the US and UK and would probably result in domestic upheavals in one or more Arab states which would provide the Communists with important opportunities. (Paras. 14–19) 4. Even without a new Arab-Israeli war, the US will face major difficulties, which the USSR is in a good position to exploit, with respect to the Baghdad Pact and inter-Arab rivalries. The US is already under heavy pressure from both the Baghdad Pact states and their Arab opponents, and on both sides there is uncertainty as to the precise nature of present US goals in the area and the extent to which the US is prepared to go in pursuing them. (Paras. 13, 20) 5. Egypt will almost certainly try to use Soviet aid to obtain US and UK support for Egyptian interests. Although it will value US and UK support as a counterweight to its ties with the Bloc and would make some concessions to obtain it, Egypt would almost certainly not undertake to renounce further dealings with the Bloc. Increased ties with the Bloc would almost certainly strengthen neutralist tendencies in Egypt and facilitate Soviet penetration. Western chances for preventing this will depend in part on the comparative performance, in Egyptian eyes, of the Bloc and of the US and UK in satisfying Egypt's aspirations. (Paras. 24–26)

6. A US policy of vigorous support for the Baghdad Pact including timely US adherence would greatly reassure its present members and increase the value of the alliance as a device for encouraging a pro-Western orientation in these and the presently undecided Middle East states. Such support in the long run is essential if the alliance is to become more than a formality. However, all-out support for the Pact would draw the US into increasing involvement in local controversies, notably with respect to Iraqi designs on Syria. It would aggravate the arms race and tend to push Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Syria into greater isolation from the West and greater dependence on the Bloc. Israel would see some advantages in US adherence to the Baghdad Pact, though it would remain apprehensive about the

consequent strengthening of the Arab states. (Paras. 38–45) 7. A US decision moderately to increase its support for the Baghdad Pact (excluding adherence to the Pact) and at the same time to attempt to cultivate Egypt and other local opponents would be difficult to carry out. Iran, Iraq, and Pakistan would probably continue to doubt the sincerity of US support unless they received substantial US military aid and unless the US adhered to the Pact. Nevertheless, Egypt would probably accept some increased support for the “northern tier” grouping as long as additional Arab states did not join the Pact and the US gave convincing evidences of support for the RCC regime. Nasir would almost certainly regard US assistance in building the High Aswan Dam and in achieving a satisfactory water agreement with the Sudan as constituting such evidence. (Para. 47) 8. A US decision to delay support for the Baghdad Pact would provide some opportunities for easing tensions and mending US fences with Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Syria. However, these states, as well as those uncommitted regarding the Pact, would interpret such a move as an indication of their own power to influence US decisions. Such a move would also be a grave blow to the Baghdad Pact and the governments supporting it, even if accompanied by minor gestures of encouragement designed to cushion the blow and leave the way open for later resumption of US forward motion. Despite probable UK and Turkish efforts to salvage the alliance, it would tend increasingly to disintegrate. (Paras. 50–52) 9. A US decision to abandon the Baghdad Pact, even if carried out through an agreement with the USSR designed to neutralize the area, would gravely damage the Western position in the Middle East. It would cause bitter disappointment among the signatories to the Pact, accentuate present tendencies toward neutralism in some of them, and almost certainly weaken the pro-Western governments of Pakistan, Iraq, and Iran. It would be widely viewed as a major retreat by the West under pressure from the USSR. In these circumstances, a return to the present Western defensive position in the area would be almost impossible. On the other hand, such a policy would free the US from a long and costly defense build up effort and would offer new opportunities for wooing Middle Eastern and South Asian neutralist and reformist elements, including the Egyptian RCC regime. It would probably reduce the danger of local wars in the Middle East and might improve the chances of an Arab-Israeli settlement. (Paras. 53–58) Discussion

I. Present Situation

10. The Egyptian-Soviet Bloc arms deal and the Soviet drive for economic and diplomatic influence in the Middle East pose serious dangers for US interests. The arms deal constitutes the first major successful Soviet effort in the Middle East since World War II, and the first the USSR has ever made into the southern parts of the area. For many years the Western Powers have been able to pursue their interests in the Middle East virtually unhindered by direct Soviet interference. This period is now almost certainly at an end. The USSR has opened a new theatre of operations in the East-West struggle and has radically revised its strategy in the area. It is presenting itself not as a supporter of revolutionary elements dedicated to the overthrow of existing regimes but as the benefactor and champion of the regimes themselves. From now on the Western Powers will probably find themselves challenged throughout the area by the USSR, vigorously pursuing its own objectives and countering those of the West.

11. The new Soviet moves almost certainly have as their goal the exclusion of Western military bases from the relatively exposed southwestern flank of the USSR and the extension of Soviet influence in the area. They probably reflect growing Soviet concern over the efforts of the US to establish its position in the "northern tier". The USSR has made it clear from the outset that it regarded the "northern tier" arrangement as a potential threat to its own strategic position. The fact that the "northern tier" scheme was bitterly opposed by some of the Arab states provided the USSR with a favorable opportunity for gaining an entrée into the Middle East.

12. In addition to undermining the US-backed defensive grouping, the Soviet leaders probably expected to achieve important direct gains from the the new diplomatic offensive in the area. The Soviet campaign has already damaged US prestige, not only in the Middle East, but throughout the world. It has broken down long-standing barriers to Middle East dealings with the Bloc. The arms deal with Egypt was convincing evidence to the Arab states that they could obtain their material ends on terms more favorable than the West would offer and without joining undesired Western defense schemes. The new Soviet policy has made the Bloc and the local Communist parties more respectable and has substantially increased the

Bloc's potential for subversive and economic pressure. Finally, Soviet penetration of the Middle East has provided the Bloc with an important new leverage in its dealings with the US and its Western allies.

13. The Egyptian arms deal has already greatly magnified the obstacles in the way of strengthening defenses in the area and of achieving an Arab-Israeli settlement. The deal has strengthened Israel's belief that it must act boldly to force a peace before it is too late and has thus increased the danger of an Arab-Israeli war. It has aggravated the struggle between Iraq on the one hand and Egypt and Saudi Arabia on the other for dominance in the Arab League and for predominant influence in Syria. It has stimulated a general arms race throughout the area. Thus, the US will find it increasingly difficult to pursue its objectives in the area without being drawn into intraregional disputes and thus becoming subject to recriminations by one or both sides. Moreover, the US will be subject to growing pressure from Israel for arms aid and a security guarantee; from Turkey, Iraq, Pakistan, and Iran for increased material and diplomatic support for the Baghdad Pact; and from Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Lebanon for material gestures in their direction. On all sides there is uncertainty as to the precise nature of present US goals in the area and the extent to which the US is willing to go in pursuing them.

II. The Threat of Major Arab-Israeli Hostilities

14. The most immediate threat to US interests in the Middle East lies in the increased likelihood of major Arab-Israeli hostilities. With Bloc arms already arriving in sizable quantities in Egypt, tensions have notably increased. Egypt is attempting to procure additional equipment to supplement that being obtained from the Bloc, is maneuvering with extensive Saudi financial backing to set itself up as an arms supply center for other Arab states, and has already begun to line up Arab support by signing bilateral defense pacts with Syria and Saudi Arabia. Israel, having approached the US on arms purchases, is also making efforts to obtain arms in Western Europe and, if unsuccessful, may seek them from the Bloc. It has undertaken a nationwide arms fund-raising campaign in Israel, and probably will also do so in the US and Europe.

15. Both sides have become more aggressive, not only along the Egyptian frontier, where a series of new and serious incidents have taken place, but also along the Syrian-Israeli border. Reinforcement of border garrisons is apparently taking place on both sides, involving in the Israeli case a fairly extensive mobilization of vehicles and reserve personnel. Despite US and UK reiteration at Paris and Geneva of their determination to maintain Arab-Israeli peace and the indication of US willingness to consider limited arms sales to Israel, there have been strong indications of Israeli disappointment over Foreign Minister Sharett's failure to obtain a firm commitment from the US and increased talk of the possible necessity of "preventive war." Such a "preventive war" may start in the form of border raids where responsibilities and intentions may initially be obscure.

16. We are unable to determine at what point a continuation or augmentation of the present scale of border incidents would lead to an outbreak of sustained large-scale hostilities. Nevertheless, we believe that as long as the present concentration of troops is maintained close to the frontiers and as long as the present high level of emotions, particularly in Israel, continues, there is close to an even chance of such an outbreak, even without a decision by either side deliberately to provoke a war.³

17. Should major hostilities develop within the next six months or so, Israel would probably take advantage of its superior capabilities to knock out Arab forward elements and capture key defensive positions across its frontiers before the Arabs had effectively mobilized their strength. Although the Arabs might be able to conduct bombing attacks on Israeli military targets and cities, particularly after Egypt's new Soviet light jet bombers became operational, the Arabs would probably be incapable by themselves of preventing such Israeli advances.

18. An outbreak of major hostilities would place the UN and particularly the Tripartite Powers in an extremely difficult position. It would be difficult to obtain UN and Western public support for military intervention to restore the status quo. Yet unless military intervention were promptly forthcoming, Israel would probably seize and hold its planned objectives, hoping that the areas seized would serve as bargaining counters in a peace settlement and

that the Western Powers would be unwilling to continue economic sanctions or other pressures long enough to force it to withdraw.

19. The Arab states would almost certainly regard Western failure to intervene promptly and effectively on their behalf as an act of betrayal and would look to the Bloc for assistance. Even if—as is probable—the Bloc avoided direct involvement in the fighting, there would be a strong revulsion of feeling among the Arabs against the West. Israeli victory in a “second round” of major fighting against the Arabs would probably also result in domestic upheavals in one or more of the Arab states, thereby providing important opportunities for Soviet diplomacy as well as for indigenous Communists and fellow-travellers. There would almost certainly be strong pressures throughout the Arab world for the rupture of all remaining formal political and military ties with the US and UK and at least some pressures for the cancellation of Western oil and other concessions. Meanwhile, the cold war against a victorious Israel would be renewed with increased vehemence.

Other Area Problems

20. Even if an Arab-Israeli war does not break out, developments in the area over the next year or so will confront the US with serious problems and may offer the USSR additional opportunities for embarrassing the West and increasing Soviet and Communist influence in the area.

21. *The “Northern Tier” States.* Soviet support for Egypt and the other states opposed to the “northern tier” arrangement will result in demands by Baghdad Pact members for increased support. They will not only demand increased material support, but will probably also seek US adherence to the Pact. Iraq in particular will argue that US failure to match Soviet assistance to Egypt with comparable assistance to Iraq will increase internal pressures against the Pact and will place Iraq in an impossible position in the Arab world. To a lesser extent, Pakistan and Iran are likely to use more or less similar arguments in pressing for greater US assistance for themselves and for the “northern tier” arrangements as a whole.

22. Soviet assistance to their rivals will also induce the “northern tier” nations to seek greater US support for their own local objectives. Iraq, for

example, will probably intensify its efforts to obtain US and UK support for Iraqi intervention in Syria, particularly if the leftward trend in Syria continues and if that state accepts Soviet arms offers. Turkey will probably support these Iraqi demands. Pakistan will point to Soviet moves in Afghanistan in its efforts to gain US support against Afghan demands for creation of an autonomous state of Pushtunistan.

23. Although less concerned with Middle East rivalries, Iran will also point to Soviet moves in the Middle East as putting the US under strong obligation to see to it that Iran does not lose by its decision to join the Baghdad Pact. It will cite Soviet support of the opponents of the Pact as evidence of the risks it took in joining and as justification of its claims for US support and guarantees.

24. *Egypt.* Egypt will almost certainly try to use Soviet support to induce the US and UK to: (a) abandon their backing of Iraq and the “northern tier” concept; (b) give the Arabs greater support vis-à-vis Israel; (c) back Egypt’s interests in the Sudan, particularly with respect to the allocation of the Nile waters; and (d) provide greater economic assistance to Egypt, particularly for the Aswan Dam project.

25. While the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) will value US and UK support as a counterweight to its ties with the Bloc and would make some concessions to obtain it, Egypt will almost certainly not undertake to renounce further dealings with the Bloc. It probably overestimates its ability to cope with the long-range political risks involved in accepting Bloc support, and will probably continue to welcome such support so long as the US appears to the regime to be supporting its rivals and enemies in the area.

26. Increased ties with the Bloc would almost certainly strengthen neutralist tendencies in Egypt, encourage a more favorable attitude toward the USSR, and facilitate Soviet political penetration. Western chances for preventing this will depend in large part on: (a) the regime’s own estimate of its need for Western support to insure its independence; (b) the extent to which its economic, political, and military aspirations are actually satisfied by the West; and (c) the degree of Egyptian satisfaction or dissatisfaction with

Soviet performance. Should Egypt feel that it had been “written off” by the West, it would be forced into increasing dependence on the Bloc.

27. *Syria and the Possibility of Iraqi Intervention.* If present trends in Syria continue, it is probable that Syria will accept Soviet arms, possibly through Egypt, and that leftist and other anti-US and UK elements will gain full control. The US has only limited capabilities for reversing these probable trends in Syria through its own actions in the country. However, the US will be under increasing pressure from Iraq [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] to support Iraqi intervention in Syria.

28. It is unlikely, however, that Iraq could set up and maintain either a pro-Iraqi regime in Syria or some form of Iraqi-Syrian union without open military intervention. The chances appear about even that Iraq could achieve lasting success by military intervention, given adequate preparation and firm and sustained US and UK diplomatic support and military aid.

29. Irrespective of the actual role of the US, the other Arab states would almost certainly regard an Iraqi move to intervene in Syria as having US and UK backing. It would evoke strong adverse reactions from Egypt and Saudi Arabia and, for entirely different reasons, from Israel. Israel might resort to force in an effort to block the development or to make local territorial gains.⁴ Although Egypt would feel compelled to honor its alliance with Syria, it could do little militarily. The danger of an Israeli military reaction would be considerably lessened if the US were overtly supporting the Iraqi move and offered to guarantee Israel against hostile action by its strengthened neighbor.

30. The USSR would oppose the move and would almost certainly attempt to get the UN to act, particularly if Iraq intervened militarily. It would attempt to capitalize on Egyptian and Saudi resentment, and would increase its covert political warfare activities in Syria.

31. Even a successful Iraqi military intervention in Syria would have to cope with strong, continuing opposition of various Syrian groups (including the Communists), who would be backed by Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the USSR, and certain French interests. The resulting unrest could probably be

contained by the present Iraqi government with continued US–UK backing, but would pose serious problems for less strong-handed successors.

32. If Iraq should attempt to intervene militarily in Syria and fail, the chances for the continuation of pro-Western governments of the type now headed by Nuri Said would be greatly reduced, since the US and UK would be blamed for not helping Iraq to attain its objectives. For similar reasons, the US and UK would also suffer considerable loss of prestige among other states of the area.

33. *Saudi Arabia.* Saudi Arabia has not yet accepted Soviet arms or Soviet requests for the establishment of diplomatic relations. It is already using these offers, however, in bargaining with the US over renewal of US rights to the Dhahran Air Base and US arms assistance. It is also exerting mounting pressure on the Arabian American Oil Company (ARAMCO) for price and other concessions. In cooperation with Egypt, the Saudis are engaged in vigorous efforts to counteract Iraqi influence in the Arab world, spending money liberally for this purpose in Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon.

34. Even more than the RCC, the Saudis would prefer to avoid ties with the Communist Bloc if they could receive the US support they desire. However, they welcome Bloc offers as bargaining counters with the US and UK, and it is likely that they are prepared to accept some Bloc support, particularly arms assistance, if the US fails to make a sufficiently attractive alternative offer. If the USSR continues to support the Arab cause against Israel and to work against Iraq as a member of the “northern tier” alliance, Soviet and Saudi policies will be parallel on two issues of intense concern to the Saudi government. In these circumstances, the Saudis would probably be increasingly willing to finance Arab arms purchases from the Bloc and tempted to accept Soviet offers to establish diplomatic relations.

35. It is almost certain that the Saudis will initially demand a high and possibly prohibitive price in return for renewal of the Dhahran Air Base agreement. They will be much more reluctant to risk a break with ARAMCO, because of their critical dependence on oil revenues. However, by miscalculation or through confidence in Soviet aid, they may insist on terms unacceptable to ARAMCO. A break with ARAMCO would probably imperil the government by depriving it of the funds needed to maintain its

control over the country. Finally, Saudi Arabia will almost certainly make strong demands on the US, both directly and through ARAMCO, for support in its conflict with the UK over the Buraimi and other boundary issues.

36. *Additional Soviet Opportunities in the Area.* If the Soviet Bloc elected to supplement material offers to the Arab states and Afghanistan by a more active campaign in behalf of the Arab and Afghan positions on political issues in the area, it would be able to embarrass the West considerably with a minimum of effort. The USSR has already indicated that it is prepared to take a more active political part in seeing that "justice," as Egypt conceives of it, is done in the Middle East. It has reportedly even assured Nasir that it will seek his prior approval before adopting policies on questions, such as arms aid to the Sudan, which affect Egypt's interests. A Soviet move in the UN in favor of Arab demands for implementing the UN Palestine resolutions would evoke powerful reactions of approval within Egypt and other Arab states. It would place the Arabs under an obvious public political debt to the Bloc, and substantially enhance the prestige and potential of the Bloc and of indigenous Communists in the Arab states. It would also place the Western Powers in an extremely difficult position, in view of their relation with Israel, and would intensify existing Arab resentment of the West's support of Israel. Active Soviet support of Afghanistan in its controversy over Pushtunistan would not offer such a political dilemma to the West, but would substantially increase the chances of Afghanistan coming under Bloc influence, with a consequent threat to Pakistan's position.

IV. Consequences of Possible US Courses of Action

37. Among the many problems in the Middle East area two of the most urgent are: (a) the conflict between Israel and the Arab states; and (b) the conflict between Iraq on the one hand and Egypt, Syria, and Saudi Arabia on the other. These have [been] greatly aggravated by recent Soviet actions. These two problems are, of course, closely related, and any US course of action with respect to one will have repercussions on the other. Any US course of action, moreover, will produce different reactions from different states in the area, and their reactions will in turn be influenced by the total

impact of US actions throughout the area. In a recent estimate⁵ we have considered possible US courses of action with respect to the Arab-Israeli conflict. With respect to inter-Arab rivalries, we believe that the general lines of policy open to the US may be treated under the following four headings:

- a. Vigorous support for the Baghdad Pact;
- b. Providing some additional support for the Baghdad Pact;
- c. Delaying additional support for the Baghdad Pact;
- d. Abandonment of support for the Baghdad Pact, either with or without a stand-still agreement with the USSR.

Vigorous Support of the Baghdad Pact

38. A policy of vigorous support of the Baghdad Pact would almost certainly require substantial military assistance to Iraq, Pakistan, and Iran and formal US adherence to the Pact. Only in this way would the Pact members be convinced that the US meant business and that they would profit more from defense association with the West than from acceptance of Bloc assistance.

39. These actions would evoke distinctly favorable responses from the present member states and would increase the value of the alliance as a device for encouraging a pro-Western orientation in these states. It would also strengthen the appeal of the Pact to pro-Western, undecided, or opportunistic elements in other states—Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan. In time, and with continued substantial military aid, it might make possible defense arrangements of significant value to the West. However, except for Turkey, none of the “northern tier” states is likely to develop significant indigenous defense capabilities against a Soviet attack for years to come.

40. In the long run, wholehearted US (and UK) support for the Baghdad Pact will be essential if the alliance is to continue as more than a formality. If the US gave such support, however, it would almost inevitably become closely involved both in local controversies and in the UK-French rivalry in

Syria and would be under increasing pressure to take sides in a series of disputes where the choice would be difficult. In addition, the UK would strongly argue the necessity of US support for the maintenance of its position in southern Arabia and the Persian Gulf.

41. The members of the Pact would expect greater support for their own local objectives. The most immediate and critical would be Iraq's designs on Syria. An Iraqi take-over of Syria would produce strong resentment in Egypt and Saudi Arabia, and would confront the US with critical problems in the Middle East and elsewhere. On the other hand, US refusal to countenance an Iraqi move on Syria might weaken Iraq's support for the Pact.

42. Egypt and Syria would react adversely to vigorous US support for the Baghdad Pact, and the more extensive the support, the stronger would be their resentment. Despite Nasir's desire to retain his independence, Egypt would probably become more involved with the Bloc unless US support for the Pact were accompanied by convincing demonstrations that the US was ready to assist Egypt as well. The cost of such demonstrations would come high. Saudi Arabia would probably remain strongly opposed to the US position in any case, and would probably be disposed to draw closer to the Bloc.

43. Should the US, by the application of sanctions, attempt to force Egypt to desist from opposing the "northern tier" or to break the RCC's new ties with the Soviet Bloc, such an attempt would probably backfire. A US decision to discontinue aid after the current fiscal year would have little effect on Egypt's economy at present and by itself would probably not cause serious reactions. US withdrawal of economic and technical aid already programmed would also have little effect on the Egyptian economy, but would probably produce an angry and emotional RCC reaction, with attendant dangers of violent anti-American disorders and increasing reliance by Egypt on Soviet assistance. Additional actions such as dumping US surplus cotton would have an unsettling effect on Egypt's economy and would probably increase Egypt's readiness to accept further Bloc barter offers. Finally the RCC would regard US support for an Iraqi move to

absorb Syria as evidence of determination to destroy Egypt's position in the Arab world.

44. The only pressure likely to have a substantial effect on Saudi Arabia would be the prospect of elimination of its oil revenues, since it depends on these revenues for a large proportion of its national income and governmental budget. There is a slight chance the Saudi Arabian leaders would disregard a threat of the ending of this income, despite their attachment to the new way of life which oil revenues have brought them and despite their need for these revenues to insure control of the country. We think this unlikely. We believe, however, that no appreciable coercive effect could be gained by other means; e.g., support of the UK in its territorial disputes with Saudi Arabia, bargaining on the lease of the Dhahran Air Base, or encouragement of disloyal tribal chieftains.

45. Israel would see some advantages in US adherence to the Baghdad Pact and would probably also favor Lebanese and Jordanian membership. It would regard these developments as blows to Egypt's prestige and strength in the area and would probably hope that they would serve to lessen the likelihood of a coordinated Arab attack on Israel. However, Israel would still remain apprehensive about the consequent military build-up of the Arab Baghdad Pact members by the US and of Egypt by the USSR.

46. The USSR, which has already demonstrated willingness to take active measures against implementation of the "northern tier" concept, would probably increase its efforts to undermine the arrangement. These would probably take the form of stepped-up aid and support for Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Syria. The USSR would probably make stronger efforts to bring Afghanistan under dominant Bloc influence. They would almost certainly attempt to make propaganda capital out of the US policy, particularly among Asian and European neutralists. We believe, however, that the USSR will not feel itself sufficiently threatened by the Middle East defense grouping to undertake major retaliatory actions such as invasion of the member states.

A Moderate Increase in US Support for the Baghdad Pact

47. We believe there is at least an even chance that the US could effectively demonstrate some increase in interest and support for the Baghdad Pact (short of itself adhering) while at the same time cultivating Egypt and its fellow opponents. However, such a maneuver would be a difficult one. To overcome the present members' concern about US intentions would require fairly considerable US military aid for Iran, Iraq, and Pakistan and possibly US adherence to the Pact at a relatively early date. Nevertheless, we believe that Nasir's genuine desire for independence from both power blocs makes him desirous of retaining at least minimal good relations with the US. He is probably prepared to accept some increased US support for the "northern tier" group so long as it does not threaten to bring about the adherence of additional Arab states to the Baghdad Pact and is accompanied by convincing evidences of continued US willingness to cooperate with the RCC in other matters. Nasir would almost certainly regard a US decision to assist Egypt in building the High Aswan Dam and in achieving a satisfactory water agreement with the Sudan as constituting such evidence. At the same time, the regime would probably conclude that further efforts to play the West and the Bloc off against each other would be profitable.

48. Such an approach would be markedly less successful with Saudi Arabia, which would welcome tangible US demonstrations of good will but would not be likely to curb its anti-Iraqi feelings and activities in return. However, Saudi Arabia would be less effective an opponent of the Baghdad Pact without strong Egyptian backing. The Syrians would probably go along with Egypt's lead.

49. The essential difficulty of this possible course of action (and of the one discussed immediately below) is that of maintaining a balance between the intrinsically incompatible aims of the rival groups in the area. The conflicts between Israel and the Arab states on the one hand and the proponents and opponents of the Baghdad Pact on the other will probably result in increasingly strong pressures on the US to choose sides and arm its allies in those conflicts or rely on an agreement with the USSR that neither is to do so.

A Decision to Delay Support for the Baghdad Pact

50. A decision to “mark time” on extension of major additional support to the Baghdad Pact grouping as such would offer some opportunities for efforts to smooth out existing tensions and mend US fences with Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the present Syrian government. These states would almost certainly welcome tangible evidence of US willingness to understand and support them—and to provide some leverage against possible Soviet attempts to dominate them. However, they would almost certainly refuse to go back on any agreements that they might have with the Bloc in order to retain US good will.

51. Basically, they would tend to interpret US reluctance to support the Baghdad group strongly as a further indication of declining US interest in going ahead against their wishes and as evidence of their power to influence US decisions. Similar judgments would be reached by the leaders of uncommitted states such as Lebanon and Jordan and by the USSR. The USSR would almost certainly take advantage of the situation to augment its efforts to undermine the Baghdad grouping and to undercut the US generally.

52. We believe that marked US unwillingness to give strong support to the Baghdad Pact grouping at this stage would be a grave blow to the “northern tier” concept and to the Middle East governments supporting it, even if accompanied by minor gestures of encouragement designed to cushion the blow and leave the way open for a later resumption of US forward motion. The leaders of Iraq, Iran, and Pakistan would be reluctant to give up the hopes of continuing US military aid and formal US adherence to the Pact on which their participation was predicted [*predicated?*], but they have already become increasingly dissatisfied over what they regard as waning US support for the Pact and over the propaganda success which the Bloc arms deal has provided their internal and area rivals. If convinced that the US had definitely shelved any early increase of support for the Pact, they would almost certainly be faced with serious domestic criticism and loss of prestige for the failure of their pro-US policies. While the UK and Turkey would probably attempt to hold the Baghdad Pact group together, it would tend increasingly to disintegrate.

Abandonment of Support for the Baghdad Pact

53. Such a decision would offer certain advantages to the US. It would free the US from a long and costly effort to build up indigenous forces in the Middle East which at best would require years to achieve significance in defending against Soviet attack, and which in an era of generally relaxing tensions might prove to be of decreasing political value. It would offer opportunities for new Western efforts to woo the politically volatile neutralist, reformist elements in the Middle East and South Asia, including the leadership group in Egypt. In the long run the decreased emphasis on arms would give the Middle Eastern governments an opportunity to devote greater effort to the material betterment of their countries; whether they did so or not would significantly affect the prospects of the local Communists under a neutralization of the Middle East.

54. Abandonment of the Baghdad Pact could lead to certain further advantages if it were carried out in connection with a firm arrangement between the Western Powers and the USSR which was actually observed, and in which both sides agreed to stop arms shipments into the Middle East and to cooperate in maintaining the Arab-Israeli status quo. With the military balance among indigenous forces frozen in the Middle East, and the major powers cooperating to keep it so, the danger of local wars would probably be reduced and the chances of an Arab-Israeli settlement might be improved. Moreover, if the USSR should become by implication a co-guarantor of Israel's continued existence and territorial integrity, it would accept a share of blame for a situation that, more than anything else, has alienated Arab opinion from the West.

55. Abandonment of the Baghdad Pact, however, would inevitably bring repercussions damaging to the Western position in the Middle East. With or without an accompanying Soviet deal, it would be viewed locally as a major retreat by the West under pressure from the USSR. It would cause bitter disappointment among the signatories to the Pact, accentuate present tendencies toward neutralism in some of them, and almost certainly weaken the pro-Western governments of Pakistan, Iraq, and Iran. Iraq particularly would consider that it had been built up only to be let down and perhaps made to look somewhat ridiculous. In Iran there would be a strengthening of the traditional tendency to balance off the Great Powers against each other. The Soviet political and economic position in Iran would be

improved, and the USSR might demand a share in the exploitation of Iranian oil resources.

56. Turkey, under such circumstances, would probably consider that it had sustained a serious blow to its prestige and some loss to its defensive position. It would be unlikely to turn toward neutralism while its territorial integrity remained guaranteed by NATO but it would attempt to compensate by asking for increased US military assistance. Pakistan would probably move towards a more neutralist position, and would lose some interest in SEATO. It would probably not adopt an anti-Western position, however, as long as it continued to receive US aid and to hope that such aid might be increased.

57. An agreement between the USSR and the Western Powers of the kind described above, while it would remove the area from military competition between the two great blocs, would not remove it from political competition. Under any of the policies set forth the US would have to contend in the future with the determination and the ability of the USSR to play a part in the affairs of the Middle East, and to seek to identify itself, more successfully than the US, with the major aspirations of the politically effective forces in the area. Under a decision to neutralize the area, the challenge offered by the USSR would be implemented by diplomatic, economic, cultural, and covert means rather than by military instrumentalities. It would still be a major challenge.

58. Should such an agreement with the USSR break down, a return to the present situation would be almost impossible. States presently members of the Baghdad Pact would be much less ready to respond to any new call by the US to organize in their own defense, politically or militarily. There would be little prospect of creating additional effective armed forces in the area. The Middle East would be closed to additional Western military bases, while such bases as it already contains would have become of doubtful value.

V. The Arab-Israeli Problem

59. Any of the US courses of action discussed above will affect US relations with Israel in some degree. In particular, vigorous support for Iraq through the Baghdad Pact would lead Israel to step up its pressures for US support and assistance—pressures which are already strong as a result of the Egyptian arms deal. Any modifications in US policy toward Israel will, in turn, affect the Arab response to the US courses of action which we have discussed. Arab reaction to US moves to reassure Israel would depend on the extent to which such moves were designed to preserve the status quo, and appeared to apply to both sides. A reaffirmation of the Tripartite Declaration of 1950 would probably produce only a slight reaction in the Arab states. On the other hand, a unilateral US security guarantee to Israel, particularly if accompanied by extensive shipments of arms, including offensive weapons, would probably result in a very severe strain on US-Arab relations.

¹ Source: Department of State, INR–NIE Files. Top Secret. According to a note on the cover sheet, “The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency, and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff.” It was concurred in by the Intelligence Advisory Committee on November 8.

In Tosec 195 to Geneva, November 8, the Department of State informed Secretary Dulles that the conclusions of the NIE were being cabled to him and that it had been prepared “on crash basis at direction Acting Secretary.” (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 396. 1–GE/11–855) ³ For our assessment of the likelihood of an Arab-Israeli war, see SNIE 30–3–55, “Probable Consequences of the Egyptian Arms Deal with the Soviet Bloc,” dated 12 October 1955. [Footnote in the source text. For text of SNIE 30–3–55, see [vol. XIV, p. 577.](#)]

⁴ The Director of Intelligence, USAF, believes that the chance of Israel resorting to force in an effort to block this development is extremely remote. [Footnote in the source text.]

⁵ SNIE 30–3–55, “Probable Consequences of an Egyptian Arms Deal with the Soviet Bloc,” dated 12 October 1955. [Footnote in the source text. For text, see [vol. XIV, pp. 577–586.](#)]

79. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iraq¹

Washington, November 16, 1955—7 p.m.

358. Department has reviewed comments Pact signatories welcoming US liaison (London's 1749, Ankara's 754, Baghdad's 409, Karachi's 874, Tehran's 712).² In anticipation formal invitation, Department is assigning Ambassador Gallman as political observer at opening session and as permanent political liaison on presumption Council headquarters will be in Baghdad. Admiral Cassady, CINCNELM, with Brigadier General from staff will be designated special observer for opening session in addition to Army Attaché, Baghdad. Latter also designated as permanent military liaison, assuming Pact organization established in Iraq.

Tehran's 712, Baghdad's 473³ and London's 1749 have indicated desirability public announcement US assignment of observers and establishment liaison arrangement. As soon as comments Karachi and Ankara on this matter received (Cirtel 283)⁴ Department prepared consider issuing such announcement.

British Embassy has informed Department of their suggestions regarding substance and agenda of opening meeting. Department's comments on these will follow.⁵

Hoover

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/10-2955. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Newsom and approved by Wilkins who signed for Hoover. Also sent Priority to Ankara, London, Karachi, and Tehran.

² Telegram 409 from Baghdad, October 29, is [Document 74](#). The other telegrams, none printed, are in Department of State, Central File 780.5.

³ Dated November 14, not printed. (*Ibid.*, 780.5/11-1455) ⁴ [Document 72](#).

⁵ On November 19, the Department of State issued a press release announcing that the members of the Baghdad Pact had invited the United

States to establish military and political liaison with the organization, and that the United States had designated Ambassador Waldemar Gallman as its special political observer at the initial meeting of the organization to take place in Baghdad on November 21. Admiral John H. Cassady, Commander in Chief of U.S. Naval Forces in the Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean, and Brigadier General Forrest Caraway would also attend as special military observers. Gallman was also designated to maintain continuing political liaison with the organization and Colonel Henry P. Tucker, U.S. Army Attaché at Baghdad, to maintain continuing military liaison. The text of the press release is printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, November 28, 1955, p. 895.

80. Telegram From the Embassy in Iraq to the Department of State¹

Baghdad, November 21, 1955—2 p.m.

505. Opening session Turk-Iraqi Pact Council of Ministers began 1000 today.

After formal welcoming address by Nuri Permanent Council established and Nuri named first chairman (see below). Heads of various delegations then delivered brief statements after which US observers invited attend.

I gave statement approved by Department² adding only expression my pleasure that Iranian Prime Minister Ala had recently escaped injury and was able be with group. Ala expressed his deep appreciation.

Slightly revised agenda from that reported Embtel 491, November 18³ adopted which called for withdrawal military experts immediately thereafter to organize proposed military committee and to study UK and Turk memos on committee's proposed activities. Military committee instructed report to Council no later than tomorrow noon.

Council next agreed Turk-Iraqi Pact should henceforth formally be known as Baghdad Pact, that French as well as English should be considered pact organization's official language and that GOI should undertake register pact with UN on behalf all member states. Suggestion of conference secretary that press communiqué be issued each day followed by final statement at end of conference and that delegations might therefore refrain from expressing individual views to press accepted with modification proposed by Macmillan that individual delegation's press officials be allowed give background guidance to press as conference proceeds.

Iranian Prime Minister sought to obtain agreement chairmanship would begin on alphabetical basis (which would mean Iran next) at beginning of 1956 but compromise proposed by Macmillan accepted that in view nearness end of current year present chairman (Nuri) be considered

chairman for next 14 months with understanding that next annual meeting of Council will be held in Tehran where he would as matter of courtesy turn over chair to host government for those sessions. Thereafter beginning 1957 chairmanship would rotate on alphabetical basis.

Meeting adjourned 1210 with second session of Council scheduled convene 1530 today.⁴

Gallman

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5.11–2155. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Tehran, London, Ankara, and Karachi.

² For text of Gallman's statement of November 21, see Department of State *Bulletin*, December 5, 1955, pp. 926–927.

³ Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/11–1855) ⁴ For text of the final communiqué issued by the Baghdad Pact Council on November 22, see Department of State *Bulletin*, January 2, 1956, pp. 16–18. Telegraphic reports on the other sessions of the meeting are in Department of State, Central File 780.5.

81. Memorandum of Discussion at the 267th Meeting of the National Security Council, Camp David, Maryland, November 21, 1955¹

Camp David, November 21, 1955

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and item 1, Allen Dulles's briefing on significant world developments affecting U.S. security.]

2. Report by the Secretary of State

[Here follows Dulles' report on the Foreign Ministers Meeting (printed in [volume V, page 803](#)) and on his trip to Spain and Yugoslavia.]

Lastly, Secretary Dulles said that he would touch on the problems of the Near East. In the main, our policies toward that area had been run from Washington by Under Secretary Hoover, although Secretary Dulles had likewise been involved while at Geneva.

Secretary Dulles expressed the view that there could be little doubt but that the Soviets had deliberately opened a new cold war front in the Near East. Molotov had been very evasive when the Secretary had questioned him on Soviet policy toward that area, and had kept insisting that the arms deal with Egypt was a simple commercial transaction from which no serious political repercussions were to be expected. It was obvious, continued Secretary Dulles, that the Soviet moves in the Near East confronted the West with a very grave situation. The loss of the oil of the Middle East would be almost catastrophic for the West. Moreover, Egypt was the gateway to Africa, the retention of which was so very important for us. If Europe were to lose Africa, little would be left of Europe in a short time. We needed to watch this situation very carefully. For some 25 years we had observed the Communists going to work to bring China under their control. We had done nothing about it until it was too late. We could not afford to repeat this mistake with regard to the Middle East or Africa.

Secretary Dulles then said he did not believe that the Arab governments were entirely happy over the prospect of possible future dependence on the USSR. It was obvious that they wanted to play off the West against the Soviet bloc, but if they were compelled to choose one or another, they wouldn't be very happy to choose the Soviet bloc. On the other hand, they might be forced to make such a choice if the West became identified with Israel in active hostilities between Israel and the Arab States. The only solution that Secretary Dulles could perceive for the short-range problem was a general solution of the quarrel between the Israelis and the Arabs. Such a solution he believed by no means impossible. Our policies and those

of the UK were pretty much alike, though Secretary Dulles expressed some distaste for Prime Minister Eden's recent speech on the Near East situation.² He said that Eden had tried to drag him into supporting this speech at the very last minute, but that he, Secretary Dulles, had bucked at full endorsement. After all, Secretary Dulles pointed out, his own speech of August 26 on this situation had been discussed for weeks in advance with the British and his proposals cleared with them before the speech was made.

Nevertheless, Secretary Dulles said that no significant cleavage between the U.S. and the UK on Near Eastern policy could be permitted. It was plain enough that the United Kingdom was trying very hard to swing support over to the side of the Arabs and to regain the lost British position with the Arab States. While this was understandable, it was simply impossible to ignore the position of the Israeli Government. If we did so the Israelis might move in such a way as to bring down the whole house.

This reminded Secretary Dulles that he had had a serious talk with Foreign Minister Sharett at the State Department this morning. Secretary Dulles had urged Sharett to remain calm and to avoid incidents involving the Arabs even if provocation existed. It had been a good talk. The Israelis had presented us with a large request for arms. Accordingly, in the course of his conversation Secretary Dulles had referred to the fact that the U.S., along with the UK, was setting up a group to exchange views on arms requests from Middle Eastern countries before any action was taken. Apropos of the Israeli-Arab situation as a whole, Secretary Dulles said that while he regarded it as extremely dangerous, it was not more so than other difficulties which we have encountered and surmounted.

Secretary Dulles then referred to the meeting which was occurring today of the representatives of the five Baghdad Pact powers. This was likewise a situation which needed careful watching. There was no doubt whatever that the Baghdad Pact worried the Soviet Union. The Soviets were genuinely concerned over the possibility that the United States might secure military bases in Iran. Accordingly, this game must be played very carefully. Half-way measures by the United States toward the Baghdad Pact might be worse than no measures at all. Secretary Dulles asked Mr. Anderson if the Planning Board was considering our general policy with respect to the Near

East and to the Baghdad Pact. Mr. Anderson confirmed that earlier action by the Council had been restricted to the Arab-Israeli problem, and that the Planning Board was now preparing a general review of our Near Eastern policy as a whole.

Secretary Dulles then went on to remind the National Security Council that the concept of the so-called “northern tier” of Middle Eastern states had originally been his own concept. At the time that this concept had been accepted there was a general feeling that we could not hope to induce the Arab States south of this tier to join with it. This view had in fact been borne out by events. The United Kingdom, which had been initially skeptical of the northern tier concept, had now switched to strong support of it; indeed, they were supporting it now more strongly than perhaps was wise. The British were now putting all their money on Iraq. In any event, the situation needed most careful reappraisal, because the British are tending to run away with it. Secretary Dulles also reminded the Council that he had not been “too keen” on having Iran join the Baghdad Pact when that country had done so, although he had agreed to the move. However, he did not think that the Soviet arms offer to Egypt could be correctly described as the Soviet reaction to Iran’s joining the Baghdad Pact, because the beginnings of the arms deal were much earlier in time than the date when Iran actually joined the Baghdad Pact. Thus, while the arms deal might not be an act of Soviet retaliation, the Soviets may nevertheless pursue their Near Eastern policy with much greater vigor than they had in the past. While we could not let the British make our policy for us in this area, or follow the British line blindly, we should certainly cooperate with the British.

At this point the President interrupted to point out that Colonel Nasser had recently made a very odd statement to Pete Jones, to the effect that we should do well to remember that “the Russians did not come to me; I went to them.” This, said the President, indicated that Nasser felt obliged to secure the arms on the ground that otherwise his government would collapse. Secretary Dulles added that there was a measure of truth in Nasser’s reasoning. Nasser felt that he must hold his job. The Army was the key to holding the job, and the Army was demanding armament. Accordingly, there was no clear demonstration yet that Colonel Nasser

actually proposed to turn his back on the West and cast his lot with the Soviet bloc. On the other hand, he may become involved in such a course if forces are unleashed that he was incapable of controlling.

[Here follows discussion of NATO; Fiscal Year 1957 programs for military assistance, economic aid, and foreign information; and U.S. military forces.]

S. Everett Gleason

¹ Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Prepared by Gleason on November 22.

² Reference is to Prime Minister Eden's Guildhall address on the Arab-Israeli dispute delivered at Mansion House on November 9. For text, see Frankland (ed.), *Documents on International Affairs*, 1955, pp. 382–385.

82. Telegram From the Embassy in Iraq to the Department of State¹

Baghdad, November 24, 1955—2 p.m.

521. Prime Minister Nuri asked me to meet with him and Menderes at airport this morning just before takeoff of Turkish delegation. I met with them along with Foreign Minister Bashayan and British Ambassador.

Nuri and Menderes had met yesterday with Jordanian Minister in Baghdad. He leaves this afternoon for Beirut where King Husain is visiting. From there he is to go to Amman to see Prime Minister Mufti.

Jordanian Minister is to tell King and Prime Minister that if Jordan joins pact, Turkey and Iraq will extend some arms and economic aid to Jordan. Macmillan has given his approval that Minister may say UK is also prepared to extend some arms aid and to revise present Anglo-Jordanian treaty as well.

Nuri and Menderes feel quite confident that these assurances will bring Jordan into pact.

When I asked Nuri what kind of economic aid Iraq was prepared to extend to Jordan, he said that would be brought out in contemplated new economic accord which is to be negotiated here next month.

Nuri and Menderes then spoke to me about Lebanon.

They feel that if approach is made now to President Chamoun to join pact, with some assurances of arms and economic aid, Chamoun can bring Lebanon into pact. He needs, however, some assurances in order to bring government along and to create most propitious public atmosphere. No approach will be made to Chamoun, however, until answer is received from us whether we too are prepared to extend some arms and economic aid.

Could we, they asked, give assurance of extending to Lebanon some defensive arms aid on grant basis, and assurance of some economic aid?

When I questioned them about extent of arms aid and just what kind of economic aid they had in mind, they replied that “token” grants of arms and economic aid would suffice. I could not get anything more definite from them. When I pressed for something more specific, at least on kind of economic aid envisaged, Bashayan volunteered that Lebanon was getting aid for irrigation development through loan from IBRD. Perhaps, he suggested, some loan, even if limited, for some such development scheme could be arranged.

Both Nuri and Menderes feel that if Jordan and Lebanon join pact now, reaction in Syria would be such as to weaken Leftist hold on that country and strengthen its pro-Western elements.

Would appreciate receive as soon as possible Department’s reaction to possible “token” arms and economic aid to Lebanon to strengthen pact members’ approach to Chamoun.²

Gallman

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/11–2455. Secret; Priority. Repeated Priority to London, Ankara, Amman, and Beirut.

² In telegram 400 to Baghdad, November 26, the Department of State responded that it had recently informed the Embassy in Beirut that the United States was prepared to give prompt consideration to a Lebanese request for assistance under the reimbursable military aid agreement with Lebanon of March 23, 1953. (5 UST 2908) Lebanon, however, had not yet made any purchases under this agreement nor had it taken action on a U.S. offer of a \$5 million loan made in February 1955. The Department also noted that the United States was unable to extend grant military assistance without a grant aid agreement with Lebanon and did not wish currently to propose such an agreement to Lebanon, because of probable Congressional opposition. (Department of State, Central Files, 783A.5–MSP/11–2655)

83. Letter From Foreign Secretary Macmillan to Secretary of State Dulles¹

London, November 25, 1955.

DEAR FOSTER: I have just got back from Bagdad and hasten to give you my impressions. First of all I would like to say how much I admire the way you have handled Sharrett in Washington. I think there really is a chance now of making some progress towards a settlement. I was impressed by the general Arab view both in Iraq and in the Lebanon in favour of a settlement of some kind. This is a new point of view because up to now they have always been against anything approaching a settlement in the hope that as the years went on they might get strong enough to liquidate Israel altogether. Partly because of the Russian intervention and the fear of Communism and partly because of a realisation among the more sensible leaders that these extreme ambitions are unrealistic, I believe they are now ready to accept the fact that they will have to live with an Israel state. Roger Makins is in touch with the State Department over the next step. Both Anthony and I feel that we ought not to lose the present impetus. The sooner we get the negotiation going on Trieste lines the better. It is a tremendous satisfaction to me and my colleagues that we are working in such harmony with you as to purpose and method.

Now about Bagdad. You will have heard from Gallman about the meeting. He made a notable contribution and his presence there, with that of Admiral Cassady, gave great encouragement. Although he had to limit himself to "observations", those that he made were very much to the point. The meeting was a great success and the presence of the four Prime Ministers has undoubtedly made an impression.

I realised, as I had not done before, the special importance of the Pact in relation to Communist propaganda today. What the Russians are really saying to the countries of Asia is this: "Your contacts with Western thought and influence have brought you nothing but humiliation. They are exploiters, colonialists, imperialists, and have no real basis of understanding with you". Thus they are preaching active communism to some nations in Asia (both the Middle and the Far East) and anti-Western neutralism to the

rest. Their method is to exploit the latent xenophobia of all these peoples and the natural jealousy of less advanced powers for the great Western and Christian civilisations.

The Pact therefore is of special importance, because it is a real partnership, on a basis of equality, between Western countries and Moslem Asian countries. Moreover since it includes a leading Arab State, Iraq, it makes a convenient link with the Arab world, now so important to us. I have discussed all this here with Anthony and we have decided that we must go all out in support of the Pact and make it a reality. This will involve a permanent secretariat of a modest kind and a budget. It means doing our utmost to get new Arab entrants, for Nuri's position cannot be comfortable while he is alone. So we are going to do everything we can to induce Jordan to come in. We may have to pay quite a price but we shall make an immediate effort to achieve this.

There is, however, one feature of the situation which I had not at all understood until I went out, and which I believe is new since you were in the area. It is this. The Russians are developing a tremendous activity and trying by every means to win the support of all states who are not definitely committed. To do this they are making use of all their normal methods of propaganda and of course shamelessly exploiting nationalist and anti-Israeli sentiments. But I was assured by all my colleagues at Bagdad that this effort is being everywhere assisted by the large subsidies which the Saudi Arabians are making to every form of subversive and anti-Western activity throughout the area. Chamoun in Beirut went so far as to say that the Saudi agents who are distributing literally millions of dollars are in daily touch with the Communist agents as to how they can best distribute their money in Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq and Egypt. This is particularly irritating when one considers that all this money is the result of Western skill and enterprise.

What then, can we do? May I earnestly ask you to consider whether you would not now decide to become a full partner of the Pact? Even if you cannot do this in a treaty form, you could possibly become a member by congressional resolution in the way which you explained to me. Your adherence would make a certainty of success of what is now somewhat

doubtful. It would be a message throughout the whole area and have the same kind of effect as when NATO was formed after the fall of Czechoslovakia and the powers of the New World came into full partnership with Europe. You will remember that this settled the hesitations of many European waverers.

The second problem is that of Saudi Arabia, [2 lines of source, text not declassified]. This raises of course very difficult problems [6 lines of source text not declassified]. You and I, of course, know all the old difficulties and suspicions. But I think the Middle Eastern position is so serious that we must use our influence to get the same kind of cooperation here as we have established in other parts of the world. It is too big an issue for us to act separately. You will of course reply, what about Buraimi? But I am quite prepared that this should be open for discussion between us just as frankly as the rest of the problem.

In spite of the difficulties, the very successful cooperation which we achieved over the Iranian oil question shows what can be done when we act sincerely together. I have had a talk with Winthrop about all this today and told him that I would be sending this message to you through him.²

Yours ever,

Harold Macmillan

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/11–2955. Secret. The salutation and closing of the letter are handwritten. Forwarded to the Department of State in despatch 1233 from London, November 29. The text of the message was transmitted to the Department of State in telegram 2170, November 25. (*Ibid.*, 780.5/11–2555) In telegram 2173, November 26, Ambassador Aldrich transmitted a report of his conversation with Macmillan on November 25 during which they discussed the contents of Macmillan's message. Aldrich reported that Macmillan had emphasized that it was of the highest importance that the United States adhere to the Baghdad Pact as soon as possible. Aldrich recommended, "I believe we

should do everything possible to act favorably on suggestions made in Macmillan's message including joining Baghdad Pact as soon as possible." (*Ibid.*, 780.00/11-2655) ² Dulles' response was transmitted for delivery to Macmillan in telegram 3132 to London, December 5, printed in [vol. XIV, p. 820](#). Regarding the Baghdad Pact, Dulles responded: "An immediate move to expand the Baghdad Pact would probably deny us Nasser's cooperation. Therefore, I think we should wait a little before trying to bring in Jordan and Lebanon. If we are not successful in Egypt, we should endeavor to secure the adherence of those two states as soon as possible.

"US adherence to the Pact would probably have to be coupled with a security guarantee for Israel."

84. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Allen) to the Secretary of State¹

Washington, November 28, 1955.

SUBJECT

FY 1957 Military Assistance for the Middle East

The Defense Department's proposal for military assistance to Middle Eastern countries for FY 1957 reflects a failure to accord an adequate priority for US military assistance in that area. In our view it falls far short of what is necessary in the field of military aid to counter the new Soviet efforts to disengage the Middle East from the West. These efforts and the formation of the Northern Tier have radically altered the basic assumptions upon which our programming has been based.

With our encouragement, Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Pakistan have firmly aligned themselves with the West and to the defensive system implicit in the Northern Tier arrangement. If it is to be effective, the Baghdad Pact group must develop political unity as well as a sense of increased security and confidence through firm Western backing; they must, moreover, have a certain degree of real defensive capability. The Northern Tier countries' principal interest in military strength is to improve their ground forces. The State-Defense Working Group Report on Middle East Defense, dated June 6, 1955, indicated this to be the field in which our efforts might most economically and usefully be concentrated to achieve an early and appreciable increase in the area's indigenous defense potential.

By virtue of our previous assurances, the Baghdad Pact countries have good reason to expect much greater US military assistance than that forecast in the current Defense Department's proposal (see Tabs A and B² for details). The adequacy and timeliness of our support will be a major factor in the development and maintenance of an effective defense organization which is so important to the political and military alignment of the entire Middle

East. A minimum rate of progress in providing for equipment deficiencies of the Pact armies would be generally consistent with existing NSC policies. Moreover, we consider appreciable military aid to these countries, which have frankly declared themselves to be our friends, particularly important in the period ahead when we are endeavoring by all feasible means to prove to the peoples of the area the value of American friendship as contrasted to Soviet blandishments. Whether correct or not, most Middle Easterners believe that the prestige and future influence of the West in the area is at stake.

Recommendations:

1. That you discuss with Secretary Wilson, Secretary Humphrey, Mr. Hollister and Mr. Hughes the urgent need of according a high priority to US military assistance to the Middle East, particularly to the countries comprising the Northern Tier, advocating for the latter a FY 1957 program that would provide for reasonable progress in meeting their equipment deficiencies (see Tab A).
2. That you advocate providing flexibility in a Middle East military assistance program adequate to meet urgent requirements which may come up during the year, such as in connection with the renegotiation of the Dhahran Base Agreement, Wheelus Base Agreement in Libya, etc.

[Tab A]

The status of our military assistance relationship with each of the Northern Tier countries and the extent of the Defense FY '57 proposals for Ground Forces is as follows:

Turkey. The effect of our commitment of June 1954, and reaffirmation at the NATO Annual Review in December, is that the Turks understand that the United States would, to the best of its ability, provide equipment to help them achieve NATO Army force goals in four or five years. This program has more recently been costed at around \$630 million. In three years only the slightest start will have been made since the programs for FY '55

and '56 combined with the FY '57 proposal would fund roughly one-fourth of equipment needs. Thus after three years, three-fourths of the program will remain unfunded. The FY '57 proposal would be the smallest portion of this funding. Only \$22.2 millions is devoted to new equipment.

Pakistan. The effect of our commitment of October 1954 is that the Pakistanis understand that the United States will provide, roughly by mid FY '58, equipment to fill existing deficiencies in 5½ army divisions. At the time of the commitment the Pakistani program was costed at roughly \$170 million for all services, but since that time it has become clear that the Army portion of such a program was considerably underestimated. While the FY '57 proposal would probably bring the total aid beyond the \$170 million mark, it does not make a material contribution toward the deficiencies of the 5½ divisions.

Iraq. In connection with our Military Assistance Agreement, assistance in addition to the initial aid program was conditioned upon Iraq's taking steps to promote regional defenses. Having fully carried out this condition by playing a key role in the formation of the Northern Tier, the Iraqis fully expect further help in meeting their legitimate defense needs. The initial program, of roughly \$11 millions, was funded in FY '54. With the exception of Centurion Tanks provided in FY '56, there has been no continuing program for the subsequent two years. While the provision of the tanks was successful psychologically, there remain basic equipment needs, costed roughly at \$60 millions, which are not being met. The FY '57 proposal provides only for additional tanks and some maintenance, but nothing towards basic equipment needs.

Iran. Convinced that neutrality is unrealistic, the Shah of Iran recently took the step of closing the gap in the Northern Tier by acceding to the Baghdad Pact. This was done in the belief that the US would assist Iran to achieve an effective Army to carry out responsibilities under the Pact, and to develop some capacity to

resist Soviet pressure. Since the fall of 1954 a MAAG/Tehran proposal for building up the Iranian Army has been held in abeyance awaiting final action in Defense. Despite some disagreement on details it is generally agreed that a military aid program of slightly under \$200 million covering a three year period would be necessary to make the Iranian Army effective. The present program consists of deliveries from the small pipeline based on funds from FY 1954 and earlier. Practically no funding was undertaken in FY '55 and FY '56. The FY '57 proposal makes no significant provision for filling Iranian Army equipment deficiencies. This is politically very dangerous, occurring as it does immediately after Iranian accession to the Pact, and in view of a commitment made to the Shah last July for a somewhat increased program in '57 and '58. Without commitment to the above \$200 million program or to any other specific program, it should be possible and is certainly necessary to do more in the way of providing new equipment than is contemplated in the '57 Defense presentation.

The Defense Department FY '57 proposal for this area, as throughout the world, is primarily designed to maintain forces now in being at present levels, to meet fixed costs, and obligations as construed by Defense. As indicated above this programming is politically inadequate for support of the Northern Tier. While in the last analysis the specific decisions concerning programs should be made by Defense, political considerations can be met if the FY '57 proposal is increased to provide for one-quarter of the Army unit equipment deficiencies in Turkey, Iraq and Iran, and one-half of such deficiencies in Pakistan.

¹ Source: Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5428 Series. Secret. Drafted by William M. Rountree and Ben F. Dixon.

² Tab B, a table entitled “Defense Department Proposal for FY '57 Military Assistance to the Middle East”, is not printed.

85. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Hoover) to the Secretary of State¹

Washington, December 1, 1955.

I concur in the attached memorandum from Mr. Allen.²

At the Budget hearings on November 30, in the presence of Department of Defense officials, I expressed the view of the Department of State in the strongest possible terms of the necessity for increasing military strength in the Bagdad Pact area, especially in Iraq, Iran, and Pakistan. I expressed the opinion that the Department did not believe that the appropriations requested of Congress for FY 57 would provide the requisite degree of backing unless expenditures were to be made from other accounts which were not indicated in the presentation.

The Department of State, to my intimate knowledge, has had continuous difference of opinion over the period of the last two years while I have been in the Department, with Defense officials regarding appropriate military levels in many of the Middle East countries. This point of view has been presented by the Department of State on many occasions before the National Security Council in connection with Middle East papers.

You will recall on several occasions that the President had personally requested Defense and the JCS to consider expanded force levels in this area. So far, no action has been forthcoming.

H.

¹ Source: Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5428 Memos. A handwritten notation on the source text indicates that it was seen by Secretary Dulles.

² *Supra*.

86. Editorial Note

On December 6, General Sir Gerald Templer, Chief of the British Imperial General Staff, accompanied by Michael Rose, Head of the Levant Department of the British Foreign Office, arrived in Amman for discussions with King Hussein and Jordanian officials. The visit, which lasted until December 14, was motivated primarily by United Kingdom desire to facilitate Jordan's early adherence to the Baghdad Pact. The Templer visit prompted the resignation on December 14 of Prime Minister Said al-Mufti and four members of his cabinet in protest over the British proposals. King Hussein then asked Haza al-Majali, a proponent of the Pact, to form a new government. Demonstrations against the new government and the Baghdad Pact broke out on December 18 in Amman, Jericho, and Hebron, forcing al-Majali to resign the following day. Hussein, in turn, issued a decree dissolving Parliament and calling for a general election within four months and asked Ibrahim Hashim, President of the Jordanian Senate, to form a caretaker government to rule until the new elections. Regarding these events and their aftermath, see [volume XIII, pages 9 ff.](#)

87. Memorandum From Elbert G. Mathews of the Policy Planning Staff to the Director (Bowie)¹

Washington, December 13, 1955.

SUBJECT

Meeting With Secretary Re NEA Draft Revision of NSC 5428

The following principal points emerged from the discussion with the Secretary on December 9 of the NEA draft revision of NSC 5428:²

1. The Secretary desires that relationships between the Near Eastern states, particularly Egypt, and Africa be covered in the paper.
2. The Secretary considers it necessary to emphasize that we must seek a modus vivendi with the Nasser regime in Egypt. Our courses of action in the Near East depend upon the success or failure of our efforts in that direction. The paper should accordingly set forth alternative courses of action based on the assumptions, (a) that we reach an accommodation with Nasser and (b) that we do not.
3. The Secretary considered that the NEA language with respect to US adherence to the Baghdad Pact was too categorical. He suggested that the formulation on this point should be more conditional, with particular reference to developments in the Arab-Israeli situation. Similarly, the Secretary questioned the desirability of calling for the adherence of Jordan and Lebanon to the Baghdad Pact without provisos relating to the Arab-Israeli situation and the state of our relations with Egypt.
4. The Secretary said that as military aid to Turkey was primarily NATO-oriented and to Pakistan SEATO-oriented courses of action concerning military aid to the Baghdad Pact should be

restricted in this paper to Iraq and Iran. After some discussion, there was consensus that the military objective of military aid to Iran and Iraq was to enable those countries to maintain internal security and to give them confidence that in case of local Communist aggression that [*they*] would have sufficient strength for holding action until outside assistance could reach them.

5. The Secretary objected to stating as the first purpose of US economic aid the countering of Soviet influence in the Near East. He agreed that this was a purpose but desired that it be mentioned less prominently.

6. The Secretary questioned the advisability of stating categorically that we should maintain the Dhahran air base. He preferred the formulation that we seek to maintain the base with the implication that we were not prepared to pay an unreasonable price for it.

7. The Secretary commented that the proposal of an economic union among Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Jordan was new to him and required further consideration.

8. The possibility of a tacit understanding with the USSR that it would cease doing certain things in the Near East that we disliked as long as we did not adhere to the Baghdad Pact or seek additional base rights in the Pact area was discussed. It was suggested that this was worth further thought.

9. The Secretary stated that in view of the impending visit of Eden and Macmillan he did not consider it desirable to put a revision of NSC 5428 into the NSC machinery at this time. The revision should be submitted after the visit and should reflect agreements and understandings that might be reached in the discussions with the two British statesmen. He thought, however, that the present paper could be usefully revised to serve as a background and position paper for the talks with the British.³

¹ Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 66 D 70, Near and Middle East. Secret.

² In preparation for the December 9 meeting, Allen forwarded to Secretary Dulles on December 7 a revised draft of NSC 5428 prepared in NEA and concurred in by the Policy Planning Staff, the Bureaus of European Affairs and International Organization Affairs, the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary for Economic Affairs, and Francis Russell. The revised draft is attached to a forwarding memorandum from Allen to Secretary Dulles. (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 611.80/12-755) ³ Following the December 9 meeting, the Policy Planning Staff undertook a further revision of NSC 5428. The text of this draft revision was forwarded to George Allen on December 28 under cover of a memorandum from Bowie. (*Ibid.*, 684A.86/12-2855)

88. Editorial Note

On December 22, at the 271st meeting of the National Security Council, Allen Dulles, in his review of developments affecting United States security, presented a report on the Baghdad Pact and the latest developments in the Buraimi area. The memorandum of discussion reads in part as follows:

“Mr. Allen Dulles said that he would next comment on developments in the Middle East. The British, he said, had been lately flexing their muscles in this area and, as a result, creating certain problems for the United States. In the first instance, they had pressured Iran into joining the Baghdad Pact. This had been followed by the quarrel with the Saudi Arabians in the Buraimi area. Now they have been trying to push Jordan into the Baghdad Pact. The results had been a failure, as indicated by the riots which had broken out in Jordan on the 15th of December. The riots had been stimulated in part by bribes from Saudi Arabia and in part by inflammatory broadcasts by the Cairo radio. The results had been a severe blow to the British and, to some extent, to Western prestige.

“Secretary Dulles pointed out that he had strongly urged Foreign Secretary Macmillan not to put pressure on Jordan to join the Baghdad Pact. Agreeing with Secretary Dulles that this had been a very unwise move, the President said that, unlike the British, we had always gone on the theory of not getting any country having common frontiers with Israel into the Baghdad Pact. Mr. Allen Dulles commented that the only explanation was the hope of the British to restore something of their lost prestige in the Middle East.

“Mr. Dulles then reported the latest developments in the Buraimi area, commenting that the British move was designed to bring the disparate sheikdoms all under the control of one pro-British sheik,

thus enabling the British to maintain their oil rights against the claims of Saudi Arabia.

“The Vice President wondered whether General Templer could have influenced British policy as a result of his position in the Middle East. The Vice President added that when he had visited the Far East, he had encountered few people who had a keener understanding of Communism or who had dealt with it more effectively than General Templer. It seemed to the Vice President impossible that Templer could have carried out such stupid courses of action as described by Mr. Dulles, unless he had been under direct orders from the British Government in London. The President pointed out that the British Chiefs of Staff were even more tightly meshed in with the civilian elements of the government in Great Britain than the Chiefs of Staff were in the United States. He shared the Vice President’s estimate of Templer’s qualities, and was sure that in the Middle East Templer was carrying out the orders of his civilian superiors.”
(Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)

89. Despatch From the Embassy in Iraq to the Department of State¹

Baghdad, January 6, 1956.

No. 504

SUBJECT

NIE 30-4-55: The Outlook for U.S. Interests in the Middle East²

I have read with much interest the recent National Intelligence Estimate on the outlook for U.S. interests in the Middle East. In accordance with Mr. Armstrong's letter of transmittal, I have made the Estimate available to Embassy officers who should see it, including our [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] Service Attachés.

We were urged in Mr. Armstrong's letter to furnish the Department with our comments and criticisms. Detailed statements prepared by Embassy Officers are attached.³ The only comment which I wish to make—and there is a consensus on this subject here in the Embassy—is that any U.S. decision to abandon the Baghdad Pact would, as the Estimate states in the last paragraph of the Conclusions, “gravely damage the Western position in the Middle East”. My principal criticism of the Estimate is that it presents the pro's and con's of this line of action in so balanced a way as to make such a decision appear as a feasible alternative. The arguments advanced for abandoning the Pact are so tenuous as to rule out, in my mind, any serious consideration of that line of action.

I feel strongly, after more than a year in Baghdad, that one thing should be crystal clear: any retreat from our well-known position supporting the Baghdad Pact would undermine U.S. interests in this part of the world by seriously weakening the security of the area, the political stability of countries friendly to the United States, and the confidence of the Middle Eastern countries in the sincerity of the United States.

Colleagues here in Baghdad have, I think, described very well our present anomalous position with regard to the Pact: we get all the blame from critic-countries for supporting it, and none of the credit which our friends in the Pact accord only to fellow members. Our friends still hope that we may soon become full participants in the Pact.

W. J. Gallman

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 101.21–NIS/1–656. Top Secret.

² [Document 78](#).

³ Not printed.

90. Editorial Note

On January 11, at a news conference, Secretary Dulles was asked several questions concerning the Baghdad Pact. He mentioned U.S. sympathy toward its formation and his own personal interest. He then said, "On the question of its further development, the United States has no particular views. We have not urged any other countries to join the pact."

Regarding U.S. membership, the Secretary said, "I think we would consider joining the Baghdad Pact if and when it seemed in doing so it would be a contribution to the general stability of the area. We do not consider it as an isolated act."

For the complete transcript of the news conference, see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1956*, page 561.

**91. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State,
Washington, January 13, 1956, 10 a.m.¹**

Washington, January 13, 1956, 10 a.m.

SUBJECT

US–UK Interests and Objectives in the Middle East in Light of
the Threat Posed by Current Soviet Strategy in the Area

PARTICIPANTS:

US

NEA—Messrs. Allen and Rountree

S/P—Mr. Bowie-Mr. Mathews

EUR—Mr. Merchant

NEA—Mr. Byroade

S—Mr. Russell

AF—Mr. Cyr

GTI—Mr. Baxter

SOA—Mr. Jones

NE—Mr. Wilkins

NE—Mr. Geren

NEA—Mr. Dixon

DRN—Mr. Ogburn

EUR—Mr. Evan Wilson

EUR—Mr. Lister

E/E—Mr. Blake

UK

Mr. Evelyn Shuckburgh (UK Foreign Office)

Mr. Geoffrey Arthur (UK Foreign Office)

Mr. Ian Samuel (UK Foreign Office)

Mr. J. E. Coulson (UK Embassy)

Mr. William Barker (UK Embassy)

Mr. Willie Morris (UK Embassy)

Friday, January 13, 1956

Mr. Allen welcomed Mr. Shuckburgh and his colleagues to the State Department, signaled the particular importance of the talks for which they had come, expressed the confidence that the conversations which are preparatory to the talks of President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Eden, would be friendly and frank, and invited Mr. Shuckburgh to lead off with a description of the overall situation.²

Mr. Shuckburgh replied that the problems the U.S. and Britain face in the Middle East are insoluble unless the two countries have a similar policy. He recalled that British Chiefs of Mission in the area had been recently summoned to London and had worked out a set of conclusions more practical than philosophical. He would begin by passing on to the group some of these conclusions.

Mr. Shuckburgh turned to a review of the findings of the British Chiefs of Mission. He said that they had concluded it is impossible to have a fixed policy applying to the whole area. Rather the best policy lies in knowing

where to yield and where not to yield. It is a policy of finding the best course between extremes, a course between getting every country in the area to commit itself to joint defense arrangements with us and the opposite extreme of complete neutralism in the area. It lies between defending our acquired positions and not dividing the Arabs. In certain respects the policy forces a choice between the rival parties Iraq and Egypt. Where we run up against Arab opposition, a policy of withdrawal is not automatically indicated. Withdrawal creates vacuums and it also prejudices our position in a part of the world where strength and consistency count for a great deal. We ought not set ourselves up against the mainstream of the emotions of the area. Our real objective is to secure the right of the West to extract and use the oil of the region. The British have troops in Jordan not because they derive some psychological benefit from having troops there, but because they believe the British effort in Jordan contributes to the security of the oil for the West. We can only get the oil by the willing cooperation of the Arabs. In search of ways to secure this objective we should avoid running against Arab passions.

Mr. Shuckburgh then undertook to state some specific objectives mentioning that he was not bothering to take special account of the Palestine question since all are agreed that solution there would be the greatest single gain which could be made. Leaving this aside, he set forth as a basic objective the continued support of the Baghdad Pact powers. Regardless of the origins of the Pact, we cannot let the Pact countries down. We must send high-level representatives to Pact meetings, must put substance into its force and protocols, must give it prestige.

Mr. Allen said he did not know that he could agree to Mr. Shuckburgh's proposition that the basic objective in the area is to preserve Western access to its oil. We would wish to consider this point further.

Mr. Shuckburgh agreed to discussion of this point at a later time, and returned to means of support for the Baghdad Pact countries. He said we should pay special attention to the economic and political aspects of the Baghdad Pact. The British Ambassadors had for a time considered the possibility of having non-members of the Pact participate in its economic functions, but later gave up this objective. The Ambassadors had also

considered the question of new members for the Pact. It had been clear from meetings in Baghdad that the Iraqis wanted another Arab State in the Pact. The British thought of Jordan for three reasons: (1) The strong desire of King Hussein to re-write the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty. A similar desire in Iraq had been accommodated by association with the Baghdad Pact. (2) The request of the Jordanians for more money and more arms in the current year. The British were not keen to grant more arms and money unless some benefit could be proved. Association with the Pact seemed to be such a benefit. (3) Things were slipping in Jordan, particularly along the line of Egyptian, Saudi interference and the British felt something positive must be done. Templer's visit went well for a time. The Jordanians never said that the proffered aid was not enough. Then the four Palestinian ministers resigned, holding that no amount of assistance from Britain could make the decision of adherence to the Pact at that time politically palatable. The ensuing riots and demonstrations proved that the Palestinian refugees have been infused with Communism and Saudi-Egyptian anti-Western propaganda beyond what most observers had expected. Therefore the British do not altogether criticize themselves for precipitating in Jordan the question of joining the Pact. At least something has been found out concerning the extent of penetration by Communist, Saudi and Egyptian agents. The young King's behavior in the crisis has gratified the British. He has been courageous and has not backed down. However, the British do not hope to get Jordan into the Baghdad Pact at any time soon. For the immediate future the Pact will be played down in Jordan. The present Jordan Government have given notice that they will join no pacts. The British hope to stabilize the situation, to repair the damage done to their position, though it must be recognized that the damage is not at the top, but rather with the Palestine section of the public. By all means, nothing should be done to betray the young King. The British are convinced that the disturbances in Jordan were in large part owed to the Egyptians. Mr. Trevelyan, British Ambassador in Cairo, says that Nasser never acts against the West, but only reacts when he conceives the West to be acting against him. In view of the present British attitude regarding Jordan's association with the Pact, Nasser should now call off his activities in Jordan. The British do not plan to go to him and beg him to call off such activity, but rather take the position that the logic of his own position requires him to

stop fighting Jordanian association with the Pact, since the Jordanians have no present intention of moving in that direction.

Mr. Allen expressed thanks for Mr. Shuckburgh's analysis and regretted a recent news report that American officials had criticized British action in attempting to get Jordan into the Baghdad Pact. Events of the kind in Jordan have hurt us as they have the British. Our window lights sometimes get broken in the reaction to a British initiative. In fact, the recent rioting in Jerusalem chose American rather than British institutions as the prime target. He then compared the Iranian and Jordanian situations with respect to their identification with the Baghdad Pact. In each country there was one pre-eminent person in favor of association: in Iran the Shah, in Jordan the King. In Iran, however, no visitor came from outside to persuade the Iranians to adhere. The Shah himself went before the Majlis and said that Iran should join out of its own interest and sit down as an equal with Iraq, Pakistan and Turkey. Mr. Allen recognized that the King of Jordan does not have the position of the Shah in Iran. Nevertheless, it is possible to appropriate from this experience the principle that indigenous forces make stronger arguments for identification with the Baghdad Pact than visiting statesmen. The official American position in this matter is very close to that of the U.K. We do not wish to pull the rug out from under Baghdad Pact countries by saying publicly we do not favor additional adherents to the Pact. For the present we are not urging anybody to join. The Secretary of State believes that the Pact should remain for the time being with the present adherents. We do not rule out our own eventual adherence, but for the following reasons we would not adhere at present: (1) Some elements in the U.S., certain Congressmen in particular, believe that adherence is undesirable from the point of view of our relations with Soviet Russia. So long as we do not adhere, the U.S.S.R. can maneuver to keep us out. Once we are in, the U.S.S.R. is able to make the argument that it is finally bottled up from all sides by Pacts and has the right to react with hostility. Mr. Allen granted that this argument was not persuasive to him. (2) If the U.S. enters the Baghdad Pact, we would involve ourselves in intra-area politics. Britain has been able to join the Pact without upsetting Egypt unduly, but it is doubtful if the U.S. can join without a complete upset of the Egyptians. (3) The Arab-Israeli situation constitutes an argument against immediate American adherence. The Israelis are pressing us for a security guarantee,

pointing out that Britain guarantees Jordan, various other states are guaranteed in one way or another, leaving Israel alone with no guarantee. Should the U.S. adhere to the Pact, the hue and cry on this score might become unbearable.

Mr. Shuckburgh replied that he was impressed by the third point, but not by the first. He cited Syria as a country whose recent leftist leanings were not modified by the refusal of the U.S. to adhere. He expressed the hope that the U.S. would not be deterred by the first argument from assisting the countries which have joined the Pact.

Mr. Allen requested the British appraisal of the situation in Iraq.

Mr. Shuckburgh replied that things are going well in Iraq, that Nuri Said is having no special troubles and that British observers see no signs that the Iraqis are restive over Iraq's adherence to the Pact.

Mr. Shuckburgh noted that the Iraqis have somewhat different views from the other Arabs on the specific question of the Russian threat. Iraqis believe that by virtue of their geographical position they are immediately exposed along with Turkey and Iran. Their association with the Pact has had a broader basis than a whim of Nuri's.

Ambassador Byroade said that Nasser in Egypt does not recognize Iraq's association with the Pact as representative of anybody but Nuri and the government of Iraq.

Mr. Shuckburgh said that he must smile at the dictator Nasser giving estimates of what is representative of the people. He would not attempt to say what might happen in Iraq should Nuri die, but for the present the British see no restiveness there.

Mr. Allen recounted that Fadhil Jamali had criticized the Iraqi government in his hearing for its slowness in economic development and on some other points, but he had shown the same enthusiasm for the Pact as had Nuri Said.

Mr. Shuckburgh admitted that things could go wrong in Iraq should the Iraqis find themselves isolated and without support.

Mr. Allen asked for an assessment of Iraq's claim to leadership in the Arab world.

Mr. Shuckburgh replied that the Iraqis are not presently occupied with a contest for leadership. Iraq's hope lies in the future. They want to get on with their economic development. After that they can be real contenders for Arab leadership.

Mr. Allen asked Mr. Byroade what he thought about Egyptian preoccupation with a claim to leadership in the Arab world.

Mr. Byroade said that the Egyptians think about their leadership chiefly when they believe it is challenged. Given ten years of reasonable stability, the Egyptians would not care greatly what happened in other Arab States.

Mr. Allen asked if we should attempt to pick the winner and back him?

Mr. Shuckburgh said that we should try to reconcile Nuri and Nasser. We should dissuade Nasser that we are attempting to isolate him. The British should answer his contentions that they are trying to wreck him in the Sudan, in Libya and in Jordan. It is true that the British wish to thwart Nasser's purpose in Libya, but this is because his purpose is inimical to the purposes of the West and not because Britain wishes to isolate Egypt. We have failed in an effort to cooperate with Nasser in the military realm. Perhaps our hope should now be fixed on the economic. This should not be too difficult. Ambassador Trevelyan believes that Nasser is not really neutralist and does not wish to cooperate with the Russians.

Mr. Byroade agreed completely, but asked whether the problem of cooperation with Egypt is not one to be attacked immediately, rather than a year from now. To get a settlement of the Palestine question, we must tell the Egyptians something of our plans covering the next several years. If we do not give Nasser an assurance of our intentions regarding the Baghdad Pact, we cannot get his consent to the Palestine settlement. On the other hand, if we could move in the direction of the Palestine settlement, having assured Nasser of our intentions respecting the Pact, Mr. Byroade does not

despair of getting Iraq and Egypt together, perhaps by means of some association of the Baghdad Pact countries with the countries of the Egypt-Syria-Saudi Pact. By such a means the West could become the champion of Arab unity.

Mr. Shuckburgh agreed and recalled his opening statement that the West should not throw itself across the stream of Arab emotions, especially those concerning Arab unity. However, he expressed a reservation about working with Nasser until his ambitions could be divined. For example, does Nasser propose that the British officers should be ejected from the Arab Legion in Jordan or that the West should get out of Libya? He recounted that on the day when the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement regarding the Suez base was signed, Mahmoud Fawzisaid to the British that the British officers should get out of the Arab Legion because their presence is an embarrassment to the Arab countries.

Mr. Shuckburgh said that Nasser is running against time in view of the severe economic problem in Egypt, particularly the growing population.

Mr. Russell asked suppose we go along with Nasser's line? How cooperative will he be after he gets what he asks for? Even if he should go through the motions of making a settlement with Israel, he would still have the power to do great damage if in the meantime the Western powers had cooperated extensively with him. We might do well to fall in with the drive for Arab unity, but only after, say, five years.

Mr. Byroade said he did not believe Arab unity would materialize. Our aim should be to get out of a position of opposing it.

Mr. Allen said that our overriding concern for Arab unity is the fear that unless we do something about it, the Russians will beat us to it. So long as we appear to oppose and the Russians to favor Arab unity, they will win in the area. We must give genuine support to Arab unity.

Mr. Shuckburgh said he had some reservations since such unity as now exists among the Arab States depends on the state of Israel. We should not appear to be against Arab unity, but he did not see how we could work actively for it.

Mr. Rountree commented there are so many diverse elements among the Arabs, that it is unlikely any cohesive force can emerge for sometime; the competition for leadership will continue.

Mr. Allen asked about the possibility of the Fertile Crescent scheme within the framework of Arab unity. Should Iraq invite any and all Arab States to join it?

Mr. Byroade said this should not be advocated at present, but might be possible after five years. The Saudi Arabians will continue in fear of the Hashimites to oppose anything that Iraq does. The Russians will also object.

Mr. Allen remarked that the Communists can always offer a more strenuous anti-Israeli resolution in the Security Council than we. This tactic may force us into a position of championing Israel against all the Arabs, or of championing some Arabs against the others. We may, for example, have to decide whether we are against the Northern Arabs.

Mr. Shuckburgh speaking personally and off the record commented that the tragedy of our position is we might be forced in the absence of a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict to abandon Israel.

Mr. Allen, also speaking personally, said that the U.S. cannot completely abandon Israel.

Mr. Shuckburgh next considered the question of Saudi Arabia and its influence in the area. Britain has experienced much trouble from this source [*10½ lines of source text not declassified*].

Mr. Allen agreed that this is a key problem and that it would figure large in the discussions. He recollected his earlier remarks concerning the indivisibility of American-British relations in the Near East, but pointed out a difference in Saudi Arabia. American oil people have been active there for the last ten years. They are close to the present ruling monarch, as they were to his father. While they do not have one hundred percent support from the Saudi Government, they are able to differ, and to present their

case. When the British say that Saudi action is anti-Western, this may be true in regard to Saudi activities in Syria, but in Saudi Arabia the King himself maintains a distinction between the U.K. and the U.S. The King knows that the Communists, if they take over Saudi Arabia, would cut his as the first throat. It may be possible to take advantage of the working relationship between the Saudis and the Americans and turn present Saudi activity into less destructive channels.

Mr. Shuckburgh made it plain that he intended no criticism of ARAMCO's policy in Saudi Arabia. He thought that ARAMCO may have been more clever than the British petroleum interests in Iran. The problem is a serious one. Western oil interests have gone into the Arab world and upset their way of life. When this happens, the West is responsible for seeing that the vacuum is filled with constructive social and economic organizations. The funds which accrue to Arab States must be husbanded and put into development. Britain, for example, went into India in a governing capacity after the British East India Company had exploited the commercial possibilities there. Britain was required to run India for a time. In Iraq 60% of the petroleum revenues goes for economic development, in Iran 70%. In Kuwait revenues go into bonds. But in Saudi Arabia the oil revenues have not been harnessed to constructive development.

Mr. Allen said he could not take great exception to this analysis but wished to point out that the present times are complicated by considerations of nationalism and anti-imperialism to a degree which the British did not face in a different century. Maybe the U.S. government has left the oil company too much to itself. Maybe we would do well to persuade the Saudis to hire American consultants as the Turkish government has employed Mr. Dewey.

Mr. Shuckburgh suggested the possibility of a development board.

Mr. Rountree remarked that we are dealing in a world context totally different from the past. Furthermore, while the Saudis know that U.S. dollars come into Saudi Arabia they also know their oil flows out to Europe. We are dealing with a sovereign and a sensitive government.

Mr. Allen said he hopes for a growing responsible middle class in Saudi Arabia, that is, a group outside the royal family but having influence.

Mr. Shuckburgh said the Saudi Army may present a possible alternative. It is not a question of [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] King Saud, but of [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] his advisers.

Mr. Rountree said that at the moment Saudi Arabia is primarily concerned with two things:

Israel and Saudi Arabia's position on the Arabian Peninsula in relation to the dispute with the Sheikdoms. A Saudi Arabian representative recently commented that Saudi Arabian-American differences arise not from their enmity with us, but from their troubles with our friends. If those two problems could be removed, perhaps the Saudis would not continue to be so unreasonable.

Mr. Rountree replied that the subject would be discussed separately but that he thought the British are aware of our general views on the question of arbitration.

Mr. Shuckburgh disputed Mr. Rountree's analysis. He claimed that the Saudis had been intriguing against the Hashimites longer than the British had been involved in the Buraimi question.

Mr. Byroade said the Saudi fear of Iraq-Syria union is a leading cause of Saudi intransigence.

Mr. Allen requested the British estimate of the Sultan of Muscat.

Mr. Samuel described the Sultan as straightforward, a man who knows what he wants, honest, upright, a man who would not be rushed and is altogether an outstanding Arab leader.

Mr. Allen recalled an American oil man describing the Sultan of Muscat in almost lyrical terms. He mentioned the possibility that the U.S. would open a Consulate at Muscat.

Mr. Samuel in replying to Mr. Allen's question said that the British have a Consulate General in Muscat and the Indians are the only other country having a resident representative there.

Mr. Allen asked for the British estimate of Turkish influence in the Arab world.

Mr. Shuckburgh replied that he keeps changing his mind on this point. Once he thought the Turks very good, now he is not sure they give good advice. They are very sure of themselves, even to the extent of believing they could have brought Nasser into the Baghdad Pact if the Western nations had given them the chance. He did concur in Mr. Allen's tribute to the Turks for their help on the Baghdad Pact in Tehran and Amman.

Mr. Allen said he was encouraged by Mr. Byroade's view that the Turks are not the main problem in the Egyptian mind.

Mr. Allen left for another appointment at 12:00 o'clock. Mr. Rountree presided following Mr. Shuckburgh's proposal that the meeting carry on until 1:00 o'clock.

Mr. Bowie said he would be glad to have the British impression of the Baghdad Pact's prospects for making a lasting impact. What are the possibilities that the Pact will gain an institutional momentum and require great Western resources for its continuation?

Mr. Shuckburgh replied that the main significance of the Pact is now political. It gives strength to the Pact countries to remain independent by the encouragement of association with one another. The nations now in the Pact have real fears of being overrun by Russians. The Pact is a guarantee of the same kind that Norway receives in its association with NATO. This does not require great military forces nor does it require the nations to devote a great share of their resources to defense. For example, Nuri, after joining the Baghdad Pact still wants to spend Iraqi money for economic development.

Mr. Rountree said that neither Iraq nor Iran is inclined to overextend itself in military expenditures, but they do regard their membership in the Pact as

meriting large grants of Western military equipment.

Mr. Rountree agreed that the precise military significance is less than the political significance.

Mr. Bowie put his questions in a different form: (1) What are we trying to achieve by the Baghdad Pact? (2) How can we avoid pressures on our own resources resulting from the images created by the Pact—the image of our beneficence as a reward for their joining the Pact.

Mr. Shuckburgh answered the first question by saying that the Pact serves as a deterrent.

In the Baghdad Pact the nations say to the Russians, “if you take Azerbaijan, then you attack all of us.”

Mr. Bowie said that the validity of such a warning does not require adherence to the Pact, as may be proved by the position of the U.S.

Mr. Rountree said that Iran adhered because the Pact would be a deterrent and would give Iran, which was seriously concerned about its capacity to withstand invasion, a basis for the development of its military capability.

Mr. Shuckburgh said there is also the political factor in that the Pact creates domestic support for the people who advocate it.

Mr. Bowie feared that this process leads to the building up by the Pact members of impossible demands on the generosity of the West, the U.S. in particular. The nations joined the Pact in the expectation of great assistance. The assistance is not forthcoming in the expected quantities and the nations then feel that they have been let down. Pakistan, for example, is always griping that it does not receive enough help from the U.S. in return for its pro-Western stand in contrast to the American and Western generosity given in return for Indian neutralism.

Mr. Rountree confirmed that where expectations of military aid are seriously disappointed, there will be trouble.

Mr. Russell directed this conversation to the problem in the Arab States by remarking that Nasser had said he had no objection to the Northern Tier as such. May it not be possible to keep Iraq happy and in the Baghdad Pact but at the same time not antagonize Nasser over the question of Arab leadership?

Mr. Arthur said that Iraq does not regard the Baghdad Pact as a means of getting leadership among the Arabs.

Mr. Russell inquired whether the British contemplate that the Arab League will be a useful instrument once a settlement with Israel is achieved. If this is the case, we should think of Jordan as an arena for Arab unity, rather than as a prospective candidate for the Baghdad Pact.

Mr. Shuckburgh replied that the British want the Northern Tier to remain as it is and want some association of the Northern Tier with the Southern areas.

Mr. Byroade said we can live with this. Nasser does not wish to destroy Western influence, but Western domination. The recent attempt to secure Jordanian adherence to the Pact is an example of the latter.

Mr. Bowie granted that the Baghdad Pact puts an umbrella over the countries, but insisted that this is something for them. What does it do for us?

Mr. Shuckburgh replied that the Pact takes its place as a part of history and must be viewed in its historical context. Its formation was indicated by the historical circumstances obtaining at the time of its formation. As these historical circumstances alter so will the character of the Pact. Just now, the need seems less for military might than for the kind of resources required to fight a cold war. In any case, the Pact countries must be kept on our side. We can suit the methods to the circumstances.

Mr. Rountree said we should not minimize the significance of Iran's entry into the Pact. In effect, this constituted Iran's departure from neutralism.

Mr. Byroade said the Pact is a good thing and needs strengthening by additional help for the countries that have already joined. However, no additional adherents are needed. We require a more sensitive response to the Bandung type countries. They are not allied with us, but they are not so far from us as completely neutralist countries. Our attitudes towards them should not be formalized so that we lose flexibility of action.

Mr. Ogburn explained that we are on the horns of a dilemma. If countries join the Baghdad Pact, we must reward them with aid to show our approval. On the other hand, if we attempt something for a country outside the Pact, as in the case of the Aswan Dam for Egypt, then we fall under the censure of doing as much or even more for the non-Pact countries. The Pact countries then ask: What do we get out of the Pact?

Mr. Byroade said there is no need to worry about Egypt's action should we give more assistance to the Pact countries.

Mr. Shuckburgh reiterated that the British believe in military aid for the Pact countries.

Mr. Rountree and Mr. Bowie pointed out that the cost to the U.S. on a per year basis for the proposed Aswan Dam will be far less than the annual cost of military assistance for the Pact countries, and far less than economic aid being rendered to Iran and Turkey.

Mr. Rountree catalogued a long list of countries including Iraq, Turkey, Libya, Ethiopia and Ceylon which had reacted with an unfavorable comparison between what the U.S. may do for Egypt in the form of the Dam and what the U.S. has been able to do for them.

Mr. Shuckburgh said we cannot adopt a policy of outbidding the Russians in every economic development project.

Mr. Arthur inquired whether it is not possible to get out of the dilemma by making a distinction between economic and military aid, expressing the view that military aid made more of an impact than economic.

Mr. Rountree replied that military aid in Iran gains the praise of the Shah and the Army, but has little effect on the public. The Iranian people consider their number one problem now to be economic and are far more aware of American financial and economic aid.

Mr. Bowie inquired of the prospects for area-wide economic programs. He supposed there was not much economic development which could be attempted in Saudi Arabia even if the West were prepared to sponsor a program.

Mr. Rountree said there may be a greater possibility for regional economic development after settlement of the Palestine problem.

Mr. Russell inquired whether the Arab League could serve as a useful device after settlement of the Palestine question.

Mr. Byroade said that we already have in the Jordan Valley development plan, the plans for the High Aswan Dam and the proposed compensation of refugees a considerable economic development program for the area.

Mr. Arthur pointed to the ancient rivalry between Iraq and Egypt over Syria. Such Arab unity as has been achieved up to now is itself the product of outside influence. An example is British organization of the Near East countries for supply and military operations during World War II. Only Western participation can produce Arab unity.

Mr. Byroade agreed but held that we must stabilize the situation for a time rather than exciting it.

The morning session was adjourned shortly after 1:00 p.m.

¹ Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Middle East 1954–1957. Secret. Drafted by Geren.

² Between January 13 and 19, officials of the British Foreign Office, led by Assistant Under Secretary Evelyn Shuckburgh, met in Washington with representatives of the Department of State to prepare the ground for upcoming talks between President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Eden. Briefing papers and background material on the Shuckburgh talks are *ibid.*, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518; NEA Files: Lot 61 D 260; and Conference Files: Lot 62 D 187, CF 647. For documentation on the Eisenhower–Eden talks, see [volume XXVII](#).

**92. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State,
Washington, January 13, 1956, 2:30 p.m.¹**

Washington, January 13, 1956, 2:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

US–UK Interests and Objectives in the Middle East in Light of
the Threat Posed by Current Soviet Strategy in the Area

PARTICIPANTS

US

NEA—Messrs Allen and Rountree

S/P—Mr. Bowie

S/P—Mr. Mathews

EUR—Mr. Merchant

NE—Mr. Byroade

S—Mr. Russell

AF—Mr. Cyr

GTI—Mr. Baxter

SOA—Mr. Jones

NE—Mr. Wilkins

NE—Mr. Geren

NEA—Mr. Dixon

DRN—Mr. Ogburn

EUR—Mr. Evan Wilson

EUR—Mr. Lister

E/E—Mr. Blake

UK

Mr. Evelyn Shuckburgh (UK Foreign Office)

Mr. Geoffrey Arthur (UK Foreign Office)

Mr. Ian Samuel (UK Foreign Office)

Mr. Willian Barker (UK Embassy)

Mr. Willie Morris (UK Embassy)

Friday Afternoon, January 13, 1956

Mr. Allen welcomed Mr. Merchant to the afternoon session and suggested that the meeting begin with consideration of Soviet penetration in the area. In our view the Egyptian arms deal with the Soviets constitutes a dramatic point in this subject. Our present point of view is that while we do not plan to engage the Communists on each one of their offers, we do recognize Communist competition as a fact of life. Our policy on the Aswan Dam is to go ahead very much as before with changes in tempo rather than content. If we should say to the Egyptians that we will not consider any enterprise for which the Russians are bidding, then the Russians would have an easy weapon with which to drive us away from any project. We are not prepared, however, to change our policy in its fundamental principles. For example, we are not prepared to give up our policy of competitive bidding merely because it would be easier to meet Soviet competition in [by] doing so.

Mr. Allen said the U.S. is worried by reports of Communist and subversive activities in Kuwait and asked for the British estimate.

Mr. Samuel replied the British believe the Communists use Kuwait as a “convalescent home” and distribution center for Communism, but not as a place to hatch plots. There is no immediate threat because the economic situation does not provide a fertile field for Communism.

Mr. Shuckburgh promised a fuller answer for Monday.

Mr. Byroade said that from his perspective in Cairo a definite pattern of attempted Communist penetration could be observed, starting long before the consummation of the arms deal, and perhaps employing the Geneva spirit as an occasion. The Communist penetration is taking political and economic rather than military forms. It seems the Communist policy aims to make economic satellites of certain countries. In the case of Egypt, the U.S.S.R made economic approaches first and later consummated the arms transaction taking advantage of such developments as the Israeli attack on Egypt on February 28, 1955, and the formation of the Baghdad Pact.

Mr. Shuckburgh said this accords with the British analysis, but such action required a prior Russian decision to back the Arabs. He regards the arms transaction as a function of this decision. The Communists are anxious for as many ways as possible to curry Arab favor and will exploit all their opportunities.

Mr. Allen made a distinction between the British and American positions in respect of the point at which the Soviets choose to attack. In the case of the U.S. the Soviets seize on American support for Israel and picture themselves as allies for the Arabs against Israel and Israel’s masters. In the British case, the Soviets attack the established position of the British as evidence of imperialism and colonialism.

Mr. Shuckburgh objected that the British have no “position” in the area, in the Russian sense. The thing that brings down the Russian ire is not a special British position in the area in terms of colonialism, but instead an attempt by Britain to line up the area for the West.

Mr. Bowie confirmed that the Russians are everywhere making much of the claim: “the West is trying to control you, but Russia leaves you to make your own decision for freedom and independence.”

Mr. Shuckburgh remarked that the British position in the Persian Gulf is very good. The British are there because they have been invited.

Mr. Bowie granted that this position might be good, but contended it can be exploited.

Mr. Shuckburgh explained that the British position in Jordan is different from that in the Persian Gulf. For Britain to station British officers in Jordan and to spend money for the Arab Legion does not help Britain particularly but does serve to keep Jordan independent. He granted that the British tie with Jordan had some significance in getting Jordan committed to the Baghdad Pact. He added in response to Mr. Allen’s earlier description of the U.S. connection with Israel that Britain is just as committed to Israel as the U.S. is. Further, Britain does not wish to suffer any less defamation than does the U.S. because of Israel.

Mr. Allen granted that British and Americans are tarred with the same brush on the Pact question. If we decide that our Pact policy causes more damage than benefits, we will have to take another look at it.

Mr. Shuckburgh said Britain cannot possibly back out of the Pact. The British favor discussing the question in terms of developing the Pact.

Mr. Allen agreed that the U.S. has no intention of pulling the rug from under the Pact countries. By “taking another look at the Pact question” he had meant an examination of all the possibilities.

Mr. Shuckburgh emphasized in particular the British conviction that going back on the Pact would not make the Russians any nicer to us. The Baghdad Pact had become a reality. It is necessary and good. It is not necessary (a) to solicit new members or (b) to build up a great military force. The British would now like to build up its political significance.

Mr. Bowie stated that the real question is whether to take the view that the Baghdad Pact has now served its purpose as a useful military warning against Communist aggression.

Mr. Shuckburgh said the Pact can become a means of coordinating development among the member countries of combatting subversion and conceivably of mutual technical assistance. The Baghdad Pact cannot practically be converted into a customs union. In replying to Mr. Bowie's question, Mr. Shuckburgh said that that Baghdad countries have shown a real interest in anti-subversion problems.

Mr. Bowie asked whether the acceptance of Soviet arms had exposed Egypt to intensified Communist subversion.

Mr. Byroade replied that the Egyptians had probably been naive in this regard but that internal security is basically good in Egypt. The regime will do a good job internally except for trade with the Communists which will be continued. The regime will not permit the distribution of Communist literature, but it must recognize the gratitude which many Egyptians feel to the U.S.S.R. for the arms. What Nasser wants is independence from the Russians, the British, the U.S. and everybody else.

Mr. Shuckburgh then asked whether dealing with Nasser would exact any of the following prices: (1) Would it require us to give up the Baghdad Pact?; (2) Would we have to agree there would be no additional accessions to the Pact?; (3) Must the British give up Jordan?; (4) Have we got to turn Libya over to Nasser?; (5) Must we abandon the Sudan to Nasser?; (6) Must we pay him more than we can afford on the Aswan Dam?

Mr. Allen added another question. Will Nasser's demand on the U.S. be no arms to Israel?

Mr. Byroade answered Mr. Allen's question affirmatively. To Mr. Shuckburgh's questions, he replied we would not have to do all the things enumerated, but it is clear that Nasser's price has gone up on Jordan. Nasser told Mr. Byroade that Britain in regard to Jordan was like a man who had a watch safely in one pocket and in trying to transfer it to the other pocket,

lost it. Mr. Byroade believes that Nasser will not require anything of the Sudan except an agreement on the Nile Waters.

Mr. Allen asked how strong an influence the British officers are in the Arab Legion.

Mr. Shuckburgh replied that the British training and financial support make a decent Arab army of the Arab Legion and protect Jordan against Israel. The British would not suffer if they got out of the Arab Legion, but on the other hand they do not wish to hand the Legion and Jordan over to the Egyptians.

Mr. Arthur said that the effect of such a hand-over would be disastrous in Iraq.

Mr. Allen asked for the British estimate of Soviet economic intentions in the area.

Mr. Arthur replied that the Russians are not on an all-out export drive, but have selected certain economic targets for political ends.

Mr. Byroade and Mr. Arthur pointed out the facility which payment in cotton provides both Egyptians and Russians. The Russians need the cotton and the Egyptians have a surplus of it to sell.

Mr. Shuckburgh said that the West should not attempt to counter block every Soviet attempt. Indeed, it might be well to let the Russians and the Arabs fall heir to certain of the friction which might arise from their working on projects together.

Mr. Allen conceded that this possibility might be worth pursuing.

Mr. Bowie said that one of the benefits from our own technical assistance programs was to get our people into foreign countries. If we wish the Russians and foreigners exposed to the friction of working together, this

would require the Russians getting a number of their people into these countries, which is not in our interest.

Mr. Allen doubted if there was any project which would increase Communist activity in the area to which we are willing to say: "O.K., let them do it."

Mr. Byroade quoted Clare Booth Luce as holding the theory: anything the Russians can do we can do better; therefore, on any project invite the Russians to do 40% and we will do the 60%.

Mr. Samuel said we must recognize the extent to which Moslem engineers might be used by the Russians. We cannot really count on frictions between Russia and others except those which proceed from the fact that the Russians are hard traders.

Mr. Blake said that in Afghanistan the Russians have made the most of their opportunities in economic assistance. They sent Moslem technicians who prayed faithfully with the Afghans. Where any friction developed, the Russians rapidly pulled back. It is doubtful if the Russians are less competent in the psychology of technical assistance than we are.

Mr. Allen said that the Western offer of aid on the Aswan Dam is going to be an invitation for many countries to come in with their requests. Some may employ a variation of the Egyptian pattern of flirting with the Communists.

Mr. Bowie inquired what is the criterion for our aid? On whom do we wish to make an impact?

Mr. Shuckburgh said we must keep the Russians from getting contacts that enable them to run the country.

Mr. Allen recounted that the Ceylonese, Libyans, Iranians and others had come to us with great complaints after the word of our possible assistance for the Aswan Dam became public.

Mr. Shuckburgh said the British had complaints from the Iranians, but an understanding attitude from Nuri Said in Iraq.

Mr. Allen said there had been little public objection to the Aswan Dam in the U.S., notably none from the Zionists.

Mr. Shuckburgh made the point that the Egyptians are highly unpopular in the U.K. since so many British have had experience of the Egyptians in the Canal Zone and in the country generally. When Mr. Allen pointed out that the Zionist groups are not so influential in Britain as in the U.S., Mr. Shuckburgh remonstrated mildly.

Mr. Allen remarked that the proposal to commit the U.S. Government for a long term aid program in an election year might give difficulty.

Mr. Russell inquired what we can do to counter the Soviet policy of going through the area and picking out the political issues like Kashmir and Palestine for destructive exploitation.

Mr. Allen said such action fits in with the Russian policy of exacerbating rather than solving tensions. The Russians are not bound to a responsible practice of diplomacy. Mr. Allen inquired whether the British thought there was any possibility that the Israelis might turn towards the Soviets.

Mr. Shuckburgh replied negatively.

Mr. Bowie pointed out that the Russians had not slammed the door on Israel, but are asking Israel to cut itself off from the West if Russian assistance is desired.

Mr. Byroade and Mr. Shuckburgh agreed that until we get over the crisis of confidence in the Arab world, nothing we do for the Arabs is likely to please them.

Mr. Bowie inquired whether the hatred of Israel really dominates the Arab mind, or whether this results from exploitation by Arab leaders.

[1 paragraph (2 lines of source text) not declassified]

Mr. Allen [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] pointed to the problem of the U.S. base in Dhahran and the Buraimi question. From a certain point of view, the existence of Israel is a benefit in dealing with certain Arab questions. For example, it was fortunate during the recent riots in Jordan that there was no common border between Jordan and Egypt.

Mr. Shuckburgh [*1½ lines of source text not declassified*] reiterated that the British do not think of Jordan as a colony.

Mr. Shuckburgh said the British are in Jordan because the Arab Legion provides a cheap division for the West and to prevent a vacuum there.

Mr. Allen suggested that if Britain should leave Jordan, probably the Iraqis are the ones to take over. He inquired whether it would help us to say to Nasser that we do not object to Jordan joining the Egyptian-Syrian-Saudi Pact.

Mr. Arthur said this would be no inducement to Nasser.

Mr. Byroade agreed.

After the reading of the several telegrams depicting new violence in Jordan, the British delegates said it had been decided that if additional troops must be sent to Jordan, they should be British rather than Iraqi.

The afternoon meeting was adjourned shortly after 5:00 p.m.

¹ Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Middle East 1954–1957. Secret. Drafted by Geren.

**93. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State,
Washington, January 18, 1956, 10 a.m.¹**

Washington, January 18, 1956

SUBJECT

The Baghdad Pact

PARTICIPANTS

US

NEA—Messrs Allen and Rountree

NEA—Ambassador Byroade

NEA—Mr. Dixon

S—Mr. Russell

NE—Messrs Wilkins, Newsom, Bergus

SOA—Mr. Jones

GTI—Mr. Baxter

S/P—Mr. Mathews

EUR—Messrs Wilson and Belcher

OCB—Mr. Eveland

UK

Mr. E. Shuckburgh (ForOff)

Mr. G. Arthur (ForOff)

Mr. I. Samuel (ForOff)

Mr. W. Morris (Embassy)

Mr. R. Bailey (Embassy)

Mr. Allen opened the conversation by noting that although many of the points of the Baghdad Pact subject had been touched on before, the UK might wish to express further views. Mr. Shuckburgh said while favoring a broader organization they were not disposed to press for other Arab membership at this time. No action should be taken in the case of Jordan. Mr. Allen asked if he had any thoughts as to how to heal the rupture between Cairo and Baghdad. Mr. Shuckburgh said the relationships between the two countries are not too bad, there is still some contact between them. The basic trouble is, of course, Iraqi-Egypt rivalry. He said that Mr. Lloyd will step off to talk with Nasser and Nuri on his return from SEATO.

Mr. Allen said that there were three reasons which make undesirable US adherence to the Baghdad Pact at this time: It would 1) arouse the Soviets considerably, 2) exacerbate inter-Arab rivalries, and 3) reduce US ability to influence developments in the area, particularly the Arab-Israeli situation. Mr. Shuckburgh said that he did not feel the first reason was really valid and that if the third reason can be eliminated the US should feel ready to move forward towards membership.

Mr. Allen speculated about the possibility of bringing Iraq and Egypt into one security organization which would eventually include all Arabs. Mr. Shuckburgh said that his government had not come to any conclusion concerning this question although they had thrown out some feelers to Nasser. The Arab League as a unit is not hostile to the Baghdad Pact. In the formation of the Pact the door had been left open to let other Arabs come in. This had not been followed up and it does not appear beneficial to do so at this time. It is always possible to open the door later. Ambassador Byroade said that he felt that clipping off one Arab country at a time was not a good idea and that an approach made to the other Arabs generally would be preferable. Any such moves would, of course, have to be informal. Any formal treaty arrangement is far away. Mr. Allen pointed out

that Nasser himself is making a strong bid for Arab unity to overcome the division which occurred after World War I.

Mr. Allen said that he understood the UK position regarding US adherence to the Baghdad Pact to be one of welcoming it at any time but understanding our reluctance to move in this direction at this time. Mr. Shuckburgh said that the UK did not necessarily concur in the position but recognized that the US is the best judge of its own capabilities. Mr. Allen asked, overlooking whatever excitement would be aroused in Cairo, what would be the effect upon the Pact of US adherence. Mr. Shuckburgh said that the question of timing was very important. Many factors influenced the timing. Could we expect help from Cairo in settling the Israeli problem? If US adherence to the Pact would have to be accompanied by a similar US guarantee to Israel we would be set back considerably. Mr. Allen said he was not 100% sure we would have to give assurance to Israel. Politically in the interests of a need for settlement, this would seem to make US adherence inadvisable presently.

Mr. Allen asked whether, if we come to the conclusion that Egypt had launched itself on a full course of neutralism, the US should go into the Pact and take the other Arabs with us. Nehru does not like SEATO but we are able to participate in SEATO and get along with Nehru. Nehru realizes we are not trying to pull him down.

Ambassador Byroade said that if Nasser came to such a conclusion it would not be due to East-West difficulties. He did not feel the Pact itself was too much of an irritant to Egypt. Mr. Allen said US aid to Pakistan along with Pakistan membership in the Pact has helped influence the Indians to be more attentive to the Soviets. Mr. Shuckburgh said that Nasser was not like Nehru. Nasser does not like the Pact, but if he could have been the leader, he would have taken a different position. Mr. Allen pointed out that Egypt could have taken up MEDO when it was offered. Mr. Byroade said that Nasser thought it better to play one group off against the other. He said that some thought might be given to the possibility of trying to draw the southern area together and gradually tie it in with the Northern Tier.

At this point, Mr. Allen read from a telegram from the Ambassador at Tehran which had been handed him. It was to the effect that the Soviets would be willing to promote and participate in giving Iran a guarantee, if the 1927 guarantee were considered inadequate. This would, of course be dependent upon the Shah's leaving the Baghdad Pact. Mr. Allen inquired as to what Nasser's reaction would be if Iran left the Pact. Ambassador Byroade said Iranian membership in the Pact does not appreciably concern Nasser. He said that Nasser did not object to the Pact basically but to the tactics in forming the Pact.

Mr. Allen said that he was afraid that this Soviet move might have an unfavorable effect in Iran and tend to undermine the government. He thought that it would be useful to counter this move by stressing within Iran the tangible benefits of being in the Pact. US adherence to the Pact, were it in order, and economic assistance would of course be helpful. Mr. Shuckburgh said that on the whole he felt the Shah was very steady with regard to the Pact. When the Shah was invited to Russia, both the US and UK were asked to brief him. He did not feel that we should be too worried about this Soviet move. The Iranians obviously wish more US assistance. In this connection he said that he wished to make clear that his instructions were to say that any military or economic aid which the US could give would be most helpful to the Pact.

Mr. Allen said that economic aid presented some difficulties. Iran did not yet have full oil revenues. The Iranians had recently decided not to utilize an Export-Import Bank credit for a specific development project while at the same time asking for a loan of equal proportions for budgetary support. The question arose as to what the Shah would say if the Soviets asked him why he had joined the Baghdad Pact. Mr. Allen said that were he the Shah he would say that he had joined for good and sufficient reasons. There were, in fact, no strings attached when he joined the Pact. Mr. Shuckburgh said that he thought we would encourage the Shah and give him stiffening advice.

Mr. Allen said he would like to return to the subject of Egypt and the prospect of interesting Nasser in cooperation. Mr. Shuckburgh said that if things go right for Nasser internally, especially on the Aswan Dam and

there is no extension of the Baghdad Pact or attempts to isolate him, he thought we might be able to make some progress. It would seem worthwhile to try to convince Nasser that the Pact is really in his best interest in order not to permit the Soviets to gain overwhelming influence in the Middle East and particularly Persia.

Ambassador Byroade said that the Soviets had consulted Nasser about giving aid to the Sudan. Nasser asked the Soviets why they had come to him and they replied that they would not do anything without consulting Egypt. Nasser had commented to Byroade that the Russians were devils but were very clever. He did not understand why the angels of the West were so blockheaded.

Mr. Allen said that it had been reported that the Sudan was thinking of recognizing Communist China and wondered why? Mr. Shuckburgh said that it had come up as a part of the general consideration which the Sudan was giving to establishing relations with the other governments of the world. Mr. Allen posed the question of declaring Egypt “beyond the pale” and “putting all our eggs in one basket—Nuri”. He presumed that if we did, Nasser would throw his lot with the Soviets. He had heard that Nuri might resign and let someone else take over as Prime Minister. Mr. Shuckburgh said he had not heard of this. Mr. Arthur said that it was understandable that Nuri got tired and actually needed to get out of office for a rest. A number of people who support the same view were capable of taking over. Mr. Shuckburgh commented that while this was true, none of the other people were as strong internally as Nuri.

Mr. Shuckburgh said he thought it was unfortunate that where the UK seeks to work with or assist a government in the Middle East it was labeled domination. But if others do the same, it is not labeled domination. The impression is given that the UK started Israel, divided the Arab world, and that Iraq was a minion, because British bases were there. Mr. Allen asked if Turkey had been accused of being foreign dominated. Ambassador Byroade said they were considered our imperialist tools. Mr. Shuckburgh said that there was always the factor of foreign exploitation of Arab resources. Mr. Byroade said that the Egyptians felt that oil negotiations for all the Arab world should be undertaken in Cairo. Mr. Samuel said the Arabs had never

united themselves and have to blame someone other than themselves. Mr. Allen said that the Arabs felt the Israelis were the worst imperialists that they had ever encountered because they had thrown out the indigenous inhabitants. When the Turks conquered the area, they did not do this but simply controlled the area. Mr. Shuckburgh said that the UK had in mind attempting to narrow the imperialist position as they have done in Iraq by following the same course in Jordan. If there is to be a defense in the area, supply lines must run through Jordan.

Mr. Allen said that he was not suggesting it, but would like to explore the possibilities which would open up should Glubb Pasha leave Jordan. Mr. Shuckburgh said that a Jordanian who would be suitable to take over from Glubb Pasha would be ready in two or three years, but that time table might have to be speeded up. Mr. Allen asked if the departure of Glubb Pasha could be used as a negotiating point with Nasser. Mr. Shuckburgh said that he did not think so.

Mr. Allen said that he wanted to turn to the question of the US rights at Dhahran Airfield. We must soon renegotiate for the continuation of these rights. The field was a great convenience but not worth enough to pay through the nose, unless we wanted to do this in an effort to increase our influence with the King. Ambassador Byroade commented that negotiations of this kind in Saudi Arabia would run into trouble and wondered if we had thought of the idea of continuing to operate in Saudi Arabia with no agreement at all. Mr. Bergus added that in the past we had used the facilities for some period of time simply by getting extensions.

Mr. Shuckburgh asked what the field was used for. Mr. Allen said it was used principally for US military air transport operations and a training program for the Saudis. The Saudis were quarrelsome, and argued that they did not get enough use from the arrangement. A factor which is important in this connection is the presence of US military personnel in the area which constitutes a psychological assurance to the oil companies.

Ambassador Byroade said that Nasser had once said to him that the really important steps which needed to be taken at this time were to establish roads and air fields in the area. He asked if the US would like air bases in Syria. Nasser said he could get them at any time we wished. Ambassador

Byroade thought it might be useful to consider building facilities without strings attached.

Mr. Allen said that the question had been raised as to whether the US should undertake fewer but larger and more impressive technical assistance projects in the Middle East. By doing so our efforts would not be dispersed and frittered away by numerous small projects. Another school of thought was that we must take a careful look around the area and at plans for development in the area to see where we could help most usefully. The latter school had prevailed as the predominant idea of our aid in the area.

The Soviets have followed the former school in India and Afghanistan. Not long ago we were requested by the Indian government to give them a million cc's of gamma globulin. Hundreds of cases of hepatitis have occurred in New Dehli and the Indian government naturally turned to the US for help. We are giving them ½ million cc's at a cost of \$1 million and we expect delivery within the seven-day period in which they requested it. If the Soviets had done this, there would have been great publicity. Mr. Allen doubted if any mention would be made of this US help. Mr. Shuckburgh said that is our nature. He thought that we were not doing aid in the wrong way. On the other hand perhaps, we should take a new look at our programs now and then from the aspect of public relations value.

Mr. Allen reverted to the subject of Jordan. Mr. Shuckburgh said that he was glad that this was brought up again as he did not wish to leave a misimpression of their views regarding Jordan. The country could not exist without subsidy. The British today are in fact supplying that subsidy and holding the country together. If the British moved out, a vacuum would ensue. The Israelis would probably take over the West Bank of Jordan and a squabble would break out regarding the rest of the country. British officers in the Legion make the force what it is today. In fact, it's the only good Arab armed force, including Egypt. For these reasons, the British position in Jordan is most important. Furthermore Iraq would never forgive the UK if they pulled out. Mr. Allen asked whether an Iraqi force in Jordan would make sense. Mr. Shuckburgh said "perhaps"; the UK had recently been urging Iraq to have more effective representation in Jordan. Ambassador

Byroade said he believed that an important factor was that the Egyptians felt that the Jordanians would not fight against Israel should Israel and Egypt engage in hostilities. This bothered the Egyptians considerably. Mr. Morris commented that you could not expect Jordan to fight simply to save Egypt. Mr. Shuckburgh pointed out that if for no other reason, the Jordanian force was useful to Egypt in that its presence made it necessary for Israeli forces to be stationed adjacent to Jordan. This Israeli force could not be moved from the Jordan borders to be used against Egypt. This Arab force would not be there at all except for the British. Ambassador Byroade said that nevertheless this was a source of irritation to Egypt.

Mr. Allen asked if the presence of UK officers in the Arab Legion might be used as a point of negotiation with Nasser. Mr. Arthur said that if the British pulled their officers out of the Legion and generally left Jordan to its own fate, great instability would grow. All of her neighbors would be plotting against her territory. The Jordanians would stand this only for a short time before pulling a coup d'état and establishing a military dictatorship. This would please Nasser considerably.

¹ Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Middle East 1954–1957. Secret. Drafted by Dixon.

**94. Memorandum of a Conversation, White House,
Washington, January 30, 1956, 2:15–4 p.m.¹**

Washington, January 30, 1956, 4 p.m.

ETW MC-1

PARTICIPANTS

US

The Secretary

Under Secretary Hoover

Ambassador Aldrich

Mr. Merchant

Mr. MacArthur

Mr. Bowie

Mr. Allen

Mr. Rountree

Mr. Hagerty

Mr. Cottman

UK

Prime Minister Eden

Foreign Secretary Lloyd

Ambassador Makins

Sir Harold Caccia

Sir Leslie Rowan

Mr. Evelyn Shuckburgh

Mr. Ian Samuel

Mr. Willie Morris

[Here follows discussion of press arrangements, a draft declaration to be issued at the conclusion of the talks, European integration, the Arab-Israeli dispute (see [volume XV, page 101](#)), and Saudi Arabia and the Buraimi dispute (see [volume XIII, page 327](#)).]

Baghdad Pact

Reverting to the Baghdad Pact, the Secretary observed the United States position had been reasonably consistent. We had thought it would be politically impossible for the United States to join until we were able to offer a comparable security arrangement to Israel. Without this, the United States could not get public support for undertaking the Baghdad treaty. We had hoped to achieve a settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute which would make it possible for us to undertake both pacts, but it appeared this could not be done quickly. He stated that he could not say the initial reactions on the part of Israel and Egypt were worse than had been expected. We had not yet pierced their initial bargaining positions and did not know the full extent of their flexibility. Unless there were grave issues it was possible that Egypt would follow dilatory tactics so long as they could get what they wanted. The Israelis likewise would not agree to truncate territory claimed by them unless grave issues should compel them to go beyond their initial bargaining position. He thought the main source of trouble would be in finding a solution to the Negev. Initially, Nasser claimed the whole area along a line north of Beersheba. The Secretary did not consider that to be a defensible position and hoped it might be possible to work something out. Meanwhile, since the United States could not include Israel in a security treaty, it could not join the Baghdad Pact.

Mr. Lloyd commented upon the great importance attached by the British to American support for the Baghdad Pact even though it could not now join. The Iranian Government was in a difficult position financially and had asked that assistance be given to support the contention Iran had not made a mistake in adhering to the Pact.

Iranian Situation

Mr. Hoover said we had the Iranian situation very much in our minds. One of the main elements of the present budgetary problem was that only 10 per cent of the oil revenues could be devoted to budgetary purposes, the other 90 per cent being required by law to go to the development program. It was difficult to justify on economic grounds financial aid to Iran since the Iranians theoretically could meet the problem by their own means. Nevertheless, the United States was exploring the problem thoroughly and hoped to be able to help in some way.

Mr. Lloyd said the Shah had “put his neck out” in adhering to the Baghdad Pact against the tradition of Iranian neutrality. The Shah now saw no concrete benefits derived from such adherence and, on the contrary, he had heard of substantial Western offers of assistance to Egypt in financing the High Aswan Dam and would naturally wonder if he had not make a mistake.

The Secretary commented the United States had not pressed Iran to join but that this had been done on the basis of Iranian judgment that it was the thing to do. Nevertheless, we did want to support Iran and to render any assistance which was warranted and which we might be able to provide.

In reply to a question of Mr. Lloyd, Mr. Rountree said the financial aid which we had been rendering to Iran for budgetary purposes had been exhausted but we were considering the possibility of some additional aid to help meet the problem until the situation in Iran, including the political and psychological factors, rendered it possible for the Iranians to cope with the problem themselves. Requests for additional aid had been based on the assumption that increased economic activity resulting from the development program would soon provide resources adequate for the Iranian Government to meet budgetary requirements from normal sources.

A two-year period was considered to be required before this balance could be met. Present availabilities of American aid for Iran consisted primarily of a \$53 million Export-Import Bank loan for development purposes and a continuation of military and technical assistance.

To Mr. Eden's comment that the Shah was now "on a limb," the Secretary responded we did not want to break it off; that he hoped we would be able to help.

Mr. Eden stated it would be a calamity if the Baghdad Pact should collapse. The treaty now had few friends in the area. He understood United States difficulties which prevented its adherence. He hoped, however, the communiqué following the current talks could give some support for the Pact. The object should be to give our friends heart, without excluding help to those who were not firmly in our camp.

Iraq

The Secretary, responding to Mr. Lloyd's query, said we were contemplating additional tanks for Iraq.

Mr. Eden inquired whether it would be possible to let Nuri know tanks could be expected.

Mr. Allen said congressional approval for the related appropriation would first be required, after which we might be able to inform Nuri.

Mr. Lloyd inquired whether United States thinking in the matter might be conveyed to Nuri, even though a firm commitment would not be possible.

The Secretary thought this might be done and suggested the matter be discussed again at a later meeting.

[Here follows discussion of Syria and Jordan (see [volume XIII, pages 567](#) and [20](#), respectively).]

¹ Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 62 D 181, CF 648. Secret. Drafted on February 7, but no further drafting information is given

on the source text. According to a note on the source text, the memorandum of conversation, cleared at the Assistant Secretary of State level only, was being given restricted circulation to appropriate U.S. officials on a need-to-know basis.

This memorandum of conversation is one of a series that records talks in Washington between President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Eden, January 30–February 1. For additional documentation on Eden’s visit to Washington pertaining to the Arab-Israeli question, see [vol. xv, pp. 101 ff.](#)

Briefing and background papers prepared for the use of Assistant Secretary Allen during Secretary Dulles’ briefing of President Eisenhower on January 26 prior to the Eden visit are in Department of State, Central Files, 611.41/1–2656.

**95. Memorandum of a Conversation, White House,
Washington, January 30, 1956, 4 p.m.¹**

Washington, January 30, 1956, 4 p.m.

ETW MC-2

PARTICIPANTS

US

President Eisenhower

Secretary Dulles

Under Secretary Hoover

Ambassador Aldrich

Mr. Merchant

Mr. Allen

Mr. MacArthur

Mr. Bowie

Mr. Hagerty

Mr. Rountree

Mr. Cottman

UK

Prime Minister Eden

Foreign Secretary Lloyd

Ambassador Makins

sir Harold Caccia

Sir Leslie Rowan

Mr. Evelyn Shuckburgh

Mr. Ian Samuel

Mr. Willie Morris

[Here follows discussion of the Arab-Israeli dispute (see [volume XV, page 108](#)).]

Baghdad Pact

The Secretary stated that at the earlier meeting the Baghdad Pact had been discussed and the difficulties of US adherence had been explained. The possibility of demonstrating greater support for the Pact had been examined and the possibility of providing additional Centurion tanks to Iraq had been mentioned. It had been agreed that in the more detailed portion of the communiqué some reference to moral support for the Baghdad Pact should be included. The unsatisfactory situation in Syria had been examined but it was thought little could be done until we knew more about what might be expected of Nasser in Egypt. The Saudi Arabian problem was much more difficult and this matter had been left for discussion with the President.

Mr. Eden remarked it was difficult to know whether Nasser could be dealt with. If so, our course of action in the Middle East could go one way; if not, it should go another.

The President recalled the British had originally thought Nasser to be a great improvement for Egypt and inquired whether they had lost confidence in him.

Mr. Eden replied it was difficult to evaluate Nasser who was a man of limitless ambition.

The Secretary remarked he did not mind ambition, which was a healthy thing that could be played upon. However, Nasser might have become a tool of the Russians. Events of the next week or two might be revealing, particularly in connection with conversations which were now taking place. If he should come to an agreement upon the High Aswan Dam it would be encouraging, but if not, we might have to consider a revision of our whole policy.

The President said he had talked recently with an American businessman who was clearly impressed with Nasser and thought that he was going about his business in an intelligent way. He had expressed the view that Nasser was not one who would cut off his nose to spite his face.

The Secretary agreed Nasser talked intelligently and made a fine impression. However, he made violent anti-Israeli statements on the one hand, while on the other saying privately that a settlement is possible. When recently presenting the new Constitution, Nasser said its main purpose was to create a core uniting the Arab world from the Atlantic to the Persian Gulf and to put back into that core a heart that had been plucked from it: Palestine. This was, of course, inflammatory and would argue against Nasser's sincerity in stating he would like to find a settlement and line up the other Arab states.

[Here follows discussion of Saudi Arabia and Buraimi (see [volume XIII, page 329](#)).]

¹ Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 62 D 181, CF 648. Drafted on February 7, but no further drafting information is given on the source text. According to a note on the source text, the memorandum of conversation, cleared at the Assistant Secretary level only, was being given restricted circulation to appropriate U.S. officials on a need-to-know basis.

96. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iraq¹

Washington, February 8, 1956—11:20 a.m.

583. Baghdad's 755, 791.² Following for use Gallman Baghdad but info posts may also find useful in explaining our position re Pact.

US relationship Baghdad Pact thoroughly discussed by President, Eden and reviewed at special meeting between Selwyn Lloyd and Baghdad Pact Ambassadors, with US attending. While acknowledging psychological and practical reasons which favored US adherence, we emphasized US responsibilities in area and necessity retain maximum US influence in light current Near Eastern problems preclude formal adherence presently. UK understands US viewpoint and agrees our conclusions. Other powers likewise expressed understanding. Final communiqué of talks reiterates solid support for purposes and aims Pact and indicates observers will play constructive roles in work of committees.

We are fully mindful principal purpose of Pact is deter possible aggression against Northern Tier and promote political and economic cooperation among its members. We will continue give full support these aims as well as facilitate indigenous efforts working towards them. Practical aspects our liaison with Pact are just being evolved. It was with the idea strengthening relationship US recently assigned additional officers to Military Observer adding more comprehensive technical support to observer function. Observer reports receiving close scrutiny with particular attention planning aspect mentioned your tel 755. In addition to direct relationships with Pact organization we expect continue utilize existing close military and diplomatic channels express US views on bilateral basis to Pact members. As Pact organization develops we expect progressively adjust our relationship in an effort be of greatest utility to Pact and our common interest. Separate FYI only telegram follows re US relationship to military committee.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/1–3056. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Dixon and Newsom and approved by Rountree who signed for Dulles. Repeated to Karachi, Ankara, Tehran, and London.

² In telegram 755, January 30, Gallman expressed his concern that the lack of a U.S. voice in Baghdad Pact military planning would result in a situation both dangerous and costly and urged U.S. adherence to the Pact at the earliest possible date. (*Ibid.*, 780.5/1–3056) In telegram 791, February 6, Gallman asked for guidance in the event that he might be asked at the February 8 meeting of the Deputies of the Baghdad Pact Council whether there was any additional information about U.S. support for the Baghdad Pact and the U.S. observer role. (*Ibid.*, 780.5/2–656)

97. Memorandum on the Substance of Discussion at the Department of State–Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting, Washington, February 10, 1956, 11:30 a.m.¹

Washington, February 10, 1956, 11:30 a.m.

[Here follows a list of 22 persons present, including Admiral Radford, General Taylor, Admiral Burke, and General White. The Department of State Delegation included Murphy, MacArthur, Bowie, Robertson, and Rountree.]

1. Talks with the British and French on the Middle East.

Mr. Murphy reviewed briefly the conversation which he had held with the British and French Ambassadors on February 8 pursuant to the agreement during the Eden talks for a discussion by the three powers of their responsibilities under the Tripartite Declaration of 1950.² He said that there was general agreement at the meeting that the three places most likely to cause trouble between the Israelis and the Arabs at the present time are Banat Yaqub, where the Israelis are threatening to divert the Jordan River; Al Auja; and Eilath, where the Israelis are threatening to run the Egyptian

blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba. Mr. Murphy said that the meeting had revealed the French position as very wary and hesitant with regard to the assumption of any responsibilities under the Declaration. It is obvious that the French would prefer to put the whole problem in the lap of the United Nations, whereas the United Kingdom is somewhat in advance of our own position as regards tripartite action. Mr. Murphy reported that we had asked the British and the French Ambassadors to consult with their governments with a view to presenting papers at the next tripartite meeting on what they would be prepared to do in the situation. He said that it was planned to have the next meeting at a lower level so as to avoid the intense press interest which had attended this first get-together.

Admiral Radford indicated some concern over British actions in respect to the Arab-Israel problem following the Eden talks. The British had prepared a planning paper and had then asked information of Admiral Cassady in London regarding the capabilities of our 6th Fleet. Admiral Radford said that in the view of our naval authorities such an inquiry was not within the terms of reference of understandings reached during the Eden talks, and that the effect of such activities would be to move joint planning activities to London. He said that he would not be prepared to undertake a joint planning exercise on this matter since the French in reality have nothing to contribute in the way of naval strength. The Admiral had no objection to the approach suggested by British General Whiteley of talks between him, Whiteley and French Admiral Valluy.

Admiral Radford declared that he did not anticipate any problem on the present expansion of naval calls on the eastern Mediterranean as agreed on with the British and asked whether the Department of State had received any comment on them. Mr. Murphy said that he was not aware of any political comment from our missions on the operation. Mr. Rountree pointed out that there had been some comment in the press of the area, particularly Lebanon, and Admiral Burke said that one news reporter had approached CINCNELM. Admiral Burke said that the Navy is treating the operation as a routine movement. Mr. Rountree expressed the view that our aim in getting word around as to our interest in continued peace in the area is being accomplished quietly but effectively through the increase in naval visits. Admiral Radford mentioned a recent visit to him by Representative

Multer and spoke of the Congressman's concern over Arab-Israeli problems.

2. Review of Admiral Radford's Recent Trip to the Middle and Far East.

Admiral Radford opened his remarks by saying that he thought that many of the opinions he had derived from his trip were already well known but that he would touch on some of the high spots. With respect to *Iran*, he found the Shah strong in his feeling of the need for tangible support from the U.S., particularly in view of Iran's action in joining the Baghdad Pact. The Admiral expressed the opinion that, even though technically we did not urge Iran to join the Pact, they certainly knew we were in favor of their joining and we do, accordingly, have some obligations towards them. The Admiral considers Iran particularly important for the U.S., and he pointed out that after all our efforts there in solving the petroleum and other problems in recent years we have built up a considerable investment in Iran from the standpoint of our national interest. He said that the Iranians are not happy over the Zagros defense line. This is a British concept but it does not protect Iran. The Admiral thinks a defense line farther north would be perfectly feasible, provided we move with determination on strengthening the area.

With respect to Pakistan, Admiral Radford commented that after more than a year we have still not straightened out the problem of support of certain Pakistan forces for which we had agreed to pay. He declared that we are going to be in serious trouble all around the world unless we get some better administrative procedures for our aid programs. There is a very real need throughout the Middle East and elsewhere for governments to make their defense plans on the basis of at least three years in advance. This is a very understandable need and is really the only practical way to plan. Having to depend on annual appropriations for our aid program and on various schemes for having money become available on a delayed schedule, such as through the use of PL 480 funds and triangular arrangements, is simply not adequate to the situation. The Pakistan matter, for instance, has become so complicated that it seems almost impossible to unravel it.

Admiral Radford stated that there is a real problem in our being merely an observer as regards the Baghdad Pact. He argued that the U.S. must take a

more active part in the military planning going on under the Pact and pointed out that the JCS has recommended that the U.S. adhere to the Pact. He asserted that the U.S. will have to pick up the price tag in any event and that, if the UK has provided poor or wrong leadership with respect to planning, we will have little grounds to criticize the decisions if we have not taken part in the planning activities. In the Admiral's view, even if it is decided that the U.S. will not join the Pact, we must find ways to be more than a mere observer and to participate actively in the joint planning so as to protect our own interests.

Admiral Radford said that he found confusion throughout the Middle East as to U.S. intentions due to the lack of a clear, definite U.S. policy. The U.S. press continues to present a picture abroad of confusion at home, and things often move so fast in Washington that it is impossible to keep the field adequately informed as to the latest trends of thought and decisions in Washington. *[4 ½ lines of source text not declassified]* The Admiral reiterated his remarks of the previous meeting with respect to the problem of our aid to neutrals. He said that there was bitterness in Iran over our plans to aid Egypt on the Aswan Dam and that there were similar grievances in Pakistan over our aid to India.

There was a discussion of the problem of personnel in the MAAG units and the difficulties often caused by transferring key personnel just when they had achieved a position of confidence and influence among local officials. There was agreement that General McClure should be kept on as chief of the MAAG in Iran if arrangements could be worked out.

[Here follows discussion of Admiral Radford's trip to Thailand, Vietnam, and the Philippines.]

¹ Source: Department of State, State-JCS Meetings: Lot 61 D 417. Top Secret.

² See [vol. XV, pp. 159–160](#).

98. Letter From Prime Minister Eden to President Eisenhower¹

London, March 4, 1956.

DEAR FRIEND: I am asking Selwyn Lloyd to discuss with Foster developments in Middle East which are causing me much concern.²

There is no doubt that the Russians are resolved to liquidate Baghdad Pact. In this undertaking Nasser is supporting them and I suspect that his relations with the Soviet are much closer than he admits to us. Recent events in Jordan are part of this pattern.

Our policy should surely be to encourage our friends who will now come under heavy pressure. This means urgent and effective measures to shore up the Baghdad Pact and Iraq in particular.

We are considering the allotment to Iraq of some of the very considerable aid we have given to Jordan—over 12,000,000 pounds a year. If the United States could accede to the Baghdad Pact the effect would be tremendous. On a lesser scale it would greatly help Nuri if you could agree that we should let him have very soon the further Centurion tanks which we discussed last month.

I feel myself that we can no longer safely wait on Nasser. Indeed if the United States now joined the Baghdad Pact this would impress him more than all our attempts to cajole him have yet done.

Certainly we should accept, I think, that a policy of appeasement will bring us nothing in Egypt. Our best chance is to show that it pays to be our friends.

I send you these reflections because events are moving fast and I am anxious to keep in touch.

Yours ever,

¹ Source: Eisenhower Library, Presidential Papers, International File. Secret. Delivered to the White House under cover of a note from Ambassador Makins.

On March 6, Ambassador Aldrich reported in telegram 3750 from London that during a conversation with Eden, the Prime Minister had handed Aldrich a copy of this letter and emphasized the urgency he attached to taking some dramatic step to bolster friendly governments in the area and the importance of U.S. adherence to the Baghdad Pact as a deterrent to Nasser. (Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/3-656) A copy of the telegram in the Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles-Herter Series is initialed by Eisenhower.

² Secretary Dulles and Foreign Secretary Lloyd attended the second meeting of the SEATO Council at Karachi March 6-8. Reports on Dulles' conversations with Lloyd concerning the Baghdad Pact are printed as [Documents 99](#) and [100](#).

³ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

99. Telegram From the Secretary of State to the Department of State¹

Karachi, March 6, 1956—10 p.m.

Dulte 4. Eyes only Acting Secretary from Secretary. Briefly discussed this evening with Lloyd possible US adherence now to Baghdad Pact. I told him President's reply to Eden² would probably be negative. I said I could not conceive Senate approving adherence to Baghdad Pact without some security pact in favor of Israel and that combination, even if Senate accepted it, would probably worsen Iraq's position rather than strengthen it. Lloyd agrees with this estimate. I told Lloyd I thought there was some hope that Nasser might take more constructive attitude toward Johnston plan and perhaps Israel peace if there was provisional standstill on Arab membership in Baghdad Pact.³ Lloyd doubted that he would do more than agree to abate anti-Western propaganda.

Lloyd pressed hard for favorable action on Centurion tanks for Iraq. I said I would recommend some favorable action although I doubted this could be provided out of FY 56 budget. Caccia implied that if they could get some executive expression of intent to provide funds out of FY 57 budget, this might meet their need.

Will repeat above from here to Cairo by special channel.

Dulles

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/3-656. Secret; Priority.

² The text of Eden's March 4 message to Eisenhower (*supra*) was transmitted to Secretary Dulles at Karachi in Tedul 5, March 5. (Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/3-556) The text of a suggested response, prepared in the Department of State, was transmitted to Dulles in Tedul 4, March 5. (*Ibid.*, 780.5/3-556) For text of Eisenhower's response to Eden, see [vol. xv, p. 337](#). In his response, Eisenhower wrote, in regard to the Baghdad Pact: "I question whether adherence by the United States to the

Baghdad Pact now is the right answer. Measures apart from actual accession to the Pact such as our recent decision to increase aid to Pakistan and Iran may be more effective support for our friends. This is particularly true when drawbacks to adherence are considered, such as the effect of the other Arab States and probable demands for arms and a security guarantee to Israel.”

³ Nasser had given this indication during a conversation with President Eisenhower’s special representative Robert B. Anderson in Cairo on March 5. Anderson, then on a secret mission to the Middle East in an effort to bring about an Arab-Israeli peace, had transmitted a report of the conversation to Washington and had asked for guidance on whether he could give such assurances to Nasser. Anderson’s report on the March 5 conversation and Acting Secretary Hoover’s response are printed in [vol. xv, pp. 302](#) and [309](#).

Secretary Dulles informed Anderson on March 6 that he agreed with Hoover that there would be “no further accession” to the Baghdad Pact. Dulles said he also assumed that there would be some assurances regarding Israel at least privately and preferably a public statement on Eric Johnston’s plan. (Kahi 2629 from Karachi to Cairo, March 6; Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518 Alpha—Anderson talks w/BG & Nasser)

100. Telegram From the Delegation at the SEATO Council Meeting to the Department of State¹

Karachi, March 7, 1956—5 p.m.

Secto 14. Baghdad Pact. During meeting with Secretary afternoon March 5 Lloyd raised question of Baghdad Pact and said for prestige purposes he hoped we might be able to send fairly senior representative from Department to attend April 16 meeting Baghdad Council in addition to our permanent representative Ambassador Gallman.

Secretary replied he would have think about this and could not give answer this juncture. Lloyd smilingly suggested it might not be necessary since

possibly US would have become member of Pact by that time. Secretary replied he did not think there was any chance of this.

Secretary made reference to comment Lloyd had made to him day before to effect it might still be possible to solve situation with Nasser. Secretary said if we tried to build up Baghdad Pact as rival organization to Nasser and Arab League at this time when there still seemed to be chance to get Nasser to do something on Johnston water plan and also with respect to moving Egyptian and Israeli forces back from Egyptian-Israeli frontier, we might increase our difficulties and precipitate action in an already dangerous situation. In other words, it might be preferable to have a standstill on Baghdad Pact and try to work something out with Nasser rather than having open break with him. Secretary went on to say UK must not count on our joining Baghdad Pact at this time. Certainly it was not possible to join this Pact without giving security agreement to Israel. If it were possible to do both, which just did not seem in cards at this time, Secretary felt we would only create greater difficulties for Iraq since Arab states would think Iraq, which they already regard as something of pariah, had agreed to US-Israel pact in return for US joining Baghdad Pact.

Lloyd agreed this would do more harm than good. Secretary reiterated we could not join Baghdad Pact without Congressional approval and this would give rise to irresistible demands for security pact with Israel.

Lloyd then mentioned he would be visiting Baghdad and Tehran March 9–10. He said it would be very helpful if he could tell Iraqis US had in mind financing additional Centurion tanks. Secretary said it did not seem possible for us to finance additional tanks out of this year's budget. He said our purpose is to get funds in next year's budget so that some additional tanks could be supplied but that Congressional action would not be taken on fiscal '57 budget until late in spring.

Lloyd asked whether he could tell Iraqis that USG was interested in helping Iraq further and in its appropriation was seeking funds for some additional tanks. Secretary agreed Lloyd could inform Iraqis of our interest and our intention this respect and said he understood Eden had made reference to this in message to President and that President would reply giving our position.

Lloyd mentioned Iran briefly and inquired whether we were going try do anything more help Iran economically. The Secretary replied we were doing our best help Iran and also to do more for Pakistan. He added that it was difficult to get much support for helping Iran to balance its budget when Iranian legislation provided that 90% of its oil revenues should go to economic development rather than balancing its budget. Nonetheless, we fully recognized importance of economic development in Iran and we were doing our best help them.

Dulles

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–KA/3–756. Secret. Repeated to London.

101. Telegram From the Embassy in Iraq to the Department of State¹

Baghdad, March 10, 1956—2 p.m.

926. Baghdad Pact Council Deputies held special session March 9 to hear British Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd who is transiting Baghdad. Prime Minister Nuri Said was in chair.

Nuri first welcomed Lloyd to Council meeting and reiterated deep attachment GOI has to principles and aims Baghdad Pact. He described it as necessity for defense and prosperity and stated GOI determined do all it can to help achieve pact aims. "We want friends and allies eager to cooperate with us" he said. Differences opinion re pact in some quarters should only induce members stand closer together. Nuri then invited Lloyd to speak.

Lloyd thanked Nuri for welcome and expressed his pleasure be here. UK position re Baghdad Pact he said had been stated by Eden previous eve in House Commons as one of unwavering support. UK intends do all it can maintain it. Pact "important feature" in UK foreign policy.

He then spoke of recent trip which he and Eden had made to US to exchange views with President and Secretary. US and UK he asserted had come to much the same conclusion re world situation. He scoffed at talk new Soviet look allegedly inaugurated by Khrushchev insisting it was deeds rather than words that mattered. Soviet deeds had been bad he said and cited Soviet arms for Egypt as well as Soviet loan and arms for Afghanistan, purpose of which could only be try stir up trouble for UK and allies. They did not suggest it safe let down preparedness. Both US and UK in agreement on this point.

Re recent SEATO meeting Lloyd commented there had been some advance pessimism that meeting might not prove satisfactory. Instead, however, SEATO meeting had been "great success" and practical steps re military

planning, combating subversion, economic planning, et cetera, had been evolved. Meeting had shown real spirit friendship alliance and comradeship and SEATO well underway make effective contribution to peace. Even such sensitive issues as Kashmir and Pakistan-Afghanistan dispute he said had been disposed of in private sessions in 20 minutes. Re Pakistan-Afghanistan UK position is that Durand Line is border. Re Kashmir issue participants had agreed early settlement desirable either thru UN or thru direct negotiations. SEATO he felt was a strong alliance and he noted that two of its members UK and Pakistan were likewise members Baghdad Pact.

Lloyd next turned to reports re his recent visit to Bahrain. Bahrain incident he stated had been unfortunate combination circumstances. Contrary to reports his car had not been stoned but some of cars at rear end of motor cavalcade had had few windows broken. During dinner with ruler some 1,000 or more people were reportedly assembling at causeway to demonstrate. He had thought it better therefore wait "until they had gone to bed" rather than risk casualties and perhaps have to "shoot some people". Situation in Bahrain confused with both ruler and opposition claiming they backed by British. Demonstration spurred on moreover by Egyptian propaganda and Saudi money. He felt however that all elements on Bahrain had learned their lesson and that such incident would not recur.

Lloyd then turned to his recent conversation with Gamal Abdul Nasser. Nasser had said that he did not approve Baghdad Pact and that anti-Iraqi actions which he allegedly admitted had only been due to it. After its conclusion he had eventually accepted it. It had only been when recent effort was made bring Jordan into it that he reacted once more. Nasser had made it clear according Lloyd that he would be prepared tolerate Pact if it were frozen at least as far as Arab countries are concerned. Lloyd himself felt it "intolerable" and "humiliation" accept such suggestion to withdraw invitation to others come in. He had told Nasser he stated that "tolerable relations with Egypt" depend on whether Nasser stopped propaganda against Iraq, UK, Baghdad Pact, on general British position in ME. Nasser had allegedly agreed "taper it off". During past week however he had been told Egyptian attacks on UK and Baghdad Pact had begun again. He felt therefore "not much reliance to be placed on understanding with him

(Nasser)". UK prepared consider getting along with him but must first wait for him stop his mischief.

Lloyd related he talked to Nasser about Jordan and Egyptian Prime Minister had appeared be genuinely surprised at strength refugees. Nasser had indicated that when he began operations against Jordanian adherence to Pact in November last year he had not suspected refugees so easy stir up and now appeared be "slightly frightened" over implications their strength. Nasser had stated he himself had tried settle 50,000 of them (presumably on Egyptian territory) but they had refused and he was powerless.

Lloyd's own impression re Jordan was that there actually two Jordans, east and west bank. He was not certain whether same solution applied to both. In any case first stage he felt was conclude "closer association between east bank and Iraq" which in interest both Iraq and UK.

He next turned to Israeli problem and opined prospects early Arab-Israeli settlement bad. Neither side willing come to any settlement and situation complicated by fact that there 4 Arab states around Israel. Immediate task in his view was not to think of settlement but rather to take more active steps keep two sides apart and maintain the peace. Reprisals could only lead to counter reprisals and in due course to war. Additional physical steps required such as marking out demilitarized zones, more UN truce supervisors, et cetera, to assist keeping peace.

Turning to Saudi Arabia Lloyd remarked everyone saying UK must be strong and firm and it had been so in case of Buraimi. "Now some of our best friends are coming along saying we must make agreement." If UK "climbs down and lets him (King Saud) back in" other Persian Gulf rulers will lose confidence in British protection. UK Lloyd said willing talk to Saud without conditions. At same time however there was "no question letting Saud and his men back into Buraimi". He had talked to Secretary Dulles about the matter and there had been "very close unity of view" between US and UK. Both had felt UK must take stronger steps against people opposing West. Both support Baghdad Pact and will do everything strengthen it.

Lloyd concluded by commenting that while immediate aim of Pact must be expedite military defense planning he felt that as Pact develops its economic aspects would hold greater attractions.

Second part of meeting devoted to questions.

Nuri said he had heard Nasser had shown interest in Baghdad Pact economic committee and wondered if this were so. Selwyn Lloyd replied negatively. Nasser's idea had only been that if invitation to other Arab countries join Baghdad Pact were withdrawn he would consider reviving idea building up ACSP with view to eventual association between it and Baghdad Pact. Nasser had made it clear however this would take time.

Nuri then asked what UK would do if Nasser continues his broadcasts against UK which were entirely contradictory to Anglo-Egyptian Treaty. Lloyd felt Nasser needed economic help and that if he did not get it this would doubtless affect him. He was particularly interested in Sudan waters and had asked UK use its influence with Sudanese Government obtain agreement on water. He had seemed "quite nervous" whether he could get agreement on it. Present base agreements in Egypt Lloyd said suited UK while Egypt on her part gets some money out of it. If Nasser continues present line however "whole of our relations with him will have to be looked at".

[2 paragraphs (14 lines of source text) not declassified]

Nuri stated that in his view entire success of Baghdad Pact depends upon stopping Saud. He may be anti-Communist, he is nevertheless doing more harm than are the Communists. Nasser could do nothing without Saudi money.

All aid given by US to Turkey, Pakistan, Iran, etc., is largely nullified by Saudi activities in Syria, Jordan and other Arab countries. Something should surely be done stop this. Baghdad Pact he observed is not only Iraq but is also "UK and US and other powers" and Egypt and Saudi Arabia should be made understand this. Iraqi critics of Baghdad Pact ask why if West favors pact does it allow Saudi Arabia act the way it does. How long will it continue? Lloyd replied in somewhat general terms that it was true

UK relations with Egypt had again reached “critical phase”. It was not tolerable continue accept Egyptian propaganda attacks against UK and Baghdad Pact. At same time he felt it was not in interest Baghdad Pact countries denounce Anglo-Egyptian agreement.

Nuri continued argue that in view Anglo-Egyptian treaty relations UK has certain right talk with Egyptians to straighten them out. He referred to his talks with Nasser in autumn 1954 before Baghdad Pact concluded and recalled Nasser’s problem had then allegedly been time required to condition Egyptian public to cooperation with West. In view uncertainty answer he, Nuri, has had take action himself.

Lloyd again related Nasser had just been accustomed to Baghdad Pact when effort had been made bring Jordan in. Nasser had said he prepared tolerate Pact if invitation to other Arab states be withdrawn. Nasser had been very successful in Jordan thus far but Lloyd wondered whether this might not change once he encounters more difficulties.

Nuri observed Nasser’s success outside of Egypt (he said he would not speak of situation in Egypt itself) was entirely dependent on Saudi Arabian money. “Stop this money for two months and see what happens” he said. Lloyd merely observed that immediate problem as he saw it was Jordan.

Lloyd asked how Nuri felt re development of Baghdad Pact thus far. Nuri opined it going well as did Iranian Ambassador. When asked re feeling on recent economic committee meeting Bashayan replied he felt this too going satisfactorily.

Lloyd next asked whether there were any weak points in organization and what could be done to improve this. Bashayan’s immediate reply was “one more Arab state in it would help greatly”. Although Pact had now been in existence for only short time work done to date “very encouraging”. Tehran meeting would show even more evidence of this.

British Ambassador Wright spoke [garble] work economic subcommittees and stated that Council had felt it desirable all member countries be

represented at forthcoming economic committee session in Tehran at ministerial or junior ministerial level.

Secretary General Khalidi referred to mass of material currently being turned out by economic subcommittees and hoped this could be presented at Tehran meeting. He indicated however that small staff of Secretariat made work difficult and whole Secretariat staffing pattern and organization needed review after Tehran meeting. All agreed.

Wright [*1½ lines of source text not declassified*] observed Nuri felt that it would be useful establish cooperation and working link among radio stations of member countries. Iraq would soon have new strong transmitter to assist in this. Nuri said GOI already trying to organize radio cooperation with Iran and Turkey in order combat Cairo broadcasts which were all “big lies”. Tehran, Ankara and Karachi already had strong stations and Iraq would do so next summer. He in close touch with Pact member state Embassies in Baghdad on organization of programs. There were moreover some useful elements which might help including several dissident Egyptians. All of this was good he admitted but principal problem still was Saudi buying of newspapers and politicians in Syria and Jordan. If that stops opposition to Pact will collapse. He had discussed this on various occasions but thus far there had been no results. [*1½ lines of source text not declassified*]

I intervened at this point saying that I did not wish impression prevail that USG had not taken real seriously Nuri’s observations re Saudi Arabian activities. My talks with Nuri on the subject had been fully reported and had been given serious consideration. Secretary Dulles had pointed out in Washington that problem had to be carefully weighed. It was difficult. One could not tell any government to do this or that with its own revenues. [*2½ lines of source text not declassified*] To work it out required time. I added that I was pleased Lloyd had made it clear how closely our two governments were working together on the problem. As an observer I said I had gotten a lift out of fact that Nasser had not as the Foreign Secretary had pointed out gone on record as opposing our eventual adherence to Baghdad Pact. I thanked Lloyd for giving us his time and for his frankness.

Lloyd then asked re work military committee which Major General Daghestani (Iraqi director military operations) outlined for him; He concluded by indicating interim report would be presented at Tehran meeting. Planners work, Daghestani felt, was proceeding satisfactorily.

Iranian Ambassador Ghods-Nakhai [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] seize upon this to state that Iranian Government expects military committee meeting take place in Tehran at same time as Council. It had instructed its representative in Pact member countries to discuss matter with governments. It would be most useful if military committee met at same time.

Daghestani again pointed out final reports of military planners would not be ready but felt there was no objection if military committee wished meet in Tehran with Ministerial Council to discuss interim report. Main difficulty he felt was problem shifting classified files to Tehran. Iranian Ambassador again emphasized importance his government attaches to such meeting. Referring to fact that Ministerial Council and military committee had met simultaneously in Baghdad last fall he felt it would make bad impression in Tehran if this did not take place this time.

Lloyd asked for views of Air Marshal Sir William Dickson (Chairman British Joint Chiefs Staff) on subject.

Dickson stated UK had felt that time factor too short to have proper military committee meeting in Tehran. He was not certain whether there were any great advantages in having progress report and cautioned against hurrying the meeting too greatly. At same time he did not see any harm in having military present in Tehran meeting.

Pakistan Ambassador Quraishi remarked military committee should presumably meet only to discuss something. Whole question however was one for military committee to decide, if it wanted to meet to consider planning or interim report there could be no objection. He understood Iranian President had been writing of anticipated meeting military committee in Tehran. Ranking military men will in any case be present there as members delegation. Moreover 3 (actually 4) defense ministers likely to be there to head delegations. Even if possibility discussing

substantive matter not great presence military should be sufficient to satisfy public which would in any case not be party to their talks.

Iranian Ambassador reiterated hope military committee would meet in Tehran.

It was agreed when concluding meeting that Secretary General might if asked by press state that Lloyd had met with Council Deputies and that there had been informal review of international situation as well as discussion re preparations for forthcoming Council meeting in Tehran. No record of meeting being prepared by Secretariat.

Lloyd emplaning for Tehran today.

Gallman

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/3–1056. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Ankara, Karachi, London, and Tehran.

102. Memorandum of a Conference With the President, White House, Washington, March 15, 1956, 2:30 p.m.¹

Washington, March 15, 1956, 2:30 p.m.

OTHERS PRESENT

Admiral Radford

General Taylor

General Twining

Admiral Burke

General Pate

Colonel Goodpaster

[Here follows discussion of the U.S. military program.]

Admiral Radford said the JCS are tending to think that the problem the United States faces is not primarily military. More important is to reach a line of action as to what we [can?] do in the Middle East. Many questions are arising. There are indications the British are shying away from joint planning, perhaps based on a conclusion that they cannot find themselves in position of fighting the Arabs. If the U.S. does not join the Baghdad Pact, there are signs the Pact may disintegrate. The President said we have been holding off on the Baghdad Pact, trying to get constructive plans adopted, such as the Johnston plan. It might well be that we could now reconsider.

He said that the Administration will soon be going to the Congress in support of the Foreign Aid program. In the second section he would like to see the Chiefs express their ideas as to what we should do in broad outline in Italy, Turkey, Pakistan, the Far East, etc.

The President said the time may be coming when we will have to serve some notice on certain of the Middle Eastern countries. Admiral Burke said what is needed at such a time is someone else in a country who can become the leader. The President said that perhaps Saud could be the leader. Arabia is the religious center. It could then take a leading role. Admiral Radford suggested working through Turkey and Pakistan. He thought that if the United States joined the Baghdad Pact, current suspicions and criticisms that it is largely political could be lessened. He referred to problems in Libya where arms are apparently passing from the Egyptians into French North Africa. Admiral Burke said we should consider what could be cut off—not always what could be added on. By dumping cotton, great pressure could be exerted. Similarly, by curtailing oil output in some areas, the flow of money might be curtailed. Difficulties in the way of these activities were brought out in discussion. The President inquired whether it would be possible to increase oil from Iran relative to output in other areas.

After further discussion, the Chiefs undertook to develop views along the lines the President requested.

G
Colonel, CE, U S Army

¹ Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster on March 16.

103. Telegram From the Embassy in Iraq to the Department of State¹

Baghdad, March 20, 1956—6 p.m.

987. Attention invited to “report US observers to Baghdad Pact military planning conference,” which is being pouched to Department Army today.² I believe Department will find it of great interest.

Summary of military observers conclusions recorded below:

1. Baghdad Pact military planning committing US to area defense concept without US participation in planning.
2. Initial studies exceedingly general in nature but may form foundation for future more realistic detailed planning.
3. Insistence on part Iranians re Elburz concept and UK refusal state force capabilities have resulted in unrealistic approach to defense planning.
4. Elburz concept acceptable as future goal, but interim planning must be made in light capabilities. These will not at present support Elburz concept.
5. Although progress in initial military planning slow, experience gained should prove helpful in future planning.
6. JCS informal comments on studies will help overcome prevailing pessimism among some pact members. US military observers feel these comments should stress importance of capabilities planning and include comments re nuclear aspects.
7. Present plans too general be of great value for US military aid planning, but US military observers feel our MDAP should eventually be programmed on basis Baghdad Pact military plans.

8. US interest in Baghdad Pact studies should be general in nature until such time as we decide participate more actively in work.

9. If in future US decides participate actively in pact military planning, US team should be thoroughly prepared assume leadership in order show how work may best be organized to produce results.

10. Apart from UK, Pakistani military planners were most experienced and qualified participate in such work.

11. Indigenous member states aware of UK military limitations and do not accept UK military leadership. Pakistanis in particular consider UK efforts directed at seeking influence military planning for benefit British political and commercial interests.

12. US military observers feel effective defense of Middle East cannot be developed unless US actively participates in Baghdad Pact military planning, supports it with military aid and commits at least token air forces [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] for defense of area.

Gallman

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/3–2056. Top Secret; Midmil.

² Not printed.

104. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson)¹

Washington, March 23, 1956.

SUBJECT

U.S. Adherence to the Baghdad Pact

1. During the past year, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have on several occasions expressed views to point out the military advantages of early United States adherence to the Baghdad Pact, while recognizing the inherent implications with regard to increased military and economic aid.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff realize that United States adherence to the Baghdad Pact is but one of several actions being studied which may involve the United States in the Middle East. However, the formation of the Baghdad Pact organization, and particularly its military planning, is advancing rapidly. In the light of this progress and of the critical situation in the Middle East, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, from a military point of view, recommend that the United States adhere to the Baghdad Pact without delay, and that the Secretary of State be so advised.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Arthur Radford²
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

¹ Source: Eisenhower Library, Sp. Asst. for Nat. Sec. Affairs Records. Top Secret. Gordon Gray sent a copy of this memorandum to Secretary Dulles on April 2. (Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/4–256) Secretary of Defense Wilson forwarded a copy of the memorandum to NSC Executive Secretary Lay on April 5 (see [Document 109](#)), who in turn transmitted both memoranda to the NSC on April 9.

² Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

105. Telegram from the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State¹

London, March 26, 1956—6 p.m.

4228. For Secretary and Under Secretary. Selwyn Lloyd called me to his office in House of Commons 3 pm today and few minutes later Prime Minister joined us. Before Eden's arrival Lloyd said they wished discuss further Foreign Secretary's message of March 21 re the Middle East,² and that while Eden would wish to make specific points purpose conversation was to emphasize urgency UK attaches to situation. He also said he hoped that pending the outcome of the consideration the UK and the US are giving the situation in general, the US would not take further steps in connection with Aswan Dam project. Lloyd further mentioned seriousness position in Jordan and a report he has received from Baghdad that at a meeting just held there of elder Iraqi statesmen, Nuri's position was challenged, suggesting the precarious-ness if not of Iraq's Western orientation, at least of Nuri's ability to maintain firm control of country.

[1 paragraph (5½ lines of source text) not declassified]

Lloyd said Eden would wish to discuss principally the Baghdad Pact and the urgency and importance of US taking some dramatic action at this time to demonstrate further its support for the Pact.

Eden produced paper headed "Note", which he said he had drafted hurriedly following lunch conversation with Lloyd, and after latter read it and approved, gave it to me for transmission. Text is as follows:

“1. The position in Jordan is very shaky and if Jordan fell the reaction in Iraq would be immediate.

2. Nuri's position there is not too strong. If he were to go, the effect on the Baghdad Pact would be disastrous. Our joint oil interests would be in the gravest danger.

3. We have to consider the effect of possible events in Jordan and Iraq on Persia. The Shah's regime would be threatened.

4. The French are attacking the Baghdad Pact despite all Monsieur Mollet's assurances to me. Her Majesty's Government, on the other hand, are deeply committed to it. There would be the most serious repercussions here if it were to collapse.

5. If the U.S. Government are unable to join the Baghdad Pact at once, can they not make an immediate declaration of intent? The position is slipping, and action is needed in a matter of days."³

Stressing desirability dramatic US move relation Baghdad Pact, Eden said he appreciated reasons previously given him by President and Secretary why the US could not join the pact at this time, but, referring to view that USG had not closed the door on future action, urged the value, if possible, of a statement now that we contemplate adhering at an appropriate later date. He was particularly annoyed at Mollet's statements yesterday attacking the Pact after agreeing with him here so recently on general solidarity toward the Middle East and he mentioned as further evidence situation deteriorating rapidly Nasser's pronouncements to which British felt it necessary react publicly last evening. Somewhat parenthetically he remarked, however, that he did not believe Nasser has as much strength behind him as his attitude would suggest, being considerably like Mussolini in his early days in that respect.

Eden was gratified that the US has been able to do something quickly to assist Libya and said that the UK expects to be able to go ahead with the Tripoli power plant project without delay.

I asked whether he had any particular reports to suggest that the position in Jordan is likely to disintegrate in the next few days, which seems to be the thesis this latest approach. He says he does not have, but that the situation there is virtually entirely dependent on the stability of the young King. Lloyd noted that while the King might weather a further revolt of Legion officers or from some other Jordan quarter, it is doubtful whether he could do so if Egypt should support such a revolt with the large subversive resources she possesses there. I also inquired whether the present

conversation indicates a shift in emphasis in UK thinking since the dispatch of Lloyd's message to the Secretary in which stress seemed to me to be on Syria whereas UK comments today emphasize Jordan, Iraq and the Baghdad Pact generally. Eden felt it to be a matter of timing. [2½ lines of source text not declassified] Only step he could see possible immediately to hold situation for the next few days would be a dramatic US declaration of support for the Baghdad Pact.

In conclusion Prime Minister expressed appreciation for the President's response to his message and the hope that US policy consideration would be completed and its views forthcoming as early as possible.

Barbour

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/3-2656. Top Secret; Eyes Only.

² See [vol. XV, pp. 383-387](#).

³ During a conversation with Sir Roger Makins on March 27, Acting Secretary Hoover showed Makins a copy of telegram 4228 from London. According to the memorandum of conversation, "The British Ambassador, in reference to numbered paragraph 5, regarding the question of the United States Government joining the Baghdad Pact at once, said he agreed with Mr. Hoover's assessment of the inadvisability of the United States Government attempting to obtain Congressional ratification of an act of adherence on our part. He said he fully appreciated the difficulty this would produce in connection with Israel and that it would be impossible to segregate the two questions. He said he had reported this to London on several occasions but obviously his messages were perhaps not being read by the top people." (*Ibid.*, S/S-NEA Files: Lot 61 D 417, Omega #1)

106. Editorial Note

On March 28, President Eisenhower approved a new approach to certain Middle East policies put forth in a memorandum to the President by Secretary Dulles of that date. The approach provided for a reexamination and re-direction of current policies with the objective of reinforcing ties with friendly countries and modifying the policies of Egypt and Syria. It also included increased U.S. support for the Baghdad Pact, short of adherence to the Pact. Subsequent to March 28, the code name “Omega” was adopted within the Department of State for the handling of all documentation pertaining to the implementation of this special Middle East policy. For text of the March 28 memorandum and other documentation relating to this subject, see [volume XV, pages 421 ff.](#)

107. Editorial Note

On March 30, at a Department of State–Joint Chiefs of Staff meeting at the Pentagon, with participants from the Departments of Defense, State, the National Security Council, and the Central Intelligence Agency, Admiral Radford and Deputy Under Secretary Murphy presented reports on the Baghdad Pact and the role of the British in the Middle East. The memorandum of discussion reads in part as follows:

“Commenting on a recent telegram from Karachi on the concern of our Middle East allies over our failure to join the Baghdad Pact, Admiral Radford said that he was fully aware of the various objections to U.S. membership in the Pact, and he was busy working on how to get around those objections. He expressed the conviction that, if the U.S. does not join the Baghdad Pact, it will fall apart. The Pact meeting on April 16 was discussed and Mr. Murphy mentioned the Department’s recommendation that there be higher ranking civilian and military representation from Washington.

“Admiral Radford reported the urgent visit to Washington next week of Air Marshal Sir William Dickson in connection with our Middle East planning. He said that the United Kingdom defense chiefs will have ready by April 21 their planning papers for various contingencies in the Middle East, including action necessary to stop an outbreak of hostilities. Admiral Radford’s final comment was that he thought the best help the British could give us in the Middle East right now would be to give in on several bitter issues such as their Buraimi controversy with the Saudi Arabians.” (Department of State, State–JCS Meetings: Lot 61 D 417)

**108. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State,
Washington, April 3, 1956¹**

Washington, April 3, 1956

SUBJECT

April 14 Baghdad Pact Council Meeting in Tehran

PARTICIPANTS

C—Mr. MacArthur

NEA—Mr. Rountree

NE—Mr. Wilkins

NE—Mr. Shaw

ICA—Mr. Ohly

S/S—RO—Mr. Kirk

Mr. MacArthur opened the meeting by stating that we are under great pressure from all the Baghdad Pact members to join the Pact. We could not do this at this time for several reasons, but we are trying to develop other ways to demonstrate our support for the Pact; therefore, Mr. Henderson and Admiral Cassady were going to Tehran as the U.S. observers to the Baghdad Pact Council Meeting on April 16.

Mr. Rountree stated that we intended to send messages to all the Baghdad Pact capitals affirming our support for the Pact and explaining why we could not join at this time. We were also providing high-level U.S. representation at the April Baghdad Pact Council Meeting. The third element is economic. We see compelling reasons for increasing the quantity of U.S. aid to the area and improving our performance in fulfilling promises of aid already made.

Mr. Ohly asked what we were trying to accomplish and whether we were trying to step up aid to all the Baghdad Pact countries or just one or two of them.

Mr. Rountree said that we were really trying to prevent the threatened collapse of the Baghdad Pact, which would be a disaster to the free world. It was difficult to say which Pact countries needed bolstering the most, but there is a critical need of supplying added material benefits to Iraq and Iran.

Mr. Rountree said the UK, recognizing our reluctance to adhere to the Pact, has been searching for other ways to improve the situation. They propose to deemphasize the military aspects of the Pact and emphasize its economic side. They have proposed to us the establishment of a technical assistance board under the Pact to which member countries could come for help with their development problems. This board would have a working fund of 1–2 million dollars for use over a period of years. The British would like to know if we favored such a board and would be willing to contribute to its working fund.

After some discussion, there was general agreement that our approach in replying to the British should be that we wanted to be helpful but that their particular proposal was not in sufficient detail for us to pass judgment on it at this time; that Mr. Henderson, Admiral Cassady, and a senior economic officer from Washington would represent the U.S. at the forthcoming Council meeting; and that they could discuss in Baghdad the degree to which our bilateral assistance could be related to the Baghdad Pact and what contribution we might make to an economic organization of the Pact. Mr. Mac Arthur asked NEA to have a message along these lines ready for clearance with ICA on the morning of April 4.

Mr. MacArthur asked Mr. Ohly to appoint a senior officer from the ICA Washington establishment to represent the U.S. at the April 12 meeting of the Baghdad Pact economic committee and serve with Mr. Henderson at the Council meeting. Mr. Ohly pointed out that the economic representative's terms of reference should be very carefully spelled out, and Messrs. Rountree and Wilkins were asked to prepare these.

Mr. MacArthur asked NEA to prepare an introductory statement for Mr. Henderson to make at the Council meeting, a statement on military matters, and a statement on the economic aspects of the meeting. He suggested that a paper drafted for the SEATO meeting (KAR D-5/15)² might be a useful guide in preparing the latter paper, which we should be prepared to make public if necessary.

¹ Source: Department of State, S/S-NEA Files: Lot 61 D 417. Top Secret. Drafted by Roger Kirk of the Executive Secretariat.

² Not printed.

109. Letter From the Secretary of Defense (Wilson) to the Secretary of State¹

Washington, April 5, 1956.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Reference is made to a letter from the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) to you dated 2 April 1956,² which forwarded the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff concerning U.S. adherence to the Baghdad Pact.

The Department of Defense has further studied this matter and considers that early adherence to the Baghdad Pact, or at least an indication of our intention to do so, may well be necessary to avoid disintegration of the Pact Organization. Such disintegration would have extremely serious consequences for the security of the Free World and of the United States.

It is recognized that there are political and other obstacles to immediate adherence as well as implications for increased aid to the countries concerned. However, the Department of Defense considers this matter to be of such critical importance as to warrant review at the highest level.

For the foregoing reasons I consider that action should be initiated which would facilitate our adherence to the Baghdad Pact at the earliest feasible time.

I am also conveying the substance of these views to the National Security Council.³

C.E. Wilson

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/4-556. Top Secret.

² See [footnote 1, Document 104](#).

³ Secretary Wilson transmitted the JCS memorandum ([Document 104](#)) to Lay on April 5 under cover of a memorandum. (Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC Memoranda) Lay sent both to the NSC on April 9. (*Ibid.*)

110. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Turkey¹

Washington, April 6, 1956—8:50 p.m.

1665. Department desires you, in manner you deem most effective, give following orally to high-level official of government to which you accredited.

USG has given most serious consideration to various expressions of concern received from officials Baghdad Pact countries in recent days over future Baghdad Pact and repeated hopes US may find it possible adhere.

USG desires reaffirm assurances given by President, Secretary of State, and numerous other US high officials on different occasions of solid US support, not only for northern tier collective security concept but for particular form it has assumed in Pact. US recognizes it had role in encouraging the initiation and supported the development of the Pact. US believes ambitions Soviet Union represent grave threat to area, that Baghdad Pact represents most effective grouping for area defense and that maintenance of sustained and strengthened Pact organization is important to Free World.

American people recognize increasing importance to them and to Free World of Middle East and have in recent years continually widened their commitments in this region. US executive and legislative organs maintaining constant review ME problems to determine best means in light over-all commitments US of contributing to lessening tensions caused by Near East disputes and at same time of strengthening area collective security and supporting firmly declared friends. Such considerations affect thinking in determining appropriate US role in Middle East.

USG aware of problem of assuring public of Pact nations of strong US support in absence actual membership at this time. Delegation of officials from high levels Departments State and Defense to attend Council meeting is immediate public indication US interest. Observers will have this problem firmly in mind and it is hoped statements they make at Tehran may

further assist member countries to understand the present position of USG and steps being taken in support of Pact.

Within context present observer relationship USG believes it can help Pact nations through influence it can exert among non-member countries of Europe and area. In so doing, US fully recognizes bold step Pact nations have taken and undesirability appear support those who for variety of motives oppose Pact. However, US also recognizes strength of Pact must rest on maintaining free world influence in other Middle East nations and continually attempting frustrate Soviet penetration by whatever means into these areas. US observers will be prepared discuss this with Pact Council.

In discussions with others, USG makes no secret its firm support. In recent weeks, USG has discussed Pact with France and Saudi Arabia, among others, and will continue, as opportunities arise, to explain and defend it to those skeptical or antagonistic.

With firm desire demonstrate strong support for Pact and Pact nations, USG is:

1. Sending special observers from Washington high levels USG in Political, military and economic fields to Tehran Council meeting. (Wireless Bulletin contains text press statement released April 6.)²
2. Authorizing these observers participate actively in discussions of area problems to extent Pact Council wishes.
3. Participating in counter-subversive and liaison committees currently meeting.
4. Giving consideration to economic coordination with Pact.
5. Willingness to consider paying its part as an observer in the expense of the Pact secretariat.
6. Requesting increases in military assistance to all area Pact countries in FY 1957, and considering means accelerating such

assistance when approved by Congress.

7. Reviewing, in response to Pact countries' request, Pact military committee planning studies, at highest level by US military authority and increasing our substantive representation in the principal activities of military committee.

8. Authorizing US representatives in Pact countries to lend such assistance in promoting the Pact as may be appropriate in light US role.

Reports of addressee posts on discussion with Governments in advance of the Tehran meeting will be appreciated.

Dulles

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/4-656. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Newsom; cleared with Secretary Dulles, Gordon Gray, and others; and approved by Rountree who signed for Dulles. Also sent Priority to Baghdad, Karachi, and Tehran; repeated to Cairo, Jidda, Amman, Beirut, Damascus, Rome, Paris, New Delhi, and London.

² Department of State Press Release No. 180, printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, April 16, 1956, p. 637.

111. Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation Between the President and the Secretary of State, Washington, April 7, 1956, 9:10 a.m.¹

Washington, April 7, 1956, 9:10 a.m.

President called Dulles. Said that Wilson had made request of NSC that the question of US joining the Baghdad Pact be put on the Agenda. President said this brought question to his mind: how can the Jews be so definitely hostile to us joining the Baghdad Pact while it is one of the big things, as he sees it, that would or could divide the Arab world. Dulles replied that they felt the Baghdad Pact would start an arms race. They think it was the thing that pushed Egypt into the deal with the Russians. President said he didn't believe that—that he thought Nasser's ambition did that. Dulles replied that his ambition was challenged by the action of Iraq—thought [*though?*] you can't prove it. Dulles further said that he tried to argue with the Jews when it was formed that they should be in favor of the Pact.

Dulles said that he was absolutely certain that it would be impossible to get ratification of any such business. He has talked to Senator George and Senator Mansfield, both of whom say it would be totally impossible. He, himself, is not too sure that it would be wise for US to join. The military people have refused to give any idea of policy up to now—and suddenly they are urging US join the Pact.

President said we were originally strongly in favor of Pact being formed. Dulles agreed, but said we were not in favor of Iraq joining. President emphasized that we were in favor of pact between Pakistan and Turkey. Dulles said that the trouble was that the British have taken it over and run it as an instrument of British policy—that has drawn down upon it a tremendous amount of criticism.

President came back to his question about Israel. Dulles said it would lead to a demand that if we are going to guarantee anybody in this area, we have to guarantee Israel. President said “We can't do any one of these things in a vacuum—have to look at rounded picture— everybody has got to have

something.” President referred to discussion of other day—did it include help. Dulles said we were sending Henderson, Admiral Cassady, etc. “We are doing a great deal.”

President then said that Rabbi Silver is back from Palestine, bringing another letter from Ben Gurion. Had the President acknowledged his previous one? Dulles thought not. Question of whether Silver would be given an appointment to see President. Dulles does not recommend it one way or other. President pointed out it might be worse to see him than not, because he would want so many things that could not be given.

¹ Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries, Telephone Conversations. Prepared in the Office of the President.

112. Telegram From the Embassy in Iraq to the Department of State¹

Baghdad, April 8, 1956—1 p.m.

1058. Called on Prime Minister and Acting Foreign Minister Nuri this morning to give him substance of Department's 809 April 6.²

Nuri asked me right off whether I had come to tell him we were now going to join Pact. I told him it was not that but that I did have some related things to tell him.

Nuri listened very attentively while I covered the points appearing in Department's message. When I finished he said "I am not disappointed". He believed he understood our position better than "some others". He appreciated the force of the domestic political factors we had to consider in reaching decisions on foreign policy. He knew that in the field of foreign policy we had to work within certain limitations. Sometimes to be sure this delayed decisions unduly. He also felt that because of our patience and reasonableness some countries were led to underestimate the real depth of our determination. On balance he said "I am encouraged at what you have told me this morning".

As I was leaving he expressed the hope that we would give him an indication of scope of military assistance we were prepared to extend to Iraq in FY 1957 just as soon as possible.

Once more as the Department will see, Nuri has revealed what an understanding friend of the United States he is.

Gallman

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/4-856. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Ankara, Karachi, Tehran, Cairo, Jidda, Amman, Beirut, Damascus, Rome, Paris, New Delhi, and London.

² Printed as telegram 1665 to Ankara, [Document 110](#).

113. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State¹

Ankara, April 9, 1956—4 p.m.

1685. Paris for Wallner and Knight. Rome for MacSweeney. Re Deptel 1664.² In absence Foreign Minister who accompanying Prime Minister on tour dedicating Sekhan dam and other development projects south Turkey, contents Deptel 1665 and reference telegram communicated to and discussed with Secretary General Foreign Ministry today.

While expecting Koprulu would want discuss further on return Ankara, Birgi considered communication and discussions reflected therein encouraging. Was particularly pleased composition United States observer delegation Tehran meeting and fact authorized actively participate broad discussions area problems. Indicated interest in possibility informal preliminary contact Turk and United States delegates prior formal Council sessions, saying Turk delegation scheduled arrive Tehran via KLM about noon April 14. I promised inform Birgi United States delegation ETA as soon as known. Birgi expressed appreciation opportunity exchange views between Secretary and Foreign Minister at NATO meeting Paris, to which sure latter would look forward.

Birgi added Turks also now satisfied about British representation in view assurances received from British Ambassador that Defense Minister Monckton will be fully briefed and prepared participate authoritatively in political discussions.

In summary, Birgi made clear considers steps we are taking assure Tehran meeting will now provide opportunity make real progress toward reaching firmer common Middle East policy and reverse recent trend toward discouragement and defeatism.

Kohler

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/4–956. Confidential. Repeated to Baghdad, Rome, Karachi, Paris, Tehran, London, Cairo, Jidda, Amman, Beirut, Damascus, Belgrade, and Tel Aviv.

² Telegram 1664 to Ankara, April 6, referred the Embassy to telegram 1665 ([Document 110](#)) as a basis for answering Turkish queries and advised: “suggest you reiterate that in current and continuing review U.S. policy in Middle East, clear-cut Turk Government position regarding Baghdad Pact, Middle East problems, and views on Nasser role, etc. have been most helpful. We attach high importance close consultation.” (Department of State, Central Files, 396.1/3–2356)

114. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State¹

Tehran, April 9, 1956—5 p.m.

1557. London for CINCNELM. Paris for Wallner. Rome for Maffitt. I read from Deptel 1768, April 6,² to Shah this morning. He listened most attentively, interrupting me at times to ask for repetition. When I concluded he stated that if he understood message correctly it meant that US Government was prepared to participate in pact as if member but without formal adherence.

He was delighted to know that US attributed such significance to forthcoming Council meeting that it was sending Deputy Under Secretary State, Admiral Cassady and an ICA regional director. He wondered whether we were deterred from actual adherence by fear of Nasser’s trouble-making potentialities.

We then discussed at considerable length general situation in ME and I again made point that now when there was evidence all not well in Soviet Union it was most important there should be no sign weakness or disagreement of part of West. He agreed emphatically and said he was much troubled over his forthcoming visit to Soviet Union now set for June 1. He did not want to go to Soviet Union but felt that he was so to speak “cornered”. He was certain that Soviets would put on very big show to impress him with their strength. He also expected that Soviets would make

offers substantial economic and technical help and that offers would be presented in highly attractive form. He felt sure that word of these offers would be circulated effectively by Soviet propaganda machine and would promptly reach Iranian public. Voroshilov had spoken to Iranian Ambassador, Moscow, only two days ago to stress importance which Soviet Government placed on Shah's visit. In this conversation, Voroshilov had admitted that Soviet policy had even up to recent past committed many errors with respect Turkey and Iran, but that Soviets were now sorry and wished sincerely to be friends and to be as helpful to both countries as they could. This same thought was stated by Mikoyan in personal conversation with Shah's half brother in Karachi.

Shah was encouraged by message I had delivered. He hoped something tangible would be forthcoming as result Council meeting. It would be a benefit not only to stability this area, but directly to Iran. He said that unless something tangible emerged which could be shown to Iranian public, he would be in most embarrassing situation which would increase public difficulties of resisting blandishments he expected from Soviets during his visit Moscow.

I asked him if he could specify pact results that would meet his requirements. His reply not entirely specific, but as I understood it covered following points:

- (1) Firmer structure pact organization with full US support.
- (2) Possibility of regional economic development.
- (3) Substantial strengthening of pact military forces.

Re (1), he stated his belief that firm pact structure would give pause to such possible troublemakers as Afghanistan since that country, even if abetted by USSR, would not wish to take on whole Baghdad Pact membership, particularly if the US was in firm support even though not active member. He thought also that strong pact organization would be deterrent against Nasser's schemes since although Nasser might create a great fuss he would not wish to challenge such stronger pact.

As regards (2), he thought that US might wish to consider development of now greatly increased oil reserves of Iran as offset to possible loss of production in an undependable and unfriendly country such as Saudi Arabia. This he gave as but one example economic development.

(3) It was essential for military security of whole ME that line of Iran defenses should now be Elburz, a defense concept in which he recalled Admiral Radford had concurred during his visit Tehran.

When I said that examples he had mentioned were primarily Iranian, he laughed and said that was true but that Turkey could give us an even longer bill of desiderata. He said that, as I knew, Menderes had threatened that if Turkey did not obtain certain objectives from the Council meeting, it would have to reconsider its entire foreign policy. Shah said Iran was not prepared to go that far.

He reiterated hope that assurances contained in telegram I had read to him were indication of some concrete contribution from the US.

After audience with Shah I saw Ala and read same message to him. He took notes on 8 points of US action in reference telegram. He was extremely pleased with message and reacted exactly as Shah had, equating US steps to decision to join pact in substance but not in form.

Chapin

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/4–956. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Ankara, Karachi, Baghdad, London, Paris, and Rome.

² Printed as telegram 1665 to Ankara, [Document 110](#).

**115. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State,
Washington, April 9, 1956, 10 a.m.¹**

Washington, April 9, 1956, 10 a.m.

SUBJECT

Middle East

PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary

Mr. MacArthur

Admiral Radford

The Secretary said he had noted that the JCS had recommended that the US join the Baghdad Pact. He said we had given serious thought to this matter but that there were considerations which made it inadvisable at this juncture for us to join, or indicate that we would join, the Pact.

As part of his consideration of this matter, the Secretary had spoken privately both to Senator George and Senator Mansfield. Both felt that the injection into the Congress of the question of joining the Baghdad Pact would create a major explosion, and the judgment of the two Senators was that the Senate would not agree. Therefore, to propose joining the Pact and then to have it rejected by the Senate would be a death-blow to the Pact and would have much more serious and detrimental effect on the Pact at the present time than our not joining.

Another reason the Secretary felt it was unwise to join the Pact was that while the original Northern Tier concept had been a regional grouping to resist Soviet penetration and aggression, it had become really a forum for Arab politics and intrigue. The UK saw in the Baghdad Pact a means of preserving its position in Iraq and also viewed it as an instrument of supporting Nuri in his rivalry with Nasser and King Saud, as well as to

support Iraq as against Syria and Jordan. In other words, the Baghdad Pact was dealing about 90% with Arab politics.

Even if we should join the Pact, the Secretary felt that the effect on Iraq would be extremely bad. The other Arab States would take the position that Iraq had sold out its solidarity with them against Israel for US membership in the Pact, and this might well result in toppling the Nuri Government.

Still another consideration was that if the US joined the Pact there would be almost irresistible pressures to give Israel a security guarantee, which would permanently alienate the Arab States and cause them to join solidly with the Soviet Union.

The Secretary concluded by saying that we fully agreed that the Baghdad Pact was in a precarious position and we were doing everything we properly could to show our support for it, short of joining.

Admiral Radford inquired what would happen if the Baghdad Pact fell apart. The Secretary said this would be a very serious situation, since the Soviets were avowed to destroy the Pact, and if it fell apart it would be viewed in the area as a Soviet victory and a major defeat for the West.

The Secretary then said we should give thought to what might be done if the Baghdad Pact started falling apart, and in this connection mentioned that it was conceivable that a situation might arise where Iraq withdrew from the Pact. In such event, one possibility was that the US might join in place of Iraq. Since we were already allied with the UK, Turkey, and Pakistan, it would not necessarily create a problem if we joined the Pact and allied ourselves with Iran. In such event, at least the Pact could be devoted to the purposes for which the Secretary had originally conceived it, namely, resistance to Soviet penetration and would not be mixed up in Arab politics.

The Secretary said the ideas he had just expressed were simply thinking out loud, as it were, but did seem worth examining on a contingency basis.

Admiral Radford mentioned a letter he had received from the Iraqi Chief of Staff indicating that to engage in the proper advance planning and utilization of resources, it would be helpful if the Iraqis could know about three years in advance what American equipment deliveries would be. This was a difficult question to answer in writing, and Admiral Radford was considering having an answer conveyed verbally to the Iraqis, which while not committing us to anything would at least not discourage them.

The Secretary mentioned that Senator Mansfield was following matters in the Middle East quite carefully, and it might be useful for Admiral Radford to see him. Admiral Radford concurred and said he would get in touch with the Senator.

[Here follows discussion of a proposal by Dulles for a pool of aircraft in the Middle East, and the Hammarskjöld mission. For text, see [volume XV, page 496](#).]

¹ Source: Department of State, S/S-NEA Files: Lot 61 D 417, Omega #1. Top Secret; Omega. Drafted by MacArthur.

116. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State¹

Karachi, April 13, 1956—2 p.m.

2121. Regarding Department telegram 2308.² On return of Prime Minister, who also serves as Defense Minister, to Karachi, took up reference telegram last night. When asked for his reaction, Prime Minister said:

“You know what my position is and has been for some time. I believe USG should join Baghdad Pact now and until it does so, no matter what efforts it makes support Pact indirectly, those opposed to Pact will still argue effectively that USG is only giving lip-service and has not yet made up its mind to fully stand behind Pact. I believe that even among the very nations USG is trying to influence by not formally joining Pact, the most effective step would be to force the issue by USG joining Baghdad Pact.”

Barring such action by USG to swing neutrals into Pact alignment, Prime Minister wants maximum political, economic and military support for Baghdad Pact members especially emphasizing joint responsibility and cooperation in planning.

When asked if he would press for public statements on Durand Line and Kashmir at upcoming Pact meeting in Tehran, Prime Minister said he felt he must do so. I said he was familiar with thinking of State Department and UK, and that having gotten statements at SEATO meeting on these issues, 90 percent of the benefit to be gained had already been gained and why risk further irritation for negligible gain. Prime Minister felt that since SEATO meetings Nehru's statements and attitude had become so strong on Kashmir that Pakistan had to attempt to get all support they could and on Durand Line, he felt the territory so obviously of interest to Baghdad Pact members and so clearly within territory involved that not to bring up Durand Line would be construed in too many quarters as weakness on part of GOP.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/4–1356. Secret; Priority. Repeated Priority to Ankara, Baghdad, Tehran, and London; repeated to New Delhi, Kabul, Cairo, Jidda, Amman, Beirut, Damascus, Rome, and Paris.

² Printed as telegram 1665 to Ankara, [Document 110](#).

**117. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State,
Washington, April 13, 1956, 3 p.m.¹**

Washington, April 13, 1956, 3 p.m.

SUBJECT

Soviet Aims in the Middle East

PARTICIPANTS

C—Mr. MacArthur

NEA—Mr. Allen

NEA—Ambassador Bohlen

O/FS—Mr. Hare

S—Mr. Russell

S/P—Mr. Mathews

NE—Mr. Burdett

EE—Mr. Blake

EUR—Mr. Lister

CIA—Mr. Roosevelt

CIA—Mr. Eichelberger

Defense—Captain Wagner

S/S-RO—Mr. Kirk

Ambassador Bohlen observed that the Soviets talked little about their policy in the Middle East and that our conclusions about it must be speculative.

The Ambassador said the Soviet leaders feel able to move diplomatically into areas which they could not get to before. Their efforts are on a government-to-government rather than on a party-to-party basis, and, in fact, he was not sure they desired communist regimes in some countries of the Middle East at this point.

The Ambassador noted that the Soviet Union was already in the Middle East and the problem was to control and counteract them in the area, not how to keep them out of it. He felt the Soviet Union did not want war in the area because of the danger of such a war spreading. The Soviet leaders feel that we are building up a war scare in the area in order to push them out of the Middle East. Due to their inexperience, the Soviets oversimplify and probably feel that an Arab-Israel war could not break out if the UK and the US did not wish it to.

The Ambassador stated that talks with the Soviets on the Middle East had produced no results because we have never gone to them with a real proposition. If the British tell Bulganin and Khrushchev that present Soviet tactics are undermining vital British interests in the Middle East and that Britain may have to take drastic action, the Soviet leaders might be prepared to talk seriously about the problem. If so, they would probably say that the US bases in the area and the Baghdad Pact threatened their security. The Soviets really fear the potentialities of the Pact, and the establishment of the Pact may have triggered their move on the arms deal. The accession of Iran to the Pact had really worried them. The Soviet leaders might agree to a conference similar to the Geneva Conference on Indochina, or a conference under the aegis of the UN which would replace the Baghdad Pact with UN or other multilateral guarantees.

After some discussion, it was agreed that Mr. Mathews would draft a paper examining the possible Soviet response to such an approach by the British and the possibilities of establishing such an arrangement.

During the course of the discussion, the Ambassador noted the Soviets now praised neutralism. They had not always done so, however, and it might be

useful to dig up the Soviet 1943 proposals on how to push Turkey and Sweden into the war against Germany. Mr. Kirk was asked to do so.

¹ Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518. Top Secret. Prepared in the Department of State but no further drafting information is given on the source text.

118. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State¹

Tehran, April 15, 1956—11 a.m.

1597. For Secretary from Henderson.² Baghdad Pact. Since arrival I have held conversations with Chapin, Gallman, Cassady, Seager, Hoar and their principal advisors concerning coming meetings of Baghdad Pact Council. Chapin and I have also had personal talks with Monckton and his British colleagues as well as with PriMin Ala. Others our group have had protracted discussions with representatives all Pact delegations. We firmly of opinion that US position here will be quite untenable and Pact itself endangered unless at early start in Council meetings I can make some definite statements of our willingness participate in activities Secretariat and committees of Pact.

We therefore recommend that I receive authorization by Tuesday morning (Tehran time) April 17 to state at appropriate time:

A. United States prepared contribute one-sixth cost of Secretariat if such cost reasonable, and organization considered sound and effective. For Secretary's information, I estimate this contribution would not exceed \$50,000. (This does not include salaries American observers in the several committees.)

B. United States prepared participate in work Economic Committee as full-fledged member that committee. (Econ Committee membership by non-member Pact specifically authorized by terms reference of Econ Committee.)

C. United States will retain observers in permanent Military and Counter-subversion Committees.

D. If desired, US willing contribute personnel to Secretariat. It is not yet clear how Secretariat will be organized and we would appreciate being given free hand now to determine how US might

best participate in it. We hope US could at least have some carefully selected personnel in administrative area Secretariat. If we contribute personnel to Secretariat we may find it necessary also pay differential to them above Secretariat scale of pay. This would be addition to \$50,000 maximum US contribution to general budget Secretariat. We would of course make it clear that our willingness participate in these activities would not automatically impose any commitments on our part provide funds for substantive activities of Pact; nor that we intend shift funds from bilateral to regional programs.

Chapin

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/4–1556. Secret; Niact.

² Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration Loy Henderson headed the U.S. Delegation and served as U.S. observer at the second meeting of the Baghdad Pact Council at Tehran, April 10–19.

119. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State¹

Tehran, April 15, 1956—4 p.m.

1602. From Henderson. Baghdad Pact. Yesterday Chapin and I had long talk with Monckton, British Ambassador Stevens and Michael Wright, British Ambassador Iraq. Wright dominated conversation on British side. His principal point was that 5 years ago no one would conceivably have predicted that 4 of the most important Moslem countries would voluntarily associate themselves in an effort, allied with the West, to combat communism, to seek regional economic development and to ask for the collaboration of US and UK. He said that any hesitation on the part of US and UK to extend such collaboration would automatically raise doubts in minds these 4 Moslem countries. Unless there was prompt strengthening of BP through US and UK the impulse so far generated would gradually fritter away even if the pact itself did not break up. This would be most unfortunate since occasion when 4 such states would be in harmony and seeking Western collaboration certainly would not arise again in foreseeable future. Wright said that in our own interest, we cannot afford to withhold our support.

Sir Walter Monckton stressed British interest in economic side BP, particularly the desirability of supporting regional economic plans. Talk here became somewhat vague as to exact type of support envisaged. When I asked point blank whether British felt that US aid should be continued on bilateral basis or whether portion of aid go through BP, Monckton replied that after all it was perhaps best to continue on the bilateral basis although aid could be coordinated with plans of economic committee for regional economic development.

In our conversation later with Prime Minister, Ala stressed now familiar theme that Iran grateful for past US budgetary aid, that he hoped US would continue offer such aid on decreasing scale over next 2 and one-half or 3 years during which time Iran would firmly establish itself economically. Ala added that Iran would continue need military aid both in matériel and in

regard to military budget especially since he understood that it was view of military committee of BP that Iran staff should be planned on Elburz rather than Zagros line. Ala indicated that Iran strongly preferred that any US aid should continue on bilateral basis; but not through BP organ.

Ala raised question of Bahrein as one “troubling” Iran Government. We strongly urged him that Iranian government would make great mistake if it were to harp on this issue at this time. I said that if Iran wishes to maintain its legal claim it can, of course, do so but I thought this should be done by private representations through the Iranian Ambassador in London or through the Foreign Minister to British Ambassador here. I said it is important that this subject should not become one upon which demagogues can capitalize since, as the Prime Minister should know, there is no indication that Britain is prepared to yield on this point.

There was danger that if this issue should be stressed extreme nationalists supported by Communists would take it up and Iran Government might eventually find itself in position similar Greek Government re Cyprus.

Chapin

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/4–1556. Secret.

**120. Notes on the Secretary of State's Staff Meeting,
Department of State, Washington, April 16, 1956, 9:15 a.m.¹**

Washington, April 16, 1956, 9:15 a.m.

[Here follow an intelligence briefing and discussion of the Philippines.]

3. *Baghdad Pact*—Mr. Rountree discussed the three major requests of Mr. Henderson for monetary contribution to the Secretariat, personnel contribution to the Secretariat, and full membership in the Economic Committee. With respect to the first there was discussion of whether the money could come from the Secretary's confidential fund, the President's \$100 million fund, MSA funds, counterpart money, and also whether there was any problem of legality. With respect to the last point, it was pointed out that the charter permits membership on the Economic Committee of non-member countries. *Action:* The Secretary approved our making a contribution to the Secretariat and said we should find the money; approved the assignment of personnel to the Secretariat; and approved U.S. participation in the Economic Committee so long as appropriate caveats were made clear that this participation did not affect in any way our decisions on aid programs.

[Here follows discussion of the Hammarskjöld Mission, Palestine refugees, and the Colombian tax on Protestants.]

¹ Source: Department of State, Secretary's Staff Meetings: Lot 63 D 75. Secret. Drafted by Fisher Howe, Director of the Executive Secretariat.

121. Memorandum for the Record by the Counselor of the Department of State (MacArthur)¹

undated

Pursuant to the Secretary's instructions, I called Senator Mansfield last Saturday² to say that Mr. Rountree and I would be glad to drop over to see the Senator this week to have a general discussion about Middle East matters. Senator Mansfield was not in his office Saturday when I called, so I left a message to the above effect, saying I would call him today. I got in touch with the Senator on the telephone this morning and repeated that if he thought it would be useful, Mr. Rountree and myself would be glad to come over to have a brief talk with him to bring him up-to-date on Middle East developments in view his interest. The Senator said he would like this very much, and suggested Wednesday afternoon at 4 o'clock, which I said would be entirely agreeable.

I then said to Senator Mansfield that there was one matter relating to the Baghdad Pact which I just wished to mention to him. Although we had no intention of joining the Baghdad Pact at this juncture for reasons with which he was fully familiar from his discussions with the Secretary, the Baghdad Pact organization did provide that non-members could participate in the work of the subordinate Economic Committee on a membership basis. We had received a recommendation from Mr. Loy Henderson that we accept membership in this subordinate committee, and that we planned to inform Mr. Henderson that we approved his recommendation. In joining the Economic Committee as a member, we would make it clear that this did not involve any additional commitment with respect to economic aid either through the Baghdad Pact mechanism or bilaterally, and also that we were not joining the Pact. However, our feeling was that in view of the fact that we were carrying on aid programs in the Asian Baghdad Pact countries, it would be useful for us to have a member of the Economic Committee follow the evolution of work in that committee so we would know what was cooking.

The Senator said he had the highest regard for Mr. Henderson's judgment, and if Mr. Henderson felt it desirable for us to assume membership in the Economic Committee, he felt we could go along with his recommendation. He added that it seemed important to him that we give what encouragement we properly could to the present government of Iraq, which was well-disposed toward the West.

DMacA

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/4-1656. Confidential. Sent to Secretary Dulles under cover of a note erroneously dated March 16 from Fisher Howe. A handwritten notation on the note indicates that the Secretary saw MacArthur's memorandum.

² April 14.

122. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iran¹

Washington, April 16, 1956—7:49 p.m.

1866. For Henderson. Re Tehran's 1597² you authorized state following at appropriate time:

(a) We willing contribute one-sixth cost of Secretariat's first year budget if such cost reasonable. US share not to exceed \$50,000. In this connection see Paragraph (e) below. When possible we wish maintain principle equal sharing of costs. FYI: Probable theory on which funds would be made available is that this is ICA aid grant to organization of which we not member, rather than contribution from State appropriation for our share participation international organizations in which we are members. Latter approach would involve numerous limitations contained in State appropriation act of which you aware, e.g., restriction of contributions to one-third organization's budget, which, while not immediate problem, could conceivably be ultimately. End FYI.

(b) US prepared participate in work Economic Committee as member. Should be understood this does not constitute agreement to "channel" aid through Economic Committee since we wish continue bilateral aid basis. However, you authorized state US will give sympathetic consideration methods assisting in implementing economic development activities involving more than one country. FYI: Our understanding is that "membership" involves participation in economic discussions, and does not raise any implications of obligation to contribute to special Economic Committee administrative budgets. Assume Committee has no independent budget, but makes use of Secretariat facilities. If assumptions invalid, clarify soonest. End FYI.

(c)

(1) Admiral Cassady already informed by Defense that US prepared establish separate permanent observer group headed by high level officer at Baghdad to work with Military Committee. You will wish concert with Admiral Cassady in announcing this point.

(2) Department prepared assign officer to Embassy Baghdad as full-time observer Countersubversive (and Liaison) Committee.

(d) US willing consider contributing personnel to Secretariat. Concur you should make it clear our willingness participate does not imply commitment to help fund substantive Pact activities or to shift aid funds from bilateral to regional programs. FYI: Re US personnel for Secretariat we propose using authority section 529 (c) (1) Mutual Security Act 1954, under which we would pay entire cost salary and emoluments directly to personnel involved. Your discretion this can be in addition US contribution directly to Secretariat budget.

(e) In order to obligate funds for accounting purposes, suggest you make statement that US will “grant not to exceed \$50,000 for this year’s Secretariat budget on condition US grant will not exceed one-sixth cost Secretariat budget” specifying in your statement whether amount includes or excludes cost US personnel made available pursuant paragraph (d) above.

Dulles

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/4–1556. Secret; Niact. Drafted by L. Wade Latham and Dixon and approved by Rountree who signed for Dulles.

² [Document 118](#).

123. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State¹

Tehran, April 17, 1956—2 p.m.

1617. Baghdad Pact—From Chief USDel.² During discussions Counter-subversion Committee report and after I offered permanent observer Counter-subversion Permanent Working Committee Turkish Delegation suggested it would strengthen general Pact counter-subversion effort if the United States were a full member (as opposed to observer) of that Committee along lines which I had just announced re Economic Committee (Deptel 1866 of April 16).³ His suggestion was immediately seconded all delegations.

I said that I was authorized only offer observer. I stated I understood membership was precluded by the by-laws which limit membership to “high contracting parties”; Turk said if by-laws prevented US membership the Ministerial Council was competent to change by-laws and that this should be done forthwith. In this he was immediately seconded by heads all delegations.

I stated that I was authorized only to offer permanent observer who would participate fully. I continued that whether or not by-laws were changed this was as far as I could go. Chairman requested and I agreed refer question our membership Counter-subversion Committee to Washington for decision.

Delegations agreed set-up subcommittee to meet this afternoon with view drafting amendment to by-laws which would permit US membership. Committee report will be considered before end current Tehran meeting.

Comment: Since objective of Counter-subversion Committee is integral part US foreign policy, and since, with limitations set forth Deptel 1866, we have become members Economic Committee, I believe it will be in US

interest to accept membership on Counter-subversion Committee. Entire US representation here concurs.

I request favorable instructions prior 9 am Tehran time April 19.⁴

Chapin

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/4–1756. Secret; Niact.

² Loy Henderson.

³ *Supra*.

⁴ In telegram 1873 to Tehran, April 17, the Department of State agreed that the United States should accept membership in the Committee. (Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/4–1756)

124. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State¹

Tehran, April 18, 1956—11 p.m.

1631. Baghdad Pact from Head US Delegation. Third meeting second session Baghdad Pact Ministerial Council held 1000 today. Meeting devoted to review international situation. Heads delegations read prepared statements with single exception Turk who announced he would make his statement at his afternoon's restricted session. Summaries of various statements follow:

1.

Iranian Hosein Ala expressed his gratification at progress made in organizing BP since Ministerial Council meeting in Baghdad and his hope that existing difficulties re Secretariat may soon be removed. He also expressed his pleasure US Government's adherence to Economic Committee. Pact in his view must achieve two interrelated objectives (a) increase defensive capability of member states in order to be able deter aggression and (b) take effective steps improve conditions of people and raise their

standard of living. Fact is however that most member countries, Iran included, lack means move towards both objectives simultaneously. Ala felt those powers who assist free countries might usefully pay greater attention to BP members and that increased aid to neutralists can only cause doubts among members. True and loyal allies, Ala insisted, should be recognized.

Speaking of Middle East situation, Ala stated Iran had voted for SC resolution sending UN Secretary General Hammarskjold to area to try to make peace. He hoped Hammarskjold would be able help and “facilitate application of UN decision”. Great powers he stated had no right seek impose solutions to Middle Eastern problems unilaterally. Elsewhere in the Middle East it seemed to him there had been some improvement and he rejoiced at independence of Morocco, Tunis and Sudan. Algerian problem however still required solution. He believed UN would be strengthened now that 16 new members admitted and expressed hope peace-loving nations might be able reach agreement on armaments in order eliminate danger of war. Iran, he said favored plan for mutual supervision. He hoped too that atomic energy might in future be increasingly diverted from wartime to peaceful uses.

Iran, Ala continued, sparing no effort to cooperate and has adopted its own internal program including:

- (A) Balancing budget which it is hoped can be done in 3 years time;
- (B) Educational program to wipe out illiteracy;
- (C) Encouraging public health and sanitation;
- (D) Prohibiting production, use and distribution opium;
- (E) Modernizing agricultural methods;

(F) Encouraging development of industries and mines.

He emphasized however that success of program depended upon foreign capital and know-how being combined with Iranian capital and manpower.

He concluded by urging greater contact among member states and settlement of their outstanding problems by negotiation.

2.

Iraqi Nuri Said first alluded to danger of Communist subversion in ME area pointing out recent Soviet tactics do not portend any real change Communist policy. Efforts of Communists still directed at attacking BP which had been organized pursuant Article 51 UN Charter and is based upon legitimate right of self-defense. Communists he said are exploiting Syrian, Egyptian, Arab-Israel and Palestinian refugee problems for their own ends and are now even hinting at possible Soviet Moslem volunteers to assist Arabs. Soviets also offering military aid to various states in area. He concerned lest tragedy of Korea and Indochina be repeated here. Recent strike among oil employees in Syria and weak attitude adopted by Syrian authorities towards strikers was one such instance which could serve only Communist interest. Nuri stressed need for immediate adoption of measures to combat subversion but urged that these measures take into account deep-rooted grievances of ME which Communists are now able exploit, viz: Palestine, Algeria, Kashmir, Pushtunistan problems. Although pact basically defensive Nuri felt its economic aspects are growing in importance and that public opinion in pact member states wants see progress in both these spheres. Indigenous resources however inadequate to meet both military and economic commitments of member countries. He hoped therefore outside economic and military aid might gradually be increased.

Nuri next recalled that Iraq had invited Ministerial Council's attention to Palestine problem at pact session in Baghdad and

stated danger had grown since that time. Israel he charged had been found guilty by SC several times and had ignored UN resolution of 1947 as well as orders of UN truce observers. There were rumors too that Israel planning early large scale offensive in order present West with fait accompli. Unless UN resolutions can be enforced Palestine (including refugee) problem remains fertile ground for Communist exploitation. Re Algerian issue Nuri decried French policy there and suggested France follow more reasonable course avoiding use NATO for purpose having no connection with NATO's real objective. France he felt should at early stage arrive at settlement along lines achieved in Tunis and Morocco.

Great powers in NATO must use their influence with France to induce latter adopt more peaceful and realistic policy. Nuri then turned to Kashmir issue and expressed his conviction that Kashmiris should be allowed determine their own destiny pursuant right of self-determination. SC resolution on subject, he felt, should be implemented. UN Palestine and Kashmir resolutions in his view stand as acid tests for future of UN. He also believes Pushtun problem should be solved peacefully on basis historical and legitimate right which had devolved upon Pakistan. All these problems, Nuri reiterated, provide subversive elements with exploitable material and prevent pact member countries from concentrating on objectives of pact.

He next referred to peaceful aims of BP and to malicious campaign to which it subjected in area. Soviet and neutralist propaganda, he charged, have from outset sought to misrepresent to public pact's peaceful intentions. All member countries, and Iraq in particular, have been subject to such attacks, some of which have even come from "great leaders" in nearby countries who have failed take into account that particular circumstances may require particular policies. He regretted too that some responsible elements of the Western press had also attacked pact. Communists, Zionists and neutralists are united in this purpose. Attacks facilitated by naive "certain country" which

squandering its oil wealth to provide support for destructive elements. Nuri concluded by expressing hope that equipment and technical assistance from West will be forthcoming to meet member states' deficiencies and stated member states impatiently waiting for us to join pact as full member.

3.

Pakistan's Mohamed Ali alluded briefly to remarks made earlier by Ala re need for increased defensive capabilities, productive capacities and outside assistance to accomplish pact objectives. He, too, expressed pleasure over Moroccan, Tunisian and Sudanese freedom. Re Algeria, he hoped French statesmanship might rise to situation and that Algeria would soon join ranks of countries like Morocco and Tunis.

Mohamed Ali then examined what he called new phase Soviet diplomatic activity special target of which seemed be ME. Soviet campaign, he pointed out, now spreading gospel peace and friendship, warning that third world war will only bring universal destruction. Soviets likewise willing become supplier of capital goods and arms to any nations that will take them. At same time, they urging Asiatic states refrain from joining BP, charging that it aimed at aggression against USSR. Asiatic nations urged be neutralists if they would win Soviet friendship. Neutralists, he explained, who are drawing on certain existing anti-Western sentiment in area and seeking spread gospel "Asia for Asiatics" are most effective exponents Soviet line. Their propaganda has much greater effect than outside Communist propaganda since it comes from neighbors who know local mentalities. Neutralist propaganda has likewise had some effect on certain press elements in both US and UK. Such neutralists' propaganda, he insisted, must be met if pact is to be successful. To meet it, however, it will be necessary provide tangible evidence that BP is serving best interests of region. Neutralists' propaganda, he continued, exploiting Arab-Israel dispute. It would, therefore, be tremendous factor for peace if Arab-Israel dispute could be solved

in accordance with UN resolution. Afghanistan's policy also represents serious problem to whole region and Council might rightly concern itself with seeking solutions for it. Re Kashmir, UN resolution calling for plebiscite should be implemented if that dispute is to be resolved. Meantime existing Pakistan-India tension makes heavy demands on defensive capacity of Pakistan and precludes Pakistan making full contribution to objective of BP. Pakistan, he recalled, has sought resolve Kashmir problem by direct negotiations but without result.

If BP to be made living factor members should coordinate policy in all matters affecting security and prosperity of region and then pursue such policy with vigor and determination without fear of offending any country or group of countries.

Mohamed Ali concluded by reiterating his pleasure that US had become full member Economic Committee and stated he, too, looked forward to day when US becomes full member.

4.

British Monckton next gave brief review UK position. Central point of interest to UK, he said, is continued expansion of USSR in all fields and finding adequate means contain it. While Soviet tactics may recently have changed British do not feel there had been any alteration in ultimate Soviet strategy. He doubted that Soviets would start war now or later but felt reason for this probably belief on part USSR that its objectives can be attained without risk entailed in open conflict.

Execution of Soviet intentions likely be continued by economic and political penetration as well as by subversion. When European unity had checked Soviet efforts, latter turned to ME where it was now exploiting such things as existing disparity of wealth, anti-Westernism and intra-area resolves.

Turning to current Bulganin-Khrushchev visit to UK, Monckton admitted there had been some misgivings on this score but stated

it finally decided some advantage could perhaps be made of visit by allowing Soviet leaders see British strength, self-confidence and belief in freedom. He promised that when visit concluded BP members will be given account of it.

Re Europe, Monckton stated UK feels principal preoccupation there is Germany and dangers inherent in failure thus far effect its reunification. Re Cyprus, UK believes order and security must first be restored and terrorists eliminated before constitutional issues can be discussed. Britain regrets that this policy had caused difficulties with Greece but is convinced there is no alternative.

He passed over Arab-Israeli problems quickly merely emphasizing that UK recognizes need for peaceful settlement and that Eden's Guild Hall speech had given some indication of Britain's thinking on subject. Eden, he recalled, had mentioned UN resolutions.

Re Algeria, Monckton said Moroccan and Tunisian settlements have shown that France gradually coming around on North African issue. Problem complicated by large French element in Algeria but UK hoped that after order restored there and elections have been held negotiations to effect settlement may take place.

Monckton observed that some states of Middle East were opposed to BP and that Egyptian propaganda combined with Saudi Government actively attacking it. British are countering this wherever necessary but do not feel full-scale publicity war against Egypt desirable. He thought something might perhaps be done convince Saudi Arabia of folly tying itself to Egyptian ambitions and that wedge may in this way ultimately be inserted between them.

Re Jordan, UK regretted Glubb's dismissal and circumstances surrounding it but feels that interests of all can best be served if Arab Legion is maintained as a useful fighting force. He admitted, however, that this might not be easy.

He said he preferred discuss Afghan problem at restricted session this afternoon. As for Kashmir, he believed Pakistan Prime Minister understood problem. UK anxious seek settlement but both Pakistan and India are members of Commonwealth and Britain does not wish discuss merits of case affecting two such members.

Continuing extemporaneously, Monckton emphasized it essential free world retain capability retaliation with overwhelming nuclear power against any Soviet surprise attack and explained UK planning for this by adding thermonuclear bombs and strategic bombing increment to its military forces. He emphasized too importance of what he called “complementary deterrent to global war” in form building shield of air, land and sea defenses along Soviet frontier. UK, he said, will maintain overseas bases and garrisons as well as necessary communications connecting them in order be able to contribute effectively to defense. It likewise establishing strategic reserve in UK available for quick transport by jet aircraft to any troubled area. He concluded by stating UK ready to discuss any disarmament proposal put forth by Soviets in genuine spirit but would not be lured into relaxing its efforts until real sincerity of Soviets evident.

5.

I spoke next. After expressing my pleasure be able participate in this review of international developments I emphasized that we aware BP under attack and wished, therefore, reaffirm assurance already given by highest officials of USG of strong US support for pact. I said we believe along with pact members that it represents most effective grouping for area defense and that maintenance of sustained and strengthened pact organization is of great importance both to countries of area and to free world. Referring to participation of American military observers in discussions affecting common defense of area and to Seager’s review of economic measures which we may be able take in common and bilaterally, I expressed hope that such measures

would demonstrate to other nations in area significance and value of our cooperation. I stated US had studied carefully reports of Gallman and other observers to pact committees and looked forward to increased participation in pact deliberations during months to come. Referring to bilateral cooperation which we currently enjoying with member states, I said we beginning increasingly consider this bilateral cooperation to be directly related to US support of Northern Tier collective security arrangement.

I then alluded to security arrangements which US already has with various member states and said we hoped assist member governments build up effective military forces by furnishing equipment and training without overburdening local economies with military costs which would weaken their economic strength so essential to effective defense. I warned that Soviet bloc intentions and current Soviet tactics had unfortunately succeeded in lulling some into belief that change had occurred in Soviet thinking. Fallacy thereof shown by Soviet day-to-day activity. Soviet rulers merely seeking new means to obtain identical goals. It behooves all free nations therefore keep up guard against Soviet threat.

Situation in certain Middle Eastern areas had deteriorated since first Council meeting. Two interacting factors might be distinguished in this: (A) Intensification Soviet activity and (B) further growth of false nationalism accompanied by irrational neutralism. Result was that some countries had been weakened and had become increasingly susceptible to Soviet Communist intrigue. Leaders of certain countries apparently willing reply [*rely?*] on Soviet promises [*garble*] to achieve success. In doing so however they unleashing forces whose purpose is to devour their own country and erode security of neighbors. Road of pact I felt was steep and narrow but [*garble*] solid path marked by realistic awareness and constant attention to Soviet maneuvers. Progress along road requires constant and increasing cooperation and cohesiveness as well as avoidance of illusion that either

neutralism or extremism offers anything but a mirage of success.
Full text will be pouched. Meeting adjourned 1215.²

Chapin

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/4–1856. Secret. Repeated to Karachi, London, Ankara, Baghdad, Rome, and Paris.

² The sixth and final meeting of the second session of the Ministerial Council of the Baghdad Pact was held on April 19. A report of the meeting was transmitted to the Department of State in telegram 1642, April 19. (*Ibid.*, 780.5/4–1956) For texts of the final communiqué, released on April 20, see Department of State *Bulletin*, May 7, 1956, pp. 753–754. For texts of statements made by Loy Henderson on April 17; by Cedric Seager at the closing session of the Council's Economic Committee on April 11; and by Loy Henderson on April 20, see *Ibid.*, pp. 754–756.

125. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State¹

Tehran, April 19, 1956—7 p.m.

1641. Paris for Wallner; Rome for Maffitt. Baghdad Pact from Chief U.S. Delegation. Although full account military meeting being transmitted through service channels, believe Department may be interested in following summary given us today by Admiral Cassady.

1. Military meetings have been “satisfactory and give reason to hope for real achievements in coming months”. Admiral felt there had been 3 accomplishments:

A) Agreement establish small liaison planning group in Baghdad. Admiral believes by sending small staff headed by General or Flag Officer we will encourage BP members establish similar permanent liaison groups.

B) Committee agreed (after much urging and cajoling by U.S.) to work out a capabilities plan including determination of forces which would cover period between now and 1957. Admiral feels this will force everyone (including United Kingdom which so far has shown itself reluctant) to make force commitment upon which realistic planning can be based. Admiral fears however it will take energy on our part to make BP countries carry through this project on schedule (October) with view to consideration by Council in Karachi in January. Admiral was impressed by velleity with which members regard process of being realistic about capabilities planning compared with their enthusiasm for requirements planning.

C) Agreement on timetable for future planning. Admiral hopes our representative in Baghdad can keep planning on track.

3. Admiral employed audience with Shah April 18 with General McClure and Hedayat present to stress need for realistic short-term planning. Although General Hedayat had earlier refused consider anything but Elburz line, Shah seemed have full understanding need for capabilities planning and stated he had previously directed Hedayat to proceed along this line. He appeared surprised this had not been accomplished.

4. Admiral summarized by saying “much has been done but much more will have to be done between now and January Council meeting”.

Chapin

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/4–1956. Secret. Repeated to Baghdad, Ankara, Karachi, London, Paris, and Rome.

126. Letter From the Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson)¹

Washington, April 23, 1956.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I refer to your letter of April 5, 1956² informing me that you consider that action should be initiated which would facilitate United States adherence to the Baghdad Pact at the earliest feasible time.

I share the view expressed in your letter that disintegration of the Baghdad Pact organization would have serious consequences. I am also aware that early American adherence to the Pact, or an indication of our intention of adhering some time in the future, would do much to bolster the Pact and would give substantial encouragement to its present members.

Subsequent to the date of your letter, on April 9, I had an extensive conversation with Admiral Radford during which I set forth a number of considerations which in my judgment made it inadvisable at this juncture for the United States to join the Pact. Among the factors of primary concern to me are the following: While the original Northern Tier concept envisaged a regional grouping to resist Soviet penetration, and the Pact in fact serves this purpose to some extent, it has become deeply involved in Arab politics and intrigue. Until this situation is changed, American adherence would be widely interpreted in the Arab world as a move against Arab unity and the action would thus seriously undermine our position in several states where we are endeavoring to exert useful influence in solving the area's basic problems.

Our signature to the Pact would give rise to almost irresistible pressures to extend to Israel a security guarantee; I doubt that Senate ratification could be obtained for protecting Iraq without also protecting Israel. If this should happen, the net result would not benefit Iraq or the Pact.

I have discussed this matter privately with certain Congressional leaders who have expressed the belief that the injection into Congress of the question would create a major issue. If the Administration should propose

joining the Pact and the proposal were rejected by the Senate, the effect upon the Pact itself would be far more serious than our failure to indicate at this time our intention of adhering.

I am keeping the matter under constant study. It may be that a situation will develop in which our membership would be practicable and advisable, but at present I believe it would be a mistake to proceed along the lines you propose. As you are of course aware, we have been working closely with the Department of Defense and other agencies in planning and implementing other ways of demonstrating to the member countries and to the world in general our solid support for the Pact.

Sincerely yours,

John Foster Dulles³

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/4–556. Top Secret. Drafted by Rountree.

² [Document 109](#).

³ Printed from a copy that bears this stamped signature.

127. Draft Paper by the NSC Planning Board Assistants¹

Washington, May 2, 1956.

IMMEDIATE U.S. ADHERENCE TO THE BAGHDAD PACT

Advantages

1. Would make continued public acceptance of the Pact in the Middle East member countries more certain by:
 - a. Removing doubts concerning U.S. support which our present relationship to the Pact appears to engender;
 - b. Lessening the criticism of the Pact throughout the Middle East on grounds that it is essentially a British plan.
2. Would enable the U.S. to exercise greater influence in development of Pact activities by permitting formal participation, with the full weight of membership, in Council meetings and Council deputy meetings. This would:
 - a. Facilitate and accelerate military planning in consonance with U.S. interests.
 - b. Give the United States a more authoritative voice in political deliberations.
3. Would strengthen the position of Nuri Said and other pro-West elements in Iraq, and the Shah and other pro-West elements in Iran.
4. Would help to stem growing criticism and dissatisfaction within Pakistan of that government's policy of alignment with the West.

5. Would strengthen the Pact's appeal to pro-Western elements in Syria, Lebanon and Jordan, and might increase the chances of accession to the Pact by Lebanon and Jordan.

6. Would demonstrate the firm, consistent and continued support by the U.S. of the concept of collective security, which the U.S. has promoted and encouraged throughout the world to counter the Soviet-Communist threat.

7. Would strengthen NATO's southern flank and facilitate coordination of planning between NATO and the Baghdad Pact.

8. Would increase the possibility of developing adequate capabilities to resist aggression with a minimum expenditure of U.S. resources.

9. Failure to adhere could well result in:

a. The collapse of the Pact and the victory of neutralism in the area [thus confronting the U.S., in the event of hostilities, with the necessity of undertaking military operations in a neutral or hostile environment].²

b. The collapse of the southeastern flank of NATO.

Disadvantages

1. Would provide Israel with a pretext for renewed demands for a U.S. security guaranty and for armaments.

2. Would cause Nasser and possibly Saudi Arabia and Syria to seek greater support from the USSR.

3. Would stimulate the USSR to give even greater support to the Egypt-Syria-Saudi Arabia axis.

4. Might provide a pretext for a coup d'état in Jordan that would take Jordan firmly into the Egypt-Syria-Saudi Arabia camp.

5. Would provide a pretext for increased attacks on the Baghdad Pact in some of the Arab States and Israel.
6. In the absence of an Iraqi-Saudi rapprochement, would cause possible complications in Saudi-U.S. relations and in forthcoming negotiations for the extension of air base rights.
7. Might involve the United States more directly in the Hashemite-Saudi and Iraqi-Egyptian disputes and would complicate U.S. relationship to the Arab-Israeli dispute.
8. Would bring a new wave of dissatisfaction with U.S. policy in India.
9. [Would increase expectations and demands of Pact members for increased U.S. military and economic aid.]³
10. Would further exacerbate U.S.–USSR relations.
11. Might lend some color to charges of U.S. imperialism in a new form.
12. Would tend to give the impression that the United States continues to place priority emphasis on military pacts in the face of the new Soviet economic diplomatic offensive.

[Here follows the text of the Baghdad Pact.]

¹ Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 66 D 487. Secret. This draft statement, marked “for NSC Staff consideration only”, was forwarded to the NSC Planning Board under cover of a memorandum by Lay on May 2. The paper was based on drafts prepared by the Departments of State and Defense in accordance with a decision by the NSC Planning Board at its April 16 meeting to request the State and Defense members each to prepare statements of the advantages and disadvantages of U.S. adherence to the Baghdad Pact. (Memorandum from Lay to the NSC Planning Board, May 2; *ibid.*; Record of Meeting of the NSC Planning Board, April 16; *Ibid.*,

S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1) The Department of State contribution, completed on April 25, was similar to the May 2 draft in most respects. It was drafted by Mathews (S/P) and by Wilkins and Newsom (NE). According to a covering memorandum of April 25 from Wilkins to Schwartz (S/P), the paper was cleared with SOA, BNA, GTI, NEA, and NE, and was revised in accordance with comments received from these various offices and bureaus. (*Ibid.*, NEA Files: Lot 58 D 460, Baghdad Pact, 1956) ² Defense proposal. [Footnote and brackets in the source text.]

³ Defense proposes deletion. [Footnote and brackets in the source text.]

128. Memorandum From the Secretary of Defense (Wilson) to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay)¹

Washington, May 15, 1956.

SUBJECT

U.S. Adherence to the Baghdad Pact

REFERENCES

1. Memo from the JCS to the Sec Def, subject as above, dated 23 March 1956²
2. Memo from the Sec Def to the Executive Secretary, NSC, subject as above, dated 5 April 1956³
3. Letter from the Sec Def to the Secretary of State, dated 6 [5] April 1956⁴
4. Letter from the Secretary of State to the Sec Def, dated 23 April 1956⁵

1. This is in reference to my memorandum of 5 April 1956. I have subsequently received a letter from the Secretary of State in which he advises that immediate adherence by the United States to the Baghdad Pact would be politically inadvisable.

2. It is also my understanding that a review of NSC 5428 (U.S. Objectives and Policies with Respect to the Near East)⁶ is presently pending before the National Security Council. Because of this pending review and the views of the Secretary of State, and in consideration of the recommendation of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff that adherence to the Pact is desirable from a military point of view, I recommend that the problem be considered by the National Security Council sometime during the latter part of 1956 to determine the desirability of announcing U.S. adherence during the January 1957 meeting of the Pact Council.⁷

CE. Wilson⁸

¹ Source: Department of State, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 61 D 167, Near East. Top Secret.

² [Document 104](#).

³ This memorandum transmitted [Document 104](#) to the NSC.

⁴ [Document 109](#).

⁵ [Document 126](#).

⁶ [Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. IX, Part 1, p. 525](#).

⁷ In a May 24 memorandum to the National Security Council, Lay indicated that Wilson’s memorandum of May 15 had been submitted to the President for consideration and that the President had on May 24 postponed the review of NSC 5428 directed in NSC Action No. 1447–c (see [footnote 5](#), [Document 66](#)) and agreed to review U.S. adherence to the Baghdad Pact in late 1956. (Department of State, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 61 D 167, Near East) ⁸ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

129. Instruction From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions¹

Washington, May 18, 1956.

CA-9191

SUBJECT

United States-United Kingdom Policy in the Middle East

While differences may arise between the United States and the United Kingdom concerning some aspects of policy in the Middle East the two governments have a basic identity of interests in the area and generally see eye-to-eye on the major problems of the Middle East. Whatever disagreement may occur is subject to frank, confidential debate. The friendly and fruitful conversations early this year between President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Eden illustrate the continuing value of periodic consultations between the two allies.

It is understood confidentially that British chiefs of mission in the Middle East have been instructed to stress, in their dealings with third parties, the general agreement existing between British and American policies. The Department believes that American officials, in their conversations with representatives of third countries, should refrain from discussing British and American differences, but should emphasize the similarity of United States-United Kingdom interests in developing reciprocally beneficial relations with the countries of the area. Although at times it may be in the United States interest to avoid identification with a British position, neither British nor American interests are served by assisting the many Near Easterners who traditionally attempt to play one country against the other.

Dulles

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/5-1856. Confidential. Sent to Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Jidda, Khartoum, Tel

Aviv, and London.

130. Memorandum on the Substance of Discussions at the Department of State–Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting, Pentagon, Washington, May 23, 1956, 11:30 a.m.[1](#)

Washington, May 23, 1956, 11:30 a.m.

[Here follows a list of 23 persons present, including Admiral Radford, General Twining, Admiral Burke, and General Pate. The Department of State Delegation included Murphy and Henderson.]

1. Baghdad Pact

Admiral Radford said that the Joint Chiefs would like to hear the comments of Mr. Henderson on the Baghdad Pact Council meeting in April. Mr. Henderson commented as follows: When he arrived in London April 12 on his way to Tehran, he found great concern on the part of Prime Minister Eden and Foreign Secretary Lloyd over the Council meeting to be held shortly and over the role of the United States. The British were particularly eager to know what specific contribution the United States planned to make. Eden emphasized his intention to tell the Soviet leaders, who were about to visit London, that the Middle East is an important area to the United Kingdom and the UK could not permit irresponsible elements to take over there.

When he arrived at Tehran, Mr. Henderson found great concern on the part of the Pact powers about the situation in the Middle East and the prospects for the Pact's future. Nuri Pasha stressed that greater US participation was essential. High officials of Turkey, Pakistan, Iraq and Iran all revealed feelings of frustration, worry, fear and puzzlement. They were particularly puzzled over the attitude of the U.S. and were concerned lest the U.S. be considering some sort of rapprochement with the Soviet Union behind their backs. They emphasized that their governments are pro-West but that they were being undermined by the "evangelical neutralists" like Nasser and Nehru. The Turks pointed out that Nasser is apparently going to get large assistance for the Aswan Dam while they, a good ally of the U.S., are having economic difficulties. The Turks and the Iraqis pointed out that Soviet overtures are being made in their direction and that parliamentary leaders of their countries are being invited to Moscow.

Mr. Henderson said that he had stressed at every opportunity the view of the U.S. that there had been no basic change in Soviet objectives but only in tactics. As a general observation, Mr. Henderson felt that the strongest reaction on the part of the Baghdad Pact nations was anger and irritation toward Nasser and Nehru. They were also irritated over Saudi Arabia, which was using money from American oil companies on behalf of Egyptian propaganda. [2 lines of source text not declassified] The UK in

this connection, asked about the attitude of the U.S. toward oil revenues for Saudi Arabia. Mr. Henderson commented in reply that the U.S. did not wish to dictate to American oil companies on this kind of problem and pointed out that Iraq and Iran would not want the U.S. to be dictating to American companies operating in their countries should a comparable political problem arise. [*1½ lines of source text not declassified*] Prime Minister Menderes of Turkey was perhaps the most positive personality at the conference in his attitude toward communists and neutralists.

Mr. Henderson said he thought Mohammed Ali of Pakistan was the star of the conference and was a figure of sufficient restraint, intelligence and forcefulness to be able to hold his own easily with Nehru. Mohammed Ali pressed for Pact actions on Kashmir and the Durand Line. Mr. Henderson had pointed out to him reasons why such action would be unwise, but the Pact powers agreed to statements on both these questions in response to Pakistani urging.

Regarding Afghanistan, Mr. Henderson said that there was general concern it might become a Soviet satellite. The Iranians were particularly worried about this. The Turks had observed that they have good relations with Afghanistan and have a military mission there. The Turks said they would do what they could to help out, and Mohammed Ali also said that he planned to go to Kabul.

Regarding Israel, there was general agreement that there would be no stability in the Middle East until the problem of Israel, or as they preferred to call it, Palestine, was solved. Nuri felt that the U.S. view that Nasser might take a more reasonable position was foolish because Nasser needs the Palestine issue to advance his nationalist purposes. Nuri himself had seemed fairly liberal on the Palestine issue and said he had advised Nasser that he would cooperate in the settlement of this problem.

Admiral Radford said that he had run into very much the same kind of attitudes in the Middle East as those described by Mr. Henderson. The Admiral commented that we must try to counteract these attitudes and that particular attention should be paid to statements appearing in the U.S. press. Mr. Henderson commented that an article in which Walter Reuther praised

neutralist India had not helped him at Tehran, even though George Meany had countered the Reuther article the following day.

Mr. Henderson said that the Baghdad Pact leaders had relaxed a good bit when the U.S. showed that it was willing to participate further in Pact activities. They were enthusiastic when the U.S. said it would station a flag officer in Baghdad for military liaison. He stressed, however, that effective action by the U.S. would be necessary before the next meeting of the Pact Council at Karachi in January. Admiral Radford said he thought that the high-powered U.S. delegation had greatly helped the Pact meeting at Tehran. Mr. Henderson replied that Admiral Cassady had been most effective. Mr. Henderson said he personally believed in the Baghdad Pact very strongly and that without it we would be in a bankrupt position in the Middle East. Admiral Radford agreed and added that we could go on the way we are now going only for so long before real difficulty will arise.

Admiral Radford said that the Joint Chiefs feel it desirable to set up a unified command in the Middle East but the problem is where to put it. If we join the Baghdad Pact we could have a place to locate such a command. Mr. Henderson commented that the attitude of the UK has changed and they are now eager for the U.S. to participate in Pact activities. [*2½ lines of source text not declassified*] He said that he thought he might ask General Whiteley here in Washington what the details of the British plans are. Mr. Murphy said he thought this was a good idea. Admiral Radford said that if the Chiefs agreed, he would ask General Whiteley. If this course failed, perhaps a government-to-government approach to the UK might be made.

Admiral Radford noted that physical facilities in Baghdad are inadequate for a U.S. staff headed by a flag officer. Mr. Henderson said that the Department was in a fairly good position so far as its building program is concerned, and he hoped to be able to improve the situation.

Admiral Burke asked whether it is advisable that the U.S. set up a permanent liaison group in Baghdad before the other powers do. Admiral Radford said that the other powers are setting up permanent groups but that we do not want to have too high ranking an officer. Mr. Henderson

commented that the sooner we do this the sooner they will do it, and observed that it would be unfortunate if we went back on our undertaking to assign a flag officer for this job.

[Here follows Item 2, "U.S. Bases in Morocco."]

3. Middle East Evacuation

Mr. Murphy noted that this subject had been raised some time ago by the Joint Chiefs. He said that the State Department does not favor a general notice deterring travel by U.S. citizens to the Near East and would oppose an evacuation of American citizens from the Near East and restrictions on travel by military dependents to the area at this time. He commented that any such action by the U.S. might have a panicky reaction.

Admiral Radford said that it is basically a problem for the State Department and noted that the situation seems to be somewhat better. Admiral Blake commented that the question is how to put pressure on Nasser to take a more reasonable position. In response to Admiral Radford's question, Mr. Murphy said that tourism brings in a fair amount of money to Egypt.

Admiral Radford asked whether the appraisal of the State Department is that the Middle East situation is better. Mr. Murphy replied that there appears to be a temporary lull at least.

Regarding the view of UN Secretary General Hammarskjold, Mr. Murphy commented that Hammarskjold appears to shift the tone of his remarks depending on the audience he is talking to.

Admiral Burke expressed the view that Nasser is trying to exert more control over the Egyptian Foreign Office and may even be putting military officers in the Foreign Office.

[Here follow Items 4–7: “Joint Military Planning with the British,” “NNSC,” “Term,” and “Philippine Bases.”]

¹ Source: Department of State, State–JCS Meetings: Lot 61 D 417. Top Secret. A note on the title page reads: “State Draft. Not cleared with any of participants.”

**131. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State,
Washington, June 7, 1956¹**

Washington, June 7, 1956

SUBJECT

Meeting of Ambassadors of Baghdad Pact Powers

PARTICIPANTS

His Excellency Musa Shabandar, Iraqi Ambassador

His Excellency Sir Roger Makins, British Ambassador

His Excellency Dr. Ali Amini, Iranian Ambassador

His Excellency Mohammad Ali, Pakistani Ambassador

Mr. Ilhan Savut, Counselor, Turkish Embassy

Mr. Hashim Khalil, Counselor, Iraqi Embassy

Mr. William M. Rountree, Department of State

Mr. David D. Newsom, Department of State

President's Statement:

The meeting began with a general discussion of the statement made the previous day by the President concerning neutral nations. The Ambassadors present expressed the hope that the United States would not embarrass those who were cooperating in collective security by excessive concessions to neutral nations. During the course of the meeting, Mr. Rountree received and distributed the later clarification of this statement issued by the White House. The Pakistani Ambassador said he would have wished the statement to be somewhat stronger, but he and the others expressed general

satisfaction with it. The British Ambassador remarked that, considering the frequency with which U.S. officials exposed themselves to the press, it was remarkable that there were so few problems of this kind.

Nehru's Visit:

The Pakistani Ambassador, reading from a telegram from Karachi, then stated he wished to express the concern of his government over the forthcoming visit of Prime Minister Nehru of India to the United States. He said his government was fearful that Mr. Nehru might attempt to influence the economic and political policies of the United States in Asia and that any change in these policies would have serious repercussions in the SEATO and Baghdad Pact countries. He asked that Mr. Rountree make known these views to the President and the Secretary. The Iraqi and Iranian Ambassadors concurred in the démarche; the others said they would request instructions.

The Ambassador then expressed his personal view that Mr. Nehru, who desires India to be in a position to dictate to both power groups, would put the President and the Secretary initially on the defensive by his approach. He said he believed the United States should "call Nehru's bluff" and take a stiff attitude with him. The United States, he said, should not be fearful that Nehru will be thrown to the Communists.

Governments in countries which have taken the bold step of supporting collective security will be weakened by any evidence that the neutral nations benefit from their position, the Ambassador said. People, he added, are already asking questions in the absence of strong moral support from the West, and particularly, from the United States. He did not deny, he said, that the United States should help India, but the feeling must be avoided that the Pact nations are "taken for granted" and others gain.

Mr. Rountree replied that the Baghdad Pact nations needed have no fear of any lessening of the firm United States support for collective security. Mr. Nehru's views, he said, were well known to the United States and it would be difficult to perceive that they could be more forcefully brought to United

States attention than in the past. He said further that he was surprised that there should be such a question of the degree of support which we give to our friends. He said this support has been definitely greater than what we have given to others. Our aid to India, for example, he said, has not been large in terms of India's total population.

One may ask, he added, why we aid India at all? In the judgment of the United States we should continue to work toward influencing India to adopt new policies. India is clamoring for help. If she does not get some from the United States, she may get it entirely from the Soviet bloc; this would make the task of the Soviet bloc that much easier. The problem of the United States is to maintain a balance. Mr. Rountree said he believed that balance had been maintained fairly well.

The Secretary's statement in Karachi, he said, should have gone far toward meeting the Pakistani desire for an expression of United States interest. Similarly, he added, the United States program in Iran is a concrete demonstration of United States interest.

The problem is complicated, Mr. Rountree pointed out, by an exaggeration of the help we are giving to others, even where careful examination shows no favoritism. In the case of the High Aswan Dam, for example, the amount the United States might spend would be over a long period of years and would, annually, be small in comparison to the aid given our friends.

The Pakistani Ambassador replied that he appreciated Mr. Rountree's remarks. The problem, however, he said, is not so much what the actual facts are, but lies in what the people understand about them. The Secretary's statement in Karachi, he said, was not couched in language that made a great impact; he realized, of course, that the United States does not make the kind of irresponsible statements that some other national leaders do.

The Ambassador added that he was troubled by one aspect of the United States aid to India. First, economic aid permits India to use other funds for purchasing armament. Secondly, while Pakistan is required, under the

United States aid agreement to maintain its armed forces at a certain level, India does not labor under such a stipulation.

Mr. Rountree replied that economic aid to India did not begin even to meet India's vast needs. He believed there was little chance United States economic aid actually released any funds for other uses.

Cultural Activities of Baghdad Pact:

Ambassador Shabandar of Iraq said he hoped that Baghdad Pact country Ambassadors would be able to meet from time to time to talk frankly about the Pact. What happened at Tehran, he said, was most helpful and moved many in Iraq who were previously hesitant about the Pact.

The Pact nations, he said, are still confronted by a strong current of anti-Pact propaganda and there is need from time to time to give the Pact a new impetus, either by having the United States formally join or by new ideas and new objectives.

The Ambassador, seeking for some new positive step by the nations in the Pact, suggested that a cultural committee might be formed. He proposed a cultural offensive which would emphasize that, through the Pact, the Moslem nations were ready to cooperate with the Christian nations to meet the Communist threat. He emphasized that the Pact needed an ideology to combat Communist ideology.

The Pakistani Ambassador agreed. He said that the Pact faced three dangers, military, economic, and ideological, and needed to be strong on all three fronts.

The British Ambassador agreed that the Baghdad Pact Organization needed to be broadly based and should take on as many responsibilities as it could readily absorb. The primary purpose, in his view, was the building of a defensive bastion. He emphasized that the Organization was only one year old and that its development had, in actuality, been remarkable in this short time. He said that the Pact Organization was currently proceeding to examine possible joint economic projects and that it was giving attention to the propaganda and publicity aspect. Much work is to be done, he said, in

building an audience and a common interest in the Pact. The new radio station at Baghdad, he said, will help in overcoming the previous communications advantage which those attacking the Pact have had. He asked the question whether these activities might not be as much as the Organization could currently absorb.

Referring to the suggestion that a cultural committee be formed, the British Ambassador asked the question whether further committees should be formed now or whether a start might be made on cultural matters within the field of the present publicity and propaganda organs.

The Turkish Counselor said he agreed in principle with Ambassador Shabandar and said he would refer to his Government the suggestion concerning the formation of a cultural committee. He said the need may ultimately arise, but he believed it might be preferable to concentrate on present activities.

The Iranian Ambassador pointed out that the Iraqi Ambassador's suggestion had been wider in scope than the formation of a cultural committee, that it had, in essence, approached the problem of attracting the rest of the Moslem world to the Christian-Moslem bloc.

Ambassador Shabandar agreed that this was his idea. The Pact nations, he said, were being attacked as supporting imperialism. He mentioned Israel and North Africa. The lives of the Moslem nations are in danger from the Communist threat and they need the support of the strong Christian nations. He said he was writing to his government along these lines. He asked what the views of the United States observer were on this matter.

Mr. Rountree said that he was certain the close collaboration of the Baghdad Pact nations in all fields was in the mind of the people who came together to form the Pact. He said the desirability of using it as an instrument in the cultural field could not be excluded and that it was certainly for the member nations to decide whether any new committees should be created. Whether or not a committee was created, he said, the cultural aspects should be pursued. In general, he said, it was his belief that any idea should be carefully and sympathetically considered which is in line with the broad policy objectives of the Pact. He said he questioned whether

the idea of Christian-Moslem religious collaboration might not create more problems than it would solve. A broader cultural exchange might be preferable to one based on religion; the latter might have an unfortunate connotation with people of the other great religions: Hindus and Jews, for example. He said he merely put this forward as a question.

Press Release:

The Ambassadors agreed that a press release would be issued stating simply that the Ambassadors had met for a discussion of common problems.

Next Meeting:

The British Ambassador invited the Baghdad Pact Embassies and the Department to his Embassy for the next meeting. No date was set.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/6–756. Secret. Drafted by Newsom on June 13.

132. Memorandum of Discussion at the 289th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, June 28, 1956¹

Washington, June 28, 1956

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and items 1–3: a briefing by Allen Dulles on significant developments affecting U.S. security, East-West exchanges, and U.S. civil aviation policy toward the Soviet Union and its satellites. Vice President Nixon presided at the meeting.]

4. *United States Objectives and Policies With Respect to the Near East* (NSC 5428;² Progress Report, dated May 17, 1956, by OCB on NSC 5428³) Mr. Anderson briefed the Council on the main points of the reference Progress Report (copy of brief filed in the minutes of the meeting).⁴ In the course of his briefing he stressed a notable development as to the Israeli water development plan. The Israelis had privately expressed to the U.S. Government their interest in a proposal under which they would agree not to go forward with their project for a diversion of the Jordan River waters (the Banat Yacov project) if they were granted their request for a \$75 million loan from the Export-Import Bank for the development of other water resources than the Jordan River.

In concluding his briefing, Mr. Anderson pointed out that although a review of our current policy toward the Near East was directed some time ago by the National Security Council, the President had recently stated that this review should not be completed until he “determines that evolving conditions in that area make feasible the adoption of a new long-term policy toward the Near East.” In the meantime, interdepartmental studies were going forward as to the possible impact upon the oil supply in Western Europe of several possible developments in the oil-producing and oil-transit states in the Middle East.

When Mr. Anderson had concluded his briefing, Secretary Humphrey inquired whether the last point, on postponing a review of our Near East policy, should be taken to inform the Export-Import Bank to sit quiet and do

nothing about the Israeli request for a \$75 million loan for water development. Secretary Humphrey pointed out that certain negotiations with the Israelis on this subject were now going on. If the Council did not wish the Bank to do anything about this matter, the officials of the Export-Import Bank should be so informed.

Secretary Dulles replied that all the President wanted was to postpone a general review of our Near East policy at the present time. This by no means meant that the Export-Import Bank should not continue its negotiations with the Israeli Government with respect to a loan for water development in Israel. Secretary Humphrey stated that as far as the Export-Import Bank goes, "we let nature take its course."

Secretary Dulles replied that we would certainly not want to agree to accept the Israeli commitment to do nothing for a period of two years with respect to the Jordan River diversion in return for a loan. Secretary Dulles then went on to emphasize that the situation in the Middle East, as far as oil resources and supply were concerned, was a situation of the utmost gravity for the entire free world. Most of the oil production in this area was in the Arab countries, some 80% of it. The rest of it was in Iran. The great danger lay in the fact that transportation of the oil and the pipelines centered in areas under the control of Syria and Egypt. Syria controlled the pipelines, and Egypt controlled transportation through the Suez Canal. Thus these two countries had a hold on the jugular vein of Western Europe, and obviously the Soviets were seeking to increase their influence in both Syria and Egypt. If these lines were cut, we would be faced at once with a crisis. The Arabs can certainly try to blackmail us, and the whole situation was made to order for the USSR to move in on. This was, in fact, the toughest long-range problem that we were up against, and it explains why the State Department is trying so hard to avoid adopting a policy of all-out support for Israel. Adoption of such an all-out support policy for Israel would almost certainly permit the USSR to dominate the Middle East and, as a result of its control of the oil of that region, to dominate Western Europe.

Secretary Dulles then suggested that one possible solution to the problem might be for the United States to build a lot of much larger tankers. This would reduce Western Europe's dependence on the pipelines and on the

Suez Canal. Admiral Radford pointed out that the number of tankers required to reduce this dependence would be impossibly large. Secretary Humphrey agreed with Admiral Radford. Secretary Dulles said that perhaps this was the case, but that some solution had got to be found for Western Europe's abject dependence on Arab whims.

Admiral Radford said he had another difficulty to raise with the Council. A few months ago the Joint Chiefs of Staff had been directed to conduct military planning with the British and French to meet the possibility of war in the Middle East. To date we have not discussed military planning with the French, because we had been informed to plan with the French only if they requested to be brought into the planning, and they had not as yet made such a request. We had, however, continuously been planning with the British, and now, indeed, had run into an impasse with the British military people as to our contingency planning. The British officers are insistent on a combined command structure throughout the Middle East, even though the head of the combined command structure might be an American and not a Britisher. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are strongly opposed to a combined command structure for the Middle East, and the issue may have to be resolved at the governmental level because it cannot be resolved at the military level.

[1 paragraph (12 ½ lines of source text) not declassified]

Admiral Radford commented that the British would be completely out of the picture in the Middle East if they lost Cyprus and its bases. While the American military have not counted on using Cyprus bases in the event of hostilities, nevertheless the fact remains that if we were barred from a Cyprus base we would have to go in and seize some other base or else induce the Turks to provide us with one.

Secretary Dulles concluded that while the Middle East was providing us with a lot of headaches, at least—as the Vice President had just pointed out—there was so far no war in the Middle East. For this we could be thankful.

*The National Security Council:*⁵

Noted and discussed the reference Progress Report on the subject by the Operations Coordinating Board.

S. Everett Gleason

¹ Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Prepared by Gleason on June 29.

² [Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. IX, Part 1, p. 525.](#)

³ Not printed. (Department of State, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 61 D 167, Near East (NSC 5428)) ⁴ The minutes of all National Security Council Meetings are in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council, Official Meeting Minutes File.

⁵ The paragraph that follows constitutes NSC Action No. 1597, approved by the President on June 29. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, NSC Records of Action)

133. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions¹

Washington, July 25, 1956—8:42 p.m.

63. Joint State/USIA message. Department concerned by reports from Near East of certain increasingly prevalent attitudes in Arab states toward production and transit of oil. Some Arab leaders inclined believe oil resources so vital they can increasingly force Western nations and companies make substantial concessions to retain rights. Further some regard West's role in production as that of mere agent, not partner.

Depcirtel 28² discussed rights at Dhahran Airfield. Similarly we desire place in proper perspective relations between states involved in production and transit of petroleum on one hand and states consuming petroleum products and the producing and transit companies on other. Principal element these relationships we wish strongly emphasize is mutuality of interests.

You authorized your discretion as question arises and to extent following applies your country emphasize to local government US views. Following for background in informal talks with local officials and other leaders; we do not desire formal representations.

In complex petroleum industry states possessing oil resources and those providing transit rights, companies developing and marketing oil, and states consuming petroleum all play important roles in cooperative partnership; none should consider its position gives it right or power dictate to others.

Essential principle present 50-50 relationship current in industry is partnership in which Near Eastern state provides resource to be developed and Western companies supply four essential elements: capital, technical and organizational skill, markets, and transportation facilities. Working together they make possible wider prosperity and development Middle East and contribute vitally [*vitality?*] Western Europe.

Continuance this relationship especially important to producing states. Companies and governments outside Western community not capable operating petroleum industry on level required maintain present output and incomes Middle Eastern states. Soviet bloc self-sufficient in oil production at relatively low level and consequently unable absorb any significant quantity Middle East oil. Bloc also lacks excess refining capacity, has almost no tankers, and no established marketing organizations in principal consuming areas for Middle East oil, notably Western Europe.

Curtailment production in any one country Middle East can be made up by output elsewhere in world. Witness Iranian experience 1951–1953. Arab states today provide approximately 21 percent total world consumption petroleum products. Flexibility industry in making up any curtailed portion this percentage by increasing off-take from other producers in area or outside area clearly established. Likewise in field transport, consuming countries able adjust in time to loss pipeline transport facilities in Middle East or loss transport capacity through Suez Canal or both. Any interruption supply would give considerable impetus consumption other forms energy and development further oil resources and new forms energy.

Government operations and development producing states heavily dependent income from oil. Saudi Arabia derives 85 per cent its government revenues; Iraq two-thirds. Syria obtains one-fourth government revenues from transit. Nearly all current Iranian development program financed by oil. Sheikdoms even more dependent on petroleum. Curtailment output or transit likely have immediate serious economic social effect in contrast benefits these revenues now bring. Loss could not be offset by local operation petroleum industry.

Near East states, Iran and West work as inseparable partners. To use relationship extract political, financial, or other concessions would work detriment of both. West would not be greater loser from action any producing state in curtailing production or transit oil.

Hoover

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 880.2553/7–2556. Secret. Sent to Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Jidda, Tehran, Aden, Amman, Basra, Dhahran, Khorramshahr, Kuwait, Tel Aviv, and Tripoli. Repeated to Bonn, London, Paris, Rome, and The Hague.

² In circular telegram 28, the Department of State instructed certain Middle Eastern and European posts to emphasize to their host governments the advantages to Saudi Arabia and other countries hosting U.S. military installations. The Department noted reports indicating that certain Arab countries had the impression that Dhahran was so vital to the United States that the United States was willing to make exorbitant concessions to retain its rights. It also affirmed that Dhahran and similar installations were of little value to the United States unless they had local acceptance. (*Ibid.*, 711.56386A/7–1456)

134. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree) to the Acting Secretary of State¹

Washington, July 26, 1956

SUBJECT

United States Participation in Baghdad Pact Activities

You asked yesterday, during the OCB briefing for the progress report on Iran,² for a brief summary of U.S. activity in the Baghdad Pact organization. Reports from the field are very encouraging as to the enthusiasm and seriousness with which various Pact committees are attacking organizational and substantive problems. U.S. participation has been warmly appreciated, and our representatives are taking an active part in guidance and formulation of policy lines.

U.S. Personnel and Financial Contribution

The United States has agreed to contribute one-sixth of the cost of the Secretariat (U.S. share for current year approximately \$75,000). The U.S. is also supplying five officers and one administrative advisor to the Secretariat. In addition, two officers and two clerk-stenographers are being assigned to the Embassy in Baghdad to work on Pact matters. A section with NEA is being set up in the Department for the same purpose to consist of two officers and clerical assistance.

Economic Committee

In the April meeting of the Baghdad Pact Council Mr. Henderson announced that the United States accepted membership in the Economic Committee and would participate fully in its activities. To date this commitment has been met. The Economic Committee, having met in Tehran, approved of the work of its committees, accepted U.S. membership, and passed a number of resolutions relating to future activities, is scheduled to meet again in Karachi next January. In the meantime the activities of the sub-committees are engaging the attention of the United States.

There are eleven sub-committees, each of which has been active since the original formation of the Economic Committee in Baghdad in January of 1956. These subcommittees are as follows:

Atomic Energy

Trade

Cooperation in Agricultural Planning

Education and Interchange of Staff

Animal Diseases and Animal Husbandry

Health and Sanitation

Soun Pest

Moroccan and Desert Locust

General Pest Control

Communications

Joint Projects

Each of the sub-committees is scheduled for meetings prior to next January, the Education and Exchange of Students Sub-Committee, the Veterinary Education Working Party of the Animal Husbandry Sub-Committee, the Agricultural Machinery Training Center Working Party of the Agricultural Planning Sub-Committee, and the Joint Projects Sub-Committee having already met since the Tehran meeting. U.S. representation is handled by designation of the U.S. delegation for each sub-committee at the time it is scheduled for a meeting, usually through designation of ICA and Embassy personnel in the country in which the meeting is being held. Depending upon the importance of the meeting and the anticipated problems, the delegation sometimes includes Washington representatives.

Specific guidelines for the U.S. are formulated for each sub-committee within the framework of the following general guidelines:

- (a) U.S. encourages and wholeheartedly supports mutual cooperative endeavors represented by the Economic Committee activities.

(b) The U.S. has and expects to continue existing bilateral programs with each of the countries in the area in technical assistance and economic development.

(c) We encourage the Economic Committee and its sub-committees to concern themselves primarily with isolation and identification of mutual economic problems and development of techniques and methods for their solution through the mechanism of the member countries, i.e., the committee structure should not take on operational or administrative tasks.

(d) In the financial field the U.S. encourages member countries to examine and utilize to the maximum their own resources and the resources available in terms of private capital, the IBRD, the Export-Import Bank, but will give sympathetic consideration within resources available to needs for technical assistance and funds for mutual development purposes when other funding sources are inadequate.

(e) We encourage the committees to look to and utilize the resources of the United Nations and its specialized agencies and coordinate its activities with them.

Military Committee—Significant U.S. Contributions

1. Provided an official U.S. Observer with the Pact's Military Committee. He has attended all substantive meetings since the initial one of November 21, 1955.
2. JCS have reviewed and commented on military studies prepared by the Pact's Planning Staff.
3. Provided Senior U.S. Military representation at the Council of Ministers' November 1955 meeting in Baghdad and the April 1956 meeting in Tehran.
- 4.

Announced intention to establish a small military liaison group with the Baghdad Pact on a permanent basis. Present plans envisage its establishment by September 1, 1956.

In connection with this item there has apparently been some shift in Defense's position in this matter. It was our understanding that a General or Flag Officer would be stationed permanently at Baghdad, and in any case this was the tenor of the announcement made at the Tehran Council meeting. However, a recent letter from Mr. Gray indicates that the permanent stationing of this officer will be in Washington and that he would go to Baghdad for meetings of the Military Committee and other important functions of the committee as they take place. Although the Defense Department tends to equivocate as to their original intention in this respect, it is believed that their decision was made recently as the result of advice of the Military Attaché at Baghdad, who, with the concurrence of the Embassy, indicated that because no other government had as yet permanently stationed a Flag or General Officer in Baghdad, it seemed questionable whether the United States should do so. As a matter of tactics we believe it would be desirable for the Department to facilitate the establishment of the permanent liaison group at Baghdad now and raise the question of permanent stationing of the General or Flag Officer in the course of the next few months. Aside from general psychological factors, there is no particular need to station that officer in the immediate future.

5. Provided U.S. military representation at the Pact's Military Deputies meeting in Baghdad July 15-18, 1956, which meeting considered the comments of the member governments upon the military studies previously prepared by the planning staff. Those studies, approved, have been forwarded to the Military Committee while others have been referred back to the Planning Committee for further study.

6. Currently providing a U.S. military representative to assist in the preparation of a naval study for the Pact's Military

Committee.

Liaison and Counter-Subversive Committees

1. Both the Liaison and Counter-Subversive Committees were proposed by the British and adopted at the Baghdad meeting of the Council in November 1955 (the proposal by the British was in pursuance of a suggestion made by the United States to the United Kingdom during the Middle East political-military bilateral discussions in Washington in the summer of 1955).
 2. The actual organization of the Liaison and Counter-Subversive Committees was accomplished at the Tehran meeting in April, at which time the U.S. indicated its willingness to become a member of these committees.
 3. The first full-scale meeting with the Counter-Subversive Committee was held in Ankara June 26–29. The U.S. was represented by delegates from the CIA and USIA working under the aegis of the American Embassy.
 4. Previous uncertainty regarding the organization of the committee staff in relationship with the Public Affairs Division of the Pact Secretariat was resolved by the adoption of a new organization pattern currently being considered by the Council of Deputies in Baghdad. As a result of this a semi-autonomous Counter-Subversive Secretariat will be set up in Baghdad with sole supervision over the Public Affairs Division of the Pact Secretariat.
 5. The Counter-Subversive Committee proposed to gather information in this field and to exchange information among the member countries. It will also study and devise methods for promoting activities in the Middle East favorable to the Pact and its members, also to counter any harmful activities that may originate in neighboring and other countries opposing the Pact, and to make recommendations to the Council on these matters.
-

¹ Source: Department of State, OCB Files: Lot 61 D 385, Box 2475, Baghdad Pact. Limited Official Use. Drafted by William O. Baxter and Ben F. Dixon. Sent through the Executive Secretariat.

² Not identified.

135. Editorial Note

Following Egyptian nationalization of the Suez Canal Company on July 26, steps were taken in Washington to begin planning emergency measures to ensure Europe's oil supply in the event the Canal was closed. In early August, the Director of the Office of Oil and Gas in the Department of the Interior, Hugh Stewart, acting in his capacity as Chairman of the Foreign Petroleum Supply Committee (FPSC) met with industry representatives on the committee and prepared a plan of action which called for the establishment of a Middle East Emergency Committee (MEEC), composed of representatives of American petroleum companies engaged in foreign operations.

The flow of Middle East oil to Europe all but completely halted after the outbreak of hostilities in the Middle East on October 29. Passage through the Suez Canal was blocked on November 1, when the Egyptian ship *Akka* was sunk in the Canal near Lake Timsah. The Iraqi pipeline ceased to function on November 3, when three pumping stations in Syria were sabotaged. On November 30, the U.S. Government reactivated the Middle East Emergency Committee and set in motion the plan to meet Europe's petroleum needs.

Regarding the sabotage of the Iraqi pipeline, see [volume XIII, pages 593 ff.](#) For documentation on U.S. interest in the European oil supply problem, within the context of the Suez Canal crisis, see volumes XV and XVI.

In February 1957, the United States Senate held hearings on government and industry participation in emergency oil planning before and during the Suez Crisis. For additional information, see U.S. Congress, Senate, *Joint Hearings before Subcommittees of the Committee on the Judiciary and the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, United States Senate, Eighty-Fifth Congress, First Session* (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1957), parts 1–4. Documentation relating to the hearings is in the Eisenhower Library, Fred. A. Seaton Papers.

136. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree) to the Acting Secretary of State¹

Washington, August 20, 1956.

SUBJECT

Proposals for New Oil Pipeline Through Iraq and Turkey

Discussion:

On August 1 the Department informed our Embassies at Baghdad, Ankara, Tehran, Damascus and Beirut² that it had been informed by Standard Oil of New Jersey that, in the event the Suez Canal is not brought under international control and oil companies are unable to depend upon proper operation, expansion of facilities and reasonable tolls, the company considers it must, in its own interest, proceed immediately to build a pipeline through Iraq and Turkey to Iskanderun. The company stated that agreement with Shell, Anglo-Persian, Gulf and Socony was necessary and, if the U.S. Government concurred, it was prepared to consult with them. The company indicated this project had been under study for some time and has certain purely economic attractions, The pipeline would be 36 or 40 inches and would handle 850,000 barrels daily. In conveying this information to the field, the Department requested an evaluation of probable Iraqi and Turkish Government reaction as well as comment from the other posts in which pipelines are operating at the present time.

The replies indicate the following evaluations and probable reactions:

*Iraq:*³ The Embassy reports IPC has been thinking along similar lines for some time. It believes the proposed pipeline would be welcomed by the Iraqi Government as a means of increasing oil revenues. However, some public protest may be expected from Arab nationalists who still resent Turkish annexation of Alexandretta (Iskanderun). The Embassy believes there would be

merit in considering the possibility of undertaking the project under the auspices of the Baghdad Pact Organization. The Embassy further thinks that it would be inadvisable to broach this matter now with the Iraqi Government. Until the Suez matter is settled, such a proposal intending to minimize reliance upon the Canal would be highly objectionable to Arabs generally and it could hardly be expected that the Government of Iraq would publicly support it.

*Turkey:*⁴ The Embassy believes the Turkish Government would enthusiastically welcome the pipeline project. The Turks would benefit economically and would enjoy a considerable enhancement of prestige. The increased importance of the Iskanderun area would, in their opinion, make the U.S. more conscious of the need for stability and security in Cyprus. The Embassy emphasizes the importance of presenting the project in a manner which does not link it with Suez Canal developments and pipeline difficulties in Lebanon and Syria, but rather with expanding production of Middle East oil fields.

*Iran:*⁵ The Embassy reports a conversation between the Ambassador and the Shah in which the Shah raised the question of such a pipeline which would transverse Iranian and Turkish territory. The Shah considers such a route, while probably more difficult from an engineering standpoint, a more reliable one than a route passing through any one of the Arab countries. It is probable that the Iranian Government would adopt a strong position in favor of construction of a pipeline by-passing Arab territory or at least for an appreciable distance running through Iranian territory.

*Syria:*⁶ The Embassy doubts that Syria's attitude towards arrangements with the present pipeline companies would be improved by the early announcement of plans for the proposed pipeline through Iraq and Turkey. The Embassy further states that such an announcement would probably produce hostile reactions

in Syria, where memories of Turkish annexation of Alexandretta are still fresh, and should be postponed for the time being.

*Lebanon:*⁷ The Embassy believes the announcement of the plans for a Turkish pipeline would tend to induce among Lebanese leaders a greater realization of the dangers of their present policy directed against IPC and Tapline.

Recommendation:

That no final decision on the Department's position regarding the proposed pipeline be taken until the London conference is concluded, but that in the meantime we explore further with Mr. Page the feasibility and implications of the Turkish pipeline and other means of ensuring our access to Middle East oil (e.g., a pipeline across Israel from the Gulf of Aqaba, new tanker construction, etc.).⁸

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 880.2553/8–2056. Secret. Drafted by A. David Fritzlan of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs on August 16. Sent through the Executive Secretariat.

² Reference is to telegram 132 to Baghdad, August 1, also sent to Ankara, Damascus, and Beirut. (*Ibid.*, 880.2553/8–156) ³ Telegram 164 from Baghdad, August 7. (*Ibid.*, 880.2553/8–756) ⁴ Telegram 358 from Ankara, August 11. (*Ibid.*, 880.2553/8–1156) ⁵ See [Document 362](#).

⁶ Telegram 327 from Damascus, August 8. (Department of State, Central Files, 880.2553/8–856) ⁷ Telegram 285 from Beirut, August 7. (*Ibid.*, 880.2553/8–756) ⁸ There is no indication on the source text of Hoover's approval or disapproval of the recommendation.

A handwritten note by George Allen at the bottom of the last page reads: "I am enthusiastic about this project and would like to see the pipeline extended some day to Europe."

137. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State¹

Tehran, November 9, 1956—1 a.m.

731. Rome for MacSweeney. Reference Embassy telegram 709.² Summoned to audience with Shah I found Mirza and all four Muslim Pact PMs and Foreign Ministers who individually and collectively bluntly stated that now US elections were over and President Eisenhower triumphantly re-elected there appears to them to be no reason why US should not join Baghdad Pact immediately. They felt elections had amply endorsed President's courageous stand on Israel invasion Egypt.

While Shah opened session by appealing for US to join, it was Menderes who explained in detail his understanding our reasons for not joining hitherto which he felt were now invalid: (1) US no longer under obligation guarantee Israeli territorial integrity because of (A) Israel's attack on Egypt and (B) her pretensions as announced by Ben-Gurion to territorial expansion. (2) Heretofore US public opinion has not been prepared for US adherence Baghdad Pact but now clear BP is instrument for peace in Middle East area. (3) No necessity trying appease Egypt or Syria which had aligned themselves with Communist camp. (4) Conversely every reason encourage non-Communist Arab nations join Pact since they would find it in their own best interests once they realized Pact, as exemplified by action taken here today, was instrument for peace and stability. (5) Menderes could not understand why when US had been guiding genius for NATO and SEATO and foster father BP US had thus far deferred formal adherence although BP was essential link between those two pacts.

Shah at this point interposed that failure join Pact created impression US lacked confidence in Iran as keystone northern tier. Menderes wound up saying that at conclusion their conference all PMs (leaving tonight) had posed question next step and had agreed US adherence BP most important in view Soviet menace.

Suhrawardy re-emphasized points made by Menderes and urged immediate US decision. He stressed importance bringing Iraq and Saudi Arabia closer together, an action in which he felt US could be most effective. Example US joining BP would be very influential determining Saudi attitude. He pointed out Mirza after returning briefly Karachi check situation would proceed, following informal visit Iraq, to Saudi Arabia in effort persuade King Saud importance Baghdad Pact. He also mentioned Lebanon as country where US influence could be asserted favor adherence.

In conclusion all participants again stressed belief most important step which could be taken for security Middle East was US adherence BP immediately and this was psychological moment for such action. As I was leaving, Pakistan Foreign Minister Noon stated “you will realize that all of us in Middle East are afraid of Russians and US cannot let us down. It must join Baghdad Pact”.

Chapin

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/11–956. Secret; Niact. Repeated Priority to Karachi, Baghdad, Ankara, Paris, London, and Rome.

² Telegram 709, November 6, contained a report which Chapin had received from the Shah and Pakistani President Mirza on the November 5 meeting in Tehran of Iranian, Iraqi, Pakistani, and Turkish representatives. At the meeting, the four countries completed a draft communiqué calling for an immediate cease-fire, withdrawal of all Israeli troops behind the Israeli border and the withdrawal of British and French forces, a guarantee of Egyptian territorial integrity, and a definitive settlement of the Israeli border along lines projected in 1947. Final acceptance of the communiqué, Chapin reported, would be made after the arrival of Pakistani Prime Minister Suhrawardy on November 6 and Turkish Prime Minister Menderes on November 7. The Shah and Mirza emphasized to Chapin that the United States should join the Baghdad Pact at an early date and urged the United States to exert every possible pressure on the United Kingdom to accept the proposals. Mirza stated that if the British should refuse to accept, not only would the Baghdad Pact break up, but he would seriously advocate Pakistani withdrawal from the Commonwealth. (*Ibid.*, 684A.86/11–656)

The final four-power communiqué, issued on November 7, conformed to the outline indicated in telegram 709 from Tehran. For text, see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents*, 1956, pp. 677–678.

138. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State¹

Tehran, November 14, 1956—1 p.m.

757. After careful consideration I respectfully suggest developments moving too rapidly and threat deterioration BP much too imminent permit wait-and-see attitude envisaged Deptel 939, November 12 to Tehran² (see today's AP reports from Baghdad and Beirut re threat Iraqi withdrawal). In my judgment great danger disintegration BP exists with consequent grave decline US prestige unless US gives satisfactory assurances BP members immediately.

Prime Minister told me yesterday (inadvertently I thought) that at recent four power Tehran meeting it was thought wiser postpone formal January BP Council meeting Karachi because of mounting anti-British sentiment throughout ME. He indicated feeling persisted that without full membership US to offset British membership four Muslim powers might prefer have UK out of Pact.

In view vehemence with which all BP Prime Ministers urged early US adherence Pact (Embtel 731, November 9)³ as reinforced Menderes representations to Warren (Istanbul's 366, November 10),⁴ Mirza's statements to Hildreth (Karachi's 1345, November 12)⁵ and remarks made to Gallman (Baghdad's 795, November 9)⁶ I am certain on basis my conversations with four Prime Ministers, Shah and Mirza that four Muslim governments will not be content at this moment with mere statement our negative attitude towards US adherence BP as outlined numbered paragraph 1, Deptel 939, November 12 to Tehran. I suggest it most important US continue exercise leadership for which BP powers look to US and which they have valued so highly in present crisis. If we are not prepared take early action responsive their recommendation we should spell out candidly and in detail "variety of reasons" why we believe time is not propitious particularly in view detailed refutation by Menderes and others earlier US objections.

As seen from Tehran major obstacle to US membership at this time is apprehension re nature Soviet reaction. It is fully appreciated here that reactions Soviet Union to such move can only be adequately evaluated in Washington and must be paramount in Department's thinking. However Turkey and Pakistan already enjoy US assurances under NATO and SEATO in event aggression, and US has taken strong stand to protect Iran against Soviet threats on two occasions since 1945. Non-aggressive nature BP clear from text and confirmed by recent events. US adherence now could not be properly interpreted as aggressive, would be in line actual US policy and interest ME and could be expected exert strong attraction on non-Communist Arab states.

Thanks to courageous stand President and US Del in UN moral leadership US in ME has never been higher. As reported my telegrams this fact fully recognized by four BP Prime Ministers not only through statements to me and US representatives other BP capitals but in formal communiqué Tehran conference. At same time British prestige has dropped sharply result Suez intervention. It appears from here now is golden opportunity while situation is still fluid consolidate US position by early adherence BP rather than permit this ascendance be dissipated by what may seem to four Muslim powers lapse of US interest in area if not unwillingness continue provide decisive leadership. If US remains unwilling join Pact when previously stated reasons appear no longer valid members likely conclude real reason for US refusal is unreadiness commit itself defense ME. This interpretation would have shattering effect on morale BP countries.

Chapin

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/11-1456. Secret; Niact. Repeated Niact to Ankara, Baghdad, and Karachi, and Priority to Paris and London.

² In telegram 939 to Tehran, sent also to Ankara, Baghdad, and Karachi, the Department of State in response to reports of apprehension among Baghdad Pact members over the Suez Crisis and danger of Soviet intervention advised: "Because of current high tension in area and possibility precipitate action might be undertaken and have adverse counter action, we believe all

countries interested in area should move with extreme caution. During next few weeks we will have opportunity to study and assess situation and should be ready to discuss results and next steps at Baghdad Pact's meeting in January [1957]." (*Ibid.*, 780.5/11–1256) ³ [Supra](#).

⁴ Not found.

⁵ Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/11–1256) ⁶ In telegram 795, Gallman reported in part that Iraqi Foreign Minister Bashayan had told him that anti-British and anti-government feelings were rapidly mounting in Iraq and that all sides were concerned over the possibility of Soviet intervention in the area. (*Ibid.*, 684A.86/11–956)

139. Memorandum From the Counselor of the Department of State (MacArthur) to the Acting Secretary of State¹

Washington, November 14, 1956.

At my daily liaison meeting at the White House this morning, the President referred to the Middle East situation and said he thought we ought to draw up a brief piece of paper which would establish the line we would take with our Arab and Middle Eastern friends.² The purpose of this paper would be so that the same general line would be taken by the interested Agencies of the Government in our conversations with our Middle Eastern friends whether here in Washington, at the UN, or in their respective capitals. It would be designed to influence them to take a more constructive position with respect to the serious situation in the Middle East.

The President said there were three thoughts which we might get across to them which he believed might be constructive. These were generally as follows:

1. The tremendous risk and threat for any nation to get into close and intimate contact with the Soviet Union.
2. The equally great threat to the Middle East in the event of another world war, since each side would be determined that the other side not have access to the oil and riches of the area, and

therefore massive destruction of oil and other resources, cities, etc., might come about.

3. That the US stands ready to extend economic friendship and assistance with no political strings attached. Thinking out loud, the President said he had in mind that we might tell them we would encourage private investment and loans, including soft loans, to assist in their economic development, on the basis of their cooperating fully with the UN and bringing about an equitable solution to the problems, with peace and justice.

I mentioned this to you briefly this morning after my meeting and you suggested that another thought which might be included would be the fact that the Soviet Union, which has oil for export, cannot absorb Middle Eastern oil, and that therefore if the states which have oil in the Middle East follow a course which leads to non-cooperation with the West and are oriented toward the Soviet Union, they will be in serious financial and economic difficulties in terms of disposing of their greatest financial resource, which is oil.

In view of the urgency which the President attaches to this task, I assume you will have this memorandum shown to those top officials in the Department who should be working on the paper which the President has requested.

DMacA

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.80/11-1456. Secret. Between November 3 and 18, Secretary Dulles was confined to Walter Reed Hospital in Washington following major surgery. He convalesced in Key West, Florida, and returned to the Department of State on December 3. (Princeton University, Dulles Papers, Dulles' Appointment Book) ² President Eisenhower referred to the need for such a study during two conversations on November 13. According to a memorandum from MacArthur to Hoover, November 13, President Eisenhower told MacArthur during an 8:30 a.m. briefing: "we should be putting our best minds to work on the problem of what we might do, particularly with respect to Egypt,

Saudi Arabia, and Syria, to keep them from gradually falling under Soviet domination.” (Department of State, Central Files, 711.11–EI/11–1356) Portions of MacArthur’s memorandum are printed in [vol. XVI, p. 1120](#).

At 11:56 a.m., Eisenhower, mentioned the subject again during a telephone conversation with Acting Secretary Hoover. The memorandum of telephone conversation is in the Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries. The portions pertaining to the Middle East are printed in [vol. XVI, p. 1122](#).

140. Memorandum From the Director of the Executive Secretariat (Howe) to the Acting Secretary of State¹

Washington, November 14, 1956

US POLICY IN THE ARAB WORLD

I enclose, first, Doug MacArthur's memorandum of his conversation this morning with the President² which deals exclusively with this subject. A copy has gone to Macomber for the Secretary only.

You will note that in this memorandum he³ suggests:

(a) A clear articulation of our Middle East policy which can be used in a number of ways with the Arab countries.

(b) He refers to the earlier conversation he had with Mr. MacArthur and to one which he had with you (memoranda of which are also enclosed)⁴ in which he feels that there is an urgent need for a new program of economic and cultural measures of considerable proportions.

I *recommend*, and Mr. MacArthur fully concurs, that, in light of the extremely heavy load of NEA "putting out fires", Bob Bowie can be given action responsibility on this matter. It is our view that (a) is sufficiently dependent upon (b) to require handling (a) first. Mr. Bowie's responsibility in this matter would be to proceed on a *top priority* basis in coordination with NEA, G, C, E and U/MSA, to fulfill at the earliest moment the requirement of the President.⁵

[Here follow Howe's recommendations concerning the distribution of the attached memoranda.]

¹ Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 66 D 487, Near & Middle East. Secret.

² *Supra.*

³ Howe is apparently referring to the President.

⁴ Attached to the source text is a copy of MacArthur's November 13 memorandum to Hoover; see [footnote 2, supra](#). Also attached is a memorandum for the record by Howe, November 14, entitled: "Economic Assistance for the Arab World". Howe's memorandum refers to the President's conversation with Hoover (see [footnote 2, supra](#)) and continues: "The President quite clearly visualizes a sizable, strong, thoroughly worked out program involving a number of countries, carefully selected, and the program as a whole designed as a major force to combat the threat of communism and Russian influence in the area and to assure the maintenance of the Arab countries in the Free World."

⁵ Hoover initialed his approval of the recommendation. A marginal notation on the source text, in an unidentified hand, reads: "Hoover also wishes consideration of the problem of the apparent tie up of Sov divisions in EE (60 divs) & whether this fact with implication of Soviet bluff, could not be exploited in Arab countries."

141. Letter From the Secretary of Defense (Wilson) to the Acting Secretary of State¹

Washington, November 14, 1956.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Reference the determination by the President at the NSC meeting on 24 May 1956² that the problem of U.S. adherence to the Baghdad Pact should be reviewed during the latter part of 1956 in anticipation of the January 1957 meeting of the Baghdad Pact Council, I am informed that the present tentative schedule would bring this question before the National Security Council sometime around the middle of December.

I believe that circumstances in the Middle East now render that schedule unsatisfactory and that consideration of this matter by the National Security Council must be given on an urgent basis if the vacuum created by recent developments is to be effectively filled. It seems to me that time is of the essence, and that immediate review is required.

I further believe that recent developments in the Middle East have created the most favorable opportunity for Congressional approval of U.S. adherence to the Pact.

I am sending a copy of this letter to the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.³

Sincerely yours,

C.E. Wilson⁴

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/11-1456. Top Secret.

² See [footnote 7](#), [Document 128](#). The National Security Council did not meet on May 24.

³ Lay forwarded a copy of Wilson's letter to members of the National Security Council under cover of a November 15 memorandum that indicated that the letter was being referred to the NSC Planning Board. (Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5428 Memos) Acting Secretary Hoover replied to Wilson on December 3 in part as follows: "I am sure you realize that the question of our adherence to the Pact is being given the most careful study in this Department and that the Department of Defense will be kept fully advised of our views." (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 780.5/12-356) ⁴ Printed from a copy that bears this stamped signature.

142. Telegram From the Embassy in Iraq to the Department of State¹

Baghdad, November 15, 1956—1 p.m.

856. Baghdad Pact. I have noted with considerable interest series recent requests and pressures in Baghdad and at pact-member capitals for US adherence BP, particularly those flowing from Tehran meeting Moslem PMs. Am pouching tomorrow despatch containing my views.² Summary follows.

As I informed Department prior to Council formation (Embtel 715, March 15, 1955)³ and prior April pact meeting Tehran (Embtel 1050, April 17, 1956)⁴ I believed half measures not enough and that formal adherence by US to pact needed more than anything else to transform pact into going concern. Today reasons for this view exist in even greater force.

Pact objectives same as those US and of undoubted validity pact considerable symbol US policy objectives Northern Tier area and if it falters seriously or fails, US position and influence will suffer major setback. For last few months pact facing difficulties particularly in economic and military fields. Owing observer status US limited to observations and inhibited from taking leadership many matters thus leaving UK with major burden. Now even this in jeopardy owing loss UK prestige in ME and Iraqi views re its relationship to UK in pact. It clear in Baghdad that Iraq and pact member representatives expect decision for US adherence soon after elections. This expectation real and resulting disappointment and disillusion may well affect our friendly and cooperative relations with some present pact members. Owing pact wording actual US defense commitments would not be increased. While some increase in “moral commitment” toward area might result, US response to attack in pact area, as elsewhere, would depend upon total circumstances existing at time. Communists and neutralists attacking pact may well conclude their efforts have borne fruit if no US adherence and they may be emboldened to further activity vis-à-vis pact and ME members. US prestige now at new high in ME thus blunting weapons most local opponents. Within limits of

pact US would have large legitimate measure freedom of action and movement to meet present serious threat and urgent military needs of Iraq. It also possible US adherence will make continued UK membership more palatable to ME members, especially Iraq.

In my opinion most of reasons formerly advanced for non-adherence now no longer valid or have dwindled in significance.

I reiterate best available means of obtaining Northern Tier goals of prevention eventual successful Communist subversion and domination several major ME countries is US adherence to pact at or before Karachi meeting. Otherwise it will slowly die and it will be a long time, if ever, before circumstances will make possible the recreation of a framework with which to plan and act for the safety and well-being of this sensitive part of the world.

Gallman

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/11–1556. Secret; Niact. Repeated to Ankara, Karachi, London, Tehran, Paris, and Rome.

² Despatch 307 from Baghdad, November 15. (*Ibid.*, 780.5/11–1556) ³ Reference is presumably to telegram 713, [Document 24](#). Telegram 715 from Baghdad concerns another matter.

⁴ Reference is presumably to telegram 1050 from Baghdad, April 7. (Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/4–756) In this telegram, Gallman noted in part: “Unquestionably considerable impatience and discouragement are developing with what is regarded as equivocal US position regarding Pact. I am not convinced however that at this late date half measures are going to help. As I have indicated before, our formal adherence is needed more than anything else to transform Pact into a really going concern.”

143. Memorandum on the Substance of Discussion at the Department of State–Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting, Washington, November 16, 1956, 11:30 a.m.[1](#)

Washington, November 16, 1956, 11:30 a.m.

[Here follows a list of 26 persons present, including Admiral Radford, General Twining, General Taylor, and Admiral Burke. The Department of State Delegation included Murphy, Bowie, and Wilkins. The first three items discussed were: “Eastern Europe,” “Near East Situation,” and “Syria.”]

4. Baghdad Pact

Admiral Radford referred to a telegram from the Army Attaché in Baghdad (AB 212 of November 14) in which responsible Iraqi army leaders indicated considerable pessimism and stated that only the U.S. could save the situation. Admiral Radford then stated that from the point of view of the Joint Chiefs, it was felt that the U.S. should join the Baghdad Pact immediately. He did not believe Israel would oppose our joining the Pact. The Joint Chiefs consider this step to be the only way to stabilize the situation.

Mr. Murphy commented that Secretary Dulles had considered this matter several days ago and continued to be of the view that we should not join.

Admiral Radford emphasized that the Pact is likely to fall apart and, if it does, it cannot be put together again. He noted both that the recent meeting of prime ministers in Baghdad was unanimous in support of the view that the U.S. should join the Pact and also that all our ambassadors in the area are emphatic in support of our joining.

Admiral Radford asked why Mr. Dulles opposes our joining. Mr. Murphy replied that the Secretary presumably felt that the same reasons for opposition to our joining as were applicable earlier still persist. He then asked what advantages the Joint Chiefs thought might flow from our adherence.

Admiral Radford replied that we are already closely involved in financial and military planning aspects of the Pact. If we join, we would probably be asked to designate an American commander-in-chief, which would give us further control over activities under the Pact. We could establish U.S. bases probably in Iraq at the north end of the Persian Gulf; we could from such bases be prepared to operate rapidly in event of difficulty in Syria. We could also support Iraq, which is now in a bad way.

The Admiral also thought that we could persuade Israel that it is in its interest that the U.S. join the Pact in order to counter what might happen in Syria and to support Iraq.

Admiral Radford also observed that Nasser's prestige is now greater than ever. The only effective way for us to counter this is by joining the Pact.

Mr. Murphy inquired whether the Joint Chiefs thought that our joining the Pact might not bring about a closer association between the Soviet Union and the Arabs. Admiral Radford said that they did not think so. Mr. Murphy inquired about the reaction of Saudi Arabia, and Admiral Radford replied that the Saudis might even join the Pact. He noted that Governor General Mirza of Pakistan had so predicted.

General Taylor said that Admiral Radford's description of the reasons why we should join expressed his views. Admiral Burke said he thought another affirmative factor is the likelihood that our declaration of intention to join the Pact would facilitate a withdrawal from Suez by the British and French. He noted that the British now have 12,000 to 17,000 troops in Suez and want the UNEF to build up to this approximate level before they pull out. If the British do not pull out soon, say within two to three weeks, the Arabs will react impetuously and may possibly seek to force the UK out of the Baghdad Pact.

Admiral Radford said that if the British and French do pull out of Suez, we will have no way to counter Soviet influence in the Near East other than by taking immediate steps to join the Pact. Our joining would make the British and French much more willing to withdraw from Suez. He noted that the French now believe it desirable for us to join the Pact.

Admiral Radford stressed that the situation is urgent. We must act fast. The danger of collapse in Iraq is great. The Admiral ventured the guess that, if we do not act by December 1, we will have lost our chance.

Mr. Wilkins commented that two serious objections to our joining the Pact had always been the danger of a serious adverse Soviet reaction and the likelihood that we would thereby be more associated in Arab minds with the UK and the French. He also noted that Turkey and Pakistan, two

members of the Baghdad Pact, are allied with us in NATO and SEATO. He commented that possibly by separate arrangements with Iraq and Iran we could accomplish our purposes without formal adherence to the Pact.

Admiral Radford said that he had followed this situation carefully in the NSC and in discussions at the White House with Congressional leaders. He is of the view that opposition to our joining would not be particularly strong. His impression was that we had decided earlier not to join for domestic political reasons, and he doubted that these were now as strong as they might once have been. Mr. Murphy noted that there were of course other important factors such as the Soviet reaction, the position of Israel, and the general uncertainty in the area. Admiral Radford reiterated that if we do not join in one month, we will have lost our opportunity.

Mr. Murphy commented that earlier the Joint Chiefs had not shown much enthusiasm for involvement in the Near East. Admiral Radford replied that the Joint Chiefs have for some time now felt it desirable that we join the Pact. He emphasized that our joining would give us further control over the situation in the Near East.

Mr. Bowie said that U.S. adherence to the Pact as urged by Admiral Radford raised a number of basic questions, such as the degree of commitment we would undertake if we were to adhere, the matter of obtaining bases and administering them, the political effect on the situation in the Near East, questions of supply and equipment, and finally the best way to deal with the Soviets in this situation. Might not, for example, a flat declaration by the U.S. that it would not let the Soviets get away with intervention in the Near East serve the same purpose.

Admiral Radford replied that to date we had neither joined the Pact nor made any unilateral statement. Mr. Murphy commented that we would have less freedom of action if we joined than we have now. The Admiral replied that this is so but is always the case if we remain outside of a treaty.

Mr. Gray commented that the question of military assistance would probably be more difficult if we joined the Pact. Admiral Radford replied that we are getting a large volume of requests for equipment now and that in any case we recognize the need to do more for countries in the Baghdad

Pact. Mr. Bowie observed that whenever the U.S. joins a security arrangement the other participants are inclined to feel that they are doing us a favor and, therefore, we should reward them. Admiral Radford said that he thought the problem of military assistance could be handled adequately.

Mr. Bowie asked whether the military forces that would become allied with us could be considered significant. Admiral Radford commented that we do not have significant forces allied with us in some parts of NATO and SEATO.

Admiral Radford said he thought the NSC should consider this matter urgently. Mr. Bowie said that the question of our relations with the Baghdad Pact would be before the Planning Board on November 19. Mr. Wilkins said that NEA is preparing a memorandum on this subject describing the problems and listing a number of courses of action, including ones short of our adherence to the Baghdad Pact, which might be taken to help the situation.

Admiral Radford described the various military measures being taken by the Joint Chiefs to be prepared for possible additional trouble in the Near East. He noted that a memorandum on this subject is in the Department for clearance before going to the White House. He said that the difficulty faced by the Joint Chiefs is having forces ready and available if trouble should start.

Mr. Murphy inquired about the air situation in Turkey. Admiral Radford replied that it is bad and then referred to the memorandum of the Turkish recently handed to Ambassador Warren. General Twining replied to Mr. Bowie's question that planes in Turkey are capable of getting up to 35,000-40,000 feet and not simply to 20,000 feet as indicated by the Turks. Admiral Burke said that the Russians are running pretty good reconnaissance over Turkey, mostly from an altitude of about 35,000 feet.

Mr. Murphy said that he would talk to Secretary Dulles about this matter before the Secretary leaves for Florida and that the Department would give

urgent consideration to this problem. A future meeting with the Joint Chiefs might be held as a matter of priority.²

[Here follows discussion of an unrelated matter.]

¹ Source: Department of State, State–JCS Meetings: Lot 66 D 407. Top Secret. Drafted by Richard Finn. A note on the title page reads: “State Draft. Not cleared with Defense.”

² Murphy subsequently sent a memorandum to Hoover summarizing this conversation. Murphy added to his memorandum the handwritten comment: “I also agreed to obtain the Secretary’s views which were later provided to Radford by memo.” (*Ibid.*, 780.5/11–1656) For the Secretary’s views, see [*infra*](#).

144. Memorandum by the Secretary of State¹

Washington, November 16, 1956.

I still have grave reservations as to the desirability of the United States joining the Baghdad Pact. I continue to feel that it is largely an instrument of U.K.-Arab politics; that under the Pact the British are trying to use Iraq to advance their interests in the Middle East and that the Pact thereby becomes confused with Iraq's violently anti-Israel attitude and also Iraq's ambitions vis-à-vis Syria, Jordan and Saudia Arabia. Furthermore, the status of the Pact seems peculiarly obscure at the moment as I understand that the Moslem countries have agreed not to meet, at least for the time being, with the United Kingdom because of their resentment at the United Kingdom attack on Egypt in collusion with that of Israel.

I believe that for the United States to enter a pact which guarantees the frontiers of Iraq would lead to irresistible pressure for a similar guarantee of Israel, and that this, if it came, would greatly embarrass us in our Arab relations.

I see advantages in a United States commitment to the "northern tier" concept. This, it seems to me, could be accomplished by Iran joining SEATO. Then there would be a solid United States guaranteed line from Turkey to Pakistan. Iraq would be protected because it does not itself directly abut on the Soviet Union. Thus Iraq would get automatic protection against invasion from the Soviet Union and we would stay clear of Arab and Israeli politics now incident to Iraq's membership in the Baghdad Pact.

If for any reason we would decide to back Iraq, we could do so on an ad hoc basis.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/11-1756. Secret. Prepared in the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs and sent under cover of a letter of November 17 from Murphy to Radford that reads as follows: "Confirming our telephone conversation this morning, I attach for your personal information a copy of the Secretary's comments

of November 16, 1956, regarding the Baghdad Pact.” (*Ibid.*, 780.5/11–1756)

145. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree) to the Acting Secretary of State¹

Washington, November 18, 1956.

SUBJECT

Position Paper on the Baghdad Pact

Discussion:

We understand Defense will raise the problem of our immediate adherence to the Baghdad Pact at the November 19 meeting of the NSC Planning Board.

We have prepared the attached position paper (Tab A) upon which Mr. Bowie could base his remarks if the matter is discussed. This paper also addresses itself to the letter from the Secretary of Defense of November 14 on this subject (Tab B).²

Recommendation:

That you approve the attached position paper on the Baghdad Pact.

[Tab A]

POSITION PAPER³

THE BAGHDAD PACT

Present Status

The Baghdad Pact grew out of the Turk-Iraqi Treaty of Mutual Cooperation of February 1955, following British, Iranian and Pakistani adherence to the latter. The Asian members joined because of a combination of national political reasons, different in each case, and a recognition, at least on the part of their leaders, of the need to cooperate to meet the Soviet military-subversive threat to their area.

A Ministerial Council has been set up and has held two meetings. It will meet next on January 28, 1957 at Karachi. In the intervals between Council sessions, normally semi-annual, the Council of Deputies, consisting of the Iraqi Foreign Minister and the chiefs of the diplomatic missions of the member states in Baghdad, have been meeting regularly. A Military Committee has been established to prepare plans for the military defense of the area against possible Soviet attack and has entrusted to deputies the staff work involved in such planning. An Economic Committee was organized in January 1956 to seek to coordinate economic planning among the member states. Working through a series of sub-committees and working parties, it is examining the possibility of cooperation in the fields of trade, communications, health and sanitation, insect control, agricultural improvement, the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes, etc. The Economic Committee will meet next on January 6, 1957 at Karachi to examine the reports of its various sub-groups. [*3 lines of source text not declassified*]

A Pact Secretariat has been organized to service the various Committees and push forward their work. Headed by an Iraqi Secretary General, it also includes a British Deputy Secretary General for Political-Administrative affairs, [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] a Turk for economic affairs and a Pakistani for Public Relations. The necessary supporting staff is being assembled from the various member states. An international administrative budget, totalling \$459,746, has been agreed upon to finance the organization.

The United States is not now a signatory of the Pact. We have, however, frequently stated publicly our continuing support for it. Moreover, since its inception we have maintained liaison with the several Pact committees

through observers. In April of this year we joined the Economic and Counter-Subversion Committees of the Pact and have since participated actively in both of these bodies and their sub-organizations. On November 1 we expanded our military liaison with the Pact by establishing in Baghdad a Baghdad Pact Military Liaison Group, consisting of a group of officers and administrative personnel. We have agreed to provide eight persons for the Pact Secretariat ranging from senior staff to clerical personnel. Finally, we have agreed to pay a one-sixth share of the Pact annual budget, amounting to \$76,350 and have paid a half installment to date.

Letter From the Secretary of Defense

On November 14, 1956, the Secretary of Defense addressed a letter to the Secretary of State (Tab B) stating, that, while the President had determined that the problem of U.S. adherence to the Baghdad Pact should be reviewed during the latter part of 1956, he, Mr. Wilson, believed the present circumstances in the Middle East made it necessary for the National Security Council to review the matter more immediately.

Mr. Wilson expressed the opinion that developments in the Middle East have created a most favorable opportunity for Congressional approval of U.S. adherence to the Pact.

Governments of Pact States Urge US. Adherence

Without exception the Chiefs of State and leaders of governments of the Baghdad Pact nations have long and consistently pled for U.S. adherence to the Pact. The Shah of Iran told our Ambassador that his country enjoyed no real security against the Russian threat as long as the U.S. remained out of the Baghdad Pact. The Prime Minister of Turkey confided to Ambassador Warren that the four Moslem Prime Ministers at the recent meeting in Tehran agreed that the time was right for U.S. adherence to the Pact. In his own view he considered it urgent that the U.S. become a full Pact member. Prime Minister Menderes concluded that there was no other means of ameliorating the dangerous situation in the Middle East. The President of Pakistan and the Chief of the Pakistani General Staff have strongly pressed for U.S. adherence to the Pact, with General Ayub going so far as to assert that had the U.S. joined the Pact when Pakistan did (September 23, 1955)

other Moslem states would have adhered and no troubles would have arisen in the Middle East. The Prime Minister of Iraq has expressed his desire for U.S. adherence to the Pact so often and so forcefully as not to bear repetition here. Recent Soviet activities with regard to the Near East in connection with the hostilities there have increased the feeling of lack of security on the part of the Asian Pact members and caused them to renew pressure for U.S. adherence.

Views of U.S. Ambassadors to Baghdad Pact Countries

Our Ambassadors to the Middle Eastern members of the Baghdad Pact have been most emphatic in their recommendations that the U.S. adhere to the Pact. For example, our Ambassador to Turkey states: “... convinced ...⁴ that prompt and full U.S. adherence to the Baghdad Pact will have tonic effect on the Middle East situation.” He continues: “... considerations (1) U.S. no longer beholden to Israel; (2) U.S. adherence would (A) fortify Anglo-American alliance, (B) strengthen U.K. position in the Middle East, (C) stiffen backs of Arab countries in firmer posture vis-à-vis Soviets, and (D) make clear U.S. serious support of security of area against Soviet encroachment.”

The U.S. Ambassador to Iraq reports: “As I informed Department prior to Council formation and prior to April Pact meeting at Tehran, I believed half measures not enough and that formal adherence by U.S. to Pact needed more than anything else to transform Pact into going concern. Today (November 15, 1956) the reasons for this view exist in even greater force.”

Ambassador Chapin telegraphs from Tehran “... now is golden opportunity while situation is still fluid to consolidate U.S. position by early adherence to Baghdad Pact ... If U.S. remains unwilling to join the Pact when previously-stated reasons appear no longer valid, members likely to conclude real reason for U.S. refusal is unreadiness commit itself in defense Middle East. This interpretation would have shattering effect on morale Baghdad Pact countries.”

Reasons Favoring U.S. Adherence

The following appear to be the basic reasons why U.S. adherence would be desirable:

1. Adherence would strengthen the general stability of the governments of the Asian Pact members, all of whom are staunch U.S. friends.
2. Adherence would give convincing evidence to the USSR of the deep U.S. interest in the security of the area. It might deter the USSR from maneuvers against the independence of the Pact members.
3. Adherence might strengthen U.S. leadership in the Middle East, thus lessening the damage to the Western position resulting from the UK-French action in Egypt.
4. U.S. adherence would strengthen the Pact itself and make its operation more efficient.
5. Adherence would formally close the last major link in security arrangements on the peripheries of Russia.

Reasons Against U.S. Adherence

1. The U.S. has given its full support to the United Nations effort to stabilize the delicate and critical situation in Egypt resulting from the British, French and Israeli military actions. Any change in the current U.S. relationship with the powers in the area might seriously jeopardize these efforts.
2. The Soviet Union has stated firmly its strong opposition to the Baghdad Pact. U.S. adherence might be taken as a pretext for further and stronger Soviet moves against the West in the Near East. U.S.-USSR relations would be further exacerbated.
3. There is serious doubt concerning the effectiveness of the Baghdad Pact in preventing Soviet penetration of the area. The Soviets appear to be capitalizing on existing tensions in the area

and using psychological, economic and covert military measures rather than direct threats of armed force. By so doing, they are, in effect, hopping over the “northern tier” line.

4. The U.S. must, in framing its policy, consider its position in the entire Near East where the uncommitted Arab nations are hostile to the Pact and are being seriously threatened from within by the Soviet exploitation of the British and French actions in Egypt. Adherence would involve the U.S. more directly in the Hashemite-Saudi-Iraqi-Egyptian disputes.

5. While public support remains strong for the Baghdad Pact in Turkey and Iran, the British and French action in Egypt has seriously weakened public support for the Pact in Iraq and Pakistan. Serious doubt remains as to the advisability of the U.S. adhering to a Pact which has lost a strong measure of support in two of its important members.

6. Adherence would provide Israel with a pretext for renewed demands for a U.S. security guarantee.

7. While the U.S. might gain some psychological benefit from adherence, this step might well be followed by strong demands for further U.S. aid to member countries on grounds that, as a member, we should demonstrate even more dramatically our support for these nations.

8. Adherence would be strongly opposed by Saudi Arabia, where the U.S. has important interests.

9. The original concept of the “northern tier” was one of an indigenous organization. The Baghdad Pact, unfortunately, has been regarded by the non-member states of the area as in large part UK dominated. The decline of UK prestige in the Middle East will probably be so serious that some other vehicle must be found for exerting U.S. leadership if we are to maintain our position. We must at least wait until we know what changes in

UK personnel and policy will take place in Her Majesty's Government.

10. We can strengthen the security of these countries through our present relationship in the Economic Committee of the Pact and through our bilateral military and economic programs without risking the serious disadvantages which would be created by adherence to the Pact itself.

11. The immediate pressure upon the U.S. to adhere to the Baghdad Pact arises from the difficulties and apprehensions of the four area members resulting from the Israel-UK-French military action against Egypt. We should not undertake the long term commitment inherent in adherence to the Pact to meet this current and short term crisis which can be and is being dealt with by other means.

12. The problem of obtaining Senate ratification of U.S. adherence to the Baghdad Pact, particularly without concurrently extending a security guarantee to Israel, discussed in the Secretary of State's letter of April 23, 1956, to the Secretary of Defense, is still with us. Recent developments in the Near East may have eased this problem, but we have no evidence that the Congress would be amenable to our adherence to the Pact.

Alternatives to U.S. Adherence

There are several alternatives to U.S. adherence to the Baghdad Pact as follows:

1. Arrange for Iran to join SEATO. This would have the advantage of affording that isolated country some assurance of U.S. armed support in the event of Russian aggression. Such assurance is keenly desired by the Shah. On the other hand this move might have a deleterious effect on the Baghdad Pact and would isolate Iraq from any collective security arrangement with the U.S. Furthermore, it is questionable that the SEATO Powers would welcome such a proposal.

2. The U.S. might join the Pact's Military Committee. This would have the advantage of enabling our Military Liaison Group to exert badly-needed leadership. This move would not satisfy the Asian members, who would still push for full U.S. adherence.

3.

At the January meeting of the Pact's Economic Committee, the U.S. might announce its willingness to assume major financial responsibility for some dramatic Pact project such as the projected Pact Highway from Istanbul to Karachi. A food reserve plan, the construction of pipelines and the connection of various railway links in the area are other economic projects which have been discussed by the Pact's Economic Subcommittee.

As a corollary to the above, the U.S. might announce its willingness to provide the Pact's countries with some badly-needed defensive military equipment such as a radar network.

4. The U.S. might seek a fundamental redirection of the Baghdad Pact to capture indigenous support and to further our long range objective of closer cooperation between the Afro-Asian nations and the West.

Conclusion

The disadvantages of U.S. adherence to the Pact are of such a nature that it is concluded that our joining now would not serve the U.S. national interest. This is without prejudice to possible future adherence. We believe that the present situation in the Middle East should continue to be handled primarily through the UN. We should do nothing to divert attention from the UN or provide a pretext for other powers to take unilateral action. The immediate need to respond to the demands of the area Pact members for U.S. action can best be met on a bilateral basis.

In this connection, we are proposing immediately, in accordance with the attached memorandum (Tab C):⁵

1. The immediate supply to Iraq of mobile radar, with training crews. This equipment would serve, also, southeastern Turkey and parts of Iran.
 2. An offer to survey air raid warning requirements in Iraq, Iran, and Pakistan. This might be accompanied by a visit from a high ranking U.S. Air Force officer. Turkey's needs are presumably being met through NATO.
 3. Immediate implementation of the U.S. program to train Iraqi pilots.
 4. A public reaffirmation of support for collective security through the Baghdad Pact.
-

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/11-1856. Top Secret. Drafted by Newsom.

² [Document 141](#).

³ Top Secret. Drafted by Robert B. Memminger, Stuart W. Rockwell, and Newsom.

⁴ All ellipses in this document are in the source text.

⁵ Not printed.

146. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iraq¹

Washington, November 20, 1956—9:16 p.m.

872. Baghdad Pact. Re Baghdad 890.² FYI Although Dept appreciates anxiety BP Prime Ministers which led to electing Iraqi Crown Prince come to Washington to present plea of four govts for early US adherence to BP, Dept doubts wisdom of visit at this time. Dept and NSC Planning Board now giving question US adherence BP intensive study. From discussions and review to date it seems highly unlikely Dept will recommend US adherence BP in immediate future. This of course does not eliminate possibility US adherence later. Consequently it seems inadvisable for Crown Prince to make what would probably be utterly unproductive visit to US particularly since failure of mission would greatly exacerbate situation. It would therefore appear far wiser for Abdulla Illah to defer trip.

Following among principal reasons which Dept considers militate against early US adherence BP:

1. US has given full support UN effort stabilize delicate and critical situation in Egypt resulting from British French and Israeli military action. Any change in current US relationship with powers in area might seriously jeopardize these efforts. US joining Pact in which British a partner would pose especially difficult problem this regard.
2. US adherence might be taken as pretext for further and stronger Soviet moves against West and Pact powers in NE particularly if there any speculation that next step would be establishment US bases in Iran.
3. In framing policy US must consider that throughout NE uncommitted Arab nations are hostile to Pact and are being threatened from within by Soviet exploitation of British and French actions in Egypt. Adherence would involve US more

directly in Hashemite-Saudi Arabia where US has special interests.

4. While public support remains strong for BP in Turkey and Iran, Anglo-French action in Egypt has weakened public support for Pact in Iraq and Pakistan. A serious doubt remains re advisability of adhering to Pact which has lost strong measure of support in two of its important members. Should US adhere and Pact continue disintegrate, US prestige would suffer severe blow and other security arrangements in which US involved might suffer.

5. While US might gain some psychological benefit from adherence this step might well be followed by strong demands for further US aid to member countries on ground that as member we should demonstrate even more dramatically our material support for these nations.

6. Original US concept of "Northern Tier" was one of an indigenous organization. BP unfortunately has been regarded by non-member states of area as Western-inspired and in large part UK-dominated. There is no doubt therefore whether US adherence would alter prevailing view and muster for Pact the necessary additional membership and widespread public support necessary to make it effective instrument for furtherance US objectives in area.

7. US might strengthen security of BP countries through its present membership BP Economic Committee and through bilateral military and economic programs without risking serious disadvantages which would be created by adherence to Pact itself.

8. Problem of obtaining Senate ratification US adherence BP particularly without concurrently extending security guarantee to Israel is still with us. Recent developments in NE have eased problem but we have no evidence that Congress would be amenable our adherence BP.

While question US adherence being reviewed Washington, Dept studying ways in which it can best express support for continued cooperation BP nations. You will be kept informed of progress planning on this aspect. End FYI.

In discussing with Crown Prince and other appropriate officials proposed mission to Washington, you should state your frank opinion that visit would involve grave risk of consequences detrimental to Pact and to mutual objectives of members and US. Early adherence by US unlikely for several reasons, none of which connote any lack interest in Pact, and abortive effort persuade US to join would be seized by enemies of Pact to endeavor seriously to embarrass present members. Prince's own position domestically would suffer if he should return with no tangible results. If he nevertheless insists on coming, USG would be happy to receive him.

Hoover

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/11–2056. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Rountree and Memminger and approved by Rountree who signed for Hoover. Repeated to London, Ankara, Tehran, and Karachi.

² Telegram 890, November 20, reported that the leaders of Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey, who were then meeting in Baghdad, had decided to send Iraqi Crown Prince Abdul Ilah to the United States to present a plea for early U.S. adherence to the Baghdad Pact. (*Ibid.*, 780.5/11–2056)

147. Memorandum of a Conference With the President, White House, Washington, November 21, 1956, 4 p.m.¹

Washington, November 21, 1956, 4 p.m.

OTHERS PRESENT

Secretary Humphrey

Secretary Robertson

Dr. Flemming

Mr. Allen Dulles

Admiral Radford

Mr. Jackson

Colonel Goodpaster

Secretary Hoover

Mr. Rountree

Mr. Phleger

Mr. Bowie

Mr. Hollister

The President opened the meeting saying it was for the purpose of gaining an understanding of the sequence of actions planned in the Middle East, and the means of dovetailing actions in the fields of oil and finance, for example, with these plans. The meeting was not intended to result in decisions. Mr. Hoover gave the President a preliminary document,² which he stressed was not thoroughly coordinated or refined, outlining such steps, and the President read it to the assembled group, interspersing comments from time to time.

The President reiterated his feeling that we should work toward building up King Saud as a major figure in the Middle Eastern area. He thought we should probably search for some way to induce the British to get out of Buraimi. He thought that we must make sure that Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Iraq at least are aware of what we are doing, and give their assent. We must explain a number of points to them very carefully. We must prevent the dissolution of Western Europe, and once withdrawal from the Suez has begun, we must let them know that we are going to aid Western Europe financially. We must stress the importance of restoring Saud's oil markets in Western Europe. If we raise output from the U.S., it will be very hard to cut back. If at all possible, we should use Buraimi as an ace in the hole. We

must face the question, what *must* we do in Europe and then the question, how do we square this with the Arabs?

Mr. Hoover said that as soon as a major movement of French and British out of Suez begins, he felt sure we would see a relaxation throughout the area. The President thought we should not simply assume this, but should work out an understanding with the Arabs. Mr. Rountree thought a schedule showing a sequence of steps would be valuable. Mr. Phleger suggested that it seems likely the British Cabinet will decide to get the troops out of the Suez area. Mr. Humphrey said that our next step must be to get square with the Arabs, once withdrawal has begun.

Mr. Robertson made a strong statement in behalf of U.S. adherence to the Baghdad Pact. He felt that Iraq, Iran, and perhaps Saudi Arabia would welcome such action, the latter particularly if it were tied to an agreement on Buraimi. The President thought that if the British get us into the Baghdad Pact—as the matter would appear to the Arabs—we would lose our influence with the Arabs. The British could then take a very intransigent stand. He suggested the possibility of getting the British out of Buraimi; then we and the Saudis should declare our support for the Baghdad Pact.

Mr. Hoover said that timing is the key to the whole problem, and said that we might do well to make a declaration in support of the Pact, rather than joining it.

The President reiterated that we ought to approach the U.K. asking them to express readiness to leave Buraimi. This would give us something with which to work out further agreements with the Arabs. Mr. Hoover said it is a question not only of King Saud himself, but of his people—who may desert him in order to oppose the West at any time. He said he had talked to Mr. Anderson, and was planning for Mr. Anderson to go out next Tuesday.

Mr. Humphrey thought we should not let Butler and Macmillan come until after a talk with Saud had been conducted. Thus, we would establish our position, so that he would understand the British being here. Mr. Hoover said the essential step is that the British and French get out of Port Said. The President pointed out that this really had two parts—the first when they start to leave and the second when they are completely out.

Mr. Allen Dulles stressed that the situation is worsening very seriously in Iraq, and that Nuri may not be able to survive very long. There was discussion as to what could be done to bolster his position, with a consensus indicating that provision of some military aid, particularly radars, and possibly some U.S. air units, coupled with a statement of some sort in support of the Baghdad Pact nations, seemed to be a desirable plan. There was discussion as to the relative importance of the Middle East and of Western Europe, culminating in statements by the President and Secretary Humphrey that the two must be considered together, and are together the most strategic area in the world—Western Europe requires Middle Eastern oil, and Middle Eastern oil is of importance mainly through its contribution to the Western European economy.

Dr. Flemming said we must know soon about going ahead with our oil pooling. He could see the way clear to do this if the Arabs agreed, but if they did not, he wondered what our line of action would be. Mr. Hoover said that the Canal can be cleared to 25 feet within 30 days, according to British estimates. Mr. Humphrey said that more than oil is involved. The British are facing a financial crisis within ten days. He thought the sequence of events was this: the British will start out of Suez in a few days; the British will want to come over here a few days later, and this will be the time when we must bargain hard with them; between these dates we must let King Saud, and even Nasser, know that, in starting talks with the British, we have not reversed our stand toward them, and that we want an understanding with them prior to the British talks; by December 3rd our arrangements must be in hand, since this is the date of the British financial announcement.

Mr. Hoover said that we are dealing with slow moving Governments in the Middle East and we cannot expect quick results. He would try to give the Arabs the idea that we helped to get the British and the French out of Suez. The President said that the moment troops start out of Suez we should tell the Arabs that we are starting to confer with the Western Europeans on how soon we can restore Middle East oil markets in Western Europe.

The President finally asked whether there is anyone we can send out to Iraq to try to help out in that situation. He thought that we could perhaps help in

Iraq by working through the Saudi Arabians. Mr. Rountree raised the possibility of a unilateral declaration in support of Iran and Iraq. He thought this would bolster these countries.

G

Colonel CE, U S Army

¹ Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Top Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster. A memorandum from MacArthur to Hoover, November 21, indicates that during MacArthur's meeting with President Eisenhower that morning, the President directed Goodpaster to call an off-the-record meeting of the members of the NSC and certain other key government officials to discuss the Department of State's plans in the Middle East. MacArthur's memorandum also notes that following this meeting he met with Rountree and Bowie and that work was currently underway to produce two papers: one on short-term and the other on long-term plans.

Attached to MacArthur's memorandum is a memorandum from the President to William Jackson directing Jackson to arrange an informal meeting at the White House to include the members of the NSC, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Director of Central Intelligence. The purpose of the meeting was to receive a Department of State outline on short-term and long-term plans in the Middle East and "to make certain that our trade and other operations are coordinated with the principal elements in the State Department planning". (Department of State, Central Files, 611.86/11-2156) ² *Infra*.

148. Memorandum From the Acting Secretary of State to the President¹

Washington, November 21, 1956.

SUBJECT

Near East Policy

In response to your request there is attached an outline of short and long term U.S. plans in the Middle East. Current developments will, of course, affect actual implementation and timing.

We believe that the measures listed form an integrated program which gives reasonable chances of obtaining United States objectives in the Near East. These may be summarized as dislodging the Soviet Union from the foothold it is now in the process of acquiring and subsequently denying to it access to the area, while retaining the area resources, especially petroleum, for the West. In drawing up the program, we have taken into account the drastic decrease in British and French influence precipitated by their military action in Egypt, but because of our global relationships, hope we can cooperate.

We are now working through the United Nations in an endeavor to contain the immediate crisis, avoiding further gains for the USSR and to set in motion procedures for solving the basic problems. We recognize that firm measures may be necessary involving strong leadership and increased commitments by the United States. The long range program is designed to encourage the development of viable nations and their cooperation with the West. Strong emphasis is placed on economic and social progress as paths to area stability and achievement of the legitimate aspirations of the peoples of the area.

Herbert Hoover Jr.

[Attachment]

AN OUTLINE OF SHORT-TERM AND LONG-TERM UNITED STATES PLANS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

I. Basic Objectives

A. Continued free world access to oil reserves

B. Continued free world right of passage (Suez Canal, pipelines, air lanes, etc.)

C. Preservation of the state of Israel and of independent Arab States

D. Exclusion of Soviet military power or political control

II. General Premise

A. United States objectives are best served by peace, political stability and economic and social progress in the Middle East.

III. Short-Term Plans

A. Measures within the United Nations

1.

Continued compliance with Cease Fire Resolution of the General Assembly

The United States will continue to support the provisions of the resolutions with all parties concerned.

2.

Withdrawal of British, French and Israeli Forces From Egyptian Territory

The United States would continue to hold that the forces of the three named countries are obliged to withdraw from Egyptian territory. The only question with regard to the immediacy of

withdrawal would be that no political or military vacuum is created by the withdrawal of the forces. Such withdrawal therefore must be coordinated with the entry into the area of United Nations forces. It is not, however, up to the three Governments to decide on the nature and strength of the United Nations forces that replace their forces as they are withdrawn.

3.

The United Nations Emergency Force

The United States would render such logistical and political assistance to the Secretary General and the Commander of the United Nations forces as may be requested and as may be feasible. The United States would hold that the area of operations and the duration of their stay in Egyptian territory for policing purposes should be clarified in the process of negotiations between the Secretary General and the parties concerned. It should be clear that the area and duration of stay are subject to review or approval by the General Assembly, and they cannot be unilaterally decided by the United Kingdom, France, Israel or Egypt.

4.

Clearance of the Suez Canal

At Egypt's request United Nations aid in clearing the Canal has been initiated. The United States would support any further United Nations steps necessary to ensure the most expeditious clearing of the canal and to ensure against any delay or conditions imposed by the Egyptian Government or by the British and French prior to their withdrawal.

5.

Possible Enforcement of Israel-Arab Armistice Observers

The Acting Chief of Staff of the truce supervisory organization is Col. Byron V. Leary USMC. The United States would raise with the Secretary General the possibility or necessity of increasing the observer corps on the Jordan-Syria-Lebanon armistice lines with Israel.

6.

General Assembly Action on the Settlement of the Suez Canal Problem

The United States would press for early consideration, subject to the views of the Secretary General and the reaction of member states, of the resolution which it tabled at the Emergency Session of the General Assembly calling for the establishment of a committee to negotiate a settlement based on the 6 proposals adopted by the Security Council on October 13.² An alternative to the Committees would be for the Secretary General himself to conduct the negotiations as already proposed by the Security Council. This change in the resolution is being actively considered at the moment. The United States must decide on its position with respect to the nature of the organization which will eventually run the Canal. This position would appear to lie somewhere between the 18 power proposals of London and the Menon plan which is in Egypt's favor.

7.

Settlement of the Arab-Israel Problem

The United States would press at a reasonably early date (depending on current developments and reactions of other member states) for adoption of the resolution which it tabled at the Emergency General Assembly Session which called for the establishment of a negotiating committee to replace the moribund and ineffective Palestine Conciliation Commission.³ The United States would be prepared to consider only such amendments to our proposals as would not prejudice the outcome of the efforts of

the Committee and which [would not?] threaten any prompt or realistic settlement. The United States will have to make decisions which will serve as some guidance to the Committee on such matters as whether or not Arab-Israel negotiations will be direct; whether or not the Partition plan of 1947 should be the basis for negotiations between the parties; whether or not all refugees shall have an option for repatriation to Israel. Decision on these questions will probably have a determining effect on the passage of the United States resolution and the success of any negotiations resulting therefrom.

8.

Arab Refugee Problem

We are actively considering whether to press at this General Assembly the reorganization of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine so that the administration of relief would be transferred to the Arab Governments instead of continuing the present unsatisfactory system of United Nations administration which has often not received the cooperation of the Arab states. While the desirability of taking this step is recognized, the question of timing has to be left open in light of developments in the area.

B. Other Political Measures

1.

Saudi Arabia

We believe the influence of King Saud important in moderating both extreme nationalist and pro-Soviet views among the Arabs. We believe the King should be kept generally informed of our policies in the area and encouraged to support United States views. We continue steps which will draw Saudi Arabia and Iraq closer together [*1½ lines of source text not declassified*]. We are playing a moderating role in the dispute between Saudi Arabia

and the United Kingdom with respect to Buraimi. During recent months we have been discussing with King Saud and his advisers the extension of the Dhahran Airfield Agreement. King Saud has pressed for extensive grant military aid. We have made several alternative suggestions and expect to resume discussions in the near future.

2.

Jordan

British influence is declining. The Soviet Union is endeavoring to increase its influence in Jordan by offers of arms. Jordan may establish diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. Finally Jordan may break with the United Kingdom and take action terminating the present British subsidy. If this latter step should take place and in order to forestall a Soviet takeover, the United States should offer to assist Jordan financially and perhaps militarily in the context of closer federation with Iraq.

C. Economic Measures

1. Emergency Relief

a.

Gaza

The Gaza refugee population will continue to be supported by UNRWA. The requirements of the non-refugee component of the population will be met by the Government of Israel as long as that Government remains in control of the area, with some supplementary assistance from voluntary agencies.

b.

Suez Canal

Relief for the population in the Suez Canal Zone, including displaced persons, will be coordinated under the United Nations Emergency Force. International Red Cross has already provided some assistance.

2. Economic Aid

a.

Technical Assistance

The United States has been extending technical assistance to the Arab States and Israel. No new assistance is now, however, planned for Egypt or Israel. The United States would extend aid to Syria if a new government not unfavorable to the West is established and to the Sudan if that Government should desire.

b.

Development Assistance

The United States has been extending development assistance to the Arab States and Israel. No new assistance is now, however, planned for Egypt or Israel. The United States would extend assistance to the Sudan if that Government should wish, and to a new government in Syria if requested. The United States is also prepared to give loan assistance to Saudi Arabia and Iraq through MSP funds if these Governments are interested.

c.

Export-Import Bank

The United States is prepared to support requests to the Export-Import Bank from the Arab States except in the

case of Egypt and Israel.

d.

International Bank for Reconstruction and Development

(Same as c, above, re Export-Import Bank financing.)

3. Transport of and Alternate Sources for Middle East Petroleum

a.

Reactivation of tankers

The Maritime Commission and the Navy Department will continue to reactivate tankers for sale or lease by the MSTs.

b.

Tanker Construction Program

A super tanker program should be carried out in American shipyards and financed by private industry.

c. Construction of Pipelines

(1)

Turkey

Petroleum industry has from time to time indicated an interest in construction of a pipeline from the Iraq and Iranian oil fields through Turkey to Iskenderun. The Iraq Petroleum Company has undertaken a preliminary ground survey of such a pipeline. We support this activity. Projected growth in

European consumption of petroleum suggests that this may be a desirable project.

(2)

Israel

The Government of Israel is most anxious to construct a pipeline from Elath on the Gulf of Aqaba to Haifa on the Mediterranean. The practicality of this program depends on resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. This project does not seem feasible because Arab sources of oil would not be available to transit Israel.

(3)

TAPLINE

TAPLINE is the only pipeline in operation in the Middle East. We should continue to urge the countries through which the lines operate to give adequate protection.

4.

Iraq Petroleum Company

Three pumping stations were destroyed in Syria. IPC reports that partial flow can be restored. We should continue to urge Syrian cooperation in re-establishing the operation of these pipelines.

d.

Assistance from the Western Hemisphere

Increased production in the United States and other Western Hemisphere producing areas would reduce the impact of the loss of Middle East oil to Europe. We are studying ways and means, through existing committees, to compensate for the disruption in oil supplies from the Middle East.

e.

Financing

We have before us the financial impact on Britain, France and certain other countries of the Near East crisis which we will have to consider and in all probability will have to lend some assistance.

4.

Trade Controls

The United States is screening the export to Israel, Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Saudi Arabia of quasi-military items such as jeeps, tires and tubes, automotive parts and multiple drive trucks.

5.

Egyptian Assets Controls

Following Egyptian seizure of the Suez Canal, the United States blocked approximately \$40 million of assets belonging to the Government of Egypt, as well as assets belonging to the Canal Company.

D. Military Measures

1.

Baghdad Pact

During the past few weeks there has been increasing pressure on the part of the members of the Baghdad Pact for US adherence. American representatives in the countries of the Baghdad Pact all favor US adherence. Some of the Departments and Agencies of the US Government in Washington favor US adherence. The Department of State does not believe that the US should adhere to the Baghdad Pact at this time. Reasons against adherence include the adverse reaction of the USSR, Israel and some of the Arab states. Meanwhile the Department of State believes there are several intermediate steps which would have the effect of supporting the members of the Baghdad Pact. These include:

- a. The immediate supply to Iraq of mobile radar with American training crews. This equipment would also serve southeastern Turkey and parts of Iran.
- b. An offer to survey air raid warning requirements in Iraq, Iran and Pakistan. This might be accompanied by a visit from a high-ranking US Air Force officer. Turkey's needs are being handled through NATO.
- c. Immediate implementation of a small US program to train 15 Iraqi pilots which later might be enlarged.
- d. A public reaffirmation of support for collective security through the Baghdad Pact. A proposed statement is attached (Tab A).⁴

2.

Military Assistance to Near Eastern States

At the present time Iraq is the only Near Eastern state which receives US grant aid. The program is small, totalling only about \$10 million annually. Other Near Eastern states, including Lebanon, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Israel have mutual security agreements under which they may with US consent purchase military items in the US. There are no agreements with Syria and

Jordan. We believe this program should continue with the following changes: The present ban on shipments of military items to Israel and Egypt should continue for the time being. The US would be willing to supply military assistance on a grant and loan basis to Syria and Jordan should subsequent circumstances make it desirable. The US would also be willing to supply grant military assistance to Saudi Arabia in addition to present reimbursable aid providing reciprocal advantages were received at Dhahran air field.

3.

US Sixth Fleet

An immediate visit by major units to Beirut [to] demonstrate US support for Lebanon. A similar visit to the Persian Gulf ports of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq and Iran by units of CONMID East Force.

IV. Long-Term Plans

A. Preservation of Peace

1. Take leadership in UN action to fix permanent boundaries between Israel and the Arab states and participate in such guarantees against change by force as may be necessary.

2. Strengthen the military posture of Iran with emphasis on internal security and resistance to infiltration and guerrilla activities.

3. Re Baghdad Pact

a. Give unilateral assurance of assistance pursuant to our constitutional processes to all Pact members in case of armed attack.

- b. Induce Pact members to revise the Pact giving greater emphasis to economic, political and cultural cooperation, possibly making it more attractive to other states in the area.
4. Consider ways and means of controlling arms shipments to Israel and the bordering Arab states.

B. Improvement of Political Stability

1. Utilize all appropriate opportunities to [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] reduce Nasser's prestige and influence.
2. Assist Iraq to expand its influence in Syria and Jordan.
 - a. Possibly encourage a federation of Iraq, Syria and Jordan [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*],
3. Further strengthen Saudi Arabia [*less than one line of source text not declassified*],
4. Possibly encourage a North Africa confederation from Libya to Morocco as a counterpoise to Egypt and if necessary to an Iraq-Syria-Jordan federation.
5. Support political elements in Israel that accept the permanent Israel-Arab states boundaries to be fixed.
6. Base our association with France in the Middle East on a recognition that the French are no longer able to play a constructive role in the area.
7. Base our association with the UK in the Middle East on a recognition that its position in the area has been seriously prejudiced by its action against Egypt and that the US must assume leadership in maintaining and restoring the Western position in the area.

C. Economic Measures

1. Take the leadership in UN action to bring about the resettlement of the Arab refugees.
2. Encourage the formation of a regional economic organization among the Arab states to deal with the resettlement of the refugees and to foster general economic and social progress in the area.
 - a. Encourage the oil producing states to assist Syria and Jordan.
3. Provide substantial economic and technical aid to assist the member states of the organization in carrying out programs for refugee resettlement and general development either
 - a. through bilateral programs geared to the organization's plans and projects or
 - b. by contributions to a common organization fund and pool of technicians.
4. Encourage production of super-tankers and possibly an Iraq-Turkey pipeline to reduce Western European dependence on the Suez Canal for access to Middle East oil.

¹ Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles–Herter Series. Secret. The source text is undated, but another copy with the attachment is dated November 21. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.80/11–2156) A separate copy of Hoover's covering memorandum is also dated November 21 and bears the typed marginal inscription: "Prepared for mtg at White House at 4:00 4/21/56". (*Ibid.*, S/P Files: Lot 66 D 487, Near & Middle East) ² Tabled on November 3; see [vol. XVI, p. 960](#).

³ Tabled on November 3; see *Ibid.*

⁴ Not attached to the source text. A copy of the proposed statement is attached to the copy of this memorandum in Department of State, Central

Files, 611.80/11-2156.

149. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Posts¹

Washington, November 21, 1956—7:55 p.m.

426. FYI. Abortive British-French military action against Egypt has precipitated new situation in Near East. Soviet prestige and influence in certain Near Eastern countries, particularly Syria and Egypt, has attained threatening proportions. [4 lines of source text not declassified] For present only US can provide leadership combat Soviet influence and revive and strengthen Near Eastern ties with West. End FYI.

You should utilize all appropriate contacts make clear informally to government you accredited and its people that US accepts and intends discharge this responsibility and will be guided by following general principles.

1. *US fully supports intense desire peoples of Near East for full independence free any foreign domination.* We shall oppose efforts from any quarter to impose foreign domination in area; we have, of course, no interest establishing any kind US domination.

2. *US convinced peoples of Near East must recognize natural economic interdependence between their area and Western Europe.* Latter area provides only practicable market Near Eastern oil. Western Hemisphere is net exporter petroleum, and neither Soviet bloc (which now exporting petroleum) nor remainder free world can absorb Near East's output. Suez Canal, pipelines and air lanes that link Europe and Asia can be profitable to Near East only if used by Western Europe. If Western Europeans cannot depend with confidence on availability of Near Eastern oil and transport facilities, they will have develop alternatives. Resultant decline Western purchases oil and use transport facilities in area could seriously reduce income and prospects economic and social progress of many Near Eastern states. Fair and reliable solution Suez issue is therefore imperative in interests of all.

3. *US further convinced solution Arab-Israel dispute is prerequisite to political stability and economic and social progress in Near East.* Political talents and economic resources that might have been devoted stability and progress in Near East have too long been diverted to fostering and exacerbating this dispute. This has led to arms race and border incidents initiated by both Arabs and Israelis and culminating in Israel's recent attack on Egypt. Evident Soviet intention perpetuate and exploit this dispute now poses greatest threat Near Eastern independence.

4. *US considers close ties with USSR are source of peril to any Near Eastern state.* Recent events Hungary constitute latest example risk to any small country of entering into close ties with USSR, which ruthless in perpetuating control of country once brought under its domination. USSR attempting enmesh some Near Eastern countries by large-scale arms deals, concentration of trade with bloc and acceptance bloc advisers and technicians. USSR, through "volunteers" or other means, might intervene in any new outbreak hostilities in Near East, whatever their cause. There is real danger such developments might bring major powers to war in area. US, for its part, could not accept establishment Soviet military power in area. Expanded war in Near East would bring death and devastation to peoples of area and make independence a mockery. We shall continue strive prevent such war.

5. *US supports and will continue provide leadership in UN efforts establish peace, security and stability in Near East.* UN's prompt action following attacks on Egypt and its effective mobilization world opinion against this resort force have shown once again that UN is source security and protection for small nations. We believe creation UN Emergency Force was major advance in development UN's security functions and presence of this force will serve security interests all Near Eastern states. We pressing for prompt and full implementation of recent GA resolutions and early UN action looking toward permanent solution Suez Canal.

We are also looking toward UN action on Arab-Israel issue at reasonably early date.

6. *US remains ready cooperate with peoples of Near East in promoting economic and social progress in area.* This cooperation would be extended without political strings and for purpose strengthening Near Eastern independence and stability. If area governments and peoples so desire, we shall seek with them agreed acceptable basis for cooperation. Assuming this basis can be found and trend events in area offers reasonable prospects success, we would be prepared make increased contributions toward appropriate indigenous development programs.

Hoover

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/11–2156. Confidential Drafted by Mathews and signed for Hoover by Rountree. Sent to Baghdad, Jidda, Damascus, Beirut, Tehran, Karachi, Ankara, Cairo, and Tel Aviv; repeated to London, Paris, Tripoli, Moscow, Ottawa, Kabul, and New Delhi.

On November 26, Robert R. Bowie forwarded the text of this circular telegram to Acting Secretary Hoover for his approval under cover of a note indicating that the telegram had been written in response to [Document 140](#), which Hoover had approved. (Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 66 D 487, Chronological 1956 Jan-Dec.) A typed notation on Bowie's covering note indicates that the telegram was approved by Hoover.

150. Telegram From the Embassy in Iraq to the Department of State¹

Baghdad, November 23, 1956—noon.

911. On evening of 21st Menderes asked me to call at Turkish Embassy. He told me that it had been hoped to finish talks between representatives of the 4 Moslem states on 20th but agreement on a communiqué could not be reached (Embtel 903, November 21).² As soon as possible after the return to Baghdad of Mirza and Suhrawardy a meeting would take place and it was hoped that at that time agreement on a communiqué could be reached. One of his objectives Menderes explained was to word the communiqué in such terms that it might contribute toward easing popular pressure on Nuri and bolster his government. He hoped that when communiqué had been issued we would be able to make publicly some kind of supporting statement.

I told Menderes that any degree of support that we could give communiqué publicly naturally depended upon wording of communiqué. From the latest information which I had received from the Department it was clear that early adherence by US to BP was unlikely. Consequently any mention of the efforts in Baghdad of the representatives of the 4 governments to effect early adherence of the US ought to my mind be avoided. Menderes agreed.

Menderes then asked me whether I had received any reaction from Washington to proposed visit of Crown Prince. I answered him along lines of final paragraph of Department's 872, November 20.³

Menderes said he still felt Crown Prince should visit Washington. Purpose of visit could be based on desire of 4 Moslem governments that Crown Prince as their spokesman give firsthand account of Baghdad talks to American officers. He felt that such a mission would be favorably received by Iraqi public, would diminish some of present pressure on Nuri and gain some time for Nuri Government. He hoped that on 22nd before final meeting he and others could meet with me again.

On the afternoon of 22nd Crown Prince, Nuri, Abdullah, Bakr, Menderes, Goksenin, and Birgi called on me at the Embassy. Nature of forthcoming communiqué was discussed at some length. Nuri wanted no reference to BP unless we could follow up communiqué with announcement of early adherence. When I said that early adherence was out of the question he said that since that was the case he hoped we would avoid making any more public statements that raised false hopes.

I expressed the view to the group that if there was to be some supporting statement made in Washington then it was best to avoid mentioning Pact or in any event refer to it only as an “indigenous” association of states. I also suggested that mention might be made of Iraq as host government, followed by reference to Iraq’s contribution to area defense.

Menderes then informed me that Turkish Government independently and quite aside deliberations that have been taking place in Baghdad would as a gesture of solidarity with Iraq withdraw its ambassador in Tel Aviv. This he said would not constitute breaking of diplomatic relations.

Before group broke up Crown Prince asked me what I had heard from Washington about his proposed visit and I told him that as we did not now contemplate joining Pact Washington thought the time for such a visit was not auspicious. He said he understood but would want to talk to me again about the nature of the proposed visit after the final meeting of representatives of the Moslem states.

Shortly after midnight I was again summoned to Qasr Al-Zuhur Palace. I found the same formidable group assembled there as 2 days previously (Embtel 889, November 20).⁴ This time Mirza was the spokesman. Agreement he said had been reached on a communiqué and he handed me a copy. Text follows in separate telegram.⁵

Mirza said that it was very much hoped by the group that some favorable comment on the communiqué could be made in Washington. I said that I would at once make their wish known to the Department.

I hope very much that we can make some favorable public statement. I think particularly paragraphs 4 and 5 of the communiqué give some scope

for this.

On leaving Crown Prince said he would like to see me some time within the next few days.

Gallman

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/11–2356. Secret; Niact. Repeated Priority to London, Paris, Ankara, Karachi, and Tehran.

² Not printed. (*Ibid.*, 780.5/11–2156) ³ [Document 146](#).

⁴ Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/11–2056) ⁵ Telegram 913 from Baghdad, November 23. (*Ibid.*, 780.5/11–2356)

151. Special National Intelligence Estimate¹

Washington, November 29, 1956.

SNIE 11–10–56

SOVIET ACTIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

The Problem

To estimate Soviet objectives and probable courses of action in the Middle East, particularly with respect to the Suez Canal and Arab-Israeli controversies.

Assumption

That the UK, France, and Israel evidence their clear intention to comply with the UN resolution with respect to the withdrawal of their forces.

Discussion

General Soviet Policy

1. The chain of events precipitated by Israeli, French, and British action against Egypt has sharply intensified most Middle East

problems, and has created major fresh sources of trouble. For the most part, these recent developments have worked to increase the influence of the USSR in the area, and to enhance considerably Soviet opportunities to undermine the Western position there and elsewhere. The USSR will take advantage of these opportunities, and in doing so will confront the US with critical policy decisions.

2. In determining specific courses of action in the Middle East, the USSR will try in every way to maximize the disruptive effects of this situation on the Atlantic Community as a whole. It will probably pursue this general objective at the expense, if necessary, of immediate Soviet gains in the Middle East.

3. The scale, nature, and timing of Soviet moves will depend on a number of factors including UN action, US policy and action, the course of the Arab-Israeli controversy, and what the UK and France do. The interaction of these factors in the fluid situation makes difficult a forecast of Soviet action. Nevertheless, Soviet objectives and certain possible actions, together with their implications, can be defined.

4. The USSR still almost certainly wishes to avoid precipitating general war over the Middle East crisis. It also probably wishes to avoid overt action which would throw the weight of world opinion against its involvement in the Middle East. Nevertheless, the credit which the USSR gained, particularly in the Middle East, by its pressures on the UK, France, and Israel to halt their action in Egypt, has probably increased its confidence that it can vigorously exploit the present crisis without undue risk.

5. In the present situation over-all Soviet objectives probably are:

- a. To consolidate the USSR's position as champion of Arab nationalism against the Western Powers and Israel and of anticolonialism in general;

- b. To use the situation to distract world attention from events in the Satellites, particularly in Hungary;
- c. To undermine Western political and military power in the area and to make difficult the maintenance of Western military bases and alliances with Middle East states;
- d. To weaken the West economically and strategically, notably through the reduction of Western access to Middle East oil; and
- e. To prolong and deepen Western differences.

6. Thus the USSR probably sees in the present situation opportunities not only to expand its influence in the Middle East at Western expense, but also a windfall opportunity to strike at the political, economic, and military strength of the Western governments themselves as well as at the unity of the Western alliance as a whole. The disruption of Middle East oil supplies and the closing of the canal to trade in other commodities as well confronts the NATO powers with serious and immediate economic problems (e.g., layoffs due to oil shortages are inevitable). In addition, the oil shortage now looming up before Europe is virtually certain to increase strains between the Western European governments as they compete: (a) for the limited supplies which are trickling through the usual channels; and (b) for emergency aid from the US in the form of additional oil and financial aid to buy oil. It is almost certain that the USSR will seek to derive maximum advantage from public resentment in Europe against the US because of the oil shortage. The USSR has made offers and will make offers of oil to certain countries in Europe and the Mediterranean area experiencing shortages.²

Probable Soviet Courses of Action—Assuming No Further Hostilities in the Area

7. *Vis-à-vis Egypt.* The USSR will almost certainly seek, as a matter of priority, to insure that Nasser remains in power and that he maintains a stiff position regarding both the canal question and Israel:

a. The USSR will almost certainly extend support to help Nasser withstand any political and economic pressures aimed at bringing about his downfall. Such support will probably include assistance designed to offset any Western economic measures against Egypt.

b. The USSR will probably work to stiffen Nasser's resistance to any UN arrangements acceptable to the British, French, and Israelis. It will support Egypt in demanding that UN intervention be limited to restoring the status quo ante (e.g., that UN troops should merely oversee the withdrawal of the Anglo-French forces, leaving Egypt in control of the canal; and then serve as a temporary shield between Egypt and Israel after a complete withdrawal by Israel behind its former borders).

c. The USSR will encourage Nasser in his insistence that Egypt control the rehabilitation and operation of the canal. It will in this and perhaps other ways seek to delay the reopening of the canal, but will avoid appearing clearly obstructionist in world opinion and alienating India and other Asian powers which are adversely affected by the closure of the canal.

d. The USSR will continue to encourage and support Nasser in demands that the UK, France, and Israel pay reparations and possibly bear the cost of clearing the canal.

e. As long as progress is being made by the UN and the UN force remains in Egypt, the USSR is unlikely to try to introduce arms and technicians in quantity. However,

in spite of the UN resolution, the USSR will probably quietly replace some of Nasser's losses in matériel in order to help his domestic position, to rebuild morale in the Egyptian armed forces, and to bolster his standing in the area. If so, the necessary technicians, probably including Soviet pilots, would accompany the equipment.

8. *Vis-à-vis other Arab States.* The USSR will probably make increasing use of Syria in its anti-Western and anti-Israeli campaign. Pro-Soviet elements are already gaining the ascendancy in Syria, where the conservative, relatively pro-Western leaders are divided and on the defensive. The USSR probably regards these trends in Syria as sufficiently favorable for the purposes of its Middle East policy, and is likely to avoid any open demonstration of control over the Syrian government even if it gains such control.

9. The Bloc has already supplied aircraft and armor to Syria. This includes an estimated 130 T-34 tanks, 200 armored personnel carriers, and 20–25 MIG 15 fighters, which were delivered in Egypt. We believe that most, if not all, of these fighters were destroyed by the UK-French attack. We have no reliable evidence to support reports that additional large quantities of Soviet air and armored equipment and personnel have arrived in Syria. Since 29 October five Soviet Bloc ships have docked at Latakia but we believe that no additional equipment other than small arms has been off-loaded. Future introduction of aircraft, military advisors, and technicians is likely, and possibly some volunteers.³

10.

Syria thus represents a promising target for Soviet efforts—military, political, and economic—in the Arab world. A continuation of the present extreme nationalist and pro-Soviet trend in Syria would give the USSR a number of advantages. It would, for example:

- a. Facilitate Soviet efforts to encourage and aid Syrian blackmail and boycott tactics and further physical sabotage against Western-owned oil pipelines transiting Syria from Iraq and Saudi Arabia—of which only one, the US-owned Tapline, is now in operation. Especially as long as the Western Powers are denied passage through the Suez Canal, this would be of critical importance to the USSR as a strategic and economic weapon against the West.
- b. Further weaken the military position of the Baghdad Pact countries and increase the defense problems of Turkey and Iraq.
- c. Open up greater political and subversive opportunities in many parts of the Arab world.
- d. Provide additional means of exacerbating Arab-Israeli tensions which the USSR can exploit in pursuing its pro-Arab, anti-Israeli, and anti-Western policy.

The establishment of a Soviet-Satellite government in Syria, or even of a government clearly dependent on the USSR would, however, also:

- a. Serve to drive Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, and Iran closer to the West, almost certainly cause Turkey and Iraq to press toward intervention in Syria, and raise fear and suspicions of Soviet intentions in much of Europe and Asia;
- b. Confront the USSR with much larger risks of having to participate directly in any local hostilities in the Middle East.

11. Jordan also represents a promising target for Soviet political and subversive efforts. The new, anti-Western Jordanian parliament has recently recommended the abrogation of the

Anglo-Jordanian Treaty (and the British subsidy) and the establishment of relations with the Bloc. Implementation of these measures requires only the consent of the [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] Jordanian king who under present circumstances is unlikely to prove able to hold out long against strong popular pressures.

12. *Vis-à-vis* Israel The USSR probably believes that incurring the enmity of Israel is a cheap price to pay for the gains in the Arab world to be derived from an anti-Israeli policy. The USSR will therefore almost certainly encourage a continuation of Arab-Israeli tensions. It will probably also encourage a belief among the Arabs that the USSR favors the eventual elimination of Israel.

13. We do not believe, however, that the USSR wants to precipitate full-scale hostilities between Israel and the surrounding Arab states. A continuation of high tension short of war probably appears sufficiently advantageous and certainly less risky for Soviet interests, since they probably consider that in present circumstances all-out Arab-Israeli hostilities might lead to the rapid destruction of Arab forces (including those equipped by the USSR) or even to US involvement and general war. Thus, the USSR will probably continue its efforts to intimidate Israel against launching full-scale war against Syria and Jordan.

Probable Soviet Courses of Action—Assuming Further Hostilities in the Area

14. If Arab-Israeli hostilities did develop, the Bloc would probably step up political support and military assistance to the Arab side, possibly including sending volunteers to Syria. In the UN and elsewhere, it would probably seek to take the lead in demanding drastic measures against Israel.

15. If Anglo-French military action against Egypt should be resumed, the Soviets would probably step up political support and military assistance to Egypt. If requested, they would probably

send volunteers. They would also probably renew and intensify their threats against Britain and France.

16. The scope of Soviet action, however, in the event of renewed British-French military operations, an Arab-Israeli war, or a conflict over Syria, would depend greatly on the attitude of the US. The USSR would be unlikely to make good on any threats of hostilities against the UK and France or Israel or even to send volunteers if it estimated that such steps would provoke a US reaction which substantially increased the risk of general war.

17. It is obvious, however, that in the critical situation surrounding an outbreak of hostilities there would be serious risks of miscalculation on the part of both the USSR and the West.

¹ Source: Department of State, INR–NIE Files. Secret. According to a note on the cover sheet, “The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Staff.” This estimate was concurred in by the Intelligence Advisory Committee on November 29, 1956. “Concurring were the Special Assistant, Intelligence, Department of State; the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Director of Naval Intelligence; the Director of Intelligence, USAF; and the Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff. The Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the IAC, and the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation abstained, the subject being outside of their jurisdiction.”

[1 paragraph (3 lines of text) not declassified]

² The Soviet Bloc now supplies approximately 90,000 barrels per day of petroleum and petroleum products to non-Sino-Soviet Bloc countries. Approximately 50,000 barrels a day are shipped to Western Europe, primarily to Sweden, Finland, and Iceland. Elsewhere, the principal recipients have been Egypt and Yugoslavia. Assuming that tankers were available, the Bloc could export substantially larger amounts of crude oil and/or finished products from its expanding production. Crude oil

production in the USSR is currently increasing at an annual rate of 95 million barrels, equivalent to an average of more than 250,000 barrels per day. Any substantial increase in exports would, however, involve some sacrifice of economic activity because of the rapidly expanding domestic requirements for petroleum. In view of these domestic needs and the difficulty of moving oil from producing and storage centers to ports, it is considered unlikely that the Soviet Bloc would maintain exports for long in excess of an additional 100,000 barrels per day. This quantity, equivalent to about four percent of total Western European consumption, would permit a reduction of some 12 to 15 percent in the estimated current deficit. Over a limited period, however, if willing to draw heavily on inventories, the Bloc would be able to augment significantly the additional quantities of petroleum available for export to Western Europe. [Footnote in the source text.]

³ The term “volunteers” is used in this estimate to mean troops, tank drivers, jet pilots, etc., actually employed, or intended to be employed, in combat. They are thus distinguished from advisors, technicians, trainers, etc., who are not in general intended to participate in combat. [Footnote in the source text.]

152. Editorial Note

On November 29, the Department of State issued a press release which paid tribute to the Baghdad Pact countries for their determination to uphold the United Nations Charter “to further a peaceful and lasting settlement of current Middle Eastern problems.” The press release noted that the representatives of Pakistan, Iraq, Turkey, and Iran had met twice in the past weeks “in order to bring to bear both their influence and wisdom in the interest of the nations of the free world.” The United States reaffirmed its support for the Baghdad Pact and for the “collective efforts of these nations to maintain their independence. A threat to the territorial integrity or political independence of the members would be viewed by the United States with the utmost gravity.” (Department of State Press Release No. 604, November 29; printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, December 10, 1956, page 918)

153. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson)¹

Washington, November 30, 1956.

SUBJECT

U.S. Adherence to the Baghdad Pact

1. In response to a memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), dated 22 October 1956,² subject as above, the Joint Chiefs of Staff submit the following views on the desirability of U.S. adherence to the Pact in the light of present and foreseeable developments within, and in the general area of, the Baghdad Pact.
2. The United States has gone publicly on record in strong support of the Baghdad Pact Organization. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have consistently, from a military viewpoint, urged that the United States adhere to the Baghdad Pact. In the past, the State

Department has objected to U.S. adherence to the Pact on the grounds that Congressional approval could not be obtained because of the objections by Israel; that Israel would demand a security guarantee which in turn would be unacceptable to certain Arab countries. Recent events might lead the Israelis to the conclusion that U.S. adherence to the Pact at this time would offer the greatest opportunity to exert U.S. influence on the political and military situations in the Middle East with resultant advantage to Israel.

3. As of now, the continued effective existence of the Baghdad Pact is at stake. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that continuation of the Baghdad Pact as a regional defense organization against Soviet aggression in the Middle East is vital to the security of this area and to the attainment of U.S. military objectives in this area. The collapse of the Baghdad Pact Organization will be an irretrievable loss to the best interests of the United States in the Middle East.

4. From a military viewpoint, the U.S. position in the Middle East is in a dangerous condition. Egypt, Syria and Jordan have made the beginnings of an alliance against Israel. There is growing evidence that the USSR is working towards the establishment of such an alliance with the expectation of controlling it. The United States and the Western World have no effective defense arrangement which would counteract such an alliance. U.S. adherence to the Pact, at this time, would provide us with an opportunity to establish a military position in the area, if it should later prove desirable.

5. Formal adherence to the Baghdad Pact will not increase the responsibilities that the United States has already assumed in the Middle East or materially increase the cost thereof. In fact, lack of adherence to the Pact might prove to be more costly in that Turkey, Iran and Pakistan might demand, justifiably, more aid. We have, in the past, been active in the development of the Pact and have taken part, in an advisory capacity, in the planning

accomplished in the Pact. We have made friends with many of the military leaders of the present Moslem countries of the Pact. It may be expected that these military leaders could exert influence on their national policies. If we join the Pact, the United States would become the military leader in the area and would have the opportunity not only to establish a secure military position in the area but also to influence political and military developments to our advantage.

6. There is evidence that Saudi Arabia and Lebanon are well aware of the enormous danger of Communist expansion in the area and are secretly disposed against Nasser and his friendship with the Soviets. If the U.S. adheres to the Baghdad Pact now, the fear of Soviet penetration which exists in Saudi Arabia and Lebanon could probably be exploited to urge them to join the Pact.

7. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the military and political advantages which would accrue to the United States by adhering to the Pact far outweigh any disadvantages which might result. An important result of prompt U.S. adherence to the Pact would be the checking and eventual downgrading of Nasser's gains. In the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, if the U.S. fails to adhere to the Baghdad Pact now, the opportunity to do so may be lost. Without tangible evidence of U.S. strength in the Middle East, it is a certainty that Nasser will end up with greater prestige than before and that Soviet penetration in the area will become an accomplished fact.

8. The U.S. statement, issued on 29 November 1956 to the effect that the U.S. would "view with the utmost gravity" any threat, political or territorial, to Turkey, Iran, Iraq or Pakistan might be considered to be a definite step in the direction of bolstering the morale of the area of [*against?*] the principal threat; but it does not go far enough to assure the end result which is required. Indeed, it prompts the logical question: "If this is true, why is the U.S. unwilling to join the Baghdad Pact?" A statement such as

that which was made may well be interpreted by the Baghdad Pact powers as evidence that while the U.S. is willing to “talk support,” we are still unwilling to take the forthright and logical action the U.S. position suggests.

9. While the Joint Chiefs of Staff are, from the military point of view, in full accord with current U.S. policies which make maximum use of the U.N., they believe that a U.S. policy which is predicated upon settlement of the major issues in the Middle East solely through the U.N. would prove to be inadequate to the attainment of essential U.S. objectives in the area. The slowness with which effective action can be taken by the U.N., the increasing influence of the Arab-Asian Bloc in the General Assembly, the ever-present Soviet veto in the Security Council and the unlikelihood of achieving U.S. objectives in the Middle East entirely through a large international body, render such a U.S. policy hazardous. Soviet penetration would be complete before U.N. solutions could be expected to materialize—even if U.N.-sponsored courses of action could be controlled so that they would be largely consistent with U.S. interests.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Arthur Radford³
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

¹ Source: Eisenhower Library, Staff Secretary Records. Top Secret. Secretary of Defense Wilson forwarded this memorandum to President Eisenhower on December 4. See [Document 159](#).

² Attached to the source text but not printed.

³ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

154. Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation Between the Israeli Ambassador (Eban) in New York and the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree) in Washington, November 30, 1956¹

Washington, November 30, 1956

Ambassador Eban telephoned me from New York to say that he was seriously concerned over the implications which were being drawn from our statement on the Baghdad Pact, which included a declaration that any threat to the members of the Pact would be viewed by the United States with the utmost gravity. The assumption was being made widely by members of the press and in the U.N. that this statement, having excluded any reference to Israel, connoted a different attitude with respect to that country.

On the other hand, the Ambassador said, Israel was being subjected to most Alarming threats by several countries, particularly the Soviet Union. The Soviet threats included the very extinction of Israel. The U.S. had stated its policy regarding Israel on various occasions in the past, but Israel most earnestly desired a renewed statement in the context of the present situation which would leave no doubt regarding our attitude. He thought that "not many hours" could be allowed to elapse before such a statement was made. He was considering how this might be handled procedurally. He had thought of sending a formal communication to the Department asking for clarification of its position and attitude regarding the security of Israel. He was also considering taking the Soviet threat immediately to the Security Council, where the U.S. representative would have an opportunity to state the American position regarding Israel's security. However it was handled, he must insist that our attitude be made known publicly with the least possible delay.

I told the Ambassador that the statement which we had made yesterday was confined to the Baghdad Pact and its specific purpose was to set forth the

U.S. attitude toward the Pact and its members. As he knew, the U.S. had been urged to join the Pact and a number of public statements had been made in this regard by members of the Pact. The statement did not intend nor could it be construed as intending to set forth the U.S. attitude toward the security of any countries which were not members of the Pact itself. The question of the U.S. attitude toward Israel was therefore an entirely separate matter. I would of course take the request under advisement but I could not comment further at this time.

(Note: It should be noted in this connection that a primary objective of Israeli policy at the present time appears to be to elicit a statement of U.S. support for Israel; every conceivable pressure will be applied by the Israelis to obtain such a statement. This is of course a matter with which we will have to deal with utmost caution, not because there is any doubt regarding our general support for the State of Israel but because we cannot permit ourselves to be maneuvered into a position of appearing to support Israel in the context of current situation which it has brought about for itself in Egypt. Mishandling of this matter could do irreparable damage to the whole American position in the current controversy and seriously diminish our effectiveness in dealing with the problem.)

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/11-3056. Secret. Drafted by Rountree.

155. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State¹

Tehran, December 2, 1956—3 p.m.

849. Re Embtel 847.² In course of hour's audience with Armour and myself, Shah did not himself mention Department's recent statement re independence and territorial integrity of BP Muslim powers. HIM appeared in unusually solemn mood. It was only towards end of interview when I asked him pointblank if he thought statement would have stabilizing influence in area that he replied without any evident enthusiasm that he felt it would help. He then stated that of course only thing which would really stabilize situation in ME was for US to adhere to BP. He realized a statement of intention to join with any long intervening delay before proposal could be put to Senate for ratification might be difficult not only so far as US domestic politics are concerned but because would permit opposition build-up from Arab states and SU. He said of course any announced intention to join which was not followed up in fact by US adherence would be fatal to Pact.

He then asked what it is that US is afraid of. Is it reaction in Arab states or is it reaction in SU? The former he discounted as unimportant, feeling that we could persuade more friendly Arab states and that adverse opinion of Egypt, Syria and Jordan did not count in any case. As for SU, it had blustered when Iran joined BP and had also blustered when West Germany joined NATO but had then subsided. He said that if necessary for reassurance US adherence could be accompanied by a reiterated statement by Iran to effect it would not permit establishment foreign bases on Iranian soil in time of peace or some similar phrase.

Remainder interview was naturally devoted to aid program with accent on Iran's need for greater military build-up. Shah stated if it was felt Iran could not absorb military matériel in greater quantities this condition could readily be rectified by increasing number of Iranian military students in US and size of US training teams in Iran. Shah concluded with well-known

argument that Iran is key to defense northern tier and its present military weakness is danger not only to itself and Middle East but to whole world.

Chapin

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/12-256. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Ankara, Baghdad, Karachi, London, and Paris.

² In telegram 847 from Tehran, December 1, Chapin reported that Prime Minister Ala and Foreign Minister ArdAlan, in a Foreign Office statement, had responded favorably to the recent U.S. statement on the Baghdad Pact (see [Document 152](#)). (Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/12-156)

156. Informal Record of a Meeting, Secretary Dulles' Office, Department of State, Washington, December 3, 1956, 11:07 a.m.¹

Washington, December 3, 1956, 11:07 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary

The Under Secretary

Mr. Murphy

Mr. Henderson

Mr. Elbrick

Mr. Wilcox

Mr. Phleger

Mr. Rountree

Mr. Bowie

Mr. MacArthur

Mr. Mathews

Mr. Burdett

Mr. Rockwell

Mr. Wilkins

Mr. Sisco

Mr. Greene

Mr. Rountree reviewed the present situation in the Middle East to bring the Secretary up to date. He noted that one pressing question requiring US decision is aid to Jordan. We have asked the British for their views but we may have to move in the next few days to provide budgetary assistance to Jordan, some of which helps support the Arab Legion, in order to forestall a Soviet move. Another problem awaiting decision is the desire of Turkey and Iraq for US assistance in the form of military aircraft and radar. State and Defense agree and do not have any objection to the stationing of US air units including pilots in Turkey, although a definition of their mission is still needed. There is also no objection to radar units in Turkey. On Iraq there is no objection to radar but it is felt no US planes and pilots should be stationed there.

The Secretary concurred with these views on Turkey and Iraq and thought that the current definition of national defense missions might be expanded to accommodate a request by Turkey to NATO for air units to supplement their own air force. The Secretary also discussed the desirability of establishing a solid line to prevent Soviet airlift into Syria, possibly by some combination of NATO and Baghdad Pact countries.

A detailed paper by S/P and NEA outlining proposed actions was discussed at some length.² The Secretary thought it overly ambitious to try to

establish a charter for the Arab countries' relations with the Atlantic Community; he thought it would be better to ride a rising tide of Arab nationalism by some such means as endorsement of the Arabs' own efforts to maintain their independence and security against international communism and Western imperialism. He thought the US could give financial support to a balanced organization of Arab countries perhaps through some mechanism analogous to that of the Marshall Plan.

There was some discussion of Saudi Arabia taking the lead in establishing such an organization and bringing Turkey, Iran and Pakistan in; the Secretary thought it might be better to keep the organization Arab and noted that Turkey is already covered in NATO and Pakistan in SEATO; thus, there remains the problem only of Iran. It was also explained that while the long-term objective would be to get all the Arab states together, it might prove desirable as a preliminary step to exclude and thus isolate Egypt and Syria as a means of diminishing Nasser's influence so that he could not aspire to take over leadership of the larger group.

S/P and NEA were to further redraft their paper, taking into account the discussion.

JG

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.00/12-356. Secret. Drafted by Joseph N. Greene, Jr. The time of the meeting is from Dulles' Appointment Book. (Princeton University, Dulles Papers) ² Reference is presumably to two papers forwarded to Secretary Dulles on November 30 under cover of a memorandum from Bowie. The two were also forwarded to Acting Secretary Hoover on December 1 under cover of a separate memorandum from Bowie. The first, entitled "Program To Counter Soviet Penetration in the Middle East," according to the covering memorandum, reflected the views of the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs and the Policy Planning Staff. The second, "Proposal for Middle East Charter," was drafted by Burdett and Mathews on November 30. (Both in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 62 D 181, CF 815) Presumably both papers were taken by Secretary Dulles when he left for the North Atlantic Council Ministerial meeting at Paris on December 8. Earlier

drafts of the “Proposal for Middle East Charter” are in the form of draft memoranda from Rountree to Hoover, prepared by Burdett on November 26 and 29. (*Ibid.*, L/UNA Files: Lot 62 D 205, International Security—Middle East Charter Nov. 1956)

157. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Murphy) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree) and the Assistant Secretary’s Special Assistant (Burdett)¹

Washington, December 3, 1956.

Since our conversation Saturday evening² at Mr. Hoover’s house, I have read carefully and given some thought to the attached paper, “Proposal for a New Grouping of Middle Eastern States”.³ Reading the revised paper, I found myself in considerable doubt as to the wisdom of the proposed course of action. I am inclined to question whether the organization of an additional international grouping in the area will really help achieve American objectives. In other words, I think I appreciate the purpose but do not agree that the suggested method will achieve it.

It was certainly to some extent American inspiration which helped create the Baghdad Pact. Now, because we feel it has developed a reputation of being an instrument of UK policy we seek to “submerge” the Baghdad Alliance in a new grouping which is generally vague in character and which I believe will arouse the suspicions of countries in the area and certainly those outside the area. It will be an unwieldy grouping at the best.

One of the key elements is Saud. He has urged us not to adhere to the Baghdad Pact. I doubt his receptivity to the present scheme. He and other Moslems could well regard the proposal as a project of American power politics.

Even though we may consider that Israel is at present not in a good posture to oppose such a scheme, a suggestion to group all of the States in the area except Israel would give rise to strident opposition in some quarters, unless it were accomplished by provision for Israeli security.

Do we really want or need to build up a new grouping? Cannot our influence be used so that the Baghdad Pact will not be known just as an instrumentality of UK policy? If we give the Baghdad Pact membership substantial support and encouragement, why should the Baghdad Pact crumble away?

The approach which seems preferable to me is a bilateral one and I think one of the keys to it is the relationship we build up with Saudi Arabia. I favor an active stand and substantial bilateralism in the area and that relates not only to Saudi Arabia but to Jordan and Lebanon as well as the Baghdad Pact membership.

I do not pretend that I have made a profound study of this problem, but these are my reactions and the reason why I do not concur in the present paper.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.80/12-356. Secret. Copies were sent to Dulles, Hoover, and Henderson. The date 12-3-56 is written in hand on the source text.

² December 1.

³ Not found attached, but presumably the “Proposal for Middle East Charter” cited in [footnote 2, supra](#).

**158. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State,
Washington, December 4, 1956, 10:30 a.m.¹**

Washington, December 4, 1956, 10:30 a.m.

SUBJECT

Baghdad Pact

PARTICIPANTS

The Ambassador of Turkey²

The Ambassador of Iraq³

The Ambassador of Iran⁴

The Ambassador of Pakistan⁵

The Secretary

The Under Secretary

Mr. Rountree

The Ambassadors of the four Asian members of the Baghdad Pact had asked urgently to see the Secretary prior to the latter's departure for Paris. They wished to discuss the current serious situation in the Near East.

After preliminary comment, in which the Ambassadors expressed their happiness at the Secretary's recovery, the Pakistani Ambassador said the group was particularly concerned with the situation in Iraq and Syria. They had discussed the matter among themselves and were convinced that any change in the Iraq Government would have serious repercussions for the whole free world since no other Iraq Government would have the strength to continue in the Baghdad Pact. The only way they could see of assuring that the situation would not become unmanageable would be for the U.S. to

adhere to the Pact. If that was not possible, however, something else should be done although the Ambassadors were quite uncertain as to what that should be.

The Secretary referred to his press statement at Augusta in which he had mentioned the Baghdad Pact. He also mentioned the Department's recent statement concerning our attitude toward the Pact and the security of its members. He felt the latter had gone a long way toward setting the record straight as to how we felt about the matter. Responding to the Pakistani Ambassador's suggestion that we might intimate that we will join the Pact, he thought that would be a serious mistake if we were not actually prepared immediately to adhere. He said that we had given constant thought to adherence and that there were still many problems, one of which was the likelihood that there would be heavy pressure from Congress for a security arrangement with Israel if we should join the Baghdad Pact. He asked what the reaction of the Baghdad Pact countries would be in this eventuality. The Iraqi Ambassador replied that it seemed to him that Israel's action in attacking Egypt had changed the situation completely, and that it would not be unreasonable to take the position that Israel did not in these circumstances deserve a security guaranty. In any event, he said, he would perceive of no objection to a security guaranty to Israel, as well as to other countries in the area, after a settlement of the Palestine problem. At the present time, however, he thought that any assurance to Israel "should not exceed the UN resolutions". The Secretary observed that any pressure from the Senate would certainly be for more than assurances to Israel in that context.

The Secretary said he wished to make his attitude toward the matter quite clear. The U.S. wanted to salvage the Baghdad Pact and it is determined to support the member governments. We wanted to encourage all the Arab states in every way possible to recognize the Soviet danger and to oppose Soviet encroachment. The creation of the Pact was, in fact, an outgrowth of a suggestion which he had made regarding the northern tier. One of the problems involved in our own adherence was that the Pact had unfortunately become involved in area politics and was not universally viewed as an instrument solely to oppose communism and Soviet aggression. As he had previously indicated, the question of Israel also

presented a problem in regard to our adhering. We recognized the importance to the four countries of the Pact, and recognized particularly this importance in the present political situation in Iraq. There was no question of our attitude toward the present Iraqi government; we wished to do everything possible to support it. However, he did not think that he could tell the Ambassadors today that he had resolved all of his doubts regarding American adherence to the Pact. He was giving thought to how our joint purposes could best be achieved in the area. Certainly the present situation was not satisfactory and something more must be done to cope with the threats of Soviet penetration. The Ambassadors need not have any concern that the U.S. presence and interest in the area would be amply demonstrated. The precise form in which this would come about, however, was now under study and he hoped to be in a position to pursue that with the interested governments in the near future.

The Iraqi Ambassador said he had just received another message from Prime Minister Nuri saying the Near East was at a crossroads and the Baghdad Pact was in a critical position. If the Pact should collapse, and if the present government should lose power, he felt a golden opportunity would be presented for the communists to make virtually unlimited progress toward their goals. Within a few years, he feared, all the area would be lost to the free world.

The Secretary replied that the Middle East was not going to be lost to the free world. The thought of war to prevent that would be terrible; everything possible should be done to avert any such situation. But the interdependence of the area on the West was so great that it would be unthinkable to have the area under Soviet control.

The Turkish Ambassador said that he felt the Iraqi Ambassador was in an awkward position to speak frankly with respect to Israel. His colleague could not feel free to advise the Secretary regarding a security guaranty to Israel. However, the Soviet danger was very great and if a guaranty to Israel was needed for the U.S. to adhere to the Baghdad Pact, the Turkish Ambassador felt certain that the Iraqi government would not raise a question in this regard.

The Iranian Ambassador expressed the hope that the Secretary would consider a possible connection between NATO, SEATO, and the Baghdad Pact, in order to provide a greater strength to all three which would derive from such a relationship.

The Pakistani Ambassador agreed and then said he thought such a connection would be of added strength to all of the security groupings.

The Secretary concluded the discussion by saying he was glad to have had this talk with the Ambassadors. He wanted them to leave with the conviction that we were fully alive to the problems which they raised. It was our firm intention to do something about them. We intend to act in an appropriate manner in association with the four countries, and perhaps with one or two others.

After the meeting in the Secretary's office the group adjourned to Mr. Hoover's office where they went over again much of the ground which had already been covered, and discussed what the Ambassadors would say to the press upon their departure. The Pakistani Ambassador proposed that they tell the press that they had again urged the U.S. to adhere to the Baghdad Pact. Mr. Rountree counseled against this, pointing out that the more the Baghdad Pact members publicly urged American adherence without such adherence materializing, the greater the implication of the weakness of the Pact. The U.S. had recently made a strong statement in support of the Pact, and it was understood that the several members welcomed the statement as a contribution to the strength and stability of the organization. The effect of that statement might be completely eradicated if the impression should be given that the Pact members already were urgently pressing for American adherence. The Ambassadors, including the Pakistani Ambassador, seemed to accept this point and to agree that the Pact countries should not give the impression publicly of continuing to insist that the U.S. join.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/12-456. Secret. Drafted by Rountree.

² Haydar Görk.

³ Moussa Al-Shabandar.

[4](#) Ali Amini.

[5](#) Mohammed Ali.

159. Letter From the Secretary of Defense (Wilson) to the President¹

Washington, December 4, 1956.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: The difficult position of the West in the Middle East, with the attendant unfavorable effects in Western Europe and in the Free World alliances as a whole, has apparently reached a stage where some additional decisive actions are needed.

The Defense Department has felt for some time that the situation would be improved and we would have a better basis for supporting actions we might need to take in the Near East if our country formally joined the Baghdad Pact. There may be reasons which we do not fully appreciate for not doing this at this time. However, we feel so strongly in regard to the matter that I am sending you some supporting data dealing with it. I hope to find time Friday² afternoon to discuss the matter briefly with you.

I am taking the liberty of sending a copy of this letter and attachments to the Secretary of State.³

With great respect, I am

Faithfully yours,

C.E. Wilson

[Attachment 1]

STATEMENT BY DEFENSE OF THE REASONS FOR U.S. ADHERENCE TO THE BAGHDAD PACT AT THIS TIME

1. Would permit the U.S. to fill the political and military vacuum which has been created by the decline in the U.K.'s position and prestige in the area. The U.S. and the USSR are the only major

powers capable of filling this vacuum. The Soviets are already making a strong bid in this direction, and failure of the U.S. to adhere to the Baghdad Pact will be looked upon as a sign of weakness and enable the Soviets to move in uncontested.

2. Would reinforce the firm support by the U.S. of the concept of collective security, which the U.S. has promoted and encouraged throughout the world to counter the Soviet-Communism threat.

3. Would demonstrate to the Soviets and to the world the U.S. determination to support the sovereignty and the territorial integrity of the free nations of the Middle East and would counter the growing impression that U.S. policy in the Middle East is one of peace at any price in contrast to Soviet willingness to take strong action when their interests are involved.

4. Would contribute constructively to the attainment of other key U.S. objectives in the Middle East, i.e.,

a. Help to preserve the flow of Middle East oil to markets in W. Europe;

b. Would ensure the availability of bases, strategic positions and Middle East resources to the U.S. and its allies.

5. Would increase the prestige of the Baghdad Pact and its member nations and enable these nations to develop an effective regional defensive organization.

6. Would help to wean several Arab states such as Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Lebanon away from Nasser's domination and reorient them towards an association of Middle East states more friendly to the West.

7. Would facilitate military planning in consonance with U.S. interests as well as the establishment of a U.S. command in the area.

8. Would strengthen NATO's southeastern flank and facilitate coordination of planning among NATO, the Baghdad Pact, and SEATO.

9. Would not necessarily increase the magnitude of the military assistance programs in the area because of U.S. leadership and influence in the Pact's strategic planning. Such planning would give appropriate weight to the wartime potential of U.S. military collaboration.

10. Failure to adhere will result in:

a. A general lack of confidence in the U.S. resolve to support its friends and allies in the face of Soviet pressure.

b. The probable deterioration of other collective security arrangements in which the U.S. participates.

c. Greater success on the part of the USSR in consolidating, strengthening and expanding its position of influence throughout the Middle East, Africa and Asia.

d. The collapse of protection for the southeastern flank of NATO.

e. The collapse of the Baghdad Pact thus confronting the U.S., in the event of involvement in hostilities in the Middle East, with the necessity of undertaking military operations in a hostile environment.

[Attachment 2]

STATEMENT BY STATE OF THE REASONS AGAINST U.S. ADHERENCE TO THE BAGHDAD PACT AT THIS TIME

1. The U.S. has given its full support to the United Nations effort to stabilize the delicate and critical situation in Egypt resulting from the British, French, and Israeli military actions. Any change in the current U.S. relationship with the powers in the area might seriously jeopardize those efforts.

2. The Soviet Union has stated firmly its strong opposition to the Baghdad Pact. U.S. adherence might be taken as a pretext for further and stronger Soviet moves against the West in the Near East. US-USSR relations would be further exacerbated.

3. There is serious doubt concerning the effectiveness of the Baghdad Pact in preventing Soviet penetration of the area. The Soviets appear to be capitalizing on existing tensions in the area and using psychological, economic, and covert military measures rather than direct threats of armed force. By so doing they are, in effect, hopping over the "Northern Tier" line.

4. The U.S. must, in framing its policy, consider its position in the entire Near East where the uncommitted Arab nations are hostile to the Pact and are being seriously threatened from within by the Soviet exploitation of the British and French actions in Egypt. Adherence would involve the U.S. more directly in Hashemite-Saudi-Iraqi-Egyptian disputes.

5. While public support remains strong for the Baghdad Pact in Turkey and Iran, the British and French action in Egypt has seriously weakened public support for the Pact in Iraq and Pakistan. Serious doubt remains as to the advisability of the U.S. adhering to a Pact which has lost a strong measure of support in two of its important members.

6. Adherence would provide Israel with a pretext for renewed demands for a U.S. security guarantee.

7. While the U.S. might gain some psychological benefit from adherence, this step might well be followed by strong demands for further U.S. aid to member countries on grounds that, as a

member, we should demonstrate even more dramatically our support for these nations.

8. The original U.S. concept of the “Northern tier” was one of an indigenous organization. The Baghdad Pact, unfortunately, has been regarded by the non-member states of the area as Western-inspired and in large part UK-dominated. There is serious doubt, therefore, whether U.S. adherence would alter the prevailing view and muster for the Pact the necessary additional membership and the widespread public support necessary to make it a really effective instrument for the furtherance of U.S. objectives in the area.

9. Adherence would be strongly opposed by Saudi Arabia, where the U.S. has important interests.

10. We can strengthen the security of these countries through our present relationship in the Economic Committee of the Pact and through our bilateral military and economic programs without risking the serious disadvantages which would be created by adherence to the Pact itself.

11. The immediate pressure upon the U.S. to adhere to the Baghdad Pact arises from the difficulties and apprehensions of the four area members resulting from the Israel-UK-French military action against Egypt. We should not undertake the long term commitment inherent in adherence to the Pact to meet this current and short term crisis which can be and is being dealt with by other means.

12. The problem of obtaining Senate ratification of U.S. adherence to the Baghdad Pact, particularly without concurrently extending a security guarantee to Israel, is still with us. Recent developments in the Near East may have eased this problem, but we have no evidence that the Congress would be amenable to our adherence to the Pact.

¹ Source: Eisenhower Library, Staff Secretary Records. Top Secret. Attached to the source text is [Document 153](#); a memorandum from Assistant Secretary of Defense Gordon Gray to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, dated October 22; four pages of excerpts from Department of State telegrams, quoting statements of foreign leaders and U.S. diplomats to the effect that the United States should join the Baghdad Pact; a paper entitled “Statement by Defense of the Reasons for U.S. Adherence to the Baghdad Pact at This Time”, printed below; and a paper entitled “Statement by State of the Reasons Against U.S. Adherence to the Baghdad Pact at This Time”, also printed below.

² December 7. No memorandum of the conversation has been found.

³ Transmitted to Secretary Dulles under cover of a letter from Secretary Wilson, December 4. (Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/12-456) On December 6, Secretary Dulles telephoned Secretary Wilson concerning his letter. The memorandum of the telephone conversation reads as follows: “W, returned the call and the Sec. said he got his letter re the Baghdad Pact. The Sec. wonders whether it is wise to press it on the Pres. at a time when the Sec. can’t be there. W. had no intention of pressing for a decision. Radford and the Chiefs feel so strongly—W. wants him to see the position. The Sec. said he will only see part if he hears them. W. won’t let him make a decision. The Sec. said it should not be presented piecemeal until the other Depts sit in. W. said he does not see the Pres. as much as before. He is going primarily for budget business but promised Radford he would spend time reviewing the thing.” (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations)

160. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree) to the Secretary of State¹

Washington, December 5, 1956.

SUBJECT

Revised Proposal for a New Middle Eastern Grouping

Pursuant to the discussion in your office on the morning of December 3, 1956, S/P and NEA have collaborated in a revision of the proposal for a new Middle Eastern grouping. We believe you will find the concept set forth in the attached paper more in accord with your views. (Tab A) To contain the present situation in the Middle East and to counter Soviet penetration, a major US move is required which will have a dramatic impact and develop support in the area. The present proposal is conceived as the core of a coordinated program. Other aspects were outlined in the paper entitled "Program to Counter Soviet Penetration in the Middle East" which was put before you at the December 3 conference and which is now being revised for submission to you under separate memorandum.²

*Concurrences:*³

S/P—Mr. Bowie

EUR—Mr. Elbrick (Tab C)⁴

IO—Mr. Wilcox

L—Mr. Phleger

U/MSA—Mr. Barnes

C—Mr. MacArthur⁵

G—Mr. Murphy (Tab B)⁶

O—Mr. Henderson⁷

[Tab A]

PROPOSAL FOR A NEW GROUPING OF MIDDLE EASTERN STATES

One of the essential prerequisites for countering Soviet penetration in the Middle East and moving toward stability and progress in the area is the creation of a framework for cohesion and cooperation among the Middle Eastern states that have some comprehension of the Soviet menace. This

framework will have to accord with the basic drives of the area—which is to say that in addition to being anti-Communist it will also have to be anti-imperialist and pro-nationalist. It will, also, unfortunately, have to recognize the strong anti-Israel sentiments of most of the area states.

None of the existing Middle Eastern groupings provides such a framework. This paper accordingly proposes that the US take the initiative in stimulating certain of the area states to undertake the establishment of a new, ostensibly indigenous grouping. It also proposes that the US (1) give a unilateral commitment to support the members of this grouping against Communist aggression and (2) provide substantial economic and some military assistance to the members.

Inadequacy of Existing Middle Eastern Groupings

Existing Middle Eastern groupings include the Arab League and its subsidiary organizations, the Egypt–Syria–Saudi Arabia (ESS) axis with its subsidiary military arrangements with Yemen and Jordan, and the Baghdad Pact.

The Arab League is anti-imperialist, pro-nationalist and, above all else, anti-Israel. It has shown few signs of being anti-Communist. [*2½ lines of source text not declassified*] It has been a battleground of inter-Arab rivalries and has been able to reach a consensus only in opposition to Israel. There is no reason to assume that it can break old habits in any near future.

The ESS axis exists to combat first Israel and second the UK and France. Far from being anti-Communist, its two principal members, Egypt and Syria, look to the USSR for arms and political support. The axis is, in fact, primarily a vehicle for the extension of Egyptian—i.e. Nasser's—influence and control over other Arab states.

The Baghdad Pact is regarded by most of the non-member area states as a vehicle for the extension of UK influence and control in the Middle East. Some elements within three of the member states, Iraq, Iran and Pakistan, share this view. Some of the Arab states, moreover, consider that the

Baghdad Pact is pro-Israel or, at best, neutral in the Israel-Arab dispute. There is little likelihood that any refurbishing of the Pact, including US adherence, would remove the pro-UK, pro-Israel coloration it has in the eyes of many Middle Easterners.

Elements of New Middle Eastern Grouping

Participants

One of the objectives of bringing about the establishment of a new Middle Eastern grouping is to submerge the Baghdad Pact in the new, and larger, body. It is essential, therefore, that the four area Pact members, Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Pakistan, be initiators and founding members of the new group. Saudi Arabia and Lebanon should also be founding members.

Saudi Arabia's attitude may well be the key factor in determining whether a new grouping can be established. King Saud is increasingly aware of the Communist menace, being particularly disturbed by the trend of events in Syria and Jordan. He is also increasingly distrustful of Nasser's ultimate objectives in the Arab world. His relations with Iraq have shown some improvement, and there seems to be real cordiality between him and the Pakistani leaders. These factors taken together provide a favorable atmosphere for pressing the merits of a new area grouping with Saud. His decision will, however, be based on his estimate of the extent of our interest in and potential assistance to the group and its members, particularly Saudi Arabia.

The potential field of membership of the new grouping extends from Pakistan westward to Morocco, excluding Israel. Initially, however, the founding members should invite only Libya, Egypt, Sudan, Ethiopia, Yemen, Jordan and Syria to join. An invitation to Afghanistan would probably be rejected in view of that country's unresolved problems with Pakistan and its heavy economic involvement with the USSR. Invitations to Tunisia and Morocco would tend directly to involve the new grouping in the Algerian issue and would unnecessarily arouse the French.

Both Egypt and Syria have publicly committed themselves to a “neutralist” position which has a strong anti-anti-Communist flavor. Dependent as the present governments of both countries have become on the USSR for arms and political support, it is doubtful that they would accept the invitation to join a new, anti-Communist area grouping. Their rejection of the invitation would serve to isolate them from the rest of the area and to emphasize their close ties with the Soviet bloc. In the unlikely event that the two countries did accept the invitation, this in itself would constitute a rebuff for the USSR and a notable reversal of recent Egyptian and Syrian positions.

The isolation of Egypt and Syria would be complete if Jordan and Yemen could be induced to accept their invitations. The prospects of their doing so are not too encouraging, but Saudi Arabia might be able to bring them into line.

Charter

The documentary basis of the new grouping would be a Middle East Charter. The Charter would specifically recognize the danger posed by international Communism and express a determination to cooperate in self defense against this threat. It would also set forth other basic principles which the Middle Eastern states believe should govern their relations with each other and the rest of the world.

A draft Charter is attached at Tab A.⁸ The language used is intended to appeal to indigenous Middle Eastern attitudes and beliefs.

Organization

Having agreed upon the language of a Middle East Charter, the participating Middle Eastern states would proceed to form an organization to “further the purposes of the Charter”. It is probable that either the Arab League or Baghdad Pact structure would provide a model. There would presumably be a council and subordinate committees. Among the latter we would hope to see economic, counter-subversion and military committees. It would undoubtedly be wise if participation in the military committee were optional. These committees should take over the functions of the parallel Baghdad Pact committees.

Timing

The developing situation in the Middle East calls for urgency in launching the new grouping, and the meeting of the Baghdad Pact Council scheduled for January 28, 1957, in effect imposes a definite terminal date. Unless by that time appreciable progress has been made toward the establishment of the new group, we may be faced with the alternatives of US adherence to the Baghdad Pact or its collapse. A suggested time schedule for action on the new grouping is attached at Tab B.⁹

US Role

Persuading Founding Members

The US will have to convince the area Baghdad Pact members that their interests will be served by submerging the Pact in a larger Middle Eastern grouping. We shall also have to support vigorously their approaches to Saudi Arabia and Lebanon to enroll these two countries among the founding members. Our trump cards will be our willingness to make a unilateral declaration of protection of the members from Communist aggression and to extend them substantial economic aid.

Our support will again be required when invitations are addressed to other area states, some of which will base their decision to accept or reject the invitation on their estimate of US interest in the project. [3 lines of source text not declassified]

Declaration of Protection

Having made clear through confidential diplomatic channels beforehand that we would take the step, when the Middle Eastern states have met and agreed on their Charter, we should announce that we would view any threat by international Communism against the independence or territorial integrity of the participating states as seriously endangering international peace and would consult with them in the event of Communist attack on any member with a view to taking appropriate measures in accordance with our constitutional processes. A draft declaration is attached at Tab C.¹⁰

It would, of course, be necessary to consult with Congressional leaders in advance of taking this step. After the event and should Congressional reaction be encouraging, we might seek a joint resolution endorsing the Executive's action.

Economic Assistance

We should be prepared to provide substantially increased economic aid to the members of the new grouping in the Middle East. This will require early consultation with Congressional leaders as its financial implications exceed present availabilities under the Mutual Security Act. Legislation would not be introduced until after the Middle Eastern states had adopted their Charter.

The emphasis of our economic assistance would be on increasing the basic economic potential of the member states and of encouraging regional projects. Simplified ways of administering the aid program should be sought, tailored to the special characteristics of the Middle Eastern situation and of this proposed new grouping.

Military Assistance

While we do not desire that the new grouping have a markedly military aspect, we must recognize that many of the members will make demands on us for military assistance. We should be prepared to meet such demands as are based on requirements to maintain internal security and to permit limited resistance to aggression. Few of the potential members have the capability of providing forces that would be of real value against the USSR.

Psychological Program

The proclaiming of the Middle East Charter should have a significant psychological impact in the area. We should be prepared to assist the subscribing area states to exploit this initial advantage with a view to cementing the new grouping and to countering the appeal of Communist and "Third bloc" propaganda. We shall wish to give continuing support to this type of psychological offensive and to utilize our own information and

cultural programs to strengthen the ties between the Charter signatories and the West.

US Participation

We would prefer that participation in the Charter and the organization set up thereunder be limited to the Middle Eastern states. If there were a strong desire among them for our participation, however, we should be prepared to subscribe to the Charter and, if necessary, join the organization. Our participation would, of course, raise the issue of participation by other non-area states. We should take the position that such participation could only occur by invitation of the Middle Eastern member states.

Other Considerations

Attitude of UK and France

The UK and France will probably not be enthusiastic about the formation of a new Middle Eastern grouping from which they would be excluded, initially at least, and which would undoubtedly have a strong anti-colonial bias. We should have to convince them that it was worth paying this price to bring about a larger, anti-Communist grouping in the area. We could point to the isolation of Egypt and Syria and to the likelihood that over time the new grouping would evolve into a vehicle for effective cooperation with the West.

Attitude of Israel

Israel will protest the creation of a new Middle Eastern grouping from which it is excluded and will renew its demands for some type of US guarantee. Israel's recent attack on Egypt leaves us in a better position to resist such demands and to maintain the position, stated by the Secretary in August 1955, that we would guarantee Israel's security in the context of a general Arab-Israel settlement.

Attitude of the USSR

We must anticipate a strong Soviet reaction, the intensity of which will increase with the success of the new Middle Eastern grouping. However, Embassy Moscow believes that in the absence of a renewal of hostilities in the Middle East the USSR would be unlikely to intervene militarily in the area, even if the US joined the Baghdad Pact. We believe that the establishment of the new grouping is unlikely to cause the USSR to resort to more drastic measures than US adherence to the Pact.

We can expect that the USSR would intensify its efforts to maintain and expand its influence in Egypt and Syria, and that these two countries, isolated as they would be, would be receptive to the Soviet effort. This situation emphasizes the necessity of other measures in the Middle East, such as a UN arms embargo against the parties to the Israel-Arab Armistice Agreements of 1949, to restrict Soviet capabilities with respect to Egypt and Syria. If these other measures can be brought into play, Egypt and Syria may in time find that they have no alternative, under their present or successor governments, to joining their neighbors in the new area grouping.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.80/12–356. Secret. Drafted by Mathews and Burdett on December 4.

² [Infra](#).

³ The source text bears the initials of all the officers listed.

⁴ Not found attached. A December 1 memorandum from Elbrick to Dulles is attached to a memorandum from Rountree to Dulles, October 3, 1957, in Department of State, Central Files, 786.5/10–357. Next to his initials here, Elbrick wrote: “(subject to three revisions)”. Presumably his memorandum spelled out those three revisions.

⁵ Next to his initials, MacArthur wrote: “I believe this is a good general idea to try out but doubt the feasibility of certain of the detailed suggestions.”

⁶ Next to his initials, Murphy wrote: “Do not concur,” and submitted as Tab B his memorandum, [Document 157](#).

⁷ Next to Henderson’s initials is the typewritten note: “(I believe this would be most difficult to execute—LWH)”. See [Document 162](#).

⁸ Not printed.

[9](#) A two-page “Timetable,” listing 12 steps to execute the program, is not printed.

[10](#) Not printed.

161. Paper Prepared in the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs and the Policy Planning Staff¹

Washington, December 5, 1956.

PROGRAM TO COUNTER SOVIET PENETRATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST

I. Essentials of the Problem

1. The primary threat to the interests of the United States and the West in the Middle East (especially oil, Suez Canal and pipelines) arises from Soviet efforts at penetration.
2. Soviet penetration is facilitated at present by three factors:
 - a. The ambitions of Nasser and the willingness of Nasser and the Syrians to work with the Soviets, especially to obtain arms.
 - b. The instability and divisions among the other Middle Eastern nations which fear Communist penetration.
 - c. The increased animosity toward the UK and France resulting from their military action against Egypt and intensified by the fact that their action was taken in conjunction with Israel's invasion of Egypt.
3. We must assume the Soviets will exploit whatever opportunities are available to enhance their influence in the Middle East. No direct means is available to us to stop them from doing so. Accordingly, our efforts to counter Soviet penetration must be directed primarily at curtailing the opportunities offered by the above factors or restricting Soviet means of exploiting them.

4. Any progress toward these objectives will require that the issue of troop withdrawals be disposed of. The UK and France have now announced their intention to withdraw their forces from Egypt, and Israel is in the process of withdrawing from the Sinai peninsula. Israel must also remove its forces from the Gaza strip and the islands in the Gulf of Aqaba.

II. Elements of a Program

1.

Our efforts to counter Soviet penetration must proceed on several fronts at the same time. An effective program must include measures to—

- a. Circumscribe Nasser's power and influence and to mobilize the UN and other opinion for actions that will serve this purpose.
- b. Close off access to Soviet arms for Egypt and Syria.
- c. Enhance the cohesion and sense of common interest among the anti-Communist actions of the area.
- d. Seal off or mitigate the Arab-Israeli conflict.

The program outlined below includes a series of actions intended to advance these several purposes and to reinforce one another.

2. The program cannot succeed without the support of the friendly countries of the area and a substantial majority within the UN—such a majority necessarily including a number of the so-called uncommitted countries. Both of these prerequisites will depend on the conviction in the Middle East and Asia that we are firmly committed to support genuine independence for the countries concerned. Our stand in the Egyptian crisis has reinforced this conviction and greatly increased our prestige and opportunity for leadership.

3.

In order to mobilize the requisite support, we will have to avoid several pitfalls:

a. We will have to counter suspicion that our aim is to dominate or control any of the countries or to reimpose British domination in a different form. For this reason, our actions will be largely self-defeating if they create a general impression that our objective is directly to overthrow Nasser.

b. Our actions must not appear to threaten the obvious security interests of the Soviet Union. Otherwise they will be considered by some to justify Soviet counteractions. Thus we must not appear to be seeking to make this area a base of operations for our own purposes as against the Soviet Union. Indeed, some of the necessary measures, especially in the UN, will have to be publicly justified on grounds other than the contest with the Soviet Union.

In short, our program must commend itself to the friendly states in the area and to the UN. We must count on the cumulative effect of the various measures [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] to frustrate Soviet penetration and use of Egypt and Syria for this purpose.

III. Proposed Program

1. The measures outlined hereunder should be pursued concurrently. It may be anticipated that Egypt will oppose all of them. We should play upon this opposition to stigmatize Egypt as an impediment to peace and progress in the Middle East. By so doing, we should be able to mobilize opinion against Nasser and to circumscribe his power and influence.

A. Proposal for Middle East Charter

2. A new framework for cohesion and cooperation among the Middle Eastern states that have some comprehension of the Soviet menace is urgently needed. The Baghdad Pact, particularly because of its reputation in the area as a British instrument, very probably cannot be adapted for this purpose. There are reasonably good prospects of forming a new grouping around a nucleus consisting of Iraq, Iran, Lebanon, Pakistan, Turkey and Saudi Arabia. Other potential members are Ethiopia, Jordan, Libya, Sudan and Yemen. Egypt and Syria would almost certainly refuse to join such a grouping.

3. The documentary basis of this new grouping would be a Middle East Charter setting forth the principles which the subscribing states believe should govern their relations with each other and the rest of the world. The Charter would include a strong anti-Communist declaration. We would encourage and bolster the new grouping by giving a unilateral commitment to support its members against Communist aggression and by providing substantial economic and some military assistance to the members. This concept is further developed in the paper entitled "Proposal for a New Grouping of Middle Eastern States".

B. Suez Canal and IPC Pipeline

4. We should urge the UN SYG to expedite the survey of the Suez Canal and to submit a report of the survey to the UNGA at the earliest possible date. We should continue to support the SYG in his efforts to begin the early clearance of the Canal either by unilateral US statements or by GA action as appropriate. We should at an appropriate time support a GA resolution endorsing the efforts being made by the SYG to bring about early agreement on a permanent regime for the Canal based on the six principles approved by the UNSC. We should also explore the possibilities of obtaining passage of a resolution putting the GA on record as favoring the prompt repair and return to operation of the IPC pipeline.

C. Israel-Arab Armistice Lines and Arms Embargo

5. We should continue to support the SYG, by such methods as may be appropriate, in his efforts to deploy the UNEF in the Gaza strip, on the islands in the Gulf of Aqaba and at key points along the Egypt-Israel Armistice Line. We should urge the SYG, once this deployment is achieved, to retain the UNEF in these positions until the GA is satisfied that the objectives of its resolutions with respect to the Egyptian crisis have been attained.

6. At a time and in circumstances that will not jeopardize the arrangements outlined in 5 and with particular regard to the likelihood of support by a substantial number of nations, we should introduce a resolution in the UNGA providing for UNEF patrol of all Arab-Israel armistice lines with the consent of the parties (see draft resolution attached). It is doubtful whether such consent [unknown amount of source text missing] the four contiguous Arab states until the GA determines that stable peace has been established in the area. It might well be difficult to get the necessary GA votes for this proposal, especially if it could be objected that this would deprive the four Arab states of the ability to defend themselves against their other neighbors. In order to meet this objection, we should explore the possibility of having the UN undertake some special obligation for the security of the states thereby deprived of further arms. This would also help to counter efforts to extend the ban to cover other countries.

D. Restraint of Israel

8. We should press Israel (a) to agree to the stationing of UNEF or to a substantial increase of the UNTSO observer corps on its armistice lines with Jordan, Syria and Lebanon, (b) to extend full cooperation to UNTSO and (c) to abandon its policy of dealing unilaterally with Arab incursions into Israel by reprisal raids. We should if necessary use the threat of US economic sanctions to ensure Israel's compliance.

E. Permanent Solution of Arab-Israel Conflict

9. We should press for UNGA action on a resolution, similar to the one we have tabled, providing for a GA committee to explore the possibilities of a

permanent settlement of the Arab-Israel conflict. We should make it clear that the committee would be expected to examine the problems of permanent boundaries and equitable arrangements for the reintegration of the Arab refugees into the political and economic life of the Middle East. Arrangements should be made to convene the GA in special session in the spring of 1957 to receive the committee's report or to avoid an adjournment of the Eleventh regular Assembly so that that it can reconvene promptly at the call of its President.

10. We should continue our support of UNRWA and reach an early decision on the question of UNGA action to transfer primary responsibility for the administration of refugee relief to host governments.

11. We should consider at a later stage the utility of establishing a UN agency to stimulate and coordinate economic development and cultural cooperation in the Middle East. Such an agency might facilitate the resettlement and rehabilitation of the Arab refugees and, in time, provide a bridge for cooperation between Israel and the Arab States.

IV. Understanding With UK and France

1. We should inform the UK and France of the foregoing program, pointing out that it is directed toward countering Soviet penetration in the Middle East and circumscribing Nasser's power and influence. It would, therefore, serve their interests as well as ours. In adopting this program, we have had very much in mind the vital importance of the Middle East to Western Europe.

2. We should seek to convince the UK and France that they should, for the time being at least, avoid injecting themselves in the Middle East and leave to the US the primary responsibility of restoring the Western position in the area. We should make it clear to them that in our view the methods they have recently been following will only increase Soviet opportunities and capabilities.

[Here follows the text of a draft resolution to be placed before the U.N. General Assembly concerning the Arab-Israeli dispute.]

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 661.80/12–556. Secret. Forwarded to Secretary Dulles under cover of a December 5 memorandum from Bowie and Rountree, indicating that the paper was a revised version of the one discussed at the December 3 meeting and should be considered in conjunction with the paper attached at Tab A, [supra](#). Wilcox, Phleger, and Barnes concurred in the paper. The Bureau of European Affairs concurred in the general approach. Murphy noted on the source text: “comments forthcoming.” Henderson concurred “subject to reservation favoring Baghdad Pact.” MacArthur submitted no comments on the paper.

162. Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration (Henderson) to the Secretary of State¹

Washington, December 6, 1956.

SUBJECT

Middle East

I have initialed a document prepared in NEA² describing a plan for the Middle East which would include what might be called a charter of relations between the Middle East and the West. I have initialed this document with two reservations: (1) I would prefer for us to move forward in the Middle East by joining the Baghdad Pact and by endeavoring at the same time to strengthen our relations with those Arab countries which show a sincere willingness to have close relations with us. (2) In case our decision not to join the Baghdad Pact is firm, we might try out the plan proposed. My reservation is that it will probably be extremely difficult to succeed in carrying out the plan and that we should engage in considerable exploratory work before embarking upon it.

Baghdad Pact

I realize that the Baghdad Pact is in a feeble condition. It is being attacked by Moscow, the anti-West Arabs, and by the neutralists led by Nehru. One of its weaknesses is that it has the reputation of being a British instrument. It will continue to have that reputation unless we join it and begin to play a more vigorous role with regard to it. I do not think that we should be unduly worried merely because the British are in it. We must at some time or other have a rapprochement with the British in the Middle East. I believe it would be short-sighted of us to proceed on the basis that the British are "done for" in the Middle East. If, for instance, the United Kingdom should make a sharp change in British attitude with regard to the Middle East, a change comparable to that made in India in 1946, I believe that in a short time we would see British prestige and strength improve in that area. It would be unfortunate if the British should reappear in the Middle East full of

bitterness stemming from the fact that when they seemed to be down and out in that area we treated them as pariahs and did nothing to help them again to become respectable.

We have a reputation, which I believe is unearned, in the Middle East of lack of stability in our relations with that area. We are said to grow hot and cold, to be uncertain of ourselves, to take certain positions for a time only to abandon them, leaving those who are supporting us out on a limb. There is now a feeling among the supporters of the Baghdad Pact that we may be about to leave them out on such a limb.

Take Iran for example. For years we have been endeavoring to persuade the Iranians that it would be impossible for Iran to continue as an independent state if it should try to play the role of a neutral as between the free world and the Soviet bloc. In 1955 we actually brought pressure on Iran to join the Baghdad Pact. At the last moment, however, when Iran had already decided to join the Pact, we suddenly drew back and advised the Iranian Government that it must follow its best judgment. Iran, therefore, joined the Pact somewhat puzzled as to what our real feelings were with respect to the Pact.

Last spring when I attended the Baghdad Pact Conference in Tehran, I pledged the support of the United States for the Pact. We agreed to participate in most activities of the Pact but not to join it. I believe that our position of giving support to the Baghdad Pact, while hesitating to join it, creates a lack of respect for us among both the supporters and the enemies of the Pact. It seems to me that we would be in a stronger position if we should go forward firmly and join the Baghdad Pact; if we should give more generous support to the nations which are members of the Baghdad Pact; and if we should treat them frankly as allies. We should, of course, not act in a provocative manner. We should, for instance, make it clear that we have no intention in time of peace of installing military bases in Iran. We should stress that our membership in the Pact does not mean that in the future we shall not continue to take a position with regard to disputes in the area on the basis of merit.

I believe that before joining the Baghdad Pact we should send a special emissary to Ibn Saud explaining why we are doing so and we should do our

utmost to persuade Saudi Arabia to join with us. We should do likewise with regard to Lebanon. It might also be helpful for us to notify Syria, Egypt, and Jordan in advance of our intentions and to point out that we hope eventually they will join the Pact. We should also inform the governments of North Africa of our reasons for joining the Pact and elicit their support.

I realize that we must take the Senate into consideration. The leaders in both Houses should be consulted in advance. If we can convince them of the desirability of our adhering to the Pact, we should join and put our adherence up to the Senate for ratification.

If we are to act we should do so quickly. It might even be possible for the President to prepare Mr. Nehru for such action when the latter visits Washington. He might tell Nehru that we are considering adherence, and that our decision to join would not mean that we are taking sides with Pakistan against India or that we are trying to form a Moslem bloc which could be injurious to the interests of India. It might be made clear to Nehru that this Pact in our opinion gives the best promise of stability in the Middle East and that without stability the situation in the Middle East is certain to degenerate further with consequent bad effects upon India itself.

The question will, of course, arise with regard to how our adherence would be received by Israel and the supporters of Israel. It seems to me that simultaneously with our joining the Pact, we should make an all-out determined effort to bring about a settlement of the Israel problem. I believe NEA has some recommendations in this regard. I assume that the President will endeavor to obtain the support of Nehru in connection with our efforts to find a solution of this dangerous dispute.

L.W.H.

¹ Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 58 D 460, Baghdad Pact, 1956. Secret.

² [Document 160](#).

163. Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation Between the President in Augusta, Georgia, and the Secretary of State in Washington, December 6, 1956, 4:50 p.m.¹

Washington, December 6, 1956, 4:50 p.m.

The Sec said he had three matters to take up with the Pres. (1) Re the Pres meeting tomorrow with Wilson and the Joint Chiefs, they may bring up the Baghdad Pact. The Sec said they were anxious to have us join. The Sec said he had considerable reservations, and that Wilson had said he would not ask the Pres to make a decision in his (Sec Dulles) absence. The Sec said it was a political decision. The Sec said he had had a long talk with the Ambassadors of the four Baghdad Pact countries—a full and frank exchange. The Sec said he had asked them suppose we can't get a 2/3 vote of Congress to join the Baghdad Pact without guaranteeing the same sort of thing to Israel, would you still want us to join? The Sec said none of the Ambassadors knew the answer to that. He said they also recognize the problem of getting Saudi Arabia in too. The Sec said he wanted the Pres to know that we are thinking actively of the problem and that he wanted to be sure the Pres knew of his own reservations about joining.

[Here follows discussion of Yugoslavia, Hungary, Austria, a personnel matter, and the President's return to Washington.]

¹ Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, White House Telephone Conversations. Transcribed by Carolyn J. Proctor. A note on the source text indicates that she was able to hear only Secretary Dulles' part of the conversation.

164. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree) to the Secretary of State¹

Washington, December 7, 1956.

SUBJECT

U. S. Position on Middle East Problems

Discussion:

Recent hostilities in the Middle East have contributed to producing a new and alarming situation in the area. The general British and French position has been gravely affected. Soviet prestige and influence, particularly in Syria and Egypt, have attained disturbing proportions, and an excellent opportunity exists for the USSR to move politically into the vacuum which has been created by the recent and drastic decline in Western authority in the Middle East. Jordan and Saudi Arabia might also be affected once Syria and Egypt fall under strong Soviet influence.

The situation in the Middle East cannot be allowed to drift. The United States is the only Western power which can provide effective leadership to combat Soviet influence and to revive and strengthen Middle Eastern ties with the West. We must accept and discharge this responsibility.

In considering what steps we might take we have been reassessing the United States' relationship with the Baghdad Pact. We have considered the wisdom of 1) U.S. adherence to the Pact and perhaps alter its nature in such a way as to make it more acceptable to other states in the area, thus increasing its scope and effectiveness in stiffening the Middle East against Soviet penetration and 2) a new grouping of Middle East states in an organization in which the United States would be an active participant. This latter proposal is the subject of a separate memorandum (Tab B).²

We have reached no conclusion as to which of these alternatives, or whether either of them, would be the best basis upon which we should proceed. As you know, there are strong proponents and equally strong opponents of each alternative. Perhaps it would be wise before reaching a decision as to what steps the United States should take with respect to the Baghdad Pact for you to discuss the matter with the British in view of the major role which the U.K. has played in the past and because of the present British interest in the area. British prestige, although badly damaged in the Middle East, continues to be of importance throughout the world and its support for U.S. policy will therefore be highly desirable, if not essential. During the course of the forthcoming NATO meeting in Paris there will be opportunities for discussion with the British. During this period it will also become clearer how events are shaping up in Egypt and whether the UN is in firm control of the situation, which will have an important bearing on future U.S. action in other parts of the area.

Depending upon the conclusions reached following your discussion with the British, we have in mind a subsequent approach to the Middle East members of the Pact and other appropriate states regarding future steps. The United States would indicate its intention to assume a more prominent role in the Middle East and would state that it was giving consideration as to how it could best associate itself with the states of the area.

For purposes of convenience, there are attached short summaries of papers relating to possible U.S. adherence to the Baghdad Pact and to a new grouping of Middle Eastern states, together with other documents bearing upon these subjects (Tabs A–G).³

Recommendation:

That you discuss in confidence, with U.K. representatives at Paris,⁴ possible U.S. adherence to the Baghdad Pact and/or the creation of a new and expanded area organization.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.00/12–756. Top Secret. Drafted by Rountree.

² Tab B is a summary of Tab A to [Document 160](#).

³ Tab A is a summary of Tab A to [Document 145](#); Tab C is a summary of Henderson's memorandum, [Document 162](#); Tab D is a summary of Murphy's December 3 memorandum, [Document 157](#), retyped and dated December 6; Tab E is a summary of Secretary of Defense Wilson's December 4 letter to Secretary Dulles, [Document 159](#); Tab F is a two-page summary of telegrams from Embassies overseas reporting reactions to the November 29 U.S. statement on the Baghdad Pact; and Tab G is the text of the U.S. statement, [Document 152](#). Also attached as Tab H is the text of the Baghdad Pact.

⁴ A handwritten marginal notation in the margin of the source text in an unidentified hand reads: "not French."

**165. Informal Record of a Meeting, Secretary Dulles' Office,
Department of State, Washington, December 7, 1956, 11 a.m.¹**

Washington, December 7, 1956, 11 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary

The Under Secretary

Mr. Murphy

Mr. Henderson

Mr. MacArthur

Mr. Phleger

Mr. Bowie

Mr. Rountree

Mr. Wilcox

Mr. McCardle

Mr. Allen Dulles (for part of meeting)

Mr. Wilkins

Mr. Jones (WE)

Mr. Sisco

Mr. Memminger

Mr. Burdett

Mr. Mathews

Mr. Greene (S/S)

SUBJECT

Middle East

The meeting considered NEA's revised proposal for a new Middle East grouping (S/S Staff Study 7928) and had before it a paper on countering Soviet penetration² and a recommendation by Mr. Rountree that the Secretary discuss the question of the Baghdad Pact with the British at Paris.³ The Secretary was particularly interested in connection with the proposal for the Middle East Charter in the question whether the concept would or should include both the Arab countries and the stronger, but non-Arab Muslim countries, Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan. There was considerable discussion of this point and of the relationship to it of India's attitude and activities. Mr. Bowie suggested that the problem is to find a vehicle for meeting the desire of the Arab Governments, particularly Saudi Arabia and Iraq, for a convincing demonstration of US intention to make its power felt in the area in a manner which would not smack of imperialism and which would leave the initiative to local countries.

Mr. Henderson expounded the thought that the Baghdad Pact is symbolic of their decision to associate themselves with the West. As it includes the UK, which has recently been involved in Egypt, the Baghdad Pact has become a rallying point for domestic opposition to some of the governments in whose stability we are most interested. It is important, therefore, that we reaffirm our support for the Pact.

Mr. Hoover expressed a preference for the bilateral approach mentioned in Mr. Murphy's dissenting memorandum.⁴

The Secretary observed that it was not a good idea to undertake a government-to-government commitment such as US adherence to the Baghdad Pact simply to bolster one man and his government, e.g. Nuri; if

bolstering him is desirable, other ways should be found to do it. Mr. Rountree noted that it is not proposed that the US pursue the Middle East Charter as an alternative to joining the Baghdad Pact unless preliminary soundings show that Saudi Arabia would be willing to participate in the Charter. He recommended that before sounding out the Saudis the Secretary should go over the ground with the British, perhaps in Paris next week.

The Secretary indicated his approval of the recommendation in Mr. Rountree's memorandum, i.e., that the question of our adherence and the Charter idea should be discussed with the British at Paris.

He also wondered whether our first problem of getting Egypt to agree to some sort of international supervision over the Suez Canal would be helped or hindered by whatever we do on the Baghdad Pact or the Middle East Charter. In response to Mr. Rountree's suggestion that it was not proposed to go ahead with new steps on the Pact or with the Charter until the Suez Canal problem is settled, the Secretary said that in his view the Suez agreement would be slow in coming and therefore the question is whether the situation in the area will hold together until Suez is buttoned up. On balance, he was inclined to think that over the next few months, while an effort is being made to solve the Suez question, we should try to deal with the other questions on a bilateral basis and thus should not try the Charter idea yet. We should also continue to support the Baghdad Pact and in fact should give it more support than we have in the past. He added that he thought the odds against the Charter idea are very great. He agreed that the Saudis are the key but thought they would be unlikely to come along quickly, and their readiness may in due course depend on the outcome of our base negotiations. He also considered an important element in the Saudi attitude the large number of Egyptians who have penetrated the Saudi Government.

In a discussion of other aspects of the Middle East problem, the Secretary:

- (1) Agreed that the US resolution on Suez which has been introduced in the UN⁵ should remain in abeyance for the time being to allow the Secretary-General time to continue to try to work out a solution with the British, French and Egyptians;

(2) Expressed general agreement with Mr. Phleger's account of manner in which IBRD planned to assist SYG with funds for Canal clearance and agreed that the US Government should continue to block Egyptian balances in this country until the question of payment for clearing the Canal is settled;

(3) Asked that some kind of resolution, if not exactly the one which the US has already introduced, on the Arab-Israeli dispute⁶ be brought before the General Assembly before the latter recesses for Christmas;

(4) Asked that consideration be given to giving the Egyptians in writing a statement pointing out that the US has, at the cost of considerable difficulty with its traditional friends and Allies, stood by its pledged word in respect to the Middle East and we would, therefore, like to know from the Egyptians that they intend to adjust their behavior and particularly to stop the many provocative actions which lead to the British and French intervention in the first place. The Secretary felt the timing of this operation might be at about the completion of the British and French withdrawal from Egypt.

JG

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.80/12-756. Secret. Drafted by Greene.

² [Documents 160](#) and [161](#).

³ *Supra*.

⁴ [Document 157](#).

⁵ Reference is to the draft resolution introduced in the U.N. General Assembly on November 3. (U.N. Doc. A/3273) For text, see the editorial note, [vol. XVI, p. 960](#).

⁶ Reference is to the draft resolution introduced in the U.N. General Assembly on November 3. (U.N. Doc. A/3272) For text, see *ibid*.

166. Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation Between the President and the Secretary of State, Washington, December 8, 1956, 11:53 a.m.¹

Washington, December 8, 1956, 11:53 a.m.

TELEPHONE CALL FROM PRESIDENT

[Here follows a brief discussion of another matter.]

The Sec then said he wished to discuss the Middle East situation. He apparently listed 3 alternatives before cjp got on phone. Sec then said he, Phleger who was with him, Hoover, preferred the course of action calling for a Congressional resolution authorizing Pres to make arrangements for military cooperation, appropriations for expenditure, etc., quoting parts of his Draft #2 Joint Resolution,² which would give both military and economic bait. Sec said this would show, particularly with Congressional adherence, our determination to make our presence known in the area. It would also give us maneuverability in the area, which would not exist through the Baghdad Pact or a new pact which would have great difficulties. The Pres said he believed if we proceed we could carry two strings in the bow, both No. 1 and No. 3 proposals. If we should get Saudi Arabia and Lebanon to adhere to Pact we could go in with them and that would be wonderful. The Sec mentioned the problem of Jewish and non-Jewish elements, both of which would get something from Resolution proposal. The Pres said in argument on the other side that as a member of the BP we would guarantee that nothing would be done as a Pact to harm Israel. The Sec said he was under great pressure from a Senatorial group headed by Javits to give assurances of security to Israel because of our statement last week about determination to help BP. The Pres said the BP has never indicated latter was not actually in the Charter of the hostility to Israel, it is only a defense against Communism. The Sec said that this BP, and that of course whereas it should be a defense against Communism, it had been perverted to an instrument of Arab politics. The Pres said that one price of our BP adherence would be a bilateral agreement with Israel. The Sec said he had mentioned this to the Ambassadors of the BP countries and

they had said they would not want that. The Pres said he was looking for a package deal, EC, SOC, etc., which would put us in a better position with them all. The Pres said that re Israel if we do anything to break up the Arab world they will feel safe, this is just cold politics. The Sec said that evidence we have at the moment is that Saudi Arabia would not join BP. Pres said then he agreed you would have to go ahead with the 3rd alternative (the Resolution). The Sec said that re the Pres making the presentation in his Inaugural Address, he would have to give State of Union first. The Pres said this was a great question of high policy and he thought would fit into ceremonial occasion. He had mentioned it to Emmett Hughes. The Sec said he felt the Pres would have to seek the Congressional authority at the beginning of Congress. The Pres said he would do so.

¹ Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, White House Telephone Conversations. Transcribed by Carolyn J. Proctor.

² Not found attached.

167. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Secretary of State and Senator William F. Knowland, Secretary Dulles' Residence, Washington, December 8, 1956, Noon–1:15 p.m.¹

Washington, December 8, 1956, 1:15 p.m.

[Here follows discussion of unrelated subjects.]

I then talked in considerable detail about the Middle East situation stating that it seemed basic that the United States must make its presence more strongly felt in the area. There seemed to be three choices: (1) To join the Baghdad Pact; (2) To try to organize a new grouping; and (3) To deal on a bilateral basis with some maneuverability. This latter I suggested should be on the basis of a Congressional resolution authorizing the President to use the Armed Forces and to spend certain sums to bolster the military defense abilities and economies of countries whose governments showed a determination to combat Communist infiltration.

I said that I had come to the conclusion that this third choice was the best. There were grave liabilities which attach to the Baghdad Pact and the process of creating a new organization would be full of delays and pitfalls. Senator Knowland indicated general concurrence without any commitment as to details. He said that it might be difficult to get the votes to adhere to the Baghdad Pact without some pact for Israel and that if the two pacts were tied together it might be impossible to get a two-thirds majority for either. The Senator did, however, suggest that if Israeli troops were withdrawn, if there was sort of a UN trusteeship in the Gaza Strip and if the UN troops could create an effective cordon to separate the Israelis from the Arabs, then some sort of a pact might be considered, but he doubted that without meeting these conditions the Senate would want to buy into the kind of feuding and reprisals that had been characteristic of the former period.

The Senator said there would be difficulty in boosting very much the foreign aid although perhaps the President would enjoy during this Session

a new “honeymoon”. I said I thought there would probably have to be somewhat more military and economic aid for the Middle East, although if Communist China indicated a non-belligerent attitude, we might be able to cut a little off of our Far Eastern commitments. I said there might have to be some aid to Europe but this could not very well be calculated at the moment other than financial aid to support the pound sterling.

Senator Knowland asked how soon I thought the Canal might be brought into operation, and I said I hoped that this might be within six weeks, at least for the smaller vessels. I said the important thing was the opening up of the Iraq pipeline through Syria. The Senator agreed that this was very important.

The Senator said that he believed that our Middle East policies had been thoroughly sound and would go down in history as being a landmark in the development of world order.

[Here follows discussion of unrelated subjects.]

¹ Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Memoranda of Conversations. Secret; Personal and Private. Drafted by Dulles on December 9.

168. Memorandum From the Acting Secretary of State to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Murphy)¹

Washington, December 10, 1956.

Just before leaving for the NATO meeting in Paris on the afternoon of December 8, Secretary Dulles discussed with me several matters on Middle East policy.

(1) The Secretary said that he had discussed with Mr. Phleger that morning the tentative draft of a joint resolution which would be presented to Congress by the President at the coming session. The Secretary said that he had a rough draft of his own, which he had compared with two alternate drafts presented by Mr. Phleger, and that he had requested Mr. Phleger to combine them into a single proposal with certain comments of his own thereon. Mr. Phleger is fully cognizant of the Secretary's views.

(2) The Secretary said that after full consideration he had decided that our policy in the Middle East should be maintained, as at present, on a bilateral basis, and that we should not engage in a multilateral approach such as that which was implicit in the Baghdad Pact. I told the Secretary that I was in full concurrence with his views and that I believed they were also the views of the responsible area heads in the Department.

(3) It is my suggestion that you ask Mr. Rountree to get together with Mr. Henderson and Mr. Phleger as a task force to thoroughly examine the projected joint resolution and have a final draft for the Secretary's consideration upon his return from Paris.²

H.H. Jr.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.80/12-1056. Secret.

² A marginal notation by Murphy reads: “Done”.

169. Memorandum of a Conversation, Ambassador Dillon's Residence, Paris, December 10, 1956, 9:45 a.m.¹

Paris, December 10, 1956, 9:45 a.m.

USDel/MC/1/1

PARTICIPANTS

United States

The Secretary

Mr. Macomber

United Kingdom

Mr. Selwyn Lloyd

Mr. Denis Laskey

SUBJECT

Baghdad Pact

During his conversation, Mr. Lloyd turned to the Baghdad Pact and wondered what the US attitude regarding the Pact should be. He said he understood the US was considering joining the Pact. The Secretary confirmed that we were considering this action but no final decision had been reached. He said that the balance of opinion seemed to be against it although a final decision would not be made until he had discussed it with the President after returning to Washington.

The Secretary said that the US had definitely decided that it was necessary to make our presence more felt in the area. He said that we were considering three alternatives. He cautioned Mr. Lloyd not to draw any final

conclusions as to our course of action. We had not ourselves reached such conclusions.

He said the first possibility we were considering was to join the Baghdad Pact. However, he said if we did so at this time we would antagonize the Saudis. He said that we could not get them to join the Pact at this time—and probably not as long as the Buraimi issue was outstanding. The Secretary said that he thought Saudi Arabia in time could be built up as the best counter to Nasser. [*3½ lines of source text not declassified*] If we join the Pact now it would anger the Saudis. Also it would make it more difficult to resolve the Canal status with Nasser. The Secretary said, however, that the main consideration against joining the Pact was the problem it would create for us regarding Israel. He said that last week the four Baghdad Pact Ambassadors had called on him in Washington urging us to join the Pact. He had asked them whether they would still want us to do so if at the same time we had to give similar guarantees to Israel. The Iraq Ambassador said “No”. The Turkish Ambassador said “Yes” and the others were undecided.

The Secretary said that the likelihood was that we could not get the necessary votes in the Senate to join the Baghdad Pact without at the same time proposing a counter arrangement with Israel. Even at that he doubted that we could get either arrangement through the Senate.

For all these reasons the Secretary indicated that it was doubtful that we would decide to join the Pact although he stressed we were interested in seeing the development and strengthening of the northern tier group.

The Secretary said the second possibility we were considering would be to develop another Pact with another name and with somewhat broader Arab participants. He said he was inclined against this suggestion as he did not have much faith in the ability of the Arabs to unite for any constructive purpose. He said that the only thing the Arabs were unified on was their hatred of Israel and, temporarily, their opposition to France and the UK.

The third possibility we were considering was a Congressional resolution somewhat similar to the Formosa resolution which would be passed by both

Houses of Congress. This resolution would authorize the President to take stronger action in the area than is now possible. The idea would be to use that authority to support the Baghdad Pact and other activities in the area.

The Secretary again stressed that no final conclusion had been reached and indicated that the Nehru visit would probably delay our reaching a conclusion. Mr. Lloyd thought that Nehru's influence would be against these proposals. The Secretary said that he had meant that the presence of Nehru in Washington and Gettysburg would postpone the opportunity to settle these matters. [*1½ lines of source text not declassified*]

The Secretary ended this part of the conversation by repeating to Mr. Lloyd what he had told the four Baghdad Pact Ambassadors. He had said to them that he could not tell what the US would do but that they could tell their Governments "to be of good courage" because we are going to do something. We are not going to let a vacuum exist in their area.

The Secretary then said that he had reviewed his current thinking on the Middle East in greater intimacy with Mr. Lloyd than he had with all but three or four members of the State Department. He asked Mr. Lloyd to hold this information to as limited a number of his colleagues as possible. He went on to say that we would have to reach a decision before the first of January, as a bipartisan Congressional meeting was being held on that date.

Mr. Lloyd, in commenting on the proposed resolution, said he gathered that as a result of this resolution we would be likely to put observers on the military committee as well as the economic committee of the Baghdad Pact and "that sort of thing".

Other Matters to be Raised by Mr. Lloyd

Mr. Lloyd said there were a number of other subjects he had wished to raise with the Secretary. The Secretary said they would have to arrange to meet again this week. Mr. Lloyd mentioned that the other matters he wished to take up were:

1. The whole question of arms to the Middle East.
2. Libya.
3. [1 line of source text not declassified]
4. Persian Gulf and possible military action there.

[2 paragraphs (6 lines of source text) not declassified]

¹ Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 62 D 181, CF 814. Secret. Prepared by the U.S. Delegation to the North Atlantic Council Ministerial Meeting. The source text bears the following marginal notation by Macomber: "OK WM." Secretary Dulles was in Paris December 9–14 to attend the 18th Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council. For additional documentation on discussions at the Ministerial Meeting pertaining to the Middle East, see [vol. XVI, pp. 1278–1306](#).

170. Special National Intelligence Estimate¹

Washington, December 14, 1956.

SNIE 30-7-56

PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES OF US ADHERENCE OR NON-ADHERENCE TO THE BAGHDAD PACT

The Problem

To estimate the consequences of alternative US courses of action with respect to the Baghdad Pact.

Conclusions

1. The effects of US adherence to the Baghdad Pact would largely depend on subsequent US policies in the area. Nevertheless, we believe that US accession to the pact would be widely regarded, at least initially, as a strong indication of US intention to oppose more actively and directly the extension of Soviet influence in the Middle East and to take a firmer stand against the efforts of Nasser and others to undermine the Western position in the area. The self-confidence and prestige of the Baghdad Pact governments and of Western-oriented elements in the other Arab states would be considerably enhanced and that of their opponents reduced. US adherence would enable the US to assume leadership of coordinated military planning and training, thus remedying a weakness which has become especially apparent with the decline of UK strength in the area. It would probably also facilitate US access to bases in the pact countries. (Paras. 9-10, 12, 19)

2. On the other hand, US adherence to the pact would involve particular responsibilities and hazards. The pact countries would almost certainly regard US adherence as acknowledgment of their claims to preferential economic, military, and especially political support. Nasser and his supporters, with Soviet encouragement,

would probably try to strengthen their hold on Syria and Jordan and intimidate pro-Western elements in Iraq and Lebanon. We believe that Egypt and Syria are already going about as far in the direction of involvement with the Bloc as they now deem prudent, and that fear of losing their independence will continue to serve as a restraining influence. However, if US membership in the Baghdad Pact, and subsequent US policies in the Middle Eastern area, should later convince them that the US had turned against them and firmly aligned itself with their local rivals and that they could no longer profit by playing the US and the USSR against each other, they would probably be less prudent in their relations with the USSR than they have hitherto been while still attempting to preserve their independence. The Asian neutrals would tend to lose the disposition they have recently shown to support the US position on Middle Eastern matters in the UN. (Paras. 13–16, 18)

3. The effect of a decision by the US not to join would also depend very largely on subsequent policies which the US might follow. By staying out of the pact the US would probably retain some extra room for maneuver in dealing with Arab-Asian nationalism and with the USSR. However, effective cooperation in situations in which their interests are not identical with those of the US by Nasser (Egypt), Nuwar (Jordan), and Sarraj (Syria) is highly unlikely even if the US refrains from joining the pact. In view of the present disrepute of the UK in the Middle East and without full US participation and support, the Baghdad Pact would almost certainly lose its potential as a military component integrated with Western defense arrangements. As a political association, it would probably be kept alive by its Moslem members if they were given US support.² In the absence of US adherence or some effective alternative US policy, the member governments, especially Iraq, would be in an exposed position in the face of Egyptian and Soviet pressures. (Paras. 19–22)

Discussion

4. Uncertainty about US policy in the Middle East, as exemplified particularly in the US relationship to the Baghdad Pact,³ has been an important factor in the complex power struggle which has been going on in the Middle East over the last two years. Despite its failure to join, the US has shared in the opprobrium vented against the pact and its members by the USSR, by India and other Asian neutralists, and by Egypt and its Arab friends. Opponents of the pact have directly and indirectly sought to discourage US adherence. Its Middle East members, in turn, have repeatedly pressed the US to make a firm and open commitment to the pact. Although this pressure abated somewhat after the US decision in early 1956 to participate in the economic and countersubversive activities of the pact organization and to sit in as observer on the military side, these states remained unsatisfied. Pressure for US adherence was again applied following Egypt's nationalization of the Suez Canal at the end of July 1956 and, in the wake of the Anglo-French military intervention in Egypt, has now been renewed with special urgency by the four Middle East members of the group.

5. The present members of the Baghdad Pact group joined it for widely varying reasons. While Turkey and the UK, and to a lesser degree the other members, were influenced by a genuine desire to develop a more effective defensive posture vis-à-vis the USSR in the Middle East, each adherent also hoped that membership would advance its special national interests in the area. The ruling groups of Iraq, Iran, and Pakistan probably expected to gain additional external support for maintaining themselves in power. Iran also hoped for a US security commitment with increased military aid. Pakistan was primarily motivated by a desire to improve its military position vis-à-vis India, and to extend its influence in the Moslem Middle East. Iraq adhered mainly in hopes of increasing its influence in the Arab world, obtaining a politically more acceptable form of defense agreement with the UK, and assuring an increase of US military aid. The differences of interest among the members and the anomalous position of the US have inhibited the development of a strong organization.

6. Nevertheless, the Middle East governments in the pact organization have for one reason or another all felt that their political and national interests would be best served by close ties with the West and with the US in particular, and that adherence to the pact was the best means of assuring increased US interest and support. Their present leaders, who are for the most part conservatives with pro-Western leanings, distrust the type of nationalism represented by Mossadeq and the RCC regime in Egypt. Their feeling that positive US action is needed has been greatly intensified in recent weeks as a result of Nasser's success in riding out the intervention storm, the increased power and influence of the USSR in the Middle East, and the intense bitterness which has been generated throughout much of the Arab-Asian world against the Baghdad Pact's sole Western member, the UK.

7. Opposition to the Baghdad Pact has been various and complex in motivation. Although the pact is only one factor among many which have caused strains and pressures in the Middle East, it has served as one of the focal points for anti-Western sentiment in the area, and as a target for propaganda attacks on the West. It has been included in Nehru's criticism of military pacts in general as tending to create discord and diminish the prospects of peace. It is also considered in India as further evidence of US support of Pakistan vis-à-vis India. Nasser has viewed the pact as a threat to his leadership in the Arab world and as a new intrusion of Western colonialism. Egypt and Syria have both regarded it as a UK-US device to build up Iraq, and have used it as one justification for looking to the Soviet Union for material aid. Many Arabs have seen the pact as a means by which the Western Powers might attempt to force a peace with Israel. The USSR has probably regarded the pact as a step toward the extension of the area of Western bases along its exposed southwestern flank.

8. On 29 November 1956 the US issued a statement reaffirming its support of the Baghdad Pact and asserting that it would view any threat to the "territorial integrity or political independence" of

Middle Eastern pact members with the “utmost gravity.” This statement will probably provide the Baghdad Pact governments with some added sense of security, and give them some assistance in replying to domestic criticism. However, it will almost certainly not satisfy their demands for US adherence to the pact.

Consequences of Early US Adherence to the Baghdad Pact

9. Early US adherence to the Baghdad Pact would be regarded at least initially as a strong indication of US intention to oppose more actively and directly the extension of Soviet influence in the Middle East, and to take a firmer stand against the efforts of Nasser and others to undermine the Western position in the area. As a result, such a decision would have a considerable effect in dissipating the impression of US indecision which, over the last two years, has discouraged the Baghdad Pact governments, weakened the will of friendly or uncommitted elements in other Arab states to stand up against Egyptian or Soviet-inspired anti-Western pressures, and encouraged greater boldness on the part of those seeking to undermine the Western position.

10. At least initially, the self-confidence and prestige of the Baghdad Pact governments and of Western-oriented elements in the other Arab states would be considerably enhanced. Waverers and opportunists among the Arab leaders would probably be more cautious about contracting ties with the Bloc. In time, other Middle Eastern countries might adhere to the pact. The pro-Western government in Lebanon, for example, would probably be interested in joining if convinced that it would achieve sufficient backing to protect Lebanon from probable counterpressures. Although Saudi Arabia has opposed the Baghdad Pact in the past and has followed a generally pro-Egyptian line, King Saud is desirous of strengthening his country's ties to the US. Recently King Saud has become concerned about the revolutionary and pro-Soviet aspects of Egyptian and Syrian policy and about the financial ill-effects of Egyptian sabotage of the Suez Canal, and it is possible that this opposition to the pact may diminish.

However, at present it appears unlikely that Saudi Arabia could sufficiently reconcile its conflicts of interest with the UK and the Hashemites to permit it to join the pact. It also appears unlikely on the basis of present evidence that Jordan could be induced to join.

11. US adherence would be welcomed by the UK, France, and probably most other Western European countries as an indication that a forceful US policy on Middle Eastern matters was emerging. It might lead these countries to believe that, despite US disapproval of Anglo-French military intervention in Egypt, the US would cooperate in other measures to protect the special Western position and interests in the Middle East.

12. The effect of US adherence to the Baghdad Pact on the military situation in the area would depend mainly upon the concrete performance of the US under the pact. The US would from the time of joining be enabled to participate in and assume leadership in coordinated military planning and training; this would remedy a weakness which has become especially apparent with the decline of UK strength in the area. US membership in the pact would probably facilitate US access to bases in the pact countries. However, any effort to establish effective indigenous defense components in the pact area as a whole would be a difficult and lengthy, and probably costly process. If the US attempted to meet the probable demands of the individual pact countries the cost would be greatly increased.

13. US adherence to the Baghdad Pact would also involve particular responsibilities and hazards. US membership would be effective over any appreciable length of time only if it were the first step in a more positive regional policy. The Baghdad Pact countries would almost certainly regard US adherence to the pact as acknowledgment of their claims to preferential economic, military, and especially political support. They would probably regard the US as committed to support them against their rivals in the present arms race in the area. If the US did not give broad

support to the pact members, their present misgivings about the wisdom of a pro-pact, pro-US policy probably would recur and might become intensified. There would be a growing tendency to regard the act of adherence and any minor aid received in connection with it as empty gestures designed merely to propitiate the Baghdad Pact group.

14. US adherence to the Baghdad Pact would arouse bitter opposition in Egypt, Syria, and Jordan. Nasser and his supporters would regard such a move as a threat to their interests in the area, and would probably react with efforts to strengthen their hold on Syria and Jordan and to undermine and intimidate pro-Western elements in Iraq and Lebanon. They might resort to organized sabotage of Tapline, ARAMCO, and other US properties in the Middle East. They would almost certainly consider the US move as justification for an intensified anti-Western policy. We believe that Egypt and Syria are already going about as far in the direction of involvement with the Bloc as they now deem prudent, and that fear of losing their independence will continue to serve as a restraining influence. However, if US membership in the Baghdad Pact, and subsequent US policies in the Middle Eastern area, should later convince them that the US had turned against them and firmly aligned itself with their local rivals and that they could no longer profit by playing the US and the USSR against each other, they would probably be less prudent in their relations with the USSR than they have hitherto been while still attempting to preserve their independence.

15. The USSR has long regarded elimination of the Baghdad Pact as an important goal of its Middle East policy. US adherence would probably increase Soviet fears about the extension of US military power in the area. Although it would almost certainly provide additional deterrents to direct Soviet military intervention in the area covered by the pact, the USSR would probably intensify its activities in other Middle Eastern countries. The USSR would almost certainly encourage Egypt and Syria in their efforts to counteract the US move, and would probably furnish, or

offer to furnish, increased amounts of military equipment and technical personnel. Local competition for arms would probably thus be stimulated. The USSR would almost certainly intensify its efforts to identify itself politically with the Arabs in opposition to Israel. It is possible that the USSR might seek to set up military alliances with Egypt, Syria, and Jordan, though we believe that the Soviet leaders would prefer to remain free of treaty commitments to these countries. Soviet leaders would probably issue new warnings to the West, possibly underlined by threatening military gestures. We continue to believe, however, that the USSR would seek to avoid actions involving a serious threat of a major military clash with the West.

16. US adherence to the Baghdad Pact would almost certainly be strongly condemned by the Indian government, and probably by other neutralist governments as well, such as Ceylon and Indonesia.

17. US adherence to the Baghdad Pact would probably not of itself have any appreciable effect on Israeli courses of action, in that it would represent a strengthening of US ties with one element in the Arab world, that led by Iraq, it would cause some concern and probably some protests in Israel. However, the Israeli leaders would probably consider US adherence to the pact as a move in the direction of a harder policy toward Nasser and would therefore at least privately see some merit in it. On balance, the Israelis would probably view the US commitment as an indirect contribution to their security, particularly in view of the Soviet Union's present highly critical attitude toward Israel. However, they would probably take advantage of the situation to bring new diplomatic and propaganda pressure on the US for a security commitment to Israel.

18. The timing of US action in joining the Baghdad Pact would be of great importance. On the one hand, the leaders of the Baghdad Pact countries are under increasing pressures; the pact is now imperilled and might collapse at an early date if the US does not

join. On the other hand, by joining the Baghdad Pact at the present stage in the Middle East crisis, the efforts of the UN in the area would be at least temporarily complicated, and perhaps badly hampered. The difficulty of getting Nasser and his friends, backed by the USSR, to agree to an acceptable settlement of the Suez issue would probably be increased. The Asian neutrals would tend to lose the disposition they have recently shown to support the US position on Middle Eastern matters in the UN. Many UN members would consider that the US had introduced a disturbing factor into the midst of delicate negotiations. These adverse effects could be offset only if the US were able to convince UN members that its joining of the Baghdad Pact would contribute to the achievement of Middle Eastern stability. It would be difficult so to convince them were the US to join the Baghdad Pact in the midst of the present crisis.

Consequences of Continued US Refusal To Adhere to the Baghdad Pact

19. The consequences of continued US refusal to join the Baghdad Pact (and to support it vigorously after joining) can scarcely be estimated without some knowledge of, or assumptions concerning, the alternative US policies which would be followed in the area. We have no such knowledge or assumptions. A few points can be made, however, even without postulating US policy alternatives. The Baghdad Pact concept has shown surprising vitality in the present crisis. In view of the present disrepute of the UK in the Middle East and without full US participation and support, the pact would almost certainly lose its potential as a military component integrated with Western defense arrangements. The US would thereby lose the present opportunity to develop and organize the military strength of the pact area as a whole. As a political association, however, the Baghdad Pact would probably be kept alive by its Moslem members, if the US, without joining the association, should nevertheless provide encouragement and support to it, and give some preferential treatment to its members.⁴

20. In the absence of some effective alternative US policy, the member governments, having unsuccessfully urged the US to join, and being already dissatisfied with what they have considered US unwillingness to support its friends, would be in an exposed position because of the increased pressures from Egypt and the USSR and the sharp decline in the strength and acceptability of the UK as a counterweight. Iraq's government would be in a particularly precarious position because of its relative isolation in the Arab world and its vulnerability to criticism for being tied too closely to the British. Conservative elements would probably try to retain control, but the eventual result would probably be the emergence of an unstable government, with a possible decline in Iraq's reliability as a source of oil for the West. While the problem would not be so acute for the other Baghdad Pact members, the Shah of Iran would almost certainly have increased misgivings about Iran's exposed position vis-à-vis the USSR and would probably face increased domestic criticism for having veered away from Iran's traditional neutralism. Pakistan's leaders would almost certainly face increased domestic criticism led by leftist and reactionary religious leaders. Although the pact has little popular support in Pakistan, Iraq, and Iran, elements throughout the Middle East disposed to look to the US for support would be further weakened. Failure of the US to take some positive action in the Middle East would almost certainly arouse misgivings elsewhere in the free world.

21. In staying out of the Baghdad Pact, however, the US would avoid various disadvantages inevitably entailed in joining. It would refrain from giving the neutralists this new ground for accusing it of preoccupation with military alliances; it would remain free of a new association with the UK in a colonial area context; it would not be aligning itself with certain Middle Eastern countries against their local rivals; and it would avoid a new source of friction with the USSR. Thus the US, staying outside the Baghdad Pact, would probably have a better chance of retaining the credit it has won in the Arab-Asian world by its

stand on Israeli, British, and French military intervention in Egypt. Moreover, by refusing to make a firm treaty commitment, it would retain some extra room for maneuver in dealing with the Arab-Asian neutralists and with the USSR, and it might be in a better position to seek a comprehensive accommodation with the forces of nationalism and anticolonialism in the Arab-Asian world. It might also help preserve a more favorable atmosphere for efforts to resolve the Suez and Arab-Israeli disputes in the UN.

22. Abstention of the United States from formal membership in the Baghdad Pact would not contribute materially to a general détente between the US and the USSR regarding the Middle East; adherence would probably worsen US-Soviet relations and would adversely affect our relations with India and other neutralist states in Southeast Asia. Achievement of effective cooperation in situations in which their interests are not identical with those of the US by Nasser (Egypt), Nuwar (Jordan), and Sarraj (Syria) is highly unlikely even if the US refrains from joining the pact. Adherence at this time—because of its effect on Nasser—might complicate pending negotiations respecting the Suez Canal. Neither joining nor refraining from joining the Baghdad Pact would in itself help materially toward solving the important Middle Eastern problems, but a decision as to the timing of adherence might have important significance depending upon the nature of the US program for dealing with the issues among the Arab states and between the Arab states and Israel. [One page of source text missing] ministerial meetings would be held at least once a year. The members appointed deputy representatives with ambassadorial rank to meet more frequently. The organization's seat is at Baghdad, where a permanent secretariat has been established. Military, economic, and countersubversive committees have been set up. Following an offer of assistance by the UK, plans to establish an atomic energy training center were announced at the second meeting.

6. Although the US is not formally a member of the pact organization, it has participated in its activities since April 1956, when a delegation headed by Deputy Under Secretary of State Loy Henderson attended the second Council meeting in Tehran. The US is represented on the economic and counter-subversion committees of the pact, has established a military liaison group at the pact headquarters, and has contributed financial support and personnel for maintenance of the permanent secretariat.

¹ Source: Department of State, INR–NIE Files. Top Secret. According to a note on the cover sheet, “The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff.” It was concurred in by the Intelligence Advisory Committee on December 14.

² The Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff, believes this sentence should read as follows: “As a political association, it would probably be kept alive by its Moslem members, but only for a short time, even if they were given US support.” [Footnote in the source text.]

³ See Appendix for major provisions of the Baghdad Pact and summary of the development and present status of the pact organization. [Footnote in the source text.]

⁴ The Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff, believes that this sentence should read: “As a political association, however, the Baghdad Pact would probably be kept alive by its Moslem members, but only for a short time, even if the US, without joining the association, should provide encouragement and support it by giving some preferential treatment.” [Footnote in the source text.]

171. Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Murphy) to the Secretary of State¹

Washington, December 15, 1956.

SUBJECT

Proposed Joint Resolution of Congress Regarding the Middle East

Discussion:

During your absence in Paris we have examined the proposed Joint Congressional Resolution on the Middle East. Mr. Phleger's draft incorporating your own ideas has been staffed and, with a few minor changes, is attached as Tab A.² This draft has the general concurrence of Messrs. Henderson, Phleger and Rountree, and myself. We feel, however, that certain questions regarding it should be called to your attention. They are as follows:

1.

Should the resolution be tied to Communist imperialism or should it also relate to possible hostilities between the states of the Middle East?

On balance we are of the view that the proposed resolution should be tied only to Communist imperialism. Communist imperialism is the principal danger in the Middle East. Friction and hostilities have existed between the states of the Middle East through past ages and will probably continue in future decades. We do not wish to overlook these frictions and hostilities as a means by which Communist imperialism may spread in the Middle East, but we believe that the proposed joint resolution should direct itself to the main source of difficulty at the present moment. Communist imperialism is a clear and present danger and is so

recognized by the American people and their representatives in the Congress. We consider it unlikely that the latter would approve a resolution not aimed specifically at Communist imperialism. The proposed resolution covering the Middle East will make clear that the United States is prepared to move in that area as it is in Europe under NATO and in Asia under SEATO and other Far Eastern arrangements. The Northern Tier countries of Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Pakistan will be heartened by a Congressional resolution which strengthens U.S. support for the area of the Baghdad Pact. The United States in the Tripartite Declaration of 1950 has made known its position with respect to the use of force or threat of force between any of the states in the area.

It is recognized that certain of the countries of the Middle East such as Egypt, Syria and Jordan cannot be expected in present circumstances to give support, at least public support, to a resolution respecting Communist imperialism. Their reluctance to do so would derive from the facts that these countries do not recognize the Communist dangers with which they are confronted; they are endeavoring to play the Soviet Union off against the United States and would not wish to be counted among anti-Communist countries in a manner which would give the impression that they are "Western oriented"; and they would interpret the unilateral United States resolution as being largely American support for the Baghdad Pact concept. It can be expected that most neutralist nations would describe the resolution as nothing more than a politically inspired cold-war step. What effect recent Hungarian events and other developments may in time have on these attitudes cannot now be predicted.

2.

(a) Should a specific sum of money be mentioned in the resolution?

On balance we believe that a specific sum of money should be indicated. The inclusion of a specific figure would round out the resolution by underscoring the importance and magnitude of the military and economic assistance which would be required and by providing general authority under which the appropriate Congressional committees could later approve specific programs and make appropriations therefor.

2. (b) On the assumption that a specific sum of money should be mentioned, should not specific countries of the Middle East be listed?

On balance we believe that specific countries should not be listed. It is our view that the total sum of money mentioned in the proposed resolution should be considered as a reserve on which the President could draw as needed in accordance with programs which would be developed in the light of future circumstances.

2. (c) On the assumption that a specific sum is mentioned in the resolution, should it comprise the total of the presently contemplated programs plus the additional funds considered necessary, or merely the latter?

On balance we believe the sum mentioned in the resolution should not include “regular” programs, particularly those in NATO–Baghdad Pact countries, but should include only additional funds required in implementation of the resolution. It will thus be clear what additional funds are needed in the light of the new situation. Furthermore, it will be possible to move ahead under regular authorizations and appropriations despite Congressional action upon the proposed resolution; otherwise, present activities might be held up on grounds that the Congress was re-examining both present and future programs in the area. Also, by establishing an area-wide figure for presently contemplated programs plus the additional funds, the result would be an identification of the precise countries covered by the resolution, since funds for countries not covered presumably would have to be justified separately.³

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.80/12–1556. Secret. Drafted by Rountree and Wilkins. According to notations on the source text, the memorandum was cleared with Henderson, Phleger, and Hoover who wrote the following comment: “The economic fund will have to be correlated with our MSA requests before the Bureau of the Budget within the next few days.” Another marginal notation reads: “Sec saw.”

² Not found attached.

³ There is no indication in the source text of Secretary Dulles’ approval or disapproval of the suggested resolution.

172. Note Prepared by Roger G. Sturgill of the Executive Secretariat¹

Washington, December 18, 1956.

SUBJECT

Joint Resolution on the Middle East—Chronology

At a meeting in Mr. Murphy's office on December 14, the texts of two drafts² were discussed by Mr. Murphy, Mr. Henderson, Mr. Phleger, and Mr. Berry. I understand that one of the drafts was prepared by NEA and the other by Mr. Phleger.

As a result of this meeting, the two drafts with minor changes were sent to the Secretary on Saturday, under cover of a memorandum from Mr. Murphy.³ On Sunday, at 6:00 PM at the Secretary's house, another meeting was held for the purpose of producing a final text. However, I understand that the Secretary asked Mr. Phleger to submit another draft. He did so on Monday, December 17, and it was discussed at a meeting in the Secretary's office at 4:15 PM that day, which was attended by Secretary Wilson, Admiral Radford, and Assistant Secretaries Robertson and Gray; and the Secretary, the Under Secretary, and Messrs. Murphy, Henderson, Phleger and Rountree.

As a result of this meeting the Secretary sent to Secretary Wilson on December 18 a letter attaching a Top Secret memorandum containing the Department's views on what authority Congress should be asked to give the President.⁴

R. G. Sturgill⁵

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.80/12-1856. Confidential.

² Copies of these two drafts and the other drafts mentioned in this note have not been found.

³ See the memorandum from Murphy to Dulles, [supra](#).

⁴ *Infra*.

⁵ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

173. Memorandum by the Secretary of State¹

Washington, December 18, 1956.

We have in mind that Congress would be asked to give the President authority:

1. To cooperate with and assist any nation or group of nations in the general area of the Middle East in the development of economic strength dedicated to the maintenance of national independence.
2. To undertake programs of military assistance and cooperation with any nation or group of nations in the general area of the Middle East upon request of their governments, in support of the inherent right of self-defense recognized in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations.
3. To employ the armed forces of the United States in taking measures, consonant with the Charter of the United Nations and other treaty obligations of the United States, to protect the territorial integrity and political independence of such nation or group of nations against Communist armed aggression.

We believe that the Congress should also authorize to be appropriated for the foregoing purposes some such sum as \$400,000,000 for the fiscal years 1957 and 1958, this to be supplemental to the present provisions of law.

John Foster Dulles²

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.80/12-1856. Top Secret. Sent to Secretary of Defense Wilson on December 18 under cover of a letter that reads: "I enclose herewith a memorandum indicating what I discussed yesterday. I am sending a copy of this to Admiral Radford. I hope that at this stage it will be kept top secret." See [supra](#).

² Printed from a copy that bears this stamped signature.

**174. Memorandum of a Conference With the President,
Washington, December 19, 1956, 2:30 p.m.¹**

Washington, December 19, 1956, 2:30 p.m.

OTHERS PRESENT

Secretary Wilson

Mr. McNeil

Admiral Radford

General Twining

Admiral Burke

General Taylor

General Pate

Colonel Randall

Colonel Goodpaster

The President said he thought we should be devising means of drawing people close to us, for example in the Middle East, and felt that we had unusual opportunities in the present movement. We can thereby displace Soviet influence in many areas through our standing firm in the United Nations in opposition to the invasion of Egypt, and through the revulsion against Soviet action in Hungary we can, he thought, make an advance. When it comes to specific action, the matter becomes more difficult. The only thing suggested is to make a survey, in partnership with the Arabs, regarding what can be done economically to bring progress in their area. He said that Nehru has some of these same ideas, but they are also vague in his mind.

[Here follows discussion of various types of weaponry, the budget, the status of world communism, and matters pertaining to the armed services.]

G

Colonel CE, US Army

¹ Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster on December 20.

**175. Memorandum of a Conference With the President,
Washington, December 20, 1956¹**

Washington, December 20, 1956

OTHERS PRESENT

Secretary Dulles

Secretary Hoover

Secretary Wilson

Admiral Radford

Colonel Goodpaster

Mr. Dulles said that he had been consulting in the Department and with Defense on what to do next in the Middle East situation. A vacuum has been created in the area with the virtual elimination of British influence and the Soviets are trying to move in. He recalled that our trouble in the area began with the Soviet intervention through sale of arms over a year ago—and reminded the group of the letter to Bulganin the President sent from his sick bed in Denver.² He thought that if we do not act, the Soviets are likely to take over the area, and they could thereby control Europe through the oil on which Europe is dependent and even Africa as well.

He said that he had considered the proposal to join the Baghdad Pact very carefully. State Department does not favor the proposal, because the Pact has become so mixed up in Arab politics. Nasser opposes it, and more importantly King Saud does also. He commented that Saud is the only figure in the area with sufficient present and potential assets to serve as a counterpoise to Nasser. Moreover, adherence to the Baghdad Pact would require Senate approval, and this would be extremely difficult to obtain, especially if the action had to be coupled with a guarantee to Israel also requiring Senate approval.

In light of these facts, Secretary Dulles said he has recommended to the group going to Congress and asking for a resolution authorizing three forms of Presidential action as a means of building our position in the Middle East. A fourth possible element in the proposal would be a Congressional authorization of a sum such as perhaps \$400 million for use in the next two years with full flexibility. The Secretary handed a copy of the draft he had prepared on this matter to the President.³

There followed discussion of the desirability of including the provision concerning funds. The discussion brought out that, for fiscal year '57, there is enough money in the ICA budget already. Inclusion of a provision regarding funds would give substance and weight to the proposal, but might of course raise argument in the Congress. Admiral Radford said that the Chiefs had proposed adherence to the Baghdad Pact simply to take some major action quickly. They support the present proposal. They are, however, afraid that including the provision concerning funds would prolong Congressional consideration. He suggested that it might be preferable for the President simply to state that the Administration will later request funds above those already appropriated for FY '57. The President suggested he can say something to the effect that sums needed in addition to those already appropriated would be the subject of urgent recommendation.

Mr. Hoover advised the group that in the fiscal year '58 proposals, there will be included a sum of \$200 million for the Middle East. In the past, numerous undesirable restrictions have been placed on such funds, and the present language is intended to give fiscal flexibility— for two further fiscal years, i.e., FY '58 and FY '59.

Secretary Dulles suggested it might be best to draft the resolution and the Message to Congress, and then talk to four to six Congressional leaders, for example Senators Johnson and Knowland, Congressman Martin, etc. Admiral Radford reiterated the concern that the money item might hold up the rest, but said it was simply a matter of tactics. Mr. Dulles said the provision would be drafted as an authorization rather than an appropriation, thus avoiding the necessity of having the matter considered by the appropriation committees.

The President asked if it would be desirable to specify that we would intervene only at the request of the countries concerned, since the countries might otherwise now take offense at the statement. Mr. Hoover said the reference to “measures consonant with the Charter of the United Nations” tended to cover this point, and Secretary Dulles cited the need for more flexibility than would be afforded by conditioning action upon a prior request. He pointed out that a sudden coup might result in displacing the government which could make the request. He said he would study this point further.

Secretary Dulles said that this matter must, in his judgment, be given the greatest urgency and momentum. He would like to see the President send up a message and proposal on the day Congress organizes, as his first act. He said that he would plan to work with Admiral Radford on the project over Christmas, and hoped to have something available for the President in ample time for submission as soon as Congress convenes.

(During the meeting the President mentioned recent messages he had received from King Saud,⁴ the President of Syria, and Chiang Kai-shek,⁵ and handed Secretary Dulles a copy of the letter from the President of Syria.) G

Colonel CE, U S Army

¹ Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Memoranda of Conversations with the President. Top Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster.

² Reference is to Eisenhower’s letter to Bulganin of October 11, 1955; see the editorial note, [vol. XIV, p. 576](#).

³ Not found.

⁴ Dated December 13, not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.86A/12-1756) ⁵ Neither printed.

**176. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State,
Washington, December 20, 1956¹**

Washington, December 20, 1956

SUBJECT

Pipeline Problems

PARTICIPANTS

The Under Secretary

Howard Page, Director, Standard Oil Company of New Jersey

NEA—William M. Rountree

NE—Edward L. Waggoner

The Under Secretary saw Mr. Page at the latter's request at 3 p.m. on December 20, 1956.

The Under Secretary gave Mr. Page a brief review of the efforts the U.S. has made to bring about a resumption of the flow of oil through the IPC pipelines passing through Syria. He expressed some concern at a report the Department had received from Ankara to the effect that the Syrians were interested in employing their own consultants to survey the IPC pipelines and conjectured that the Syrians might be thinking of nationalizing the pipelines. Mr. Page said this interpretation was disturbing, but that it might be possible that the Syrians feared that they will be called upon to pay the cost of repair and wanted an independent appraisal of the extent of damage.

In a discussion of the possibility of building a new pipeline which would terminate at the Mediterranean via Turkey, Mr. Page gave the following information. Discussions among the companies which might be interested in such a pipeline have taken place and a further meeting may be held in the near future. The American companies would wish an assurance that such a

project would have the approval of the United States Government, particularly the Department of Justice. He added that approval of the NSC on security grounds would be extremely valuable in promoting interest among the companies. The proposed pipeline would carry from 800,000 to 1,000,000 barrels a day, would cost approximately \$650,000,000 and should be open to any company which could use such a pipeline. The proposition was an entirely practical one and the route not too difficult. Because of the anticipated delay in steel deliveries, were the project to be decided on in the near future, completion could not be expected before 1961. The Under Secretary asked whether completion might be speeded up if special priority were assigned to steel deliveries for this project. Mr. Page replied that in general three years are required from the time the steel starts through the plant until the oil starts flowing and that 1960 appeared to be the earliest possible date for completion under any circumstances.

Mr. Page stated that the companies felt that some form of treaty arrangement should be made to afford the pipeline international protection and that the companies would be prepared to start immediately once a satisfactory treaty arrangement was arrived at. The essence of his position was that an investment of the magnitude envisaged would be far safer if based on a government to government interest rather than purely on a government to company relationship. There followed a discussion of the desirability of bilateral treaties among the interested parties as opposed to one multilateral treaty. Mr. Page had with him a suggested draft of a bilateral treaty. It was felt that a multilateral treaty covering only the construction and operation of the pipeline itself would probably present fewer difficulties in terms of negotiation and parliamentary procedures than would a series of bilateral treaties. The Under Secretary suggested that Mr. Page send some of his legal people to discuss the general subject of a treaty with NEA and the Legal Advisor's office in the Department and Mr. Page agreed to do so.

In a discussion of the registry and ownership of the company which would construct and operate the pipeline, Mr. Page stated that the company would be partially owned by U.S. interests (presumably in part by the UK-French-Dutch interests in IPC) and probably registered in the U.K., Panama or the Bahamas. Mr. Rountree remarked that U.K. or Bahamas registry might

present certain problems in terms of public reaction in the Middle East. Also, Panamanian registry might present problems since Panama would not presumably be a party to a treaty covering the pipeline. It would seem that registry should be in one of the participating companies' countries. Mr. Page agreed that this might be desirable and added that the company must, for financial reasons, be registered in a country in the sterling area.

The Under Secretary was obliged to leave at this point in the conversation to keep another engagement.

Mr. Page then proposed that consideration be given as well to establishing a U.N. corridor from the Gulf of Aqaba to Gaza in which pipelines could be laid. He observed that such an arrangement would remove some of the risks involved in dependence on the flow of oil through Syria and the Suez Canal, and might provide a U.N. buffer between Israeli and Egyptian forces. Also, U.N. port area at the head of the Gulf of Aqaba would provide a neutral gateway between Egypt, Israel, Jordan and Saudi Arabia. Mr. Rountree agreed that it was necessary to reduce Western Europe's dependence on a continuing flow of oil through such unstable countries as Egypt and Syria, but expressed the opinion that it would not be feasible to undertake such a project in the absence of a definitive Arab-Israeli settlement. Mr. Page left with the Department copies of proposals concerning the construction of pipelines from the Gulf of Aqaba to Gaza (attached).²

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 887.2553/12-2156. Confidential. Drafted by Rountree and Waggoner on December 21.

² Not printed.

177. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the President and the Secretary of State, White House, Washington, December 22, 1956, 6 p.m.¹

Washington, December 22, 1956, 6 p.m.

I gave the President a draft (copy attached)² of the proposed message to Congress. He went over it and made a few minor suggestions and expressed his satisfaction with the draft, saying this is a “good paper”. General Gruenther, who had been playing bridge with the President, was with us during this part of our talk and also read the draft.

I said to the President and to General Gruenther that I thought we should not disguise from ourselves that this prospective action might involve a very sharp Soviet reaction. I related my remarks to what I had said at the NSC to the effect that the successive setbacks of the Soviet rulers in terms of the Communist satellite parties in free countries, the satellite governments in Eastern Europe and internal unrest in Russia itself combined to make it hard for them to accept any further setbacks.

[Here follows discussion of unrelated subjects.]

¹ Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Meetings with the President. Secret; Personal and Private. Drafted by Dulles. A handwritten notation on the source text reads: “No dist[ribution].”

² Attached but not printed.

178. Operations Coordinating Board Report¹

Washington, December 22, 1956.

PROGRESS REPORT ON UNITED STATES OBJECTIVES AND POLICIES WITH RESPECT TO THE NEAR EAST (NSC 5428) (Policy approved by the President—July 23, 1954)

(Period covered: May 18, 1956 through December 22, 1956)

A. *Summary of Operating Progress in Relation to Major NSC Objectives*

1. *OCB Recommendation Regarding Policy Review.* U.S. policy toward the Near East as set forth in NSC 5428 has been reviewed from the standpoint of operating considerations and in the light of experience to date and anticipated future developments. A number of courses of action are no longer applicable to the present situation. It is recommended that NSC 5428 be reviewed as early as circumstances permit.

2. *Summary Evaluations.* The reporting period was one of very serious stress culminating in the outbreak of hostilities and the sending of a UN police force to the Near East. The Soviet Union, by outright propaganda support of the Arabs and by supplying aid, primarily military armaments, made psychological capital of the situation and greatly strengthened its position, particularly in Syria, Jordan and Egypt. The U.S. was able to retain its economic position and a measure of political influence, particularly in Iraq and Saudi Arabia. In some respects, by its strong stand in support of UN efforts in the crisis, the U.S. psychological position in the Arab states was enhanced. The position of its principal Western allies, however, declined sharply.

3.

Availability of Resources, Strategic Positions, and Passage Rights. The U.S. position in oil-producing countries remained

relatively strong, but the availability of these resources was seriously curtailed by the blocking of the Suez Canal and the sabotage of the Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC) Syrian pipeline following the British, French, and Israeli military actions in the Canal area.

The Western control of strategic points in the area has been seriously threatened by the wave of anti-British and anti-French feeling following the military action of the U.K. and France against Egypt. British strong points in Jordan and Iraq were particularly threatened and there was unrest in the Persian Gulf Sheikdoms. Moreover, this reaction has raised serious questions about the ability of Britain and France to reassume their previous positions in the face of the current climate of area and world opinion. The Suez Canal base agreement of 1954 between Egypt and Britain is virtually dead. With respect to an extension or a renewal of base rights, the United States, however, continues to exercise rights at the Dhahran Airfield in Saudi Arabia while negotiations continue.

4. Denial of Resources and Strategic Positions to the Soviet Bloc. The denial of resources and strategic positions to the Soviet bloc was made increasingly difficult by the weakened position of the British and French. Throughout the period, the Soviets made efforts to obtain an economic foothold. The Czechs are making a strong effort to obtain the contract for construction of a Syrian Government oil refinery. There were rumors of Soviet bloc efforts to obtain minerals concessions in Egypt and Yemen. The sale of relatively large quantities of Soviet arms to Egypt, Syria, and Yemen brought Soviet bloc technicians to these countries and seriously threatened the traditional Western position of dominance in these strategic areas. However, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Lebanon continued to reject Soviet bloc offers of arms aid. Soviet efforts at penetration were blocked in some measure by Western control of petroleum markets and by superior Western technology.

5. *Maintenance of Stable, Friendly Governments.* The opportunistic and nationalistic Nasser government of Egypt gained in influence throughout the area and other Arab heads of state were less able to resist the formation of governments which catered to this surge of nationalism. The Lebanese Government, previously unfriendly to the West, was replaced by one more friendly on November 19. Syria's unstable political complex continued to drift leftward. Jordan's parliament on November 21 called for abrogation of the Anglo-Jordanian treaty and for acceptance of a subsidy from Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Syria. Iraq's government remained pro-West, but its position was seriously shaken by popular resentment over the Iraqi-U.K. tie. Some civil disturbances resulted. King Saud, while publicly friendly to Nasser and the Arab cause, maintained an independent position using his influence for moderation on nationalistic elements, steering a course between the extreme pro-Soviet and strongly pro-West Arab groups.

6. *The Arab-Israeli Issues.* Hostilities between Israel, Britain, France and Egypt brought to an abrupt end, for the present, efforts to pacify the frontier and greatly complicated and dramatized the need for effective long-range efforts to secure a permanent peace. There was abandonment by Britain and France of the Tripartite Declaration, and Israel declared the Armistice Agreements of 1949 with Egypt to be no longer valid. The Secretary of State's message of August 26, 1955 and a White House statement of April 9, 1956 remained the basic U.S. approach to a solution. (See attachments 1 and 2)²

7. *Reversal of Anti-American Trends.* The initial reaction in the Arab world to the U.S. position in the face of Israel-British and French action was extremely favorable. Subsequently, however, Soviet propaganda and the threat of Soviet military intervention caused the USSR to be given the greatest credit in the Arab world for the cessation of hostilities in Egypt. U.S. emphasis on a peaceful solution of the Suez Canal controversy and strong U.S. support of the UN effort to restore peace has resulted throughout

the crises in relatively favorable treatment in much of the Arab press tending somewhat to reverse previous anti-American trends. [3 lines of source text not declassified] Arab bitterness over the U.S. support of Israel continued, however. The extent to which current events will alter a long-standing anti-American feeling in certain political circles cannot yet be determined.

8. *Prevention of the Extension of Soviet Influence.* Soviet influence was considerably extended in the area through the use of propaganda, and by diplomatic, economic and quasi-military measures, which enhanced the Soviet position with Arab people and with some governments. Egyptian and Syrian military and economic dependence on the bloc was increased. By support of the Arab nations and particularly Egypt and Syria throughout this period, the Soviet Union appeared as the defender of the sovereignty of small countries and of Arab nationalism against the threats of Western "imperialism." The Soviet position as military purveyor and technical adviser gave it a military foothold of great future potential in the heart of the Near East. Egypt and Syria recognized Communist China and Syria took steps to permit the opening of an East German Consulate in Damascus. The USSR and its satellites made increasing efforts, in the political, economic and cultural fields, to influence the Sudan in the formative months of the new republic. While the U.S. may gain by its current stand on the Israeli, British and French actions, such a gain will probably not be at the expense of the current Soviet position. Events in Eastern Europe appear to have had little effect on the public opinion of the Near East though serious efforts have been made to keep the issues alive in the area.

9. *Progress in Meeting Objectives in Military Program Schedules.* The rate of delivery of grant military aid to Iraq, the only country in the area receiving such aid, has been satisfactory. Shipments amounted to \$13 million as of August 31, 1956 of an FY 1950-56 program of \$17.9 million. The Iraqis, however, continue to press for a larger program with increased speed in deliveries. Orders for military equipment under the Reimbursable Sales Program were

received from Saudi Arabia, Israel and Lebanon but there were no substantial shipments to any of these countries.

10. *Progress in Meeting Economic Program Schedules.* Technical cooperation programs in Iraq and Lebanon are proceeding normally while those in Egypt, Israel and Jordan are almost at a halt with the bulk of Mission personnel having been evacuated. Development assistance to Egypt has been decelerated since the nationalization of the Canal on July 26; no new commitments are being made but deliveries against prior contracts are continuing. Similarly, development assistance to Israel has been decelerated since the outbreak of hostilities. Development assistance operations in Jordan are continuing to the extent possible under present conditions.

11. *NSC 1290-d Programs for Iraq and Syria.* During this period, arrangements were completed for the training of ten Iraqi police officials in the United States, thus implementing one of the recommendations of the 1290-d study. An Embassy recommendation regarding assistance in penal reform in Iraq was under study. The police survey has not as yet been implemented. Because of the political sensitivity of the British on this subject, negotiations have had to proceed slowly. Regarding Syria, the previous OCB recommendation that no action be taken to strengthen internal security forces in Syria remained valid.

12. *New NSC Action 1550³ Commitments Entered into During the Reporting Period.* A commitment to spend \$25 million over five years in U.S. funds for services to Saudi Arabia in connection with the extension of the Dhahran Airfield Agreement was made in August. Clearance is being obtained for an additional commitment in this connection under the new procedures established under NSC Action 1550.

B. Major Operating Problems or Difficulties Facing the United States

13. *Nationalism.* Throughout the Arab area there have been increasing manifestations of an awakened nationalism, springing in part from a desire to end both real and imagined vestiges of the mandate and colonial periods, but stimulated by opportunism, Soviet propaganda, aid and infiltration, and by Egyptian ambitions and intrigue. Because the former mandatory and colonial powers were from Western Europe, the nationalism has assumed generally an anti-Western form. This situation has created opportunities for Soviet exploitation, and has, at the same time, placed the United States in a difficult position. The natural U.S. sympathy with those genuinely desirous of becoming free and completely sovereign nations runs, at times, into sharp conflict with actions required to maintain the strength of the Western alliance and to support our closest allies.

14. *Readjustments in Economic Relationships.* Nationalistic leaders in some of the Arab nations have rejected established economic and commercial relationships with the Western European powers which they have linked to the earlier mandatory colonial relationships. The two most significant examples in the area were the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company by Egypt and the unilateral repeal of tax exemption provisions in oil company concessions in Lebanon. This trend has made the United States particularly observant of any indications that similar actions may be taken against the extensive operations of U.S. companies in the Arab area.

15. *Differences in U.S.-Western European Assessments of Situation.* Differences of assessment, both as to the character of the threat to the West and the means to meet it, have arisen between the United States and Britain and France. While the United States sees in nationalism much that represents a threat to the West, it tends to regard this nationalism as an inevitable development which should be channeled, not opposed. Britain and France have seen this nationalism, backed by Soviet encouragement, as a threat to their entire position in the area. They have tended to think that, once the group in power is

defeated by force, people and leaders will arise who will welcome the re-assertion of British and French influence. Significant manifestations of these differences appeared even before the most recent British and French actions in Egypt, in discussions between the U.S. and these nations over the Persian Gulf principalities, over the dispute between Yemen and Aden, over Suez, and over events in Jordan.

16. *Intra-Area Rivalries and Disputes.* In seeking stability in the area, the United States faces the problem of numerous traditional rivalries and disputes. The rivalry between Egypt and Iraq made the creation of a collective security arrangement in the area more difficult. The rivalry between Syria and Egypt on the one hand and Iraq on the other has grown in intensity and has handicapped constructive measures for stabilizing the situation in Jordan. The United States did assist in lessening the separation of Iraq and Saudi Arabia and in reducing [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] support for anti-Western opposition elements in Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon. Divisions still remain, however, which make any stabilization of the area difficult.

17. *Arab-Israeli Hostility.* The most bitter of the intra-area disputes, that between the Arab states and Israel, remains a principal basic cause for area instability. Israeli military action against Egypt commenced at the end of October and ended early in November when both sides complied with the UN cease fire resolution. The basic causes of this conflict, including the question of ultimate boundaries, however, remained unsolved.

18. *Status of United Nations Prestige.* The United States looks to the United Nations as the instrument for the creation of stable borders and ultimate peace between the Arab states and Israel. United Nations inability to stop border incidents and, in particular, Israeli retaliation and the actual Israeli flouting of UN observers have tended seriously to lessen the prestige of the UN in the area. However, the strong role played by the UN in bringing to an end the hostilities in Egypt and presence of UN

troops have brought hopeful increase in the stature and prestige of the UN in the area.

19. *Soviet Economic and Military Penetration.* Fulfillment of United States policies in the area, already beset by growing nationalism, by differences in assessment with its Western allies, by continued disputes, and by the weakening of the United Nations, and by the recent crisis over the Suez Canal, has been complicated further by the opportunistic activities of the Soviet Union. By offering arms to the Arab nations, by subsidizing Eastern bloc nations in economic competition with the West, and by efforts to turn serious events into propaganda victories, the Soviet Union has entered into affairs in the area as never before. The Soviets sought to capitalize on the disruption of trade with the West caused by the Near East crisis by prompt renewal of shipments to Egypt after hostilities ended and by new shipments of petroleum to Syria. Its immediate purpose appears primarily to destroy Western influence, to frustrate any Western plans for collective security, and to establish strong Soviet economic and political influence among all the nations of the area.

C. Immediate Operating Problems

A serious problem is the vacuum created by British and French collapse and preventing the USSR from filling it. The United States faces certain immediate problems arising directly out of the recent British, French, Israeli, and Soviet moves in the area:

20. *Withdrawal of Foreign Forces from Egypt.* The British, French and Israeli forces have begun their withdrawal from Egypt and the UN forces are assuming control. The clearance of the Suez Canal is expected to begin soon. The Secretary General of the United Nations has now moved to institute a damage survey leading to a reopening of the Canal.

21. *Problem of Relations with Israel.* The U.S. faces the problem of the extent to which its normal relations with Israel will be continued, particularly in the event of any reluctance on the part

of Israel to comply completely with the UN resolutions on the cease fire and troop withdrawal.

22. *Relations with Egypt.* It is likely that for the time being Nasser will remain the leader in Egypt. Recent relations with Egypt, however, appear to indicate that the United States cannot successfully deal with President Nasser. The United States is faced with decisions regarding future aid to Egypt, its attitude toward the Nasser regime, and the degree to which it will actively seek to curb Nasser's influence and Egyptian activities in the Near East and Africa. There is substantial evidence of active Egyptian Government interference in the affairs of other Arab nations. This came to light particularly in Libya where the Egyptian military attaché was declared persona non grata on November 6, 1956. The Lebanese have also uncovered extensive Egyptian covert activity, but have taken no similar action in the matter.

23. *Problems in Syria and Jordan.* Whatever the outcome of the present situation in Egypt, the unstable situations in Syria and Jordan will remain serious threats to the peace. Syria, in particular, remains a likely focal point for communist influence. The likelihood of Jordan's retaining its ties with Britain seems slight although Jordanian leaders are seeking a formula to retain British subsidy. Some progress is being made toward a Syrian-Jordan economic union as committees from the two countries discuss customs, transit and other steps toward economic collaboration. The United States will face the problems of what to do about the present Syrian regime and what attitude it should adopt toward political changes which may occur in Jordan.

24. *Arab Refugees.* The Arab-Israeli dispute remains a continuing, serious long-term problem. The United States will face, immediately, however, the problem of what to do about continuing international support of the Arab refugees especially in the Gaza Strip. It is planning to seek, through the United

Nations, to return responsibility to the host nations, but recent events create great difficulties for this plan.

25. *Collective Security and the Baghdad Pact.* Iraq has announced it will no longer participate in meetings of the Baghdad Pact Council at which Britain is present and all area members have strongly urged U.S. adherence. Furthermore, the Asian members of the Pact are becoming increasingly nervous over Soviet moves in the Near East. The future of the Pact itself, and the future U.S. relationship to the Pact and the Pact countries are currently under review. Meanwhile, the United States is considering measures to strengthen Iraq, the one Pact member in the Arab world. Defense and State are working actively on steps to aid the Iraqi Air Force and to increase the already approved MAP program by an additional \$10 million for army material.

26. *Economic Dislocation.* There is a deterioration in the economic situation throughout the area caused particularly by the dislocation of the petroleum industry. Shortages have resulted in Syria and Egypt, and Saudi Arabia has demanded that American companies provide [for?] these shortages. There were further economic dislocations due to cessation of traffic through the Suez Canal, which, coupled with the inability of oil-producing states to dispose of their normal oil output, constituted exploitable weaknesses in the area, with each side losing. Even when full pipeline transit is restored, the pipeline complex will continue to be threatened by disputes between the companies and the transit countries over payments. Oil producers and consumer countries can, in the light of recent and present crises, be expected to continue examining and developing alternative methods of shipment and alternative sources of supply.

27. *Dhahran Air Field Negotiations.* In June the five year agreement with Saudi Arabia, granting U.S. rights at the Dhahran Airfield, expired. In initial negotiations for its extension the King made clear his belief that Saudi Arabia needed “justifications” for extending the agreement. The “justification” initially amounted to

requested grant aid of \$250 million yearly for five years but has since been scaled down. However, temporary extensions were given which presently run into 1957, and the U.S. Government is preparing to present a package which will include the continuation of present services, including increased training assistance for the Saudi Army, and the “Royal Guard” Regiment, an air force training program and assistance in constructing an air terminal.

D. Additional Major Developments During the Period.

[Here follow numbered paragraphs 28–31 summarizing the events following President Nasser’s July 26 nationalization of the Suez Canal Company up to the withdrawal of Israeli forces. For extensive documentation on these events, see [volume XVI](#).]

32. *Events in Jordan.* Following the ousting of General Glubb in March, the political situation in Jordan deteriorated steadily and the influence of pro-Egyptian anti-British politicians grew. The Iraqis attempted to increase their influence in Jordan and planned to send in forces to stabilize the situation, but disagreements arose over questions of military command. Later, following the British, French, Israeli action, troops entered Jordan from Syria, Iraq and Saudi Arabia. Elections on October 21 resulted in substantial gains for pro-Egyptian elements and the installation of a Cabinet largely opposed to continued alliance with Britain. The Parliament decided to abrogate the Anglo-Jordan treaty and seek diplomatic relations with the USSR.

33. *Baghdad Pact.* Baghdad Pact activities continued to expand in the economic field and military planning directed at defense of the area from the attacks from the north went forward. The next Baghdad Pact Council meeting had been scheduled for Karachi in January. Strong pressure has come from the Prime Ministers of the four Asian countries for the U.S. to adhere. A U.S. military liaison group which the U.S. announced at the April meeting was formally established November 1. The U.S. issued a statement of

support for the area members of the Baghdad Pact on November 29. (See attachment 7).⁴

34. *Saudi-U.K. Dispute over Buraimi.* This dispute remained unsettled but both formal and informal exchanges between Saudi Arabia and the U.K. continued until the breaking of diplomatic relations on November 6.

35. *Soviet Pressure.* The Soviet Union made a major intervention by demands on Israel, Britain and France for immediate withdrawal of troops and by other threats of action in the area.

36. *Syrian Developments.* During early December charges of Soviet influence in Syria originated in Iraq, Turkey, Israel, and other Western-oriented sources. Syria has countered with verbal attacks on the Government of Nuri Said in Iraq and with charges that Anglo-French-Israeli and Turkish troops were massing against her, none of which charges have been substantiated. A number of pro-Iraqi, pro-Western politicians have been arrested and charged with complicity in an alleged Iraqi-sponsored plot to overthrow the Government of Syria. Syrian Army G-2 Sarraj has, especially since October 29, increased his influence in the Syrian army. As the representative of the army in a time of emergency and in collaboration with leftist and anti-West politicians, Sarraj has increasingly dominated the civilian government. Since October 29, Syrian foreign policy has closely paralleled that of the USSR.

37. *Evacuation of U.S. Citizens.* The U.S. throughout this period watched closely for conditions which might place Americans in jeopardy, mindful, however, that any evacuation must be so timed so as to not adversely affect political conditions. Evacuation phase I was made effective for Egypt on July 28 and for Syria and Jordan on August 13. Phase III was declared effective for Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Israel on October 28, when evidences of Israeli intentions against Egypt had been made clear. A full and successful evacuation of non-essential American citizens from

these four countries was carried out by ships of the Sixth Fleet, assisted by military and civilian aircraft and merchant ships.

[Here follows a list of attachments.]

Note: The following National Intelligence Estimates are applicable to the Near East:

1. The Outlook for Saudi Arabia, NIE 36.6–56, April 24, 1956.⁵
2. The Outlook for U.S. Interests in Libya, NIE 36.5–56, June 19, 1956.⁶
3. The Outlook for Iraqi Stability and Foreign Policies, NIE 36.2–56, July 17, 1956.⁷
4. UK-French Military Intentions in Egypt, SNIE 30–6–56, Nov. 6, 1956.⁸
5. Sino-Soviet Intentions in the Suez Crisis, SNIE 11–9–56, Nov. 6, 1956.⁹
6. Outlook for the Syrian Situation, SNIE 36–7–56, November 16, 1956.¹⁰
7. Soviet Actions in the Middle East, SNIE 11–10–56, November 27, 1956 (to be published).¹¹
8. Probable Consequences of U.S. Adherence or Non-Adherence to the Baghdad Pact, SNIE 30–7–56, December 14, 1956.¹²

¹ Source: Department of State, S/S–NEA Files: Lot 61 D 167, Near East (NSC 5428). Top Secret. Transmitted to James S. Lay, Jr., under cover of a memorandum from Elmer B. Staats that indicated that the progress report was concurred in by the Operations Coordinating Board on December 19. Staats also noted: “In considering this report, the Board agreed that transmission of the report to the National Security Council be delayed about

a week to permit recording the final withdrawal of the U.K. and French forces from Egypt, if that event took place as expected. This report, therefore, covers the period from May 18, 1956 through December 22, 1956.”

The progress report was discussed at the 310th meeting of the NSC on January 24, 1957; see [Document 187](#).

² For text of Secretary Dulles’ address, see Department of State *Bulletin*, September 5, 1955, pp. 378–380; the text of the White House statement is *ibid.*, April 23, 1956, p. 688. For related documentation, see [volume xvi](#).

³ NSC Action No. 1550 was taken by the National Security Council at its 283d meeting on May 3, 1956. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council) ⁴ See [Document 152](#).

⁵ Not printed.

⁶ [Vol. XVIII, p. 454](#).

⁷ [Document 435](#).

⁸ [Vol. XVI, p. 1018](#).

⁹ [Ibid., p. 1020](#).

¹⁰ [Vol. XIII, p. 601](#).

¹¹ [Document 151](#).

¹² [Document 170](#).

179. Editorial Note

Secretary Dulles briefly discussed the question of United States adherence to the Baghdad Pact with British Ambassador Sir Harold Caccia on December 24 at the Secretary's private residence. A memorandum of the conversation by Secretary Dulles is scheduled for publication in [volume XXVII](#).

180. Editorial Note

During a meeting at his private residence on December 29, Secretary Dulles consulted with Congressman James P. Richards on the President's forthcoming address to the Congress on the Middle East. He informed Richards that he and the President wished to have Richards available to spearhead the implementation of the program if the Congress approved it. Dulles told Richards that if he accepted the position his status would probably be that of Special Assistant to the President with the personal rank of Ambassador. Richards indicated that he would inform the Secretary of his decision on December 31. A memorandum of the conversation by Dulles is in Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Memoranda of Conversations.

181. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France¹

Washington, December 29, 1956—4:18 p.m.

2473. Paris pass to Perkins. This morning Secy called in British and French Ambassadors and outlined to them in general terms Administration's plan to present to Congress program for military and economic cooperation in Middle East. Secy said plan not yet formulated in detail but was designed to permit US to play more effective role Middle East. He had given general indication of this in course of Ministerial meeting of NAC earlier this month.

Secy said Congressional authority would be requested to permit use of available FY 57 aid funds on more flexible basis in area and additional authorization would be sought for FY 58 and FY 59 for military and economic programs. On military side President would request discretionary authority to use military force in case of armed Communist aggression in area. We must not offer Soviets opportunity to move into present vacuum and Administration had decided that US must exert itself more vigorously in area than before. President and Secy would meet Congressional leaders next Tuesday to present this program and it was hoped authorization would be forthcoming from Congress in month or so after Congress convenes. In view of urgency situation it was considered desirable not to wait for general MSA legislation but to request priority this program. Secy pointed out authorization requested would enable military plan more intelligently in area. While President had made important declarations with respect to area, particularly Baghdad Pact countries, Secy said declarations did not provide basis for action without Congressional approval. It was felt that standby authority for use of military force should be requested now since postponement request for Congressional action until time when circumstances actually demand it might involve unacceptable delays.

Secy said in reply to question this action may make possible US participation in Military Committee of Baghdad Pact. He said program does not contemplate that military authorization will extend to Israel-Arab

controversy unless aggression occurs as result direct Communist involvement. He said it is contemplated that any action taken under new authorization would come within Article 51 of UN Charter.² He described collective defense arrangements around world to which US is party and emphasized “gap” which exists in Middle Eastern area. If this area is lost, North Atlantic Treaty Organization would be undermined. He felt it was not practicable at present to handle situation through US adherence to Baghdad Pact because (1) Saudi Arabia strongly opposed to Pact and we do not wish to alienate that country and (2) on domestic side proposal to join Pact would raise demand for similar measures with respect to Israel which might block any action. Secy recognized Congress might be reluctant to give discretionary authority to President and he was therefore unable to say what form Middle Eastern plan might finally take. He repeated that military authorization would not be used to take any offensive action but would only be employed to counter Soviet-inspired aggression.

Question of countering subversion was raised by Alphand. Secy said plan not designed for this purpose but announcement of support and interest by US Govt should allay present fears of certain governments in area and help them maintain themselves.

Secy made clear plan for economic cooperation in area concerned problems of Middle Eastern area only and not collateral problems of oil shortages in Europe, etc. Plan would not be finally crystallized until Congress has been consulted and he asked Ambassadors to caution their governments to avoid if possible any public reference to plan prior to such consultation and to official announcement here.

Dulles

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5–MSP/12–2956. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Elbrick, cleared with Rountree, and approved by Secretary Dulles. Also sent to London.

² Article 51 of the U.N. Charter reads in part: “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations,

until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.”

182. Memorandum of a Meeting, White House, Washington, January 1, 1957, 2-5:50 p.m.¹

Washington, January 1, 1957, 5:50 p.m.

NOTES ON PRESIDENTIAL–BIPARTISAN CONGRESSIONAL
LEADERSHIP MEETING

[Here follows a list of attendees.]

Middle East Resolution—To open the meeting, the President called on Secretary Dulles for a general review of the situation. The Secretary reviewed the deterioration of the Soviet position during the past year, specifically the declining influence of the Communist parties in free European nations, increased nationalism in the satellites, and a growing spirit of independence among the Russian people. He recounted United States activities to deter the use of force in the Middle East and the ensuing difficulties. He noted the fiscal actions of the United States in support of Britain after its withdrawal from Suez.

The Secretary stated that the prestige of the United States had increased in the Mid-East because of our conduct in the crisis but had decreased among the colonial powers of Western Europe.

Looking to the future, Secretary Dulles stressed the importance of preventing the Soviet from recouping its position by a victory in the Middle East. He stressed the importance of maintaining our deterrent power, including a continued strengthening of local forces in various areas of the world. With regard to satellite states, he believed our policy should continue to be the encouragement of an evolutionary process leading toward national Communism as a first step prior to a complete departure from international Communism.

Concerning Hungary the Secretary stressed the importance of maintaining moral pressure through the United Nations and otherwise against the Soviet for its actions in that state.

The Secretary spoke briefly on the recent NATO meeting which helped to re-establish unity and strength among the Western powers. He noted the legislation that will be sent to Congress to allow training of the forces of our allies in the use of nuclear weapons—necessary if we are to count on their assistance in any future war there which would be largely an atomic war.

As a result of Suez, Secretary Dulles believed European countries have become increasingly aware of their weakness when disunited. Hence they are moving toward greater integration, particularly since they now realize the United States will not support their actions in every instance without regard to what is involved.

Concerning Asia, the Secretary took note of the reasonably stable situation during the past year, the decline of Soviet prestige because of Hungarian developments, the greater solidarity of Asian nations as evidenced by bloc voting in the United Nations. He believed the new Japanese government will take a more independent attitude in relations with the United States without becoming anti-American. Generally, he saw a trend toward greater nationalism. He thought the Chinese Communists could still be contemplating the future seizure of Taiwan since they refused in the Geneva talks to renounce the use of force. Nevertheless, he believed the Geneva talks had served a good purpose by achieving the release of most American prisoners. The Secretary spoke very briefly on developments in the Americas.

He remarked on the importance of economic vitality in the free world and he cited the need of OTC which he thought the President would again recommend to Congress. He cited the competition of Soviet economic and military credits totaling perhaps \$1.4 billion arranged during the past year.

Secretary Dulles also noted progress in the development of the atoms for peace agency.

Concerning disarmament, he expected a continuation of Russian maneuvering, with no indication of any early agreement to the open-skies

proposal.

The Secretary concluded with his belief that a change in the whole Soviet system is getting underway although it may be five or ten years, or more, before dramatic changes can be seen.

The President then reverted to the Middle East situation, the future importance of oil to us directly, and the present importance of Britain and France continuing as strong powers. He referred to the nations in the Middle East friendly toward the United States.

The President then recalled traditional Russian ambitions in the Middle East, the present impossibility of France and Britain acting as a counterweight, and the existing vacuum that must be filled by the United States before it is filled by Russia. He cited Syrian developments as evidence of Russian intent. He asserted that the United States must assure the Middle East countries of our friendship and must help them economically since the primary concern of local rulers is with their local economies. He stressed that time is of the essence and he believed Congress would want to take as the first order of business the message he would soon be sending to request authorization of a special economic fund and authorization for the use of military force if necessary. He added that should there be a Soviet attack in that area he could see no alternative but that the United States move in immediately to stop it—other than suffering loss of that area to Russia. Loss of the area would be disastrous to Europe because of its oil requirements. He cited his belief that the United States must put the entire world on notice that we are ready to move instantly if necessary. He reaffirmed his regard for constitutional procedures but pointed out that modern war might be a matter of hours only.

The President believed that if the Administration had that kind of authority it might never have to be used. Concerning the possibility of indirect assault by the Soviet, the President stated that the situation required that the United States negotiate agreements—not necessarily treaties—to help the Middle East countries economically and militarily.

The President said that these conclusions had been reached after literally months of study, that the program was not fully complete and was open to

further discussion. He re-asserted his belief that the United States just cannot leave a vacuum in the Middle East and assume that Russia will stay out.

At the President's invitation, Secretary Dulles presented further details. He first reported to the group that accounts of the new program began to leak out Thursday morning and that he had therefore held a background conference Friday night in order to insure against any other nation taking credit for the program when it could be effective only if clearly the US program. He repeated that Administration thinking had not crystallized beyond the certainty that something had to be done. He summarized relationships and tensions existing among the several nations of the Middle East. He then stressed the desirability of a declaration of United States' policy subscribed to by both the Executive and the Congress. He commented further on the economic and military measures in view, stressing the need for the latter as a means of reassuring the people in the countries under greatest pressure from Russia. He believed it impossible to develop any sort of treaty arrangements given the many existing animosities. He made clear that the United States would focus solely on the Russian threat, making certain of keeping clear of internal squabbles. Secretary Dulles also pointed out the distinction between the Middle East and other troubled areas, such as Kashmir, by virtue of the fact that in the latter case there was hope of satisfactory settlement through UN activity alone. He stressed that anything done in the Middle East by the United States would be subject to pertinent provisions of the UN Charter. He said that the United States plan would constitute a decision to act only if the United Nations could not or did not act. The Secretary summarized the situation as one that could be met successfully by restoring confidence of security against any direct aggression and of protecting against indirect aggression through economic programs of a size not much larger than presently in being. He concluded by citing the urgent requests from the Saudis, the Lebanese, and others, on the need for the United States to act quickly.

Senator Johnson opened the discussion by asking when the message would be ready. The President indicated that it would be the fifth or sixth of January. He added that he hoped it would be the product of a consensus reached by the group despite the possibility of many honest differences.

Senator Russell inquired about the pressures on the countries near collapse and Secretary Dulles replied concerning their fear of Russia moving in to fill the vacuum. The President added that Russia might look to that area as a means of recovering from the setbacks it had been experiencing in the satellites. Senator Russell stated that everybody would agree on the need to do something but much more information would be necessary prior to adopting a specific action. He asked about Nasser's plans and how much he could be trusted. Secretary Dulles spoke on the difficulty of placing much trust in him but reported Mr. Hammarskjold's opinion that Nasser has pretty well lived up to such specific commitments as he has made to the United Nations. Senator Russell asked about the possibility of proceeding through regular treaty procedures. Secretary Dulles noted again the animosities in the area and the President cited particularly the difficulty of including Israel in any group. He thought the situation would be different if an entire set of bilateral treaties could be accomplished simultaneously, an action impossible at this time. He believed informal agreements to be the feasible alternative. Senator Russell then asked how much information would be given Congress and the President said that there would be full discussion, especially with the Foreign Relations Committees.

Senator Smith questioned the possible adverse reaction to this proposed military approach outside of United Nations channels. Secretary Dulles assured him that the United States would be acting only on request of an invaded country in the same manner as provided by arrangements in other areas of the world. He added that the United States had not previously made such arrangements here because of the primary British responsibility. He went on to emphasize the necessity for stating US policy clearly in advance as a deterrent force.

Senator Knowland asked if the concept should not be broadened to cover a situation where a country invited entry of Russian divisions, which would

certainly be against our national interest. The President replied that in such a case there would be time to consult with Congress again.

Rep. McCormack, citing his open-mindedness on this question, asked if the President did not already have power to carry out these proposals without seeking Congressional authorization. The President replied that greater effect could be had from a consensus of Executive and Legislative opinion. He cited a possible instance where the President would be required by the Constitution to consult Congress, then spoke of the desire of the Middle East countries to have reassurance now that the United States would stand ready to help. Mr. McCormack asked if we yet had indication from any countries of a desire for the United States to tie in closer with them. The President cited Saudi Arabia and Iraq. The Secretary made mention of Iran, Lebanon and Libya.

Mr. Allen suggested that this measure would be like the one approved with reference to Quemoy and Matsu.² The President agreed, then commented that in modern war there might not be time for orderly procedures so it was necessary to make our intent clear in advance.

Senator Russell thought that if this step should be taken we would not want to let it appear that only a “small war” might ensue. The President commented that should Russia move it could not possibly be a “small war”. Senator Russell thought that ought to be made clear; then the President continued with regard to Russia moving in such a way that we can know the source and know what to attack. Secretary Dulles cited the greatest danger as that of an internal action, like the coup in Czechoslovakia, which really resulted from the presence of Communist troops on the border of the country.

Secretary Dulles stated that the Administration was not looking for conclusions at this meeting since there was need for considerable discussion and presentation to the Congressional Committees. The President asked Speaker Rayburn if the House could begin consideration quickly. The Speaker thought it could after completion of organization of the House. He asked if the countries involved in the measure would be named specifically. The President thought they could be. The Speaker then commented that if the Resolution were to be undertaken it would need to have nearly

unanimous support, otherwise it would not be very effective. He thought the Resolution would occasion much propaganda against the United States, hence full explanations and a very clear Resolution would be needed to counter such propaganda. The President thought that both the Resolution and the explanation should contain clear indications that the United States would act only where requested, and that the United States was not being truculent.

Mr. Halleck asked whether the British and the French could be counted on to use their power if Russia tried to cut off the Mid-East oil supplies. Secretary Dulles believed so. Mr. Halleck then asked if it could not be expected that the United States would be drawn into any such conflict. Again Mr. Dulles believed so.

Senator Johnson spoke at length on his dislike of the manner in which this project was reported prematurely by the press. In regard to timing in the Senate, he cited the possible rules fight and other organizational matters which would preclude action on the Resolution prior to about January 8th. The President repeated how the first leak, despite great secrecy precautions, had made necessary the background conference. In response to inquiry from Mr. McCormack, the President said the Executive Branch had been seeking answers for the Middle East since last July but not until two weeks ago had any plan been put on paper. Mr. McCormack asked what would be the latest time that this Resolution could be effectively accomplished. The President thought it impossible to set a fixed date. He hoped instead it would be the first order of business after agreement on rules. Speaker Martin thought it might be helpful for the House to act quickly even though the Senate would require more time.

The President concluded this phase of the discussion by stating that the Secretary would discuss the Resolution informally with House and Senate leaders before it is officially submitted.³

[Here follows discussion of unrelated matters.]

L.A. Minnich, Jr.

¹ Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Legislative Meetings. Confidential. Drafted by L. Arthur Minnich.

² Reference is to the Joint Congressional Resolution of January 29, 1955, which authorized the President to use U.S. forces in defense of Formosa and the Pescadores. For text, see [vol. II, p. 162](#).

³ At the Eisenhower administration's request, Secretary Dulles met with members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee at 6:15 p.m. on January 2. The record of the meeting, which was held in executive session, is printed in U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Together with Joint Sessions with the Senate Armed Services Committee (Historical Series)*, Volume IX, Eighty-Fifth Congress, First Session (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979), pp. 1–35.

183. Editorial Note

On January 5, President Eisenhower presented to the Congress his proposal for United States military and economic cooperation with those Middle Eastern nations desiring such assistance. Speaking before a joint session, the President emphasized the importance of the Middle East to the United States and warned of the danger posed by international communism to the area. According to the President, there were three “simple and indisputable” facts:

“1. The Middle East, which has always been coveted by Russia, would today be prized more than ever by International Communism.

“2. The Soviet rulers continue to show that they do not scruple to use any means to gain their ends.

“3. The free nations of the Mid East need, and for the most part want, added strength to assure their continued independence.”

The President noted that the United Nations could always be helpful in protecting the independence of small nations, “but it cannot be a wholly dependable protector of freedom when the ambitions of the Soviet Union are involved,” Therefore, the President maintained, a greater responsibility now devolved upon the United States. In order to make more evident U.S. willingness to support the independence of the freedom-loving nations of the area, the President proposed that the basic U.S. policy toward the Middle East should find expression in joint action by the Congress and the Executive. Specifically, the President proposed that the Congress authorize the following U.S. actions:

1) Cooperation with and assistance to any nation or group of nations in the general area of the Middle East in the development of economic strength dedicated to the maintenance of national independence;

- 2) Programs of military assistance and cooperation with any nation or group of nations in the region that desired such aid;
- 3) Employment of U.S. armed forces to secure and protect the territorial integrity and political independence of nations requesting such aid against overt armed aggression from any nation controlled by international communism; and
- 4) Employment, for economic and defense military purposes, of sums available under the Mutual Security Act of 1954 as amended, without regard to existing limitations.

In regard to this last point, the President indicated his intention to seek in subsequent legislation the authorization of \$200 million to be available during each of fiscal years 1958 and 1959 for discretionary use in the area, in addition to the other mutual security programs. For text of Eisenhower's address, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1957*, pages 6–16.

Later that day, Representative Thomas S. Gordon, Chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, introduced as House Joint Resolution 117, *A Joint Resolution to Authorize the President to Under-take Economic and Military Cooperation with Nations in the General Area of the Middle East in Order to Assist in the Strengthening and Defense of Their Independence*. The resolution provided for the authority that the President sought. House joint Resolution 117 was referred to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs and hearings were held between January 7 and 22. For the record of the hearings, see *Economic and Military Cooperation with Nations in the General Area of the Middle East, Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Eighty-Fifth Congress, First Session, on H.J. Res. 117* (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1957).

On January 9, the same resolution was introduced into the Senate as Senate Joint Resolution 19 by Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Theodore F. Green, acting on behalf of himself and Senator

Alexander Wiley. The resolution was referred to the Committees on Foreign Relations and Armed Services jointly. Hearings were held before the two committees beginning on January 14. For the record of the public hearings held between January 14 and February 11, see *The President's Proposal on the Middle East, Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, Eighty-Fifth Congress, First Session*, on S.J. Res. 19 and H.J. Res. 117, parts 1–2 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1957). The record of the Executive Sessions held between January 28 and February 13 is printed in Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *Executive Sessions Historical Series*), Volume IX, pages 87–408.

184. Editorial Note

On January 7, the White House announced that President Eisenhower had appointed James P. Richards as Special Assistant to the President with the personal rank of Ambassador to advise and assist the President and the Secretary of State on problems of the Middle Eastern area. In particular, Richards was commissioned to head a special group of Department of State, Department of Defense, and International Cooperation Administration officials to implement certain aspects of U.S. Middle Eastern policies. For text of the announcement, see Department of State *Bulletin*, January 28, 1957, page 130.

185. Memorandum From the Secretary of Defense (Wilson) to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay)¹

Washington, January 10, 1957.

SUBJECT

U.S. Adherence to the Baghdad Pact

With reference to my memorandum to the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, dated 14 November 1956,² subject as above, I am of the opinion that my recommendation contained in that memorandum has been overtaken by the Joint Resolution on the Middle East as proposed by the President. Accordingly, I recommend that the subject be deleted from the NSC Tentative Agenda, where it is currently listed as an item awaiting consideration.

C.E. Wilson³

¹ Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5428 Memos. Top Secret. Attached to a January 17 memorandum from Lay to the National Security Council that indicates the President approved Secretary Wilson's recommendation contained in this memorandum.

² See [footnote 3, Document 141](#).

³ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

186. Editorial Note

On January 11, at the 309th meeting of the National Security Council, Allen Dulles, in his review of developments affecting U.S. security, presented a report on the reaction of Middle Eastern countries to the administration's recent proposals and the Congressional Joint Resolution. The memorandum of discussion reads in part:

“The Director of Central Intelligence indicated that he would first discuss the reaction in Near Eastern countries to the Administration's recent proposals with regard to our Middle Eastern policies and the Congressional Joint Resolution. According to our intelligence, the official reaction both in the Arab states and in Israel had thus far been reserved. The reaction of Syria and Jordan had been cool. The Soviets had advised the Egyptians that they too proposed to make an official statement on Soviet Middle Eastern policy within a few days. Nasser has ordered the Egyptian press to be discreet in its treatment of the President's statement. Nasser apparently expects the forthcoming Soviet announcement to be in the nature of a Soviet counter-guaranty to protect all the Arab states, plus a massive aid program for these states. Syria is following in general the Egyptian line, whereas Lebanon and Iraq have indicated warm approval of the new policy. The Israeli press has been moderately critical of the new policy, on grounds that it left too many problems—such as the Suez Canal—unsolved.” (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)

187. Editorial Note

At the 310th meeting of the National Security Council on January 24, Allen Dulles discussed the situation in the Middle East in his briefing. For text of his remarks, see [volume XVII, pages 47 –48](#). Agenda item 3, entitled “United States Objectives and Policies With Respect to the Near East,” focused on NSC 5428 and the December 22 OCB Progress Report ([Document 178](#)). The discussion began as follows:

“Mr. Cutler passed briefly over the substantive content of the OCB Progress Report, in view of the fact that much of the policy was now out of date. He did, however, point to the recommendation of the OCB that the time was at hand for the Council to review our existing Near East policy statement (NSC 5428). In connection with this recommendation, Mr. Cutler added that he had learned, in a conversation with Secretary Hoover, that Secretary Dulles did not think that the time was yet at hand for the Planning Board to commence a review of NSC 5428. Nevertheless, Mr. Cutler suggested that the Council might wish to hear a report on the current situation in the Near East from Secretary Hoover.

“Referring to the OCB recommendation for a review of NSC 5428, Secretary Hoover indicated that the State Department believed that many of the long-range policies and objectives in the existing paper were still viable. Accordingly, rather than to commence now a reconsideration of NSC 5428, the State Department believed it would be better to postpone such reconsideration until some of the short-range problems in the Near East had been met and solved. He said he had particularly in mind developments in connection with the Joint Congressional Resolution and the results of the recommendations which would flow from Congressman Richards’ trip to the Middle East.”

The discussion then turned to the situation in the Gaza Strip and King Saud's forthcoming visit. For text, see [volume XVII, pages 48–49](#). Arthur S. Flemming then made some comments on the supply of petroleum:

“In concluding his remarks, Secretary Hoover suggested that Dr. Flemming might wish to comment on the petroleum situation as it was affecting Western Europe. Dr. Flemming summarized a recent meeting of himself and Government officials to discuss conditions in Texas and the decisions of the Texas Commission. He pointed out that Europe appeared to be in pretty good shape with respect to its supplies of gasoline, but that it was not well off in terms of its fuel requirements. At present, the fuel supply was only 67% of Western Europe's requirements. Nevertheless, Dr. Flemming suggested his view that it would be unwise for the Federal Government to exert direct pressure on Texas to increase output at the present time. One happy feature of the situation was that Venezuela had been shipping a great deal more crude to us than they had earlier estimated that they would be able to do. The discussion concluded with a comment on the difficulties which the Administration would face internally when the Suez situation was finally solved and Europe got its regular supplies of petroleum from the Middle East.”

The remainder of the discussion on this item is printed in [volume XVII, pages 49–51](#).

The last item concerned NSC 5401 and the November 9, 1955, and June 22, 1956, OCB Progress Reports. NSC 5401, approved by the President on January 2, 1954, is not printed. The OCB Progress Reports [*3 and 5 pages of source text, respectively*] were not declassified. (Both in Department of State, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351) The NSC directed the NSC Planning Board “to review the policy in NSC 5401 under special security safeguards.” (NSC Action No. 1659, approved by the President on January 28; *ibid.*, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council) The memorandum of discussion at the 310th NSC meeting was prepared by S. Everett Gleason. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)

**188. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State,
Washington, January 25, 1957¹**

Washington, January 25, 1957

SUBJECT

Proposed Discussions in London regarding New Middle East Pipeline

PARTICIPANTS

The Under Secretary

Brewster Jennings, Chairman of the Board, Socony-Mobil Company

M. J. Rathbone, President, Standard Oil of New Jersey

Rear Admiral Thomas Kelley, Socony-Mobil Company

William M. Rountree, Assistant Secretary, NEA

Herman Phleger, Legal Advisor (for last half of conversation)

Edwin G. Moline, RA

Murat W. Williams, GTI

Mr. Jennings explained that he and Mr. Rathbone had come to ask Mr. Hoover's advice regarding an invitation for discussions in London with Shell, British Petroleum, Compagnie Francaise and three other American companies concerning the construction of a new pipeline to carry Middle East crude oil (from the Persian Gulf area through Iraq to Iskenderun, Turkey). He said that the oil involved would be more than IPC oil and would include probably oil also from Kuwait and Iran. Mr. Rathbone said that the project would be a very large trunkline carrying 1.2 million barrels a day in two parallel lines, each of 600,000 barrels capacity. The meetings

in London would probably not take place before February 18. The London discussions would be preliminary and would probably lead to the setting up of a working group to bring the matter into focus.

Mr. Rathbone said that the companies concerned desired assurances from the U.S. Government that their undertaking was legal and satisfactory. They further desired the assurance that our Government is sympathetically inclined to the project and would consider backing it up with some sort of treaty protection. No one of the companies wanted to go into this project without assurance that the Government was favorably disposed to it.

It was explained that the companies envisaged the organization of a pipeline company which would make agreements with the various countries. A treaty would probably be sought between the countries of transit and of ownership. This treaty (1) would recognize the existence of the agreements between the pipeline company and the countries; (2) would provide that no country would make any changes in its laws to affect adversely the operation of the company, and (3) in case such changes were made, would provide the companies recourse to the International Court of Justice.

Mr. Hoover expressed general agreement with the treaty relationship and compared it to the Convention of 1888 covering the operation of the Suez Canal. He also said that the project would seem to be desirable from an overall point of view.

Regarding the anti-trust aspect of the project, Mr. Jennings said that the companies would like a similar arrangement to that which was provided in the Iranian case in 1953, when a letter from General Bedell Smith stated that the Government would have no objection to the discussions that were to be undertaken leading eventually to the consortium agreement. Mr. Hoover pointed out that there might not be any anti-trust problem provided the discussions were limited to the pipeline project without reference to production concessions. However, he asked Mr. Phleger for a legal opinion. Mr. Phleger said he could see no reason why the Department of Justice should object to attendance at the meeting, particularly since the discussions in London would only be exploratory. Mr. Rathbone proposed that a letter be written to the companies with the clearance of the Department of Justice and ODM saying that there was no objection to the discussions provided no

agreement was entered into and provided that when an agreement was contemplated it would be submitted for the opinion of the Department of Justice.

Mr. Rountree expressed the opinion that the proposed pipeline would be a most helpful development in the Middle East. There was some discussion on the effect of the project upon existing pipeline contracts. It was generally agreed by Department representatives that this would strengthen the existing pipeline arrangements since an alternative route was provided. However, it was clear that this undertaking would require at least three years to complete and the total cost was estimated at \$760 million.

Mr. Jennings left a letter addressed to the Secretary informing him of the invitation to the London meetings and asking the Department's opinion regarding attendance. It was agreed that an answer would be forthcoming shortly, but Mr. Hoover stated that the companies could be reasonably sure that the answer would be favorable.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 880.2553/1-2557. Confidential. Drafted by Williams.

189. Editorial Note

On January 29, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and the Senate Committee on Armed Services, sitting jointly to consider Senate Joint Resolution 19, adopted by a vote of 30 to 0 a motion by Senator J. William Fulbright requesting the Department of State to “provide a chronological statement, together with classified and unclassified supporting documents, telegrams, and the like, of all the events that have contributed significantly to the present situation in the Middle East, with particular reference to the period beginning January 1946.” The resolution also affirmed that “the committees desire such information as soon as possible, but they will not delay action on S.J. Res. 19 pending receipt of such information.” The text of the resolution is in Senator Theodore Green’s letter to Secretary Dulles of January 29. (Department of State, Central Files, 114.2/1–2957) The text of the letter is printed in the *Congressional Record*, volume 103, part 11, page 14702.

For the record of the discussion on Fulbright’s motion, see Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *Executive Sessions* (Historical Series), Volume IX, pages 101–127.

On April 12, Deputy Under Secretary Murphy transmitted to Senator Fulbright the first installment of documents compiled by the Historical Division of the Department of State: a chronological statement with supporting documents concerning U.S. policy and the Aswan High Dam, which Fulbright’s subcommittee had asked be given priority. (Letter from Murphy to Fulbright, April 12; Department of State, Central Files, 874.2614/4–1257) During the next 4 months, the Department of State forwarded to the subcommittee in installments additional documentation dealing with the Aswan High Dam and chronological statements with supporting documents covering U.S. policy in the Middle East for the years 1946–1948. Copies of the chronological statements and related documentation are filed with Office of the Historian Research Projects 396 through 399 in National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, PA/HO Files: Lot 79 D 251 and Lot 89 D 263.

Finally on July 30, the special subcommittee met and decided to abandon its inquiry. Afterwards, Fulbright told the press that the decision to discontinue had been made in view of the size of the task and the fact that events since adoption of the Eisenhower Doctrine had made many of the questions obsolete. (*The Washington Post*, July 31, 1957)

190. Editorial Note

Between January 30 and February 8, Saudi Arabian King Saud and other Saudi dignitaries visited Washington and held extensive discussions with President Eisenhower, Secretary Dulles, and other high-ranking United States officials. For documentation on the visit of King Saud, including information relating to the Baghdad Pact and other regional issues, see [volume XIII, pages 413](#) ff.

191. Memorandum of a Conference With the President, Washington, March 6, 1957¹

Washington, March 6, 1957

OTHERS PRESENT

Secretary Dulles

General Goodpaster

Ambassador Richards joined the group for the initial discussion, which had to do with the President's letter to him and the proposed statement to be made by the President on signing the Mid-East resolution.² There was discussion as to indicating to House leaders that the amendments introduced by the Senate were acceptable to the Administration. Mr. Dulles said he had so notified Speaker Rayburn. The President asked General Persons to join the meeting and when he did so asked him to see that other leaders were informed. Ambassador Richards said there was some question regarding the amendment on the non-use of arms for aggressive purposes. At the President's request Mr. Morgan and Mr. Harlow joined the meeting and there was extended discussion and several phone calls were made concerning the effect of the amendment. The outcome was a conclusion that the reference in the amendment to Section 105A of the Mutual Security Act³ was reasonably susceptible of an interpretation that it incorporated the other eligibility provisions of the Mutual Security Act. Mr. Morgan felt it would be dangerous to allow the amendment to stand. There was discussion of the possibility of having the House recede accepting the Senate version with a further House amendment which the Senate might then consider. As an alternative, it was suggested that House leaders might state their understanding before their vote on the Resolution that only the *specific* conditions stated in Section 105A applied. The President asked General Persons, Mr. Morgan and Mr. Harlow to work the matter out with the other people concerned.

Mr. Dulles indicated that Ambassador Richards planned to leave on his mission on about March 12. He will be accompanied by representatives from State, ICA, and Defense. Ambassador Richards said that with regard to his power to make commitments, he of course intended to send all such back to Washington for action, but that there would be need for quick action on the recommendations here. The President said he would like to have arrangements made to give such recommendations the highest priority for consideration.

At this point Ambassador Richards left the meeting and Mr. Herter joined. They discussed a number of State Department appointments with the President. On one of these, the President asked General Persons to consult with Senate leaders before the nomination is submitted.

G
Brigadier General USA

¹ Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries. Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster on March 7.

² See [Document 193](#).

³ Reference is to the Mutual Security Act of 1954 as amended; for text of Section 105A, see 68 Stat. 835.

192. Position Paper Prepared in the Department of State¹

Washington, March 8, 1957.

AMBASSADOR RICHARDS' MISSION TO THE MIDDLE EAST

Use of U.S. Armed Forces Under the President's Proposals

In a letter regarding the military aspects of the President's proposals, signed by Mr. Reuben B. Robertson, Jr., on February 13, the Department of Defense stated in part:² "... the best defensive arrangements can be obtained through cooperative effort involving the use of combined forces (United States and indigenous) in which each nation contributes that which it can do most effectively. This concept could culminate in a combined United States indigenous capability of sufficient strength to permit, in some cases, a reduction of local military forces to levels more compatible with indigenous support capabilities ... The prerequisite to determining those U.S. forces which should be earmarked for deployment to the area, as well as the question of bases, can only be determined in connection with a U.S. defense plan. This is now in process of preparation."

During the visit of Crown Prince Abdul Ilah of Iraq in February 1957, he was given to understand that in the context of the President's Middle East proposals the United States hoped to be able to go much further in its participation in the Baghdad Pact's Military Committee, as well as in all Pact activities directed against communism. Similar statements were made to the Foreign Minister of Pakistan on February 26 and the Turkish Ambassador on January 17.

The Richards' Mission inevitably will be queried intensively by certain countries with respect to the employment of United States armed forces. The protection offered thereby in case of need is to some countries a most attractive feature of the Middle East program as a whole. This aspect will be particularly important to the "northern tier" countries which are bound to be disappointed over the limited, if any, additional aid available. Also, unless the Mission makes clear the seriousness of the United States

determination to act in case of necessity, the value of the Joint Resolution as a deterrent to communist aggression will be seriously weakened.

Pertinent Factors

The problem of the possible use of U.S. armed forces under the President's proposals is obviously a most complex one involving far-reaching military and political decisions, affecting United States relations both with the Soviet bloc and nations of the area and questions of military expenditures. Set forth below are some of the factors which need consideration:

1.

Although the Joint Resolution carries with it no United States commitment, there will be set up a strong moral obligation to respond to an attack by international communism by use of U.S. armed forces if a victim of aggression which shows a determination to resist so requests. Failure to act would adversely affect defense arrangements throughout the world, encourage Soviet aggressiveness, and destroy area confidence in the United States.

[Numbered paragraph 2 (12 lines of source text) not declassified]

3. Local counteraction by United States and indigenous forces is a possible alternative to global retaliation. If local action is to be a real possibility, advance preparations of a military nature are certainly required. Beside the military problems involved, questions of the most far-reaching political significance arise:

a. With respect to US-USSR relations, it is a major objective of United States policy to seek an acceptable adjustment which would reduce the dangers of armed clash with the Soviet Union. The further intrusion of a United States military presence in the Middle East area probably would make an adjustment more difficult to realize, at least in the first instance. While a stronger U.S. military position in the area might have a deterrent

effect and eventually induce the USSR to seek a real accommodation, it is likely in the immediate future to stimulate greater Soviet activity. Should the U.S. decide to establish additional bases near its borders or deploy troops to the area, the USSR might estimate that a military threat was being directed against its own security and that this would justify its taking increased risks of war before the United States had consolidated new positions in the Middle East. Fear that the Baghdad Pact was the precursor of U.S. military bases was a factor of indeterminate importance leading to the Soviet decision of April 1955 to increase its activities in the Middle East.

b. With respect to the Middle East area, the present climate of opinion, with few exceptions, is strongly opposed to any arrangements implying subordination to a Western power. Efforts by the United States to obtain additional bases or other facilities for use in peacetime would mean, except for rare exceptions, bucking the dominant trend now at work in the area. Although individual leaders might accept such arrangements, the sentiment of the people generally is opposed. Trying to obtain special military rights would adversely affect the political impact of the President's proposals and run counter to the stress placed on building up local power in contrast to the introduction of outside force. The Baghdad Pact countries are most anxious to build up the strength of their own forces for a variety of reasons not necessarily related: to the Soviet threat and are unlikely to accept the logic of reducing their forces as U.S. military strength in the area is built up.

c. Sharper differences would ensue with the so-called neutral nations, especially India. Divisions in the area would be increased.

d. Base or other facilities in the area would in most cases involve continuing difficulties with the host countries. Any facilities would have to be immediately available. It is questionable whether they could be kept in an adequate state of readiness without the presence of considerable numbers of United States personnel. The unfortunate experience of the British in attempting to maintain bases in the area is instructive.

4. A decision to defend the area by local use of U.S. and indigenous forces could lead to increased costs. Payment of local governments for bases and other facilities, the expense of United States personnel needed to maintain the bases, the direct costs of the U.S. troops earmarked for the area, and the cost of indigenous forces would all have to be taken into account.

5. Regarding the Baghdad Pact, it is important that the United States not permit it to fail now. Regardless of the Pact's past history, United States prestige is deeply involved as is the willingness of area friends to stand up and be counted. At the same time, it would appear inadvisable to link the President's proposals directly to the Pact, thus jeopardizing their acceptance by other area countries. Although King Saud's understanding of the purposes of the Baghdad Pact has grown as a result of his visit here, he might withdraw his endorsement of the President's proposals if they were based on the Pact. Arrangements with the Pact countries should not preclude encouragement of other regional groupings with a pro-Western orientation. The United States can probably act most effectively by continuing to strengthen the Pact while not joining formally. The Military Committee of the Pact provides a vehicle which could be used for planning with the area countries where this is most urgent, while avoiding to a considerable extent the political liabilities of full Pact membership.

While the complex problems outlined above will not be resolved before the departure of Ambassador Richards' Mission, the Mission should be in a position to convey the impression that the United States is determined to implement if necessary the statement regarding use of U.S. armed forces. It should also try to maintain interest in the Baghdad Pact, disabusing area countries of any belief that the President's proposals are intended as a substitute. At the same time, the Mission should strive to avoid losing possible support for the proposals from opponents of the Pact.

Accordingly the Mission might take the following positions in talks with foreign officials:

1. The President alone retains the ultimate decision on whether to employ the armed forces of the United States if requested to do so in the event of overt armed aggression by international communism.
2. The Joint Resolution authorizes the President to act quickly in an emergency.
3. Countries in the general area of the Middle East whose acts evidence their determination to maintain their independence against international communism may rest assured that in answer to a request the United States would take appropriate action inside or outside of the United Nations. The report of the Committee on Foreign Relations and Armed Services of the Senate stated —“The Joint Committee strongly supports the policy announced by the President of using armed force, if necessary, to help nations in the Middle East resist overt communist aggression. The Joint Committee has not the slightest doubt that, should such aggression occur and should American help be requested, help would be forthcoming promptly and forcefully.”
4. In reply to any inquiries regarding planning for the use of United States armed forces, facilities or bases, the Mission would state that any views area countries wish to advance will be carefully considered by the United States. The Mission should avoid any appearance of soliciting suggestions for combined

planning, bases or other facilities in addition to existing arrangements.

5. The President's proposals in no way supplant the Baghdad Pact. In the sense that both are directed at building strength against international communism they supplement each other. The United States stands fully behind its statement of November 29, 1956.

6. For their own confidential information only, the top leaders of the Baghdad Pact countries would be informed that the United States is prepared to join the Military Committee of the Pact if invited to do so at the next meeting of the Council. The desirability of keeping the information confidential for the present would be stressed. King Saud would be told of the decision and its importance in developing area strength against communism would be emphasized.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 120.1580/5-3157. Top Secret. The source text is marked "General Paper 11" and is part of a series of position papers, drafted in the Department of State, in preparation for the special mission of Ambassador Richards to the Middle East. In addition to 11 position papers concerning economic, military, and procedural issues in general, papers analyzing the possibilities for involvement in the President's special Middle East program were prepared for the following countries: Afghanistan, Egypt, Ethiopia, Greece, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, and Yemen. All of these papers are *ibid*.

Documentation on the Richards Mission in general is printed in this compilation. Documentation concerning those aspects of the Richards Mission pertaining to individual countries is printed in the respective compilations in [volumes XIII](#), [XVI](#), and [XVIII](#). Additional documentation relating to the Mission is in Department of State, Central File 120.1580 and NEA Files: Lot 57 D 616, which contains Ambassador Richards' personal files.

The position paper printed here is a revision of a paper originally drafted on February 27. A cover sheet indicates that the paper was drafted by Burdett and cleared with Memminger, Stevens, Rockwell, Jones, and Withers in the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs; with the Office of Eastern European Affairs; and with Mathews of the Policy Planning Staff, except for recommendation 6. The paper was also cleared with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and with the Department of Defense “as appropriate guidance for the Richards Mission from a military viewpoint.”

² The ellipses in the following quotation are in the source text.

193. Editorial Note

On March 9, President Eisenhower signed into law the Senate Version of H.J. Resolution 117, S.J. Resolution 19, as Public Law 85–7. (71 Stat. 5) He also announced that Ambassador James P. Richards would leave for the Middle East on March 12 as the head of a special mission to explain the Resolution to the region’s leaders. For text of the President’s statement, see Department of State *Bulletin*, March 25, 1957, page 480.

The House Committee on Foreign Affairs had reported out H.J. Resolution 117 on January 25 with slight modifications. The text of the report, *Approval of an Amended Middle East Resolution by the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives: House Report No. 2, 85th Congress, January 25, 1957*, and the text of the amended resolution adopted by the House of Representatives on January 30 by a vote of 355 to 61, are printed in *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents*, 1957, pages 803–817.

On February 14, the Senate Committees on Foreign Relations and Armed Services, acting jointly, reported out S.J. Resolution 19 with substantive amendments. The text of the Senate report, *Approval of an Amended Middle East Resolution by the Committees on Foreign Relations and Armed Services of the Senate: Senate Report No. 70, 85th Congress, February 14, 1957*, and the text of the amended resolution adopted by the Senate on March 5 by a vote of 72 to 19 are printed *ibid.*, pages 818–831. The House of Representatives approved the Senate version of the resolution on March 7 by a vote of 350 to 60.

194. Letter From the President to His Special Assistant (Richards)¹

Washington, March 9, 1957.

DEAR MR. AMBASSADOR: I asked the Congress on January 5, 1957, to join with me in a program for economic and military cooperation with the states in the general area of the Middle East. I said that I intended promptly to send a special mission to the general area of the Middle East to explain the cooperation the United States is prepared to give. The Congress, by Joint Resolution adopted on March 7, 1957, endorsed the program.

I am now asking you as a Special Assistant to the President, with the personal rank of Ambassador, to undertake the mission to the Middle East as soon as possible. In charging you with this responsibility, I wish to express again my complete trust and confidence in your carrying out of this difficult assignment. You will be given full support by the various Government Departments and Agencies concerned. I know you will wish to consult closely with our Chiefs of Mission in the field.

I believe it will be desirable for you to visit each independent nation in the general area of the Middle East which expresses an interest in discussing the program. You will, of course, be speaking directly for me and the Secretary of State.

You are entrusted with a fourfold task:

1. To convey to the Middle East Governments the spirit and purposes of my Middle East proposals as endorsed by the Joint Resolution of the Congress.
2. To determine, after consultations with the Governments concerned, which countries in the area wish to avail themselves of the United States offer of assistance and to participate in all or part of the program.
- 3.

To make commitments for programs of economic and military assistance, within the provisions of the Joint Resolution and within the limitation of funds appropriated by the Congress, which you deem to be essential and urgent to accomplish the purpose of the program.

I assume you will keep me informed, through the Department of State, in regard to any commitments which you contemplate. This authorization, of course, does not extend to any question regarding the employment of the armed forces of the United States, which I alone must decide.

4. To report to me your findings and to recommend further appropriate measures to accomplish the purpose of the program either under the Joint Resolution or otherwise.

More detailed guidance with respect to your first three responsibilities will be provided by the Secretary of State on my behalf. In connection with your report and recommendations, I shall value any observations you may wish to make regarding the intra-area problems and measures that may facilitate their solution.

I know you share my personal conviction of the importance of this mission to the welfare of the United States and to the cause of world peace to which we are all dedicated. I wish you all success.

With warm regard,

Sincerely,²

¹ Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Administration Series. The text of this letter was drafted in the Department of State by Burdett and Mathews and transmitted to the White House on March 4 under cover of a memorandum from Secretary Dulles to President Eisenhower. In the memorandum, Dulles suggested that the President meet with Richards prior

to his departure, and that in order to focus attention on the mission there be a short ceremony when the President signed the Joint Resolution on the Middle East Program. Dulles also transmitted under cover of the March 4 memorandum a suggested statement for the President's possible use during such a ceremony. Notations on copies of these documents in Department of State, Central Files, 120.1580/3-457, indicate that Eisenhower initialed his approval on March 9 and that the President, Secretary Dulles, and Ambassador Richards revised the suggested statement prior to its delivery by the President. The memorandum of Eisenhower's meeting with Dulles and Richards on March 6 is printed as [Document 191](#).

² Printed from an unsigned copy.

195. Letter From the Secretary of State to the President's Special Assistant (Richards)¹

Washington, March 9, 1957.

DEAR MR. AMBASSADOR: The President's letter of March 9, 1957² asked you to undertake a special mission to the general area of the Middle East to explain his proposals, endorsed by Joint Resolution of the Congress, for United States cooperation with nations of that region. As requested by the President I am providing you on his behalf with more detailed guidance regarding the first three tasks he has entrusted to you.

1.

“To convey to the Middle East Governments the spirit and purposes of my Middle East proposals as endorsed by the Joint Resolution of the Congress.”

The basic purpose of these proposals is to help the states in the general area of the Middle East, at their request, to maintain their national independence against the encroachments of international communism. The Government of the United States considers that the establishment by international communism of control or decisive influence over any Middle Eastern state would endanger the independence of all the nations in the area and adversely affect the security of the United States.

In order to deter communist military adventures and to maintain an atmosphere of calm confidence on the part of area states, the President concluded that it was necessary to make clear that the United States is prepared to interpose its military power in the event of overt armed aggression by international communism in the Middle East. That part of the proposal relating to the use of the armed forces of the United States is directed at this aspect of the problem.

It is equally essential to strengthen the determination and ability of the Middle Eastern nations to protect their independence against communism subversion. Both the protection offered against direct armed attack and the special programs of economic and military assistance are designed to accomplish this purpose.

No part of the proposal, nor any other policy of this Government, has as its purpose the establishment of a United States sphere of influence in the Middle East or interference by the United States in the internal affairs of any Middle Eastern state. The United States is not seeking, through these proposals to gain any additional military facilities for its own use. This Government is convinced that there is a broad identity of interest between the United States and the nations in the general area of the Middle East. It is on this firm base of common interest that the Government of the United States desires to cooperate with the Governments of the area to their mutual benefit.

Some Middle Eastern governments may ask what relation the proposals have to the possibility of non-communist aggression in the area and to such area problems as Palestine and the Suez Canal. This Government, by various public pronouncements and by its action at the time of the attacks on Egypt, has made clear its determined opposition to any aggression against the political independence or territorial integrity of the nations of the Middle East, and its determination to oppose any such aggression in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations. This policy stands unchanged. The President's proposals have singled out communist aggression because experience has shown that the communist nations are not dissuaded from undertaking or pursuing aggression by the moral or political power of the United Nations. The proposals are designed to supplement the universal non-aggression principles expressed in the Charter of the United Nations.

These proposals, of course, do not represent the totality of United States policies. The programs undertaken pursuant to the

proposals will impede exploitation of area problems by international communism and thus facilitate progress toward their solution. Neither the proposals nor the related programs are, however, intended of themselves to bring about a solution of these problems. United States efforts to assist in this regard are carried on through other activities and channels, for example the United Nations.

While you will need to take account of the intra-area problems, I believe your mission should take the position with area Governments that it is not charged with responsibility for seeking solutions to these problems.

2.

“To determine, after consultations with the Governments concerned, which countries in the area wish to avail themselves of the United States offer of assistance and to participate in all or part of the program.”

In determining whether to participate in the program, area countries may be influenced principally by two factors—the shield offered by the United States against overt armed aggression from any nation controlled by international communism and the prospects of economic and military aid. In discussing the first aspect, your objective should be to instill confidence in the nations of the area, especially in those whose geographic position leaves them most exposed, thus building up or reinforcing the will to resist efforts at subversion. You may point out that while the United States retains the ultimate decision on how to act in a given situation, the Joint Resolution authorizes the President quickly to employ the armed forces of the United States in the event of overt armed aggression by international communism. Countries in the general area of the Middle East whose acts evidence their determination to maintain their independence against international communism may rest assured that in answer to a request the United States would take appropriate action inside or outside of the United Nations.

You are bound to encounter excessive expectations and demands for economic and military assistance, particularly from the Baghdad Pact countries despite the fact that they are already recipients of substantial aid under existing programs. This Government has repeatedly shown its support of the Baghdad Pact, notably by the statement issued on November 29, 1956, and the present program should give further assurance to and strengthen the friendly governments joined in the Pact. While it is not contemplated that the Baghdad Pact should be the vehicle for carrying out the program, the Joint Resolution specifically refers to "any nation or group of nations" desiring United States assistance. I believe this Government should be receptive to requests from groups of nations, such as the Baghdad Pact, for assistance towards consultative institutions, activities and projects which they have worked out in common and which further indigenous efforts to develop regional strength and stability.

The program must do more than register the participation of nations already committed to the free world, such as the members of the Baghdad Pact. While not wishing to give United States friends the impression that they are being slighted, the main effort necessarily must be focused on winning over the waverers whose determination and ability to resist international communism is weak. The United States should be forthcoming in extending assistance when aid is likely to encourage a Government to resist the communist threat and act against it, but should not bolster the standing of a Government which avoids any stand against international communism and in fact tolerates and facilitates the growth of communist influence.

3.

"To make commitments for programs of economic and military assistance, within the provisions of the Joint Resolution and within the limitation of funds appropriated by the Congress, which you deem to be essential and urgent to accomplish the purpose of the program."

The Congress has approved the President's recommendations that certain restrictions in the Mutual Security Act with respect to the granting of aid be removed from \$200 million out of funds already appropriated thereby granting considerable leeway in determining the most effective use of funds to accomplish the political objectives sought. I believe it is desirable nevertheless to follow, to the extent feasible, the provisions of the Mutual Security Act. However, your primary guide should be whether a given economic or military activity in a given situation will develop or reinforce the will and ability to resist international communism. You will wish to consider, among other factors, whether an activity will help meet an economic crisis, aid in building effective internal security forces or have an immediate political impact furthering the program.

While in the field, you may find certain situations where the need is so evident and urgent that you will wish to take action on the spot. The President has authorized you to do so within the provisions of the Joint Resolution and has asked you to keep him informed, through the Department of State, in regard to any commitments which you contemplate. I am confident that you will consider the effects on existing policies and programs, and the possible reactions of the Congress.

I am most pleased that you have agreed to undertake this difficult mission, which is so important to the national welfare of the United States. The Department of State will make every effort to meet any requests which you may have. I extend my best wishes for a successful outcome to your mission.

Sincerely yours,

John Foster Dulles³

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 120.1580/3-957. Secret. Drafted by Burdett and Mathews.

² [Supra](#).

³ Printed from a copy that bears this stamped signature and a handwritten notation by Richard Selby that reads: “This letter signed by Sec. on 3/4, at same time as he signed memo to Pres. This letter was dated 3/9, same date as President’s letter to Amb. Richards, so as not to pre-date the President’s instructions to the Ambassador.”

196. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Turkey¹

Washington, March 9, 1957—2:23 p.m.

2092. There are now six groups known to Department to be working on pipeline projects transiting Turkey to Iskenderun. Some groups (Allen-Reynolds, Iranian Oil Syndicate, Constantine-John Brown, and unidentified German) apparently have their focus on Iran as point of origin. Others (IPC-Texas-California-Gulf, and Fiat-Williams groups) have their focus on Iraq and Kuwait. Some of foregoing groups envisage initially or at later date a project involving network reaching to Iran, Iraq and Kuwait fields.

Limited information available here indicates widely different approaches to and concern with such problems as participation of foreign oil companies already in region, participation of foreign oil companies capable of assuring adequate marketing arrangements, participation of local interests (including governments), common carrier concept, size of pipeline, point of junction of Iraqi and Iranian sections with Turkish section, cost and method of financing, need for related international treaties, and need for US anti-trust protection for US participants.

Several groups have had separate talks with Turkish, Iranian and/or Iraqi Governments and several also report independent talks between Turkish and Iranian Governments. Both Turkish and Iranian Governments reported favorably disposed. British have approached Department on question of international treaty in connection with project and have also raised larger and long-range problem of movement Mid-East oil of which pipeline project is part.

Several groups (IPC-Texas-California-Gulf, Allen-Reynolds and Iranian Oil Syndicate) have made formal approaches to US Government. Others (Fiat-Williams) have only informally indicated interest and briefly outlined their plans.

It is not clear what will emerge from activities these various groups. Information generally lacking on status their negotiations. Among those known to be active at present time are Allen–Reynolds, Fiat–Williams, Iranian Oil Syndicate, and IPC–Texas–California–Gulf group. Latter group having meeting in London in mid-March and Socony–Jersey Standard of this group have indicated to Department that treaty arrangement is sine qua non to their proceeding with contract.

In principle, construction additional pipeline facilities, particularly as alternatives to existing facilities and from points that cannot be otherwise serviced, considered to be in US national interest and Department has already so informed groups that have raised question. Department prepared provide fuller guidance as situation develops. Meanwhile present Department thinking includes following considerations: (1) impartiality towards various US groups interested in project; (2) preference for private ownership and private financing of project; (3) preference for common carrier system which would be new in area but in line with US practice; and (4) prepared consider attempting negotiation of treaty with countries of transit, providing pipeline operating company appropriate protection.

When approached by Socony–Jersey Standard regarding attendance London meeting with IPC partners, Texas, Standard Oil of California, and Gulf, Department interposed no objections but said that as plans developed we would expect to be informed. Socony is aware of necessity of our consulting with Justice Department on antitrust aspects of problem. Department will so consult when appropriate on any project growing out of activities mentioned in this cable regardless of sponsorship.

Addressee posts requested to be alert to and promptly report on all future developments with regard to this or similar project. If approached you are authorized, except for treaty problem, to give substance Department views along lines set forth above.

Herter

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 880.2553/3–957. Confidential. Drafted by Owen T. Jones and approved by Rountree. Also sent to Tehran, Baghdad, Rome, London, and Paris.

197. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions¹

Washington, March 12, 1957.

753. Baghdad Pact. During forthcoming ME visit Amb Richards may at his discretion inform Baghdad Pact govts on confidential basis (beginning with Turkey) US prepared join Baghdad Pact Military Committee if invited to do so by Pact Ministerial Council. Richards would emphasize that proposed step represents further evidence US willingness assist Pact countries combat Communist threat. Public announcement (probably in Ministerial Council's final communiqué) not expected until formalities of joining completed.

Dept desires various interested non-Pact countries be informed this decision on confidential basis soon as practicable but believes timing and details such communication best be left to Richards in light developing situation. Accordingly Richards being asked advise certain of above addressee posts take whatever action he deems appropriate as Mission proceeds. Upon notification by Amb Richards you may take action he requests without further reference to Dept. Notify Dept and Richards urgently as action completed.

Under no circumstances should foregoing be revealed to any foreign govt.

Herter

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 120.1580/3-1257. Secret; Limit Distribution. Sent to Ankara, London, Baghdad, Karachi, Tehran, Paris, Paris (for Perkins), Jidda, Tel Aviv, Cairo, Damascus, New Delhi, Moscow, Athens, Beirut, Khartoum, Tripoli, Kabul, and Addis Ababa.

198. Agreed United States-United Kingdom Position Paper¹

Washington, March 16, 1957.

BEM D-3/4

GUARANTEES FOR MAINTENANCE OF FLOW OF MIDDLE EAST OIL THROUGH PIPELINES

(Agreed US-UK Paper)

Recommended Position

The two Governments recognize that access to Middle East oil will be of increasing importance to the West and that greater guarantees for oil pipeline operations would be desirable. Both Governments will continue to lend appropriate assistance to petroleum transit companies in the defense of their interests under existing transit arrangements. They are also prepared to consider negotiating treaties with transited countries designed to lend stability to new pipeline projects and will consult together to this end. The two Governments will consider whether it is desirable to negotiate similar treaties for the protection of existing pipeline operations.

Discussion

The recent crisis in the Middle East has revealed the vulnerability of both producers and consumers of oil in relation to governments controlling the transit routes from the oil-fields to the markets. In the case of the Suez Canal, the problem is of wider scope than the oil industry and is being handled independently. But the destruction of the I.P.C. pipeline in Syria, and the threat to destroy the trans-Arabian pipeline in the same country, have created a specific problem the solution of which is equally urgent. It is unlikely that oil companies will be prepared to invest large amounts of capital required for expansion of the existing pipeline system unless they can be given better guarantees for the security of the lines than they have hitherto enjoyed. And this difficulty arises at a time when Europe's requirements of Middle Eastern petroleum are rapidly increasing.

It has therefore been suggested that the governments of the pipeline companies in the Middle East should endeavor to find some means of creating the necessary conditions for expanding investment in pipeline schemes. Of the suggestions so far examined, the most practical seems to be the negotiation of treaties between these parent governments and the governments of the countries in which the pipelines are situated.² These treaties would seek to extend appropriate protection for pipeline operations. Their substance would be determined on the basis of further study and consultation.

It would probably be easier to begin with a new pipeline rather than with those already in operation, particularly if this pipeline were constructed through a country which had not hitherto been used for the transit of oil. The inter-governmental treaty could then be incorporated in a “package deal”. The I.P.C. are contemplating an early approach to the Turkish Government for the construction of a pipeline across their territory from the oil-field at Kirkuk. This proposal might provide the best opportunity for initiating the suggested series of intergovernmental agreements. The two Governments will consider whether it is desirable to negotiate similar treaties for the protection of existing pipeline operations.

¹ Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 62 D 181, CF 856. Secret. A cover sheet indicates that the paper was prepared jointly by representatives of the British Embassy in Washington and the Department of State and that, within the Department of State, it was approved in substance by Rountree, Moline, Corbett, Beckner, and Metzger. The paper was one of several agreed position papers done in preparation for the Anglo-American Heads of Government Conference at Bermuda. See the editorial note, *infra*. The paper was discussed at a meeting of Department of State and British Embassy officials on March 8. The memorandum of the conversation is *ibid.*, Central File, 880.2553/3–857. The recommended position was formally approved by the two governments on March 23.

² The text is approved on the understanding that the “countries in which the pipelines are situated” included producing as well as transit countries. [Footnote in the source text.]

199. Editorial Note

Between March 21 and 24, President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles met with British Prime Minister Macmillan and Foreign Secretary Lloyd at the Mid-Ocean Club in Bermuda and discussed in detail, among other subjects, common problems concerning the Middle East. Documentation recording discussions on the Arab-Israeli dispute, the Suez Canal, and the Gulf of Aqaba is printed in [volume XVII, pages 448–466](#). Documentation pertaining to Middle East regional economic and military subjects is printed below. Documentation on all aspects of the preparations for and the proceedings of the Bermuda Conference, including the full texts of [Documents 201](#) and [202](#), is scheduled for publication in [volume XXVII](#).

200. Telegram From the President's Special Assistant (Richards) to the Delegation at the Bermuda Conference¹

Ankara, March 21, 1957—7 p.m.

1. Bermuda for USDel. For Secretary from Richards. Deptel 2161.² I informed Menderes March 21 of our intention join Military Committee of Baghdad Pact if invited to do so by Ministerial Council. I stressed importance we attached to keeping matter from public knowledge at present. He was obviously pleased and said “very well done”.

Menderes had opened our first formal meeting this afternoon by discussion of value of Baghdad Pact. He said Turkey still of opinion that full US membership in pact best means to assure security of Middle East. He considered President's proposal step in “progressive method” towards US adherence to pact. I pointed out that assurances conveyed by Middle East proposals more far-reaching than pact membership. He replied Turkey realized this but US adherence would have great effect on other states in area, while failure to adhere would cause continuing doubt that US really supported pact.

At our suggestion Turks have agreed immediately to inform other pact countries in confidence of our decision. Telegrams discussed in Washington regarding notification other countries sent from Ankara.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 120.1580/3–2157. Secret; Niact. Also sent to the Department of State as telegram 2169, which is the source text.

² In telegram 2161 to Ankara, March 18, the Department of State advised Ambassador Richards that he should inform Secretary Dulles in Bermuda when Menderes had been told of U.S. willingness to join the Military Committee of the Baghdad Pact, if invited to do so by the Ministerial Council. (*Ibid.*, 120.1580/3–1857)

**201. Memorandum of a Conversation, Mid-Ocean Club,
Bermuda, March 21, 1957, 8 p.m.¹**

Tucker's Town, Bermuda, March 21, 1957, 8 p.m.

USDel/MC/2

PARTICIPANTS

United States

Ambassador Whitney

Mr. Rountree

United Kingdom

Prime Minister Macmillan

Mr. Selwyn Lloyd

SUBJECT

Baghdad Pact

At dinner with the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister on March 21, I informed them, in accordance with the Secretary's instructions, that Ambassador Richards had that day told the Turks that the United States would be willing to join the Baghdad Pact Military Committee, if invited to do so by the members. I read them the substance of Ambassador Richards' telegram reporting his conversation with the Turkish Prime Minister.²

¹ Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 62 D 181, CF 861. Secret. Drafted by Rountree.

² *Supra.*

On March 22 during a news conference at Bermuda, Press Secretary Hagerty announced that the United States through the Richards Mission had advised members of the Baghdad Pact of its willingness to join the Military Committee of the Pact. The text of Hagerty's statement is printed in *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1957*, p. 771.

**202. Memorandum of a Conversation, Mid-Ocean Club,
Bermuda, March 21, 1957, 10:30 a.m.¹**

Tucker's Town, Bermuda, March 21, 1957, 10:30 a.m.

USDel/MC/3

PARTICIPANTS

United States

The President

Secretary Dulles

Ambassador Whitney

Senator George

Mr. Hagerty

General Goodpaster

Mr. Phleger

Mr. Elbrick

Mr. Rountree

Mr. Wilkins

Mr. Morris

Mr. Macomber

Mr. Walmsley

United Kingdom

The Rt. Hon. Harold Macmillan, Prime Minister

Rt. Hon. Selwyn Lloyd, Foreign Secretary

Rt. Hon. Sir Norman Brook, Secretary to Cabinet

Sir Frederick Hoyer-Millar, Permanent Under-Secretary, Foreign Office

Sir Harold Caccia, British Ambassador to U.S.

Mr. P. H. Dean, Deputy Under-Secretary, Foreign Office

Mr. Harold Beeley, Assistant Secretary, Foreign Office

D. S. Laskey, Personal Assistant to Foreign Secretary

Mr. O. P. Hope, Foreign Office, Press Director

C. O. I. Ramsden, Personal Assistant to P. M.

Mr. F. A. Bishop, Personal Assistant to P.M.

Mr. T. W. Garvey, Secretary of Delegation

[Here follows discussion of the Suez Canal crisis and the Arab-Israeli dispute; see [volume XVII, pages 452–458](#).]

Flow of Oil through Pipelines:—The next item on the agenda, the Baghdad Pact, was postponed to a later session and consideration was initiated on the question of the flow of oil for Europe through pipelines.

The Prime Minister asked about the “umbrella plan” saying that he understood that the objectives had been agreed upon in a paper developed by the State Department and the UK Embassy in Washington² on the use of the treaty instrument to cover a pipeline from Iran through Iraq and Turkey to be privately financed. The Prime Minister stated that the companies concerned are in consultation in London and the British Government, when

the companies are ready, wish to raise with the United States the place and timing of consultations on this proposal. The Secretary stated that the object of the exercise would be to examine the possibility of a Constantinople Convention so to speak for pipelines which would protect the private financing and operation of such carriers. Should this prove successful it might be extended to existing pipelines. It was agreed that consultation should take place at the appropriate time between the governments and with the companies.

The Secretary referred to reports, emanating primarily from Israel and France, of a plan to construct a large pipeline through Israel to permit oil for Europe to bypass the Canal and asked the British what views they might have on the project (which is not to be confused with the 8 inch pipeline currently under construction in Israel for its own supply). It was agreed that the project is not feasible since in the eventuality (1) of an Arab-Palestine settlement, which though remote is the objective of both governments, it is not apt to be used; and (2) of no settlement the oil from Arab countries is most unlikely to be available, although it might for a short time arrive from Iran. It is therefore agreed that the better alternative, although not immediate, is the Iran-Iraq-Turkey circuit.

Concluding Remarks:—Selwyn Lloyd asked permission before adjournment to call attention to the great usefulness of the MEEC in maintaining the flow of oil during the present crisis to the European economies which had suffered less than anticipated and urged that the Committee be kept in being in the likelihood that the effects of the oil crisis would still be felt in Europe next winter. The President acknowledged the usefulness of the Committee but flagged the attention of the British to the risks the members of the MEEC felt they incur under US legislation of anti-trust action, and he mentioned in this connection the investigation underway of the recent price rise. The Secretary added that it should moreover be kept in mind that problems are developing not only for the companies but also in US relations with other producing countries caused by disruption of normal patterns of the oil market by alterations between customary and abnormal flow of oil to markets.

The meeting adjourned at 12:30.

¹ Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 62 D 181, CF 861. Secret. Drafted by Walmsley. The Delegation at Bermuda transmitted a summary of this conversation to the Department of State in Secto 8, March 22.

² [Document 198](#).

**203. Memorandum of a Conversation, Mid-Ocean Club,
Bermuda, March 23, 1957, 10:30 a.m.¹**

Tucker's Town, Bermuda, March 23, 1957, 10:30 a.m.

USDel/MC/8

PARTICIPANTS

United States

The Secretary

Sen. George

Amb. Whitney

Mr. Quarles

Mr. Murphy

Mr. Rountree

Mr. Elbrick

Mr. Hagerty

Gen. Goodpaster

Mr. Macomber

Mr. Phleger

Mr. Wilkins

United Kingdom

Mr. Selwyn Lloyd

Sir Frederick Hoyer Millar

Mr. P.H. Dean

Mr. Harold Beeley

Sir Harold Caccia

[Here follow a list of subjects and discussion of the Communist influence in Africa. For text, see [volume XVIII, pages 53–56.](#)]

2.

Baghdad Pact. Selwyn Lloyd said that they were delighted that the United States had decided to participate in the Military Committee of the Baghdad Pact. He asked if we had any plans for economic aid for the countries of the Baghdad Pact or for the Pact itself.

Mr. Rountree, at the Secretary's request, briefly outlined US views with respect to economic aid in relation to the Baghdad Pact. He said that the main purpose of Ambassador Richards' mission was to explain the objectives of the Joint Resolution which the American Congress had adopted on March 9, 1957. He also wished to determine what countries in the Middle East were willing to cooperate in working for these objectives. During Ambassador Richards' present visit in the Middle East he would discuss ways and means of cooperating through 1) economic assistance, 2) military assistance and 3) forces which the Congress had authorized the United States to use if it should be necessary. Mr. Rountree said that we wished to avoid the impression that under the new program we planned to give away large sums of money because, in fact, we had no large sums of money for this purpose. Ambassador Richards was authorized to discuss priority projects with the various countries which he visited. At the present time there were already in existence substantial programs in each of the countries of the Baghdad Pact. It was not our intention that the wider authority with respect to

the expenditure of \$200 million already authorized under existing legislation would be applied primarily in these countries. It was our thought that Ambassador Richards might be able to give some additional military aid rather than economic aid in these countries. In other parts of the Middle East it was our thought that we could resume some programs which had been held up during recent months. During Ambassador Richards' recent visit to Beirut arrangements had been made to supply Lebanon with \$10 million worth of aid. Similar small commitments would be made in other countries of the Middle East.

Selwyn Lloyd asked if we planned to channel any American aid through the Baghdad Pact. Mr. Rountree said that we did not plan to supply any aid through the Baghdad Pact itself, but that in our consideration of economic aid for the Middle East we would take into account regional projects which had been developed by the Economic Committee of the Baghdad Pact.

The Secretary said he wished to add a few words to the discussion. He had noted as a result of his experience with NATO and SEATO that these organizations seemed to wish to become dispensers of economic aid for the areas which they covered. He said Lord Home had told him during the SEATO meeting in Canberra recently² that the Asian members wished to create a committee for the handling of economic aid. This development had been discouraged with the exception of one multilateral project in the SEATO area. The Secretary thought it difficult to handle aid through the Economic Committees of a Pact organization because it would require considerable staff, including experts on engineering, finance and economic matters. As a result of our experience, we prefer to deal directly with other governments. The Secretary said that during the SEATO meeting he had told the Pakistani Foreign Minister that the United States would be willing to extend US aid to Pakistan through SEATO if Pakistan so desired, but it would inevitably move more slowly in this way. As a result, Pakistan representatives had shown no interest in this suggestion. In some cases other countries thought

that aid through a Pact organization would be a means of increasing assistance, not merely of changing its method of delivery. The Secretary thought that in the future total US aid would decline and that ways should be sought of spending less aid rather than more. This trend could now be observed in NATO, where the US and UK were in agreement to fight down requests for additional assistance. The US and UK were also in agreement regarding the SEATO area. The Secretary said that one reason some countries might desire aid through a Pact organization was because the Pact label made the economic assistance more palatable in this form.

Selwyn Lloyd said he was in agreement regarding aid for the areas covered by NATO and SEATO, but he thought that the Baghdad Pact needed to be made politically viable. At one time emphasis on the Economic Committee of the Baghdad Pact might have made the Baghdad Pact more desirable. Now, however, it seemed to him that the Baghdad Pact required special consideration. It was not desired to upset Saudi Arabia unduly, although they could hardly object on grounds of their own substantial income. On the other hand, the Baghdad Pact countries had been strong allies and might be rewarded. US participation in the Military Committee had been helpful. The United Kingdom had been extending technical assistance through the Economic Committee of the Baghdad Pact and [that] would be increased from 250 thousand pounds to one million pounds, but could not be raised above this figure. Selwyn Lloyd added that we had so strongly insisted on bilateral arrangements for aid that they wondered if the United States agreed the Economic Committee of the Baghdad Pact had any value.

Mr. Rountree said that as indicated in the context of the Secretary's remarks there was reason [for] the existence of an Economic Committee and the desirability for some multilateral programs in the area. Other functions which the Committee could perform would include promotion of trade, studies of the area and surveys of communications projects. We could provide technical

assistance in such matters, but the implementation of projects beyond such assistance should be on a bilateral basis. It was our thought that the Economic Committee had useful coordinating functions.

Selwyn Lloyd said he understood this aspect of the matter, but it meant that there was little money passing through the Economic Committee of the Baghdad Pact. He mentioned that the UK had set up an Atomic school through the Baghdad Pact.

The Secretary said that the Pact members wished to point to the aid which they are receiving as a justification for their membership in the Pact. This desire made it necessary for us to recognize and consider how we could meet their wish. We had found in the Far East that multilateral projects were complicated to handle and had developed slowly or not at all. In many cases projects such as proposed plans for Japanese investment in India looked fine on paper, but had proved difficult to implement. Pact relationships did not as a rule conform to economic patterns, although they were acceptable for strategic requirements. We needed to decide at the present time how we could, for example, assist Prime Minister Nuri of Iraq.

Selwyn Lloyd said we also needed to decide how to assist the Shah of Persia. He added that the UK would write a paper analyzing the situation and making recommendations as to what was needed. He said that the Economic Committee of the Baghdad Pact would meet in May and that pending this meeting the US and UK could develop a common line as to action which should be taken. The Secretary said that this procedure was agreeable.

Selwyn Lloyd said he wished to raise one or two questions with respect to Iraq. He understood that we had had discussions regarding the supply of American military equipment to Iraq. The British Ambassador in Baghdad had recently expressed his concern that Iraq might play the US off against the UK. Selwyn

Lloyd asked if we planned to supply Iraq with Sabre Jets. Reuben Robertson said that we had no plans to supply Sabre Jets to Iraq.

Selwyn Lloyd asked if it would not be desirable to link the possible sale of Sabre Jets with British Hunters under the off-shore procurement program, although he was not pressing for Hunters. He believed that there should be agreement on the merits of whether aircraft should be supplied by the UK or US.

Mr. Robertson said that discussion between the United States and Iraq had been cautious because we knew that the UK was considering the supply of Hunters. Selwyn Lloyd observed that Prime Minister Nuri was a shrewd bargainer.

The Secretary said that some months ago there had been agreement that Iraq's requirements for heavy tanks should be the British Centurions. He noted that we had supplied Iraq with some small tanks or armored cars. He thought that we should work out the same principle with respect to aircraft.

Mr. Robertson noted that we had not promised to supply Iraq with aircraft but had only discussed with the Iraqi representatives the question of number of wings which might be needed. He said this matter could be further discussed between the US and the UK.

The Secretary said he had with him a summary of recent conversations which had taken place between the US and Iraq and wished to read the paragraph relating to the question of aircraft, as follows:

“The United States has given careful consideration to requests for equipment for the Iraqi Air Force. The United States is not at present in a position to meet these requests, but suggests discussions at a later date on the possibility of the sale of aircraft under the existing reimbursable assistance agreement between Iraq and the United States.”³

Mr. Beeley said that in previous years the US and the UK had kept each other informed of developments through representatives of the Department of State and Department of Defense on the one hand and the British Joint Staff and the British Embassy on the other.

The Secretary said that this procedure sounded satisfactory to him and that we would be ready for further talks when they were.

3.

*Tripartite Declaration of 1950.*⁴ Selwyn Lloyd referred to the Tripartite Declaration of 1950 and asked if we had any comment. The Secretary said that American policy as stated in the Tripartite Declaration had not changed in any way, although it seemed clear that the British had had different views on October 29, 1956.⁵ It might therefore seem desirable for Selwyn Lloyd to make known British attitude at the present time.

Selwyn Lloyd said that since developments on the Suez, the UK considered that the Tripartite Declaration had been in effect except for Egypt. The Secretary said that American policy continued to be as stated in the Tripartite Declaration of 1950. The White House had on October 29, for example, indicated that the United States would honor its pledge under the Tripartite Declaration.⁶ As a statement of policy we considered the Tripartite Declaration to be in effect. Implementation of the policy on the other hand might require Congressional action. The Joint Resolution which the American Congress adopted on March 9 authorized the United States to take action with respect to countries dominated by the Communists if such action should be necessary. There is no authority, however, under other circumstances, although the Joint Resolution contains the following language which had been introduced in the Senate: "The United States regards as vital to the national interest and world peace the preservation of the independence and integrity of the nations of the Middle East". It was not clear precisely what

this phraseology meant, although it may provide additional authority. The Secretary did not think that it was so intended and had questioned several Senators on this point. [2 lines of source text not declassified] He interpreted the Resolution as meaning that the integrity of the Middle East as a whole was vital and believed it would be so interpreted by the President. The Secretary noted that the British were free to deploy their armed forces, whereas the United States required Congressional sanction.

4.

Question of Arms Supply to the Near East—Resolutions of the General Assembly. Selwyn Lloyd said he wished to discuss this question in the light of resolutions of the General Assembly.⁷ He said that the following question might post the issue: If Russia supplied arms to Egypt, would that be a breach of the General Assembly Resolution?

The Secretary said that he wished to consult Mr. Phleger but he thought that once peace was firmly reestablished, the resolution would not apply. He did not think that peace was as yet firmly reestablished. At the same time he did not think that the resolution should continue perpetually in effect. However, there was an area of legal doubt.

Selwyn Lloyd said they had given a practical interpretation to the Resolution of the General Assembly. No arms were being supplied to Israel, not even items which had been loaded for shipment and aircraft engines which had been sent to England from Israel for overhaul. He believed that if this interpretation were correct it would mean that the Soviet Union could not supply arms to Egypt.

Selwyn Lloyd agreed that the resolutions could not continue perpetually in effect. He noted that there were reports that the French were now shipping [arms?] to Israel and asked if NEACC were now active. The Secretary said that it was not.

Mr. Phleger said that General Assembly Resolution might be said to be of doubtful validity after complete withdrawal of the forces which had intervened in Egypt. However, its validity might not depend entirely on the withdrawal of forces since it also referred to the Suez Canal.

Selwyn Lloyd asked if there was any information whether the Russians were sending arms to Egypt. The Secretary said that there was no solid information that heavy arms were being sent to Egypt, although small arms might be moving.

Selwyn Lloyd said he had the same impression. The Secretary observed that if the Soviet Union was challenged on any arms which it was supplying to Egypt it might reply that they were in transit to other countries such as the Yemen.

5.

*Agreed Positions, including Guarantees re Pipelines,*⁸ *Palestine,*⁹ *Suez,*¹⁰ *Oil Study,*¹¹ *Aqaba,*¹² *and Libya.*¹³ Selwyn Lloyd noted that there was a proposal for a document indicating minutes or positions on which agreements had been reached, including guarantees with respect to pipelines, Palestine and Suez. He said he also understood that there were papers on an oil study and Aqaba for inclusion among these documents.

The Secretary said that he had seen some of these documents and had one or two questions and some suggestions. He thought the paper touching on the oil study should not be too broad and that the representatives of the US and the UK should start at once and prepare specific plans such as the Study on Oil Resources. He thought they should not merely engage in a general review. The Secretary said that he did not believe the date of April 15 to commence discussions was realistic but that we would endeavor to meet it.

Selwyn Lloyd said that they had looked at this question in much wider terms and that the President had favored a Joint Planning

Group which they had interpreted as a continuing process. The Secretary thought that work might commence at once and exchange of views might begin on or before April 15. It would seem desirable to indicate in the paper that the first subject would be the Study on Oil Resources.

The Secretary said that he thought the paper on Palestine which had been agreed in Washington prior to commencement of the Bermuda Conference was too pessimistic and suggested that phraseology be introduced which would indicate that these views were held as of the present moment only. He thought that if developments should take a favorable turn we should be in a position to move boldly. Selwyn Lloyd agreed.

The Secretary said that we had pressed Israel that the UNEF should be placed on both sides of the Armistice demarcation line between Israel and Egypt.

Selwyn Lloyd said that the British had taken similar action and had suggested that Israel at least agree to the stationing of the UNEF at certain places on its side of the line but that Israel continued obstinate in refusing to consider any possible presence of the UNEF in its country.

The Secretary and Selwyn Lloyd agreed on minor changes of phraseology of the papers on guarantees for pipelines and the Suez. The Secretary remarked, in explanation of the concept of blocking payment of tolls, that if we had to accept passage through the Canal under protest and the payment of tolls to Egypt, we could place a second block on funds which were now held unless there were a settlement. Selwyn Lloyd noted that the United Kingdom had claims and counter claims which made its attitude somewhat different.

The Secretary and Selwyn Lloyd also exchanged further views on Aqaba and agreed on the position paper. It was also agreed that it might be desirable to seek an advisory opinion or a decision from the ICJ.

The Secretary and Selwyn Lloyd also exchanged further remarks regarding Hammarskjold's discussions with Nasser during which the Secretary said that our information thus far indicated they seemed to be progressing well.

The Secretary and Selwyn Lloyd also noted that further discussions would take place on Libya. Mr. Lloyd thought that the matter was urgent. The Secretary agreed and said that if the British planned to cut down in Libya, it was essential that we be informed.

[Here follows brief discussion relating to Germany and the final communiqué. For text of the communiqué, see Department of State *Bulletin*, April 8, 1957, pages 561–562.]

¹ Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 62 D 181, CF 861. Secret. Drafted by Wilkins.

² Reference is to the Third Meeting of the Council of Ministers of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, held at Canberra, Australia, March 11–13. For documentation, see [vol. XXI, pp. 295 ff.](#)

³ Reference is to a U.S. memorandum read to Iraqi Chief of the General Staff on February 15. The memorandum of conversation and the memorandum are in Department of State, Central Files, 787.5–MSP/2–1557.

⁴ For text of the Tripartite Declaration on Middle East security issued by the Governments of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States on May 25, 1950, see Department of State *Bulletin*, June 5, 1950, p. 886. For information concerning its formulation, see [footnote 3, *Foreign Relations, 1950, vol. V, p. 168.*](#)

⁵ At 4:50 p.m. on October 29, Secretary Dulles met with British Chargé J.E. Coulson and French Chargé Lucet to discuss the applicability of the Tripartite Declaration to the Israeli invasion of the Sinai Peninsula earlier that day. For text of the memorandum of the conversation, see [vol. XVI, p. 829.](#)

⁶ For text of the statement issued by White House Press Secretary Hagerty, see Department of State *Bulletin*, November 12, 1956, p. 749.

⁷ Reference is to Resolution 997 (ES–I) adopted by the Emergency Session of the General Assembly on November 2, 1956, which recommended “that all Member States refrain from introducing military goods in the area of hostilities”. For text and additional information, see the editorial note, [vol. XVI, p. 932](#). Resolution 997 (ES–I) was reaffirmed in Resolution 999 (ES–I) of November 4 and Resolution 1002 (ES–I) of November 7.

⁸ The text is the same as [Document 198](#).

⁹ [Vol. XVI, p. 463](#).

¹⁰ [Ibid., p. 464](#).

¹¹ [Infra](#).

¹² [Vol. XVI, p. 466](#).

¹³ Not printed.

204. Paper Agreed Upon at the Conference at Bermuda¹

Bermuda, March 23, 1957.

1. AGREED POSITION ON STUDY OF MIDDLE EAST PROBLEMS

The President and the Prime Minister agreed that there should be undertaken as a matter of urgency a study of the present situation and probable future developments throughout the Middle East, dealing first with those aspects of the problems bearing upon the supply of oil to the free world, with a view to making recommendations for furthering the common interests of the two Governments in this area.

The following plan was adopted for the implementation of this decision:

1. Appropriate officials of the respective governments will separately study the factors involved.
2. On or before April 15 exchanges of views based upon these studies will start as between officials of the Department of State and the British Embassy in Washington, or between the Foreign Office and the American Embassy in London.
3. It will then be mutually decided what further procedural steps should be taken to concert the views of the two governments to bring them into accord in so far as possible. This might be accomplished either by a visit of American officials to London or of British officials to Washington.

¹ Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 62 D 181, CF 868. Secret.

205. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iraq¹

Washington, March 28, 1957—1:35 p.m.

1681. Inform Richards. Baghdad's 1579.² Department has read with interest Nuri's suggestion for organization pro-American Doctrine nations. In event Nuri or other governments should raise this possibility you might wish indicate Department's view that Congressional resolution envisions no such formal organization and American Doctrine does not have as purpose organizational lining-up of NE nations on basis Doctrine. We believe such an effort would be harmful to purposes Doctrine in area as it would provide basis for charges re US attempts to dominate and commit states in area by attaching strings to US assistance.

Any move commit Saud to formal organization would be undesirable as it might lessen his influence in Arab world. Department inclined believe Saud's influence, on balance, beneficial and that Saud moving slowly in direction closer cooperation with pro-Western states. Any effort spotlight or accelerate this move through formal alignment with these powers might retard present progress. In recent weeks as example Saud has cordially received Shah of Iran and Chamoun, has agreed to visit Iraq, has expressed warm welcome for Richards Mission and has encouraged other Arab states receive Mission and has used influence restore normal flow oil to Western Europe. Believe preferable continue to encourage such moves as individual steps and not seek encourage Saud's adherence more formal pattern.

Dulles

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 120.1580/3-2357. Secret. Drafted by Newsom and approved by Rountree who signed for Dulles. Repeated to Jidda, Beirut, Karachi, London, Tehran, Ankara, Cairo, and Damascus.

² In telegram 1579 from Baghdad, March 23, Gallman reported that Nuri Said had suggested to Lebanese President Chamoun that Chamoun sound

out King Saud on taking the initiative in lining up, within a formal framework, governments in the area that responded favorably to the Eisenhower Doctrine. (*Ibid.*, 120.1580/3–2357)

206. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Sprague) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Murphy)¹

Washington, March 28, 1957.

DEAR MR. MURPHY: In anticipation of the military planning talks that should follow as a result of the approval of the Joint Resolution on the Middle East and the subsequent announcement by the United States that we are prepared to assist independent nations in their defense against Soviet aggression, the Department of Defense has prepared a tentative plan for the conduct of these talks. We consider that the military planning talks should be conducted by two groups: (a) Preliminary Planning Group; and (b) Detailed Military Planning Group.

The Preliminary Military Planning Group should visit the capitals of the Middle Eastern countries of the Baghdad Pact as soon as practicable after the results of the Richards Mission have been determined. The group would also visit other countries which Ambassador Richards has visited, if, after consultation with him, it appears that military benefits would result. This group should be mainly concerned with the area-wide aspects inherent in a defense of the Middle East.

Detailed military planning will need to be undertaken after the return of the Preliminary Military Planning Group. We visualize that these talks would not begin until the guidance from the Richards Mission and from the Preliminary Military Planning Group has been incorporated into appropriate terms of reference. The objectives to be achieved by these planning talks are outlined in the attachment.

The Department of Defense considers that the preliminary talks should be conducted by a group of not more than four high-ranking military officers.

The composition of the detailed planning group, and the locale for this second group of talks can be determined at an appropriate time.

Knowledge of this plan for military planning talks would be helpful to Ambassador Richards during his current exploratory talks with the Middle Eastern countries. It is therefore requested that the information contained in the letter, and the attachment hereto, be forwarded to Ambassador Richards.

Sincerely yours,

Mansfield D. Sprague

Appendix

OBJECTIVES OF THE MILITARY TALKS²

1. The objectives of the Preliminary Military Planning Group should be:

a. To explain to the Governments of Middle East countries, as appropriate, the military aspects of the Joint Resolution and the readiness of the United States to assist independent nations to increase their defense against Soviet aggression, direct or indirect.

b. To obtain the endorsement and adoption by these countries of the United States defense concepts.

c. To assess the magnitude of the problem of an area-wide defense of the Middle East.

d. To persuade these countries to be realistic in their planning by:

(1) Taking into full account the magnitude of the contribution the United States can make.

(2) Removing political obstacles which prevent the stationing of forces of one Middle East country in another country of the Middle East.

(3) Prestocking and preparing defense positions in one country for use by another country whose forces are to be deployed therein.

e. To direct the attitudes of these Middle East Governments toward the military aspects of the Joint Resolution and to exploit their willingness to cooperate in working out the planning details in order to derive mutually the benefits of the Resolution. One of the desired results of the preliminary planning talks is the determination of a suitable framework for an effective common defense plan for the Middle East.

f. If appropriate, to inform these Middle East Governments of the follow-up plans for conducting military planning talks.

2. The objectives of detailed military planning cannot be finalized now, but our general thinking is that they should be:

a. To conduct under appropriate terms of reference, detailed planning with the military officials of these Middle East Governments, with the view to obtaining realistic military objectives and programs in their countries in consideration of the possible military contribution of the United States.

b. To determine the availability of the facilities necessary for the support of U.S. forces which may be operating in or through the Middle East in the event of general or limited war.

c. To report to the Joint Chiefs of Staff the findings and the progress of the planning and to recommend appropriate measures area-wide and country-by-country, to accomplish the purposes of the Joint Resolution.

3. The scope and pattern of the U.S. military effort, both in terms of U.S. forces and of military aid, which, in the best interests of the United States, should be provided in each country must conform to and be in direct support of the U.S. concepts for defense of Middle East area under conditions of general war and conditions short of general war.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/3-2857. Top Secret.

² Top Secret.

207. Telegram From the President's Special Assistant (Richards) to the Department of State¹

Karachi, March 28, 1957—8 p.m.

2628. From Richards. Trip so far has shown virtually universal dislike and distrust of present Syrian and Egyptian Governments on part of top officials in countries visited. They all counsel avoidance of any aid to those governments and indicate little if any hope that anything mission or USG could do would change attitude current leaders.

On other hand there seems to be fairly general feeling that both governments becoming politically isolated within region and that this isolation, if carried far enough, will either cause their fall or force change of policy. If this analysis correct, there would seem to be possibilities [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] in which this mission could play role by bolstering other Arab countries (such as Libya and Sudan) while remaining cool and unresponsive toward Syria and Egypt.

We recognize key to success [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] might be attitudes Saudi Arabia and to some extent Jordan. We would have to count upon King Saud's maintaining his support for Doctrine. If in addition out of current turmoil in Jordan and evident desire not to be excluded from US assistance, anti-Communist Government ready to support stand of King Hussein should emerge, real progress would have been achieved in isolation Egypt and Syria.

Would appreciate Department's reaction.²

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 120.1580/3-2857. Secret. Repeated to Cairo, Damascus, Amman, and Jidda.

² See [infra](#).

208. Telegram From the Department of State to the President's Special Assistant (Richards), at Karachi¹

Washington, March 30, 1957—12:40 p.m.

2492. Karachi's 2628.² Department inclined agree general analysis set forth reftel. Leaders in countries you have visited however strongly hope for firm alignment those supporting Doctrine and for isolation Egypt and Syria. They may tend be overly optimistic about trend toward isolation or results such isolation although presence Mission in area has undoubtedly had some effect on situation Jordan and Syria. We believe obvious effort isolate Syria and Egypt through your Mission might have contrary results in Arab world, including Saudi Arabia where King has taken positive steps on our behalf. Present atmosphere Egypt, Syria and Jordan does not encourage us suggest you visit these countries, but we believe it too early exclude possibility. We continue watch events closely with role your mission in mind and will be particularly interested your recommendations following visits Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Yemen.

Dulles

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 120.1580/3-2857. Secret. Drafted by Newsom and approved by Rountree who signed for Dulles. Repeated to Baghdad, Cairo, Damascus, Amman, and Jidda.

² [Supra](#).

209. Memorandum for the Record by the Secretary of State's Special Assistant (Macomber)¹

Washington, April 1957.

April 3, 1957

At 5:45 p.m. this afternoon I received a call from Mr. Henry Holland, formerly Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, who reported the following: He had been approached by a group of Texans headed by Mr. Clint Murchison who in turn had been approached by the Israeli Government to participate in a pipeline construction running from the Gulf of Aqaba through Israel to the Mediterranean. Mr. Holland's impression was that this pipeline would parallel the proposed eight inch pipeline now under construction. Mr. Holland said that he had not talked with Mr. Murchison directly, but had been called by a Mr. Gerald Mann who represents Mr. Murchison. Mann on behalf of the Murchison group asked Holland to act as their legal counsel in this matter.

Mr. Holland reported that he had told Mann that he was not qualified to be of any real assistance to the Murchison group, and therefore declined the offer.

Mr. Holland suggested that Governor Dewey's firm would be in a better position to be of assistance to the Murchison group. Mann then suggested that Holland call Dewey to see if the latter would be interested in taking on the assignment.

Holland called Dewey who said that he would be willing to work for the Murchison group, but only if the Department of State had no objection. Holland had replied that there was one simple way to find out about that: "to ask the Department of State". Dewey had replied: "all right you ask them". Holland said he was, therefore, now calling on behalf of Dewey to see if there would be any State Department objection to Dewey's firm acting as counsel to the Murchison group in this matter.

In conclusion Holland stressed two points. First that the Murchison group was not interested in spending one dollar or taking one step in connection with this project unless it was consistent with the policy of the United States. Second, Governor Dewey was not willing to serve as counsel unless the Department of State had no objection to his doing so.

Mr. Holland suggested that the Department's reaction to this matter could be communicated to Governor Dewey through Mr. Holland's secretary, Barbara Massay. Mr. Holland informed me that he would be out of the country for the next ten days.

I reported the above to the Secretary. His reaction was that it should be made perfectly clear to the American businessmen involved that this Government would not use its good offices or in any other way seek to assure that the oil producing countries in the Middle East would use this pipeline to transport their oil. The Secretary also made the point that it was essential that the Israelis not be in a position to state to others that the participation of this group in the pipeline undertaking carried with it the implication that the United States was prepared to bring pressure on the oil producing areas in the Middle East to use this facility. The Secretary said that I should report this to Bill Rountree to ascertain if he agreed with this reaction, and if he did I was to pass it along to Mr. Holland.

April 4, 1957

I reported the above to Mr. Rountree. Mr. Rountree agreed with the Secretary's reaction. He said that he thought the United States position as outlined by the Secretary should be made clear to the Murchison group, and that this group should then make its own decision based completely on the commercial considerations involved. In this connection he thought it was important that the Murchison group make inquiries through commercial channels to ascertain whether, in fact, any of the present oil producing companies or countries in the Middle East would be prepared to take advantage of this facility, and make their decision on the basis of their findings.

Mr. Rountree also said that he thought that the Department's reaction should be given directly to Mr. Holland and not through Mr. Holland's secretary. He felt that to do otherwise would run the risk of our reaction becoming garbled.

4:30 p.m.

I called Barbara Massay and said that I had ascertained the Departmental reaction to the matter which Mr. Holland had raised with me last evening. I said that because of the complexity of the problem involved, I was under instruction to report directly to Mr. Holland. Miss Massay said that she would send a cable to Mr. Holland giving him that information. She said she imagined that Mr. Holland would ask her to telephone the parties involved and indicate that he would not have an answer for them until after he returned to this country.

April 8, 1957

Miss Massay telephoned me today to say that she had talked with Mr. Holland in Mexico City. Mr. Holland had said he would be glad to wait until he returned to the country to have the State Department answer his query. He also said, however, that it would be perfectly all right with him if I passed it directly to Governor Dewey. I told Miss Massay that I was under instructions to report to Mr. Holland personally and, although I was sure the Secretary, if he were here, would authorize me to talk to Governor Dewey, in the Secretary's absence I thought I had better stick to my instructions and wait and report to Mr. Holland.

William B. Macomber, Jr.²

April 19, 1957

Mr. Holland telephoned me from New York today. I gave him the Department's position in regard to the above matter, using the language underlined on page 2.³ I read this underlined language to him word for

word. Mr. Holland said he understood our position; he thought it was a reasonable one, and he would convey it to Governor Dewey.

W.B.M., Jr.⁴

¹ Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers. Confidential; Personal and Private.

² Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

³ Reference is to the portions of the last paragraph in the April 3 entry beginning with “it should be made perfectly clear to the American businessmen involved” and ending with “would use this pipeline to transport their oil”; and beginning with “essential that the Israelis not be in a position” and ending with “to use this facility”; and to the portion in the first paragraph of the April 4 entry beginning with “this group should then” and ending with “on the basis of their findings”.

⁴ Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.

**210. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State,
Washington, April 4, 1957¹**

Washington, April 4, 1957

SUBJECT

New Pipeline in Middle East

PARTICIPANTS

Eugene Holman, Chairman of the Board, Standard Oil Co. of N.J.

M. J. Rathbone, President, Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey

T. E. Monaghan, Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey

D. A. Shepard, Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey

W—Mr. Dillon, Department of State

Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey group reported to Mr. Dillon the status of the exploratory talks regarding the construction and operation of a new pipeline from the head of the Persian Gulf through Iraq and Turkey to the eastern Mediterranean. They reported that at the meeting in London on March 18, 19, and 20, attended by representatives of the following groups: Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey, Gulf Oil Corporation, Standard Oil Co. of California, Socony Mobil Oil Co. Inc. Texas Co., British Petroleum Co. Ltd., Royal Dutch Shell, and Compagnie Francaise des Petroles, agreement was reached on the following points:

- (i) that a new pipeline system to the Eastern Mediterranean, with a capacity in the region of 1,200,000 barrels per day, should be the immediate objective.
- (ii) that the main route of such a pipeline system should be from the head of the Persian Gulf via Iraq and Turkey to the

Mediterranean Seaboard and that it was desirable ultimately to transport oil from Iraq, Kuwait, Iran and Saudi Arabia.

(iii) that the objective should be two 34"/36" lines as the main trunk system, the first to be completed in 1960, or earlier if practicable, and the second as soon thereafter as circumstances permit.

(iv) that the maximum protection of the pipeline system should be obtained by International treaties of one kind or another.

(v) that there should be a separate Company, of nationality yet to be decided, which would have the necessary powers and be responsible for the negotiation of transit rights and for the construction, financing and eventual operation of whatever finally became the main trunk system.

(vi) that, in arriving at a recommendation as to the most desirable form of tariff, in relation to transit terms, the appropriate Committee should freely and thoroughly explore and report upon all aspects of the question.

(vii) that outside finance should be obtained to the maximum degree possible compatible with the economics but that such equity capital as would be necessary should be subscribed by the oil companies.

They also reported that there was agreement set up for Four Committees (Organization Committee, Treaty Committee, Finance Committee, and Engineering Committee) to pursue the problem further. They indicated that the main problem to be resolved was that dealing with the form of a treaty to protect the pipeline and its operations, and they stated flatly that such a treaty was a sine qua non of the success of the project. Beyond that, they indicated that there was still a good deal of difference regarding the question of the tariff to be charged and it was not clear as to what the exact share of the different parties in the pipeline would be, although it was indicated that the over-all share of the American companies would be on the order of 45 percent.

Preliminary studies indicate that the cost per barrel of transporting from the head of the Persian Gulf to the United Kingdom by the proposed pipeline and then by 45,000 ton tanker from the Eastern Mediterranean terminus would be approximately one-third cheaper than the present cost of transporting oil from the Persian Gulf to the United Kingdom by 45,000 ton tanker through the Canal. In other words, the project is economical and the only difficulty is the substantial cost of construction, presently indicated at roughly \$850 million.

The various committees are to report back their interim recommendations to the principals at a meeting to be held in London on May 13. At that time it is planned to form a company to assume responsibility for the future progress of Planning and Coordination.

Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey representatives inquired as to the general attitude of the Department of State toward this project. Mr. Dillon replied that the Department in general favored the development of alternative routes for the transport of oil, and the Department had agreed to consider problems involved in treaty protection of such an operation.

The representatives of Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey then requested the following action from the Department:

(a) that the Department inform the governments concerned in the area regarding the development to date and indicate that the U.S. looked with favor on this project. (Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey representatives pointed out that since they had as yet no single organization there was no way in which they could talk to the governments involved. They said that there was a good deal of publicity beginning to leak out regarding the project, and they were afraid that the governments in the area would become offended if someone did not apprise them of the facts.)

(b) that the Department of State give its general views, prior to the May 13 meeting, regarding the type of treaty protection that might be considered most practical by the U.S. Government. (There are at present two ideas. The first, favored by the European companies, is for a multilateral general treaty which

will protect not only the pipeline but also all existing and future concessions in Turkey and Iraq. The second idea relates only to the pipeline and its operation. While the American companies would be delighted to have the general protection, they are inclined to feel that this is not a practical project and, therefore, to favor a treaty dealing specifically only with the pipeline. Two preliminary drafts of a general treaty and a pipeline treaty were furnished to Mr. Dillon.)

Mr. Dillon promised to consider the matter and inform the Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey representatives as rapidly as possible, and in any event, at least one week prior to the May 13 date of the next meeting.

(c) that the Department of State inform the Department of Justice of the results of the March meeting in London, and request Department of Justice clearance for the May 13 meeting, including the formation of a joint company for the purpose of assuming responsibility for the future progress of Planning and Coordination of the project.

Mr. Dillon said that the Department of State would get in touch with the Department of Justice in an attempt to obtain the clearance desired.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 880.2553/4-457. Confidential. Drafted by Dillon.

211. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree) to the Secretary of State¹

Washington, April 4, 1957.

SUBJECT

Richards Mission—Lebanon, March 14–17²

Discussions

The President and other top officials received Richards cordially, demonstrated a clear understanding of the American Doctrine, and expressed approval of the United States policy in the Middle East. They emphasized the need for economic aid and indicated they would prefer help over a period of five or six years rather than a large lump sum. Lebanon fears communist penetration more than Soviet attack but needs a small army with modern arms.

Findings

Richards felt that the Lebanese endorsement of the Doctrine showed political courage. There is real fear of subversive activities supported by Egypt and Syria, but no intention or capability of attacking another country. Richards justifies economic aid on political rather than economic grounds, and is satisfied that limited military aid would have no effect on arms balance in the area.

Commitments

- (1) Economic development assistance on grant basis for housing, highways, irrigation, flood control, airport extension, etc.—\$10 million.
- (2) Military defense assistance on grant basis for transport, engineering equipment, a few guns, etc., details to be decided by

experts— \$2.2 million.

Comments

Richards felt that the public impact would be particularly important in Lebanon, the first country on his itinerary. The Lebanese Government was apparently quite happy over the results of the visit.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 120.1580/5–1057. Secret. Drafted by Don C. Bliss. Also addressed to the Under Secretary of State.

² Regarding the Richards Mission visit to Lebanon, see [vol. XIII, pp. 208–212](#).

212. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree) to the Secretary of State¹

Washington, April 4, 1957.

SUBJECT

Richards Mission—Libya, March 17–20²

Discussions

The King and Prime Minister approved the American Doctrine without reservation, indicating that Libya has no fear of U.S. intentions. The Prime Minister argued for special consideration since the United States is the only power which could raise the Libyan standard of living. He warned that aid to the bad boys at the expense of our friends would invite the overthrow of friendly governments and encourage blackmail. Libya is confronted by a “little Russia” next door, but the U.S. should not worry about Nasser propaganda.

Findings

Richards observes Libya is a desert Kingdom dependent on subsidies, the government is primitive, and it is like a marionette with Egypt, Russia and the U.S. pulling the strings. Nasser is the most popular person in the country due to his emotional appeal, but the government is committed firmly to the West. The problem of the Mission was not to sell the Doctrine but simply to determine the level of aid, taking into account that Libya is already getting \$20 million from us, plus \$8 million from Wheelus Base goods and services. The Libyan shopping list totalled \$30 million, but Richards decided to concentrate on broadcasting and education for their immediate political impact.

Commitment

Economic development grant aid for broadcasting, teachers college, economic survey, water supply—\$4.5 million

Comments

The Libyans were deeply disappointed, requested that the commitment not be announced, and urged postponement of the final decision until the end of the trip. Richards agreed to consider this, and feels that the Libyans have a strong case. The Embassy has argued strongly for a “contingent” program of \$10 million.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 120.1580/5–1057. Secret. Drafted by Bliss. Also addressed to the Under Secretary of State.

² For documentation on the Richards Mission visit to Libya, see [vol. XVIII, pp. 472–479](#). For text of the joint communiqué issued on March 20 in Tripoli, see Department of State *Bulletin*, May 6, 1957, p. 726.

213. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree) to the Secretary of State¹

Washington, April 4, 1957.

SUBJECT

Richards Mission—Turkey, March 20–23²

Discussions

The Prime Minister stressed that Turkey is primarily interested in the Middle East security but felt that the U.S. should look to its friends first, consider the uncommitted states second, and disregard the opposition states. Richards said these priorities are understood in the U.S. but we feel that encouragement to the weaker states might have a tonic effect.

Richards announced U.S. willingness to join the Baghdad Pact Military Committee if invited and referred to the regional projects in terms of our financial limitations. He also declared U.S. willingness to supplement the Turk military program. Seager conducted economic talks with the Turks but they requested no additional aid. The Turks were pleased by the Baghdad Pact announcement through them and further flattered by Richards' request for comments on other Middle East states, which they gave freely.

Findings

Richards was impressed by the Turks, admired their self-confidence and steadiness, their strength of character, and their open-eyed attitude, with few delusions, but noted that it would be an error to assume that they are pliable and always responsive. They have charted their own road and intend to follow it. They are more ready to listen to us in foreign than in internal affairs, as in divergences over anti-inflation.

Commitments

- (1) Adherence to Military Committee of Baghdad Pact
- (2) One squadron F-100 aircraft—\$16 million
- (3) One submarine on loan—\$4 million
- (4) Assistance for surveys of regional projects

Comments

The Turks were deeply satisfied by the Richards visit. They expect and deserve a prominent part in expanding the Doctrine. Ambassador Warren reports orally that Richards handled himself extremely well.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 120.1580/5-1057. Secret. Drafted by Bliss. Also addressed to the Under Secretary of State.

² Regarding the Richards Mission visit to Turkey, see [vol. XXIV, p. 710](#). For text of the joint communiqué issued on March 22 in Ankara, see Department of State *Bulletin*, May 6, 1957, pp. 726-727.

214. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree) to the Secretary of State¹

Washington, April 4, 1957.

SUBJECT

Richards Mission—Iran, March 23–27²

Discussions

Meetings with the Prime Minister and the Shah were highly satisfactory in terms of the Doctrine and the Baghdad Pact. The Shah was chiefly interested in military problems, is worried by his military weakness as an obvious target. The Prime Minister presented a shopping list [for a] four-year program costing \$102 million and expressed particular interest in the Turk-Pakistan rail link. Both Shah and Prime Minister commented freely on other countries. This seems to be a successful Richards gambit.

Richards gave assurances if Iran attacked U.S. would be at its side; we had put hand to plow and would not turn back. He stressed military planning on regional basis and said economic aid would be small because funds are limited, but there is some possibility for regional projects. Our economic strength is spread thin and future aid will emphasize loans.

Findings

Richards quite critical in his appraisal of Iran—economic plan bogged down, feudal outlook, tendency play both sides, Shah over-ambitious, general apathy and inefficiency. Cash resources are sufficient but Richards hopes aid may stimulate initiative and concludes that the political impact will help to align Iran with the West.

Commitments

(1) U.S. membership in Baghdad Pact Military Committee.

(2) Increased military construction, \$6 million in grant aid and \$5 million in local currency from FY 1957 economic development funds—\$11 million.

(3) Military grant aid, small arms, trucks—\$2 million.

(4) Grant aid, rail and telecommunications surveys for regional projects—\$6 million to be finalized in Baghdad.

Comments

Iranians professed profound disappointment but this was for bargaining purposes and Embassy believes they were quite happy. The Shah was particularly pleased by the military aid. The Iranians showed little gratitude and seemed to assume that U.S. aid would be forthcoming.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 120.1580/5–1057. Secret. Drafted by Bliss. Also addressed to the Under Secretary of State.

² Regarding the Richards Mission visit to Iran, see [Documents 396–399](#).

215. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree) to the Secretary of State¹

Washington, April 4, 1957.

SUBJECT

Richards Mission—Pakistan, March 27–29²

Discussions

President and Prime Minister welcomed Richards and soon agreed on Doctrine. The Pakistanis responded freely to request for their views on other countries and seemed disposed to be helpful with Afghanistan. They regard so-called dynamic or progressive neutrality, which is really aggressive neutrality, as greatest threat today. They pressed on the question of whether the Doctrine covers internal subversion and Richards replied that it would not if a communist government were in power due to internal causes, since the use of U.S. troops would then violate sovereignty and the right of people to choose their government. He also ducked the question of a possible attack from India.

Findings

Richards was impressed by the Pakistan positive attitude, determination to succeed, activity and drive in contrast to Iran. Their major drawback is crushing burden of “defense” against India. Another is lack of qualified personnel in depth. They have the potential and the desire to form the Eastern stanchion of Middle East defense against communism. They had no demands but emphasized their severe annual food short-fall.

Commitments

(1) U.S. adherence to Baghdad Pact Military Committee

(2) Military grant aid, vehicles, aircraft, guns, ammunition—\$10 million

(3) Economic aid on loan basis for foreign exchange costs of fertilizer factories—\$10 million

(4) Contribution to telecommunications regional projects after consultations in Baghdad

Comments

The Richards offers were received with quiet satisfaction, and the Prime Minister stated that the long-pending FCN treaty could now be approved. Richards urges that ICA favor projects to raise the Pakistan food output. The Embassy reports on the favorable impression created by Richards' candor and persuasiveness.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 120.1580/5–1057. Secret. Drafted by Bliss. Also addressed to the Under Secretary of State.

² Regarding the Richards Mission visit to Pakistan, see [vol. VIII, p. 476](#). For text of the joint communiqué issued on March 31 in Karachi, see Department of State *Bulletin*, May 6, 1957, pp. 728–729.

216. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree) to the Secretary of State¹

Washington, April 4, 1957.

SUBJECT

Richards Mission—Afghanistan, April 1–3²

Discussions

In preliminary frank talks Foreign Minister Naim stressed disequilibrium in Middle East and Afghan concern with its security position as governed by geography. Richards noted how the U.S. had thrown away its arms after the last war, permitting the Soviets to swallow countries one by one. Now the U.S. is prepared, will not start war, but will win. He does not expect another invasion, but if war came, free world must be defended at its perimeter.

Richards in formal talk with Prime Minister Daud gave a careful presentation of the Doctrine, stressing that the Middle East states are not friendless if attacked but we seek no bases, alliances or meddling. The Afghan response was reasonably good. Daud stressed neutrality, peace, independence, and the incompatibility of communism. He had accepted aid from the north but without conditions. Richards assured him we are not critical provided Daud keeps in mind how Soviets subverted other countries. The President asked him to tell the Afghans we do not seek to impose our will on anyone and in our creed we prefer to die as free men rather than live as slaves. Daud did not probe the specifics of the use of U.S. armed forces and this subject was cautiously skirted.

Commitments

(1) Equipment for road improvement and maintenance, half loan, half grant—\$2.0 million

- (2) Motor vehicles and maintenance equipment, loan basis—\$2.2 million
- (3) Coal trucks and equipment, loan basis—\$800 thousand
- (4) Civil police equipment, grant basis—\$360 thousand
- (5) U.S. prepared to allocate \$2,950,000 from regular program funds for Helmand Valley project, additional financing subject to appropriations
- (6) Renewed assurances of U.S. interest in a regional transportation survey
- (7) Richards noted Afghan interest in a PL 480 program.

Comments

This was a difficult negotiation for Richards, and SOA feels that he handled it extremely well. Ambassador Mills was insistent before Richards arrived that the program be considerably larger. The actual commitments are exactly as recommended by the Department and ICA, but an attempt has been made to round them out with additional assurances of U.S. interest.

In his Kabul discussions Richards wisely did not employ his previously successful gambit of asking for comments on other Middle East states.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 120.1580/5–1057. Secret. Drafted by Bliss. Also addressed to the Under Secretary of State.

² For documentation on the Richards Mission visit to Afghanistan, see [vol. VIII, pp. 250–254](#). For text of the joint communiqué issued on April 2 in Kabul, see Department of State *Bulletin*, May 6, 1957, pp. 729–730.

217. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree) to the Secretary of State¹

Washington, April 16, 1957.

SUBJECT

Report on the Richards Mission—Iraq, April 6–8²

While Ambassador Richards was in Baghdad, Prime Minister Nuri stated to him that the three main threats to Middle East stability were: the Arab-Israeli problem, especially the territorial aspects, and the manner in which the Russians are using the Arab fear of Zionism as a weapon against the West; the Soviet use of Nasser and his policies to penetrate the Middle East, particularly Egypt, Syria and Jordan; and the concentration of Soviet efforts in Syria after their failure in Iraq.

The Prime Minister expressed gratitude for the aid to Iraq, proposed by the Richards Mission, but stressed Iraq's need for aircraft and airfields to hold off a Soviet attack. He pointed out that 70 percent of Iraq's oil revenues are going for development and that 60 percent of the budget is earmarked for defense. In these circumstances Iraq needed assistance with regard to the aviation equipment and air defense facilities it required.

The Prime Minister advised Ambassador Richards not to “reward blackmailers”. He thought that the Mission might visit Syria and Jordan, but only to discuss its objectives—not to extend aid.

Ambassador Richards made the following commitments for aid to Iraq:

1. Police equipment and training, grant—\$1,000,000
2. Telecommunications equipment for Iraq section of regional system, grant—\$1,150,000

3. Consultant engineer contract for Baghdad–Basra railway, grant—\$350,000
4. Military assistance previously arranged, \$6,676,000 confirmed as being on grant basis
5. Additional military assistance for tanks, guns and other equipment, grant—\$7,408,000

Ambassador Richards found that the Iraq Government was following progressive policies and using its oil revenues effectively, but that the decline in revenue from oil resulting from the decreased capacity of the IPC pipeline is a serious problem. He commented that the Iraqis, although disappointed in the quantity of aid offered and stressing their need for help in the aviation field, were reasonably satisfied in the circumstances.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 120.1580/5–1057. Secret. Drafted by Bliss. Also addressed to the Under Secretary of State.

² Regarding the Richards Mission visit to Iraq, see [Documents 454–456](#).

218. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree) to the Secretary of State¹

Washington, April 16, 1957.

SUBJECT

Report on the Richards Mission—Baghdad Pact, April 9²

During his visit to each of the four Baghdad Pact countries— Turkey, Pakistan, Iran and Iraq—Ambassador Richards gave assurances that the United States was prepared to assist in financing preliminary surveys for several regional projects discussed in recent meetings of Baghdad Pact economic experts. On April 9, in Baghdad, Ambassador Richards told the Secretary General of the Baghdad Pact that there was unanimous agreement in the four countries that these projects should be promptly undertaken. He also said that the survey funds would be made available through the Secretary General, so as to emphasize their identity with the Pact.

The following commitments were made by Ambassador Richards for Pact regional projects:

- | | |
|---|--------------|
| 1. Surveys for telecommunications and highway links between the four capitals | \$1,000,000 |
| 2. Iran telecommunications project | 4,000,000 |
| 3. Engineering Iran portion Iran–Turkey railway | 2,000,000 |
| 4. Turkish telecommunications project | 600,000 |
| 5. Turkish highway link with Iran-Iraq | 2,000,000 |
| 6. Telecommunications project in Iraq | 1,150,000 |
| 7. Telecommunications project in Pakistan | 1,820,000 |
| | \$12,570,000 |

The governments concerned are required to approve these projects formally and to authorize the Pact Secretary General to act on them. Concurrently, the United States Operations Missions in the four capitals will prepare the bilateral agreements necessary for the initiation of the projects.

The commitments which Ambassador Richards has made for regional Pact projects have been very favorably received in the Pact countries, and the Secretary General has stated that the undertakings will be most effective in strengthening the Pact. Ambassador Richards' decisions were communicated to the press in Baghdad by the Ambassador and the Secretary General of the Pact.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 120.1580/5–1057. Secret. Drafted by Bliss. Also addressed to the Under Secretary of State.

² After completing his visits to the four Baghdad Pact countries, Richards issued a statement to the press at Baghdad on April 8. For text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, May 6, 1957, pp. 730–731.

219. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree) to the Secretary of State¹

Washington, April 17, 1957.

SUBJECT

Report of the Richards Mission Visit to Saudi Arabia, April 9–10²

Discussion:

During the brief visit of the Richards Mission to Riyadh, King Saud and his Counselors reviewed with Ambassador Richards the broad range of US-Saudi affairs. Special attention was paid to the purposes of the American Doctrine and to the problem of the Gulf of Aqaba. Ambassador Richards also noted in his general comments (Tab A)³ that Buraimi and the old issues of Zionism and imperialism also loomed large in Saudi Arabian thinking.

The King stressed his warm friendship for the United States and his strong opposition to Communism (Tab B). He inquired how the United States would define those countries which were under the domination of International Communism, and asked particularly about Syria. Ambassador Richards replied that such a determination would be left to the good judgment of the President, and pointed out that no governments had asked the U.S. for help against Syria. The King demonstrated his support for the Doctrine by reporting that he had attempted to pave the way for the Richards Mission in Yemen by sending a Royal Counselor with a personal message to the Iman (Tab B).

The King stated firmly that he would never consent to recognizing the Gulf of Aqaba as an international waterway and would not agree to the transit of Israeli ships. The King said he would have no part in any reference of the matter to the International Court of Justice and insisted that the Gulf of Aqaba is an Arab sea. Ambassador Richards presented at some length the U.S. position on this matter (Tab B).

As had been agreed upon previously, Ambassador Richards advised the Saudi Arabian Government in an aide-mémoire of the U.S. willingness to provide up to \$20 million for expansion of the Port of Dammam (Tab C). The Saudi Arabians regarded this as not related to the new American Doctrine and as simply a part of the earlier agreement concluded in Washington.

Comments:

The communiqué issued on April 11 (Tab D)⁴ reaffirms the policy of the February 7 communiqué in Washington and asserts an intention to continue to oppose Communist activity. Sheikh Yusuf Yasin, however, agreed to this language only if the communiqué included also reference to “other forms of imperialism,” which were understood by the Saudis to include Zionism.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 120.1580/5–1057. Secret. Drafted by Bliss. Also addressed to the Under Secretary of State.

² For documentation on the Richards Mission visit to Saudi Arabia, see [vol. XIII, pp. 489–494](#).

³ None of the tabs was attached to the source text.

⁴ For text of the joint communiqué issued on April 11 in Riyadh, see Department of State *Bulletin*, May 6, 1957, p. 731.

220. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree) to the Acting Secretary of State¹

Washington, April 13, 1957.

SUBJECT

Exchange of Views with the UK on Middle East Problems Bearing upon Oil Supply

Pursuant to the Bermuda agreement that the US and UK Governments would exchange views on Middle East problems bearing upon the supply of oil to the free world on or before April 15, 1957,² a Departmental working group³ has prepared the attached paper. (Tab A) This paper does not purport to be more than a summary statement of the major problems and possible ways of dealing with them as seen by this Government. It should serve to initiate the agreed exchange of views, leaving to later stages the exchange of more detailed data. The preparation of such data is well advanced as an informal interdepartmental working group has since January been studying various aspects of the oil supply problem. The present paper drew heavily on the work of that group.

This paper has been coordinated within the Department with ARA, E, EUR, FE, IO, L, NEA, and R and S/P, and outside the Department with CIA, Defense, Interior, Maritime Commission and ODM.

Recommendation

It is recommended that you approve the attached paper and authorize me to hand it to a representative of the UK Embassy on April 15.⁴

[Tab A]

US VIEWS ON MIDDLE EAST PROBLEMS BEARING UPON THE SUPPLY OF OIL TO THE FREE WORLD⁵

I. Basic Premises

1. The US Government agrees with the UK Government that “in the next 10 years or so it is unlikely that increased supplies of other forms of energy will be sufficient to make much impact on the demand for oil” (*paragraph 4 of Report on Long-Term Requirements for the Transport of Oil from the Middle East transmitted to the Department of State by the British Embassy on January 4, 1957*).⁶ Acceptance of this premise does not, of course, obviate the recognized need for the free world, and particularly Western Europe, to pursue vigorously present and projected plans for the development of alternative sources of energy.

2. The US Government also agrees that free world demand for oil will increase substantially during the next decade and that “The bulk of this additional oil will have to come from the Middle East where most of the world’s proven reserves lie.” (paragraph 2 of above-cited Report). This premise would be dislodged only if very substantial new crude oil deposits were to be found outside the Middle East.

3. The US Government’s estimates of basic data bearing upon free world oil supply differ in some respects from those of the UK Government as indicated in the previously cited Report. The US estimates are given in Annex A⁷ for convenient reference.

4. Certain Middle East governments have shown a willingness and capability to deny Western access to oil reserves (Iran 1951–3) and to disrupt Middle East oil transport facilities (Egypt and Syria 1956–7). It is essential that more effective measures be devised to protect the free world’s, and particularly Western Europe’s, long-term access to Middle East oil and to insure against temporary interruptions of its flow.

II. Protection of Free World Access to Middle East Oil

5. The difficulties and dangers inherent in the free world’s dependence on Middle East oil would be intensified if this

dependence came to rest upon one or two countries. Two countries, moreover, would not provide what Western Europe currently needs. The US and UK should accordingly seek to retain access to the oil resources of all four of the major Middle East producing states: Iran, Iraq, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. This effort is favored by the heavy dependence of these four countries on revenues derived from the sale of their oil in free world markets.

6. Continued access to Iranian oil seems least likely to be disturbed. Iran has already had a national convulsion over oil; its Government has adopted a pronounced pro-Western stance; it is relatively immune to the fevers of the Arab world.

7. In Iraq, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia strong internal and external pressures exist on behalf of policies in common with other Arab states. Extreme Arab nationalism that looks to Nasser for leadership seeks to present itself, with some effect, as the exponent of true Arabism. Strong feelings existing in Iraq and Saudi Arabia over the Arab-Israel dispute and in Saudi Arabia over continuing differences with the UK provide bases for pressure and agitation by extremist groups. While these factors do not appear immediately to threaten continued access to the oil resources of the three countries, the ability of their present leadership to withstand the extremists would be improved if the bases for pressure and agitation were minimized or removed.

8. Free world dependence upon Middle East oil transport facilities already rests principally on two countries. Egypt can block the Suez Canal, and Syria alone can breach the existing and operating IPC pipelines and Tapline. These, moreover, are countries in which Soviet influence is most extensive, Arab nationalism most extreme and involvement in the Arab-Israel dispute currently most immediate. The economic self-interest of both countries in revenues from these facilities, or pressures from petroleum producers and consumers will serve to inhibit interference with the facilities in normal circumstances, but developments such as a

renewed outbreak of Arab-Israeli hostilities could well lead to the denial of both Canal and pipelines.

9. The political realities and common prudence dictate that the US and the UK should seek to reduce free world dependence on Egypt and Syria. As there is now no practicable alternative to the Suez Canal, the US and the UK must also, however, seek to restore normal conditions in the Middle East so that the Canal, and the existing pipelines, will be available.

10. In protecting continued access to Middle East oil resources and transit facilities, Saudi Arabia is the key country, and relations between Saudi Arabia and the West are of particular importance. If Saudi Arabia could be brought to identify its interests with those of the US and the UK, there could follow a reduction of the extremist threat in Iraq, a curtailment of financial support for Arab extremist movements, constructive Saudi influence on behalf of secure transit rights for oil, Arab acquiescence in a substantial British position in the Persian Gulf and Arab cooperation in opposing the expansion of Soviet influence.

Recommendations

11. The US and the UK should consider immediate steps which they may take, either jointly or individually, for stable and mutually beneficial relationships with Iran, Iraq, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. These might include:

a. Restoration of normal diplomatic relations between Iraq and France and between Saudi Arabia and the UK and France.

b. An agreed settlement between the UK, the Persian Gulf states, and Saudi Arabia on Buraimi and the frontiers. In this connection, the following courses of action might be considered:

i. Mediation by the US.

ii. Direct talks between the UK and Saudi Arabia.

iii. A direct approach by Muscat to Saudi Arabia on border issues with suitable recognition of the rights of Abu Dhabi as represented by the UK.

iv. Saudi Arabian recognition of Muscat's sovereignty over Inner Oman.

v. A treaty establishing a neutral zone under the administration of indigenous tribes.

vi. Return of the Buraimi refugees.

vii. Return to arbitration.

c. Obtaining settlements of the varying claims to the islands and the sea bed of the Persian Gulf. In this connection, the following might be considered:

i. An international conference of interested states.

ii. Reference to the ICJ.

iii. Reference to the UN Legal Committee for an advisory opinion.

iv. A joint US–UK approach to the interested powers proposing agreement on the median line of the Gulf.

d. Curbing the Egyptian subversive apparatus in the Middle East, and diminishing extremist influence through the replacement of Egyptian and Syrian

teachers and technicians in the area, especially in Kuwait.

e. Strengthening the internal security forces of the producing states.

f. Maintaining the 50–50 principle in Middle East concessions.

g. Supporting friendly indigenous information and exchange efforts stressing community of interests between oil producing states and West.

12. The US and the UK should also consider immediate steps which they may take, either jointly or individually, to protect access to Middle East oil transport facilities. These might include:

a. Increasing the influence and prestige of Iraq and Saudi Arabia in the transit states.

b. Reducing the likelihood of Arab-Israel hostilities by

i. Seeking more effective UN policing of the Arab-Israel Armistice Lines and the prevention of raids across the lines.

ii. Maintaining pressure on Israel to adopt a less belligerent posture.

c. Fostering treaty guarantees of the security of new pipelines that may be built in the Middle East and seeking opportunities to obtain similar guarantees for existing pipelines.

d. Assisting the transit companies to secure satisfactory agreements with the transit countries.

III. Insurance Against Interruptions of Middle East Oil Supply

13. The Middle East producing and transit states will be less disposed to interfere with free world access to the area's oil if they are aware that Western Europe is able to cope with temporary interruptions of the flow of Middle East oil. Several possible measures could provide insurance against such interruptions.

14. As was shown in the Iranian oil crisis, the existence of excess developed capacity in the four major Middle East producing states enabled the free world to defeat attempts by one of these states to impose unacceptable conditions for access to its oil or to injure Western Europe by stopping oil exports. The rapid rise in petroleum requirements has now greatly reduced the margin of excess capacity that existed in 1951, and it would not be possible today quickly to offset the loss of supplies from one major producing state by increasing output in the other three.

15. The Suez oil crisis emphasized the importance of alternative sources of oil supply. Shipments from the Western Hemisphere to Western Europe contributed substantially to minimizing the effect of the closure of the Suez Canal and IPC pipeline on supplies, although balance of payments difficulties were created. The US will soon be unable to provide substantial quantities of petroleum from its own production to meet a similar future crisis without imposing drastic domestic rationing, a step that would be taken only in a major emergency clearly threatening the security of the US. Venezuela could be a significant alternative source if its productive potential were rapidly developed. Colombia also offers opportunities for development. In the Eastern Hemisphere, North Africa is the most promising non-Middle East source and has the special advantage of close proximity to Western Europe. North African oil would also be non-dollar oil, a further and important advantage. Given reasonable political stability, a considerable expansion of Indonesian production is likely. Burma, too, offers some possibilities. It should be stressed, however, that significant

development of these potential alternative sources of supply will require several years of concentrated effort. If this effort is promptly launched, these sources can afford the free world a useful margin of flexibility in emergencies that might arise three or more years hence.

16. The Suez oil crisis also emphasized the importance of a surplus of tankers to cope with increased maritime movements necessitated by disruption of Middle East transport facilities. It must be assumed that world shipping will soon resume and continue using the Suez Canal if, as appears probable, the Egyptian Canal authority provides safe and adequate service. It must also be assumed that existing Middle East pipelines will be restored to maximum operation as soon as possible, if, as a consequence of these developments, tanker fleet owners should be disposed to begin restricting new construction and expediting scrapping, free world Governments would be well advised to consider the desirability and practicability of instituting measures to forestall such action with a view to maintaining surplus tonnage in being.

17. One way to dissuade fleet owners from cutting back would be to institute a program to increase petroleum stockpiles in Western Europe, thus affording cargoes for surplus tankers. Such stocks as did exist greatly eased the immediate impact of the Suez oil crisis in Europe. If between three and six months' requirements could be stored, it might well be possible for Western Europe to withstand a future transport crisis for as long as a year, on the reasonable assumption that tankers engaged in the Middle East-Western Europe movements, being diverted from the Suez Canal to the Cape route, could provide about 50% of normal requirements. Supplementary stockpiles in the Western Hemisphere might also be of advantage.

18. Another way to discourage tanker cut back would be to provide inducements for the withdrawal of tankers from active service and their placement in tanker reserve fleets for emergency

use. Such a program would not only involve substantial financial outlays but would also present many difficulties in implementation. It would, however, provide significant insurance against future transport crises.

19. The continued operation of Tapline during the Suez oil crisis makes a prima facie case for the construction of other alternate pipelines in the Middle East. A number of the major oil companies are giving serious consideration to an Iraq–Turkey line. This proposal has already aroused Arab opposition, and it cannot be excluded that Iraq might succumb to Arab pressures against a line so obviously avoiding other Arab states. If so, an Iran–Turkey line initially tapping the new Qum discovery would be an alternative. As this pipeline would bypass all Arab states, it has an intrinsic attraction. The proposed pipeline through Israel does not appear likely to make a major contribution to the movement of Middle East oil to Western Europe.

Recommendations

20. The US and the UK should consider immediate steps which they make take, either jointly or individually, to insure alternative oil availabilities. These might include:

a. Encouraging the oil companies to build up and maintain in each of the four major Middle East producing states developed standby capacity at least 25% in excess of increasing petroleum demands upon these countries.

b. Persuading free world countries outside the Middle East to permit further exploration for and development of oil resources.

c. Encouraging the oil companies vigorously to pursue non-Middle East exploration and development and, in such areas as Venezuela and eventually Algeria, to build up and maintain developed standby capacity at least

25% in excess of immediate petroleum demands upon those areas.

21. The US and the UK should also reach agreement as soon as possible on a program, involving the most practicable combination of oil stockpiling, maintenance of the tanker fleet at a high level and new pipelines, designed to insure Western Europe, and to the maximum extent possible other free world areas, against temporary interruptions of the flow of Middle East oil. In order to determine the most practicable program, it will be necessary urgently to examine:

- a. The desirability and practicability of encouraging the completion of present tanker construction programs and of discouraging expedited tanker scrapping, both on the intrinsic merit of these steps and with a view to providing tonnage for the movement of petroleum to Western European stockpiles or for possible reserve fleets.
- b. The relative merits of tankers over 60,000 dwt. vs. tankers of 45,000–60,000 dwt.
- c. The availability in Western Europe of below ground storage (mines, quarries, pits, etc.) for between three and six months' crude oil requirements, and the cost and steel requirement of unavoidable tank storage.
- d. The utility of crude oil stockpiling in the Western Hemisphere.
- e. The impact of proposed pipelines in the Middle East and elsewhere (e.g. the proposed line from Marseille to Rotterdam and the North Sea) on the maintenance of the tanker fleet and on free world, particularly Western European, vulnerability arising from increased dependence on Middle East pipelines.

f. Over-all problems of finance and steel availabilities.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 880.2553/4–1357. Secret.

² See [Document 204](#).

³ Elbert Mathews of the Policy Planning Staff chaired the interdepartmental working group.

⁴ Herter initialed his approval on the source text.

⁵ Secret. Earlier drafts of this paper, prepared by Mathews, are in Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 67 D 548, S/P Record Copies.

⁶ Not printed. (*Ibid.*, Near and Middle East) See [vol. x, p. 647](#).

⁷ Not printed.

**221. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State,
Washington, April 17, 1957¹**

Washington, April 17, 1957

SUBJECT

US-UK Discussion of Factors Affecting Access to Petroleum
Resources of Middle East

PARTICIPANTS

United States

William M. Rountree—NEA

Elbert G. Mathews—S/P

Fraser Wilkins—NE

David Newsom—NE

United Kingdom

John Coulson, British Embassy

Adam Watson, UK Foreign Office

Willie Morris, British Embassy

Mr. Coulson began by handing Mr. Rountree a memorandum on the Gulf of Aqaba question.² Mr. Rountree said he would study and comment at a later meeting.

Mr. Coulson then said that he had read with interest the paper on factors relating to Western access to petroleum in the Middle East.³ He said the UK was in general agreement on the exposition of the relevant factors in the

first ten paragraphs of the paper. He suggested that the third section, on petroleum, be left for a later meeting. He suggested that the group then proceed to review the recommendations contained in the second section, after which the United Kingdom representatives might wish to express certain of their views in writing. He suggested that a drafting committee might then put this section of the paper into final form.

Mr. Coulson, turning to the section on recommendations, noted that these appeared to be based a good deal on the supposition that it would be possible for the United Kingdom to make some concessions on the Buraimi issue. He said he still did not believe this was a practical possibility, but he believed the United Kingdom would be prepared to discuss this in the third phase of the talks.

Paragraph 11 (a), Mr. Coulson noted, referred to the desirability of restoring normal diplomatic relations between Iraq and France and between Saudi Arabia and France and the United Kingdom. He agreed that this was desirable but asked how the United States thought this might be accomplished. He said the United Kingdom felt the Iraqis would restore relations with France as soon as they could, and said the UK had not attempted to take any lead in the matter.

Mr. Mathews suggested that both the US and the UK could speak to Iraq. He said the establishment of relations with Saudi Arabia was tied in somewhat with the problems in paragraph 11 (b). Mr. Wilkins said that the United States had discussed the establishment of diplomatic relations with the UK with Saudi Arabian representatives during the King's visit and had the impression that, at the proper stage, Saudi Arabia would consider it.

Mr. Coulson said the UK had taken the line that it was up to both Iraq and Saudi Arabia to do something when they could. He asked whether Saudi Arabia might make the establishment of relations contingent upon a settlement of some of the problems with the United Kingdom. Mr. Mathews replied that he did not think so.

Mr. Rountree noted the Saudi Arabian move in lifting the embargo on British and French flag tankers as an indication of their desire for ultimate normal relations.

Mr. Coulson added that the United Kingdom would be willing to resume the talks with Saudi Arabia broken off by the rupture in relations. Mr. Watson agreed that they could revert to the earlier situation.

Mr. Coulson then referred to the sub-paragraphs of 11 (b). He said (iii) seemed to be a question of both procedure and substance. He thought (iv), suggesting that Saudi Arabia might recognize the status of Inner Oman under the Sultan's rule had merit.

Mr. Rountree pointed out that these various suggestions were put down in an effort to catalogue elements of the problem. They did not necessarily represent isolated steps. Step (iv), for example, he said, might have to be taken in conjunction with step (iii).

Mr. Coulson commented on suggestion (v) relating to a neutral zone with administration by indigenous tribes as being unrealistic since the tribes in the area had never been able to get on together before. He said he believed (vi) would require a reversal of the position of the Sultan of Muscat on the return of the Buraimi refugees.

Mr. Newsom said that had been inserted under the impression that the British representatives had indicated to Saudi Arabia in the talks in 1956 that some of the refugees might return. Mr. Morris confirmed this, saying that only two or three of the leaders would continue to be excluded.

Mr. Watson commented that he was interested in the emphasis in the paper on relations between the Sultan of Muscat and Saudi Arabia. Mr. Coulson said he was under the impression that the Sultan did not want any direct relations with King Saud. Mr. Watson asked what the United States had in mind.

Mr. Rountree said that, in the past, it had appeared to the United States that when the United Kingdom and Saudi Arabia discussed the question of Buraimi, each was actually interested in a wider problem. The United

States, he said, was seeking ways to attack the wider problem and, by so doing, to reach some settlement on Buraimi. Since the primary concern is really Muscat and the Trucial Sheikdoms, Mr. Rountree said it might be desirable to determine whether some of the previous obstacles might be overcome by a new approach encompassing this wide area.

Mr. Watson asked how the Sultan could give any assurance that would satisfy King Saud on the Oman question without giving up some of his sovereignty. Mr. Newsom explained that part of the problem, so far as King Saud was concerned, was what he believed to be his genuine obligation to the tribes of the area and to the Ibadhi people who had appealed to the King for assistance. Mr. Newsom said he believed any settlement had to provide the King with something he could point to which satisfied this obligation. He said that, in informal conversations with Azzam Pasha, the latter had suggested that King Saud might accept the sovereignty of the Sultan over Oman in direct negotiations with him. Mr. Newsom said he believed it was conceivable that language could be devised in an agreement between King Saud and the Sultan which would recognize the Sultan's sovereignty, but still recognize the special status of the Ibadhi people in a manner which would meet Saud's problem.

Mr. Coulson noted the first point, mediation by the United States. He said this was a "tricky" point and one that the United States would want to consider most carefully. Mr. Watson said he believed it would be a thankless task.

On the last point (vii), Mr. Coulson said return to arbitration was impossible. It would, he said, be difficult to sell to the Sultan.

Mr. Rountree, discussing the general approach to the problem, said the United States was seeking some way to break the past impasse. He said he believed this would require a new approach. He said he believed resumption of the previous talks without some new idea would merely restore the early bottleneck. He said he believed Saudi Arabia would be responsive to suggestions. He suggested that the possibility of informal discussions with Azzam Pasha not be excluded.

Mr. Coulson commented that “new approaches” seemed always to involve concessions by the United Kingdom. Mr. Mathews said this was not the intention and, further, that he was worried by the implication that each new approach meant “concessions.” He said a new way was essential if the problems were to be met.

Mr. Watson pointed out that the United Kingdom had only a partial power in this matter and that they were, in a sense, merely acting as the attorneys.

Mr. Newsom said that the United States had seen nothing to indicate that King Saud wished either to reduce substantially or eliminate the British position in the area. He said that agreed boundaries with the British position would, in the opinion of the United States, eliminate some of the factors of uncertain authority which caused the present difficulty. Mr. Rountree supported this view.

Mr. Rountree added that the King had counselled moderation on the Yemenis in their dispute with the United Kingdom and had, similarly, supported forces of moderation in Jordan.

Mr. Watson acknowledged that it was possible King Saud’s earlier policy might have changed.

Mr. Coulson then moved on to paragraph (c), relating to the Persian Gulf problems. Mr. Rountree said he wished to stress at this point that this paper was purely a planning document and that some of the suggestions would require considerable study.

Mr. Coulson acknowledged the seriousness of the sea bed problem in the Gulf. He suggested that the US and the UK might approach this problem in stages. He said he believed it was necessary to start with political factors and then, at a later stage, refer legal questions resulting from the political factors to the International Court, or the International Law Commission. All were agreed on the seriousness of the problem and that the problem required further study.

Mr. Coulson indicated his agreement on paragraphs (d), (e), and (f).

There was considerable discussion on the problem of Egyptian and Syrian teachers in Kuwait and other petroleum areas. While acknowledging that this was a problem, Mr. Watson pointed out that there were good Egyptian and Syrian teachers and suggested that the word "undesirable" should be used. There was general agreement that there were no short range alternative sources. Mr. Rountree added that many areas, Libya, Sudan, Saudi Arabia, all wanted to get rid of Egyptian teachers, but were unable to do so. The American University of Beirut was mentioned as a possible long term source for new teachers.

Mr. Mathews suggested that the real short term solution was to strike at the subversive apparatus. Mr. Wilkins indicated that this had been done with some success in certain areas. Mr. Watson suggested that a change in the Egyptian government might help and that this possibility should not be ruled out.

Mr. Morris stressed Cairo's importance as a source of the printed word. The possibility was mentioned that British and U.S. agencies might seek to expand the influence of Beirut and, also, examine the possibility of publishing more suitable texts for the schools.

Mr. Coulson said the British agreed on paragraphs (e) and (f), but did not know the meaning of (g). Mr. Mathews explained that this was meant to emphasize the importance of interchanges between friendly nations in the area. Mr. Coulson said the committees of the Baghdad Pact might help in this. Mr. Watson mentioned the growing importance of television as a medium in the area.

Mr. Coulson asked, also, what the United States had in mind in paragraph 12 (a), referring to the increase of Iraqi and Saudi Arabian influence in Syria and Jordan. Mr. Coulson said that Iraq and Saudi Arabia should work together on this. Mr. Rountree said the United States had been working through King Saud in certain matters related to Syria where the King had been inclined to counsel moderation. [2½lines of source text not declassified]

Mr. Coulson said he was agreed on 12 (b), (c), and (d).

Mr. Coulson said he would, at the next meeting, wish to say a few words on the Yemen-Aden situation and to discuss the Iraqi-Kuwaiti frontier problem. Other items to be discussed would be Egypt, Iraq, Syria, and Jordan. On the latter, he said, he was waiting for an agreed estimate from the two Ambassadors in Amman.

Mr. Rountree said that he was inclined to think the King would not want the Richards Mission to come at this time. He said the Mission did not propose to go to Syria, unless there was a change in government there.

Mr. Morris asked whether the Department had as yet an answer to the question put by Sir Harold Caccia relating to the U.S. position in the event of a request by Hussain for assistance from the retiring British forces in Jordan.

Mr. Rountree said the Department hoped this situation would not arise. At best, he said, this would be a last resort and other measures should be tried first. The use of UK troops would have grave implications. He said he was not prepared to provide the answer on Mr. Herter's behalf, but he could say that, in Departmental discussions, the United States had been acutely conscious of the dangers and difficulties involved.

With respect to the general situation in Jordan, Mr. Rountree said the United States believed that any violation of Jordan's frontiers by Syria would be covered by the Tripartite Declaration. He said he did not know what action the United States might take in such a case, but, whatever it was, it would be within the authority of the Declaration.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 880.2553/4-1757. Secret. Drafted by Newsom.

² Not found.

³ *Supra*.

**222. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State,
Washington, April 18, 1957¹**

Washington, April 18, 1957

SUBJECT

Problems Relating to Western Access to Petroleum Resources of
the Middle East

PARTICIPANTS

United States

NEA—William M. Rountree

S/P—Elbert G. Mathews

NE—Fraser Wilkins

NE—David Newsom

United Kingdom

John Coulson, British Embassy

Adam Watson, UK Foreign Office

Willie Morris, British Embassy

Mr. Coulson began by mentioning that the British Embassy in Rome had reported an article in an Italian newspaper stating that the U.S. and the UK were having a ten-day conference on Middle East and African problems. Mr. Rountree suggested that, if the press in the United States should inquire about the current discussions, the matter should be played “in a low key” and the Department should merely state that regular exchanges were

continuing with representatives of the United Kingdom and other governments which share the United States interest in the Middle East.

Mr. Watson remarked that, if the press asked him about his mission here, he intended to say that he was here on routine business with his Embassy, but would take advantage of the opportunity to talk to people in the Department.

Aden

Mr. Coulson then proceeded to the first agenda item of the day, Aden. Reading from a prepared briefing paper, he said, in summary: The British regard Aden as important in their chain of world-wide defenses, particularly since the British trouble in Ceylon.² Aden is one of those points, like Singapore, whose geographical importance transcends its local importance. This fact has not escaped the Kremlin's notice. Aden is also important from the civil point of view, as an air transit point, and because of its oil refinery. It is also an important bunkering station and naval refueling base. Moreover, it is an oasis of good government and calm in a savage part of the world.

In the British view, the Protectorates are chiefly important as a buffer for Aden, although the British Government feels a strong obligation to improve conditions in the Protectorate and to prevent interference from others.

Mr. Rountree, at the conclusion of Mr. Coulson's summary, commented that the United States recognized the significance of Aden and was well aware that Aden and Yemen could each, potentially, control the Red Sea.

Mr. Coulson remarked on British concern over Soviet influence in Yemen. Mr. Newsom said that there had been a favorable turn in that the Yemenis had presented a note to the British which appeared to be more conciliatory in tone than the previous ones. He said that, while the Department knew of no connection, it was perhaps interesting that King Saud had sent an emissary to the Imam to urge prudence in dealing with the British only a short time before this note was sent.

Mr. Rountree added that he had, in his talks with the Yemeni Chargé in Washington pointed out that the terms in which the Yemenis had earlier described the proposed agenda had been unsatisfactory to the British. He had urged the Yemenis not to attempt to predetermine the substance by the phrasing of the agenda. Mr. Rountree said he believed that Mr. Zabarah understood. He said he had also stressed to Mr. Zabarah that the United States had reports from both sides in the frontier dispute and that it was not in a position to evaluate the situation or to take sides.

Mr. Coulson said that the British had been going to ask the United States to use its influence with Yemen and he was pleased to hear that it had been doing so. He also hoped the Department would keep the Saudis in touch with the situation and warn the Yemenis against permitting Soviet influence to gain a foothold.

Mr. Newsom said that, in discussions with the Yemenis, the United States had also stressed the 1934 treaty³ as a basis for an understanding. He was, he said, interested in the fact that the latest Yemeni note referred to this treaty for the first time in the recent exchange of notes.

Mr. Watson stressed that the British had no desire to expand the Protectorate and that all the urge to expand came from Yemen—encouraged by Egypt and the USSR.

Mr. Coulson also said the British would be delighted if the United States could increase its influence in Yemen. He mentioned the Yemen Development Company and wondered if this company could increase its activities.

Mr. Rountree said that we were aware that the Yemenis wished the firm to be more active, but that preliminary exploration took considerable time.

Propaganda

Mr. Coulson said there were a few comments he wished to make on propaganda in the area. He said he believed the U.S. and the UK were in

general agreement on the dangers of Egyptian propaganda. He wished to note that his government hoped that those who organize the programs broadcast from the radio station at Dhahran should take greater care to avoid items which seemed to aid the Egyptians.

Mr. Newsom explained that he believed Mr. Coulson had reference to the ARAMCO station at Dhahran and that he understood the British Government had spoken directly to officials of the company. He also understood that the company had inquired of Dhahran about the problem and had been advised that the Dhahran station, intended for the American personnel at ARAMCO, used only United Press news.

Mr. Rountree added that he believed all the broadcasts were in English.

Mr. Coulson suggested that greater effort might be made positively to make these broadcasts helpful. Mr. Newsom explained that this was a company station over which the United States Government had no control.

Iraq-Kuwaiti Frontier

Mr. Coulson said the British would give the Department a note on this subject at a later stage.

Egypt

Mr. Watson, again following the prepared briefing paper, made these comments on Egypt:

Egypt was undoubtedly the most important Arab country. It was at the center of the Arab world and had strong cultural influence through teachers, radio and publications, although its current political dominance might be waning. The long term problem was grave, however, because of the rapidly growing population and the static income. Even the High Dam, if built, would only serve to keep pace with growing demands. This combination of growing population pressures and static income will tend to make Egypt the center of revolutionary ferment and discontent in the area. Egypt will then seek other means to increase its income and will look to the sources of Arab

oil and seek to change the present situation. Egypt will seek to make the oil “belong to all the Arabs.”

These economic features, the Israel problem and the resentment of imperial tutelage will cause conditions which will make many Egyptians look to Russia. The problem is not necessarily one of internal Communism, but of the Soviet Union’s influence as a supporter of Egyptian causes. In this situation, the Soviet Union has a natural field of activity.

Everywhere in Egypt, even in the Army, there is now some concern over the extent of the commitment to the Soviet Union. This situation is also estranging other Arab powers. The hostility of the U.S., also, is causing anxiety regarding the wisdom of Nasser’s policy. Many people in Egypt, including the bulk of the trading classes, would prefer to go with the West. The forces of revolution are dominant, however, and demagogic leaders prevail. It would appear that almost any other Egyptian government would have to favor the same policy of subversive imperialism, even though many classes in Egypt may not want it.

If there is agreement that this is a reasonable analysis, the U.S. and the UK cannot hope to procure a radical change. They can hope for three things:

1. Greater expressiveness for the desire of the masses and the commercial elements for a more moderate policy.
2. Lower degree of fanaticism.
3. Less efficiency in carrying out the revolutionary policies.

It looks as if the West would have to accept an unsatisfactory settlement on the Canal. After this, there will undoubtedly be pressures to relax exchange controls. This will lead to further pressure in the United Kingdom and perhaps to negotiations on the resumption of commercial relations and diplomatic ties.

The West cannot expect Nasser to cut his Soviet ties. He may moderate his policies in the interests of practical concessions from the West. Some believe there is no prospect of a better Egyptian government. The UK believes this is a question of degree. It is probably hopeless to convert Egypt to an active ally, but it might at least become as neutral as India.

The UK believes that such an Egyptian government is attainable and within resources the UK and U.S. can command.

In summary: (1) Nasser is not the best Government of Egypt that can be obtained; (2) it may be in the UK's interest to resume commercial and diplomatic relations, at the same time continuing the policy of "cutting Nasser down to size;" (3) the U.S. and the UK should continue to withhold economic and financial aid and other marks of favor, while at the same time avoiding conspicuous evidence of hostility likely to increase Nasser's prestige; and (4) the UK would like the U.S. to consider a program of support which might be given another government and to discuss the psychological moment and means of making this program known in Egypt.

Following Mr. Watson's presentation, Mr. Mathews asked at what point such a program might be made known. [*3 lines of source text not declassified*]

Mr. Rountree added that he did not believe the point had yet been reached. Mr. Wilkins remarked that such a program was, in fact, in existence and that the Egyptians were well aware of the results of their past policies.

Mr. Watson said the British were not rigid in their approach to the problem and wanted the views of the United States. He emphasized that Britain believed another Egyptian Government or leader, however difficult and neutral, would be less symbolic and less effective than Nasser [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*].

Mr. Rountree said it was the present view of the United States that Nasser's efficiency could be reduced by minimizing the influence of Egypt in the area. He said he believed great progress had been made to this end. He said he believed there were signs the other Arab countries were becoming deeply concerned over Egyptian influence. The thing to do, he said, is to

reduce Egyptian influence and Egypt's power to make trouble. He said he believed this held more possibilities than effecting a governmental change. He said he saw no real alternatives to the present government in Egypt.

Mr. Watson said Britain did not wish to take a purely negative approach. He asked whether it was clear what the U.S. and the UK would do for an Egyptian government which behaved better. He said Britain was thinking along the lines of doing something for the Nile waters, the Canal, the wheat problem, resumption of U.S. aid, providing more to Egypt for the transit of oil. He said Britain wants Egypt to be richer.

Mr. Rountree said that the United States had also considered what it might do if the Egyptian Government changed its policies. He mentioned the possibility of unfreezing blocked funds, of permitting normal commercial shipments, resuming CARE, P.L. 480, technical assistance, development assistance and EximBank loans. [*1 paragraph (2 lines of source text) not declassified*] In answer to a question on Nasser's present mood, Mr. Rountree said that he seemed to be tense and preoccupied and motivated by an intense suspicion. He said he believed Nasser was not moving with the same sureness as before.

Iraq

Mr. Coulson summarized the British position on Iraq along these lines:

Iraq has the brightest prospect economically and has made considerable advances in the social and political field. It has remained firm and sensible in the midst of the recent uproar. How long this will last depends on Nuri. Many people think a change is due. This could take several forms. Nuri could form another government. Nuri could participate in someone else's government. Unless Nuri were a victim of a coup d'état, the UK saw little reason to presume the new government would not follow the same policy, but another government might not be so staunch in the pursuit of these policies. The UK believes the consequences of Nuri's going must be minimized by strengthening those who follow his policies through close support of the Baghdad Pact, supply of arms, and support in the political

field. The UK believes it very important for the U.S. and the UK to keep Iraq in touch with their views on political issues.

In reply, Mr. Rountree said that the United States agreed Nuri was an important asset, and the United States had given him firm support and would regret to see him leave. He said he believed there was no basic difference in the U.S. and UK estimates of the situation. He mentioned that the U.S. did talk over with the Iraqis matters of common concern and mentioned the Jordanian situation. He said the United States membership in the military committee of the Baghdad Pact will form a new platform for such cooperation. The United States, he said, had also agreed to a military assistance program for the current year of a considerable order of magnitude.

Mr. Mathews remarked that he hoped that, if Iraq were asked to assist in Jordan, they would be more forthcoming than they had been in the past. Mr. Coulson admitted that this had been a problem.

Syria

Mr. Coulson stated that the British regarded Syria as the center of Communist activity and as a threat to the rear of Iraq and Lebanon. He said Britain desired to see a more friendly Syrian government, not necessarily a member of the Baghdad Pact, but cooperating with the Baghdad Pact countries and the West. He said the greatest problem was that, if Iraqi influence increased in Syria it would disturb the Saudis. He said that the best way to meet this was to increase Saudi-Iraqi cooperation, and he knew this was being done. He said he hoped Saudi Arabia could be brought to recognize Iraq's special problems and position in the northern part of the Arab world. He said Britain did not intend to press for a resumption of diplomatic relations with Syria under the present government. He said Britain might favor economic assistance to another government, but doubted that Britain, itself, could do much.

Mr. Rountree said he had no comment on these remarks.

Jordan

It was agreed that the discussion of Jordan would be postponed until the joint assessment by the U.S.–UK Ambassadors in Amman had been received.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 880.2553/4–1857. Secret. Drafted by Newsom.

² In May 1956, the Ceylonese Government informed the British Government that it must eventually evacuate its military bases at Trincomalee and Negombol. Documentation on U.S. interest in this question is *Ibid.*, 741.56346E.

³ Reference is presumably to the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation among the United Kingdom, India, and Yemen of February 11, 1934.

223. Background Paper Prepared in the Department of State¹

Washington, April 19, 1957.

OIL PIPELINES IN MIDDLE EAST

Our assessment of the growth of Free World requirements for Middle East oil and of the limitations on tanker movements around the Cape indicates that not only must existing transit facilities (i.e., Trans-Arabian and IPC pipelines and the Suez Canal) be expanded, but new pipeline routes with new port outlets must be constructed.

During the past several months considerable interest has been manifested in various quarters (governmental and private) in the construction of the following new pipeline routes in the Middle East: (1) Trans-Turkey, (2) Trans-Israel, and (3) Trans-Isthmus of Suez.

Trans-Turkey Pipeline: We are greatly interested in the recently proposed pipeline system extending from the Persian Gulf through Iraq and Turkey to an outlet on the Mediterranean in Turkey, due to the interest of a number of US-owned petroleum companies operating in the Middle East and due to the fact that it will provide both a needed addition and an alternative to the transit routes across Syria and Egypt. We feel that if such a pipeline is constructed, means should be found to assure it of maximum protection, such as treaty guarantees.

Trans-Israel Pipeline: We hold the following views on this proposal of the Israel Government: (1) The feasibility of the pipeline raises a number of questions, the principal of which is the availability of an assured supply of oil. (2) Whereas US Government financing is not available, we have no objections to private US interests investing in this pipeline if after investigation they feel it is a good investment.

Trans-Isthmus of Suez Pipeline: Given the Egyptian Government's stand on matters relating to operation and management of the Suez Canal, it does not

seem prudent to us to add to the West's dependence on transit of the Isthmus of Suez by construction of oil pipelines paralleling the Canal. However, as in the case of the Trans-Israel pipeline, we have no objections to private US interests investing in this pipeline if after investigation they feel it is a good investment.

Discussion:

1.

Free World Demand for Middle East Petroleum

During the next ten years or so it appears unlikely that increased supplies of other forms of energy will be sufficient to make much impact on the demand for oil. In fact, projections of the Free World's demand for oil during the next decade show substantial increases. Unless very substantial new crude deposits are found to the west of Suez, the bulk of this additional oil will have to come from the Middle East where most of the world's proven reserves lie. Our assessment of the growth of Free World requirements for Middle East oil and of the limitations on tanker movements around the Cape indicates that not only must existing transit facilities (i.e., Trans-Arabian and IPC pipelines and the Suez Canal) be expanded, but new pipeline routes with new port outlets must be constructed.

By 1965 Free World requirements for petroleum products are anticipated to rise to about 23 million barrels per day, an increase of over 9 million barrels per day above 1955 consumption. It is expected that the Middle East will supply over 4 million barrels per day or almost one-half of this increase. Thus, by 1965 Middle East oil production is estimated at 7.5 million barrels per day, an increase of 130 percent over the 1955 level. Around 5.6 million barrels per day, or three-quarters of this production will be required to meet the demands of markets west of Suez. Existing Middle East transit facilities when fully operative are capable of handling around 40 percent of this projected westward movement. Moreover, present estimates indicate that the westward movement

of Middle East oil may well increase another 3 million barrels per day by the early 1970s.

2.

New Pipeline Routes

During the past several months considerable interest has been manifested in various quarters (governmental and private) in the construction of the following new pipeline routes in the Middle East: (a) Trans-Turkey, (b) Trans-Israel and (c) Trans-Isthmus of Suez.

(a)

Trans-Turkey Pipeline: Representatives of the major oil companies operating in the Middle East met in London in March and concluded that the growth and the demand for oil, particularly in Western Europe, made it essential that there be constructed a new Middle East pipeline system extending from the Persian Gulf through Iraq and Turkey to an outlet on the Mediterranean in Turkey. Their proposal envisages the construction of two trunk pipelines each of approximately 34" to 36" in diameter; the first line to be completed if possible by 1960 and the second by 1962. The combined capacity of the new lines would be approximately 1,200,000 barrels per day. The cost involved is estimated to be in excess of \$800 million. The companies have not yet reached any firm decision concerning the specifics of this pipeline system, but are actively giving study to technical, financial and legal considerations involved in a project of this magnitude. It is our understanding that these companies propose that this system be built and run by a separate new company, to which they would subscribe equity capital. Further discussions will be held by these companies in London around the middle of May.

We are greatly interested in this project due to the interest of a number of US-owned petroleum producing companies and due to the fact that it will provide both a needed addition and an alternative to the transit routes across Syria and Egypt. Also this pipeline system would be in position to tap the fields of three of the four major Middle East oil producing countries—i.e., Iraq, Iran and Kuwait as well as a new off-shore field in Saudi Arabia.

In addition to the above proposal, there has been considerable interest by a number of private companies, other than the major oil producers, in the construction of a Trans-Turkey pipeline which would tap the recently discovered Qum field in Iran. Our present thinking on this project includes the following considerations: impartiality toward the various US groups interested in the project and preference for private ownership and private financing of the project.

(b)

Trans-Israel Pipeline: Israel has expressed the desire to construct a 32” pipeline from the Port of Eilat to the Mediterranean capable of handling about 400,000 barrels per day. This pipeline would cost approximately \$70 million. Israel has urged that the USG should take a positive and favorable interest in this pipeline. The major elements of our position are as follows: (1) The feasibility of this pipeline raised a number of questions principal of which is the availability of an assured supply of oil. (2) Whereas US Government financing is not available, we have no objections to private US interests investing in this pipeline if after investigation they feel it is a good investment.

The French Government has reportedly been favorably considering assisting the Government of Israel in constructing a 16” Trans-Israel pipeline.

(c) *Trans-Isthmus of Suez Pipeline*: Certain private interests (not including the major oil producing companies in the Middle East) have discussed with the Egyptian Government proposals to parallel the Suez Canal with oil pipelines. Given the Egyptian Government's stand on matters relating to operation and management of the Suez Canal, it does not seem prudent to us to add to the West's dependence on transit of the Isthmus of Suez by construction of this nature. However, as in the case of the Trans-Israel pipeline, we have no objections to private US interests investing in this pipeline if after investigation they feel it is a good investment.

¹ Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 62 D 181, CF 871. Confidential. According to a note on the cover sheet, this paper was drafted by Bensusky and cleared by Rockwell and Beckner. It was one of a series of papers prepared for the Delegation to the North Atlantic Council Ministerial meeting at Bonn, May 2–4. In the records of the Delegation, the paper was designated NMB B–18/51.

224. Telegram From the President's Special Assistant (Richards) to the Department of State¹

Asmara, April 19, 1957.

63. Have reached point on mission where remaining visits and schedule should be firmed up. Not compatible with dignity of this mission to loiter doubtfully and undecidedly awaiting invitations from hesitating Syrian and Egyptian Governments. They should be so informed.

Mission leaving for Khartoum tomorrow and returning here April 22. Expect remain here until 25 or 26. Consider absolutely essential have decision re Egypt and Syria by April 25. Would like by that time fix dates all remaining visits but realize this may not be possible if Jordan situation still confused.

My present feeling is that visit Cairo unlikely produce any positive results in furtherance new Middle East policy, especially since Nasser obviously pre-occupied with Suez and Israeli issues outside scope my authority. Failure of mission in Egypt could be something anti-climax to success of mission thus far. Nevertheless, there is something to be said in favor of going there if definite clear invitation received in next few days. We should be in position say either that Nasser himself chose not to hear our story or that we told our story and gave him same opportunity as other Middle East states to understand and accept doctrine. Otherwise we might give anti-West elements in all Arab states excuse to say we deliberately bypassed Egypt in order split Arab world. This might be especially embarrassing to King Saud.

I reiterate my previous request for specific up to date guidance as to how we should proceed with discussions from policy standpoint, if we do visit Egypt. It would not be my intention to commit funds unless there is extraordinary change for better in situation.

I gather there is general agreement between Embassy Damascus, Department and this mission that visit to Syria is undesirable on basis

present attitude Syrian Government. In absence new developments I plan eliminate Damascus from schedule.

If King Hussein can maintain his position and new cabinet shows sympathetic attitude, it seems to me very important that mission should visit Jordan and that we should be prepared commit fairly substantial funds. On reasonable assumption that new government favorable to West in Jordan would cause Egypt and Syria renege on promised military assistance, Washington guidance on categories, general magnitude of aid that may be considered will be helpful; namely, budget support, straight economic aid and military aid.

Hope for early answers all foregoing points.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 120.1580/4–1957. Confidential; Niact. Repeated Priority to Amman and to Cairo, Baghdad, Jidda, and Damascus.

225. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree) to the Secretary of State¹

Washington, April 22, 1957.

SUBJECT

Richards Mission—Yemen, April 11–14²

The negotiations of Ambassador Richards in Yemen came to an abrupt end the night of April 14 in a dramatic interview with the Imam, who asked that our proposals be considered as never having been made. Previous discussions with officials had resulted in an offer of \$2,050,000 for road construction after the Yemenis had presented a long list of projects without supporting data. The Imam regarded this offer of only one percent of \$200,000,000 as harmful to his prestige and likely to shame him before his people if released to the press.

After some further discussion with officials Ambassador Richards decided to make no aid commitment and to attempt no joint communiqué. He issued a brief press statement to this effect, but mentioned the possibility of further discussions at an appropriate time.

Discussions with the Crown Prince brought out Yemeni opposition to British “aggression,” opposition to communism, and a complaint that the American-owned Yemen Development Company had done nothing productive. The discussion of projects with officials went well enough except for their disappointment over the small American offer. Ambassador Richards promised to report their needs to Washington and to recommend the establishment of a technical assistance mission. Ambassador Wadsworth also informed the Imam that he would return to discuss the Yemeni projects further.

In his report Ambassador Richards observes: “Playing in tougher league now—batting average hit slump.”

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 120.1580/5–1057. Secret. Drafted by Bliss. Also addressed to the Under Secretary of State.

² For text of the joint communiqué issued on April 15 in San'a, see Department of State *Bulletin*, May 6, 1957, p. 763.

226. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree) to the Secretary of State¹

Washington, April 23, 1957.

SUBJECT

Richards Mission—Ethiopia, April 15–18²

Both the Emperor and the Foreign Minister presented Ambassador Richards with a long list of complaints similar to those passed to Vice President Nixon on March 12.³ In general they seemed to feel that they are not getting sufficient United States support despite Ethiopia's traditional pro-American stand, as a result of which they are threatened with a loss of territory to Greater Somalia, are attacked in hostile radio broadcasts from Egypt, and their policies are opposed by Egypt and Syria in the Afro-Asian group. They also mentioned our failure to consult Ethiopia on the Aswan Dam.

Nevertheless the Foreign Minister assured Ambassador Richards of continued close political collaboration with the United States, despite the risks of granting us base rights without a commitment to defend Ethiopia. Ethiopia is willing to grant additional facilities but the need for aid should be recognized, as a basis of "equilibrium" with Saudi Arabia.

Commitments

The aide-mémoire delivered by Ambassador Richards provides for the following grant assistance:

1. Radio broadcasting station, 300 kilowatt, and training of \$1,000,000 personnel
2. Two small Bell helicopters, possibly modified to one 10- 212,000 passenger helicopter and spares
3. Civil police equipment 200,000
4. Civil police training to be recommended by consultant,

estimated cost under \$200,000, to be obligated FY 1958

5. Additional military equipment, including light tanks, 3,000,000 vehicles, weapons

\$4,412,000

The Ethiopians were moderately pleased by these proposals, but Ambassador Richards concluded that the United States must be more responsive to Ethiopian requests in order to count on their support on major East-West issues.

Communiqué

The communiqué stressed Ethiopian support of the American Doctrine, referred to “common interest in resisting the threat of international communism,” and expressed opposition to aggression from any source.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 120.1580/5–1057. Secret. Drafted by Bliss. Also addressed to the Under Secretary of State.

² For documentation on the Richards Mission visit to Ethiopia, see [vol. XVIII, pp. 350–357](#). For text of the joint communiqué issued on April 18 in Addis Ababa, see Department of State *Bulletin*, May 6, 1957, pp. 763–764.

³ Vice President Nixon visited Ethiopia March 11–13, as part of his visit to Africa. See [vol. XVIII, pp. 339–349](#).

227. Telegram From the Department of State to the President's Special Assistant (Richards), at Asmara¹

Washington, April 23, 1957—10:11 a.m.

65. For Richards from the Secretary. We have given careful thought to your future itinerary in light extremely complex considerations regarding Egypt, Jordan and Syria. For differing reasons, we have concluded that visit to none of these countries should take place in immediate future. Nor do we wish now to indicate that visits will not take place.

While Government of Egypt has expressed general desire have you come to Cairo, specific written invitation not extended and Egyptian Government has in fact suggested that visit not take place until after May 4. While King Hussein of Jordan no doubt anxious to receive your Mission, there nevertheless are important political reasons why visit at this time would be judged by him and by us to be unwise. On one hand he is badly in need of assurances regarding US assistance and support, but on other hand your presence in Jordan at this juncture might serve as rallying point of opposition elements inside and outside Jordan [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*]. Previous communications have established agreement between us that situation in Syria not conducive to successful visit in present circumstances.

In view possibility and indeed likelihood that visit to one or more these Arab States will later prove feasible, it would seem highly desirable that visit to Israel be postponed until decision regarding Arab States finalized. We hope that such visit can take place after visit to any neighboring Arab States to be included in itinerary.

We have thus considered what arrangements might make it feasible for you to proceed with visits to other capitals, allowing several weeks for situation in questionable countries to clarify. It occurs to us that most feasible plan would be to find justification for leaving area temporarily after which visits

would be resumed, starting with Morocco and Tunisia, to be followed by Greece and Israel. Egypt, Jordan and even Syria could be added before Israel, depending upon later developments.

I plan attend NATO Council meeting in Bonn arriving May 2nd through 4th. Although extremely heavy schedule will in fact permit relatively little time for discussions, rearrangement of your itinerary might publicly be based upon decision on your part and mine that we should take opportunity afforded by my presence in Europe to consult. You and your colleagues might come to Bonn as convenient after May 1. Suggest your flight route be arranged so as to avoid transit through countries which you might later visit, e.g. Egypt.

I am deeply conscious of added burden which this will impose upon you. I would be reluctant to suggest it except for the extremely complicated situation which has developed in the area since your departure from Washington and because of the importance of moving at the right time. I will be grateful for your reactions.

With kindest personal regards, Foster.

Dulles

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 120.1580/4-2357. Secret. Drafted by Rountree and approved by Secretary Dulles.

228. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree) to the Secretary of State¹

Washington, April 27, 1957.

SUBJECT

Richards Mission—Sudan, April 20–22²

In preparation for the Richards Mission visit the Sudan Council of Ministers met to discuss our Middle East proposals on April 17, when differences developed between the principal partners of the coalition. The Prime Minister and others advocated acceptance while three pro-Egyptian Ministers argued that this would weaken the neutrality policy of the Sudan.

Ambassador Richards on his arrival in Khartoum found the political atmosphere uncertain, with Nasser agents active and making a special effort to forestall approval of the American Doctrine. His discussions with a group headed by the Foreign Minister brought a series of questions, which he answered, a statement of the Cabinet's understanding of his answers, and a final declaration that the Council of Ministers "prefer at the present time to refrain from taking any resolution accepting or rejecting such aid; it will continue its study of the matter and let its decision be known in due course." In the ensuing discussions the Sudanese assumed that if they reached a decision in a few weeks they could still request aid, but Richards explained that it was most unlikely he could take action after leaving Khartoum.

Ambassador Richards was disappointed but felt that there was nothing further to be done, since it would be unwise to appear to force aid on the Sudanese. He concludes that the country is in relatively good economic condition and is fearful of antagonizing Egypt and other Arab states. The Prime Minister and others friendly to the United States are not prepared for a showdown with the pro-Egyptian minority in the coalition and the

Embassy agrees that this would be unwise. Nevertheless Ambassador Richards feels that the Sudan is definitely worth wooing.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 120.1580/5–1057. Secret. Drafted by Bliss. Also addressed to the Under Secretary of State.

² Regarding the Richards Mission visit to the Sudan, see [vol. XVIII, pp. 639–643](#). For text of the joint communiqué issued on April 22 in Khartoum, see Department of State *Bulletin*, May 13, 1957, p. 764.

229. Telegram From the Department of State to the President's Special Assistant (Richards), at Athens¹

Washington, April 30, 1957—9:22 p.m.

3901. For Richards from Secretary. Dear Dick: The President and I have been giving further thought to the future arrangements for your Mission in the light of the most recent developments in the Arab-Israel area. The conclusion which we have reached involves further change in plans which we believe the present situation necessitates.

Events in Jordan moved with such speed that we found it necessary to give King Hussein speedy financial aid without prior discussions between you and the Government of Jordan. Hussein has gratefully accepted this assistance, despite the fact that his present difficulties appear to make it impossible for him to be as forthcoming publicly as we might otherwise expect. Moreover, we can understand why under present circumstances he feels it best that your Mission not visit Jordan. We feel also that you should not in the near future visit Egypt and Syria, even after you are finished with Morocco and Tunisia. On the other hand, we wish to avoid any impression of disinterest in Israel, although a visit there and not to Jordan does present some disadvantages.

As you know, it was our original thought that your visit to Bonn with subsequent stops in Morocco and Tunisia would provide some time to review the situation before you were required to proceed to Israel and perhaps to other states in that vicinity. We now believe it would be best for you to proceed from Athens directly to Israel for a very brief (one day) visit, thence Morocco and Tunisia, and then to Washington.

This further change would be explained by public statement to the effect that despite earlier plans for us to meet in Bonn, the President was particularly anxious to have your counsel in connection with current preparations for the new Mutual Security bill to be discussed with Congressional leaders on May 9, [and] the President had asked you to curtail your present tour and return to Washington as soon as possible. In

the same statement it would be said that it was envisaged that those countries which you had been unable to visit and which were interested in discussing the program would be able to exchange views with this Government through regular diplomatic channels.

The rapidly moving and favorable developments which have brought about this alteration in plans are in no small measure due to the success of your efforts. We think it wise that you and your colleagues remain in Athens until the announcement is made and arrangements made with Israel, Tunisia and Morocco.

I am departing immediately for Bonn. I would appreciate your telegraphing your comments to Chris Herter.

With kind regards, Foster.

Dulles

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 120.1580/4-3057. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Bergus and Rountree and approved by Herter who signed for Dulles.

230. Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation Between the President's Special Assistant (Richards) in Athens and the Acting Secretary of State in Washington, May 1, 1957, 10:10 a.m.¹

Washington, May 1, 1957, 10:10 a.m.

Ambassador Richards telephoned me this morning from Athens regarding the question of his going to Israel. I told him that there was very strong feeling on the Hill that he should go and that if he came back here without visiting Israel it might jeopardize our entire Mutual Security Program before Congress. Ambassador Richards said he realized the kind of pressures we had from Congress but still felt strongly that, since he will not be going to Syria, Egypt or Jordan, he should not go to Israel; that if he went it would be over his protest; and that he felt it would do more harm among the Arab countries than the good it would do on the Hill. He said he would be willing personally to go to the Congress and explain why he did not go.

I told Ambassador Richards that we were up against a choice between two evils but that we had tried to weigh all the considerations and thought he should make a quick trip there. I told him that I had been present yesterday afternoon when the Secretary discussed this with the President just before the Secretary left for Bonn,² and it had been decided then that Ambassador Richards should go. I told him, however, that in view of his feelings, I would talk with the President again telling him that Ambassador Richards was doing this under protest, and then telephone Ambassador Richards again later in the morning.

Ambassador Richards said he would appreciate this being checked with the President once again, and said that if he was ordered to go to Israel he would, of course, go but he wanted to make it a matter of record that he was doing so under protest.

At the end of the conversation, it was agreed that Ambassador Richards should be back in Washington on May 8th.

¹ Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 57 D 616. Confidential. Prepared in the Office of the Secretary of State.

² On April 30 at 12:48 p.m., Secretary Dulles spoke with President Eisenhower, who was then in Augusta, Georgia, about the Richards Mission. The memorandum of the telephone conversation is in the Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, White House Memoranda of Telephone Conversations.

³ Printed from a copy that bears this stamped signature.

231. Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation Between the President's Special Assistant (Richards) in Athens and the Acting Secretary of State in Washington, May 1, 1957, 10:55 a.m.¹

Washington, May 1, 1957, 10:55 a.m.

I telephoned Ambassador Richards in Athens to tell him I had discussed the matter of his going to Israel with the President² again and that the President still felt that Ambassador Richards should go. The President felt that since a formal invitation had been extended by Israel and arrangement made for the visit, and since he would be making only a one-day courtesy call, it would be more helpful than harmful for him to go. It was agreed that Ambassador Richards would get in immediate contact with Tel Aviv and make the necessary arrangements for the visit. It was also agreed that appropriate notification would be sent by the Department to the Arab countries and that, in any event, no public notice of the visit would go out for the next twenty-four hours.

At the end of our conversation, I told Ambassador Richards how much we all appreciated the superb job he has been doing under extremely difficult conditions.

Christian A. Herter³

¹ Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 57 D 616. Confidential. Prepared in the Office of the Secretary of State.

² No memorandum of this conversation has been found.

³ Printed from a copy that bears this stamped signature.

232. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions¹

Washington, May 1, 1957—10:06 p.m.

877. Joint State–USIA Message. FYI—Department expected announce May 2 Ambassador Richards will conclude current ME tour by visits Israel, Tunisia, Morocco. Announcement will indicate President's desire confer Richards on preparations new Mutual Security Program in anticipation discussion with Congressional leaders May 9. Richards visit to Bonn confer with Secretary during NAC Meeting canceled because of time pressure. Arrangements for discussions with other ME states not visited by Richards Mission (Egypt, Syria, Jordan) re Doctrine will be made through normal diplomatic channels where firm interest in such discussion is expressed. End FYI.

USIA output should stick strictly to terms of official announcement when it is released. Additional points to be made are: 1) Richards Mission has completed visits to all ME countries originally included in scope of Doctrine which indicated firm interest in receiving him to discuss Doctrine. 2) If desirable in light questions arising from local reaction to US assistance to Jordan outside Doctrine, say this aid provided in response urgent request King Hussein to assist him maintaining independence and integrity Jordan and action within spirit of Doctrine. 3) Major results Richards Mission have been to give substance to US desire, as expressed in Doctrine, to assist in strengthening and maintaining integrity of those states in ME seeking cooperation in maintaining their independence against international communism.

Herter

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 120.1580/5–157. Confidential. Sent to Addis Ababa, Amman, Ankara, Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Jidda, Kabul, Karachi, Khartoum, Tehran, and Tripoli.

233. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree) to the Secretary of State¹

Washington, May 8, 1957.

SUBJECT

Richards Mission—Greece, April 28–May 2²

Discussion

In spite of the short notice (the Greek Government was notified on April 26 that Ambassador Richards intended to be in Greece on April 28 on his way to Bonn), arrangements were made and the Mission was well received by the Greek Government. The Mission consulted with Prime Minister Karamanlis and other Government officials. It was evident that the Prime Minister's prime concern was in obtaining greater recognition of the role he considered Greece could play in the Middle East and in getting United States moral and economic support for this role. The Prime Minister stated that he thought the United States underestimated Greek potentialities in this respect, and having invested large amounts of money and much effort to make Greece strong, the United States had failed to utilize the results of this investment. He indicated particularly that Greece's long history of trade with the Middle East, the numerous Greek colonies in Arab states, the influence of the Greek Orthodox Church, the association of Greek and Middle East military in a spirit of confidence, the lack of Arab fear of Greece because of the latter's lack of imperialist ambitions, and the fact that Greece could serve as a show window of the results of American friendship and aid were all factors which emphasized the potential of Greece in playing an important role in the Middle East.

The Greek Government further was quite critical of United States policy in its emphasis on Turkish influence and in promoting the Baghdad Pact. They insisted the Pact is a bad influence and expressed the hope that the American Doctrine would eventually take the place of the Pact.

The Government heartily endorsed the American Doctrine and, as indicated below, was quite willing to emphasize the importance of United States aid and of cooperation with us.

Commitments

During the discussions Ambassador Richards indicated that no material aid for Greece was contemplated in connection with his Mission and the Greek Government made no request for such assistance. Therefore, no commitments were made.

Communiqué

A joint communiqué, issued on May 2, stressed the danger of international communism and the necessity for cooperation in the free world. It also pointed out the necessity for improving the economies of the weaker nations and the fact that Greece, with her ten years of experience with American aid and cooperation, demonstrates the desirability of such assistance in preserving the national independence of the countries of the Middle East.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 120.1580/5–1057. Secret. Drafted by Latham. Also addressed to the Under Secretary of State.

² Regarding the Richards Mission visit to Greece, see [vol. XXIV, pp. 581–582](#). For text of the joint communiqué issued on May 2 in Athens, see Department of State *Bulletin*, May 27, 1957, pp. 844–845.

234. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree) to the Acting Secretary of State¹

Washington, May 8, 1957.

SUBJECT

Richards Mission—Israel, May 3²

Discussion

The Mission spent but one day in Israel motoring from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem on the morning of May 3 and departing that evening for Tripoli. Ambassador Richards met with Prime Minister Ben Gurion and subsequently with Golda Meir, Foreign Minister, and Mr. David Eshkol, Minister of Finance. The Ambassador reports that the meetings were marked by cordiality and understanding. In view of the very short notice of the Mission's visit and the proximity of the Israel Independence Day celebrations, it was impossible to have Cabinet consideration prior to the departure of the Mission. It is therefore expected that the Israel Cabinet will meet this week to consider a public statement of Israel's position with reference to the Doctrine.

Government officials appeared interested largely in whether the Doctrine could be interpreted to cover an attack by an Arab state "influenced" by international communism. The Mission pointed out the wording of the Joint Resolution and the fact that the President would make a determination in any actual situation. The Government was also worried about the effect of a strong public endorsement of the Doctrine on the position of Jews behind the Iron Curtain.

Commitment

No commitment for aid was made by the Mission.

Communiqué

In view of the difficulties of Cabinet consideration, no joint communiqué was issued.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 120.1580/5–1057. Secret. Drafted by Wade Latham.

² Regarding the Richards Mission visit to Israel, see [vol. XVII, pp. 597 – 601](#).

235. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree) to the Acting Secretary of State¹

Washington, May 8, 1957.

SUBJECT

Richards Mission—Libya, May 4²

Discussion

It will be recalled that the Richards Mission first visited Libya March 17–20 as a result of which commitments in the amount of \$4.52 million were made. However, the Libyan Government was disappointed with this magnitude and Ambassador Richards agreed to later reconsideration. As a result, the initial joint communiqué was vague as to the exact commitments made. Arrangements were completed and project agreements were signed on the initial commitments.

On May 4 the Mission again visited Libya during the course of which Ambassador Richards made additional commitments in the amount of \$2.5 million for economic activities. He had previously indicated to the Department that he felt very strongly the necessity for providing an additional increment in the magnitude of \$2.5 million.

The Mission's return visit was extremely well received. He met with Prime Minister Ben Halim and members of the Cabinet. The Government of Libya seemed particularly impressed at the implementation of Ambassador Richards' previous promise to review availabilities, and the Ambassador states that he believes this concrete demonstration of United States support for a Government which is courageously standing up in support of the West at a difficult time will not be lost on other Arab states. As far as Libya is

concerned, it represents tangible proof of the value of cooperating with the United States.

Commitments

The result of the second visit was to increase the total commitment to \$7.02 million all on a grant basis except for the amount allocated to the Tripoli power plant. The aide-mémoire did not distinguish between the first and second visit. The total commitments therefore are:

1. General survey of Libyan development needs	\$.3 million
2. Development of broadcasting facilities	2.5 million ²
3. Assistance in educational system	1.5 million ²
4. Survey of Libyan police force and provision of equipment (\$20,000 committed in first visit)	.37 million
5. Low cost radio receivers	.15 million
6. Domestic water supply	.2 million ²
7. Telecommunications	1.0 million
8. Additional financing Tripoli power plant	1.0 million
9. A study of military requirements by a MAAG after a military assistance agreement is signed ³	

Communiqué

A joint communiqué was issued on May 4 stating that in the first visit of the Mission it was announced that Libya and the United States would work together for the successful application of the proposals in recognition of the dangers of international communism and that as a result of the second visit studies have been completed of assistance which would contribute to Libya's needs. The communiqué further stated that the United States

Government will undertake necessary steps to provide assistance in the fields of development, broadcasting, education, electric power development, telecommunications, and domestic water supply.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 120.1580/5–1057. Secret. Drafted by Lathram.

² For text of the joint communiqué issued at Tripoli on May 4, see Department of State *Bulletin*, May 27, 1957, p. 845.

² For text of the joint communiqué issued at Tripoli on May 4, see Department of State *Bulletin*, May 27, 1957, p. 845.

² For text of the joint communiqué issued at Tripoli on May 4, see Department of State *Bulletin*, May 27, 1957, p. 845.

² For text of the joint communiqué issued at Tripoli on May 4, see Department of State *Bulletin*, May 27, 1957, p. 845.

³ Represents commitments made in first visit. [Footnote in the source text.]

236. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree) to the Secretary of State¹

Washington, May 9, 1957.

SUBJECT

Richards Mission—Tunisia, May 4–5²

Discussion

Ambassador Richards reported that during his visit of May 4 and 5 no difficulties were encountered with the Tunisian Government over the reendorsement of President Eisenhower's proposals for the Middle East, Prime Minister Bourguiba having previously publicly endorsed the American Doctrine. Ambassador Richards offered \$3 million in economic assistance on a grant basis and this was welcomed by the Prime Minister as symbolic of United States friendship and support. The Government of Tunisia was disappointed with this magnitude indicating they had drawn up a list of projects on which assistance was needed totaling \$57 million. The question of United States military assistance was not specifically discussed although there was discussion of the utilization of a portion of the funds being offered for vehicles and communications equipment for internal security forces.

The Prime Minister spent a major portion of the discussion time on the subject of "colonialism" in general and his position on Algeria specifically. Prior to the Mission's arrival the Prime Minister called in the French Ambassador to inform him of the visit and to discuss Tunisian interest in the Mission. We had previously advised the French of the probability of a small economic aid commitment, but had indicated that we were opposed to providing military equipment.

Commitments

At the time of Ambassador Richards' departure there was acceptance in principle of the \$3 million aid offer, but since agreement had not been reached on utilization of funds, no specific commitment and no aide-mémoire was presented. These matters will be subject to further negotiation between the Tunisian Government and our Embassy.

Communiqué

A joint communiqué was issued by the Tunisian Government on May 7 stating that after cordial talks with Ambassador Richards the Prime Minister reiterated his previous endorsement of President Eisenhower's proposals for the Middle East and was pleased to have had discussions with Ambassador Richards regarding them and the need to meet the menace of international communism. No reference was made to economic aid in view of the Prime Minister's desire to avoid linking aid to Tunisian support for the Doctrine.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 120.1580/5-1057. Secret. Drafted by Latham. Also addressed to the Under Secretary of State.

² Regarding the Richards Mission visit to Tunisia, see [vol. XVIII, pp. 664–671](#). For text of the joint communiqué issued on May 6 in Tunis, see Department of State *Bulletin*, May 27, 1957, p. 845.

237. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree) to the Secretary of State¹

Washington, May 10, 1957.

SUBJECT

Richards Mission—Morocco, May 6–7²

Discussions

The Mission discussed the Doctrine with the Sultan, Foreign Minister Balafrej, and other Government officials. Throughout the discussions it was apparent that the base negotiations, which began while the Mission was there, were the primary and virtually sole consideration of the Government. It was also evident that the Moroccans intend to take no action which might weaken their bargaining position. The Sultan is well aware of the military importance of our installations and their relation to the military assurances of the Doctrine.

The discussions were most cordial and friendly but the Sultan was unwilling to take any public position further committing Morocco to cooperate with the United States pending the results of the base discussions. However, he asked Ambassador Richards to tell the President of his support for the principles and moral spirit of the Middle East proposals, his recognition of the threat of international communism, and his determination to wipe out communism in Morocco.

Brief economic discussions were held with second level officials, with the Moroccans displaying lack of enthusiasm to discuss possible projects. It became clear they had instructions from the highest level to avoid any discussion of economic aid in the context of the Mission.

The conclusion of the Mission was that the Moroccans feel they have a strong position from which to negotiate on base rights and we may anticipate a heavy asking price.

Commitments

No request was received for aid and no commitments were made even though in the talks with various officials the possibility of up to \$5 million in aid was mentioned by the Mission. However, these discussions were not serious.

Communiqué

A joint communiqué was issued on May 7 stating that Ambassador Richards was welcomed with great regard, and presenting a detailed exposé of the President's Middle East proposals. It further stated that this explanation was given the greatest attention in a spirit of mutual understanding, and that the position of Morocco remains as it was at the time of the visit of Vice President Nixon. There was no specific endorsement of the Middle East Doctrine.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 120.1580/5–1057. Secret. Drafted by Latham. Also addressed to the Under Secretary of State.

² Regarding the Richards Mission visit to Morocco, see [vol. XVIII, pp. 574–577](#). For text of the joint communiqué issued on May 8 in Rabat, see Department of State *Bulletin*, May 27, 1957, p. 845.

**238. Memorandum of a Meeting With the Secretary of State,
Department of State, Washington, May 13, 1957, 11 a.m.¹**

Washington, May 13, 1957, 11 a.m.

PRESENT

Ambassador Richards

The Under Secretary

G—Mr. Murphy

O—Mr. Henderson

NEA—Mr. Rountree

NEA—Mr. Wilkins

S/P—Mr. Bowie

S/S—Mr. Howe

CIA—Mr. Allen Dulles

CIA—Mr. Kermit Roosevelt

The Secretary sought to discuss various aspects of our Middle East policy, particularly to get Ambassador Richards' views before he left town. The Secretary said that he thought we were at an intermediate stage with the completion of the Richards Mission on the American Doctrine and that we must prepare ourselves for increased responsibilities in the area.

At the Secretary's request Mr. Rountree led the discussion touching on the various countries:

1.

Morocco—

The Moroccans are definitely favorable to the American Doctrine but are more interested in U.S. bases negotiations which started on Saturday. The Moroccans are definitely seeking increased aid and Defense is not willing at all to pay all that the Moroccans want. There is presently scheduled \$40 million in defense support. Mr. Rountree pointed out the difficulty in estimating the actual need of the Moroccans since our assistance would be supplementary to the French, the size of which we do not know. Continued French assistance can be expected because of the close economic ties and dependence between them.

2.

Tunisia—

Bourghiba has given the fullest support to our policies. However, Bourghiba in a speech recently indicated clearly that he wishes to have military assistance as a significant part of the \$3 million we had offered in economic aid and this, as Bourghiba knows, will, as a matter of principle, cause difficulty with the French; he is raising it as a test to show his independence of the French.

3.

Libya—

There are no current policy problems although the UK is presently cutting its military establishment and support which comes to \$12.5 million. Our bill may come to as much as \$30 million.

4.

Sudan—

The growing rapprochement with Ethiopia was noted as a good sign. The elections are coming up and the Egyptians are seeking to interfere.

5.

Yemen—

Soviet penetration was noted and Saud's awareness and unhappiness with this. The Imam is playing into the hands of the Russian technicians and Russian policy [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*]. The need for a U.S. Mission there was emphasized even though there is no present budget plan for a Mission.

The question of Suez Canal arrangements by the British came up and the lack of information on what the British were planning to do or whether they had come to any real agreement at Basel. The Secretary said that Caccia or Coulson should be called in to give us information on British plans.

Mr. Rountree discussed a troublesome development with respect to the Baghdad Pact, namely, that Admiral Boone is planning to visit a number of Middle Eastern countries following the Baghdad Pact [meeting] to discuss the implementation of the American Doctrine including, according to his stated reasons, the estimated costs and the possibility of stationing U.S. troops and further U.S. bases. It was noted that Mr. Murphy was meeting on this subject later. It was agreed that such a trip would be most inadvisable and Mr. Bowie pointed out that the NSC had asked the JCS for its views on the defense arrangements for the Middle East and he thought that any military trip such as was contemplated would be completely out of order before the JCS report to the Council which the Military seems to be reluctant to submit. Also on the Baghdad Pact it was noted that General Twining would be present as the U.S. representative on the military committee and Mr. Rountree indicated that we had asked the Military for their position papers to make sure that this was fully in line with our political policies for the meeting.

The Secretary thought that a separate meeting should perhaps be held for discussion of Egypt.²

The Secretary asked to have the present group reconvene to complete the round-up of Middle Eastern countries, including at least Saudi Arabia, Syria, Lebanon and Iraq.³

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.80/5–1357. Secret. Drafted by Fisher Howe.

² No record of such a meeting has been found.

³ Those present at the May 13 meeting continued their discussion on May 14; see *infra*. A third meeting on the Middle East, which Ambassador Richards did not attend, was held in the Secretary's office on May 21. The memorandum of this conversation briefly indicated that a memorandum submitted by Allen Dulles was discussed. (Department of State, Central Files, 790.00/5–2157)

**239. Memorandum of a Meeting With the Secretary of State,
Department of State, Washington, May 14, 1957, 3 p.m.¹**

Washington, May 14, 1957, 3 p.m.

PRESENT

Ambassador Richards

The Under Secretary

O—Mr. Henderson

NEA—Mr. Rountree

NEA—Mr. Wilkins

S/P—Mr. Bowie

C—Mr. Reinhardt

S/S—Mr. Howe

CIA—Mr. Allen Dulles

CIA—Mr. Kermit Roosevelt

This was a continuation of the meeting of yesterday in which seriatim the various countries of the Middle East were taken up.

1.

Israel—

Mr. Rountree indicated that the Richards Mission had covered Israel with a minimum of public flurry. Subsequently, however, Eban had suggested a joint communiqué even though from the outset we had sought a unilateral communiqué by the Israeli. He noted that the Israeli draft² mentioned nothing of the American Doctrine. More recently Eban has on instructions revised and improved the communiqué but still wants it to be joint. This is still a troublesome problem.

The Israeli have not mentioned the Suez or their intent to send a ship through as now mentioned in the news tickers. Indeed the Israeli had agreed previously to consult with us before taking any such action. The Secretary read his ticklish press conference statements on this subject.³

Action: The Secretary asked that we arrange for the text of his press conference statements on the the problem of an Israeli ship in the Suez to be transmitted to all our Embassies where it might be useful and to establish procedures whereby this is carried out with respect to all items in his press conferences.

2.

Lebanon—

Mr. Rountree reported that the Richards Mission has been satisfactory and that the medical assistance we had rendered was also successful. It was noted that the elections come up at the end of May and June and will represent the proof of our success in this area. It was noted also that the President of Lebanon may join the meeting of the Kings in Baghdad.⁴

3.

Syria—

Although Syria was not generally discussed Mr. Allen Dulles made the suggestion that we might seek to get President Chamoun of Lebanon to be the Envoy to influence Kuwatly who is in the “swing position” and might be won over to bring his influence to bear on the Army and cause a swing-away from the Left. Although some doubt was expressed that this would be effective it was agreed that there was no objection and Mr. Allen Dulles will prepare a project for discussion with Mr. Rountree.

4.

*Saudi Arabia and Iraq—*It was noted that the rapprochement between King Saud and Iraq was a most favorable development largely attributable to the Saud visit to the US⁵ and to the Richards Mission. The Secretary indicated that it was important that something come out of it and that we don't allow a tendency to fall back.

There was a brief discussion of whether the meeting of the Kings tended to weaken the Pact which was doubted. It was thought that Iraq would not develop a tendency to get out of the Pact mainly because such a policy would undermine Nuri. The Secretary as an aside mentioned that he doubted the value of Iraq in the Pact. At the same time it was noted that although King Saud has become more tolerant of the Pact where before he has resented the effect it had on splitting the Arabs, there is no chance that he would himself wish to join.

The Secretary wanted to be sure that we were doing all we could to respond to King Saud's expressed desires for closer relations with the U.S. Mr. Rountree reported that we had sent an American interpreter but that the Embassy Arab interpreter established even closer relations with the King.

There was brief mention of the present effort to improve the radio facilities in the area notably in Jordan. Mr. Allen Dulles also noted that the anti-Communist theme in the area was making good progress.

The balance of the discussion related to the Baghdad Pact in which Mr. Rountree noted that it would be a very important meeting in which the following three issues predominated:

1. U.S. membership in military committee.
2. Implementation of the aid commitments through the Pact.
3. Increased U.K. aid measures recently made known to the Department.

The Secretary emphasized the need to use care in the language describing our association with the Baghdad Pact to assure that it conforms to the spirit of the Middle East Resolution.

It was agreed that the position taken by the U.S. Military representatives in the Military Committee was of paramount importance. Messrs. Murphy and Henderson were meeting with General Twining this afternoon and would seek to find out what the positions were that were to be taken. If they experience any difficulty the Secretary felt that he probably should discuss the matter promptly with the President and seek through appropriate meetings to resolve issues wherein the planned military effort might not be consonant with our overall political policies. Meanwhile, however, Mr. Bowie would alert General Cutler to the problem and point out that we still wished to push for JCS submission to NSC of its paper on strategy for defending the area⁶ and to push for an early NSC discussion of it.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 790.00/5–1457. Secret. Drafted by Fisher Howe.

² Not found.

³ For the transcript of Secretary Dulles' press conference of May 14, see Department of State *Bulletin*, June 3, 1957, pp. 894–901.

On May 21, the U.S. and Israeli Governments issued separate statements concerning Ambassador Richards' mission to Israel. The texts are printed *Ibid.*, June 17, 1957, pp. 968–969.

⁴ King Saud and King Faisal met in Baghdad May 11–18.

⁵ King Saud visited the United States January 30–February 8, 1957. For documentation, see [vol. XIII, pp. 413 ff.](#)

⁶ Reference is presumably to the Joint Chiefs of Staff paper "Military Implications of Joint Resolution 117 on the Middle East" transmitted to the National Security Council under a memorandum from Secretary of Defense Wilson on June 26; neither was declassified. (Department of State, OCB Files: Lot 61 D 385)

240. Editorial Note

Between April 15 and May 10, representatives of the British Embassy and the Department of State met in Washington to discuss and refine the memorandum, "U.S. Views on Middle East Problems Bearing Upon the Supply of Oil to the Free World," prepared by an interdepartmental working group and submitted to British representatives on April 15. As a result of these discussions, an agreed U.S.-U.K. paper, "Review of Middle East Problems Bearing Upon the Supply of Oil to the Free World," dated May 10, was prepared. On May 14, Rountree forwarded a copy of this paper to Secretary Dulles under cover of a memorandum indicating that the United States was ready to undertake the final stage of the consultation process, which would consist of higher level discussions between British and United States officials in London. Dulles approved Rountree's recommendations that planning proceed for this meeting.

The U.S. memorandum is attached to [Document 219](#). Documentation concerning U.S.-U.K. discussions of the memorandum is in Department of State, Central File 880.2553. The agreed paper of May 10 is printed in [volume X, page 682](#).

241. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Murphy)¹

Washington, May 14, 1957.

SUBJECT

Suggested talking points for today's meeting with General Twining on ME defense plan

We understand that General Twining will wish to discuss certain points relating to: I) the Baghdad Pact meeting,² as well as the proposal for, II) a high level military survey to be made in several Middle Eastern countries.

I. Baghdad Pact:

1. We are very pleased that General Twining is representing the United States at the Military Committee meeting. His presence will demonstrate the great interest of the United States in the Baghdad Pact. We are aware that the presence of such a prominent military figure will probably cause some nervousness on the part of the Soviet Union, but we do not believe this will be a serious matter particularly if, as expected, there will emerge from the Pact meeting no communiqués or reports of a provocative character.

2. We are awaiting with interest position papers which we understand are in process of preparation in Defense for the Military Committee meeting. Since some of the principal items will, of course, involve important political considerations, we hope that we will have plenty of time to study the papers before General Twining's departure.

3. Among the specific items which will probably be discussed at the Military Committee are the questions of the Treaty Area and the Command Structure. We would like to comment on these items as follows:

a)

Treaty Area: We have already taken the position that the treaty area of the Baghdad Pact should include Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan (both East and West) and their contiguous waters. We have agreed with Defense, moreover, that the Pact area might be extended to cover other areas to include contiguous waters if such nations join the Pact.

At the same [time] we have told Defense that we believe the fixing of the Pact area is basically a political matter and should be debated and settled within the Baghdad Pact Council. Since the United States is not actually a member of the Pact, we have indicated that we question the propriety of our entering into the debate on this matter, his does not, of course, preclude us from letting our views on this subject be known to the active members on the Pact Council as well as to the Military Committee.

b) *Command Structure:* Apart from the reference to a command structure contained in Baghdad's Telegram No. 1873,³ we have not been aware that the subject was under active consideration and required an urgent reply. We knew, of course, that informal suggestions have been made from time to time by military officers of various of the Pact member states that they would like to see an American commander. So far as we know, we have made no commitment to this effect. From a political point of view, we have certain reservations concerning the desirability of naming an American to command whatever Baghdad Pact Treaty state forces

may be developed. In any event, we do not feel that we can give any definitive views on the command structure question until such time as we have had an opportunity to study the Military Deputies' report on the subject. We should ask, therefore, that the U.S. Delegation to the Military Committee make no commitment on this subject pending further study of the matter here.

4. With regard to the general position to be taken at the Baghdad Pact [Military?] Committee, it is clear that the military role of the United States in the area will be greatly affected by the National Security Council consideration which is presently in train. As a general proposition we would of course urge that no position taken at the Military Committee prejudice the issues which will be involved in the National Security Council decision.

II. Proposed High Level Military Survey:

1. The proposal for this survey as incorporated in Secretary Sprague's letter of March 28,⁴ involves a number of extremely important policy questions which we believe should receive attention at the highest levels before the survey is undertaken. We therefore have considerable doubt that the time is right for this project to be carried out. We believe that for the time being discussions of Defense arrangements for the Middle East be confined to those items which might properly be discussed in the Baghdad Pact meeting at Karachi within the framework of policy which has been agreed or will be agreed before the Pact meeting.

2. While we welcome the possibility of a visit by General Twining to various countries in the area, we are aware that this involves a certain risk at the present time, particularly if it should appear that the visits have for their purpose the establishment of military arrangements with countries in the area (especially with non-Baghdad Pact countries) which are undergoing severe strains as a result of recent political developments. We would prefer, in fact, that General Twining not visit those countries at this time. (As a fall-back position we might agree to a visit to some of the

countries, notably Baghdad Pact countries, strictly within the context of orientation.)

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/5–1457. Top Secret.

² The Third Baghdad Pact Ministerial Council Session was to be held at Karachi, June 3–6.

³ Telegram 1873, May 11, reported in part that the U.K. military delegation had suggested that the Military Committee of the Baghdad Pact convene on June 1, and noted that it was most important to obtain decisions regarding a command system and definition of the Baghdad Pact military area. (Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/5–1157) ⁴ Not found in Department of State files.

242. Memorandum for the File by Eli Stevens of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs¹

Washington, May 15, 1957.

SUBJECT

Meeting with General Twining on Middle East Defense Planning

Outstanding Points

1. Mr. Rountree outlined points in his talking paper to Mr. Murphy² and stressed that no commitments be made or position taken at the first meeting of the Baghdad Pact Military Committee.

a. General Twining agreed.

2. Rountree stressed delicate political problems would result from a high level planning survey and suggested such a trip may be premature.

a. General Twining stated he also had misgivings about the timing and agreed such a survey would be premature.

b. General Twining also agreed the Military Committee meeting should be the only thing tackled at this time. He planned to return immediately to Washington after this meeting.

3. Mr. Murphy raised issue of the area of Baghdad Pact, and it was agreed our position would be same as that reached with Defense last fall, also that:

a. State would arrange to discuss this matter with the British in order to find out why they wished to exclude

Western Turkey and East Pakistan.

4. Murphy and Rountree asked for Defense's views on the command structure and possible requests that U.S. head same. Rountree had reservations on this point.

a. Twining stated this subject had not been considered by the JCS. He would take matter up with the Chiefs on the following day, and apprise us of their views.

b. It was generally agreed the acceptance of the Command idea may well be followed by a request for assignment of U.S. forces.

5. Mr. Henderson agreed to meet with General Twining next week to discuss further their respective roles at the forthcoming meeting.

6. General Twining said his present feeling was to attend the Military Committee meeting more in the role of an observer, and make no commitments. That the results of the meeting should be reviewed here on his return before a decision is reached on any further action such as the planning survey.

a. Rountree, Murphy and Henderson were in agreement.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/5-1457. Top Secret.

² [Supra.](#)

243. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom¹

Washington, June 1, 1957—2:50 p.m.

8428. Department has informed British Embassy here of readiness conduct final phase talks re measures to insure access ME petroleum supplies. Talks agreed upon at Bermuda and preliminary phase conducted here. Deputy Under Secretary Henderson designated US representative; Ambassador Trevelyan to represent British. UK has agreed dates June 11–14.

Henderson will arrive London June 11 from Karachi after four-day stopover Geneva. Elbert G. Mathews, Member Policy Planning Staff, and Fraser Wilkins, Director NE, will join Henderson in Geneva and proceed London with him. Party will inform you from Geneva of exact ETA. Please arrange suitable hotel accommodations.

Department desires following Embassy officers also be prepared assist discussions: Evan Wilson, Grant McClanahan and James Swihart.

Discussions and Henderson's movements being conducted under secret classification. In event any leaks you should merely indicate opportunity Henderson's return from Karachi taken for exchange views on matters common interest.

In event your discussions with Foreign Office these talks should elicit any information re UK approach or objectives these talks, inform both Henderson Karachi and Department. We presuming basis will be identical paper drafted in preliminary Washington discussions.²

Herter

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 880.2553/6–157. Secret.

² Reference is to the May 10 paper cited in [Document 240](#).

244. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Embassy in Pakistan¹

London, June 4, 1957—4 p.m.

93. Karachi for Henderson. Trevelyan called on Barbour yesterday to discuss next week's ME talks (Department telegram 8428)² and gave preliminary Foreign Office thinking as follows: British anxious keep talks informal and he expected have only three or four aides. They do not contemplate keeping any agreed record or drawing up any document at end of talks although they do expect work from and suggest maybe possible redraft unagreed parts of document mentioned last paragraph Department referenced telegram such as para 9 (Embassy assumes Department's representatives will bring copies of this document which Embassy has not received). Envisage endeavoring achieve agreement specific courses of action.

Trevelyan said Department had suggested group should discuss Egypt and that discussion of access ME oil should include question of sub-sea oil rights in Persian Gulf. These were agreeable to Foreign Office. Remarked re latter point that British would not want refer sub-sea question to some international legal body, which Department may contemplate. He added British would have some comments to make re Palestine problem as well. Re Buraimi, reiterated British difficulties making progress that problem, but expressed willingness discuss effects possible courses of action on British interests Gulf sheikhdoms and appraise net advantages various steps that might be taken.

As Trevelyan expressed desire meet privately with you as soon as possible after your arrival on June 11 Barbour suggested he dine that evening at Barbour's house where if you have no objection you and Wilkins and Mathews will be staying. Trevelyan agreed importance talks be kept secret. However, as being reported separately matter may have already been leaked here by British. Wilson, McClanahan and Swihart will of course be available.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 880.2553/6–457. Secret; Limited Distribution. Repeated to the Department of State as telegram 6678, which is the source text.

² [Supra](#).

245. Briefing Paper Prepared in the Department of State¹

Washington, June 5, 1957.

SUMMARY OF MIDDLE EAST PIPELINE PROJECT

Background:

The interested international petroleum companies have held two meetings in London in recent months relating to the proposed new major pipeline system which would extend from the Persian Gulf to an outlet on the Mediterranean. The most recent meeting was held May 13–16, 1957. A summary report prepared by the companies for answering inquiries is attached together with a statement of consensus of opinion relating to important aspects of the project.²

At the recent conference the companies decided to set up a continuing study group to give attention to the intricate technical, financial and legal problems involved in the project. The proposed system would supplement and not replace the use of existing transport facilities. It is anticipated that [in] the first stage the project would transport approximately 800,000 b/d (barrels a day) through one 38/40" line; ultimately the project would be increased to 1,400,000 b/d to 350,000 b/d. The cost of this first phase is estimated at \$550 million; the total project approximately \$980 million.

The companies represented were as follows: American Independent Oil Company, the Atlantic Refining Company; Compagnie Francaise des Petroles; Getty Oil Company; Gulf Oil Corporation, Hancock Oil Company; Richfield Oil Corporation; San Jacinto Petroleum Corporation; Signal Oil and Gas Company; Socony Mobil Oil Company, Inc.; Standard Oil Company of California; Standard Oil Company (New Jersey); The Standard Oil Company (Ohio); The Texas Company; Tidewater Oil Company; Royal Dutch Shell; and The British Petroleum Company Limited.

Action taken by US companies:

Mr. Rathbone, Standard of New Jersey, together with executives of other interested companies, informed the Department May 24 of the London meeting and action taken. The following were stated to be the most urgent problems requiring attention:

1. A determination that participation of American firms in the project is acceptable to the Justice Department. (This is something of a major problem because the US Government has a suit pending against the principal US participants. The Department hopes that by the inclusion of two groups of independent companies this problem may have been surmounted.)
2. Negotiation of an overall treaty. (Preliminary US views on a treaty are in a separate paper.)
3. Financing. This is essentially a problem for the companies. The Department understands that it is their desire to finance the project with sterling funds.

Action taken by US Government:

Following conclusion of the May meeting, the Department instructed our Missions abroad to bring to the attention of appropriate authorities in Ankara, Baghdad, Tehran and Jidda the results of companies' conversations in London; to inform them that the companies plan to approach the local Governments shortly to inform them on certain questions in which they may be interested. It was pointed out that the U.S. Missions in discussing this matter with local officials should take care to point out that firm decisions regarding the project were dependent on the results of continuing studies; that the route and terminal of the new system was not yet decided; that the completed project may involve more than one route and terminal; that the proposed system will serve as a supplement to existing transportation facilities, providing flexibility for the export of Middle East oil; and that apart from this project, individual companies have under study other means of transporting Middle East oil. The Department has not been informed of the results of conversations to date. It is understood that the

chiefs of U.S. and British missions have been in consultation with one another on this project.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 880.2553/6–3057. Confidential. Drafted by John F. Shaw of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs.

² Not found attached.

246. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom¹

Washington, June 5, 1957—7:13 p.m.

8508. Re London's 6678.² While Dept in general agreement approach to talks as suggested by UK it believes we should move toward recommendations as envisioned at Bermuda. Bermuda paper on study of Middle East problems suggested "recommendations for furthering the common interests of the two govts in this area". With this in mind we considering possible ultimate referral to two govts series broad recommendations based generally on recommendations and substance identical paper prepared during Washington discussions.

As Foreign Office aware, Dept considers steps to improve UK-Saudi Arabian relations and to resolve current differences between two powers as key subject these talks. Henderson will also be prepared state views re Egypt as well as Jordan problem.

Re Persian Gulf sub-sea rights Dept will suggest US-UK consultations leading to possible common position at International Law Commission Conference on Law of Sea scheduled for 1958.

Dept assuming discussions will not embrace technical aspects of access to petroleum which are matters currently under consideration by experts both countries.

Dept regrets that leaks may have occurred re Henderson talks and hopes Embassy can continue picture these as routine matters.

Dulles

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 880.2553/6-557. Secret; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Karachi for Henderson.

² Printed as telegram 93 from London to Karachi, [Document 244](#).

247. Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration (Henderson) to the Secretary of State¹

Washington, June 20, 1957.

SUBJECT

US–UK Talks on Middle East, June 12–14, 1957

In accordance with your instructions, I met in London from June 12 to 14, 1957 with Sir Humphrey Trevelyan, representing the UK Foreign Office, to complete the US-UK review of Middle East problems bearing upon the supply of oil initiated at Bermuda. The heads of the African, Eastern and Levant Departments of the Foreign Office participated with Sir Humphrey, and I had with me Mr. Mathews of S/P, Mr. Wilkins, Director of NE, and Mr. Wilson of our London Embassy.

Sir Humphrey and I reached agreement on the attached conclusions and recommendations (Tab A) for submission to our respective Secretaries. It was understood between us that this paper had no standing unless and until it was approved by you and Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. You will observe that this paper closely parallels the draft conclusions and recommendations which you approved on June 5, 1957 (Tab C).²

The complex of problems arising from relations among Saudi Arabia, the UK and the Persian Gulf sheikhdoms was inevitably the major subject of our discussions. As will be apparent from Recommendation 1 and the related US and UK comments, the British took the position that they could do no more to ease the Buraimi situation than seek to arrange an early meeting between King Saud and the Sultan of Muscat. The British position rested on three basic propositions. First, the US had had marked—and welcomed—success in re-orienting King Saud, [*1½ lines of source text not declassified*] despite his dissatisfaction with the Buraimi situation. Second, the Sultan of Muscat and the Sheikh of Abu Dhabi considered that the Buraimi issue had been resolved by their reoccupation of the oasis and were not willing to enter into negotiations on a closed issue. Third, British

attempts to persuade them to do so would damage UK relations with these two states and arouse doubts as to the value of British protection throughout the Persian Gulf area.

The British did, however, agree with us on the general desirability of settling frontier disputes and defining boundaries on the periphery of Saudi Arabia, and Recommendation 1 was cast in these terms. You will recall that at Bermuda the President and Prime Minister Macmillan discussed an early definition of frontiers which might be accompanied by some type of US guarantee. Despite this background, at our first meeting in London Sir Humphrey stated (1) that the UK doubted that any boundaries fixed in agreement with Saudi Arabia would be viable and (2) that this British appreciation would not be significantly altered by a US guarantee of such boundaries. With a view to clarifying the British position, I gave Sir Humphrey an illustrative draft of a possible statement which the US might make on boundaries (Tab D),³ emphasizing that I was handing it to him on a provisional basis and that it had not been seen by the Department. After considerable discussion, the British subsequently appeared to return to their Bermuda position and again expressed an interest in a US public declaration on boundaries (see fourth sentence of the UK comments on Recommendation 1).

It was clear, however, that the UK was unwilling to suggest negotiation of the Buraimi issue to the Sultan of Muscat or the Sheikh of Abu Dhabi. I would go so far as to say that the British would be unwilling for the foreseeable future to bring about any arrangement regarding Buraimi which could be described as a further British retreat in the Middle East. In the circumstances it seemed wise to concentrate upon an early meeting between King Saud and the Sultan of Muscat— first proposed by the US side in the Rountree–Coulson talks. Once this meeting is brought about and new friendly relations between Saud and Muscat have developed, the possibility for substantive discussions on the Buraimi issue may arise. This prospect should be of some interest to King Saud although it falls far short of his present expectations.

In discussing relations with Egypt (Recommendation 6), Sir Humphrey emphasized that the UK Government wanted to remove any doubts that the UK-Egypt financial talks might have occasioned as to the firmness of the UK's anti-Nasser position. Those talks had been entered into in order to make the necessary arrangements for the use of the Suez Canal by British shipping. When the talks were resumed, the UK would maintain a hard position and would insist upon a firm and equal quid pro quo that Nasser might desire.

Although the London discussions resulted in no immediate concrete progress toward the solution of specific problems, I am convinced that the exercise was worthwhile. We had a very free and frank exchange of views. As one result, I believe that the British were more persuaded that we are sincerely trying to find objective solutions of Persian Gulf problems and less fearful that we are acting merely as protagonists for Saudi Arabia or Aramco. As another result, my associates and I were satisfied that UK influence on the Persian Gulf rulers is limited; the limitations are probably not as severe as the British allege, but they do exist and they are substantial. At the conclusion of the talks both sides had a better understanding of the other's position, and these positions were, I believe, less rigid than at the beginning of the discussions. For this and one other reason, I agreed with Sir Humphrey on the desirability of periodic meetings of senior US and UK representatives to discuss the Middle East (Recommendation 9). The other reason is that the British obviously derive great satisfaction and comfort from intimate consultation with us on an area of such vital importance to them. Our investment of time and funds in periodic meetings promises large dividends in terms of British willingness to accept our leadership and to support our policies in the Middle East.

Recommendations:

1. That you approve the paper at Tab A.⁴
2. That you sign the letter at Tab B⁵ informing Mr. Lloyd of our action.

[Tab A]

MEASURES TO ENSURE CONTINUED ACCESS TO MIDDLE EAST PETROLEUM RESOURCES⁶

I. Conclusions

1. Access to Middle East petroleum supplies will, for at least the next ten years, be vital to the security of Western Europe.
2. The most vital section of the area is that comprising the four principal producing states: Iraq, Iran, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia.
3. Continued access to the resources of these states depends on the maintenance of friendly and influential relations with those countries. In this connection, the following assets are important:
 - a. The Baghdad Pact
 - b. The American Doctrine
 - c. The British position in Kuwait and the Persian Gulf in general
 - d. U.S. relations with Saudi Arabia.
4. It is desirable that close relations be established between the U.K. and Saudi Arabia and between Saudi Arabia and Muscat.
5. Continued access to the resources of the oil-producing states requires the establishment and maintenance of secure means of transit. The principal present transit routes of importance are:
 - a. The sea route through the Persian Gulf
 - b. The Suez Canal
 - c. The Trans-Arabian Pipeline
 - d. The Iraq Petroleum Company Pipelines.

6. These means of transit are currently threatened by:

- a. Soviet activity and influence in Syria, Egypt and Yemen
- b. Egyptian and Syrian subversive political activity in Lebanon, Jordan and the Persian Gulf states
- c. Tensions arising from the continuance of the Arab-Israel dispute.

II. Recommendations

1.

Efforts should continually be made to achieve a settlement of outstanding frontier disputes between Saudi Arabia and the peripheral States beginning with Qatar and extending through the Aden Protectorate and to define the frontiers. Hitherto it has been found impossible to obtain a settlement of these disputes which would be acceptable to all the states concerned.

U.K. Comments: The U.K. does not know of any change in the views of these states which would materially alter this situation. The U.K. is always ready to discuss frontier problems (which include the Buraimi problem) with Saudi Arabia. U.S. help in working towards a settlement of these problems will be most useful. A public declaration by the U.S. Government supporting a frontier settlement would materially contribute to the stability of the area. The U.K. considers that the most hopeful way of improving the situation in the areas of dispute between Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf States in the near future is likely to be the arrangement of an early meeting between King Saud and the Sultan of Muscat, with a view to the mutual grant of concessions which will reduce tensions between Saudi Arabia and Muscat and lay the basis of a friendly relationship which is a prerequisite for the settlement of the border problems. The U.S. and U.K. Governments should consult on the method to be

adopted to arrange such a meeting. [3 lines of source text not declassified] The meeting would require careful preparation.

U.S. Comments: The U.S. welcomes the continued willingness of the U.K. to discuss frontier problems (which include the Buraimi problem) with Saudi Arabia. It considers a solution of these problems important to furthering the common interests of the U.S. and the U.K. in the Middle East. The U.S. is of the opinion that the present moment is particularly propitious for attempting to bring about a frontier settlement and is inclined to believe that it may become progressively more difficult with the passage of time to obtain the kind of settlement which would preserve the Western position in the Persian Gulf. Meanwhile, it stands ready to consult on the method of arranging a meeting between King Saud and the Sultan of Muscat as proposed by the U.K. and to discuss with the U.K. suggestions for bringing about an eventual settlement of border disputes. The U.S. is prepared to give sympathetic consideration to making a public declaration at the appropriate time supporting a frontier settlement accepted by the parties concerned.

2. There should be an early reestablishment of diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and the U.K. American assistance to this end will be welcomed by the U.K.

3. The U.S. and U.K. should cooperate to preserve beneficial U.K. relationships with the Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea principalities of special importance to the supply of oil to the free world, including especially Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Sharja and Muscat.

4. The U.S. and the U.K. should consider steps to be taken to promote settlements of the various claims to islands and sea bed of the Persian Gulf. Officials, including legal experts, of the two Governments should discuss as soon as possible how progress can be made to this end and what principles the two Governments should seek to have recognized by the States concerned in order to assist the settlement and prevent the inflammation of disputes

and to minimize difficulties likely to arise in the grant of oil concessions.

5. U.S. and U.K. efforts should continue to strengthen Jordan and Lebanon to resist threats to their independence and territorial integrity from Soviet and Egyptian activities. Iraq and Saudi Arabia should be encouraged to assist these efforts. There should be further U.S.–U.K. discussions at an early date on the future of Jordan, in the light of the joint assessment of the situation by the U.K. and U.S. Ambassadors in Jordan, which is expected.

6. The U.S. and the U.K. should be prepared to restore tolerable relations with Egypt and Syria, once the acts of these states firmly indicate a will to reestablish and maintain such relations with the West and to moderate anti-Western policies. In the meantime, neither Government should, without consultation, take any action which would strengthen Nasser or the present Syrian leadership internally or their influence externally. Both Governments should inform each other before considering unblocking blocked Egyptian balances. The U.K. will inform the U.S. before taking any action towards the resumption of diplomatic relations with Egypt.

7. The U.S. and the U.K. should pursue urgently through established machinery discussions of measures to ensure against interruptions of the flow of Middle East oil.

8. The U.S. and the U.K. should continue efforts to maintain peace and tranquillity in the area, particularly in those parts affected by the Arab-Israel dispute, working directly as well as through other countries and through the United Nations.

9. In order to assure close cooperation in the Middle East, senior representatives of the U.S. and U.K. Governments should periodically exchange visits of the kind now concluded.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.41/6–2057. Secret. Sent through the Executive Secretariat and Rountree.

² Not printed. Tab C is a draft of the memorandum attached at Tab A. It bears a notation that it was approved on June 5.

³ Not printed.

⁴ Robert Murphy initialed his approval on the source text and added the notation: “on the basis of signed ltr, 6/24/57”. Loy Henderson’s initials also appear below Murphy’s note.

⁵ Not printed. Attached at Tab B is a carbon copy of a letter from Secretary Dulles to Foreign Secretary Lloyd that informs Lloyd of Dulles’ approval of the conclusions and recommendations prepared by Sir Humphrey and Loy Henderson, and reaffirms the importance the United States attached to the improvement in relations between the United Kingdom and Saudi Arabia.

⁶ Secret.

248. Editorial Note

During the summer of 1957, internal U.S. Government discussions took place concerning possible military implications of Joint Resolution 117. Documents regarding these discussions, which involved military contingency planning, were not declassified under Section 1.3 (a) (1) and (2) of Executive Order 12356.

249. Memorandum on the Substance of Discussions at the Department of State–Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting, Washington, June 27, 1957, 11 a.m.1

Washington, June 27, 1957, 11 a.m.

[Here follows a list of 26 persons present, including Admiral Radford, General Twining, Admiral Felt, and General Pate. The Department of State delegation included Henderson, Reinhardt, Mathews, Bennett, Rockwell, Stevens, and Eilts. Item 1 of the memorandum concerned “Distribution of Baghdad Pact Military Committee Documents.”]

2. Baghdad Pact Ministerial Council Session at Karachi

In his brief discussion of the Karachi meeting Mr. Henderson expressed his personal appreciation, as well as his official commendation, of the outstanding role played in the Karachi talks by General Twining. He paid tribute to the calm influence exerted by General Twining in the discussions and made mention of the great respect in which General Twining had obviously been held by the representatives of other nations present at the meeting. In discussing the meeting General Twining said he had been confronted with heavy pressure for the establishment of a command structure and that he was sure these pressures would continue. He stressed the difficult nature of the problem. Mr. Henderson admitted the difficulties but said that the State Department did not feel the time is yet ripe for setting up the command structure. Admiral Radford pointed out that we cannot participate in the command structure if we are not members of the Baghdad Pact and that even membership in the Pact might be going too far at this stage of affairs. He expressed the view that the compromise solution worked out at the meeting was a reasonable solution and should be an adequate arrangement for the foreseeable future. He recalled that the Chiefs had not welcomed joining the Military Committee, but he went on to say that being a member of the Military Committee without membership in the Pact itself would place us in a difficult position. Mr. Henderson agreed with Admiral Radford's view and said that that was further testimony to the importance of Ambassador Gallman's being fully informed of current developments in the Military Committee. General Twining at this point praised Ambassador Gallman's qualities and bespoke his personal confidence in the Ambassador.

Admiral Radford referred to the many national rivalries in the Middle East and the desire of some members of the Pact to use the organization for local or regional situations. Mr. Henderson stressed that he had pointed out firmly at the Karachi meeting that the U.S. views the Pact as a common defense against communism and not as a vehicle for use in connection with regional disputes. Admiral Radford commented that we must take account of that

position in our instructions to the Deputy Director of Planning. He went on to express the view that Iran shares our view on the proper scope of the Pact. Turkey also shares our view but is more careful in expressing its views publicly due to relations with Iraq and general interest in the Near East area. These nations agree with us that Syria may fall under communist domination, but Admiral Radford suggested that, in such an event, the situation could be better handled under the American doctrine rather than by use of the Baghdad Pact. Mr. Henderson agreed with Admiral Radford's view.

[Here follow item 3, "Proposal for NATO Stockpile of Atomic Weapons;" item 4, "Military Activities on the Chinese Off Shore Islands;" and item 5, "Operation Alert."]

¹ Source: Department of State, State-JCS Meetings: Lot 61 D 417. Top Secret.

250. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Egypt¹

Washington, July 2, 1957–6:25 p.m.

19. Embtels 3871,² 3879.³

1. Preliminary discussions with industry indicate pipeline parallel Canal not economically attractive. Following appear significant objections from financial point of view:

(a) Cost of terminal facilities including improvement and expansion roadsteads Port Said and Suez;

(b) Time lost in tie-up of ships at loading and unloading terminals, which greatly in excess time required for transit of Canal;

(c) Industry source states pipeline operations per 100 miles more expensive than equal distance by sea;

(d) Failure of Egypt to insure cooperation between Suez Canal Authority and representatives of shipping and trade would suggest that users not likely have any control over services and charges of Canal; this in turn would be likely result in corresponding lack of participation in control charges for pipeline operations since these would probably be fixed on basis of Canal tolls.

2. In addition to questionable economic advantages deriving from this proposal, Department not enthusiastic about plan under present circumstances since would result in increasing Western dependence upon Egyptian operation of transit facilities. Acquiescence of USG in Egyptian operation of Suez Canal is trial measure based on hope Egypt will achieve a regime governing

Suez Canal in conformity with six requirements of Security Council Resolution of October 13. Projects designed to increase reliance on Suez Isthmus route should be regarded in light of efforts to obtain reasonable assurance that rights and interests of international community in Suez will be safeguarded.

3. In April Onassis forwarded copy of pro forma agreement regarding construction, operation and management of pipeline facility between Gulf of Suez and Port Said, which Department acknowledged without comment. No favorable disposition toward this proposal indicated by Department.

Foregoing may be used as basis for oral discussion with Greek Ambassador.

Dulles

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 880.2553/6–2857. Confidential. Repeated to Jidda.

² In telegram 3871 from Cairo, June 28, Ambassador Hare informed the Department of State that Greek businessman Aristotle Onassis had informed the Embassy that the Egyptian Government had decided to proceed with a project to construct a pipeline parallel to the Suez Canal. Onassis told the Embassy that the next step was to ascertain whether potential users of the pipeline were interested in having the pipeline built, which would facilitate financing. (*Ibid.*, 880.2553/6–2857) ³ In telegram 3879 from Cairo, June 28, Hare reported further on Onassis' interest in constructing a pipeline parallel to the Suez Canal and conveyed a request from the Greek Embassy in Cairo to find out the U.S. attitude toward the scheme. (*Ibid.*, 880.2553/6–2857)

251. Memorandum of a Conversation Between Secretary of State Dulles and Prime Minister Suhrawardy, Department of State, Washington, July 10, 1957, 4 p.m.¹

Washington, July 10, 1957, 4 p.m.

He spoke of the US–UK in the Middle East. He said he thought it was important to re-establish the prestige and the influence of the UK in the Middle East, and that he assumed that this was in accord with US policy and that we had no desire to push out the British. I assured him that this was the case, that we had constantly refrained from making our presence felt in the Middle East under circumstances which could be interpreted as indicating a rivalry with the UK. Suhrawardy spoke in very high terms of our Middle East policy and felt that the situation had as a result of it very much improved. He was glad to know that we were sympathetic to reinstating the UK as far as was practical.

The Prime Minister stated his policy to be to try to bring about a unity of the Moslem states distinguished from the purely Arab states, and this would bring together the four Baghdad Pact countries plus Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and such African countries as Morocco, Tunisia, Libya, and Sudan. He spoke also of Ethiopia, although it is not distinctively a Moslem country. He spoke of bringing Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Lebanon into association with the Baghdad Pact. He said this could already be done with reference to Lebanon, but that it was unwise for Lebanon to move alone. He thought in such ways it could be demonstrated that Egypt and Syria were isolating themselves from the Moslem world as a result of their community with the Communists.

The Prime Minister spoke of the concern of King Saud with respect to Aqaba and said that King Saud had asked him to explore this topic with us. King Saud had said that unless some solution could be found he might have to “sever” his new connections with the US.

The Prime Minister then spoke of the Moslem Baghdad Pact countries and said he particularly sought closer communication as between them. This related not only to radio and the like but communication by air travel, rail travel and shipping. He spoke particularly of the importance of shipping to Saudi Arabia and spoke of the possibility of organizing a shipping company with capital from Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and the US. He said that King Saud had asked him to send various technicians to Saudi Arabia, particularly to equip munitions plants and to replace the Egyptians in this respect.

The Prime Minister said he expected to stop over in Jordan on his way back and would like to bring some kind of message from us to King Hussein.

The Prime Minister felt that in all these matters Pakistan and he personally could play a major role, leading a sort of counter-offensive against the narrow nationalism of Nasser. He spoke of the importance of North Africa and the important role that Bourguiba could play. He also spoke of the importance of Ghana.

The Prime Minister then spoke of Israel and the problem of the refugees. He felt that something might be done about this, particularly in relation to Jordan and Iraq. He said, however, it was very difficult to get the refugees to give up their status as such. He said he had been told that in the case of Iraq some 6,000 came there to work but always insisted upon going back for a short time so as to maintain their status as “refugees” and their theoretical right to return to Israel.

The Prime Minister said that his most immediate concern was the situation to the west of Pakistan in relation to the Moslem and Arab world. However he was not unmindful of the problems of SEATO and of China. He said there was danger that the free countries there might “fall into the clutches of China.” He felt that Burma was a key factor and that they might turn to the US for help. He hoped that if so we could give them some help. If Burma were to take an anti-Chinese Communist line, this would have immense psychological value throughout the area. He expressed the opinion that the Pibulsong Government in Thailand would probably hold on, but that in the main the free countries of the area were rather feeble.

JFD

¹ Source: Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199. Secret. Prepared in the Office of the Secretary of State.

252. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom¹

Washington, July 10, 1957—6:27 p.m.

267. Department approached past week by representatives French, British and Netherlands Embassies seeking US views on quadrilateral meeting sometime during July to discuss treaty covering proposed Middle East pipeline. Dept replied along following lines. Addressees should take similar position if matter raised by governments.

While Department now giving attention development treaty along lines C type its view not sufficiently clarified at this time to put forth in quadrilateral meeting. More importantly however Department believes four-power meeting foreseeable future purpose discussing subject unwise as likely have most unfortunate consequences for project particularly in Arab states.

US particularly desirous present time avoid stirring up Arab sensitivities as multilateral discussion this project likely to do, since this government currently engaged in critical conversations with Saudi Arabia over Gulf Aqaba. Consensus here discussions looking to development satisfactory draft treaty should proceed as quietly as possible. Department prepared exchange views Embassies UK, France and Netherlands on ad hoc basis and several meetings with Embassy representatives already planned.

Dulles

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 880.2553/7-1057. Confidential. Drafted by Shaw and approved by Dillon who signed for Dulles. Also sent to Paris and The Hague and repeated to Ankara, Baghdad, and Tehran.

**253. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State,
Washington, July 12, 1957¹**

Washington, July 12, 1957

SUBJECT

The Middle East

PARTICIPANTS FOR PAKISTAN

The Prime Minister

Mr. M. S. A. Baig, Secretary of Foreign Affairs

Mr. A. Husain, Secretary of Defense

PARTICIPANTS FOR THE UNITED STATES

The Secretary

The Under Secretary

William M. Rountree, NEA

Ambassador-designate James Langley

Robert R. Bowie, S/P

J. Jefferson Jones, III, SOA

Charles D. Withers, SOA

John M. Howison, SOA

The Baghdad Pact

The Secretary referred to the Prime Minister's suggestion that Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan join the Baghdad Pact and said the United States would be happy to observe such a development. However, we estimate that Saudi Arabia is not yet ripe for membership in the Pact. We agree that the three should come in together. They might eventually approach membership by the process of associating with one of the committees of the Pact, possibly the economic committee first. The United States would not wish to bring pressure upon anyone to join the Pact as the British had done in Jordan with unfortunate consequences. Mr. Rountree observed that the key country in this situation is Saudi Arabia, and the Prime Minister agreed.

Mr. Suhrawardy noted in passing that he considered the natural regional grouping to be that of the Muslim states rather than the Arab states alone.

Jordan

The Secretary observed that we attach much importance to the Prime Minister's prospective visit to King Hussein and the Prime Minister asked what he should tell Hussein. He stated that President Eisenhower had told him we had difficulty in finding money for Jordan. According to Mr. Suhrawardy, Jordanian representatives had been telling him that Jordan would look to the US for money.

The Secretary agreed that the situation of the Jordanians was serious. The US would not wish them to fall back into the clutches of Egypt. Neither could we give them money indefinitely. The British had withdrawn their subsidy partly because it represented a drain upon their resources. The US simply could not try to balance the budget of every country with financial difficulties.

Jordan had never been a viable state, the Secretary continued. Ernest Bevin had told him with much satisfaction of the creation of Jordan; it was to be a British base to remain useful after Suez had gone. Clever plans such as this one sometimes failed to work out. People got independence-minded. Jordan's only source of income was the rental of its real estate for military bases.

Mr. Suhrawardy observed that the Jordanians could rent their real estate to Russia or Egypt, to whom it would be most useful.

The Secretary declared that the fact that the US had found \$30 million for the Jordanians showed that we were serious about Jordan but that we could not supply funds indefinitely.

The Secretary suggested that Mr. Suhrawardy tell Hussein he had acted with courage and skill and with good judgment in his choice of people to rely on. We showed our sympathy at a time Hussein was afraid of foreign intervention by sending our fleet to the Eastern Mediterranean. But neither a fleet nor money constituted a permanent solution of Jordan's problems and the US would welcome suggestions from Mr. Suhrawardy and from King Hussein as to what the future of Jordan should be. The Prime Minister put forward the thesis that there should be a federation of Jordan with Iraq to form a "greater Iraq". Faisal and Hussein might rule jointly.

The Secretary asked how King Hussein sees his own future and emphasized that he would like to have Mr. Suhrawardy's conclusions after his visit to Amman. Mr. Suhrawardy said he would ask King Hussein for his views concerning the future. The Secretary urged that the US and Pakistan work together in the matter.

The Secretary said that Jordan is wretchedly poor. Perhaps development of water resources or settlement of refugee problems would help. Mr. Rountree concurred, noting that with less population Jordan could be made viable but that there did not seem to be the possibility of enabling Jordan to support its present population, including refugees. The Secretary observed that the refugees were a continuing menace to the stability of Jordan. Mr. Suhrawardy responded that the refugees lived on the hope of returning to Palestine. The US position had been set forth in an August 1955 address made by Secretary Dulles, a copy of which was made available to the Prime Minister.

The Arab-Israeli Question

The Prime Minister expressed the view that the key to settlement of the Middle East situation was the Palestine question. He asked for our thinking on any approach to its resolution. The Secretary responded that the refugee question was the first matter to be solved. This might mean in the first instance the development of water resources to provide useful livelihoods for the 900,000 refugees. Israel should take some back but obviously could take back only a token number, in view of recently increased immigration of Jews leaving Eastern Europe as a result of reviving anti-Semitism there. The Prime Minister asked why the US could not derive a propaganda advantage by pointing out that the Soviets were sending their Jewish population to swell the ranks of the Zionists. It was observed in response that some of the immigrants are Russians who come via Poland and enter Israel as Poles. In any case, Israel does not wish to offend the USSR, since it is anxious that the Jews there be permitted to leave.

Reverting to the refugee question, the Secretary suggested that if Israel chose to conduct a campaign in favor of the refugees, it could derive large sums of money from gifts by Jews abroad and from loans by international banking institutions. If the Israelis would thus compensate the refugees, they would no longer be so unwelcome as penniless beggars in neighboring countries such as Iraq. The US Government was prepared to help with money for the refugees.

The Prime Minister expressed the opinion that Egypt and Syria do not want the refugees to be resettled. The Secretary agreed that the Egyptians value this "running sore", which provides an opportunity for communist propaganda as well as for exploitation by the Egyptians. During the recent Jordanian crisis, had not King Hussein acted wisely and the Egyptians unskillfully, Amman would have been overrun by the refugees. The King still sat on dynamite where the refugees were concerned.

The Prime Minister asked whether there was now any active question of a commission to settle Israel's boundaries. The Secretary responded that he was not sure whether the position he had taken in August 1955 still met the situation; at that time he favored a sort of overpass-underpass arrangement of Israeli and Arab routes crossing at the head of the Gulf of Aqaba.

The Aqaba Question

In response to a question about the Aqaba situation, the Secretary declared that since the birth of the nation the US had respected the three-mile limit of territoriality of the seas, as well as the principle that a body of water giving access to several sovereign entities is international. We cannot break with this tradition.

Mr. Suhrawardy expressed his understanding of these views, but asked whether the Saudis could understand them. The Secretary responded that the US is trying to explain them to the Saudis. Mr. Suhrawardy predicted that Saud would ask whether the Egyptians could understand them.

The Secretary responded affirmatively. The Egyptians had already, in 1950, publicly recognized the Gulf of Aqaba as open sea and in the present situation were being quiet, trying to set the Saudis and the Americans at odds with each other. The new factor in the situation was that within the last year the Israeli port of Elath had been opened. Previously the Gulf had been an Arab sea, and the head of the gulf an Arab crossroads on the route to Mecca, despite Israel's technical sovereignty over Elath since 1948.

The development of Elath understandably irritates Saud, the Secretary continued. The Israelis have built an 8-inch pipeline from Elath to Haifa to carry petroleum for the refinery. There has been speculative talk about a big pipeline from Elath to a Mediterranean port, but it probably will never be built. The US Government has discouraged private American capital from participating in such a line.

The Israelis have recently put two frigates in the Gulf, the Secretary reported. He expressed the view that something could be done about the frigates, although the US had as yet taken no position on the question of military use of the Gulf. Otherwise the Israelis had no shipping of their own. They chartered ships from the US and from other countries. There was nothing the US could do to prevent private American shipowners from chartering their vessels to the Israelis. We can't understand why the Saudis should consider that their particular quarrel is with the US, since the Israel-chartered ships plying the Gulf to Elath are of various flags.

An unfortunate development had occurred recently when, without the knowledge of the Secretary or Mr. Rountree, a routine Notice to Mariners of US Government origin had advised that the Gulf of Aqaba was international in status. This circular had come to the attention of the US press, portions of which were inclined to play up indications of US support for Israel, and had been made to appear as an important political development.

The US was trying to play down the whole question and to avoid disagreeing with Saud. We have advised the Saudis that if they wish to take the question of the status of the Gulf of Aqaba to the International Court of Justice, we should be glad to abide by its decision.

The Pakistan Prime Minister asked whether he could have copies of Saud's recent letter to the President and the US reply and the Secretary responded that the US was still working on its reply. If it were completed while the Prime Minister remained in the United States, we would try to get something useful to him, at least before he left New York.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/7-1257. Secret. Drafted by Howison and Withers.

254. Memorandum From the Department of State Representative on the NSC Planning Board (Bowie) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Cutler)¹

Washington, August 1, 1957.

1. The Department of State considers that alternative and/or supplemental facilities for the westward movement of Middle East petroleum are vital to the security of the United States.

2. In view of the project for a new Middle East pipeline from the Persian Gulf through Iraq and Turkey to the Mediterranean, the Department of State believes that the National Security Council should urgently consider (a) whether the United States should support such a project, and (b) if so, what form such support should take.

3. Accordingly, the Department has prepared and submits herewith for circulation to the other interested agencies a background paper on the significance of a new Middle East pipeline system.

Robert R. Bowie²

[Attachment]

Background Paper Prepared in the Department of State³

Washington, July 17, 1957.

SIGNIFICANCE OF A NEW MIDDLE EAST PIPELINE SYSTEM

Problem:

Is the construction of a new Middle East pipeline system which would supplement existing facilities for the movement of Middle East petroleum to the West in the national interest of the United States? (Map, Tab A)⁴

Background:

Major international petroleum companies have expressed interest in constructing a new pipeline system (Metline) from the Persian Gulf through Iraq and Turkey to the Eastern Mediterranean. Their principal motivations appear directed at keeping transportation costs at a minimum and at providing greater security than offered by existing transit facilities. The system which they propose would supplement the Suez Canal and existing Middle East pipelines and increase facilities for the transport of Middle East oil by nearly 50 percent. They state that at the conclusion of the first stage of construction, i.e., by the end of 1960,⁵ the project would be capable of transporting approximately 800,000 barrels per day through one 38"/40" line. The second 38"/40" line they estimate will be completed by the end of 1962,⁵ and the completed project would have a capability at that time of moving 1,400,000 barrels per day. The cost of the first phase is estimated at \$550 million;⁶ the cost of the total project is approximately \$980,000,000.⁶

Companies which have expressed an interest in the project are the following: American Independent Oil Company; the Atlantic Refining Company; Compagnie Francaise des Petroles; Getty Oil Company; Gulf Oil Corporation; Hancock Oil Company; Richfield Oil Corporation; San Jacinto Petroleum Corporation; Signal Oil and Gas Company; Socony Mobil Oil Company, Inc.; Standard Oil Company of California; Standard Oil Company (New Jersey); The Standard Oil Company (Ohio); The Texas Company; Tidewater Oil Company; Royal Dutch Shell; and The British Petroleum Company, Limited.

The companies state that no firm decisions can be made in regard to this project until satisfactory treaty arrangements have been concluded with the countries in which the pipeline system is to be located.

Discussion:

1. *Economic need for increasing facilities for movement of Middle East petroleum:*

a. *Suez experience:* The blocking of the Suez Canal and the sabotage of the IPC pipeline in the fall of 1956 reduced the movement of Middle East petroleum to the West through existing facilities by 85 percent. Shipments via the Suez Canal and existing pipelines were cut from 2,350,000 b/d to 350,000 b/d. To off-set loss of movement through the Canal and the IPC pipeline, Western Europe resorted to rerouting Middle East petroleum via the Cape at additional expense and to obtaining petroleum from the Western Hemisphere at higher prices. The Suez crisis, due to these added costs and foreign exchange losses on the resale of Middle East oil resulted in a dollar balance of payments loss for Western Europe, and particularly the UK, of about \$400 million.

b.

Long term growth in requirements of Europe, the U.S. and Canada.

In 1956, the demand for Middle East oil in the area West of Suez (Europe, North and West Africa, and North American East Coast) totaled about 2,300,000 barrels daily (b/d). On the assumption that (1) European oil demand from all sources will increase during the next three years at the rate of the past five years and at a somewhat lower rate thereafter, (2) no restrictions are placed on U.S. imports of Middle East oil, (3) only negligible amounts of Sahara oil are produced and delivered to markets and (4) Caribbean exports to Europe approximate pre-Suez levels, the demand for Middle East oil West of Suez would rise to 3,900,000 b/d in 1960 and 5,900,000 in 1965. In the event of moderate restrictions on U.S. imports of Middle East oil

and secure conditions for production and transport of Sahara oil, the above requirements would be reduced by roughly 200,000 b/d in 1960 and 800,000 in 1965. (See Table 1)^Z

c.

Capability of Existing Facilities: Assuming adequate dredging and efficient operation the Suez Canal might readily accommodate about 2,000,000 barrels per day of northbound oil traffic, existing pipelines will shortly have a total capacity of 1,000,000 barrels per day. In addition a small number of giant tankers will become available with a capability of moving about 50,000 barrels per day in 1960 via the Cape of Good Hope and about 100,000 barrels per day in 1965. The deficit in transit capacity for moving Middle East oil would amount to 850,000 barrels per day in 1960 and rise to 2,800,000 barrels per day in 1965. Tankers under construction or on order and definitely planned for the mid-1960's will have sufficient carrying capacity to transport, utilizing customary facilities, all Middle East petroleum required in the area West of Suez. However, these facilities, i.e., the Suez Canal and pipelines across Syria, must be substantially expanded.

In a period of emergency, involving closure of existing transportation routes for Middle East oil, the area West of Suez would be wholly dependent upon tankers which would then become the bottleneck. If both the Suez Canal and now existing pipelines were interrupted, tankers normally moving via those routes to Europe and North America could be diverted to the Cape of Good Hope route but would be able to carry only from 50 to 60 percent of their usual oil traffic.

2. *Now Existing Facilities Might be Expanded:* Existing Canal, pipelines and tanker operations are all capable of expansion.

a. *Expansion of Suez Canal:* An alternative to expansion of pipeline facilities in the Middle East is an increase in the capacity of the Suez Canal. Great increases in the Canal's capacity are possible beyond the level of 2,000,000 b/d. This could be achieved by completion of the 8th improvement program (\$50–\$75 million, by organizational measures requiring no added financial outlay⁸ and by undertaking the 9th improvement program (estimated total cost \$300 million). With these measures the Canal's capacity could be raised to 3,200,000 b/d by 1960 and 5,500,000 b/d by 1965. With substantial completion of the 9th improvement program the Canal would have a capacity by 1965⁹ which would be more than sufficient to eliminate the expected deficit in transport capacity at that time. While Egypt might close the Canal, nevertheless the tankers customarily transiting the Canal could be diverted to other routes. Considerable sacrifice in carrying capacity would result from their transfer to the Cape of Good Hope-Europe route but some increases in capacity would result from shifting them to the Western Hemisphere-Europe route.

b. *Expansion of Existing Lines:* The capacity of existing pipeline facilities could be greatly increased if Metline is not constructed. (However, the amount of this increase will depend to a large extent on political conditions and trends in the transit states and on company decisions re construction of tankers.) Tapline, for example, may increase its capacity by 1965 from about 400,000 b/d to around 800,000 b/d. IPC may divert, by 1960, its present Haifa lines through Syria and Lebanon and may expand movement of petroleum through existing lines across Syria as well as construct a major line from Kirkuk to the Persian Gulf. In addition there is talk of an Arab pipeline which would extend primarily from the Saudi Arabian fields to the

Mediterranean across only Arab territory. There is also report of a new pipeline to be constructed parallel to the Suez Canal. In addition Israel is promoting an international pipeline from the head of the Gulf of Aqaba to the Mediterranean. Moreover, there are at present two U.S. groups actively interested in a pipeline project connecting the recently discovered Qum field in north-western Iran with a Mediterranean terminus in Turkey. Although commercial exploitation of this field appears to be a few years in the future, negotiations for a pipeline outlet for this petroleum may well proceed apace with Metline developments.

c.

Tanker Program: If tanker programs continue at recent levels a considerable number of vessels will be available that might not be built should new pipelines be constructed. If Metline is built with a capacity of 1,400,000 b/d, or a like expansion in existing pipelines occurs, about 300 to 350 T2 tanker equivalents would be displaced. These tankers could, in case of emergency, carry roughly 450,000–500,000 b/d via the Cape of Good Hope or about 10% of the European area's total requirements in 1965. Moreover, in the absence of the foregoing expansion in pipeline construction a greater emphasis is likely to be placed on building giant tankers of 50,000 dwt and more. At present at least 80 of these giant tankers are expected to be available by 1965.

If giant tankers are to move more than minor amounts of Middle East oil via the Cape of Good Hope during the next ten years¹⁰ and thereby replace Metline or lessen normal dependence on the Suez Canal, a costly construction program on a crash basis would be necessary. This type of program would have to be

adopted by the oil companies if they were unwilling or unable to build additional pipelines and Egypt could not be relied upon to expand the capacity of the Suez Canal. The placement of more orders for giant tankers by the oil companies and independent operators would provide the incentive for shipyards to expand for the larger tankers particularly by devising new methods of construction, e.g., prefabrication of tanker segments as practiced in Japan. Additional investments in port and harbor facilities would also be necessary due to the special problems of handling the giant tankers.

d.

Illustrative alternatives: Should the international petroleum companies decide against constructing the Metline, or any portion thereof (i.e., from Kirkuk through Turkey to the Mediterranean) due to inability to secure adequate guarantees covering its operation or other considerations, they will probably adopt a combination of measures to expand transit facilities in the Middle East (Case 1, Table 2).¹¹ These may involve a doubling of Tapline; a possible expansion of IPC lines across Syria; increased use of the Suez Canal; acceleration of supertanker construction; and building a pipeline south from the northern Iraq fields to the Persian Gulf which would not involve displacement of tankers.

If Metline is built with an ultimate capacity of 1,400,000 b/d by 1965, the capacity of existing pipelines will not in the immediate future exceed the projected level of 1,000,000 b/d. Virtually all the remaining requirements of Middle East oil would move through the Suez Canal, where northbound oil traffic could rise from 2,050,000 b/d in 1960 to 3,400,000 b/d in 1965. (Case 2, Table 2) If dependence on the Canal is

to be minimized companies would have to expand existing pipeline facilities as well as construct Metline and increase outlays for supertankers.

3. *Political Assessment:*

a. *Arab petroleum policies:* Some Arab countries have tried for many years separately and collectively (e.g., the Arab League) to use Middle East oil as a means for obtaining from the West a greater recognition of Arab aspirations. The Arabs can be expected to continue to exploit the dependence of the West on Middle East petroleum in an effort to obtain settlements favorable to them. At the present time existing transit facilities, i.e., the Suez Canal and existing pipelines, all lie within the territories of Arab countries.

b. *Suez Canal:* The primary artery for movement of Middle East oil is the Suez Canal. Before the Suez crisis the Canal accounted for nearly 65 percent of the transit of petroleum from this area to the West. Given a minimum capability of handling 2,000,000 b/d the Canal would still be handling in 1960 more than 50 percent of the petroleum movements to the West. (Table 2) Though continuation of this dependence on the Canal seems inescapable in the foreseeable future every effort should be made to improve this situation in view (1) of the inability of the West to isolate the Canal from the policies of Egypt and (2) of Egypt's continued dependence on the Soviet Union for political, military and economic support.

c.

Pipelines: Existing pipelines originate in Iraq or Saudi Arabia and transit Jordan, Syria and Lebanon. Jordan, although presently aligned with the West, is economically and politically weak. Syria is unreliable.

During the Suez crisis Syria readily collaborated in disrupting the movement of Middle East petroleum to the Mediterranean by its destruction of the IPC pipelines. With Syrian leaders increasingly inclined to accept Soviet influence more blindly than any other country in the area, there is a strong presumption that Syria will continue to use its position in the transport of Middle East petroleum for political purposes. IPC and the Government of Iraq have suffered extensive financial losses from destruction of pumping stations on the IPC lines in Syria; IPC operations are also being harmed by arbitrary and capricious moves on the part of leftist groups in the name of Syrian labor. Current assessment of the political situation in Syria does not indicate that there is likely to be any real improvement in the near future. There have also been periods when Lebanese governments have hampered the operation of pipeline companies in ways which violate concession agreements.

The Arab states generally believe that Arab oil should be moved across only Arab states and have undertaken to devise schemes for accomplishing this objective. For example, it is understood that at King Saud's request Aramco is studying the possibility of some form of treaty arrangement between Saudi Arabia and the Tapline transit states of Jordan, Syria and Lebanon. There was also proposed at Saudi initiative at the recent meeting of the Arab League Economic Committee the formation of an all Arab company to build and operate a pipeline network in lieu of the proposed Turkish line. Ownership would be vested in Arab Governments and in Arab or foreign companies and individuals. A meeting is being called for February 1958 to which international petroleum companies will be invited to discuss the plan.

d.

Prospects for Metline: The principle of a pipeline system extending from the Persian Gulf to the Mediterranean across Turkey is understood to be acceptable to the Turkish and Iranian Governments and possibly the Government of Iraq. Former Prime Minister Nuri has in the past indicated support for the Iraq-Turkish pipeline. If he were to return to office Iraq's position could be viewed with more certainty. Opposition to the project has come from primarily nationalist elements. However, the Government is also hesitant because it would be accused of helping to deprive "sister Arab states" of oil revenues, even though experience as the result of the Suez crisis has raised doubts in the Government as to whether Iraq can continue to base its movement of petroleum on pipelines through Syria. Moreover, even strongly pro-Western Iraqis are loath to put Iraq in the position of destroying a united Arab front, and with it the possibility of using oil as a means of pressure on the West for political ends. Its Kirkuk field, which accounts for 75 percent of Iraq's petroleum production is entirely dependent upon access to a group of pipelines across Syria. An alternate pipeline system would enable expansion of production in the Kirkuk field, the reserves of which are extensive, and would provide Iraq with an alternate or supplemental means of moving its petroleum output into world markets. Saudi Arabia on the other hand is not likely to be interested in Metline for political and geographic reasons. Also, the Saudis, as noted above, seem desirous of encouraging the development of an "all Arab" line and are apt not only to oppose Saudi participation in the project but the participation of Iraq. Also Saudi petroleum fields lie at a farther distance from the Mediterranean terminal of the Turkish line than from the Mediterranean terminal

of the existing Tapline system. The Department understands that the companies included Saudi Arabia's northern fields in their planning in order to bring Saudi Arabia within the proposed new treaty system and thereby obtain improved assurances covering their existing concession arrangements in that country. Only limited enthusiasm in Kuwait can be expected if Saudi Arabia is not participating in the project.

Although the proposed Metline system might include a number of states which are not members of the Baghdad Pact, the major trunk line, extending from the Persian Gulf to the Mediterranean, would lie within the territories of two members of the Baghdad Pact. Accordingly, it would be consistent with U.S. objectives of strengthening ties between Baghdad Pact members to encourage development of a new pipeline system. The project would also benefit from the security offered by the Baghdad Pact, but might on the other hand become even less acceptable to Saudi Arabia and other non-member Arab states if linked to the Pact.

The comprehensive treaty which the companies originally sought is so broad and sweeping in its provisions that it is considered unacceptable to Middle East states. Not only is it viewed as non-negotiable but likely to frighten the states of the area to the point of discouraging all interest in the project. A more limited treaty relating solely to protecting the pipeline system, which is under study by the companies and the Western Governments, is considered more likely to be acceptable to the Middle East states.

Just how much security will result from such an instrument is problematical. It should, however, encourage the companies to invest in this project and may provide international acceptance of principles

relating to pipeline operations and settlement of disputes which may be extended to other facilities.

4. *Summary:*

a. *General:* Additional facilities for the movement of Middle East petroleum to the West are needed. Existing Near Eastern pipelines and the Suez have a capability of moving an estimated 3 million b/d against petroleum requirements of Western Europe and North America (East Coast) which are expected to rise to 5.9 million b/d by 1965.

b. *Arguments in favor of Metline:*

(1) Additional transport facilities in more secure areas are desirable.

(a) Existing arteries, except for the route around the Cape of Good Hope lie entirely within control of Arab states. As a result they will continue to be exploited by the Arab nationalists particularly in the transit states to obtain support from the West for their aspirations, in regard to Israel and other matters.

(b) Dependence of Egypt on the Soviets and Syria's domination by leftist forces makes it wise for the West to diminish reliance on the Suez Canal and existing pipeline facilities by the construction of facilities not transiting these countries.

(2) Since the major trunk lines of the new system would be within the territory of Baghdad Pact states the project would serve to strengthen ties between Pact members (Turkey, Iraq and Iran) and [who] enjoy the security of the Pact,

(3) Iraq would particularly benefit economically by an alternative means of moving petroleum from its Kirkuk field which is now virtually isolated.

(4) The proposed pipeline is cheaper than equivalent tankers, requires less steel and is more profitable. No government financial aid is required. While supertankers offer greater security than pipelines, to construct them in significant numbers by the mid-60's would be very costly and require a crash program.

(5) Even if a pipeline system capable of moving 1.4 million b/d were built, approximately 4.5 million b/d of Western requirements would still have to be handled in 1965 by tankers via Suez or pipelines situated in the Arab states (less perhaps 0.1 million moving by supertanker via the Cape to North America and Europe). If Metline is not built Western dependence on the Suez Canal and existing pipelines would be even greater.

c. Arguments against Metline:

(1) The proposed pipeline system is a fixed installation which can be easily sabotaged in case of serious trouble in the area. It is susceptible to stoppage in case of disputes over transit rights, labor considerations and

other difficulties with local governments. Each state crossed beyond the producing area represents a potential obstacle to the delivery of the petroleum which it carries.

(2) Tankers would provide greater security than Metline for the movement of Middle East petroleum to the West. The security interests of the U.S. might be better protected through expanded tanker construction. Tankers are flexible, they can be used from any point in the Persian Gulf either via the Canal or via the Cape of Good Hope or shifted to the Western Hemisphere or other sources of production. They have a war time security value which a pipeline would not have. Construction of Metline or any other pipelines in the area would reduce tanker construction.

(3) The possibility that Arab states may actively oppose a pipeline route through non-Arab lands creates a degree of political risk for Western interests in the area. Moreover, Arab, opposition is likely to be intensified by an attempt to negotiate a comprehensive treaty which impinges upon their concept of sovereign rights.

(4) Arab pressures in and upon Iraq oppose the project and may result in political instability within that country with unfavorable political developments for the West or in renewed isolation of Iraq in the Arab world.

5. Conclusions:

- a. New transport facilities, e.g., Metline and supertankers, to supplement those presently in existence are required to move Middle East oil to the West.
- b. A greatly accelerated supertanker construction program would provide the most secure oil transport facility and thus would serve the national security better than other alternatives. However, any significant rapid increase in supertankers would require a costly crash program.
- c. The Metline project while somewhat less secure than super tankers, is also in the national interest since it would provide a means of lessening dependence on the Canal and existing pipeline facilities. It should not be viewed as lessening the need for other measures such as (1) emergency petroleum stockpiling in Western Europe, (2) a steady expansion in the construction of super tankers, and (3) development and expansion of alternative production facilities in more secure areas.

¹ Source: Department of State, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 61 D 167, Middle East Petroleum Pipeline System, Construction of; NSC 5722. Secret. This memorandum and the attached background paper were circulated to the NSC Planning Board on August 5 under cover of a memorandum from Marion W. Boggs. After Planning Board discussion of the subject and preparation by appropriate agencies of any additional studies desired by the Planning Board, the Department of State was to prepare a draft statement of policy as the basis for a report to the NSC.

² Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

³ Secret.

⁴ Not printed.

⁵ These estimates on completion dates appear optimistic, since actual construction work could not commence until after concession and treaty arrangements had been concluded. The companies are also planning on

38"/40" pipe which is not likely to be available in large commercial quantities until 1960. [Footnote in the source text.]

⁵ These estimates on completion dates appear optimistic, since actual construction work could not commence until after concession and treaty arrangements had been concluded. The companies are also planning on 38"/40" pipe which is not likely to be available in large commercial quantities until 1960. [Footnote in the source text.]

⁶ These cost estimates were made by the international petroleum companies sometime prior to the recent \$6 a ton rise in the price of steel. [Footnote in the source text.]

⁶ These cost estimates were made by the international petroleum companies sometime prior to the recent \$6 a ton rise in the price of steel. [Footnote in the source text.]

⁷ Not printed.

⁸ The organizational measures would include increasing (1) the number of vessels forming a convoy (to 15 or 20 for each of four convoys or even to 30 to 40 vessels for each of two convoys) and (2) the speed limit of 7 knots. Larger convoys would be made possible by decreasing the spacing between ships. [Footnote in the source text.]

⁹ This assumes more rapid completion of the program than envisaged by the Suez Canal Company which estimated completion by 1968. [Footnote in the source text.]

¹⁰ Normally, no more than 15 to 20 giant tankers could be expected to use the Cape of Good Hope route by 1965 unless Canal tolls were raised substantially. These would have an aggregate carrying capacity of about 100,000 b/d. [Footnote in the source text.]

¹¹ Table 2 is not printed.

255. Editorial Note

Between August 5 and 9, representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom met in Washington to continue their discussions on the problems of transporting Middle East oil. For additional information, see the editorial note, [volume X, page 734](#).

256. Editorial Note

At its 334th meeting on August 8, the National Security Council noted a July 29 memorandum from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense and an attachment, which had been forwarded by S. Everett Gleason to the National Security Council on August 5. Neither the memorandum nor the attachment has been declassified. (Department of State, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 61 D 167, Middle East, Military Implications of Joint Resolution on) At the meeting, the NSC determined that action called for in NSC Action No. 1753 had been completed and directed the NSC Planning Board to prepare a study of long-range U.S. policy toward the Middle East area, with a view to presenting recommendations to the NSC in November 1957. (NSC Action No. 1771, approved by the President on August 9; *Ibid.*, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council) NSC Action No. 1753, taken at the 331st meeting of the NSC, July 18, and approved by the President on July 22, was not declassified. (*Ibid.*) NSC Action No. 1771 initiated the process that culminated in the adoption at the 352d meeting of the National Security Council on January 22, 1958, of NSC 5801, “Long-Range U.S. Policy Toward the Near East.” NSC 5801 is scheduled for publication in [Foreign Relations, 1958–1960, volume XIII](#).

Also on August 8, Marion Boggs forwarded to the NSC Planning Board a memorandum outlining the “Procedure To Review Long-Range U.S. Policy Toward the Near East (NSC 5428).” A copy is in Department of State, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 61 D 167, NSC 5801 File.

257. Memorandum Prepared in the Department of the Interior¹

Washington, August 1957.

PROPOSAL FOR NEW MIDDLE EAST OIL PIPELINE SYSTEM

Comments of the Office of Oil and Gas, Department of the Interior

1. At its meeting on August 13, 1957, the NSC Planning Board discussed the problem of a possible new Middle East petroleum pipeline system as outlined in the State Department memorandum of August 1, 1957, with attachments,² and invited Government agencies concerned to submit such additional comment or information with respect to the construction of such a pipeline system as they may deem appropriate.

2. It may be helpful to submit at this time the following brief comments, particularly because recent events in Syria may make it desirable to consider in the near future some aspects of this proposal. A detailed analysis of this and other Middle East petroleum problems has been begun in connection with bilateral U.S./U.K. discussions that have been in progress for some time. Although it is anticipated that this analysis will materially clarify many parts of the Middle East oil transportation problem, there are some fundamental aspects of a major pipeline to move Middle East oil to Western markets that may be helpful now to mention.

A. The Kirkuk field in Iraq is located several hundred miles from tidewater; has reserves capable of supporting a production rate much above the 500,000 plus B/D capacity of the Iraq pipeline system; its oil must seek a market in the West.

B. A large capacity pipeline from the Kirkuk field to a deep water Mediterranean terminal in Turkey would

provide a very useful new outlet for Kirkuk oil with added insurance against disturbances in Syria in particular that have in the past been very expensive for Iraq.

3.

Construction of a pipeline from Kirkuk through Turkey to the Mediterranean would be a problem relatively much more simple than the entire pipeline system described in the State Department memorandum. Its functions would be of obvious value to the West, to Iraq, and to Turkey. It, therefore, would appear eligible for support under any Middle East conditions that can be foreseen.

This pipeline would involve basic political problems similar to those of the complete system but would be much more limited in scope. This part of the system would likewise provide an excellent occasion for exploring the political problems involved.

4.

The complete pipeline system would draw on the crude oil reserves at the head of the Persian Gulf as well as on those of Northern Iraq and Turkey. In addition to the complex political problems, there are other aspects which must be examined in the light of our national security. These include the question of whether undue reliance might be placed on pipelines; the extent to which construction and use of this pipeline might inhibit normal expansion of the tanker fleet; comparative security of the pipeline, the Suez Canal, and other tanker routes; costs and economics of the pipeline relative to use of large tankers on alternate routes.

These complex considerations can be defined with acceptable accuracy for planning purposes only after completion of the extensive and fully informed appraisal of all factors involved which is now underway.

5. In view of the circumstances, it is suggested that:

- a. Consideration be given now to the question of whether support should be given to the Kirkuk–Mediterranean line via Turkey.
- b. Consideration of the complete system be postponed until the detailed analyses now under way have been completed.

¹ Source: Department of State, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 61 D 167, Middle East Petroleum Pipeline System, Construction of; NSC 5722. Secret. Circulated under cover of an August 26 memorandum from Boggs to the NSC Planning Board for use in connection with its discussion of this subject on August 30. (*Ibid.*) ² Attached to [Document 254](#).

258. Memorandum of a Conversation, Washington, August 26, 1957¹

Washington, August 26, 1957

SUBJECT

IPC Pipeline

PARTICIPANTS

Mr. Garran, British Chargé

Mr. Willie Morris, British Embassy

NEA—Mr. William M. Rountree

During the course of a meeting in the evening of August 26th, Mr. Garran referred to his recent conversation with the Secretary,² in which the Secretary had mentioned the IPC pipeline in connection with current Syrian problems. According to Mr. Garran, the Secretary had asked for the British evaluation of the possibility of the pipeline being severed. He had now received certain information from London. He said the Foreign Office evaluation was that the lines would probably not be severed in present circumstances. If, however, the Syrians were put under heavy pressure and there was trouble in Syria itself, or if there were any question of intervention from outside, the lines would likely be severed.

I told Mr. Garran that we would certainly share the evaluation that the lines would probably be severed in the circumstances mentioned. I felt the Secretary's question, however, had been a bit broader. Although I was not present I was under the impression that the Secretary had sought information on the effects upon the UK and Europe of the lines' severance. We would want to know, if possible, whether the consequences would be of manageable proportions so that this factor would not be an over-riding consideration in the attitude which we and others might take toward the Syrian Government in trying to deal with the extremely dangerous political

problem which had been created by recent developments there. I said that I would present the information to the Secretary, and speak to the Secretary later about a more precise evaluation of the information we sought.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 880.2553/8–2657. Secret. Drafted by Rountree.

² No memorandum of this conversation has been found.

259. Memorandum From William Leonhart of the Policy Planning Staff to the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Kalijarvi)¹

Washington, August 30, 1957.

SUBJECT

Metline Project: NSC Planning Board Meeting, August 30, 1957

1. The NSC Planning Board, in its meeting this morning, again considered the Department's background paper, "Significance of a New Middle East Pipeline System."² In conformity with your memorandum of today's date on the same subject we emphasized the Department's hope that an early decision could be reached by the NSC.
 2. Accordingly, we have now been requested to prepare a draft statement of policy for Planning Board consideration. At the meeting the Justice representative reiterated the position of his Department that no decision be made with respect to Metline within the next four weeks while the Attorney General is negotiating for a relief settlement of pending litigation with certain major U.S. petroleum companies. The time that will necessarily be required for Departmental drafting and Planning Board consideration will probably consume the next month. If not, the paper when completed by the Planning Board, can be held back from NSC consideration until after October 1.
 3. The Planning Board would like to know the date on which the draft policy statement should be scheduled. Would you please have your action officer notify me when we expect to have the draft ready for Planning Board consideration.³
-

¹ Source: Department of State, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 61 D 167, Middle East Petroleum Pipeline System, Construction of; NSC 5722. Secret.

² Attached to [Document 254](#).

³ Draft statements of policy on “Construction of a New Middle East Petroleum Pipeline System” were circulated to the NSC Planning Board on September 19 and 25. (Department of State, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 61 D 167, Middle East Petroleum Pipeline System, Construction of; NSC 5722) For text of a draft statement of policy sent to the National Security Council on September 30, see [Document 265](#).

260. Memorandum From the Director of the National Security Council Secretariat (Boggs) to the National Security Council Planning Board¹

Washington, September 5, 1957.

SUBJECT

Review of Long-Range U.S. Policy Toward the Near East

REFERENCES

A. Memo for Planning Board, August 14, 1957 (Procedures) and references therein

B. Memo for Planning Board, August 30, 1957 (CIA Summaries)

The enclosed reports, prepared by the Department of State, on (1) the adequacy of the current statement of U.S. policy toward the Near East (NSC 5428) and new policy questions not covered by NSC 5428, and (2) publicly announced U.S. policy on Near East questions, are transmitted herewith for discussion by the Planning Board at its meeting on Friday, September 6, 1957.

Marion W. Boggs²

[Enclosure 1]

LONG-RANGE U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE NEAR EAST: REPORT ON EXISTING POLICY AND NEW POLICY QUESTIONS

Problem

(1) To break the existing policy statement in NSC 5428 into two categories:

(a) Policy statements apparently acceptable and reflecting the current situation;

(b) Policy statements about which there is some question or uncertainty as to present applicability.

(2) To list policy questions not covered in the existing paper.

Discussion

NSC 5428 was approved by the President on July 23, 1954. The pace and magnitude of events in the Near East since that date has manifested itself in every aspect of our relations with the countries of the area. There remain statements in NSC 5428 with respect to our interests and our objectives in the Near East which are still valid. There is hardly a paragraph in the entire document, however, which fulfills the criteria of acceptability and accurate reflection of the current situation. We believe that a complete redrafting rather than a mere revision of this document is required and have not attempted to dissect out those fragments of NSC 5428 which could be said to have continuing validity.

The Current Situation

The NIE on major trends affecting U.S. interests in the Near East over the next five years (Target date October 1)³ should be of great assistance in identifying and evaluating the developments of the past three years and their lasting impact on the area. Without prejudging the conclusions of this forthcoming NIE, it can be stated that the principal development of the past three years has been the assumption by the U.S. of main responsibility for the Near East on behalf of the free nations and tacit recognition of this fact by our allies. This development has perhaps been most dramatically brought to the attention of the American people by the promulgation of the "Middle East Doctrine" by the President and the Congress followed by the highly successful trip of Ambassador Richards to the area. Our country took these steps after a series of events, particularly the ill-fated invasion of Egypt, demonstrated the decline of Britain's position in the area and the eclipse of French influence. It was clear that urgent and effective assumption of Free World leadership in this area was essential, in view of the substantial

increase of Soviet presence and influence in the area brought about by heavy propaganda support of Arab causes, arms deals, and trading arrangements.

Policy Questions We Face

This burgeoning of our responsibilities in the Near East has had its impact on all aspects of our relations with each of the countries of the area. New day-to-day guidelines of policy have had to be devised. Without attempting to anticipate the detailed treatment of specific questions which will be set forth in the requested staff study (Target date October 15) it would seem that our objective in reviewing our long-range policy toward the area will best be met if we seek to provide the best possible answers to this general question: The United States has formally assumed Free World leadership in the Near East. How shall we carry out this endeavor, and to what degree should we commit our prestige to it?

From this broad line of inquiry will flow a great many specific and detailed questions. In a preliminary examination in the Department of State, over thirty hard questions affecting political and economic matters quickly emerged. In the military field use has been made of the documents supplied by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In the attached annex, we set forth a few questions of the type which we feel will come to light and call for answers in the course of our continuing study.

Annex

1. The Secretary of State's speech of August 26, 1955 indicated our willingness to take the initiative in assisting the parties to the Arab-Israel dispute to work toward a settlement. In view of recent developments, would it now be in the U.S. interest for this country to assume the leading role in such an endeavor?
2. Does our new role in the area require us to seek peace-time expansion of our military facilities and bases in the Near East? Should we seek stockpiling facilities in the area? Do we need to station additional forces there? Are our transit rights adequate?

3. What should be our attitude towards “Arab unity”? Are there other possible regional groupings which we should promote? Have recent developments altered our thinking as to the short-term and long-range roles to be played by indigenous forces in area defense?
4. How can we reconcile our increased role in the area with significant public and congressional sentiment favoring a curtailment of economic and military assistance programs?
5. Should circumstances require it, do we have the capability in the area for quick and effective action in such “limited war” contingencies as an outbreak of Arab-Israel hostilities; an armed attack by a Middle East nation under the control of international Communism against another nation in the area; a Communist-inspired internal uprising against the established government of a friendly Near East state?
6. How can we combat Communist political penetration of the Middle East?

[Enclosure 2]

SUMMARY OF PUBLICLY ANNOUNCED UNITED STATES POLICY ON NEAR EAST QUESTIONS⁴

1. *The Tripartite Declaration of 1950.* The issuing Governments (United States, United Kingdom, France) recognize that the Arab states and Israel need to maintain a certain level of armed forces for the purposes of internal security, legitimate self-defense, and to permit them to play their part in the defense of the area. The three Governments require assurances from states receiving arms that such states do not intend to undertake any act of aggression. The three Governments, should they find that any of these states (Arab states and Israel) was preparing to violate frontiers or armistice lines, would, consistent with their obligations as UN members, immediately take action, both within and outside the UN, to prevent such violation.

In testimony before Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees on January 15, 1957, the Secretary said that the British and French had stated that the Declaration was no longer binding on them, but that the Declaration was still an expression of United States policy.

2. *Arab-Israel Settlement.* The United States believes a settlement is an imperative necessity and will in all probability require support from outside the area for its achievement. The plight of the refugees requires that these people should, through resettlement and, to such an extent as may be feasible, repatriation, be enabled to live a life of dignity and self-respect. The President is prepared to recommend: (a) substantial United States participation in an international loan to enable Israel to make adequate compensation to the Palestine Arab refugees; (b) a United States contribution to the realization of water development and irrigation projects which would directly or indirectly facilitate the resettlement of the refugees; (c) United States assistance to enable the parties to reach agreement on permanent Arab-Israel boundaries and United States participation in an international guarantee of such agreed frontiers. The United States would support a UN review of the status of Jerusalem.

(Secretary of State's speech of August 26, 1955)⁵

3. *Supply of Arms.* While we continue willing to consider requests for arms needed for legitimate self-defense, we do not intend to contribute to an arms competition in the Near East because we do not think such a race would be in the true interest of any of the participants.

(Statement by the President, November 9, 1955)⁶

4. *Attitude toward Israel and Arab States.* United States foreign policy embraces the preservation of the State of Israel in its essentials. It also embraces the principle of maintaining our friendship with Israel and the Arab States.

(Secretary of State's letter to Congressman Hugh Scott et al., February 6, 1956)⁷

5. *Aggression in the Near East*. The United States, in accordance with its responsibilities under the Charter of the UN, will observe its commitments within Constitutional means to oppose any aggression in the area. The United States is likewise determined to support and assist any nation which might be subjected to such aggression.

(White House statement, November 29, 1956)⁸

6. *The Baghdad Pact*. The United States has, from the inception of the Baghdad Pact, supported the Pact and the principles and objectives of collective security on which it is based. A threat to the territorial integrity or political independence of the members would be viewed by the United States with the utmost gravity.

(Department of State statement, November 29, 1956)⁹

7. The “*Middle East Doctrine*” (Public Law 85–7, March 9, 1957). The President is authorized to cooperate with and assist any nation or group of nations in the general area of the Middle East desiring such assistance in the development of economic strength dedicated to the maintenance of national independence. The President is authorized to undertake military assistance programs with any nation or group of nations desiring such assistance. The United States regards as vital to the national interest and world peace the preservation of the independence and integrity of the nations of the Middle East. If the President determines the necessity thereof, the United States is prepared to use armed forces to assist any such nation or group of such nations requesting assistance against armed aggression from any country controlled by international Communism. The President should continue to furnish facilities and military assistance to the UNEF in the Middle East with a view to maintaining the truce in that region.

¹ Source: Department of State, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 61 D 167, NSC 5801 File. Top Secret.

² Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

³ Concurred in by the Intelligence Advisory Committee on October 8; see [Document 267](#).

⁴ This brief summary does not purport to be a comprehensive review of publicly expressed United States policy on the many important questions affecting our relations with the states of the Near East. Comprehensive collections of important documents are contained in “The Suez Canal Problem, July 26–September 22, 1956” (Dept. of State Publication 6392) and “United States Policy in the Middle East, September 1956–June 1957” (Dept. of State [Publication] 6505). [Footnote in the source text.]

⁵ For text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, September 5, 1955, pp. 378–380.

⁶ Reference is to President Eisenhower’s statement of November 9, 1955, on the occasion of hostilities between Egypt and Israel in violation of the General Armistice Agreement. For text, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1957*, pp. 839–840.

⁷ For text of Secretary Dulles’ exchange of correspondence with 40 members of the U.S. House of Representatives, see Department of State *Bulletin*, February 20, 1956, pp. 285–288.

⁸ The reference is evidently an error. The statement described in paragraph 5 was made by White House Press Secretary James C. Hagerty on April 9, 1956, in Augusta, Georgia. For text, see *Ibid.*, April 23, 1956, p. 688.

⁹ See [Document 152](#).

261. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree) to the Secretary of State¹

Washington, September 6, 1957.

SUBJECT

Soviet Note on the Middle East of September 3, 1957

Discussion:

The latest Soviet note on the Middle East dated September 3, 1957, replying to the United States note of June 11, 1957,² is primarily a restatement of familiar themes. These themes, however, have been updated by references to Sixth Fleet maneuvers “in connection with the developments in Jordan,” the “unprovoked aggression” by Great Britain against the people of Oman, the allegation that the United States and other Western powers “prevented” the Security Council from discussing the problem of Oman, and the anti-government conspiracy allegedly exposed in Syria “which was organized by official American representatives”.

Similar notes despatched to the United Kingdom and France differed little from the note addressed to the United States Government, although they both included specific references to the Baghdad Pact.

The notes are probably designed to serve as a warning to the West against countermeasures in Syria. Their delivery is timed to make a bid for Arab support as the UNGA convenes by restating the familiar Soviet propaganda themes.

Recommendation:

That, should the matter be raised in your talks with Foreign Minister Pineau, you indicate that the Department is drafting a reply which, after

coordination with French and United Kingdom officials, you feel should be delivered in the near future.³

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 680.00/9–657. Confidential. Drafted by John Dorman, Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs.

² On February 11, 1957, the Soviet Union initiated a public exchange of correspondence with the United States concerning a Soviet proposal for a four-power declaration setting forth basic principles to govern the policy of the two powers with respect to the Middle East. For text of the two notes cited here, as well as previous correspondence, see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1957*, pp. 761–769.

³ The United States responded to the Soviet note on September 24 in a note from the U.S. Embassy in Moscow to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs. For text, see *Ibid.*, p. 770.

**262. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State,
Washington, September 25, 1957, 11:59 a.m.¹**

Washington, September 25, 1957, 11:59 a.m.

SUBJECT

Pella Plan for Middle East Development Fund

PARTICIPANTS

Italian:

Sig. Giuseppe Pella, Italian Foreign Minister

Amb. Manlio Brosio, Italian Ambassador

Sig. Massimo Magistrati, Director General, Political
Affairs, Italian Foreign Office

Sig. Attilio Cattani, Director General, Economic
Affairs, Italian Foreign Office

U.S.:

The Secretary

Ambassador Zellerbach

Mr. C. Burke Elbrick, EUR

Mr. H. G. Torbert, Jr., WE

Mr. A. Jose DeSeabra, Interpreter

Foreign Minister Pella said that for some time now he has had an “*idée fixe*”, that of a “triangular system” to give economic assistance to countries in the Middle East. The assistance would not be given *directly* by the U.S.

but by those countries receiving loan aid from the U.S. The local currency counterpart equivalent of the amount to be repaid the U.S. under previous loan programs would go into a fund administered and controlled by the U.S. At the rate of 60 to 70 million dollars a year, in about 15 years the fund could build up to approximately 1 billion dollars; the intake could be increased through sale of bonds, etc.

One of the consequences of such economic aid to the Middle East would be that of increasing exports of equipment and goods in general from European countries to the Middle East. Thus additional markets would be obtained by European nations, at the same time that the economic development of the Middle East would be substantially increased.

Before such a program could be put into operation, certain difficulties would have to be ironed out:

1. The U.S. would be by right and duty the sole judge of what countries should receive what aid.
2. An Act of Congress would be needed. However, it might be easier (here Pella is speaking from long experience as Finance Minister) to obtain a deferment on the payment of debts than to have new appropriations voted.

One argument in favor of this plan is that at present the U.S. is spending more than 60 million dollars a year in aid to the Middle East.

The Secretary commented that our general policy is to oppose the creation of new international funds which were frequently presented. (For example: the Japanese had suggested the day before that we contribute \$500 million to one for the Far East and the Latin Americans had already suggested one.) However, he did not wish absolutely to foreclose a new idea and suggested Mr. Pella might wish to write up his proposal in somewhat more detail and discuss it with Ambassador Zellerbach.²

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 880.00/9–2557. Confidential. Drafted by Torbert. The time of the meeting is from Dulles' Appointment Book. (Princeton University Library, Dulles Papers) Italian Foreign Minister Pella was in the United States as head of the Italian Delegation to the 12th session of the U.N. General Assembly.

² On October 28, Foreign Minister Pella forwarded to Ambassador Zellerbach a memorandum embodying Pella's proposals for a Middle East Development Fund under cover of an undated letter from Pella to Secretary Dulles. The text of the memorandum and the covering letter were forwarded to the Department of State in despatch 543 from Rome, October 30. (Department of State, Central Files, 880.0000/10–3057) On November 29, Zellerbach forwarded to Secretary Dulles a signed copy of the two documents and a supplementary memorandum from the Italian Foreign Ministry. In his covering letter to Dulles, Zellerbach stated that his reaction to the basic political premise on which Pella's proposal rested was generally positive. Zellerbach also noted that Pella's stated aim was to obtain U.S. assent before discussing the matter with his European colleagues. (*Ibid.*, 880.0000/11–2957)

263. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, September 25, 1957, 3:35 p.m.¹

Washington, September 25, 1957, 3:35 p.m.

SUBJECT

Iraqi Pipelines

PARTICIPANTS

H. E. Ali Mumtaz al-Daftari, Minister of Finance and Acting Foreign Minister of Iraq

Saleh Mahdi, Chargé d'Affaires of Iraq

The Secretary

Stuart W. Rockwell, NE

David D. Newsom, NE

The Finance Minister said that he was discussing with Iraq Petroleum Company officials in London the possibility of new pipeline capacity for Iraq. This would be achieved, he said, by a pipeline to Kuwait and by diverting the Haifa pipeline. The pipeline through Kuwait would raise the amount of oil shipped from southern Iraq from 8,000,000 tons per year to 23,000,000. The diversion of the Haifa line would add an additional 12,000,000 tons per year.

The Secretary asked the Minister's views regarding a proposed pipeline through Turkey. The Minister replied that this would be very expensive and would cost nearly \$1 billion and would take four years to build. He said Iraq could not wait so long to get additional capacity. The Secretary said he thought the \$1 billion figure was high, and mentioned the figure of \$450 million. The Finance Minister indicated he believed this to be the least desirable of the alternatives currently open to Iraq.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 887.2553/9–2557. Secret. Drafted by Newsom. The time of the meeting is from Dulles' Appointment Book. (Princeton University Library, Dulles Papers) See also *infra*.

**264. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State,
Washington, September 25, 1957, 3:35 p.m.¹**

Washington, September 25, 1957, 3:35 p.m.

SUBJECT

Middle East Development Organization

PARTICIPANTS

H.E. Ali-Mumtaz al-Daftari, Minister of Finance and Acting
Foreign Minister of Iraq

Saleh Mahdi, Chargé d'Affaires of Iraq

The Secretary

Stuart W. Rockwell, NE

David D. Newsom, NE

During the course of his conversation with the Secretary, the Finance Minister said he was working on an idea to create an organization which would help those Arab states which did not possess oil revenue. He said this would be accomplished by a contribution of the oil-producing states up to 3–5% of revenues to a central organization. This organization would then be in a position to lend money to other Arab states, perhaps at a modest interest fee of 2% over a long term. He mentioned that Lebanon, Syria and Jordan were nations immediately requiring help.

He said that he was discussing this proposal with Selwyn Lloyd and hoped to get Lloyd's agreement for Kuwait to participate. He said he believed Kuwait had more revenue now than they could use and would have more in

the future. He said he believed if he could get Kuwait to participate, Saudi Arabia would also be encouraged to join.

The Secretary expressed the view that this was an excellent idea.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 880.00/9–2557. Secret. Drafted by Newsom. The time of the meeting is from Dulles' Appointment Book. (Princeton University Library, Dulles Papers) See also [supra](#).

265. National Security Council Report¹

Washington, September 30, 1957.

NSC 5722

CONSTRUCTION OF A NEW MIDDLE EAST PETROLEUM PIPELINE SYSTEM

Note by the Executive Secretary to the National Security Council

REFERENCE

NSC 5428²

The enclosed draft statement of policy on the subject, prepared by the NSC Planning Board at the request of the Department of State, is transmitted herewith for consideration by the National Security Council at its meeting on Thursday, October 10, 1957.³

It is recommended that, if the Council adopts the enclosed statement of policy, it be submitted to the President with the recommendation that he approve it, direct its implementation by all appropriate Executive departments and agencies of the U.S. Government, and designate the Operations Coordinating Board as the coordinating agency.

James S. Lay, Jr.⁴

[Enclosure]

**DRAFT STATEMENT OF U.S. POLICY ON CONSTRUCTION OF A NEW MIDDLE EAST
PETROLEUM PIPELINE SYSTEM**⁵

(Note: This paper does not consider the Middle East oil situation in general
war)

General Considerations

1. The reduction of the vulnerability of oil movements from the Middle East is vital to the economic growth of Western Europe and therefore of major interest to the United States. European dependence on oil as a source of energy is steadily increasing.⁶ For the next decade at least, the Middle East will continue to be the principal source for supplying Europe's growing requirements for oil.

2. The vulnerability of the European-North and West African area to interruption of Middle East transit facilities was clearly demonstrated during the Suez crisis. Only a major effort by the United States, Venezuela, and the European countries and by the supplying companies, coupled with an unusually mild winter and the continued operation of Tapline, prevented a serious emergency from developing. This region's dependence on Middle East oil is increasing both absolutely and relatively. In 1955 the Eastern Hemisphere west of Suez obtained 1,938,000 barrels per day, or 67 per cent of its total oil supplies from the Middle East. In 1960 the Middle East is expected to provide 3,250,000 barrels per day, or 74 per cent of the total supplies. By 1965 this is expected to increase to 4,700,000 barrels per day, or 76 per cent of the total supplies.

3. If facilities for the transport of oil over new routes are not constructed, all of this oil, except that which passes around the Cape of Good Hope, must continue to move through Syria and Egypt. Currently about 2,300,000 barrels per day are moving across Syria and Egypt—that is, 600,000 barrels per day through the IPC pipelines and Tapline transiting Syria; 1,700,000 barrels per day via the Suez Canal. By 1958, if the IPC lines are fully repaired, planned expansion of Tapline is completed, and the customary methods of operation of the Suez Canal continue to be followed, these facilities will transport about 3,000,000 barrels per day. The risks of depending solely on these facilities are obvious.

4. A number of proposals for reducing the degree of vulnerability appear to offer prospects of long-range relief—for example, the development of new oil sources west of Suez and an emergency program for the construction of supertankers capable of economic operation around the Cape of Good Hope. Only time and experience can determine the degree of relief from

new sources. In the long run, supertankers as an alternative to the Canal and existing pipelines would provide perhaps the greatest measure of safety. Existing foreign shipyards already have work expected to keep them substantially occupied until 1961. American shipyards have some idle capacity. The contribution that the tankers now under construction can make toward a reduction of vulnerability will be relatively modest during the period to 1962. The extent to which tanker construction will be continued thereafter cannot now be predicted, but would be affected by then existing or projected capacity of pipelines (see table, p. 15).⁷ An emergency program for supertanker construction, beyond that now planned, might involve government outlays for shipyard construction.

5. Another important means to help avoid an increased reliance on Syria and the Suez Canal would be the construction of pipelines to transport oil from the northern Persian Gulf region to the Mediterranean without passing through Syria. One industry proposal is Metline, a privately-financed and -operated crude oil pipeline, which 17 international petroleum companies, including 14 American companies, are currently planning to construct. The first phase of their proposed program includes construction by the second half of 1961 of part of the Mediterranean terminal and a 38/40 inch trunk line from the Mediterranean to Rumaila in southern Iraq together with gathering lines from Safaniya/Burgan and Abadan. The second phase would involve completion, in the second half of 1962, of the Mediterranean terminal and a parallel 38/40 inch line from the Mediterranean to Rumaila. The initial quantities of petroleum for the line when fully completed are as follows:

Saudi Arabia (Safaniya field)	200,000 b/d
Kuwait (Burgan field)	400,000 b/d
Southern Iran	350,000 b/d
Southern Iraq	250,000 b/d
Northern Iraq	200,000 b/d
	1,400,000 b/d

In the event that Saudi Arabia and Kuwait do not participate in a multilateral treaty covering this project, the second parallel trunk line and the gathering lines to these countries are unlikely to be completed. This

circumstance would leave Metline with a capacity probably not exceeding 800,000 b/d according to the above estimates.

6. The precise extent of interest on the part of Near East petroleum producers in this project cannot now be determined. The original concept, as indicated in paragraph five above, was based on the assumption by the industry that a treaty negotiated with Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Iran and the Governments of the investing companies was needed to protect existing investments in petroleum activities in the area generally and the new investment necessitated by this particular project. The inclusion of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait now seems marginal and the project increasingly appears to be one involving essentially Iraqi petroleum, possibly Iranian petroleum and right-of-ways across Turkey. Turkish petroleum, if commercially exploitable deposits are discovered in that country, could also be moved through this line. It cannot be assumed that the industry would be interested in making a heavy investment in this line if it extended solely from the northern Iraqi fields to the Mediterranean. Only four of the seventeen companies interested in Metline are involved in the development of northern Iraqi fields and they export the bulk of the output of the fields in this part of Iraq over existing lines in Syria. Currently they are moving 200,000 b/d out across Syria; by next May shipments will reach 530,000 b/d; and current improvement plans will bring shipments up to 700,000-800,000 b/d by 1961 when the Kirkuk fields will be producing at their estimated capacity (800,000 b/d).

7. Among the risks involved in the construction of Metline are the following:

a. The proposed pipeline system is a fixed installation which can be easily sabotaged in case of serious trouble in the area. It is susceptible to stoppage in case of disputes over transit rights, labor considerations and other difficulties with local governments. The extent of this risk will vary with the proximity of the line to the Syrian border, which will depend upon the detailed plan developed by the oil companies.

b. Establishment of Metline, or expansion or establishment of any other pipelines from the Persian Gulf, would reduce future tanker

requirements and thus tend to reduce the construction and⁸ reduce the availability of tankers. The security interest of the United States might be better protected through expanded tanker construction; tankers can be flexibly used, and, providing that political factors permit it, can be used from any point in the Persian Gulf either via the Canal or via the Cape of Good Hope or shifted to the Western Hemisphere or other sources of production. They have a wartime security value which a pipeline would not have.

c. The possibility that Arab states may actively oppose a pipeline route through non-Arab lands creates a degree of political risk for Western interests in the area. Arab pressures in and upon Iraq to oppose the project may result in political instability within that country with unfavorable political developments for the West including further isolation of Iraq in the Arab world. Except for Iran, at present all oil to be moved originates in Arab countries and passes through Arab countries.

8. Despite the risks mentioned above, however, Metline offers the following advantages:

a. Metline will reduce the vulnerability of Western Europe to interruption of existing transit facilities under conditions short of general war in the following manner:

(1) Metline will provide an alternative route through friendly territory (Baghdad Pact countries) for the transport to the Eastern Mediterranean coast of a portion of Western Europe's requirements for Middle East oil.

(2) The existence of Metline may lessen the likelihood that any other transit facility will be closed either by sabotage or by the imposition of crippling conditions of transit.

(3) The existence of Metline will lessen Western Europe's growing dependence on the Suez Canal.

b. Metline will lessen the vulnerability of the economy of Iraq to the cessation of the movement of its inland petroleum across Syria.

c. The conclusion of an inter-governmental treaty protecting the specific pipeline agreements involved in Metline may develop new international criteria for the resolution of disputes involving transit arrangements which may have beneficial effects on the existing pipelines and Canal operations.

d. The proposed pipeline makes possible economies in the transport of Middle East petroleum as compared with an all-tanker operation from the Persian Gulf. Capital investment is smaller than would be involved in an equivalent tanker lift; less steel and other materials are required.

e. Since the major trunk lines of the new system would be within the territory of certain Baghdad Pact states, the project would serve to strengthen ties among them.

Objectives

9. Reduction of Western European vulnerability to the interruption of oil movement from the Middle East.

Major Policy Guidance

State-Treasury-Commerce-Budget

Interior-ODM-JCS

10. The United States should favor private industry plans for the construction of all or part of Metline as part of Metline, because the risks an additional facility for the westward of interruption of that line are great and because, once built or

movement of Middle East petroleum, in projected, Metline would the interests of U.S. security. discourage construction and continued availability of tankers and thereby, in the event of interruption of the line, decrease the capability for the transport of Middle East oil which would otherwise exist.⁹

11. a. U.S. companies which have shown an interest in the project should be encouraged, taking into account the considerations listed below, to refer to the U.S. Government a formalized Metline plan believed by them to be acceptable. The Attorney General should be requested to advise the National Security Council as to the antitrust implications of the plan as a basis for Presidential determination of the national security interest in the plan in relation to its anti-trust implications.¹⁰

b. A prerequisite to Government approval of Metline from an anti-trust standpoint should be full opportunity by all companies which indicate an interest in this project to participate on an equitable basis. Any initial plan should encompass feasible extensions of the project to other oil fields in the Middle East, with all of the interested companies given, in advance, equitable rights to all extensions of the Metline project.

12. The United States should be prepared with the UK, the Netherlands and possibly France, to negotiate an appropriate treaty arrangement with

Turkey and Iraq, and if needed with other Middle East countries. The treaty would be designed to provide feasible legal and diplomatic assurances relating to the agreements entered into between the oil companies and the Middle East Governments concerning investments in and operation of Metline.

13. No U.S. Government financial support, allocations of material or other administrative measures should be provided for the Metline project. Patrolling or other protective measures by U.S. armed forces should neither be provided for nor contemplated in the treaties referred to in paragraph 12.

14. The United States should, as appropriate, favor other activities by private enterprise not inconsistent with paragraphs 10-13 of achieving the objective stated in paragraph 9, such as developing new oil sources west of Suez, building oil stocks in Western Europe, and accelerating the development of atomic power in Western Europe.

¹ Source: Department of State, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 61 D 167, Middle East Petroleum Pipeline System, Construction of; NSC 5722. Secret. Not printed are an annex and accompanying table that set forth the probable shortfall in petroleum supplies to the Eastern Hemisphere west of Suez in 1965 under certain assumptions involving the closure of all or part of Middle East transit facilities in an emergency short of general war.

² [Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. IX, Part 1, p. 525.](#)

³ NSC 5722 was not considered by the National Security Council on October 10 or later. On February 27, 1958, in a memorandum from Gerard C. Smith to Robert Cutler, the Department of State recommended that NSC 5722 be cancelled. The memorandum noted that recent developments made it “unlikely that Metline can now be successfully advanced.” The memorandum listed the following two developments:

“1. A lessening of industry interest as a result of (a) slackening in the rate of increase in Western European demand for Middle East petroleum; (b) an overabundance of tankers; (c) a commitment by the Iraq Petroleum Company to plan for using the Syrian pipelines to increase output of the Kirkuk fields.

“2. Current Arab opposition to a pipeline through non-Arab territory and the resulting likely political disturbance should construction of Metline go forward or should negotiations for necessary treaty protection be initiated.”

The National Security Council cancelled NSC 5722 on March 4, 1958. Copies of Smith’s memorandum and Lay’s March 4 memorandum to the National Security Council are in Department of State, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 61 D 167, Middle East Petroleum Pipeline System, Construction of; NSC 5722.

⁴ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

⁵ An attached map, entitled “Metline, as related to principal Middle East petroleum producing and transmission facilities,” is not printed.

⁶ In this statement, allowance has been made for increased coal production in Europe and for atomic energy development. [Footnote in the source text.]

⁷ Not printed.

⁸ The ODM Member wishes to insert the word “significantly” at this point. The Department of Commerce is unwilling to express a judgment at this time as to whether the reduction in availability of tankers would be significant or not. [Footnote in the source text.]

⁹ The ODM, Interior and JCS representatives believe that any U.S. encouragement of private industry should be limited to a line which would provide a Mediterranean outlet through Turkey from the Kirkuk area in Iraq (and perhaps also from the Qom field in Iran) and which accordingly would have no adverse effect on tanker availabilities. State believes that if such plans are presented to the U.S. Government they should receive most careful consideration. [Footnote in the source text.]

¹⁰ The Justice representative calls attention to the fact that the disposition of the pending anti-trust suit against some of the companies with respect to

their activities abroad will complicate action by the Attorney General in this regard. [Footnote in the source text.]

266. National Intelligence Estimate¹

Washington, October 8, 1957.

NIE 30-2-57

NEAR EAST DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING US INTERESTS²

The Problem

To analyze probable developments affecting US interests in the area during the next several years.³

Summary

1. The situation in the Near East has changed profoundly within the past few years and the outlook for Western and US interests has deteriorated. While British and French influence in the area has declined, the USSR has entered actively into Near East affairs by supporting the radical element of the Arab nationalist movement. As yet radical Arab nationalists control only Egypt and Syria. However, sympathy and support for their strong anti-Western, revolutionary, and pan-Arab policies come from a substantial majority of the Arabs of the Near East. Within the region, indigenous Arab support for Western interests comes largely from the outnumbered and often weakly-led conservative nationalist elements.

2. The present military regimes in Egypt and Syria, or ones like them, will probably remain in power for the next few years. If they do, the economic and military dependence of both Egypt and Syria on the Bloc is likely to increase. Nasser and the Syrian leaders will probably continue to exert a powerful influence over radical Arab nationalists throughout the area, except in the unlikely event of their emerging clearly as Soviet puppets. The chief weakness of the radical Arab nationalists will lie in domestic economic problems and in the divisive influences of special local interests and personal struggles for power and leadership. Effective unity among this group is unlikely, except on the issues of Israel and anti-colonialism. Nevertheless, even if the present Syrian or Egyptian regimes should fall, the

radical Arab nationalist movement will continue as a basic element in the Near East situation.

3. The conservative grouping, composed of Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Iraq, and Lebanon, forms a loose coalition of regimes that look to the US for aid because of their common interest in the existing system and opposition to the forces of revolution represented by the radicals. They do not reject the basic ideas of Arab nationalism, and they are more tolerant than the US of Arab relations with the Bloc. King Saud, even more than the other conservative leaders, is likely to seek to maintain the appearance of loyalty to the principle of Arab solidarity, despite his differences with the radicals.

4. Prospects for broadening or consolidating the position of the conservative forces in the Arab states are poor, although these forces will continue to be an important factor in the area. *[10 lines of source text not declassified]*

5. A principal obstacle to stability in the area and to a cooperative relationship between the US and local states is the hostility between the Arab states and Israel. Given the Arab arms build-up, Israel's forceful policy, and the unwillingness of either side to compromise, prospects for a solution of the Arab-Israeli problem are poor.

6. We believe that there will almost certainly be some armed conflict in the area during the next several years. The chances of hostilities arising out of the Arab-Israel situation are better than even. Any armed intervention in Syria would probably spread to involve Arab-Israel fighting. Hostilities might arise out of the collapse of the regime in Jordan, and the chances of such hostilities spreading to an Arab-Israel conflict are better than even. We believe that fighting will occur on the Aden-Yemen border or in the Muscat-Oman area, but that such fighting would probably not spread to other Arab areas. In the event of hostilities, the USSR may employ threats and demonstrations of force, but it is unlikely to risk general war in order to defend all or any part of its present position in the area, although the risk of miscalculation might be considerable.

7. With the objective of strengthening its influence and harassing the West, the Bloc will continue to aim at such primary targets as Western oil concessions and military bases, and Western relations with Israel. It is

unlikely that the Bloc will try to establish Communist regimes in the area within the next few years, but will continue to represent itself as the champion of Arab nationalism and to attempt to bring the Arab states one by one within the Soviet sphere of influence. Although radical Arab nationalist governments are unlikely for the next year or so willingly to grant the USSR military bases on their soil, construction of installations, including port facilities, in the area for the operation and maintenance of Soviet-made armaments creates facilities which could be used on short notice by the USSR as physical extensions of its own military power.

8. Pressures on Western oil companies for arrangements more favorable to producing and transit countries will mount. At least as long as conservative governments remain in power in the producing countries, arrangements acceptable to Western interests can probably be worked out. Egypt and Syria will probably seek to keep facilities open for the sake of revenues and to maintain good relations with the oil-producing Arab states. Egypt and Syria are unlikely, except under extreme provocation, to exercise their capability to stop the flow of oil from the Persian Gulf to the Mediterranean.

Discussion

Recent Developments

9. In the past two years the decline of the British and French role in the Arab area has been greatly hastened. Meanwhile, the Soviet Bloc has established itself as a power with direct interests and influence in the Near East through the supply of arms to Egypt, Syria, and the Yemen, through its role in the Suez crisis, and through an intensive political, economic, and cultural campaign. During this period the US has emerged as the recognized representative of Western interests. The Near East has thus become a principal arena of the contest between the US and the USSR.

10. These developments in external forces have interacted with changes within the area itself. Nasser has become, especially since the Suez episode, the spokesman and symbol of radical Pan-Arab nationalism. Yet even before the Suez crisis conservative Moslem and Christian leaders had become concerned at Nasser's tendency to take unilateral actions in self-

assumed leadership of the Arab world and at his steady drift toward the Communist Bloc which they felt was a threat to their position. Egyptian subversive activities in other Arab states also encouraged distrust of Nasser. Hence the ruling groups in Iraq, Lebanon, Jordan/and Saudi Arabia welcomed the announcement of the American Doctrine as an opportunity to strengthen their own positions. Thus has emerged a division of the Arab Near East into two loose groupings.

11. Radical Pan-Arab nationalism is the movement of Nasser and the Syrian leaders. They advocate the union of all Arabs in a single state. Among Arab leaders they are both the most dynamic and the most violent in their anti-Westernism, the most interested in a military buildup as a symbol of Arab strength, and at the present time the most activist in their hostility toward Israel. They are revolutionaries who believe in replacing many traditional social and economic institutions with a state socialism of their own devising. The majority of politically conscious Arab Moslems throughout the Near East, particularly the middle class intelligentsia, are sympathetic to this concept of Arab nationalism. Its proponents believe that the West's only interests in the Near East are Israel, oil, and domination of the area. They also believe the West to be opposed to their concept of Arab unity. During the past two years they have become largely convinced that Soviet Bloc assistance will be helpful to them in overcoming Western obstruction, and that they can safely accept such Bloc support.

12. Conservative Arab nationalism is represented in Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Iraq by the ruling dynasties and their supporters. In Lebanon it is represented by the present government and supported by the traditionally dominant Christian element. These forces are wedded to the traditional Arab nationalist concept of Arab solidarity, but they reject the radicals' concept of a single Arab state. These elements share the general Arab opposition to "imperialist" special privilege and hostility to Israel. However, their supporters are the more conservative and more traditional elements with a vested interest in the status quo in the separate Arab states. They are equally suspicious of the radical nationalists' new order and of Soviet support of their rivals. Hence they seek assistance from the West, despite differences over Israel. This conservative point of view is largely

confined to the upper and professional classes and has little popular support.

Pattern of Arab State Relationships

13. The present lineup of radical and conservative forces has assumed no rigid form; the relative strength of each side and the degree of difference between them will vary. Both radicals and conservatives will remain basically neutralist in outlook and will accept extra-area relationships mainly with the objective of improving their relative position within the area. Both groups will continue to agree on the objective of Arab independence and both will remain violently antagonistic toward Israel and "imperialism." Despite the differences between them, these common interests will tend to draw them together. Nonetheless, these two groupings reflect the main lines of conflict over local and regional issues. It is likely that they will persist throughout the period of this estimate and that they will be generally on opposite sides of the East-West competition for influence in the area.

14. *The Egyptian-Syrian Axis:* The radical nationalists are in control in Egypt and Syria. There is a formal alliance between the two countries and a military agreement places forces of both under the Egyptian Commander-in-Chief.⁴ The members of the dominant coalition in Syria have followed Nasser's example and he probably still has considerable influence over them, though not a controlling one. In fact they have probably already gone further in their relations with the Soviet Bloc than Nasser would have thought desirable. There are no immediate prospects that this grouping of states will become any more close-knit. In its international alignment the Yemen must be classified with this group, largely because of the traditional claims of its dynasty against Aden.

15. Nevertheless, the radical Pan-Arab nationalist group in all the Arab states has acquired strength from Nasser's gains at the expense of the West. It can point to his success in obtaining arms and economic assistance from the Soviet Bloc while still maintaining his "positive neutralism." It can claim leadership in Arab opposition to "imperialism" and Israel and can play effectively on the vulnerability of the conservative Arab local nationalists to charges of collaboration with the West. On the other hand, its

relations with the Bloc lay it open increasingly to countercharges of too-close collaboration with the USSR and the abandonment of “neutrality.”

16. *The Conservative Arab Group*: The conservative Arab nationalists are a disparate group. Aside from the mutual defense treaty between Iraq and Jordan, there is no other formal alliance or understanding among them and there are many factors that separate them. Jordan has had reason to fear being swallowed up by Iraq and Saudi Arabia. Hashimite Jordan and Iraq in the past have been separated from Saudi Arabia by the traditional dynastic feud, although this dynastic dispute plays a lesser role today. Iraq has been separated from the other states by its membership in the Baghdad Pact. Although all the states of this group cooperate in one way or another with the US and have accepted US aid, only Iraq and Lebanon were willing formally to accept assistance under the American Doctrine. Lebanon, which because of its large Christian population and ties with the West has more reasons than the other states to adhere to the conservative group, makes little contribution to its strength.

17. The principal bond among these states is their common fear of the threat they see to their position in the policies and methods of the radical Pan-Arab nationalists. To guard themselves against this threat, they are ready to accept Western support. Their desire for good relations with the West is also based on the fact that this group includes the principal oil producing states, which need to maintain good relations with the Western states which provide their principal markets.

Prospects for Change in Relationships Among the States

18. The factors which created the Egyptian-Syrian alliance are likely to persist and this alliance, accordingly, is likely to continue in some form. However, its cohesiveness is likely to be affected by the geographical separation of the two countries, by incipient policy differences between them and by internal economic and political instability.

19. *Stability in Egypt*:⁵ Although the Egyptian regime will face increasing domestic problems and growing opposition, no opposition group appears to be likely to develop the capability to take over. If Nasser were eliminated, a coalition of his principal lieutenants would probably continue with most of

his policies, but would almost certainly be a less potent influence in the Arab world.

20. *Stability in Syria:*⁶ The open assumption of power in Syria by a radical pro-Soviet coalition in August 1957 was a blow to the hopes and a challenge to the position of conservatives throughout the area. However, Syria's conservative Arab neighbors are unlikely to take action. The regimes in Iraq, Jordan, and Lebanon are torn between feeling that something must be done and awareness of the dangers involved in an attempt. Singly or in combination, they lack the capability of effective intervention. Moreover, they, like Saudi Arabia, are restrained by unwillingness further to rupture Arab unity. In some form or other, the dominant coalition will probably remain in power. Whatever its form, it will almost certainly retain its orientation toward the Soviet Bloc.

21. Turkey is keenly aware of the dangers involved in a pro-Soviet government in Syria and is anxious that some positive action be taken to overthrow the Syrian coalition. However, Soviet warnings, realization that to be politically successful intervention in Syria must appear to be Arab, and awareness that Iraq would be unlikely to commit itself, make it unlikely that Turkey will act without prior assurance of US support. Turkey's concern will not abate, however, and the possibility of precipitate action by Turkey cannot be ruled out.

22. If a conservative government were established in Syria through outside intervention, it might prove able to maintain itself initially with the help of outside forces. Its ability to retain control for any length of time, however, would probably diminish if it appeared to have gained power through the intervention of non-Arab states.

23. *Stability of Conservative Grouping:* The radical nationalist group will continue its efforts to undermine the conservative regimes and to break up the tenuous unity of the conservative group of countries. In Jordan, the Palestinian majority opposes King Hussein's pro-Western stand, and Egypt and Syria may succeed in promoting the return to power of a radical nationalist government such as that dismissed by Hussein last April. However, they will probably try to avoid the break up of Jordan, as this would almost certainly precipitate a general Arab scramble for territory, in

which Israel would feel compelled to participate and which would greatly increase the chance of great power involvement.

[Numbered paragraph 24 (22 lines of source text) not declassified]

25. Saud is likely to insist on seeing his policy of friendship with the US generously rewarded and is not likely to be reasonable or easy to deal with on questions of military or economic assistance. He will compare his receipts from the US with what Nasser, Syria, and the Yemen get from the Soviets. King Saud, however, is genuinely suspicious of the Communist Bloc and is unlikely seriously to consider close relations with it. Nevertheless, he will continue to make gestures of cooperation with the radical Arab nationalist group from time to time, primarily to preserve a facade of Arab unity, but also to win concessions from the US.

26. Iraq is likely to remain a stable force in the conservative nationalist group and to continue its membership in the Baghdad Pact, at least as long as the present ruling group remains in power. In the absence of US encouragement and support, Iraq is unlikely to take the initiative in exercising leadership in the conservative grouping. There are forces of opposition to the conservative regime in Iraq which will probably grow during the next few years, but they are unlikely to take control.

27. In Lebanon the traditionally dominant Christian element and its supporters are apprehensive of an Arab world dominated by Moslem Pan-Arab nationalists and will support the conservative proponents of local nationalism in the area. In the event of a breakup in the grouping of conservative states, the conservative elements now in control in Lebanon will seek a more direct relationship with the West.

28. The situation is temporarily quiescent in the Persian Gulf and on the southern rim of the Arabian Peninsula, except for continuing disturbances on the Aden–Yemen border. However, the area remains a fertile ground for Arab and Soviet efforts to harass the British, and further armed conflict is likely. The British still consider this area vital to their interests and will use force if necessary to maintain their position, although they will be

considerably hampered by the pressure of US and world opinion. In Bahrein and Kuwait there is an even chance of serious opposition to the British-supported conservative governments from urban elements.

Other Factors in the Situation

Communism

29. In the Near East, as elsewhere, local Communist parties have in recent years followed the strategy of attempting to cooperate, rather than compete, with the more popular nationalist groups. In Syria the local party, though legally proscribed, has attained a certain recognition. Its leader exercises some influence upon the ruling clique, which includes at least one Communist sympathizer, General Bizri. A major source of Communist strength in Syria is the 15–20,000-strong paramilitary Futuwwa youth movement which has received training in the use of small arms and street fighting techniques under Major Burhan Qasab Hasan, who is almost certainly a Communist. In the other Arab states, Communist parties are illegal and their governments have continued to harass local Communists. In Jordan, the party is a small but significant part of the opposition and potentially dangerous.

30. We have no evidence of any change in the attitude of Arab governments toward local Communist parties. Nevertheless, in those countries where local attitudes toward the Bloc continue to become more favorable, it is reasonable to assume that the intelligentsia will show increased interest in the Communist system, that there will be some softening of government action against local Communists, and that the domestic Communist parties will expand both their overt organizations and their covert penetration of nationalist groups. Communists are likely to play an active role in the development of Arab labor organizations, and with Egyptian and Syrian support may become an increasingly dangerous source of unrest and agitation in key industrial and commercial areas such as Basra, Kirkuk, Aden, and the Persian Gulf oil centers. They will also continue to win support among Palestine refugees.

Military^Z

31. As a result of the general arms buildup throughout the area, the military capabilities of the individual countries are likely to improve. The rate of improvement in the Arab armed forces, however, will continue to be slow and suffer from serious deficiencies in leadership, logistics, and technology. Israel's manpower limitations will make further strengthening of its forces largely dependent on qualitative improvements. Should Soviet arms deliveries and training assistance continue at roughly the present level—as we believe likely—and should Western assistance remain limited, the military power of Egypt and Syria will constitute a growing pressure on their neighbors and a threat to Israel. Syrian forces will continue to be incapable of defending their country against an invasion by Turkish or, for the near future, Israeli forces.

32. Israeli military strength constitutes a strong deterrent to attack by its Arab enemies. For at least the next year or so, Israel unaided will probably retain the capability to defend itself successfully against the combined ground forces of all Arab states. Furthermore, it now has and will retain the capability to launch severe air strikes against most important Egyptian and Syrian targets. Israel will probably continue for the same period to be capable of defeating the armed forces of Syria and Jordan, and occupying the Sinai Peninsula. However, it will remain vulnerable to surprise air attack by Egypt and Syria, and in less than a year its shipping will be vulnerable to Egyptian submarine attack.

33. At least for the next year or so it is unlikely that Egypt or Syria will grant the USSR the right to establish military bases on their soil, or that the USSR will seek such bases. In fact, the objectives of the Bloc's military assistance program are primarily political. However, the construction of installations, including port facilities, in Syria and Egypt for the operation and maintenance of Soviet-made armaments creates facilities which could be used on short notice by the USSR as physical extensions of its own military power.

Economic Prospects

34. Since World War II the interest in economic development and in increased military strength has made new demands on limited economic resources of Near East states. Revenues from petroleum can be utilized in some states, but all will continue to try to get foreign assistance for their economic development and military programs. In consequence, the Western-oriented states importune their friends, particularly the US, for aid, and Bloc offers of assistance have found receptive audiences in other countries.

35. Given available resources and local government policies, prospects for general economic progress during the period of this estimate are not promising except in Iraq. The mass of the people in most Arab states is unlikely to achieve much, if any, improvement in their standard of living and many will lose ground. Jordan, without a viable economy and burdened by a large refugee population, will be heavily dependent on outside assistance. Lebanon may hold the line economically, though its revenues are somewhat dependent on access to the hinterland through Syria. Israel will press forward with its own ambitious development plans, but they will remain heavily dependent on a flow of funds from abroad. Plans for a marked increase in immigration, however, threaten Israel's net economic gain.

36. The outlook is most promising in Iraq, which has underway a well coordinated development plan amply financed by oil revenues. These revenues, however, are primarily dependent upon the flow of oil through pipelines to the Mediterranean coast across Syria. Barring prolonged disruption of the pipelines, the plan's impact will almost certainly be increasingly felt, and the general economic improvement may contribute to greater political stability.

37. Of the countries accepting Bloc economic aid, Syria stands to gain the most. The credits recently promised by the USSR may enable Syria to satisfy its development needs for some time. Although details have not been settled, it appears that the USSR will undertake several of the projects envisaged in the Syrian government's \$180 million six-year development scheme. However, increasing rapprochement with the USSR and the socialist orientation of the government may discourage private investment,

in which case additional outside assistance— from the Bloc or elsewhere— would be required. It is likely that the Bloc will extend further financial assistance with the primary objective of increasing Syrian economic and political dependence. Increased economic dependence on the Bloc, however, may arouse apprehension among Arab nationalists and result in some pressure on the Syrian government to modify its policy.

38. The Bloc has assumed a major role in certain areas of Egyptian economic life. About 10 percent of Egypt's annual cotton exports will be required for the next five years to pay for the arms received prior to 1957; Egypt is indebted to the Bloc for \$17 million worth of construction projects now underway. By mid-1957 the Soviet Bloc had become the principal purchaser of Egyptian cotton (55 percent) and the chief supplier of wheat (65 percent) and of petroleum (50 percent). This situation, however, is partly the consequence of reduced Western and Indian cotton purchases and the termination of PL 480 wheat sales.

39. In accord with its stated policy of neutrality, Egypt will probably continue to seek to balance economic relations between the Bloc and the West. The country's complex economic problems, sharpened by population pressure and limited natural resources, will lead it to seek additional amounts of foreign assistance. In the absence of Western aid and investment, and substantial Free World cotton purchases, Egypt is likely to make greater demands on the Bloc which, whether Nasser intends it or not, are likely to increase his dependence upon the Bloc. Even if assistance becomes available on a sizable scale, we believe that it will not reverse the downward trend in the Egyptian standard of living.

Petroleum

40. The non-Communist world looks increasingly for its petroleum requirements to the vast reserves of the Middle East.⁸ This is particularly true of Western Europe, which now consumes almost three million barrels of oil per day, of which 72 percent comes from the Middle East. In 1965 Western Europe is expected to consume more than six million barrels per day, of which about 75 percent will come from the Middle East.

41. The existing pattern of oil production and transportation in the Middle East is being subjected to pressure both from nationalistic movements and governments within the area, which are seeking increased revenue and more control over oil operations, and from the probable entry of new foreign companies, chiefly Japanese, Italian, and West German, which would almost certainly be prepared to offer more favorable terms to the host countries. As a result, a revision of the present 50–50 division of production profits and an increase in charges for pipeline transit facilities appear probable within the next few years. However, at least as long as the conservative nationalist governments continue to control the major oil-producing areas, expropriation and prohibitive royalty fees and other excessive financial demands are unlikely.

42. The future of various plans for new pipelines⁹ and the likelihood of expansion of the Suez Canal's capacity for oil shipments remain uncertain. Under these circumstances, the present pattern of movement of Middle East oil to the Free World west of Suez—35 percent via pipeline and 65 percent via the Suez Canal—appears likely to remain basically unchanged during the next five years. An increasing number of new super-tankers capable of using the Cape of Good Hope route will be put in service during the next few years.¹⁰ These will probably not affect the pattern of oil movement toward Western Europe under normal conditions. In the event of closure of the Suez Canal and/or the pipelines, however, full mobilization of tanker capacity and diversion of Western Hemisphere oil might make it possible for Western Europe to meet its minimum requirements.

43. Egypt and Syria are unlikely, except under extreme provocation, to exercise their capability to stop the flow of oil from the Persian Gulf area to the Mediterranean. Syria and Egypt will wish to conserve revenues from the pipelines and the Suez Canal, and will hesitate to provoke the West and the oil producing Arab states on a matter so critical. The USSR will probably maintain as an objective the denial of Near East oil resources to the West. However, under ordinary conditions, the Bloc would probably be inhibited from seeking to acquire major oil concessions by its position as a surplus producer of oil and its lack of excess refining, storage, transportation, and market facilities. At the same time, the Bloc might attempt to market small amounts of Middle East oil as a token breach of the Western monopoly.

Suez Canal

44. Egypt regards its control of the Canal as a matter of national prestige. It will seek to operate and develop the Canal in an efficient manner, particularly in view of the fact that it will have to seek outside financial assistance for necessary development of the Canal. Egypt is unlikely to interfere with traffic, other than Israeli, except under crisis conditions. Nasser will remain adamant on the question of the transit of the Canal by Israeli flag vessels or by vessels carrying strategic materials to Israel.

The Arab-Israel Problem

45. Opposition to Israel continues to be the principal point of agreement among all factions of Arabs and acute tension between the Arab states and Israel will continue throughout the period of this estimate. The likelihood of armed clashes is heightened by Israel's dynamism, as evidenced in its border area development activities, and by the Arab attitude of intransigent hostility. While there is no indication that either side plans an attack in the near future, Israel's fear that Syrian and Egyptian absorption of Soviet arms will deprive it of military superiority could lead to another preventive war within the next year or so. The French will probably continue their support of Israel.

46. A resumption of the Israeli policy of "active defense"¹¹ would revive Arab clamor for action against Israel but probably would not result in any Arab military operation against Israel until Egyptian and Syrian military leaders estimated that their forces had acquired sufficient superiority to inflict serious damage on the Israeli armed forces or territory. Despite Egypt's and Syria's ability to launch surprise attacks they will lack the overall capability to offer Israel a serious military challenge for at least another year.

47. Both the Arab states and Israel have persisted in their uncompromising attitude on the settlement of individual issues between them, the most important of which concerns the Arab refugees. Arab political leaders continue to regard the refugee question as a valuable asset in a final settlement of the Palestine issue, while bitterness against the West has made the refugees themselves an easy prey for Syro-Egyptian and Communist

influences and anti-Western propaganda. Moreover, popular sentiment in most Arab states tends to deter Arab governments from any readiness to compromise on the refugee question.

48. For its part, the government of Israel has shown little disposition to negotiate the question on a basis acceptable to the Arabs. The UN refugee program (UNRWA) is scheduled to end in 1960 and there does not appear to be much prospect for its continuation beyond that date. The host governments may be unwilling or unable to assume this burden of support. There is a possibility that the approaching end of UNRWA support may make some of the refugees more receptive to the idea of resettlement. However, it is almost certain that there will be strong pressures from Arab governments and from most of the refugees for continuation of outside aid in some form. The net result is likely to be a general increase in Arab bitterness and resentment against the West.

The Soviet-American Contest for Position and Influence

The Soviet Campaign

49. The Bloc will continue to pursue an active policy in the Near East designed to vitiate the Western strategic position in the area, including its base structure, and to attain a position to deny the area's oil resources to the West.

50. Arab attitudes toward the Sino-Soviet Bloc are a source of considerable advantage to the Bloc in the Near East. The Soviets have succeeded in representing their hostility to Western "imperialism" as equal to that of the Arabs. They also enjoy the advantage of being able to exploit the Israeli issue for their purposes. Most politically conscious Arabs are indifferent to world affairs except as they affect their own area. The conflict between the Communist Bloc and the West is regarded as a battle of giants which concerns the Arab world only insofar as it intrudes in Arab affairs or offers opportunities to the Arabs to advance their own interests. Even among politically sophisticated Arabs very few comprehend the issues between the Soviet Union and the US, and they fail to share the West's apprehension of

Soviet ambitions in the area. Their fears of Western “imperialism” are not the result of a judgment of the relative merits of the Communist and Western position, but the result of past experience, present friction, and future aspirations.

51. The Soviet Bloc appears to be carrying out a flexible and opportunistic policy of limited risk in the Near East. It has managed its campaign in such a way as to leave the initiative with the Arab leaders. The Bloc has responded quickly to Egyptian, Syrian, and Yemeni requests and has been careful to avoid the appearance of attaching strings to its assistance. The Bloc has also shown itself willing to extend aid to other Arab governments without political conditions, in the hope of eventually weaning them away from the West.

52. Another characteristic of the Soviet campaign has been the care with which the Soviets have avoided affronting the Arabs on the points on which they are particularly sensitive. They have carefully catered to the Arab slogans of “independence” and “neutrality” and have been mindful of Arab prestige. Of great importance is the fact that the Soviets have conducted their campaign in the Arab states on a government-to-government basis. The local Arab Communist parties have probably not been involved. It is also likely that the Bloc advisers have been instructed not to engage in blatant advocacy of Communist doctrine. Soviet propaganda aimed at the Arabs has had the objectives of convincing them of the Bloc’s support of “peace” and of the goals of Arab nationalism and unity, of representing the Bloc as being on the Arab side against Israel, of painting the West as the enemy of Arab nationalism, and of fostering the feeling of common interest between the Arabs and the Bloc in resisting their common enemy, the Western “warmongers.”

53. The Bloc will probably seek further to develop its position in the Near East along the lines laid down in the past two years. It will establish economic and political influence wherever it can, but will probably not seek during the next few years to install Communist regimes in states of the area. The USSR will continue to pose as the friend and protector of the independent Arab states and will seek to establish itself as a power with recognized interests in the Near East area. It will seek to exploit the Arab-

Israeli situation. For example, it might stimulate and support an Arab attempt to force a solution of the Arab-Israeli problem along the lines of the 1947 UN Partition Plan and subsequent resolutions on Palestine. The Soviets will probably continue to supply arms to Arab states on terms similar to those prevailing during the past two years. They would probably also be willing to increase the number of their military and technical advisers but would remain careful not to offend Arab sensibilities.

54. The USSR will probably state its reassurances to the Arab states strongly, but in terms which permit the widest possible freedom of action. These reassurances, however, will probably not go as far as support for Arab annihilation of Israel. In extreme circumstances the USSR would almost certainly adopt a highly belligerent posture, possibly including military gestures against countries threatening friendly Arab states. However, we do not believe that it would deliberately risk World War III to protect all or any part of its newly acquired position in the Near East, although the risk of miscalculation might be considerable.

The Western Position

55. In the contest between the West and the USSR for influence in the Near East, Western European powers will probably leave the initiative to the US. However, Britain, France, and other Western states will be critical of US policy if it does not act effectively to protect Western interests, particularly in petroleum, when threatened. This might lead to a growth in Western Europe of sentiment in favor of a settlement recognizing Bloc interest in the Near East in return for a guarantee of the Western European economic position.

56. The US position with the governments of the conservative Arab states has significantly improved during the past year, but not among the Arab public. Most Arabs failed to understand Western indignation at Nasser's nationalization of the Suez Canal Company and at his taking Soviet arms. The UK-French-Israeli invasion of Egypt confirmed in Arab minds the charges that the extremists had been making against the "Western imperialists." The role of the US in the passage of the Cease Fire Resolution in the UN was widely appreciated, but Soviet threats against the UK made an equal or greater impression on the Arab public. Moreover,

when the Egyptians made further demands for assistance the Soviet Bloc appeared to comply while the US held back. The US stand on Suez was misinterpreted among the Arabs as an indication that the US intended to back the Pan-Arab program against the UK and France, and many became confused and disillusioned when this turned out not to be the case.

57. The Baghdad Pact and the American doctrine have had some appeal in the Near East, but are probably believed by almost all Arabs to indicate American preoccupation with Communism to the exclusion of what they consider to be the more pressing problems of the area. The conservative nationalist leaders probably share this view to some extent, but they and a large proportion of the upper class conservatives in their countries feel that they are dependent upon the US for the maintenance of both their internal and regional positions. They look to the US for material and diplomatic assistance in sufficient quantity to sustain them. They believe that the US has the capability of meeting their needs, but they are concerned whether the US will maintain its interest in their welfare long and consistently enough to enable them to survive.

Continuing Prospects

58. The radical Pan-Arab nationalist movement in something like its present form will probably continue to be the most significant indigenous regional force in the Near East. The states of this group will continue to proclaim their adherence to the doctrine of "positive neutralism," and will persist in attempts to use the USSR as a counter to real or imagined Western pressure. The radical Pan-Arabs, however, are unlikely to make significant progress toward their announced goal of Arab unity. Even an effective Egyptian-Syrian union is unlikely, and differences and disputes are likely to occur between the Syrian and the Egyptian leaders. The Yemen, although useful from the Egyptian and Syrian point of view as a means of causing trouble for the UK and possibly for Saudi Arabia, is unlikely to become a meaningful part of an organization of Arab states.

59. The forces of conservative Arab nationalism are likely to continue to be generally identified with the West. In some areas they will probably show

instability and suffer reverses, but will remain an important factor in the Near East situation. Iraq and Lebanon are likely to stand relatively firm, but Saudi Arabia will continue to waver from side to side. The monarchy in Jordan is unlikely to survive without financial and political support from sources friendly to the West. Even with such assistance its chances of survival are only somewhat better than even.

60. We believe that there will almost certainly be some armed conflict in the area during the next several years. The chances of hostilities arising out of the Arab-Israel situation are better than even. Any armed intervention in Syria would probably spread to involve Arab-Israel fighting. Hostilities might arise out of the collapse of the regime in Jordan, and the chances of such hostilities spreading to an Arab-Israel conflict are better than even. We believe that fighting will occur on the Aden-Yemen borders or in the Muscat-Oman area, but that such fighting would probably not spread to other Arab areas.

61. We believe that Israel will continue to receive outside financial and diplomatic support and will persist as a dynamic force within the area. It will almost certainly move ahead with its immigration plans and its energetic development programs. Moreover, it will stand on its refusal to repatriate Arab refugees in any substantial numbers or give up presently held territory in exchange for a settlement with the Arabs. Israel will seek to keep its armed forces qualitatively superior to those of its Arab opponents. It will continue to pursue an active and determined policy and is unlikely to shrink from the use of force where it considers such action necessary.

62. Sino-Soviet influence will expand in the Near East, but the Bloc will experience growing problems as it becomes involved in the area. The Arab nations which become its clients are likely to make demands for aid and assistance which will exceed Bloc allotments. Bloc support of Syria and Egypt probably will continue to antagonize these states' rivals both within the area and on its periphery.

63. Prospects for improved internal political stability in the Arab states are not good. All governments, whether conservative or Pan-Arab nationalist, will be obliged to continue to rule by repression of the opposition if they are to remain in power. In the conservative states, the radical Pan-Arabs will

attempt to wrest power from the existing regimes. In Syria and Egypt the regimes are likely to retain their authoritarian military character and will retain the capability to put down opposition by force.

Outlook for Western Interests

64. The chances of a US understanding with Egypt and Syria are limited by prevailing attitudes of their leaders. Both governments are convinced at the moment that the US is determined to overthrow them. Both are prey to obsessive suspicions of the Western powers, and these suspicions are assiduously cultivated by the Soviets.

65. In the situation likely to prevail the conservative Arab governments are likely to become progressively more dependent upon the US. In this event, economic progress in these states will be regarded in the area as an index of the value of association with the US.

66. Throughout the area the rise in the level of public expectation of improvement in economic standards and welfare will impose difficulties upon governments. The radical nationalist governments of Egypt and Syria are committed to ambitious social and economic reforms. However, problems of implementation and lack of resources make it unlikely that they can fulfill their expectations, even with Soviet assistance, and they will probably experience political difficulties as a consequence. The conservative governments of the oil-producing states have financial resources with which to effect reforms which would probably broaden the base of popular support and thus ultimately strengthen their position and that of the conservative grouping. Prospects for successful prosecution of large-scale development programs are good, however, only in Iraq.

67. Pressures on Western oil companies for arrangements more favorable to producing and transit countries will mount. At least as long as conservative governments remain in power in the producing countries, arrangements acceptable to Western interests can probably be worked out. Egypt and Syria will probably seek to keep facilities open for the sake of revenues and to maintain good relations with the oil-producing Arab states. However, Egypt and Syria will be more difficult to deal with, and the possibility of closure of transit facilities will remain.

68. British military arrangements and political influence with Iraq are likely to continue, but the UK's position in the Persian Gulf area is likely to be weakened. The Baghdad Pact will continue to draw the fire of the Pan-Arab nationalists and the Soviets. The extent of US participation and US support—as well as US assistance to member nations, whether through the Pact or otherwise—will have an important effect upon the effectiveness of the Pact and the morale of its member states.

¹ Source: Department of State, INR-NIE Files. Secret. According to a note on the cover sheet: “The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force and The Joint Staff.” It was concurred in by the Intelligence Advisory Committee on October 8.

Two tables, entitled “Importance of Middle East Oil in the Supply of Free World Petroleum Requirements” and “Production and Disposition of Middle East Oil, 1956, 1960, 1965,” are not printed. The source text indicates they were taken from “Studies of the Petroleum Sub-Committee of the Economic Intelligence Committee.”

² Supersedes NIE 36–54, “Probable Developments in the Arab States,” 7 September 1954, and NIE 30–4–55, “The Outlook for US Interests in the Middle East,” 8 November 1955. [Footnote in the source text.]

³ The area covered by this estimate includes the Arab states—Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen—the Arab sheikdoms and principalities of the Arabian Peninsula, and Israel. Excluded from primary consideration are Greece, Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Libya, and the Sudan. [Footnote in the source text.]

⁴ Saudi Arabia and Jordan are members of this alliance, but have ceased to be active. The Yemen is also a member, but plays a minor role. [Footnote in the source text.]

⁵ See NIE 36.1–57, “The Outlook for Egypt and the Nasser Regime,” scheduled for completion in October 1957. [Footnote in the source text. For text, see [vol. XVII, pp. 790–791.](#)]

⁶ See SNIE 36.7–57, “Developments in the Syrian Situation,” 3 September 1957. [Footnote in the source text. For text, see [vol. XIII, pp. 674–680.](#)]

⁷ See Annex: Military Strengths of Near Eastern States. [Footnote in the source text. The Annex is not printed.]

⁸ Proven reserves in the Near East are conservatively estimated at 144 billion barrels or 70 percent of the non-Communist world total. Other estimates run as high as 223 billion barrels. [Footnote in the source text.]

⁹ See Map. [Footnote in the source text. The map is not printed.]

¹⁰ By the mid-1960’s, roughly 80 super-tankers (65,000 deadweight tons and over) are expected to be in use. Normally, no more than 15 to 20 of these tankers would be expected to be carrying Middle East oil and using the Cape of Good Hope route to North America (East coast) and Western Europe by 1965. These would have an aggregate carrying capacity of about 100,000 b/d. If Canal tolls are raised substantially, more of these super-tankers would be employed in the Cape route. [Footnote in the source text.]

¹¹ A policy by which the Israelis use “retaliatory” raids into Arab territory to intimidate Arab governments and reduce border-crossings and infiltration. [Footnote in the source text.]

267. Memorandum From the Director of the National Security Council Secretariat (Boggs) to the National Security Council Planning Board¹

Washington, October 8, 1957.

SUBJECT

Review of Long-Range U.S. Policy Toward the Near East

REFERENCES

A. Record of Meeting of Planning Board, September 6, 1957, item 4²

B. Memo for Planning Board, September 5, 1957,³ and Memo for Board Assistants, September 16, 1957 (State)⁴

C. Memo for Board Assistants, October 4, 1957 (Defense)⁵

D. Memo for Board Assistants, September 13, 1957 (CIA)⁶

The enclosed draft list of questions on the subject is transmitted herewith for use by the Board Assistants at an early meeting in preparing a list of questions for Planning Board discussion pursuant to Reference A.

The enclosure consists of a topical arrangement, prepared by the NSC Staff, of the State, Defense and CIA questions circulated by References B–D, supplemented by NSC Staff questions not previously circulated. All questions submitted by State, Defense and CIA have been included in the enclosure with the exception of No. 6 in the State list of September 5.

Marion W. Boggs⁷

[Enclosure]

REVIEW OF LONG-RANGE U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE NEAR EAST: POLICY QUESTIONS

1. *U.S. Objectives.* Are the following objectives in the Near East the most important for the protection of U.S. security interests?

a. The elimination or reduction of Soviet Bloc influence in the area.

b. The production and transit of oil through the area of the Middle East to the satisfaction of Free World requirements.

c. Denying the Soviet Bloc access to the resources, markets, and lines of communication of the Middle East.

d. The development of pro-U.S. governments in all nations of the area. (Defense)

2. *U.S. Commitments*

a.

The United States has formally assumed Free World leadership in the Near East. How shall we carry out this endeavor, and to what degree should we commit our prestige to it? (State)

or

a. In view of the deep involvement of U.S. prestige and interest in the Near East, what action should the U.S. take to maintain its prestige and interest against the formidable challenges they now face in the area? (*[less than 1 line of source text not declassified]*)

b. Should the U.S. undertake additional commitments with respect to the Near East in order to meet

contingencies, such as subversion and non-Communist aggression, which are not provided for under the terms of the Joint Resolution? (Defense)

c. Should circumstances require it, do we have the capability in the area for quick and effective action in such “limited war” contingencies as an outbreak of Arab-Israel hostilities; an armed attack by a Middle East nation under the control of international Communism against another nation in the area; a Communist-inspired internal uprising against the established government of a friendly Near East state? (State)

3. The Baghdad Pact and Arab Unity

a. What is our present view of the Baghdad Pact? NSC 5428 (para. 6-c) stated that the immediate benefits of a Northern Tier defense arrangement would be primarily political and psychological. Do we still view these as the primary benefits or do we consider the Pact an important military instrument? (NSC Staff) Should the U.S. attempt to expand the membership of the Baghdad Pact? (Defense)

b. What should be our attitude towards “Arab unity”? Are there other possible regional groupings which we should promote? Have recent developments altered our thinking as to the short-term and long-range roles to be played by indigenous forces in area defense? (State)

c. Should we establish contingency planning in the event Arab unity should prevail? In such an eventuality, what Arab leadership would be in the best interests of the U.S.? (Defense)

4. U.S. Bases

- a. Does our new role in the area require us to seek peace-time expansion of our military facilities and bases in the Near East? Should we seek stockpiling facilities in the area? Do we need to station additional forces there? Are our transit rights adequate? (State)
- b. What is our future need for our military installations at Dhahran; and how can they be made more secure? (State)

5. *Soviet Penetration*

- a. What degree of Soviet presence in the area can the United States tolerate? Is it possible to arrive at a workable modus vivendi with the USSR in the area? (State)

(1) What should be our attitude toward area states which assume a neutralist policy and position? (*[less than 1 line of source text not declassified]*)

(2) What should be our attitude toward area states which (a) accept a close relationship with the Soviet Bloc, or (b) gradually accept Communist doctrine and establish the Communist system? (*[less than 1 line of source text not declassified]*)

(3) What should be our attitude toward the further extension of Soviet influence and Soviet activity throughout the Near East area by legal means not involving the use of force? (*[less than 1 line of source text not declassified]*)

(4) Can an acceptable mechanism for controlling arms shipments to the area be

devised? (State)

b. In order to prevent further Soviet influence and penetration in the Near East, should the U.S. adopt courses of action vis-à-vis the USSR which involve a more direct confrontation of Soviet activity and interests in the area? (Defense)

c. Can we expect to do more than isolate Syria and Egypt? (State) Is Egyptian and/or Syrian cooperation with the U.S. essential to future stability and settlement in the Near East? If such cooperation is essential, what actions can induce such cooperation? (Defense)

d. Can we take steps to lessen the dependence of certain states in the area on Soviet Bloc markets for an outlet for their exports? In view of the importance of cotton to several of the states, should we review our own cotton purchase and disposal programs? (State)

e. How can we best assure the leadership of responsible and constructive elements in the growing trade union movement in the area? (State)

6. *U.S. Aid Programs*

a. How can we reconcile our increased role in the area with significant public and congressional sentiment favoring a curtailment of economic and military assistance programs? (State)

b. Should the U.S. as a government make a greater coordinated effort with respect to the Near East and accord it higher priority in policy considerations? Should U.S. assistance elsewhere in the world be decreased accordingly to provide the necessary U.S. resources? (Defense)

c. To what extent should the U.S. engage in regional as opposed to bilateral aid programs? (NSC Staff)

d. In the light of the limited economic capability of the majority of Near East countries, should our U.S. grant military assistance furnished in the future be limited to providing equipment and training primarily for internal security purposes, with reliance on U.S. capabilities for defense against external aggression? (Defense)

e. In view of the fact that Jordan is not an economically viable state, are we prepared to provide continuing economic support for an indefinite period? Is there any alternative which is compatible with U.S. interests? (NSC Staff)

7. *Jordan River Development.* What alternatives are possible and what approach should we take on Jordan River water development? (State)

8. *Arab-Israeli Dispute*

a. The Secretary of State's speech of August 26, 1955 indicated our willingness to take the initiative in assisting the parties to the Arab-Israel dispute to work toward a settlement. In view of recent developments, would it now be in the U.S. interest for this country to assume the leading role in such an endeavor? (State)

b. Would U.S. security interests in the Near East be better advanced by backing one side or the other in the event the Arab-Israeli dispute remains unsettled: (1) in the short-term and (2) over the long-run? (Defense)

c. Can and should the USSR be forced to clarify its pro-Arab position, e.g., does it include dissolution of Israel? (NSC Staff)

d. Are there further steps which the United States can take to prevent the question of the Gulf of Aqaba from becoming an explosive issue? (State)

e. What is to be our long-run policy with respect to the Gaza strip and with respect to the continued maintenance of the UN Emergency Force in Gaza and Sharm el Sheikh? (NSC Staff)

f. What should be done about the Palestine refugee problem? What are present prospects of action on the proposals of the Secretary of State in his speech of August 26, 1955? What should be the U.S. attitude toward extension of the mandate of UNRWA beyond 1960 when its present mandate expires? Should the U.S. increase the percentage of its support (70%)? Would such an increase contribute significantly to rehabilitation and resettlement? (NSC Staff)

9. Oil (Including the Suez Canal Problem)

a. Can we strengthen the position of the Suez Canal as a truly international waterway? What degree of moral and material support should we give to proposals for alternatives to the Suez Canal? (State)

b. Are present arrangements for the production and transit through the area of Near East petroleum resources adequately responsive to area political trends and the needs of the consuming countries? (State)

c. Would a revision of recent U.S. policy regarding voluntary oil import restrictions, which would permit an increase in U.S. oil imports from the Middle East, enhance U.S. influence in the area over the long term? (Defense)

10. Roles of Other Non-Near Eastern Countries in the Area

- a. What are the future roles of Britain and France in the area? (State)
 - b. How can we help to improve relations between the United Kingdom and Saudi Arabia? (State)
 - c. Is it to our interest to promote increased roles for Italy and the German Federal Republic in the area? (State)
 - d. Can Greece and India play constructive roles in the area? (State)
 - e. Should we seek to strengthen the relations between the states of North Africa and those of the Near East? (State)
 - f. What contributions can the United Nations make to the stability and economic and political progress of the area? (State)
-

¹ Source: Department of State, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 61 D 167, NSC 5801 File. Top Secret.

² Not printed. (*Ibid.*, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1) ³ [Document 260](#).

⁴ Boggs' memorandum of September 16 transmitted to the National Security Council Board Assistants the text of a paper, prepared by the Department of State, that listed "Additional Questions for Consideration in Review of United States Policy Toward the Near East (NSC 5428)." (Department of State, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 61 D 167, NSC 5801 File) ⁵

Boggs' memorandum of October 4 to the National Security Council Board Assistants transmitted the text of a paper, prepared by the Department of Defense, that listed "Possible Questions in Connection With Review of Long-Range U.S. Policy in the Near East." (*Ibid.*) ⁶ Boggs' memorandum of September 13 transmitted to the National Security Council Board Assistants the text of a paper, prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency, entitled "CIA Comments and Questions." (*Ibid.*) ⁷ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

268. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree) to the Secretary of State¹

Washington, October 9, 1957.

SUBJECT

NSC 5722—Construction of a New Middle East Petroleum Pipeline System

Discussion:

The petroleum industry proposed several months ago to construct a pipeline from the head of the Persian Gulf through Iraq and Turkey to the Mediterranean to facilitate the movement of Persian Gulf petroleum to Western Europe. The first phase of construction would result in an installation capable of moving 800,000 barrels per day; completion of the second phase would result in a line with a total capacity of 1,400,000 barrels per day.

Within the past few days information has come to the attention of the Department² which indicates some petroleum companies now believe that certain developments since last spring reduce the immediate economic need for proceeding at this time with plans to construct a pipeline from the head of the Persian Gulf through Iraq and Turkey to the Mediterranean. These developments include the following:

1. A smaller increase in demand in Western Europe than had been expected.
2. Certain recent decisions by the Iraq Petroleum Company which reduce the amount of oil for the new pipeline by 350,000 barrels per day:

a. Decision to increase the capacity of its lines across Syria by 10 million tons (200,000 barrels per day);

b. Decision to construct a deep water tanker loading facility in the Persian Gulf off southern Iraq which would increase the movement of oil at that point by 150,000 barrels per day. Although the Department does not know the extent to which these views are shared by the companies concerned, action by the Council on NSC 5722 does not appear necessary at this time. Accordingly consideration by the NSC of the draft policy has been deferred at the Department's request.

Recommendation:

If asked in the Council to give the reasons for the Department's request to defer consideration of the draft policy, you may wish to use the foregoing information.

¹ Source: Department of State, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 61 D 167, Middle East Petroleum Pipeline System, Construction of; NSC 5722. Secret. Drafted by Shaw and concurred in by Murphy, Jones, Mann, Dillon, and Raymond.

² Dillon discussed this matter at the Secretary's Staff Meeting on October 4. (*Ibid.*, Secretary's Staff Meetings: Lot 63 D 75) Additional documentation is *Ibid.*, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 61 D 167, Middle East Petroleum Pipeline System, Construction of; NSC 5722.

269. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Secretary of State and the Under Secretary of State (Hoover), Department of State, Washington, October 21, 1957, 11:15 a.m.¹

Washington, October 21, 1957, 11:15 a.m.

Mr. Hoover said that he had a talk with Secretary Anderson wherein the latter had put out the idea that some sort of an international Mid East organization might be established which would receive a tax of 10% which Western companies receiving Middle East oil would impose and which organization with joint Arab-West management would use the funds for economic development in the Middle East.

I said I thought this idea was very interesting and hoped that he could work on it. Later on I saw Secretary Anderson and expressed the same thought to him.

JFD

¹ Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Memoranda of Conversation. Confidential; Personal and Private. Drafted by Dulles.

270. Staff Study Prepared in the Department of State¹

Washington, October 30, 1957.

UNITED STATES OBJECTIVES AND POLICIES WITH RESPECT TO THE NEAR EAST

Problem

1. To analyze the current situation in the Near East, to ascertain the factors and trends which endanger the U.S. and Western position there, and to determine the general course of action that will better safeguard U.S. and Western interests in the area.

Analysis

Objectives

2. The objectives of the U.S. with respect to the Near East are:

- a. Availability to the U.S. and its allies of the resources, the strategic positions, and the passage rights of the area, and the denial of such resources and strategic positions to the Soviet bloc.
- b. Stable, viable, friendly and progressive governments in the area, aware of the threat to their own independence and integrity posed by international Communism, and with maximum capacity to meet that threat.
- c. Containment of the Arab-Israel problem, a reduction of tensions between Israel and the Arab states, and, ultimately the promotion of an atmosphere in which the parties to the Arab-Israel dispute can work toward a peaceful and equitable settlement of their differences either directly or through the good offices of a third party.

- d. Establishment among politically important groups in the area of a psychological climate favorable to the achievement of U.S. objectives.
- e. Prevention of the further extension of Soviet influence in the area and the rollback of existing Soviet presence and influence.
- f. Wider recognition on the part of the governments and peoples of the area that in the twentieth century independence can only be perfected by “interdependence”, realization of the community of interests between the area and the Free World, [and] awareness of the stake which the peoples of the area have in the future and fortunes of the Free World.

The Importance of the Area

3. The Near East is of great strategic, political, and economic importance to the Free World. The area contains the greatest petroleum resources in the world and essential facilities for the transit of military forces and Free World commerce. It also contains the Holy Places of the Christian, Jewish, and Moslem world and thereby exerts religious and cultural influences affecting people everywhere. The geographical position of the Near East makes the area a stepping stone toward the strategic resources of Africa. The security interests of the U.S. would be critically endangered if the Near East should fall under Soviet influence or control. The strategic resources are of such importance to the Free World, particularly Western Europe, that it is in the security interest of the U.S. to maintain a high level of effort to insure that these resources will be available and will be used for strengthening the Free World.

Principal Obstacles to U.S. Objectives

The Arab-Israel Dispute

4. The U.S. role in the United Nations and elsewhere in the circumstances surrounding the emergence of the State of Israel, and subsequent U.S.

private and public economic assistance to Israel, are the primary bases for criticism of the U.S. in the Arab world. The commonly stated official Arab public position on the Arab-Israel conflict has since 1948 consisted of insistence on the implementation of all relevant United Nations resolutions with respect to Palestine. Extremist Arabs call for the extinction of Israel by force, but the containment and isolation of Israel is the general Arab objective, since the fear of Israeli expansionism pervades the Arab world. The Arabs seek in the long run the disappearance of Israel. Israel's primary objective is to obtain a settlement based on Arab recognition of the status quo, involving recognition that Israel is here to stay and a gradual relaxation of present Arab economic warfare. Israel seeks to establish itself as a permanent entity in the Middle East, viable both territorially and economically, in the context of the fulfillment of its self-ordained mission to "ingather the exiles" and bring a majority of the Jews of the world to live in Israel.

5. The Soviet Union supported United Nations action recommending the partition of Palestine and, through Czechoslovakia, provided the arms which so heavily contributed to the Israel victories in 1948. Support for Israel was discarded about 1952 for a pro-Arab policy. Prior to the United Kingdom-French-Israel invasion of Egypt in 1956, there appeared to be a limit beyond which Soviet anti-Israel propaganda would not go. Since then, However, Soviet anti-Israel propaganda seems to have gone much further, but there is still some reason for believing that the USSR would not deliberately provoke an Arab state to attack Israel.

6. The change in administration in the U.S. in 1953 saw a reexamination of U.S. policies with respect to the Palestine problem and a conscious effort to establish a more balanced approach. U.S. actions and the U.S. attitude are, however, still regarded by the Arabs as being heavily weighted on the Israel side. The U.S. supports the continued existence of Israel, and also supports the territorial integrity of the Arab states against Israeli aggression. The U.S. strongly desires to see a settlement of the Palestine problem. Specific points of friction between the Arabs and the U.S. on the Arab-Israel problem include: Israel military superiority; the problem of the Arab refugees; U.S. public and private aid to Israel; Israel immigration policies; and Israel use of the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Aqaba.

Arab Nationalist Aspirations

7. As is the case with other newly emergent states, the Arab countries have had to face up to the fact that national independence is not a solution to all of their problems. The result has been two-fold: a jealous and exaggerated concern over present sovereignty, and a feeling that the Arab place in the sun cannot be achieved in the context of the present situation where Arab human and physical resources are divided among eleven separate national entities and parts of the Arab world are still under the control of Western Powers. While there are probably decisive historical, ethnic, and cultural obstacles to Arab unity, it has become a widespread aspiration particularly among the semi-educated urban proletariat. Nasser, in particular, has demonstrated his ability to exploit this aspiration. Israel, as a physical separating factor, plays a role in this context.

8. Our economic and cultural interests in the area have led, not unnaturally, to close U.S. relations with elements in the Arab world whose primary interest lies in the maintenance of relations with the West and the status quo in their countries—Chamoun of Lebanon, King Saud, Nuri of Iraq. In the spring of 1957, the U.S. took dramatic action to support King Hussein and to maintain the independence of a Jordan which is basically unviable, politically and economically. These developments have contributed to a widespread belief in the area, particularly among discontented elements mentioned above, that the U.S. desires to keep the Arab world disunited and is committed to work with “reactionary” Arab elements to that end.

9. The USSR, on the other hand, having no established economic or other interests in the area, and desirous of destroying the Western position, need not be inhibited in proclaiming all-out support for Arab unity and the most extreme Arab nationalist aspirations.

Repercussions in the Area of the East-West Struggle

10. Communism in both its domestic and international guises has appeared in the area as the latest of a series of foreign ideologies. The Near East, according to some scholars, has been in a state of political and cultural

disequilibrium since the arrival of Napoleon in Egypt in 1798. The area's institutions and religions have steadily declined in vigor, as a result of the impact of Western culture, and native resistance to Communism per se has therefore been disappointing. The fashionable policy in the area is a "neutralism" based on the belief that Arab interests will best be served by encouraging a competition between the East and the West for Arab favor. The Arabs do not lack confidence in their ability to maintain their independence in such a competition. The Arabs sincerely believe that Israel poses a greater threat to their interests than international Communism.

11. Arab animus towards Israel is a useful area for exploitation by the USSR which faces no domestic difficulties or inhibitions of conscience in pursuing an anti-Israel policy and in supplying arms. The USSR can also freely endorse Arab aspirations for unity and the elimination of all Western influence from the area, particularly Arab-Western military arrangements which cause concern to Soviet leaders. Arab extremists and the Soviets have a common objective in unseating Arab rulers interested in maintaining the status quo in the area and consolidating their regimes. The USSR repeatedly calls attention to its propinquity to the area as against the remoteness of the West. Certain Arab states have surplus agricultural commodities which compete with our own in world markets but which the Soviet bloc is willing to purchase.

12. The U.S., on the other hand, is publicly committed to a foreign policy which embraces the preservation of the State of Israel in its essentials. We have found it to our interest to work with and seek to strengthen those Arab leaders who appreciate the mutual benefits derived from cooperating with the West. These same leaders are the joint targets of nationalist Arabs and the USSR. Where we and our friends seek a level of stability in the area to permit peaceful economic and social progress, nationalist Arabs and the Soviets need continuing chaos in order to pursue their separate aims. Certain of the governments friendly to us are required to use repressive measures in order to curb extremist elements and retain power; we are identified with those efforts. The impact of our efforts to bring home the facts concerning police state methods behind the Iron Curtain is blunted by the commonness of similar—if less efficient—methods in the Near East. The Near Eastern tends to see our support of such governments as

inconsistent with U.S. principles, while not at the same time exhibiting an aversion to the use of repressive measures in the Soviet area. [*2½ lines of source text not declassified*] The younger generation, generally uninfluenced by religion, is not repulsed by the idea of a controlled society. Our Western democratic ideals of freedom and democracy, while vaguely reversed [*reversed?*] and talked about, are, in actuality, little understood. Against the background of the grievances against the West, the antagonisms toward Israel, dissatisfaction with local governments, an imperfect understanding of the principles we espouse, and venal and ineffective local information media, our psychological efforts against Communism lose their effectiveness.

13. Our responsibilities as the leader of the Free World in the region add to the area of potential difficulties in our relations. So long as so many Arabs remain unconvinced of their stake in the future of the Free World, our concern over Middle East petroleum as essential to the Western alliance, our desires to create indigenous strength to resist Communist subversion or domination, our efforts to maintain existing military transit and base rights and to deny them to the USSR, are looked upon as a mere cover for a desire to divide and dominate the area. This is a situation which, given time, can be improved as there is growing realization that only the Free World is willing or able to develop, purchase and dispose of the oil of the area on terms which can fulfill Arab aspirations for higher living standards.

14. Soviet interest in opposing both the Baghdad Pact and the American Doctrine is obvious. Here again a substantial element of Arab public opinion pursues the same objective. Iraqi membership in the Baghdad Pact is considered a challenge to Egyptian leadership of the area, an attempt to divide the Arab world, and to minimize the Israeli threat. It is claimed that membership of non-Arab states, even though they may be Moslem, prevents the Baghdad Pact from being a truly indigenous instrument. Arab nationalists argue that British membership in and U.S. support of the Baghdad Pact prove its "imperialist" character. There is also opposition to the Baghdad Pact based on the fear that it increases the risk of bringing World War III to an area which escaped the horrors, and indeed, profited, from World War II. This fear applies likewise to the American Doctrine. In addition, the American Doctrine, with its "stand up and be counted"

character with respect to international Communism, is incompatible with the Arab brand of “neutralism”, and traditional Arab reluctance to be committed.

United States Support of Western Allies

15. The major phenomena affecting the U.S. since the ill-fated British-French-Israel invasion of Egypt in November, 1956 have been the emergence of the U.S. as the leader of Free World interests in the area and tacit recognition of that fact by our British and French allies in all areas except the Persian Gulf. U.S. action opposing the invasion was generally appreciated by the Arabs at the time, but the strong position which we briefly achieved began to fade quickly for a number of reasons, one of which was our making it clear that the U.S. would under no circumstances permit developments in the Middle East to lessen its support of the Western European alliance. This continuing and necessary association with the West makes it impossible for us to avoid some identification with the powers which formerly had “colonial” interests in the area. As these interests have receded, the points of conflict between the Arab states and nations of Western Europe have been reduced. There remain several, however, which can only be troublesome for some time to come.

Persian Gulf

16. The United Kingdom is convinced that its continued predominance in the Persian Gulf is essential to guarantee the flow of oil necessary to maintain the British domestic economy and international position. Saudi Arabia undoubtedly over the long run envisions the reduction or elimination of British influence in the Gulf [*1½ lines of source text not declassified*]. The Persian Gulf States and the Aden Colony and Protectorate are considered by Arab Nationalists as terra irridenta in the Eastern Arab World. The Western alliance makes the U.S. a target for some of the animus which this situation generates.

North Africa

17. The continuing conflict in Algeria continues to excite the Arab world. There is not a single Arab leader, no matter how pro-Western he may be on

other issues, who is prepared to accept anything short of full Algerian independence as a solution to this problem. The nature of the warfare there provides a constant stream of news and propaganda which has a highly unsettling effect in the Eastern Arab states. There is fertile ground for Soviet and Arab nationalist distortion of the degree of U.S. and NATO moral and material support to the French in Algeria. The emotional and ostentatious character of French support for Israel is a further unsettling element. The promising relationship which was developing between Tunisia and Morocco, on the one hand, and France on the other, as a result of French granting of independence to those countries, is being poisoned by disputes arising out of the hostilities. This development serves to jeopardize U.S. objectives in these two countries and elsewhere in the Arab world.

Economic Problems

18. The majority of the states in the area have seen a significant rise in living standards since the close of World War II. Standards of consumption have risen, education is more widespread, and a middle class is being established in an area where but a decade or two before feudalism seemed quite firmly entrenched. As is generally the case, however, the rise in living and social standards which has taken place has only whetted the mass appetite for more progress and more material advantages. This rise in living standards, moreover, sometimes has the effect of moving people from a settled tribal or village environment into an urban realm of potential conflict with new forces and new ideas; they move from areas of political inertia into areas of stimulated dissatisfaction. Not unnaturally the tendency is to ascribe the blame for the area's relative state of underdevelopment to external factors such as "colonialism", unfair arrangements with the oil-producing companies, and a desire on the part of the West to keep the Arab world relatively undeveloped so that it may ultimately become a source of raw materials and the primary market for Israel industry. There is a lack of desire on the part of the Arabs to recognize the need for conscious and deliberate planning of major development programs either on a national or regional basis, the need to establish orderly processes of capital formation within the area, and the advantages to be gained by the free movement of capital and persons throughout the area.

19. The above statements with respect to a gradual increase in living standards do not apply to Egypt. It would appear that the population pressure in Egypt has reached a point where there is practically nothing which human technology at its present stage of development could do to arrest the downward trend of living standards. Even the fullest development of the Nile River would be overtaken by population growth within Egypt. Perhaps Egypt's only economic salvation may lie in a major technological breakthrough such as a discovery of oil in vast quantities on Egyptian territory or the establishment of a source of extremely cheap power for use in the desalinization of seawater and pumping it up to Egypt's desert plateaus.

20. U.S. economic and technical assistance programs have contributed substantially to the rise in the standard of living throughout most of the area. Here again, however, the favorable impact of such programs has been dissipated to some extent by the fact that this rise in standards has not kept up with local expectations. In a sense, we have become victims of our own reputation for rapid, skillful and imaginative execution of major engineering works. The Arabs feel that we have the resources with which to perform miracles in their countries if only we desired to do so. A further source of difficulty has arisen from comparisons on a per capita basis of assistance which we have given to Israel with assistance rendered to the Arab states. Legislative requirements surrounding U.S. aid are considered to be "strings" or political conditions established in derogation of local sovereignties. In some cases, U.S. aid programs have meant the import of a large number of U.S. technicians, all requiring a firmly [*fairly?*] high, and by local standards, ostentatious standard of living. The presence of American technicians and advisers in some numbers in local government agencies has excited adverse comment from time to time.

21. A further problem is created by the fact that certain of the agricultural commodities produced by the area have become surplus to and competitive with the needs and products of the West. This is particularly true with respect to Egyptian and Sudanese cotton. It is periodically true of such crops as Syrian grains, Iraqi cereals and dates, and Lebanese fruit. The Soviet orbit has been able to increase the volume of its trade with the area

by arranging to dispose of certain of these commodities under barter and economic and military assistance arrangements.

21–A. The obstacles to the attainment of our objectives are so great and the forces working to weaken the U.S. position in the area are so strong that we cannot exclude the possibility of being faced with a set of circumstances which put up to us squarely the choice of either using force to maintain our position in the area or seeing it disappear entirely.

Elements of a Course of Action

The Arab-Israel Dispute

22. We must learn to live with this problem for a long time ahead, as the widely divergent objectives of the parties to the dispute, and the efforts of the USSR to capitalize on the conflict prevent a dramatic resolution of the problem. In a dispute where emotions and tensions are so high, we cannot expect to hope that either party will respond quickly or affirmatively to a policy of sympathetic impartiality on our part. Each will insist that our policies favor the other side. Our own lack of maneuverability in this field, however, impels us to endeavor to commit ourselves to a process of persuasion not only with regard to sincerity of our motives but also as to the worth of the very real practical benefits which our policies have brought and can bring to the area. There are specific points of friction which we can endeavor to minimize, but the attitude of the parties, the willingness of the Arabs to turn to the USSR, and the increased weakness of our position in the area make it unwise for the U.S. to take an initiative looking toward a general settlement for the foreseeable future. This would not, however, preclude us from supporting, or even inspiring, an initiative taken by another friendly country, or in the United Nations.

23. Our primary short-term objective must remain the prevention or thwarting of a resort to force by either party to the Palestine dispute in an attempt to gain a favorable solution. The present courses of action in this contingency involving the use of moral suasion and economic sanctions, within and outside the United Nations, which served us well in the Suez hostilities should be retained. We should continue efforts to maintain and perhaps expand the mission of the UNTSO and of the UNEF in preventing

and localizing frontier outbreaks. We should continue publicly to oppose an arms race in the area, despite the fact that Soviet deliveries to Syria and Egypt, and French deliveries to Israel give us little basis for hope that the present competition for arms will be quickly terminated. We should continue to require Israel to look to sources other than the U.S. for its military requirements. The present state of tensions in the area requires us to recognize that the aforementioned courses of action might prove inadequate to the achievement of our objectives. We should be prepared to deal with a contingency requiring a direct U.S. military action in opposing an aggressive act on the part of a party to the Arab-Israel dispute and rendering quick and effective assistance to the victims of such aggression. Our military planning and the disposition of our . forces in the area should take this possibility into account. We should maintain the offer of willingness, contained in the Secretary of State's speech of August 26, 1955, to join in an international guarantee of agreed frontiers between Israel and the Arab states.

24. The presence of nearly a million refugees from the 1948 Palestine hostilities on the territory of the Arab states surrounding Israel serves as a constant reminder of the humiliating defeat the Arabs suffered at the hands of an Israel which received a large measure of support from the U.S. U.S. contributions to UNRWA have been the decisive factor in maintaining a relief, medical, and educational program for the refugees at a level which compares not unfavorably with standards extant among the indigenous populations of the host states. This U.S. contribution has gained us no popular credit with the Arabs; to the contrary, our assistance is dismissed as a wholly inadequate act of atonement. The Arabs demand the repatriation of the refugees, which Israel refuses, and efforts by the U.S. or UNRWA to improve the lot of the refugees have been largely unsuccessful, in view of this political obstacle.

25. The UNRWA mandate from the United Nations General Assembly expires on June 30, 1960. It is apparent that UNRWA will find increasing difficulty in financing its needs during the remainder of its existence. The U.S. should continue to contribute to UNRWA programs, subject to the present limitation that our contribution should not exceed 70 percent of the total. If UNRWA's financial difficulties cause the curtailment of refugee

programs in host countries friendly to us (e.g., Jordan and Lebanon), we should be prepared to assist those countries bilaterally. We should take no action to extend the mandate of UNRWA beyond 1960. To do so would give the impression both to the host countries and to Israel that the U.S. was prepared to carry this heavy burden indefinitely and in the absence of progress toward a permanent solution. We should begin now to study measures to be taken when UNRWA disappears. The least we should do is to seek that the United Nations investigate the situation thoroughly with a view to establishing a new agency with more realistic terms of reference. Consideration might be given to permitting the United Nations responsibility for the refugees to expire altogether, to be replaced by bilateral programs of assistance from friendly governments to be used in resettlement projects. We should continue to state that the offers concerning refugees set forth in the Secretary's speech of August 26, 1955 remain valid (willingness to assist Israel in financing compensation, willingness to assist in projects aimed at rehabilitating the refugees either by resettlement in the Arab states, or, to such extent as may be feasible, repatriation). While, in present circumstances, we should avoid a U.S. initiative in the refugee problem, we should in appropriate circumstances encourage or even inspire an initiative by a third party. We should continue to make clear to the Israelis our view that they must in some way accept the principle of repatriation.

26. The Unified Plan for the Development of the Jordan River Basin (The "Johnston Plan") which would provide inter alia a decent livelihood for well over 100,000 Jordanians and refugees gained technical acceptance by the Arab states and Israel as a result of brilliant and painstaking negotiations by Ambassador Eric Johnston during the period 1953–1955. The plan failed to receive political clearance by the Arab states. In view of the tense political situation in the area, it is not believed that clearance of the Unified Plan, as a whole, by the interested states could be achieved in the immediate future. This should not preclude study and perhaps action on elements of the plan which might be implemented in the hope that ultimately a number of seemingly isolated works could be linked together in a system covering the entire river basin, e.g., a diversion of the lower Yarmuk by Jordan into an East Ghor Canal.

27. Another source of friction is the avowed policy of Israel of encouraging unrestricted Jewish immigration. Arab apprehension over this policy springs from two basic causes: (a) increased Israel population makes more difficult the task of eventually liquidating Israel; (b) Israel's resources are already inadequate to support the present population. The Arabs feel that a further influx will inevitably lead to Israel territorial expansion, despite any pretensions to the contrary which any present Israel Government may put forward. There is enough realism in the second of these concerns to give us pause. Israel firmly hopes to "rescue" the 2.5 million Jews now living in the Soviet orbit. The USSR has permitted a trickle of emigration from behind the Iron Curtain, apparently for the purpose of keeping this hope alive in Israel. *[18 lines of source text not declassified]*

28. A further source of friction lies in U.S. public and private economic assistance to Israel. The Arabs point out that total U.S. public assistance to Israel with a population of less than two million has approximated that given to the entire Arab world. An effort has been made to establish a pattern of declining U.S. Government aid to Israel, not only because of our policy of impartiality, but also in order to wean Israel away from dependence on the U.S. This effort should be continued and we should seek as quickly as possible to put public aid to Israel on a project basis, *[1 line of source text not declassified]* and encourage the Israelis to look to private capital investment as their primary source of external assistance. U.S. private assistance to Israel is also a point of friction with the Arabs who point out that the exemption from income tax which is accorded to U.S. contributions to the United Jewish Appeal makes these gifts an indirect additional subsidy from the U.S. Government. *[9 lines of source text not declassified]*

29. A further source of friction lies in the question of Israel use of the Suez Canal and passage through the Straits of Tiran. The Arabs oppose the former because they feel it enables Israel to avoid the full impact of the Arab boycott of Israel. Our own position supporting the Israel right to use the Canal is based on the Constantinople Convention of 1888 and the Security Council Resolution of 1951. At present, a tacit and probably

fragile *modus vivendi* appears to be on the way to being worked out whereby Israel cargoes of “non-strategic“ goods, as defined by the Egyptians (this does not include oil), are permitted transit through the Canal in third flag vessels.

30. The question of passage through the Gulf of Aqaba has taken on much more importance in recent months. With the occupation of the former Egyptian gun position at the Straits of Tiran by UNEF, there is no longer a physical means in the hands of the Arabs for obstructing passage of Israel or Israel-bound shipping. The majority of the world maritime powers, including the U.S., support the right of innocent passage through the Straits for ships of all nations, including Israel or Israel-bound shipping. In an Aide-Mémoire dated February 11, 1957, it was stated that “the United States believes that the Gulf comprehends international waters and that no nation has the right to prevent free and innocent passage in the Gulf and through the Straits giving access thereto² In the absence of some overriding decision to the contrary, as by the International Court of Justice, the U.S., on behalf of vessels of U.S. registry, is prepared to exercise the right of free and innocent passage and to join with others to secure general recognition of this right.” Since the Israel withdrawal from Sinai and the deployment of UNEF at the mouth of the Gulf, over a score of vessels, including U.S. ships, have called at the Israel Port of Eilat. The Israelis have constructed an eight inch oil pipeline from Eilat to Beersheba which connects with a sixteen inch line from Beersheba to the Mediterranean. So far, Israel has been able to purchase oil from Iran for delivery to Eilat. Israel naval forces in the Gulf consist of two frigates and three PT boats. These vessels have apparently been tied up for the past few months. The Israelis have made it clear, however, that any attempt to interfere with Israel-bound traffic through the Gulf will be met by force.

31. The principal protagonist of the Arab view that Israel should be excluded from the Gulf has become Saudi Arabia. King Saud maintains that this is a “life and death” matter for his country and that Israel use of the Gulf represents a “reward for aggression.” He has expressed concern at the presence of Israel warships so close to Saudi Arabia, and publicly declared that Israel’s presence in the Gulf threatens the security of a traditional route for Moslem pilgrims and the Moslem Holy Places themselves. He is also

concerned at the economic implications of Israel's use of the Gulf. First, it represents an Israel breakthrough of the Arab boycott. Secondly, it opens a prospect of Persian Gulf oil reaching the Mediterranean by means of a channel not in Arab hands. The King has reacted negatively to suggestions that Saudi Arabia take an initiative in this matter in the International Court of Justice. He believes that the U.S. has sufficient influence with Israel to force a return to the status quo ante in the Gulf. While there is as yet no evidence that the King will resort to force in an effort to eliminate Israel presence in the Gulf, it seems clear that the King's attitude on this question will greatly influence many other aspects of U.S.-Saudi Arabian relations.

32. We have engaged in extensive discussions of the Gulf of Aqaba question with the Saudis over the past several months. Our objective in such discussions has been to persuade the Saudis that our position with respect to the freedom of passage through the Gulf need not jeopardize any legitimate Saudi interests. We have also sought to persuade the Saudis of the wisdom, if they continue to believe they must oppose the use of the Gulf by Israel-bound shipping, of seeking action in the International Court of Justice, perhaps through a request for an advisory opinion by the Security Council or the General Assembly. So far our efforts have not been successful. If this problem continues to fester, and it appears that a resort to force in the Gulf is imminent, we should seek to arrange an initiative in the United Nations to obtain a determination of the rights of the parties and the maritime community by the International Court of Justice. In the above circumstances, we may wish to suspend, pending the Court's determination, our present policy of looking with favor upon transits through the Straits made without the permission of the littoral states.

[Numbered paragraph 33 (10 lines of source not) text declassified]

The East-West Conflict

34. The USSR appears committed to a course of action designed to achieve: first, a global recognition that the Soviet Union has a legitimate interest in the area and must be dealt with on that basis; secondly, sufficient influence to put the USSR in a position whereby it can effectively deny the oil

resources of the area to the Western alliance; and finally, the complete removal of Western influence and the ultimate domination of the area by the USSR. It is believed that the USSR seeks to bring about these developments by means short of overt acts which would risk global war. At the same time, we must face up to the possibility that the USSR is so heavily engaging its prestige in the area, and is so recklessly in the pursuit of its objectives, that a combination of circumstances might arise which could bring about hostilities between Soviet or "volunteer" forces and the forces of the Free World, including the U.S.

35. The USSR is seeking an arrangement whereby it, on the one hand, and the U.S. and its allies on the other, would acknowledge and accommodate to each other's interests in the area. For example, it would probably be possible to achieve a tacit working arrangement whereby, if the U.S. would suspend the military assistance provisions of the American Doctrine, cease supporting the Baghdad Pact, and make it clear that we would neither strengthen present military bases in the area nor seek additional ones, the USSR, for its part, would limit or forego arms deliveries to the states of the area. The overriding disadvantage to us of such an arrangement is obvious. We for our part would be committed to acquiescence in an irreversible trend toward the dissolution of any security system in the area. The Soviets, on the other [hand], would be in a position, once it became clear the Western security system was dead beyond any revival, to resume arms shipments at any time they chose. Meanwhile they would not have ceased working against us, and Near East governments friendly to us, by political means. The fact that those states in the area nearest the USSR are those which are the most concerned about the Communist threat (Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan) makes a territorial *modus vivendi* with the USSR impractical. Any line that were drawn would involve our consent to paramount Soviet influence among peoples most determined to resist it, and the weakening of the Northern barrier would gravely expose the states to the South. The consequent effect on other peoples in the area, who witnessed such a sell-out on our part, could again only favor the USSR.

36. It is therefore apparent that there is little we can do directly with the Soviet Union other than continue to make clear our determination to risk global war, if necessary, to prevent aggression in the area by a state

controlled by international Communism, and to assist states in the area to defend their independence against indirect Communist aggression. The primary thrust of the Soviet effort has been in the fields of subversion, willingness to exploit intra-area conflicts, propaganda, and intimidation of the states of the area. Our efforts must be concentrated in the strengthening of resistance to Soviet efforts by the peoples of the area themselves. Of advantage to us is the fact that those states in the area which have shown themselves most disposed to accept Soviet influence are not contiguous to the Soviet Union. The issues involved in this area are so great however and the stakes are so high we would not wish to leave the impression that this study seeks to close the door firmly to the possibility of any conceivable understanding with the Soviet Union. Even if, in this remote contingency, some sort of an arrangement with the USSR could be worked out, a vigorous action program covering all other fields would still be required of us in order to maintain the United States position and influence in the area.

37. It is clear that none of the indigenous forces in the area defined for this study will be in a position to offer effective cooperation in a war against Soviet forces for the few years ahead in which we are interested. The primary objective of our military assistance programs, therefore, must be in strengthening internal security against Communist subversion or efforts to influence governments through civil disturbance. We should be prepared to go beyond this, and provide items of equipment not strictly necessary for internal security if the morale of the government and security forces of the country we are assisting so requires it. Some recognition should be taken of longer range plans for area defense. We should seek in all cases to limit our military assistance programs to the economic capacity of the receiving country to carry a military establishment. We cannot, however, in present circumstances, bind ourselves absolutely to this consideration. The maintenance of internal security in states of the area friendly to us, and the prevention of arms imbalances among area states so great as to tempt local aggression, are so important that we should be prepared, if necessary, to divert resources intended for other areas to this task. We must also be in a position to supply armed forces, on request, to assist local security forces in combating Communist-inspired revolutionary movements.

38. For a long time to come, the primary responsibility for defending the area against international Communism will rest with us. It is therefore essential that U.S. planning and military staffing patterns take this into account. The Department of Defense should carry out its plan for a coordinating mechanism in this field where presently various military branches and services, including CINCNELM, CINCEUR, USAF and JCS, have different and limited responsibilities for the Middle East, Our forces in the area should have at their disposal adequate resources [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*]. Early completion of an agreed plan on political-military objectives and strategy for the area is essential. The plan would take into account the Defense Department's study of the military implications of the Joint Resolution on the Middle East and the study by Frank Nash on the general problem of U.S. overseas bases.

39. The Baghdad Pact is a going concern. Its survival of the shock of the Suez invasion demonstrates that it has a certain resilience. The U.S. has been able to use it as a basis for stimulating needed regional economic development projects. We should continue to support the Baghdad Pact. We should not join it at this time. The added encouragement which would be given to Pact members by our joining would be greatly outweighed by the problems we would face in our relations with other states such as Israel and Saudi Arabia. We should encourage present Pact members to strengthen the Pact as it now is rather than seek new adherents to the Pact. We should participate actively in the work of the Economic Committee and the Counter Subversion Committee of the Pact. Our participation in the Military Committee will depend heavily on the development of our own plan for the defense of the area.

40. It is recognized that the measures discussed above, while absolutely essential to the protection of our interests in the area, are primarily of a negative and prophylactic character. The struggle between ourselves and the Soviet Union with regard to the Middle East will in all probability be carried on primarily as a battle for men's minds. In such a context, the totality of our policies toward the area must constantly be appraised to determine whether what we are doing and what we stand for has sufficient appeal and dynamism. This is particularly true with respect to our attitudes toward Arab nationalist aspirations and Arab "nationalism."

41. As noted above, the primary factors in the area favoring Arab “neutralism” have been the feeling that the Arabs can only gain in an East-West competition for their favor and a fear of the consequences which a third world war might bring to the area. We have attempted with regard to the former to make clear that the U.S. is unprepared to engage in a competition with the USSR, and that a strengthening of relations with the Soviet Union almost inevitably means a jeopardizing of relations with the U.S. We have endeavored to persuade the Arabs that the best way of preventing World War III anywhere in the world is for the free peoples to unite and maintain their strength.

42. We have not defined, on an area basis, with any precision the degree of Soviet presence and influence in a country which we would be prepared to tolerate. We felt, for example, that the degree of economic commitment to the Soviet bloc by Egypt resulting from the arms deals made it impossible for us to implement our offer to be of assistance on the Aswan Dam. We have viewed with grave concern the degree of Soviet presence and influence in Syria resulting from the recent arms and economic assistance deals. At the same time, we have viewed with relative equanimity trade agreements between such countries as Israel and Lebanon with Soviet bloc countries. These agreements have not resulted in a primary dependence on Soviet bloc markets. We have sought to prevent recognition of Communist China by the Arab states, but have not made it an issue in our relations with Israel which recognized Communist China in January, 1950. We have successfully counseled the Jordan Government of the dangers involved in the establishment of diplomatic relations with the USSR, applauded the decision of the Iraqis to sever such relations, but have not urged Lebanon to follow suit. We have indicated a willingness to offer economic aid to Yemen despite that country’s purchase of arms from the Soviet bloc and acceptance of bloc economic aid offers. The foregoing would appear to indicate that we have found it necessary to make decisions on an ad hoc country-by-country basis, in the light of circumstances prevailing at the time, and the basic attitude of the country concerned toward the Communists. It is not believed that it would be possible or useful in this study to attempt to define with any precision the degree of Soviet presence which we could tolerate, as there are subjective and local factors which must be taken into account in each case.

43. These considerations affect also a definition of a “neutralism” which would be acceptable to us. We have on more than one occasion expressed the view that we are prepared to deal with a “truly neutral” Egypt. We have pointed out to the Egyptians those aspects of the Egyptian-Soviet relationship, and other Egyptian actions which have, in our view, prevented Egyptian policy from being “truly neutral.” The lack of a constructive response to these comments by the Egyptians has not enabled us to pursue this matter in any detail with them.

44. It is obviously impossible to attempt to set down in advance a definitive description of what we would regard as “true neutralism.” There are a few rules of thumb, however, which might be worth considering in this study. We would probably not oppose the maintenance of diplomatic relations with the USSR and Soviet satellite countries (except East Germany) provided the Near East state concerned felt that it required such relations for prestige purposes and demonstrated an awareness of, and determination to deal with, potential subversive threats emanating from bloc missions. The question of relations with Communist China is more difficult but even here we might be prepared to tolerate such relations provided the Near East state concerned undertook to minimize these relations and to make no efforts to persuade other area states to establish them. The question of economic relations is largely one of degree. We have tolerated bilateral trade agreements with bloc countries when their impact on area trade patterns was not overly significant. We would probably have to go a bit farther than this with respect to a surplus commodity such as Egyptian cotton. A formula might be worked out whereby the West would be prepared to make a sympathetic effort to assist the Near East state in disposing of its surpluses, provided the Near East state undertook not to seek Communist markets for more than half of its annual crops. In the field of cultural relations, the Near East state should be prepared to make a serious effort to balance Communist bloc presentations with those from the Free World. The Near East state concerned would be expected to assure that its state-directed propaganda media would avoid slavish adherence to the Communist line. The most difficult area would probably be that of arms supplies and we would probably have to content ourselves with an arrangement whereby, over a period of years, *total* dependence on the Soviet bloc for arms, ammunition, and replacements was phased out. In

this, as in other areas, much would depend on the willingness of the Near East state concerned to recognize the danger to its own independence from Communist agents, including bloc technicians, and a determination to deal with this threat.

45. A primary consideration in determining the possible conditions of a modus vivendi which could be reached with an Arab state on the basis of a mutual definition of "true neutralism" would be that under no circumstances could the total effect of our political commitments and economic and military assistance to such a state be greater than or even approximate that which we are doing for other area states which have had the courage and conviction to take positions clearly favoring the Free World.

Arab Nationalist Aspirations

46. The U.S. is unjustly accused of hampering Arab nationalist aspirations. The historical record going back to the middle of the nineteenth century indicates the significant and positive role which we have played in an emerging Arab nationalism. It is doubtful that such states as Syria, Lebanon and the Sudan would have achieved their complete independence as rapidly as they did had it not been for United States support. Furthermore, such public expressions of our attitude toward Arab unity as have been made, have been positive and favorable. We have in the past made clear that we would not look with disfavor upon the union of two or more Arab states provided this took place in accordance with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples directly concerned. In the specific instances where we have opposed schemes for "Arab Unity" (our sympathy with King Ibn Saud's opposition to the King Abdullah-United Kingdom "greater Syria scheme"; our opposition to Nasser's efforts to extend Egyptian hegemony by subversion) they have been clearly cases to which our publicly stated criteria did not apply. We have also made considerable efforts to prevail upon the Arabs to reduce trade barriers and to stimulate the flow of goods, persons and capital among their countries. We have offered technical assistance to the Arab League, as an entity, to facilitate this process. We stimulated consideration of a project for an Arab bank as a device for promoting the investment of oil revenues in "have not" Arab states. We

supported the awarding of the status of observer to the Arab League at the United Nations.

47. It would be useful for us to examine how we could best use this clear historical record in our informational and other activities to demonstrate our acceptance of a peaceful evolution of the Arab world toward a unit or units of greater size, strength and potentiality based on the popular will. If we restate such a position, we should be better able to point out the true character of schemes which, while masquerading under the rallying cry of "Arab unity," are merely the efforts of one despotic regime to expand its territory and influence at the expense of other peoples.

48. It is clear that a federation of Egypt and Syria under their present regimes, with the resulting increase in their capability to threaten Lebanon, Jordan and Saudi Arabia and Iraq and perhaps engulf them one-by-one would be contrary to our interests. There are, however, regional schemes which are not without attraction to us and which we should carefully consider. Among these are a strengthening of the ties among Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Iraq; the strengthening of relations between Iraq and a pro-Western Syria whereby Iraq would gain some kind of access to the Mediterranean; a strengthening of relations between the Sudan and Ethiopia; and, while not in the area of this study, the possibility of a North African Federation comprising Libya, Tunisia, Morocco and eventually an independent Algeria. [4 lines of source text not declassified]

Egypt

49. Our objectives are an Egypt prepared to maintain normal relations with Western countries; recognizing the threat to itself and to the area of international Communism and thus refraining from abetting its objectives; desisting from efforts to dominate the Middle East and devoting major attention to internal and economic problems. Among specific courses of action which suggest themselves are the maintenance of a situation which demonstrates that collaboration with the Soviet bloc in the military and economic spheres does not fulfill Egypt's most basic requirements. We should continue to press for acceptable arrangements for the Suez Canal. Failing a change in the attitude of the Egyptian Government, we should persevere in efforts to isolate Egypt. We should, by appropriate means,

make clear to the Arab world Egypt's inherent economic and social weaknesses and growing incapability to exercise constructive leadership. We should continue to display an attitude of relative indifference to developments inside Egypt but be quick to identify and generate opposition to Egyptian efforts [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*]. The U.S. should always remain ready to respond to the unexpected if Nasser's future actions render invalid the present assessment, and to work for an understanding along the lines set forth in paragraph 44 above. However, the U.S. should be wary of being drawn into unilateral moves, and proceed on a quid pro quo basis insisting upon performance by Egypt which could be proven. We should urge our Western allies who may for compelling economic reasons seek an accommodation with Egypt to pursue a similar policy.

Syria

50. Our objective in the period immediately ahead must be to keep the present regime in Syria off balance and in the position of being an abnormality in the area. By so doing, we are in the best position to encourage the generation of pressures upon Syria by the other Arab states. We should keep both Syria and the Soviet Union on the defensive as to the depth of their collaboration. We should by every possible means make it abundantly clear to the Arab peoples as a whole, including the Syrians themselves, that the maintenance of the present regime in Syria not only threatens Syrian freedom and independence but endangers the entire area. We should maintain diplomatic relations with Syria throughout this period if it is possible to do so without risking humiliation. [*2½ lines of source text not declassified*]

Saudi Arabia

51. We should continue to seek to maintain the friendliest relations with King Saud and endeavor to persuade him to use his influence for objectives we seek within the Arab world. We should be careful not to overestimate the latter nor to expect Saud to take positions which on their face, at least, appear directly to oppose public protestations of "Arab unity." We should, under appropriate circumstances, and with due respect for the sensitivities involved endeavor to make clear to Saud our belief that his own strength

and, indeed, the future of his regime, depend very heavily on a program of judicious financial, economic and social reform. We should continue to permit the relationship between ARAMCO and the Saudi Government to remain on a purely commercial basis, intervening only when there is a clear threat to American interests. We should do our utmost to bring about a diminution of difference of opinion on the Gulf of Aqaba as an obstacle to good relations. We should seek to increase our influence and understanding among groups in Saudi Arabia from which elements of leadership may emerge, particularly in the armed forces and middle level of Saudi Arabian Government officials.

52. While it is clearly to our interests to promote the resumption and bettering of relations between Saudi Arabia and Great Britain, we should probably avoid undue haste. British-Saudi differences with respect to the Persian Gulf are deep-seated and our best course of action may well lie in continuing to exhort both sides to compose their differences without our becoming too deeply involved in the specific points of dispute. The British now indicate that they are prepared to move with the tide in permitting to the Gulf Shaikhdoms greater freedom of action in relations with neighboring Arab states. We should encourage this and, as opportunities arise, also encourage the gradual evolution of more modern political institutions in these Shaikhdoms. We should also strengthen our own representation in the Gulf area, through the completion of treaty negotiations with Muscat and the establishment of a Consulate in Muscat and, perhaps eventually, through the establishment of a Consulate in Bahrein. On the Buraimi issue, the most we can probably hope to accomplish is to persuade the British and the Saudis either to resume negotiations in some mutually acceptable context or to establish a neutral buffer area between their respective spheres of influence. Such negotiations might drag on interminably and might not themselves produce any progress, but the fact that they were going on might serve to encourage the restoration to normal of other aspects of the British-Saudi relationship.

Yemen

53. Our objectives in Yemen include: a government able effectively to govern the country as a whole, keeping law and order; permitting legitimate

foreign participation in development in accordance with established international commercial practice; recognizing the threat of international Communism and prepared to phase out its present arrangements with the Soviet Union for arms, technical and economic assistance; prepared to maintain peace on the border with the Aden Protectorate and agree to a fair demarcation of the boundary; receptive to the influence of King Saud on Middle Eastern problems. The present Imam, while opportunistic, seems disposed to balance the trend toward relations with the Soviets by closer relations with the West. During this period, we should support the regime of the present Imam and seek to extend U.S. influence to the maximum extent possible. Our opportunities in a period of dynastic strife or under a regime headed by Crown Prince Badr might be less. Among possible courses of action are: remain aloof for the present from the internal political struggle; move carefully but rapidly to the formulation and implementation of a few high impact economic assistance projects; establish a resident representative in Yemen; encourage King Saud to take a more active part in Yemen affairs and assist him in establishing a useful degree of influence; support practical arrangements for the delineation of the boundary between Aden and Yemen.

Jordan

54. Our short term objective in Jordan must be to assure the continuing success of King Hussein's actions to rid the country of Soviet-Syrian-Egyptian domination, and to maintain its true independence and integrity. It is recognized that from the long-term viewpoint, Jordan is viable neither economically nor politically. It should be similarly recognized, however, that under present circumstances it is impossible to conceive of a situation whereby Jordan could disappear without the risk of widespread bloodshed and a grave threat to our interests in the area. In the long term, we should be prepared to accept a merger or association of Jordan with one or more other Arab states so that it would form part of a viable political entity capable of resisting international Communism and other foreign pressures. [2 lines of source text not declassified] The U.S. initiative in this regard should be confined, for the present, to the strengthening of Saudi and Iraqi influence in Jordan. Israel has thus far acquiesced in efforts which have been made to this end and we should seek to assure the maintenance of this Israeli

attitude. Our present short-term courses of action with respect to Jordan should be maintained. These include: the extension of economic aid for budgetary support and economic development; military assistance to the extent necessary to retain the loyalty of the Arab Army to the King and its capability to maintain internal security; [1 line of source text not declassified]; efforts to persuade Iraq and Saudi Arabia of the importance to their own interest of assisting Jordan politically and economically. In addition, we are urging the British to maintain economic development assistance for Jordan at previous levels.

Iraq

55. Our short-term objectives must include the maintenance of the present regime in Iraq. It is recognized that the present regime lacks widespread popular support and there are substantial elements in Iraq who deeply regret their enforced isolation from many of the trends affecting the rest of the Arab world. It should be equally recognized, however, that there are few elements among the opposition with whom we could work and that a change of regime or a period of chronic instability brought about by successful civil commotion could only greatly endanger our interests. It is felt that as the benefits of Iraq's wise investment in economic development become apparent to evergrowing numbers of people, there will be an increasing interest in the maintenance of Iraqi independence and an increasing pride in Iraq's growing strength. This trend is already discernible and should be encouraged. We do not feel that it is unrealistic over the long term to assume that a peaceful change from the present system of government to a more broadly-based, moderate, and progressive government can be achieved. Such a government could provide leadership to forces of constructive and progressive nationalism, based on complete independence throughout the Arab world. We should continue our present courses of action with respect to Iraq. These include: extension of military assistance to Iraq³ at a level calculated to strengthen internal security, maintain the morale, prestige, and loyalty of the Iraq Army, and permit Iraq to play a role, as a member of the Baghdad Pact, in the defense of the area; extension of technical assistance and guidance in the sound investment of Iraq's oil revenues; fostering Iraqi cooperation with Saudi Arabia, Jordan,

and Lebanon; and cooperation with the United Kingdom in military assistance to Iraq.

Lebanon

56. Lebanon has defied all known criteria with respect to political and economic viability and has emerged as the most prosperous (per capita) and advanced Arab state in the world. While internal pressures within Lebanon remain high, it is important that we recognize the degree to which Lebanese politicians will seize upon external issues for purposes of personal advancement. A great deal of the anti-Western and “pro-Arab” statements and actions emanate from a group of opposition leaders who are well aware of the importance to them personally of the maintenance of Lebanon’s independence and good relations with the West. For example, a large measure of the opposition outcry to the instrument of Lebanon’s adherence to the American Doctrine may well arise from a desire to prevent President Chamoun from obtaining a further term of office. In a country as small as Lebanon, with a political system based on ever shifting coalitions among established ethnic and religious groups, it is important that the U.S. maintain contact and influence among a large number of local leaders. It is also important, in planning U.S. programs for Lebanon, to recognize Lebanon’s position as a “show case” of close relations with the West and its role as a net exporter of such human resources as commercial acumen and professional skills to the rest of the Arab world. For example, economic assistance to Lebanon is difficult to justify on the basis of need, in view of Lebanon’s current prosperity. On the Other hand, however, a soundly conceived and well-executed development program in Lebanon has repercussions to the advantage of Arab-Western cooperation far beyond Lebanon’s borders. We should continue to extend military assistance to Lebanon at a level sufficient to permit the maintenance of internal security and to allow Lebanese forces to withstand the initial onslaught of an attack from Syria until outside help can arrive. We should quickly implement present plans to provide technical assistance for the strengthening of the police and gendarmérie. Economic and technical assistance should continue to be extended at approximately current levels. We should stress both within and outside the country the theme of Lebanon as a highly successful experiment in which many peoples of diverse religion and culture work

together amicably and effectively for the advancement of their country. We should continue to support the American University of Beirut.

Sudan

57. Our objectives are a stable Sudan, oriented towards the West, free from effective influence by international Communism, uninvolved in Arab quarrels, and cooperating with other states in the Nile Valley, especially Ethiopia and Uganda, but eventually also Egypt, for the unified development of this river system. The Umma Party in the Sudan, which leads the present coalition, has demonstrated its determination to maintain Sudanese independence and its awareness of the threat from Egypt and international Communism. It is to our interest that the Umma Party and its close allies achieve a substantial victory in the forthcoming elections which are to be held in February, 1958. We should be prepared to be adequately responsive to requests for economic and technical assistance which may result from the forthcoming visit of an ICA mission to the Sudan. We should pay special attention to the problem of internal security and be prepared to consider a small program, if requested, directed at increasing the internal security capabilities of the Sudan Defense Force. We should encourage close Sudan-Ethiopian relations and endeavor to bring Uganda into this grouping. We should be in a position to take measures, in conjunction with our Western allies, to assure that Sudan will find a market in the Free World for the larger part, at least, of its exportable surplus of cotton.

Roles of Other Powers

58. Current British policies tacitly admit the change which has taken place with respect to the British position in the area—a trend which was accelerated by the abortive attack on Egypt. Diplomatic relations with Egypt, Syria, and Saudi Arabia remain severed. The British have voluntarily withdrawn militarily from Jordan and Libya. There is no longer evidence of a British compulsion to take initiatives in the area without consulting us, as was the case with the rupture of the Buraimi arbitration proceedings; the Eden Palestine speech of November, 1955; the Templer Mission which aimed to bring Jordan into the Baghdad Pact in December, 1955; and, of course, the Suez affair of 1956. While the British are the first

to recognize that they no longer have a paramount position in the area, they are acutely aware of their dependence on Middle East petroleum to retain world power status and are determined to maintain for this reason their position in the Persian Gulf. The British also wish to keep their present influence with Iraq and the other Baghdad Pact powers. Our objectives with respect to the British in the area will no longer revolve around the usefulness per se of the maintenance of a British position in the area. Rather will they be conditioned by our very real interest in maintaining Britain as a strong and prosperous member of the Western alliance. We should be prepared to keep the United Kingdom currently informed and work with it through both overt and covert channels on area problems to the extent that this will in fact advance U.S. area objectives. We should continue to urge a settlement of the Buraimi and related boundary problems with Saudi Arabia, and of the Persian Gulf islands and sea bed question. We should support a continuing important British role in Iraq, but should not allow deference to British wishes to block the exercise of the measure of U.S. responsibility the situation demands, particularly in the military assistance sphere. We should encourage the United Kingdom to continue financial and other support for the Baghdad Pact.

59. France [*1½ lines of source text not declassified*]. The attack on Egypt, the ostentatious military assistance to Israel, and the Algerian problem, have embittered French relations with the Arab world. Except for North Africa, the French position has been almost totally destroyed and the same is likely to occur in North Africa in the absence of a prompt solution of the Algerian problem. Our objective with the French in the area covered by this study lies primarily in the field of public relations: [*4 lines of source text not declassified*]. We should keep the French generally informed of our policies, [*1½ lines of source text not declassified*]. We should also seek to encourage France to use its new-found influence with Israel on behalf of the common Western interest in the area.

60. A number of other powers have a deep interest in the area and have expressed a desire to consult with us with regard to it. *Turkey* is of course gravely concerned at developments in Syria and the growth of Soviet influence there. Turkey would like to see more Arab states join the Baghdad Pact. We should consult closely with the Turks but recognize that their

ability to exert a great deal of day-to-day influence in the area is rather closely limited by Arab antipathy toward the Turks which goes back to the days of the Ottoman Empire and Arab disapproval of the rather close relations (primarily economic) between Turkey and Israel. Turkey's greatest contribution to our objectives in the Near East will probably continue to be the fact that a strong Turkey lies athwart the land communications between the USSR and most of the Arab World. *Iran's* contributions also will probably remain primarily geographical. The Iranians have cooperated with us in the area and their influence while not great has been constructive. Iran thus far has been able to turn away Arab pressure to cease sales of oil to Israel for delivery through the Gulf of Aqaba. *India's* Nehru makes pious pronouncements from time to time with respect to the need for peace in the Near East but it is highly doubtful that India would accept the role of peacemaker between the Arabs and the Israelis. Nehru probably realizes that his assuming such a role would cost India what influence it has in the area and that the effort would probably not succeed. *Pakistan* seeks continually to extend its influence as a large Moslem nation into the Near East and has close and sometimes useful relations with Saudi Arabia and Iraq.

61. *Italy* constantly requests us to consult more with respect to Near East problems. The Italians seem primarily interested in obtaining U.S. recognition of them as a Mediterranean power. While the Italians are highly thought of throughout the area and enjoy good relations with all of the countries there, they have an exaggerated opinion of their influence nor are they in a position to devote much by way of resources. Italian connections with the Yemen are particularly helpful to the U.S. The *Germans* are without doubt the most popular of any of the Westerners with the Arabs. German goods and trading arrangements are highly regarded. Germany was able to turn away much of the Arab criticism arising from the reparations agreement with Israel by hinting in appropriate places that this agreement came about as a result of U.S. pressure on Germany. The German Federal Republic is willing to cooperate with us in the Near East. However, the Bonn government can be expected to devote most of its energies in this area to prevent Arab recognition of East Germany. We cannot, therefore, look to the Germans to take many risks. We should, however, urge them to grant credits for economic development to friendly Arab states. The Greeks

presently are cultivating relations with the Arab states, particularly Egypt. The Greeks hope thus to be able better to protect the thousands of Greek residents in Egypt. They also seek to capitalize on the anti-Turkish feeling in the area and gain support for their desire to annex Cyprus. We cannot expect Greek influence in the area to be very useful to us so long as the Cyprus matter is unresolved.

Role of the United Nations

62. The United Nations has been seized of the Palestine question since before the emergence of the State of Israel. It is directly involved in the unresolved Arab-Israel problem in a number of ways. The United Nations Truce Supervision Organization maintains the ceasefire ordered by the Security Council in the summer of 1948 and provides the machinery for the implementation of the Armistice Agreements between Israel and its immediate Arab neighbors. The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East provides relief and shelter for the nearly 1,000,000 refugees. The United Nations Palestine Conciliation Commission (of which the U.S., France and Turkey are members) was charged with carrying the parties of the dispute forward from the stage of Armistice Agreements to a general settlement. The efforts of PCC have been unsuccessful and the Commission is now almost moribund. It is, however, performing a useful function in that it is gathering and organizing data as to the ownership and value of property now in Israel which belonged to the Arab refugees. These data will be invaluable if ever a compensation plan can be carried out. Since 1956, a United Nations Emergency Force has been in the Near East. UNEF is presently stationed at the mouth of the Gulf of Aqaba and in the Gaza Strip. The Secretary General was charged by the Security Council in the Spring of 1956 with a mission to the area to bring about practical measures aimed at reducing border tensions.

63. The foregoing indicates how deeply involved the United Nations is in the area, to a degree where a Palestine settlement, without United Nations participation at some stage, would probably not take place. In the months immediately ahead our primary objective in the United Nations with respect

to Palestine will probably be to maintain an atmosphere of moral pressure on the parties to work toward a settlement. A great deal will depend on how the United Nations acquits itself in its handling of the present Syrian complaint against Turkey. We should continue to support the UNTSO and to urge that Israel cooperate fully with it. We should continue to explore possibilities of an enlarged function for UNEF.

Economic Policies

64. The last year or so has seen the beginnings of the emergence of the U.S. Government as victor over its own procedures with respect to economic aid to the area. Through a judicious use of Sections 201 and 401 of the Mutual Security Act, and the broad authority contained in the Middle East Doctrine, we are beginning to achieve that degree of flexibility so necessary for the successful operation of our programs in the Near East. The Development Loan Fund should also prove a useful tool. It is difficult to forecast a decline in the total amount of aid to be extended to this area. The reduced allocations to Israel have been more than offset by increasing U.S. responsibilities in Jordan and Lebanon. Developments favorable to us in either Syria or Egypt would almost certainly involve substantial economic aid programs to those countries. If a Palestine settlement could be achieved, the U.S. would probably be looked to for contributions which could run into hundreds of millions of dollars. A major task before us will be to persuade the American people, at a time when sentiment for foreign aid is declining, of the importance to our interests of the maintenance of economic programs in the Near East.

65. We have made a clear record of our desire to assist in regional economic development projects. Some beginnings have been made with respect to the Baghdad Pact countries. Regional projects involving both Arab states and Israel are obviously not feasible. Regional projects involving only Arab states have been difficult to identify, in view of rivalries among the states themselves and their desire to assure their own internal economic development before cooperating with other countries. Another source of difficulty has been the fact that Syria has never signed an economic assistance agreement with us, economic aid to Egypt is now suspended, and the program in Saudi Arabia was terminated in 1954 to be resumed only

this year and only with respect to assistance for the Port of Dammam and the construction of an air terminal at Dhahran. Despite these difficulties, we should continue to express our willingness to finance sound regional projects proposed by the states of the area. We are presently examining a proposal for a development bank for the area.

66. Our major economic interest in the area is, of course, oil. The most significant recent developments have probably been the breach of the 50–50 formula in Iran and the entry of a number of new companies showing interest in developing the oil of such regions as the off-shore areas of the Persian Gulf and territory in Saudi Arabia which ARAMCO is relinquishing in accordance with its concession agreement. We can expect to see continuing pressure on the oil companies from the governments in the area for higher revenues. In Saudi Arabia the pressure on ARAMCO is in the direction of an integrated company responsible not only for production but for transportation and marketing as well; the Saudis are undoubtedly looking toward the distant day when they will take over the company. It may well be that the present trend will continue until arrangements are found whereby title to the oil produced remains in the hands of the country from which it is extracted; with the foreign concessionary companies operating on the basis of management and market contracts. The consortium arrangement in Iran may point the way to this type of relationship throughout the area.

67. The arrangements for transporting oil out of the area will also be under heavy pressure for upward revisions of the share of the local governments through which the facilities pass. The pipelines furthermore live under the risk of disruption at the hands of an unfriendly government, particularly Syria. While Nasser seems presently committed to a policy designed to demonstrate to the world that he is capable of operating the Suez Canal on an equitable and efficient basis, this attitude may well wear off as economic pressures within Egypt mount. It would appear that safety and dependability for the export facilities of oil from the area lie primarily in the diversification of those facilities. It is noted that the petroleum industry is losing interest in an alternative pipeline through Turkey. If the Qum oil field

should prove out, perhaps Iran and Turkey will come to an arrangement of their own. The Iraqis should be encouraged in their plans to link by pipeline their northern oil fields with the Persian Gulf and to establish an offshore loading port near Basra. While we should not publicly oppose the diversion of the presently unused Haifa pipeline through Syria to a Lebanese port on the Mediterranean, this development would simply increase the number of facilities available only on Syrian sufferance and may be of doubtful economic value, in view of the condition and size of the long-unused line. With the linking of Iraqi fields to the Persian Gulf and the completion of the tanker fleet presently in the shipyards or on the drawing boards, the West should be in a much stronger position. There will be competing countries anxious to dispose of their oil and a number of alternative transportation facilities equally anxious for employment. We should maintain pressure on Egypt to make a more adequate international commitment with respect to the operation of the Canal. We should give diplomatic support, as required, to the pipeline companies in their discussions with the governments through whose territory the facilities run.

68. One of the principal problems faced by the countries in the area is that of disposing of their agricultural surpluses. Egyptian and Sudanese cotton are particularly difficult to dispose of in Free World markets. From time to time, surpluses arise in such commodities as Lebanese apples and Jordan and Syrian cereals. The USSR has been quick to exploit these surpluses and to offer to purchase them at what appear to be higher prices than those available in Free World markets. While this is a highly difficult problem for us, in view of U.S. cotton surplus and the domestic political importance attached to cotton, there are a few courses of action which merit detailed study. First of all, we could examine how the Western World as a whole, particularly the NATO countries, might best work together to provide markets for critical surpluses. Secondly, in the field of cotton, we might give intensive study to the possibilities of an international cotton agreement. Finally, we should give consideration to a plan whereby the U.S. and perhaps its Western allies would be in a position to effect pre-emptive purchases, if necessary, of surplus agricultural commodities, including cotton.

Two other matters deserve mention at this point. The developing, largely politically oriented, labor organizations in the Near East should be recognized as potent psychological weapons. Many of the unions are now largely uncommitted or are veering toward Communist control. Every effort should be made to encourage their Western orientation and establishment on sound, practical economic (rather than political) lines. Our programs of bringing more labor grantees to the U.S.⁴ Although civil aviation matters are dealt with in other NSC and OCB documents, note should be taken of the increased capacity of the USSR to put competing civil aircraft into the air.

69. Psychological and political programs carefully adapted to the attitudes and conditions in the area and designed to reach groups considered politically important and influential should:

a. Further and explain U.S. policies and objectives, stressing:

(1) U.S. interest in freedom and independence of Middle East nations.

(2) U.S. belief [that] regional problems are primarily concern of nations in area.

(3) U.S. support for freely-chosen closer unity among Arab nations.

(4) Traditional U.S. support for nationalist aspirations of peoples.

(5) U.S. support for United Nations.

(6) U.S. desire to contribute to economic strength of nations in area.

b. Recognizing the generally [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] ineffective character of indigenous information media in the Arab world, seek to create a climate favorable to the U.S. through the maximum encouragement of effective direct

relations between U.S. citizens and peoples of the area through exchange of persons, technical assistance programs, and the stimulation of private U.S. activities in the area.

[Heading and numbered paragraph 70 (2 lines of source text) not declassified]

¹ Source: Department of State, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 61 D 167, NSC 5801 File. Top Secret. A memorandum from Boggs to the National Security Council Planning Board transmitting the Staff Study for discussion at the Planning Board’s meeting of November 5 and a table of contents are not printed.

² Ellipsis in the source text.

³ See Annex on “US–UK Memorandum of Understanding on US Military Assistance to Iraq”. [Footnote in the source text. The Annex is not printed.]

⁴ The handwritten words “should be expanded” appear at this point in another copy of this paper in Department of State, Central Files, 611.80/10–3057.

271. Memorandum on the Substance of Discussion at the Department of State–Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting, Washington, November 1, 1957, 11:30 a.m.¹

Washington, November 1, 1957, 11:30 a.m.

[Here follows a list of 23 persons present, including General Twining, General Taylor, Admiral Felt, and General White. The Department of State delegation included Murphy, Smith, and Anschuetz.]

1. U.S. Military Representative for the Middle East

Mr. Murphy stated that the Department's initial reaction was a favorable one and asked whether the Chiefs would wish to elaborate on their concept.

General Twining replied that their idea was to tie things together, to designate someone from whom it would be possible to get an answer to military problems involving the Middle East area, and that while it would be inaccurate to refer to the proposed headquarters as a "command" it would in fact provide a nucleus from which, in the event of hostilities, a command could be formed. In response to a question from Mr. Murphy it appeared that the Chiefs themselves had not developed in their own minds a clear delineation of the countries to be included in the area. General Taylor said that in his view North Africa probably would be included and that one of the criteria would be to include in the area such countries as CINCEUR could not effectively control and supervise.

Mr. Murphy pointed out that this proposal poses political problems and that it had been suggested that certain of the Arab countries such as Saudi Arabia might regard this in an invidious light. Both Generals Twining and Taylor confirmed their own feelings that the headquarters should in fact be in the heart of the area, General Taylor suggesting that it be located somewhere in the Arab countries. Malta and Turkey were suggested as possible sites for the headquarters, but the consensus was that Malta being within the NATO area and the headquarters of already existing NATO commands would make it inappropriate. Mr. Murphy pointed out that we

have approximately 8,000 U.S. military personnel and dependents already in Turkey and that, although by definition the proposed headquarters would be a small one, the history of such organizations usually demonstrated that they possess considerable capacity for growth.

Mr. Murphy noted that one of the responsibilities proposed for the Military Representative was participation in “supra-national agencies”. No plausible explanation was forthcoming as to what this phrase implied, and Admiral Austin suggested that this probably reflected merely an effort to “cover the waterfront”.

Mr. Murphy concluded by saying that the proposal in general appeared to him as useful and necessary but that any definitive statement of our position would be contingent on more specific proposals from the JCS.

[Here follow Item 2, “Efforts To Counter the Propaganda Effect of Sputnik;” Item 3, “Aid to Yugoslavia;” Item 4, “Service Attachés to Moscow;” Item 5, “Berlin;” Item 6, “NATO Exercise ‘Red Epoch’ ;” and Item 7, “Second Plane for the King of Morocco.”]

¹ Source: Department of State, State-JCS Files: Lot 61 D 417. Top Secret. The source text indicates that the memorandum is a “State Draft. Not cleared with Department of Defense.”

272. Memorandum Presented to the National Security Council Planning Board¹

Washington, November 4, 1957.

1. The Middle East Staff Study² admits that the U.S. must learn to live with the problem for a long time ahead. It treats the problem as hopeless of solution in the near future. It offers nothing new or initiative, just more of the same, and working on the “fringes”.
2. It seems to me the Planning Board ought to explore some major alternatives which differ from restating our existing policy and courses of action.
3. In the interesting paragraphs 4–21 which state the “obstacles to U.S. objectives”, there are set forth the following Arab beliefs which cut across our existing policy guidance:
 - a. The Arab interest will be best served by a competition in the Mideast between the Communist world and the Free World, not by the exclusion of either.
 - b. “Neutralism” is really a better course for small Arab states than taking sides with either big power.
 - c. Communism is not an important threat to Arab countries; far less important than Israel. There are certain exceptions to this viewpoint.
 - d. As a matter of fact, Communism may be religiously wrong, but [*1½ lines of source text not declassified*]. Communist police state methods are no worse than methods employed by Near East regimes (including those supported by U.S.).

e. In the long run, Israel should “disappear”; it is the common enemy on which all can agree.

g. Also the U.S. befriends the ex-“colonial” powers (Baghdad Pact—U.K. interest in sheikdoms—French aid to Israel). Algerian “freedom” is a *must* for the Arabs.

f. While the Soviets oppose Israel, the U.S. has supported Israel and has helped it economically more than the Arabs.

h. There is a mystique that ties all Arabs together—not only common religious belief. The U.S. wants to keep the Arab world disunited and thus get Arab oil for itself and allies—U.S. helps only *some* Arab states.

i. The U.S. is identified only with archaic, status-quo, and reactionary regimes.

j. The Arab place in the sun can never be reached through national independences of 11 weak nations.

k. The U.S. has resources to perform economic miracles in Arab countries if really interested in doing so, instead of keeping them just as sources of raw materials.

4.

How are any of these obstacles to be overcome or dealt with effectively under the proposed objectives and policy guidance?

Objective 2.a. really states the primary U.S. objective. 2.b.–f. seem subsidiary thereto and explanatory thereof.

Paragraphs 2.b. and 2.e. are unrealistic. Whether or not 2.b. relates to all of the existing Arab countries or only to some of them, it is an unrealistic goal for the U.S. to think of “stable,

viable, friendly, and progressive governments” in this area. It seems also unrealistic to have a goal of rolling back existing Soviet presence and influence.

This kind of objective does not really contribute anything toward the solution of the Middle East problem in the present or in the near future. It is merely a restatement of the old policy which has been followed, with the results shown at the present time.

The Russian presence in the Middle East is a fact. It is there not by force of arms but by trade, supply of arms, influence, subversion, propaganda.

We need to have a new look and a new posture, a new kind of approach, which may take a long time to materialize but toward which all our efforts should be addressed.

a. We should be working toward a sensible plan of Arab unity and unification in the Arabian Peninsula, perhaps a few countries coming together at first, but with a goal of a sufficiently strong Arabian Peninsula state to survive independently.

b. We should work for Israel [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] its borders guaranteed, [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*].

c. We should play down armament and play up a regional economic body. (Perhaps this position to be workable should be coupled with some kind of international agreement to limit armament sales and be coupled with increased security guarantees.—?) The regional body would be composed of all Arab nations in the Near East (as defined), using U.S. technical advice, financed by Arab, U.S., and other Free World country contributions, prepared to give economic assistance to all Arab countries, regional in organization but not necessarily regional in projects.

5. Possible Other Objectives

1. Palestine refugees.
2. Israel status [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*].
3. Eisenhower Doctrine.
4. Truly “neutral” countries fully acceptable.
5. Economic development.
6. Interest of other Free World countries.
7. Training of leaders.

¹ Source: Department of State, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 61 D 167, NSC 5801 File. Top Secret. A November 8 transmittal memorandum from Boggs to the National Security Council Planning Board is not printed. It indicates the memorandum was presented to the Planning Board at its November 5 meeting; see [infra](#).

² [Document 270](#).

273. Editorial Note

On November 5, the National Security Council Planning Board considered the Staff Study, [Document 270](#). The Board also noted that the Department of State would prepare a draft statement of policy on the subject in light of the discussion. The record of the meeting is in Department of State, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1.

Subsequent to the meeting, Robert Cutler included in his weekly report to Sherman Adams the following account of the discussion on the study during the November 5 meeting:

“The first half of the meeting was devoted to further consideration of the State Department’s draft of a staff study on the Near East. While this draft does constitute a first rate analysis of the existing situation in the Near East and the obstacles confronting U.S. objectives in the area, I felt it to be defective in its suggestions for positive revision of our existing policy. Accordingly, at the end of the discussion, I made certain proposals for a new, fresh look at our objectives and future courses of action in the Near East. I also urged the Planning Board to do its best to come up with new and original recommendations for formulating a realistic and effective U.S. policy in the Near East.” (Memorandum from Cutler to Adams, November 12; Eisenhower Library, Staff Secretary Records)

**274. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State,
Washington, November 13, 1957¹**

Washington, November 13, 1957

SUBJECT

Middle East

PARTICIPANTS

Mr. Abdel Khalek Hassouna, Secretary General of the Arab League

Mr. Kemal Abdel Rahim, Head of the Arab States Delegations Office and the Arab

Information Office The Secretary

NEA—William M. Rountree

NE—Wells Stabler

Messrs. Hassouna and Rahim called on the Secretary at their request. Mr. Hassouna expressed appreciation for being received by the Secretary and said he was sorry that his commitments at the General Assembly had prevented him from keeping a previous appointment with the Secretary. He said he welcomed the opportunity to exchange views with the Secretary since it had been some little time since he had seen him.

Mr. Hassouna stated that both he and Ambassador Rahim were working for the common objective of improving relationships between the US and the Arab world, particularly Egypt and Syria. He said he had an opportunity to talk with Syrian Foreign Minister Bitar before the latter returned to Damascus and had found Mr. Bitar pleased with his meeting with Mr. Rountree. Mr. Hassouna expressed the view that in recent weeks there had

been generally a better atmosphere in the area and said it was important to maintain this improvement and continue along this road.

The Secretary said that he, too, was glad to have the opportunity to see Messrs. Hassouna and Rahim and to exchange views with them. He said he thought that in general the atmosphere in the area was improved, especially with regard to US–Arab relations in a number of the Arab states. However, he regretted that this did not seem to be the case with respect to Egypt and Syria. He thought that if the leaders of Egypt and Syria really believed what their press and radio were saying with regard to the US and the Soviet Union, then it would be extremely difficult to find a basis for improved relations. If the leaders thought that the US represented a threat to their independence and integrity, while the Soviet Union was their great friend, we would find it very hard to establish a constructive relationship.

The Secretary went on that what greatly concerned us was the degree of dependence on the Soviet Union which was growing up in Egypt and Syria and the belief of the leaders of these countries that they had nothing to fear from such close association. Mr. Hassouna remarked that in his view there was no growth of communist strength or of the appeal of communism to the peoples of Egypt and Syria and that in any event it was a mistake for the US to be overly concerned by what press and radio had to say. The Secretary replied that it was not a question of how many communists there might be in Egypt or Syria and he did not for one believe that Egypt and Syria were going communist in as far as the people were concerned. He pointed out that in the Soviet Union only about 3% of the total population was communist while in countries such as Hungary and Poland, the percentage was probably even less. He remarked that it was a strange phenomenon that there were less communists in the so-called communist countries than there were communists in free world countries such as France and Italy. He said that what he had in mind was the development of a dependence on the Soviet Union which enabled that country to establish the policies of the other country. Thus, it was that dependence on the Soviet Union which obliged Czechoslovakia and Poland to refuse the Marshall Plan at Soviet insistence. He feared that possible Syrian dependence on the Soviet Union

had been responsible for the Syrian about-face in rejecting King Saud's mediation offer. The Secretary went on that while he did not expect Mr. Hassouna to reply or to comment, it was our analysis that the Soviets had demanded that the Syrians reject Saud's mediation offer and that the dependence of the Syrian army and of the Syrian economy on the Soviet Union had made it possible for the Soviet Union to have its way.

The Secretary continued that he had made clear to Ambassador Hussein that, for example, we had no objection to Egypt's dealing with the Soviet Union and that our attitude toward a given country would not be based on whether the country did or did not have dealings with the Soviet Union. In fact, we have relations with both Yugoslavia and Finland which have considerable dealings with the Soviet Union. However, both Finland and Yugoslavia have had very intimate knowledge of the Soviet Union and of its rapacious nature and are thus fully aware of the dangers of too close an association. The Secretary mentioned that while President Tito had taken a happier view of the Soviet Union in the recent past because of the denigration of Stalin and the exile of Molotov, his two principal enemies in the Soviet Union, the recent removal of Zhukov had perhaps made President Tito think twice about Khrushchev.

We believed that it was essential that Syria and Egypt have a more acute awareness of the dangers of a close association with the Soviet Union. The Secretary said that if Syria and Egypt believed that the US threatened their independence and that the Soviet Union did not, then there was little basis on which to do business with the US. It would be just as well under those circumstances for those states not to have any dealings with us. However, he would prophesy that if that were the case, history would write an epitaph on the loss of the independence of those countries.

The Secretary stressed that while the US had had ample opportunity to grab territory following World Wars I and II, when we had troops all over the world, the fact was that we had not. On the contrary, we had withdrawn our troops as quickly as possible. Similarly, although we had inherited a colonial establishment following the Spanish-American War, we had given independence to Cuba and the Philippines as quickly as possible. On the other hand, the Soviet Union had given up nothing on which it had laid its

hands, with the one possible exception of Austria where the Soviets had finally withdrawn, but only after long negotiation and heavy pressure. The record was clear and it was difficult to understand how Syria and Egypt could believe otherwise. The Secretary went on that the position which we had adopted in the fall of 1956 in opposing our two closest allies had been a clear demonstration of our adherence to principle and had been an act of great political courage by this administration, involving also as it did the problem of Israel.

The Secretary said that the US would be glad to do whatever it could to assist the Arab states in maintaining their independence and integrity but that there had to be mutual trust and confidence between us or otherwise there was nothing that could be done.

Mr. Hassouna said that he thought there could be mutual trust and confidence but that, of course, Arab confidence in the US would be more secure if specific actions were taken which in themselves would dispel the atmosphere which has been created by the press and radio attacks against the US. Mr. Hassouna said that specifically the question of Israel and our support for colonialism were the two most difficult aspects of Arab-US relations. He was certain that if the Arabs felt that the US would not always side with Israel in connection with any dispute which might arise between Israel and an Arab state, and that the US would always stand against aggression from whatever quarter, the Arabs would have great confidence in us. He said that many Arabs considered that the Eisenhower Doctrine had purposely left out any reference to aggression from whatever quarter in order not to tie Israel's hands. He appealed to us to consider a declaration in which the US would take a stand against any aggression, not just aggression by international communism.

Mr. Hassouna went on that the other great problem in Arab-US relations was our support of colonialism, which in turn meant our continued support for the French in Algeria. The Algerian question was not the principal problem before the Arabs and they were certain that if we would support the independence of Algeria, the last trace of colonialism would disappear and this thorn in the side of US-Arab relations would be removed. He

hoped that the US would be able to support the Arab position in the debate on Algeria in the General Assembly.

The Secretary replied that with respect to the colonial question, he did not see how the Arabs could continue to associate the US with colonialism after what we had done last year. He did not believe that this should remain an issue between us. He said we had been concerned by the failure of the French to find a solution to the Algerian question. While he did not know exactly the manner in which the Algerian item would be discussed at the General Assembly, he could say that the public position we might find it necessary to take would probably not reflect exactly our private position. He believed that we could do more effective work privately and quietly rather than having the issue become even more involved and complex through public debate. Mr. Hassouna agreed with this view.

The Secretary then went on that the problem of Israel was a more difficult one. Although the previous administration had been identified with Israel, this administration was not. We did much to restrain Israel and we had been particularly active during the Syrian crisis to keep the Israelis from doing anything rash. We also did many things with regard to Israel about which the Arabs did not know.

On the other hand, we were not like the Soviets who gave their support for the creation of Israel and now called for its destruction. We had supported the creation of Israel and we adhered to that policy. Because of the position of strict impartiality between Israel and the Arab states which this administration has adopted, it was in a good position to assist towards a settlement of some of the outstanding problems between Israel and the Arab states, such as refugees and other outstanding questions. The Secretary stated that he doubted very much whether a future administration would be in such a good position to help the parties move toward a solution of the Palestine problem. He implied to Mr. Hassouna that the Arabs would do well to take advantage of this situation.

The Secretary continued that the problem of guaranteeing states of the area against aggression from whatever quarter was complicated by the fact that we did not wish to take any step which either directly or indirectly recognized Israel's present borders. We considered those borders to be

temporary ones and if we guaranteed the Arabs against aggression, we should also have to guarantee Israel which would implicitly recognize the present Israel borders. It had been relatively simple to obtain congressional approval with regard to the Eisenhower Doctrine which related to aggression by international communism. However, it would be most difficult to go back to Congress again with regard to a guarantee for the Arab states without offering a similar guarantee to Israel which, as he had just explained, would involve the problem of Israel's boundaries.

Mr. Hassouna and Mr. Rahim thanked the Secretary for receiving them and Mr. Hassouna emphasized the usefulness of such exchanges.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.00/11-1357. Confidential. Drafted by Stabler.

275. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State¹

London, November 13, 1957—1 p.m.

3015. Middle East pipeline. Some senior American oil officials in London in recent weeks have been informing Embassy officer that the international oil companies no longer interested going ahead Metline proposal. Until Turkey–Syrian crisis Shell only holdout against this point of view but understand Shell now agrees attitude other companies. Main reasons project no longer of interest reported to be as follows:

(a) Convinced neither HMG or USG willing attempt negotiate treaty protection considered essential oil companies (although [New] Jersey attempting revision “C–type” treaty at Department’s suggestion, this now purely academic exercise).

(b) Reassessment economic considerations have led conclusion not warranted.

(c) Some companies never from outset were particularly enthusiastic and have had opportunity these months “work over” colleagues.

FonOff seemed to be generally aware above. Has informed some companies and Embassy that despite decision oil companies, would hope no public announcement to this effect would be made as believe it desirable possibility this project be kept alive as insurance protection.

Whitney

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 880.2553/11–1357. Confidential.

**276. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State,
Washington, November 19, 1957¹**

Washington, November 19, 1957

SUBJECT

Meeting of the Baghdad Pact Ambassadors

PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary

NEA—William M. Rountree

Ambassador of Pakistan (Mohammed Ali)

Ambassador of Iran (Ali Amini)

Ambassador of Great Britain (Caccia)

Ambassador of Turkey (Urguplu)

The Pakistani Ambassador said he regretted that the Ambassador of Iraq was not present since he had hoped that all of the Baghdad Pact Ambassadors might meet with the Secretary. Mr. Al-Shabandar, however, was entertaining at a luncheon and had asked the group to go ahead in his absence.

The Pakistani Ambassador gave the Secretary background with respect to the present meeting. He said that when Lebanese Foreign Minister Malik was in Washington, Ambassador Ali had had an opportunity to talk with him at dinner, along with the Iranian Ambassador and Ambassador Richards, about the situation in the Middle East. [4 lines of source text not declassified] Dr. Malik had felt strongly that the situation was critical and the United States must do something dramatic to offset the substantial Soviet gains. [7 lines of source text not declassified] There had, however,

emerged in the discussion several other points which the group felt should be put to the Secretary. First, Ambassador Ali said, was a feeling that the United States should adhere to the Baghdad Pact. Nothing would give the people of the Middle East greater confidence in the determination of the United States. While this involved certain problems with respect to the attitude of Saudi Arabia and Jordan, it was felt that these problems could be overcome. Secondly, the Ambassador continued, it was essential to appease Arab sentiment in the area and establish a better psychological basis upon which to oppose Soviet penetration. This might be done by persuading France to make concessions on Algeria and thus remove an important propaganda instrument now in the hands of the Soviet Union and those unfriendly to the West in the Middle East. Also, the atmosphere could be substantially improved by a settlement of the Palestine refugee question through insisting that Israel repatriate a substantial number with arrangements for the remainder to be compensated for the loss of their property in Israel.

The Pakistani Ambassador emphasized that the group was not putting these matters up to the Secretary on behalf of their respective governments. They wished to discuss the matters on an entirely informal basis in order to get the benefit of an exchange of views. He underlined his own concern at the critical situation in the area. He felt that Lebanon was extremely weak and the psychological effect of any “back-tracking” on the part of the Lebanese Government would be very grave.

The Secretary thought it was very useful to have talks of this kind. He had been impressed in recent weeks with the fact that the machinery of various collective security organizations was perhaps too rigid and did not permit enough consultation at whatever point it might be most desirable to consult—in Washington, Karachi, Ankara, Tehran, Baghdad or London insofar as the Baghdad Pact was concerned, or in Paris, London or Washington insofar as NATO was involved.

He was very glad that the Ambassadors had come to discuss these matters to which we, of course, attached the greatest importance. Regarding the general Middle Eastern situation, the United States took a serious view. We were determined and confident that given the good will and help of

surrounding countries, the Soviet Union would not be able to maintain indefinitely a satellite position in Syria. The Secretary had long felt that it would not be possible for the Soviet Union to do so in a country not connected geographically with Russia so as to be under the direct menace of Soviet forces (he mentioned as an apparent exception Albania, and discussed the special considerations which rendered it perhaps undesirable to attempt to bring about a change in that country). The Syrian situation could not be changed overnight. He felt that the establishment of a free government of Syria was premature at this time but that the time might come when this approach would be useful. We must have plans to deal with the problem; indeed, we did have certain plans which we felt should be discussed only on a need to know basis.

Continuing, the Secretary said that the situation had not developed in a way entirely adverse to the interests of the free world. It was true that the USSR had made gains in Syria and to a lesser extent in Egypt. It was also true that Egypt and Syria had been isolated to a considerable extent and that all of the governments represented in the present meeting had good relations with all of the other Arab nations. There were some indications, although perhaps slight, that Nasser was not happy with his present situation and wanted to improve it by bringing about better relations with the West. In this connection, the Secretary thought it important that we not forget a "keystone" of our policy, [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] the leadership of King Saud as against that of Nasser. It was important that we not take action which would be regarded by King Saud as a blow to his leadership. The United States felt that from an international standpoint any moves such as our joining the Baghdad Pact would be premature and would not help the over-all situation unless such action could be based upon the acquiescence of King Saud. The Secretary also perceived difficulties on the domestic front to our adherence to the Baghdad Pact. We had already come as close as possible to joining the Pact without going to the United States Senate. It was difficult to see how we could get Senate approval for adherence to the Pact unless we were in a position to give assurances to Israel. Any good which might be achieved by our joining the Pact would thus be jeopardized in the area by the necessity of engaging in some formal undertaking with Israel, which would create widespread resentment among the Arab states.

The Pakistani Ambassador observed that in the Eisenhower–Macmillan communiqué² no reference had been made to the Baghdad Pact. The absence of such reference had, he thought, undermined the prestige of the Pact which would have been helped greatly if it had been mentioned and supported. The Iranian Ambassador agreed that this omission was unfortunate. The Secretary said the omission was “unconsidered”. Even if the Pact had been mentioned, however, that would not affect the validity of what he had said about the disadvantage at this juncture of our adhering to it.

Turning to the Palestine refugees, the Secretary said he earnestly hoped that the time soon would come when this problem could be tackled. He thought the best approach at the present time would not involve open efforts by the United States, United Kingdom and others represented at the meeting. However, if a nation not itself involved in the problem or in the area should agree to feel out the situation quietly, this might be well worth exploring. The United States would be prepared at the proper time and in the proper circumstances to endeavor to persuade Israel to accept a number of refugees, and it would be prepared otherwise to act along the lines set forth in the Secretary’s August 26, 1955 speech. We were watching the situation closely and reviewing it almost daily to see if an opening could be found to solve the problem. However, we must act cautiously. The Secretary recalled the damaging accusations against King Hussein to the effect that he had been negotiating with Israel. Indicative of the explosive nature of the problem was that the Arabs generally felt compelled to insist that no solution to the refugee problem or other elements of the Israeli question could be sought in the context of the existence of Israel. King Saud himself had said only recently that the one solution to the problem was to turn Palestine back to the Arabs.

The Iranian Ambassador said he had recently learned from an Israeli representative that Israel would be prepared to take some of the refugees back, if the Arabs agreed to take some. He thought it possible that Iran would be willing to do something itself with respect to the resettlement of Arab refugees. The Secretary said this latter suggestion might be very useful. It was difficult at the moment, however, to visualize a quick change in the Arab attitude so that the leaders would not publicly insist that all the

refugees must go back to Israel. While some Arabs might take a constructive position privately, uniformly they took unhelpful public positions.

Responding to the Pakistan Ambassador's statement that the situation was extremely dangerous and was cause for great alarm (commenting that it was much better to err on the side of being too alarmed rather than being not sufficiently alarmed), the Secretary said he was willing to be alarmed if that would help him to do the right thing. We were anxious to undertake any reasonable program that was apt to work. He thought, however, that United States adherence to the Baghdad Pact would not work for the reasons which he had set forth. If, however, the group felt that his estimate in this regard was wrong, that opinion would carry great weight with him. If the Ambassadors' Governments felt that the United States should nevertheless adhere to the Baghdad Pact, he would be willing to consider the matter although he felt that we should take heavily into account King Saud's attitude. The Pakistan Ambassador said that King Saud was an absolutely key figure, and expressed the view that we must keep King Saud on our side at all costs. The Turkish Ambassador expressed some doubt that the Arab states would in fact strongly object to United States security arrangements with Israel if the United States felt it necessary to extend a security commitment to balance its joining the Baghdad Pact. The Iranian Ambassador tended to disagree with the Turkish Ambassador in this regard.

The Iranian Ambassador said that he planned himself to talk with Arab representatives about the refugee problem to see what he might do in a quiet way. The Secretary thought that a good idea and said we would be glad to help in any way we could. He thought it much better to undertake this on a basis of quiet diplomacy rather than as part of any formal plan.

The Pakistan Ambassador said he had recently suggested that the Baghdad Pact be represented by an observer at the NATO Council meeting in Paris. He thought it highly desirable that the various Pact organizations have a proper degree of coordination and liaison. The Secretary took note of his suggestion but made no commitment.

Regarding Algeria, the Iranian Ambassador said he hoped that the matter could be handled in the United Nations in a way which would not give the Soviet Union an opportunity to pose as “protector of the Arabs”. The Pakistan Ambassador emphasized his belief that something should be done to “take the heat off this issue”. None of the Ambassadors present had any specific proposals to make, although the Iranian Ambassador said he had suggested to Mr. Pineau the previous evening that the French might agree to talk with representatives of Morocco and Tunisia in the presence of observers from Algeria. Responding to the Secretary’s question, Ambassador Amini stated that the Foreign Minister had not said “no” to the proposal, but had given no indication of acquiescence. The Ambassador thought Mr. Pineau wanted to find some formula that would relieve the tension. The Secretary commented that if the French could be persuaded to engage in such discussions that would be fine, but his impression was that they could not be so persuaded. The British Ambassador expressed a similar view.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/11–1957. Secret. Drafted by Rountree.

² For text of the Declaration of Common Purpose, issued at the conclusion of Prime Minister Macmillan’s visit to Washington on October 25, see Department of State *Bulletin*, November 11, 1957, pp. 739–741.

277. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Italy¹

Washington, November 22, 1957—5:08 p.m.

2171. Ambassador Brosio received by Dillon November 19 to discuss Pella Plan. Following is summary Dillon's remarks (memorandum of conversation follows)² which you may use in replying to Italians (Rome telegram 1774):³

- 1) We desired clarification certain points Italian memorandum.⁴ We assume from US contribution not major factor (Brosio indicated Italians believed use Marshall Plan funds had particular political appeal).
- 2) We suggested one possibility for Marshall Plan repayments which had been considered by Department as source financing for variety projects was their payment into Development Loan Fund which could then make loans to provide US contribution.
- 3) It was pointed out Congress had asked Department study possibility having Marshall Plan repayments paid into U.S. Development Loan Fund.
- 4) It was noted problem created whenever, as in SUNFED, it was proposed US make large contributions to organizations with large group of members where US voice in determining use funds not consonant with US contribution.
- 5) Dillon pointed out same problem not created when we entered into bilateral arrangements. Multilateral projects this type somewhat complicated though we admitted political appeal this idea.
- 6) We were interested in Pella Plan and would certainly pursue our study thereof. We agreed NATO was not forum for such

project. OEEC might also have disadvantage including nations who were not concerned this type problem. Special Middle East fund was also possibility.

7) Italian idea of European contribution in Pella Plan fitted in with Congressional desire for burden-sharing.

8) Dillon concluded plan required more study and our definitive answer might well be delayed until after December NATO meeting in which we were heavily engaged now.

FYI. Brosio indicated Pella Plan not yet presented to Italian Government as whole. He added it would be unpopular because it involved expenditures. He thought they would delay submitting it until there was definitive reply from us. End FYI.

Dulles

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 880.0000/11-2857. Confidential.

² The memorandum of conversation is *ibid.*, 880.0000/1-1957.

³ In telegram 1774 from Rome, November 18, Ambassador James Zellerbach informed the Department: "I expect to have discussions later this week re his plan and would be grateful for any comments and/or guidance Dept can give at this time." (*Ibid.*, 880.0000/11-1857) ⁴ See footnote 2, [Document 263](#).

278. Editorial Note

On December 4, Marion Boggs forwarded to the National Security Council Planning Board a draft Statement of Policy by the National Security Council on “Long–Range U.S. Policy Toward the Near East,” prepared in the Department of State on the basis of previous memoranda prepared for the Planning Board, including the October 30 Department of State Staff Study ([Document 270](#)). A copy of the draft statement and Boggs’ covering memorandum are in Department of State, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 61 D 167, NSC 5801.

The statement was considered by the National Security Council Planning Board on December 6. According to the record of the meeting, the Board referred the section of the draft paper entitled “General Considerations” to the Board Assistants for revision in light of the discussion at the meeting. The Board also requested the Department of State member to report at the next scheduled meeting of the Board on the Department of State’s views as to the extent to which recent sensitive policy developments should be incorporated in the draft statement of policy. (*Ibid.*, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1) On December 27, Boggs circulated to the National Security Council Board Assistants the text of “Suggested Changes in Draft Statement of Long–Range United States Policy Toward the Near East”, prepared in the Department of State. On December 31, Boggs circulated to the National Security Council Planning Board the revised text of the “General Considerations” and “Objectives” sections of the draft statement of policy, prepared by the NSC Board Assistants in light of the Planning Board discussion. (*Ibid.*, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 61 D 167, NSC 5801 File) The final draft of NSC 5801, “Long–Range U.S. Policy Toward the Near East”, January 10, 1958, and adopted as amended at the 352d meeting of the National Security Council on January 22, is scheduled for publication in [Foreign Relations, 1958–1960, volume XII](#).

**279. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State,
Washington, December 6, 1957¹**

Washington, December 6, 1957

SUBJECT

Pella's Consultation with the Secretary: The "Pella Plan"

PARTICIPANTS

Italian

Signor Giuseppe Pella,

Italian Vice Premier and Foreign Minister

Ambassador Manlio Brosio

Ambassador Massimo Magistrati

Ambassador Attilio Cattani

Minister Egidio Ortona

Signor Carlo Perrone-Capano

Signor Luciano Favretti

Signor Giuseppe De Rege

Signor Gabriele Paresce

United States

The Secretary of State

Governor Adlai Stevenson

Mr. Robert Murphy
Mr. C. Douglas Dillon
Mr. C. Burke Elbrick
Mr. G. Frederick Reinhardt
Mr. Gerard Smith
Dr. D. A. FitzGerald—ICA
Mr. Mansfield Sprague—Defense
Mr. Stuart Rockwell—NE
Mr. W. T. M. Beale, Jr.
Mr. B. E. L. Timmons—RA
Mr. H. G. Torbert, Jr.—WE
Miss Constance Harvey—WE
Mr. James B. Engle —WE

The Secretary opened the second (wider) meeting with Italian Foreign Minister Pella by expressing our great pleasure that Signor Pella had been able to rearrange his trip in order to pass through Washington to consult on the NATO Heads of Government meeting.² Summing up for the benefit of the new participants what had taken place during the conversation with Signor Pella at the previous meeting (just concluded in the Secretary's office), the Secretary said he and Signor Pella were in accord on the importance of the Heads of Government meeting and particularly the necessity that it should give a new emphasis to NATO. He then invited Signor Pella to follow any procedure at this meeting that he desired.

After expressing in English his appreciation for the opportunity to continue his conversation with the Secretary, with the participation of other United States officials and Governor Stevenson, Signor Pella continued in Italian that he did not wish to abuse the occasion by bringing up particular subjects but he thought the problem of economic assistance to the Middle East was a matter of importance to NATO. He summed up the ideas (known as the “Pella Plan”) which he said the Italian Government had expressed on the subject (what he said corresponded closely to his recent letter to the Secretary, with enclosures).³ He estimated that the Plan would provide funds amounting to about \$70 million per year for some fifteen years. He wanted the United States to know that the Italian Government was suggesting the Plan within the framework of the already existing United States aid effort in the area. He said that the 20 percent European contribution suggested in the Plan was only an “indicative” figure and could be increased. Referring to a rumored American idea of basing a development plan on contributions of petroleum companies, Signor Pella suggested that guarantees of reimbursement by the Middle Eastern countries might be based on the subsoil resources of the loan recipients.

Signor Pella said his Plan had two aspects:

1. Financial/administrative. He conceded that the fund would be created largely with United States resources, though these would come out of reimbursements from previous loans. He realized that the United States would bear the major burden and that it had to keep in mind its bilateral relations with each of the Middle Eastern countries. He understood that the United States was anxious to avoid the creation of new organs for economic development, but thought a solution might be found through establishing a special section of the IBRD or of the Export-Import Bank to administer the Plan.
2. Political/economic. This would be the problem of programming, that is, the search for the methods to be used and the countries to be the beneficiaries of the Plan.

After speculating whether the Plan might embrace the Northwest African countries and those on the Eastern flank of the Arab world, Signor Pella

made clear that nothing in his Plan was intended to be dogmatic. His Government would be willing to see everything in the proposed plan changed if only it could serve to establish a triangular formula (the United States–Europe–Middle East) as the basis for solving Middle Eastern economic problems.

The Secretary said we had studied Signor Pella's Plan with great interest and were intrigued by the thought of cooperation between the United States and Europe on assistance to Middle Eastern countries. We agreed with Signor Pella that this should not be a distinctly NATO operation. The question of how to implement the concept set forth by Signor Pella involved certain problems. We are not sure that to bring in the Marshall Plan reflows would be the best formula. This would tend to make the basis of our assistance to the Middle East almost accidental. It happens that repayments on the Marshall Plan loans were now beginning at the same time that this Middle Eastern problem was coming up; there is not any necessary relationship between the two. For example, Ireland, which was an important recipient of Marshall Plan loans, has not much interest in the Middle East. Italy was the fourth largest beneficiary of Marshall Plan loans and has, of course, an interest in the Middle East.

The Secretary then referred to the concern of our Treasury Department that the capital and interest payments on the Marshall Plan loans be made. If the loans were not repaid, this would give rise to an expectation of an impending general moratorium on the payments of debts due to the United States. This might have an effect on the atmosphere of confidence and it could cause suggestions that the same principle be extended to United States loans other than the Marshall Plan loans. The Secretary said we thought contributions to Middle Eastern development should be made on the basis of criteria other than the Marshall Plan loan repayments. He pointed out that the United States was presently contributing economic assistance to the Middle East (the Arab countries and Israel, but not Pakistan) in sums much greater than Marshall Plan reflows. To gear our contributions to the Marshall Plan reflows might diminish rather than increase our assistance to that area, even if there were a European supplement of 20 percent. The Secretary also pointed out that, since French assistance to Morocco and Tunisia was already considerable, they might not

feel like increasing their contribution to that area, particularly in view of the financial position of the French Government (which was precarious, despite the flourishing French economy). The Secretary thought it likely that the French Government would itself want to receive loans rather than to extend credits abroad any further.

The Secretary expressed doubt whether it would be possible for the NATO Heads of Government meeting in ten days' time to come to any very definitive conclusion in this matter. He said there would probably be discussion in the United Nations framework today whether the United Nations should take initiatives in this direction. The Secretary said this problem was extremely complicated, especially as there were so many possible ways of proceeding. He thought any program which would combine the interest of Western Europe and the United States and the Middle Eastern area, while bringing Germany in more actively and enlisting a greater use of the resources and capacities of the other European countries, should be studied. The Secretary believed it would be impracticable to try to make any decision on this matter at the coming NATO meeting—above all, because this subject did not come within the scope of a NATO function. In conclusion, he thought the *concept* of trying to work something out with the Middle Eastern area was all right.

Other topics which came up during this meeting are covered in separate memoranda of conversation.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 880.0000/12-657. Confidential. Drafted by Engle.

² For a memorandum of the conversation with Pella on December 6 concerning the NATO Alliance, see [vol. IV, p. 242](#). Memoranda of conversations with Pella on December 6 concerning Soviet purchases of surplus commodities and Egypt are in Department of State, Central Files, 661.80/12-657 and 774.00/12-657.

The NATO Heads of Government met in Paris, December 16-19.

³ Reference is presumably to Pella's undated letter to Secretary Dulles that was forwarded to Ambassador Zellerbach in Rome on October 28. See footnote 2, [Document 263](#).

**280. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State,
Washington, December 6, 1957¹**

Washington, December 6, 1957

SUBJECT

Pella Plan

PARTICIPANTS

Ambassador Attilio Cattani, Director-General, Economic Affairs,
Italian Foreign Office

Count Giuseppe De Rege, Counselor, Italian Embassy

C. Douglas Dillon, Deputy Under Secretary

E. T. Long, WE

Ambassador Cattani stated he wished to elaborate on the Pella Plan. He emphasized the lack of any existing body to promote economic development in the Middle East and the need to guide the Middle Eastern countries toward Western concepts. He pointed out that there was no assurance that the Pella Plan would be a success but said it was necessary to try something along these lines, to provide some "hope" for the Middle East. After mentioning the need to have something constructive in this sense come out of the NATO Heads of Government meeting, he stated that Italy felt it had to discuss the Plan with its European friends before the meeting to ascertain if and how much they were willing to sacrifice and then to assess their reactions after the meeting.

Mr. Dillon said it would be difficult for us to use Marshall Plan funds for the Pella Plan, that there was no logic for using them only for the Middle East. He pointed out that when the suggestion of using Marshall Plan reflows for the Development Loan Fund came up in Congress last year, it was decided further study should be made. Although the Executive has not

as yet taken a definite position on this issue, it may be expected that Congress and the Executive will discuss it at length during the coming session. He commented that the DLF was more logical an approach for the US, that the DLF could contribute as much or even more to a European [*Middle East?*] fund than the Marshall Plan payments would permit. Secondly he said we weren't sure that the yardstick envisioned under the Pella Plan (i.e., additional contributions tied to the size of a country's Marshall Plan loans) was valid, that there was no particular relationship between the size of the loans and the size of the various countries. Mr. Dillon pointed out that as the Secretary had indicated earlier we were interested in the principle of cooperative efforts of this nature, that we certainly had no objection in principle to the Pella Plan. He also said that he felt Italian talks with the other European countries would have a positive effect on our side and would be constructive for the Italians. We would find it much easier to come up with something concrete when we had an indication as to the extent of European support of the proposal. With respect to the political aspects of the Middle East, he mentioned that we were currently studying within the government ways and means of helping out, one concrete idea being that of getting the oil companies to contribute to Middle East economic development.

In response to a question concerning the probable attitudes of other countries, Cattani said the *Germans* would be for the Plan in principle but would raise objections on the technical side, the *French*, though unpredictable of course, would probably go along in some measure, the *Swiss* would probably contribute, the *Swedes* might go along but probably would not, the *Austrians* perhaps would contribute in order to tie themselves more closely to Western Europe. He said the Northern European nations would undoubtedly follow whatever course the British took.

Mr. Dillon said that in view of Middle Eastern feeling against France, French participation shouldn't be played up and perhaps it would be just as well for the French to go it alone in their own areas. He expressed some doubt that the UK, which has been reducing its foreign financial activities, *vide* Jordan, would be interested in a Pella Plan fund. Within the NATO and OEEC context, Dillon asked whether Greece and Turkey would be givers or

receivers (Cattani replied he hoped Greece and Turkey would be satisfied somewhat through the FTA).

Cattani said the West collectively must have a device with which it can deal individually with the Middle East countries. He emphasized that the Middle East must be taught Western ideas and pointed out a center of Middle East technical assistance, located perhaps in Naples, might be an extremely valuable vehicle where European non-political technicians could instruct Middle East students. Mr. Dillon said this type of thing might be a constructive beginning.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 880.0000/12-657. Confidential. Drafted by Long.

281. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Egypt¹

Washington, December 9, 1957—7:28 p.m.

1555. Department has for some time been thinking of possibility establishing some multilateral mechanism for economic assistance to Middle East. A specific proposal along these lines has now been made public. Pella, Foreign Minister Italy, has suggested establishment development fund for Middle East using repayments to US on “Marshall Plan” loans and direct contributions European countries. Pella considers such funds would be administered by European board with US designee as chairman. One possibility might be to use OEEC in some supervisory way and same countries would be members of fund. Pella has stressed however his ideas remain flexible both as to contributions and organization. Loans would be made to Middle Eastern countries for long term development projects. Stories appeared *New York Times* December 7 and 8.

Desire urgently your evaluation likely official attitude possibility your country’s cooperation with a Middle East Development Fund under European administration and US participation. In your discretion you may wish check confidentially with some knowledgeable contact but do not raise officially.

Reply immediately priority.

Dulles

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 880.0000/12-957. Confidential; Priority. Also sent priority to Amman, Damascus, Beirut, Baghdad, Jidda, Khartoum, and Tripoli. Repeated to Benghazi, Paris, and Rome.

282. Memorandum on the Substance of Discussion at the Department of State–Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting, Pentagon, Washington, December 13, 1957, 11:30 a.m.[1](#)

Washington, December 13, 1957, 11:30 a.m.

[Here follows a list of 26 persons present, including Admiral Burke, General White, Lieutenant General McCaul, Vice Admiral Austin, and Lieutenant General Eddleman. The Department of State delegation included Murphy, Rountree, and Robertson. The portion of the memorandum concerning Item 1, “The Middle East Problem,” is printed in [volume XVII, pages 852–856](#).]

2. Middle East Military Representative

Mr. Murphy referred to the fact that in the previous discussion of this matter the Department had expressed agreement in principle to the creation of a Middle East Military Representative. He noted that no specific proposals had yet come from the Joint Chiefs regarding a location in the area where a headquarters for this officer might be established. He said that in the Department's view it was extremely difficult to find one satisfactory location and suggested that as an initial proposition it might be desirable to establish the Middle East Military Representative here in Washington. Mr. Rountree concurred in the difficulties of finding an appropriate place to put such a headquarters in light of current political difficulties. He noted that wherever in the area it might be placed it would provide an effective target for communist propaganda. In light of these facts as a pilot operation Washington might be the most desirable location.

General Eddleman inquired whether Libya might not be a satisfactory site. Mr. Rountree conceded that our present position in Libya was reasonably satisfactory, but warned that the presence of a military headquarters along the lines proposed might focus undesirable attention on Libya and change the context of our relationships there with the risk that our position might be seriously undermined. It would seem likely that the Middle Eastern states would attribute much more importance to such an operation than would probably be intended by the United States. He pointed out that Turkey, as a member of NATO as well as the Baghdad Pact, presented definite political obstacles with regard to many of the Middle Eastern states.

General Eddleman expressed the opinion that little could be accomplished by locating the headquarters in Washington. Admiral Burke likewise felt that it would be difficult for the Middle East Military Representative and his staff to maintain adequate contact with developments and personalities in the area if they were forced to operate from Washington.

Mr. Murphy inquired what the jurisdiction of the proposed Military Representative would be—whether his authority would extend from Casablanca to Iran. Admiral Burke replied that this had not been defined and would depend somewhat on the site selected for his headquarters.

Mr. Rountree acknowledged that Turkey would be the least undesirable location, and Mr. Murphy promised to take another look at the possibility of establishing a headquarters for the Middle East representative in Turkey.

[Here follow Item 3, “Indonesia,” and Item 4, “Berlin.”]

¹ Source: Department of State, State–JCS Meetings: Lot 61 D 417. Top Secret. A note on the cover sheet reads: “State Draft. Not cleared with Department of Defense.”

**283. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State,
Washington, December 17, 1957¹**

Washington, December 17, 1957

SUBJECT

Middle East Oil Concessions and Profit Sharing Formula

PARTICIPANTS

William M. Rountree, Assistant Secretary, NEA

Roy R. Rubottom, Jr., Assistant Secretary, ARA

Thomas C. Mann, Assistant Secretary, E

Loftus E. Becker, Legal Adviser

Nestor Ortiz, ARA

Robert Rutherford, FSD

William Van Dusen, FSD

Stanley D. Metzger, L/E John F. Shaw, NE/E

Mr. Rountree reported the Conorado Oil Company had approached the Department to determine its views on an offer which it was considering making to the Sheikh of Kuwait for Kuwait's undivided half-interest in the Neutral Zone off-shore area. This offer would include a 60-40 sharing of profits. Since first approaching the Department to ascertain its views on this offer, Conorado had called to state that certain of its participants (members of the group) have been cooling off and that the company might not now proceed to make a proposal. Among other things the participants (members) thought the Japanese negotiations were pretty far along and it might not be possible for an American group to successfully bid on this area.

By way of background, Mr. Rountree explained the 50–50 profit sharing arrangement had been established for the Middle East about seven years ago by the oil industry, based on commercial considerations, with the encouragement of the Department. George McGhee and others concerned with petroleum matters at that time thought the concept was a generous one. In addition, the concept has been one which could be defended and has had a stabilizing effect on petroleum matters in the Near East since its establishment. The decision of ARAMCO to base its operations on this principle, however, was resented by the British. At one time they alleged that this decision was responsible for the British interests being expelled from Iran.

The first big break in this principle, Mr. Rountree said, recently occurred when the Italian Group, ENI, entered into a 75–25 profit sharing arrangement with the Iranian Government and NIOC. This arrangement presents a new formula for profit sharing and it has resulted in considerable excitement. While it is still too early to predict whether commercially exploitable petroleum will be discovered and successfully marketed by this new group, should they succeed, there may be a general move to re-negotiate existing concessions. There is also the fear that ENI might make similar arrangements with others in the area. The recent Japanese–Saudi Arabian agreement on sharing profits on a 56–44 basis raises the possibility of the Saudis becoming partners in the production of Near Eastern petroleum. This concession arrangement gives the Saudis rights with respect to producing, refining, transporting and marketing. The Japanese agreement appears to be a more serious development, inasmuch as the prospects of the Japanese finding oil appear to be good. It was generally recognized, however, that the cost of producing off–shore oil will be more expensive than land–based production; also the Japanese do not have proven capability in the field of off–shore operations.

These departures from the 50–50 profit sharing principle, Mr. Rountree explained, place the U.S. Government in a very difficult position. Many problems are raised. To the extent that representation is made against these new formulas, local authorities consider the U.S. is uninterested in them and their national aspirations, but only in the rights and privileges of American companies. The concept of the 50–50 arrangement, he said, arose

out of a desire to stabilize the terms under which petroleum is developed and marketed. If the companies involved in this business wish to upset this principle, it was Mr. Rountree's opinion that we cannot very well take the position that it is not in their interest to make more favorable arrangements. In his opinion decisions regarding the terms and conditions under which companies are prepared to engage in the production and marketing of petroleum involve issues which can be resolved only on the basis of commercial considerations. The U.S. Government, he thought, should avoid the implication of protecting and furthering American economic imperialism.

In the discussion which followed Mr. Mann noted that the 50-50 profit sharing formula had developed some years back and had been applicable to concession arrangements involving exploitation of new and unproven areas. For some time he thought there has been a departure from this principle in Venezuela where, for example, the concession was being offered to land which adjoined proven deposits. For this reason he did not think that the Japanese offer represented a radical departure from established Venezuelan practices. To the extent that the Japanese are prepared to establish an integrated company and accept the Saudi Arabians as partners a departure from established practice is occurring. He, however, could see no way of controlling the terms which the U.S. and foreign interests are prepared to offer for petroleum concessions.

Mr. Rubottom observed that the profit sharing arrangements are very complex. He did not think that the Japanese arrangement would create any particular problems in Latin America. He noted that the Japanese would probably need technical help, but that this was probably obtainable. An offer by an American group departing from the 50-50 principle might be more upsetting on the petroleum picture in Latin America, but, he too, was unable to see what could be done to dissuade private commercial interests from what they believe to be in their interests.

The Legal Adviser noted that the participation of American companies in an "integrated" operation might be illegal under U.S. laws. Mr. Rutherford suggested that rather than departing from the 50-50 principle, Conrado

might be encouraged to provide larger bonuses, a device which he noted was not unusual.

It was the consensus of opinion that there has been in the past some departure from a straight 50–50 sharing of profits in regard to concession arrangements adjacent to proven resources. While the Department might hope that companies would try to maintain the 50–50 principle, and was concerned about the consequences of any departure from it, the Department could not control what American and foreign companies might be prepared to offer for oil properties. Furthermore, it would be difficult for the Department to persuade American oil companies that it was not in their interest to propose arrangements more favorable than the 50–50 concept.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 880.2553/12–1757. Confidential. Drafted by Shaw.

**284. Memorandum of a Conversation, U.S. Embassy Residence,
Paris, December 18, 1957, 10:30 a.m.¹**

Paris, December 18, 1957, 10:30 a.m.

USDel/MC/30

PARTICIPANTS

United States

The President

Mr. Rockwell

Turkey

Mr. Adnan Menderes, Prime Minister of Turkey

Mr. Fatin Zorlu, Foreign Minister of Turkey

Mr. Melih Esenbel, Secretary General of the Turkish
Foreign Office

SUBJECT

Baghdad Pact

Prime Minister Menderes said that US adherence to the Baghdad Pact would be very helpful. It would increase Middle East strength against Communism and decrease the influence of the neutralist Arabs.

The President said that we have carefully studied the matter of our joining the Baghdad Pact. We are members of the Pact in all but name, and the Secretary himself may go to the forthcoming meeting in Tehran. There is

the serious problem of Saudi and Jordanian opposition to the Pact. We have to try to calm their fears. He said that with his colleagues he would make a special review of the matter of US adherence to the Pact.

¹ Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File. Secret. Drafted by Stuart Rockwell of the U.S. Delegation to the NATO Heads of Government meeting, held at Paris, December 16–19. Another copy of this memorandum of conversation is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 947.

Documentation on the NATO Heads of Government meeting is printed in [vol. IV, pp. 218](#) ff. For text of the final communiqué, issued on December 19, see Department of State *Bulletin*, January 6, 1958, pp. 12–15.

285. Memorandum of a Conversation, Paris, December 19, 1957, 4 p.m.¹

Paris, December 19, 1957, 4 p.m.

USDel/MC/35

PARTICIPANTS

United States

The Secretary

Mr. Rockwell

Turkey

Prime Minister Adnan Menderes of Turkey

Mr. Fatin Zorlu, Foreign Minister of Turkey

Mr. Melih Esenbel, Secretary General of the Foreign Office

SUBJECT

Baghdad Pact

The Prime Minister said that we must not accept a fait accompli in Syria. The US should once more study the possibility of full membership in the Baghdad Pact.

The Secretary said that we wanted to do everything that we could to strengthen the Pact, but that we did not see how we could join the Pact without at the same time becoming involved in a security guarantee for Israel, which would have very serious repercussions in the Arab states. The influence of the friends of Israel in Congress, together with that of those

people who opposed treaties anyhow, could block in Congress our formal adherence to the Baghdad Pact if this was not accompanied by a security arrangement with Israel. The Secretary thought that on balance we would lose by this. Through our membership in the Military Committee, and the American Doctrine, we were on the side of the Pact members. We had the authority to fight with them, and would do so if they were attacked. There might be some prestige value in joining the Pact, but the price was too high, he thought. However, if Turkey could get the Israeli Government to agree not to press for a security arrangement with the US if the US joined the Pact, then we would take a new look at the problem. Mr. Menderes said that Turkey was going to do this.

The Secretary commented that we should get more Arab countries to join the Pact. Mr. Menderes replied that if the US joined, Lebanon and Jordan and Saudi Arabia would do so also. The Secretary doubted that Saudi Arabia would join, although he noted the great progress recently made in King Saud's thinking about Communism. He thought the US could take substantial credit for this. If Saud would enter the Pact and no Israeli guarantee were required, the situation as far as US adherence was concerned would be very different.

Mr. Menderes said he hoped the Secretary would attend the Pact meeting in Ankara in January.²

¹ Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 947. Secret. Drafted by Rockwell. The meeting took place at the Turkish NATO Delegation.

² Secretary Dulles attended the meeting of the Baghdad Pact in Ankara, January 26–30, 1958.

Iran

Contents

[Increased U.S. Military Aid to Iran and the Iranian Role in Middle East Defense, U.S. Economic Aid and Loans to Iran, Iran's Adherence to the Baghdad Pact, and Participation of American and Foreign Oil Companies in Iran's Oil Development](#) (Documents 286-416)

Increased U.S. Military Aid to Iran and the Iranian Role in Middle East Defense, U.S. Economic Aid and Loans to Iran, Iran's Adherence to the Baghdad Pact, and Participation of American and Foreign Oil Companies in Iran's Oil Development¹

¹ For previous documentation on U.S. relations with Iran, see [Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, volume X](#).

[286. Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs \(Jernegan\) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration \(Henderson\)](#)

Washington, January 7, 1955.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 788.5–MSP/1–755. Secret. Drafted by Stutesman and approved by Baxter and Kitchen.

[287. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense \(Wilson\)](#)

Washington, January 7, 1955.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 788.5–MSP/1–1055. Top Secret. Transmitted to the NSC for consideration at its January 13 meeting under cover of a memorandum from Lay, January 10.

288. Memorandum From the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Bowie) to the Under Secretary of State (Hoover)

Washington, January 11, 1955.

Source: Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5402—Memoranda, Top Secret. Bowie was the Department of State Representative on the NSC Planning Board. At the bottom of the source text the following note was typed: “NEA concurs.”

289. Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Jernegan) to the Secretary of State

Washington, January 11, 1955.

Source: Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5402—Memoranda. Top Secret. Drafted by Baxter, Kitchen, Dixon, and Stutesman and concurred in by S/P, G, EUR, and E.

290. Memorandum of Discussion at the 231st Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, January 13, 1955

Washington, January 13, 1955

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Drafted by Gleason on January 14.

291. National Security Council Report

Washington, January 15, 1955.

Source: Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5504 Series. Top Secret.

292. Letter From the Under Secretary of State (Hoover) to the Director of the Foreign Operations Administration (Stassen)

Washington, January 27, 1955.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 788.5–MSP/1–2755. Secret. Drafted by Dixon and concurred in by Jernegan, Baxter, and Frechtling (in substance).

293. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Allen) to the Acting Secretary of State

Washington, January 31, 1955.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 788.5–MSP/1–3155. Secret. Drafted by Baxter, Stutesman, Kitchen, and Dixon. George V. Allen became Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs on January 26.

294. Memorandum From the Secretary's Special Assistant for Mutual Security Affairs (Nolting) to the Acting Secretary of State

Washington, February 1, 1955.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 788.5–MSP/2–155. Top Secret.

295. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of the Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs (Kitchen) to the Acting Secretary of State

Washington, February 2, 1955.

Source: Department of State, GTI Files: Lot 58 D 338, Military Aid 1955. Confidential. Also sent to Allen and Jernegan.

296. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs (Baxter) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Allen)

Washington, February 4, 1955.

Source: Department of State, GTI Files: Lot 58 D 338, Military Aid—1955. Secret. Drafted by Stutesman.

297. Letter From the Director of the Foreign Operations Administration (Stassen) to the Under Secretary of State (Hoover)

Washington, February 5, 1955.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 788.5—MSP/2—555. Secret.

298. Memorandum of a Conversation, New York, February 8, 1955

New York, February 8, 1955

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 788.1½—955. Secret. Drafted by Kitchen on February 9.

299. Memorandum for the Record by the Under Secretary of State (Hoover)

Washington, February 26, 1955.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 888.2553/2—2655. Confidential.

300. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Allen) to the Acting Secretary of State

Washington, March 3, 1955.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 888.2553/3–355. Official Use Only. Drafted by Allen and concurred in by Willis C. Armstrong and Eakens.

301. Paper Prepared by R. Bernard Crowl of the Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs

Washington, March 18, 1955.

Source: Department of State, GTI Files: Lot 58 D 338, Military Aid—1955. Secret.

302. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State

Tehran, March 23, 1955—6 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 788.5–MSP/3–2355. Secret. Passed to FOA, Treasury, and Defense.

303. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, March 30, 1955

Washington, March 30, 1955

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 888.2553/3–3055. Official Use Only. Drafted by Eakens on April 4 and approved by Hoover.

304. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State

Tehran, April 8, 1955—7 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 788.00/4–855. Confidential. Repeated to London, Meshed, Isfahan, and Tabriz.

305. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State

Tehran, April 11, 1955—7 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 788.5–MSP/4–1155. Secret.

306. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson)

Washington, April 12, 1955.

Source: National Archives and Records Administration, JCS Records, CCS.092 Iran (4–23–48). Top Secret.

307. Editorial Note

308. Despatch From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State

Tehran, April 25, 1955.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 788.5/4–2555. Top Secret.

309. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Waugh) to the Under Secretary of State (Hoover)

Washington, May 2, 1955.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 888.2553/5–255. Drafted by Eakens and approved by Armstrong.

310. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Hensel) to the Secretary of State

Washington, May 14, 1955.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 788.5–MSP/5–1455. Top Secret.

311. Letter From the Director of the Foreign Operations Administration(Stassen) to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Hensel)

Washington, June 16, 1955.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 788.5–MSP/6–2855. Top Secret.

312. Memorandum From the Director of the Executive Secretariat (Scott) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Jernegan)

Washington, June 22, 1955.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 788.5–MSP/6–2255. Secret.

313. Letter From the Acting Secretary of State to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Hensel)

Washington, June 23, 1955.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 788.5–MSP/5–1455. Top Secret. Drafted by Crawl and cleared by Baxter and Jernegan.

314. Letter From the Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson)

Washington, June 27, 1955.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 788.5–MSP/6–2755. Top Secret. Drafted by Hannah and Dixon on June 25.

315. Letter From the Director of Central Intelligence (Dulles) to the Under Secretary of State (Hoover)

Washington, July 1, 1955.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 788.5–MSP/7–155. Secret.

316. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State

Tehran, July 2, 1955—3 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 788.11/7–255. Secret. Repeated to London and Moscow.

317. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Allen) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Murphy).

Washington, July 5, 1955.

Source: Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5504—Memoranda. Top Secret. Drafted by Hannah and cleared by Baxter.

318. Memorandum From the Officer in Charge of Iranian Affairs (Hannah) to the Director of the Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs (Baxter).

Washington, July 6, 1955.

Source: Department of State, GTI Files: Lot 58 D 338, OCB 1955. Top Secret.

319. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iran

Washington, July 11, 1955—6:27 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 788.11/7–255. Secret. Drafted by Baxter; cleared by William A. Crawford, Deputy Director of the Office

of Eastern European Affairs; and approved by Allen. Repeated to London and Moscow.

320. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iran

Washington, July 11, 1955—7:21 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 788.5–MSP/7–1155. Secret. Drafted by Crowl and cleared in NEA and S/MSA; cleared in draft with Hoover and Ohly of ICA; and approved by Allen. Effective July 1, 1955, FOA was abolished and its functions and personnel were transferred to the International Cooperation Administration (ICA).

321. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State

Tehran, July 19, 1955—4 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 788.5–MSP/7–1955. Secret.

322. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iran

Washington, August 5, 1955—5:56 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 788.00/8–555. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Hannah and Baxter. Repeated to London and Moscow;

323. Letter From the Secretary of Defense (Wilson) to the Secretary of State

Washington, August 5, 1955.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 788.5–MSP/8–555. Top Secret.

324. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State

Tehran, September 1, 1955—1 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 788.5–MSP/9–155. Secret.

325. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State

Tehran, September 3, 1955—1 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/9–355. Secret; Priority.

326. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State

Tehran, September 5, 1955—noon.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/9–555. Secret; Priority.
Repeated priority to London.

327. Memorandum of Discussion at the 258th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, September 8, 1955

Washington, September 8, 1955

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret.
Drafted by Gleason on September 15.

328. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Jernegan) to the Acting Secretary of State

Washington, September 9, 1955.

Source: Department of State, GTI Files: Lot 58 D 338, NSC 155. Top Secret. Drafted by Hannah.

329. Editorial Note

330. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iran

Washington, September 17, 1955—3:23 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/9–1755. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Hannah and cleared with Baxter, Jernegan, Hoover, and DOD/ISA. Repeated to Ankara, Baghdad, and London.

[331. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State](#)

Tehran, September 27, 1955—5 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/9–2655. Secret. Repeated to Ankara, Baghdad, and London.

[332. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iran](#)

Washington, September 30, 1955—7:18 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/9–3055. Secret. Drafted by Cowl and cleared by Baxter and the Department of the Treasury and ICA.

[333. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State](#)

Tehran, October 5, 1955—6 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/10–555. Secret; Priority. Repeated to London, Baghdad, Ankara, and Paris.

[334. Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation Between the Director of Central Intelligence \(Dulles\) and the Secretary of State, Washington, October 6, 1955, 6:37 p.m.](#)

Washington, October 6, 1955, 6:37 p.m.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations. Transcribed by Phyllis D. Bernau.

335. Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation Between the Secretary of Defense (Wilson) and the Secretary of State, Washington, October 6, 1955, 6:48 p.m.

Washington Bern, October 6, 1955, 6:48 p.m.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations. Transcribed by Phyllis D. Bernau.

336. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iran

Washington, October 6, 1955—7:46 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/10-555. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Baxter and Hannah; cleared by Crawford of EE; and approved by Dulles. Repeated niact to London, Baghdad, and Ankara.

337. Letter From the Director of the Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs (Baxter) to the Ambassador in Iran (Chapin)

Washington, October 7, 1955.

Source: Department of State, GTI Files: Lot 59 D 654, Political Letters—Notes, 1955. Secret; Official-Informal; Personal for the Ambassador.

338. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State

Tehran, October 7, 1955—8 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/10-755. Secret. Repeated to London, Baghdad, and Ankara.

339. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State

Tehran, October 8, 1955—noon.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/10–855. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Ankara, Baghdad, and London.

340. Editorial Note

341. Editorial Note

342. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Allen) to the Under Secretary of State (Hoover)

Washington, December 2, 1955.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 788.5–MSP/12–255. Secret. Drafted by Hannah and cleared by Baxter, E, the Export-Import Bank, Department of the Treasury, and ICA.

343. Telegram From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Radford) to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson)

Baghdad, December 21, 1955—8:20 a.m.

Source: National Archives and Records Administration, JCS Records, CCS 092 (8–22–46) (2). Top Secret. Sent as Naval message 6198, ALUSNA Baghdad to the Secretary of Defense for the information of the JCS. Radford was on a tour of military installations and personnel in the Near and Far East. See Document 97.

344. Memorandum From the Director of the International Cooperation Administration (Hollister) to the Under Secretary of State (Hoover)

Washington, January 23, 1956.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 788.5–MSP/1–2356. Secret. Also addressed to Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security

Affairs Gordon Gray.

345. Editorial Note

346. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iran

Washington, February 2, 1956—12:11 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/2–256. Secret. Drafted by Hannah, cleared by Kitchen and Baxter, and approved by Rountree.

347. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Gray) to the Director of the International Cooperation Administration (Hollister)

Washington, February 7, 1956.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 788.5–MSP/2–756. Top Secret.

348. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iran

Washington, February 8, 1956—7:24 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 788.5–MSP/2–856. Confidential. Drafted by Kitchen and Rountree, cleared by Baxter, and approved by Rountree.

349. Memorandum of Discussion at the 276th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, February 9, 1956

Washington, February 9, 1956

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Drafted by Gleason on February 10.

350. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Hoover) to the Deputy Director for Operations, International Cooperation Administration (FitzGerald)

Washington, February 9, 1956.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 888.00/2-956. Confidential. Drafted by Rountree and cleared by U/MSA and E.

351. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iran

Washington, February 14, 1956—7:29 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/2-656. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Hannah; cleared by Kitchen and NEA/UN, NEA/L, NEA, and EE; and approved by Allen. Repeated to Moscow and London.

352. Memorandum of a Conversation Between Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi and Secretary of State Dulles, Governor-General's Residence, Karachi, March 9, 1956, 9-10 a.m.

Karachi, March 9, 1956, 10 a.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 110.11-DU/3-956. Secret. According to a covering note by Macomber, March 9, the Secretary dictated this memorandum, and a note on the source text indicates that the Secretary later approved it. A copy of this memorandum was distributed in the Department of State as USDel/MC/11, March 9. (Ibid., Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199) A summary of this conversation was sent to Washington in Secto 37 from New Delhi, March 9. (Ibid., Central Files, 110.11-DU/3-956)

353. Summary Paper Prepared by the Officer in Charge of Iranian Affairs (Hannah)

Washington, March 13, 1956.

Source: Department of State, GTI Files: Lot 59 D 654, Iran Budgetary Aid 1955–56. Secret.

354. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iran

Washington, March 16, 1956—7:31 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 888.10/3–1556. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Hannah; cleared by GTI, E, U/MSA, and ICA; and approved by Hoover.

355. Letter From Howard D. Page, Director of Standard Oil Company, New Jersey, to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree)

New York, May 1, 1956.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 888.2553/5–156.

356. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of the Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs (Kitchen) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree)

Washington, May 17, 1956.

Source: Department of State, GTI Files: Lot 59 D 654, Iran 1956 Memoranda. Secret. Drafted by Hannah.

357. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Allen) to the Under Secretary of State (Hoover)

Washington, June 22, 1956.

Source: Department of State, GTI Files: Lot 59 D 654, Iran, Military Aid 1956. Secret. Drafted by Hannah.

358. Report of the Interdepartmental Committee on Certain U.S. Aid Programs

Washington, July 3, 1956.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 700.5–MSP/7–356. Secret; U.S. Eyes Only. According to a cover sheet attached to a copy of this report *ibid.*, OCB Files: Lot 61 D 385, Iran, it was submitted to the Secretaries of State, the Treasury, and Defense and to the Director of the International Cooperation Administration. The report was the work of the Prochnow Committee, formally titled the Interdepartmental Committee on Certain U.S. Aid Programs, which was established by the NSC on December 8, 1955, to prepare reports on the coordination of military and economic aid programs in Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, Vietnam, the Republic of China, and Korea. The committee was headed by Deputy Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Herbert V. Prochnow and consisted of representatives of the Departments of Defense and the Treasury, the Bureau of the Budget, ICA, and CIA. For documentation on the establishment of the committee, see volume x. The Prochnow Committee submitted a final composite report to the NSC on August 3. (Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5610 Series) This combined report was discussed by the NSC at its 301st meeting on October 26, 1956; see vol. x, p. 124.

359. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree) to the Acting Secretary of State

Washington, July 20, 1956.

Source: Department of State, OCB Files: Lot 62 D 430, Iran 1956. Top Secret. Drafted by Hannah and cleared by Baxter.

360. Memorandum From the Acting Secretary of State to the President

Washington, July 24, 1956.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 661.88/7–2456. Secret. Drafted by Hannah on July 23 and cleared by Baxter and Crawford.

361. Preliminary Notes on the Operations Coordinating Board Meeting, Washington, July 26, 1956

Washington, July 26, 1956

Source: Department of State, OCB Files: Lot 62 D 430. Secret. Drafted by Arthur L. Richards.

362. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State

Tehran, August 9, 1956—5 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 974.7301/8–956. Secret; Priority. Repeated to London, Cairo, and Paris.

363. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Iranian Ambassador (Amini) and the Under Secretary of State (Hoover), Department of State, Washington, August 13, 1956

Washington, August 13, 1956

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 974.7301/8–1356. Secret. Drafted by Rountree and approved by Hoover.

364. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State

Tehran, September 11, 1956—1 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 888.2553/9–1156. Confidential.

365. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree) to the Secretary of State

Washington, September 26, 1956.

Source: Department of State, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 61 D 167, Iran, U.S. Policy Towards (NSC 5504). Top Secret. Drafted by Hannah. Rountree was appointed Assistant Secretary of State on July 26 and entered duty on August 30.

366. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree) to the Under Secretary of State (Hoover)

Washington, October 4, 1956.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 888.10/10–456. Secret. Drafted by Smith and Jones and cleared with U/MSA, E, and ICA.

367. Memorandum of Discussion at the 299th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, October 4, 1956

Washington, October 4, 1956

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Drafted by Gleason on October 4.

368. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iran

Washington, November 2, 1956—8:40 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 888.2553/11–256. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Jones and cleared by OFD, Treasury, Export–Import Bank, E, and ICA.

369. Letter From the Director of the Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs (Jones) to the Ambassador in Iran (Chapin)

Washington, November 7, 1956.

Source: Department of State, GTI Files: Lot 59 D 654, Eximbank-IBRD. Secret; Official-Informal.

370. Letter From Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi to President Eisenhower

Tehran, November 20, 1956.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International Series.

371. Memorandum From the Director of the International Cooperation Administration (Hollister) to the Acting Secretary of State

Washington, November 23, 1956.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 788.5-MSP/11-2356. Confidential.

372. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson)

Washington, November 30, 1956.

Source: Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5610 Series. Top Secret. Transmitted to the NSC under a December 5 memorandum from Gleason.

373. Memorandum From the Secretary of State to the Director of the International Cooperation Administration (Hollister)

Washington, December 7, 1956.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 788.5–MSP/12–756. Confidential. Drafted by Hannah and Jones and cleared by G, U/MSA, E, and S/P. A memorandum from Rountree to Dulles, December 1, recommending that this letter be sent to Hollister is Ibid., GTI Files: Lot 59 D 654, Iran 1956 Memoranda.

374. Memorandum From the Secretary of State to the President

Washington, December 7, 1956.

Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 64 D 206, King Saud/Eisenhower. Drafted by Hannah.

375. Memorandum of a Conversation, Washington, January 3, 1957, 10:30 a.m.

Washington, January 3, 1957, 10:30 a.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 398.14/1–357. Confidential. Drafted by Smith.

376. Memorandum for the Record by the Chief of the Military Advisory Assistance Group in Iran (Seitz)

Tehran, January 3, 1957.

Source: Department of State, GTI Files: Lot 60 D 533, Iran, U.S. military assistance to, 1957. Secret.

377. Letter From the Counselor of the Embassy in Iran (Stevens) to the Officer in Charge of Iranian Affairs (Hannah)

Tehran, January 14, 1957.

Source: Department of State, GTI Files: Lot 60 D 533, Iran, Official Informal Letters from Tehran, 1957. Secret; Official–Informal.

378. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs (Jones) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning (Bowie)

Washington, January 11, 1957.

Source: Department of State, GTI Files: Lot 60 D 533, Iran, U.S. Iranian Relations, 1957. Secret. Drafted by Hannah. Bowie was also the Department of State representative on the NSC Planning Board.

379. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State

Tehran, January 17, 1957—3 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 888.2553/1–1757. Secret.

380. Editorial Note

381. National Intelligence Estimate

Washington, January 23, 1957.

Source: Department of State, INR–NIE Files. Secret. National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) were high-level interdepartmental reports on foreign policy problems, drafted by officers from those agencies represented on the Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC), discussed and revised by an interdepartmental working group coordinated by the Office of National Estimates of the CIA, approved by the IAC, and circulated under the aegis of the CIA to the President, appropriate officers of cabinet level, and the NSC. The Department of State provided all political and some economic sections of NIEs. NIE 34–57 superseded NIE 34–54, “The Outlook for Iran,” December 7, 1954. (Ibid.)

382. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State

Tehran, January 23, 1957—7 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 788.00/1–2357. Secret.

383. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State

Tehran, January 24, 1957—1 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 888.2553/1–2457. Secret.

384. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iran

Washington, January 26, 1957—2:09 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 888.2553/1–1757. Secret; Priority. Drafted by W. Van Dusen of FSD and Smith, cleared by GTI and WE, and approved by Rountree.

385. Editorial Note

386. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State

Tehran, January 31, 1957—10 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 888.2553/1–3157. Secret.

387. Briefing Paper

Washington, February 5, 1957.

Source: Department of State, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, NSC 5703/1 Series. Top Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text. According to a covering memorandum from Marion W. Boggs to the Planning Board, February 5, this paper was for the use of Cutler in briefing the NSC on February 7.

388. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Kalijarvi) to the Secretary of State

Washington, February 5, 1957.

Source: Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5703 Series. Top Secret. Drafted by James A. Lynn and Milner L. Dunn of the Bureau of Economic Affairs.

389. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree) to the Secretary of State

Washington, February 6, 1957.

Source: Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5703 Series. Top Secret. Drafted by Hannah and concurred in by Barnes, Murphy, and Kalijarvi, who added as a comment a copy of his memorandum to the Secretary, supra. According to a covering note from Fisher Howe to Dulles, February 6, Murphy approved this paper and read Kalijarvi’s comment. Murphy did not, to use Howe’s words, “feel that any disagreement on policy is involved, but has suggested to Mr. Kalijarvi that he attend the NSC briefing in order to present E’s views.”

390. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning (Bowie) to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Cutler)

Washington, February 6, 1957.

Source: Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5703 Series. Secret. Drafted by William Leonhardt, Department of State NSC Planning Board Assistant.

391. Memorandum of Discussion at the 312th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, February 7, 1957

Washington, February 7, 1957

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Gleason on February 8.

392. National Security Council Report

Washington, February 8, 1957.

Source: Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5703 Series. Top Secret.

393. Despatch From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State

Tehran, March 11, 1957.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 788.11/3–1157. Secret. Also sent to KhorramShahr, Isfahan, Tabriz, and Meshed. Passed to London, Moscow, Ankara, Baghdad, Kabul, Karachi, Jidda, New Delhi, Madrid, Rome, Bern, Dhahran, and Kuwait.

394. Telegram From the Embassy in Italy to the Department of State

Rome, March 18, 1957—6 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 888.2553/3–1857. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Tehran, London, and The Hague.

395. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State

Tehran, March 19, 1951—6 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 888.2553/3–1957. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Rome, London, and The Hague.

396. Telegram From the President's Special Assistant (Richards) to the Department of State

Tehran, March 25, 1957—5 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 120.1580/3–2557. Secret. Repeated to Karachi, Kabul, London, Paris, Amman, Cairo, Damascus, Baghdad, Tripoli, Jidda, Beirut, Athens, Rabat, Tunis, Addis Ababa, Aden, Khartoum, New Delhi, Rome, and Tel Aviv. Ambassador James P. Richards was sent as Eisenhower's Special Assistant to 15 Middle East nations between March and May 1957 with the task of explaining the Eisenhower Doctrine. Richards visited Iran March 23–27. (Despatch 936 from Tehran, April 16; *ibid.*, 120.1580/4–1657) See also Document 214. For additional documentation on the Richards Mission, see Document 184 ff.

397. Telegram From the President's Special Assistant (Richards) to the Department of State

Karachi, March 27, 1957—8 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 120.1580/3–2757. Secret. Also sent to Ankara and Baghdad and repeated to Tehran.

398. Telegram From the President's Special Assistant (Richards) to the Department of State

Karachi, March 27, 1957—9 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 120.1580/3–2757. Secret. Repeated to Tehran, Kabul, Baghdad, London, Paris, Cairo, Amman, Jidda, Ankara, Tel Aviv, Damascus, Aden, Beirut, Athens, Khartoum, Rabat, Tunis, Tripoli, Addis Ababa, and New Delhi.

399. Telegram From the President's Special Assistant (Richards) to the Department of State

Karachi, March 28, 1957—9 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 120.1580/3–2857. Secret. Also sent to Tehran, London, Paris, Ankara, and Baghdad; repeated to Tripoli, Cairo, Khartoum, Addis Ababa, Jidda, Amman, Tel Aviv, Damascus, Beirut, Kabul, Athens, Tunis, Rabat, Rome, and New Delhi.

400. Telegram From the Department of State of the Embassy in Iran

Washington, April 9, 1957—6:41 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 888.2553/3–2957. Secret; Priority. Drafted in GTI and cleared with FSD, ITR, WE, RA, and NE. Repeated to London and Rome.

401. Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation Between Mr. McLaughlin of the Socony Mobil Oil Company, Inc., and the Chief of the Fuels Division (Beckner), Washington, April 16, 1957

Washington, April 16, 1957

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 888.2553/4–1657. Official Use Only. Drafted by Beckner on April 22.

402. Memorandum of Discussion at the 334th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, August 8, 1957

Washington, August 8, 1957

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Gleason on August 9.

403. Memorandum From the Secretary of State's Special Assistant for Intelligence (Cumming) to the Under Secretary of State (Herter)

Washington, August 20, 1957.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 888.2553/8–2057. Secret. Drafted by C. Dirck Keyser, Seymour Goodman, Herbert Glantz, and Thomas Fina all of INR.

404. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree) to the Ambassador in Iran (Chapin)

Washington, August 24, 1957.

Source: Department of State, Tehran Embassy Files: Lot 62 F 43, 322.1 Bahrein Dispute. Secret; Official-Informal.

405. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree) to the Secretary of State

Washington, September 7, 1957.

Source: Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5703 Series. Secret. Drafted by Howard Ashford and cleared by Jones.

406. Memorandum of a Conversation Between Secretary of State Dulles and Foreign Minister Ardalan, Waldorf Towers, New York, September 17, 1957, 6 p.m.

New York, September 17, 1957, 6 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 110.11–DU/9–1957. Secret. Drafted by J. Jefferson Jones, III, Adviser to the U.S. Delegation to the 12th U.N. General Assembly.

407. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, September 25, 1957

Washington, September 25, 1957

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 888.2553/9–2557. Confidential.
Drafted by Torbert.

408. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, September 26, 1957

Washington, September 26, 1957

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 788.5/9–2657. Confidential.
Drafted by Jones on September 27. A note by Macomber on the source text reads as follows: “O.K., WM (note deletion on p. 2)”. See footnote 4 below for explanation of the deletion.

409. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree) to the Secretary of State

Washington, October 12, 1957.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 788.5–MSP/10–1257. Secret.
Drafted by Mouser and Williams and cleared by Murphy, Dillon, and Barnes.

410. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State

Tehran, November 7, 1957—5 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.88/11–757. Confidential.
Repeated to London and Moscow.

411. Memorandum From the Director of the International Cooperation Administration (Smith) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Dillon)

Washington, November 26, 1957.

Source: Department of State, GTI Files: Lot 60 D 533, Iran, Qom Airfield, 1957. Secret.

412. Letter From the Counselor for Political Affairs of the Embassy in Iran (Stelle) to the Officer in Charge of Iranian Affairs (Mouser)

Tehran, November 18, 1957.

Source: Department of State, GTI Files: Lot 60 D 533, Iran, Official and Informal Letters from Tehran, 1957. Confidential; Official–Informal.

413. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iran

Washington, December 10, 1957—5:47 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 888.10/11–1357. Confidential. Drafted by Mouser, Jones, Williams, and Kennedy; cleared with ICA, U/MSA, Defense, and Dillon; and approved by Rountree.

414. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State

Tehran, December 15, 1957—2 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 888.10/12–1557. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Baghdad, London, Ankara, Karachi, and Paris.

415. Staff Summary Supplement Prepared in the Department of State

Washington, December 17, 1957.

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles–Herter Series. Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text. Initialed by Eisenhower.

416. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State

Tehran, December 18, 1957—3 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 888.10/12-1857. Secret.

286. Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Jernegan) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration (Henderson)²

Washington, January 7, 1955.

SUBJECT

Increased Military Aid for Iran—National Security Council Meeting January 13

We have recommended to the Secretary that you accompany him to the NSC meeting on January 13 which will consider a new policy statement on Iran. We have also suggested that you be asked to give an oral report on the situation in Iran. In this connection and as a follow-up to our informal meeting in your office on Monday,³ I submit the following brief review of developments on the question of increasing the military aid program for Iran.

1. *Current Military Assistance to Iran.* Since 1950, a total of \$124 million in military aid has been programmed for Iran.⁴ The objectives of this limited program, as presently constituted, will be met by 1957. The Defense Department considers that \$10 million a year in military aid will then suffice to maintain the Iranian military establishment.

2. *The Shah's Request for Increased Military Aid.* The Shah asked, while visiting Washington in December 1954, for "additional aid in the matter of training and also to furnish us, just as fast as we are prepared to make effective use of them, all the weapons required by a modern Army—weapons which in our case would be required not only for our own defense but also for that of the region". He also asked for help in giving to the Iranian armed forces "food and clothing of the kind which men undergoing rigorous training should have ... and funds with

which to resettle some of our contingents in more strategic areas or to transfer our military stores to places where they will be less vulnerable”.⁵

3.

The U.S. Response. U.S. military and civilian officials took the line, in response, that we are prepared to help develop in the Iranian armed forces defensive delaying capabilities which would make a useful contribution to the defense of the Zagros Mountain line. However, until intensive training has improved the Iranian Army’s ability to make effective use of modern weapons it will not be possible for the US to evaluate the military role which Iranian forces should play. We do not want, furthermore, to develop a military establishment in Iran which would be an undue burden on the national economy. We would be prepared to ask Congress for some defense support funds for Iran in FY 1956 but we need assurances that, as oil revenues increase, the Shah will see to it there is enough set aside to make a major contribution towards supporting the armed forces and thereby reduce reliance on foreign aid. (See memorandum of conversation between Shah, Under Secretary of State, Deputy Secretary of Defense and high military officers—Tab A.)⁶

One of the principal elements in the situation will be the determination of Middle East defense requirements by the US, UK, Turkey military staff talks⁷ referred to later in this memorandum. We did not, of course, inform the Shah of these talks.

We have learned from reliable sources that the Shah received a good impression from his reception here, although he has expressed the hope that US Government decisions on the Iranian military problem will not be too long delayed.

4.

Revision of NSC Policy Statement on Iran. Following the oil settlement, it was decided that the NSC statement of policy toward Iran should be revised to reflect recent developments and to project our future course of action. The major point discussed in the NSC Planning Board has been whether the US Government should decide now to increase military aid for Iran in order to take advantage of favorable political and psychological elements in the Iranian situation and take into account the impact of the Shah's visit to the United States. The Department has recognized from the start that training and reorganization designed to improve Iran's ability to utilize and absorb military equipment must precede shipments of additional equipment. The major point of dispute between Defense and State has been over the question of timing. Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff hold firmly to the view that no decisions can be taken on this matter until after a review of the purely military requirements for defense of the entire Middle East has been completed. In the meantime, additional training teams are being sent to Iran; but Defense admits that the effect of these teams will not be felt much before the end of this year nor can these teams make any useful recommendations concerning a military buildup in Iran until after July at the earliest.

The following language has been suggested as a new statement of "Objectives" as regards military aid:⁸

"Iranian armed forces capable of maintaining internal security and having defensive delaying capabilities which would make a useful contribution to Middle East defense.

"Iranian participation at an appropriate time in Middle East defense arrangements."

The "Courses of Action" designed to achieve the above objectives which have been agreed upon at NSC Planning Board levels are listed below:

“I. Take the necessary steps, including, as appropriate, provision of military and related defense support aid for Iran, to help:

a. Develop in the Iranian armed forces defensive delaying capabilities which would make a useful contribution to Middle East defense.

b. Improve the ability of the Iranian armed forces to maintain internal security.

c. Enhance the prestige of the monarchy and the morale of the Iranian Government and the military services.

d. Give the Iranian Government and the people a greater degree of confidence in the ability of the Iranian armed forces to defend Iran.

In carrying out this course of action keep the UK informed in general of the program and its objectives, and coordinate the program with the capabilities and plans of the UK, Turkey, Iraq and Pakistan for the defense of the area.

II. The amount and the rate of such military and defense support aid to Iran should be directly related to:

a. The attitude of Iran with regard to this aid and with regard to political, economic, and military

cooperation with the free world, including Turkey, Pakistan and Iraq.

b. Iran's ability and willingness to institute reorganization of its military establishment and its ability by intensive training satisfactorily to utilize present military equipment and to absorb additional equipment.

c. The role which Iran is expected to play in Middle East defense.

d. The ability of Iran to make increasingly larger contributions toward supporting its military establishment by use of its own resources, thereby progressively reducing reliance on foreign aid.

III. Encourage Iran to enter into military cooperation with its neighbors as feasible, and to participate in any regional defense arrangements at an appropriate time which may be developed for the Middle East."

5.

Defense-JCS Attempts to Set Limitations on Action. In the opening sentence of Paragraph II (above) Defense-JCS have proposed substituting "controlled by" for the words "directly related to". This would run the risk, in our view, of giving undue weight to technical considerations without sufficient regard for the more important political and psychological elements of this problem.

Defense–JCS have also proposed the addition of the following subparagraph to Paragraph II above:

“The availability of military assistance and defense support funds in the light of US world–wide commitments and duly established priorities.”

This would, in our view, imply that this consideration, which affects all aid programs, should be especially applicable to Iran. We are recommending to the Secretary, in a separate memorandum,⁹ that he oppose these Defense–JCS suggestions.

6.

Our Estimate of Defense–JCS Thinking. It can be expected that our military establishment will refer to Paragraph II (c) whenever political and psychological questions are raised as evidence of the need to move rapidly in expanding our military aid to Iran. Military talks between the US, UK and Turkey are to commence on January 18 in London.¹⁰ It is believed that the talks will concern the purely military requirements for defense of the Middle East. It is also believed that the Zagros Mountain line will be treated as the first line of defense. It is impossible to guess what these military talks will produce concerning the importance of an Iranian Army capable of defense against Soviet aggression.

The “McClure Plan”¹¹ submitted last fall by the Commander of the Military Assistance Advisory Group in Iran has been totally disregarded according to the Defense representative at the NSC Planning Board. So far as can be determined, there is no present intention in Defense of considering a program of the nature recommended by General McClure.¹²

² Source: Department of State, Central Files, 788.5–MSP/1–755. Secret. Drafted by Stutesman and approved by Baxter and Kitchen.

³ January 3; no record of this meeting has been found in Department of State files.

⁴ At this point the following phrase was deleted from the memorandum: “of which about 70% has been delivered.”

⁵ Ellipsis in the source text. The quotes are taken from a memorandum handed to President Eisenhower by the Shah during his visit to the White House, December 13, 1954. (Department of State, Central Files, 788.11/12–1454) A summary of this memorandum is printed as Tab A to a memorandum from Jernegan to Dulles, December 9, 1954, [Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. X, p. 1066](#).

⁶ Attached but not printed. The discussion at this meeting was summarized in telegram 1187 to Tehran, December 15, [ibid., p. 1076](#).

⁷ See [Document 7](#).

⁸ The sentences quoted in the paragraphs below are revisions to draft NSC 5402/1, “U.S. Policy Toward Iran,” December 30, 1954. (Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5402—Memoranda) NSC 5402/1 was prepared by the NSC Planning Board and transmitted to the Council for its consideration at its meeting on January 13. NSC 5402/1 was a revision of NSC 5402, “U.S. Policy Toward Iran,” January 2, 1954, [Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. X, p. 865](#).

⁹ [Document 289](#).

¹⁰ At this point Jernegan deleted the following sentence: “Although an agenda has reportedly not yet been drawn up.”

¹¹ Reference is to Brigadier General McClure’s memorandum of September 2, 1954, to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G–3, Department of the Army, not printed.

¹² The following handwritten note from Jernegan to Henderson appears on the source text: “LWH: I was assured that the U.S.–U.K.–Turk talks in London have a much broader scope than merely to determine the manpower required to defend the Zagros line. JDJ”.

287. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson)¹

Washington, January 7, 1955.

SUBJECT

United States Policy Toward Iran—NSC 5402/1²

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff submit herewith their views regarding a draft statement of policy titled “United States Policy Toward Iran” (NSC 5402/1), prepared by the National Security Council Planning Board for consideration by the Council at its meeting on 13 January 1955.
2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are in general accord with the objectives and courses of action set forth in the proposed policy, which are designed to orient Iran more positively toward the West and to change it from a liability to an anti-Communist asset in Asia.
3. Prominent among the courses of action proposed in the draft is the improvement of the effectiveness of Iran’s armed forces, by the provision of military and related defense support aid. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the current military assistance program has already contributed materially to that end and should continue to do so. An expanded program would doubtless further enhance the effectiveness of Iran’s forces. However, in view of the limited MDAP funds which can be expected to become available, it is necessary that commitments requiring additional military assistance be restricted primarily to the fulfillment of military requirements and be carefully considered in the light of their relative worldwide importance. Among the primary considerations are (a) the role the recipient country is expected to play in the defense of the region of which it is a part, (b) its technical and moral [*morale?*] capacity to discharge that role, and

(c) the progress the Iranian Army may show under the tutelage of the U.S. training teams.

4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff anticipate that the forthcoming U.S.–U.K.–Turkey planning talks and the studies incident thereto will make possible a more definite determination of the role Iran should fulfill in the defense of the Middle East. It is considered that, pending such a determination and a demonstrated capacity on the part of Iran’s armed forces to utilize effectively the weapons they now have or will shortly receive, a decision at this time to expand significantly the military assistance program for that country would be premature.

5. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the first sentence in paragraph 14 of the draft statement of policy³ overstates the U.S. expenditures required to develop significant delaying capabilities and recommend that the word “very” be deleted.

6. Paragraph 21 of the draft statement of policy sets forth the conditions which should govern the scope and pace of U.S. military assistance and defense support to Iran. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider these conditions, including those in the bracketed subparagraph e,⁴ to be appropriate criteria. Further, if the principle of subparagraph e is present by implication, as stated in the footnote on page 12,⁵ the Joint Chiefs of Staff can perceive of no objection to its inclusion as a statement of an essential criterion. With respect to the alternate phrasing in the lead-in of paragraph 21,⁶ they consider that either is acceptable provided the proposed subparagraph e is retained. In view of the fact that Iran already has accomplished some reorganization of its military establishment and in the interests of emphasizing the role of the U.S. training teams, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend the following changes in subparagraph 21 b:⁷

“b. Iran’s ability and willingness to *continue* reorganization of its military establishment and its ability by intensive training *under the tutelage of U.S.*

training teams satisfactorily to utilize present military equipment and to absorb additional equipment.”

7. Subject to the foregoing comments and recommendations, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that you concur in the adoption of NSC 5402/1 as an acceptable statement of United States policy toward Iran to supersede NSC 5402.

8. The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff did not participate in the action of the Joint Chiefs of Staff outlined in this memorandum.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Robt. B. Carney⁸
Chief of Naval Operations

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 788.5–MSP/1–1055. Top Secret. Transmitted to the NSC for consideration at its January 13 meeting under cover of a memorandum from Lay, January 10.

² See [footnote 8, supra](#).

³ The first sentence in paragraph 14 of NSC 5402/1 reads as follows: “The development of significant defensive delaying capabilities in the Iranian armed forces would require a long-term program involving U.S. expenditures very substantially in excess of present levels.”

⁴ Subparagraph e reads as follows: “The availability of military assistance and defense support funds in light of U.S. world-wide commitments and duly established priorities.”

⁵ The footnote on page 12, referring to subparagraph e, reads as follows: “Defense–JCS proposal. The other Planning Board members believe the principle of this paragraph is present by implication in all NSC policies and hence need not be stated here.”

⁶ Paragraph 21 with the alternative language reads as follows: The amount and the rate of such military and defense support aid to Iran should be directly related to [controlled by]:”. The portion in brackets was a JCS–ODM proposal.

⁷ Subparagraph b originally read as follows: “Iran’s ability and willingness to institute reorganization of its military establishment and its ability by

intensive training satisfactorily to utilize present military equipment and to absorb additional equipment.”

[8](#) Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

288. Memorandum From the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Bowie) to the Under Secretary of State (Hoover)¹

Washington, January 11, 1955.

SUBJECT

Iran's Role in Middle East Defense

This is in response to your query of January 8² as to what role Iran is expected to play in Middle East defense (reference is made specifically to NSC 5402/1, paragraph 21(c)).

The role which this Government desires that Iran play in Middle East defense is not as yet entirely clear. From the political point of view, it is important that she be encouraged and enabled to play an active role, cooperating closely with the free world and helping to strengthen or fill out the "northern tier". This would not only assist our overall political and defense posture in the Middle East but would also strengthen pro-Western elements in Iran and militate against an Iranian relapse into a dangerous posture of "neutralism".

From the military point of view our position is best set forth by the final sentence of paragraph 11 of NSC 5402/1 which states "No final decisions regarding Iran's role in area defense can be made until after the entire Middle East military picture has been reviewed." This is our position at the present time for several reasons:

[Numbered paragraph 1 (2 lines of source text) not declassified]

2. The U.S. military are reluctant to agree to any increased military aid to Iran because of the shortage of funds and equipment for the worldwide military aid program.

3. The Pentagon, apparently stimulated by Admiral Radford, is in the process of rethinking its overall views on Middle East defense in event of general war.

4. There will be a military meeting in London on January 18 with British and Turkish military to review Middle East defense.

In the light of the above the Joint Chiefs refuse to be specific about the military role they wish Iran to play in Middle East defense and will probably continue so to refuse for several more months.

¹ Source: Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5402—Memoranda, Top Secret. Bowie was the Department of State Representative on the NSC Planning Board.

At the bottom of the source text the following note was typed: “NEA concurs.”

² No record of this query has been found.

289. Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Jernegan) to the Secretary of State¹

Washington, January 11, 1955.

SUBJECT

NSC 5402/1, US Policy Toward Iran

Discussion:

NSC 5402/1, *US Policy Toward Iran*, is scheduled for consideration by the Council at its meeting on January 13.

The policy as now written takes into account (1) the settlement of the Anglo–Iranian oil dispute with the prospect of renewed oil revenue for Iran; (2) the presently favorable situation which offers an opportunity to move forward in building a position of comparative strength in Iran and to change a liability in Asia into a possible asset; (3) the need to assist in developing in the Iranian armed forces defensive delaying capabilities which would make a useful contribution to Middle East defense; and (4) the Department of Defense position that we should not consider undertaking an increased military program prior to receiving the recommendation resulting from the forthcoming US–UK–Turkish area defense study.

The Shah and a pro–Western government have established political stability and, with our assistance, are commencing an economic development program designed to bring to the Iranian people tangible social and economic benefits from the oil settlement.

The traditional Iranian policy of refusing to choose sides in major world conflicts is being abandoned. The Shah told the President, “In abandoning a negative and sterile policy, the Iranian Government and Parliament have made the conscious decision to turn their backs on this form of isolationism and join hands with the leading nations of the free world.”² As further

evidence of this trend away from “neutrality,” the Iranian Government is taking strong action in suppressing Communist activities.

The Shah and other key Iranian leaders want to join with Turkey, Pakistan and Iraq in military arrangements within the “northern tier” concept. They feel it necessary, however, to have an Army in which the Iranian people can have some confidence, which could put up an honorable defense against Soviet aggression and which can make some useful contribution to area defense. To achieve such defensive capabilities the Iranian Army needs our help in training, reorganization, improved equipment and in preparation of defensive positions. For political and psychological reasons beyond purely military considerations, the Department of State continues to believe that it is important to increase military aid to the Iranian Army if Iran is to join regional defense arrangements and to continue to resist Soviet pressures with courage and determination.

The Department of Defense is reluctant to increase military aid at a time when world-wide military aid requirements are using up available funds. Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff also feel that no decisions on this subject can be taken until after a military review of all Middle East defense requirements has been completed. The military have suggested language in Paragraph 21 of NSC 5402/1 which would require decisions on the amount and rate of military and defense support aid for Iran to be “controlled by” various factors which, in our view, should read “directly related to” but not “controlled by.” The Defense position would run the risk of giving more weight to technical considerations than to the more important political and psychological elements of the unusual opportunity which is open to us in Iran today.

Recommendation:

- (1) That the policy be approved as proposed, excluding the Defense-JCS suggestions in Paragraph 21.
 - (2) That Ambassador Loy Henderson be asked to accompany you, and give an oral statement regarding the situation in Iran.
-

¹ Source: Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5402—Memoranda. Top Secret. Drafted by Baxter, Kitchen, Dixon, and Stutesman and concurred in by S/P, G, EUR, and E.

² The source of this quote is unclear. The only record found of the Shah's conversation with President Eisenhower is the summary in telegram 1175 to Tehran, December 13, 1954, [*Foreign Relations*, 1952–1954, vol. X, p. 1073](#).

290. Memorandum of Discussion at the 231st Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, January 13, 1955¹

Washington, January 13, 1955

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and items 1. "CIA Quarterly Report," 2. "Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security," 3. "U.S. Policy Toward Formosa and the Government of the Republic of China," 4. "Current U.S. Policy Toward the Far East," and 5. "United States Policy on Berlin."]

6. *U.S. Policy Toward Iran* (NSC 5402/1;² NSC 5402;³ NSC Action No. 1266;⁴ NIE 34–54;⁵ Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated January 10, 1955⁶) Mr. Cutler briefed the Council at some length on the background of the new policy paper on Iran (NSC 5402/1), calling particular attention to paragraphs 20 and 21 (copy of Mr. Cutler's briefing notes filed in the minutes of the meeting).⁷ He then pointed out the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with respect to paragraph 21. They wished that the "amount and rate" of such military and defense support aid to Iran should be directly "controlled by" rather than merely "related to" the various conditions set forth in the subparagraphs of paragraph 21. Furthermore, they wished to add an additional subparagraph e, to read as follows:

"e. The availability of military assistance and defense support funds in the light of U.S. worldwide commitments and duly established priorities."

Secretary Humphrey said he strongly supported the recommendation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the inclusion of the condition set forth in their proposed subparagraph. The other members of the Council at first perceived no objection to adding this subparagraph. However, Under Secretary Hoover, who had taken Secretary Dulles' place at the table, said he was opposed to adding this subparagraph, since he believed that the principle of

the paragraph which the Joint Chiefs desired to add was present by implication in all NSC policies. The President inclined to agree with Secretary Hoover, and inquired whether, if the Joint Chiefs' subparagraph was put in the Iranian paper, it would not appear to militate against Iran specifically, since such a paragraph had not been inserted in other policy papers.

Secretary Humphrey said that if it was absolutely implicit in all NSC papers, and if this implication were clearly understood by all concerned, he would have no objection to leaving the subparagraph out of the Iranian paper.

Secretary Hoover then said he wished to refer briefly to subparagraph 21-c, which conditioned U.S. military assistance to Iran on "the role which Iran is expected to play in Middle East defense". Secretary Hoover went on to say that the State Department had been trying to get this role determined for something over a year and a half, and that there had been no policy decision on the matter. We were in very great need of deciding on some kind of defense plan for the whole Middle East area, and more particularly for Iran's part in this area defense.

The President said that he thought it unlikely that we could do much more than make an approximation of Iran's defensive role under varying assumptions.

Admiral Radford said he desired to point out the unusual difficulties which were encountered by military planning for this troubled part of the world. He mentioned the conversations with the British about Iran's defense role, which had been delayed because of our desire to include the Turks in such conversations and the British objection to their inclusion. He then mentioned the "hassle" with Pakistan with respect to the amount of assistance which the United States was to afford that country. This problem remained to be ironed out. In any case, continued Admiral Radford, Pakistan and Turkey were the two key nations in the defense of the Middle East. We could readily defend Iran if we could expand the Pakistani Army to anything like its real potentialities. Military opinion, both in Pakistan and

in Turkey, takes a very poor view of the military capabilities of the Iranian Army—in particular, of the capabilities of the Iranian officer corps. For these and other reasons, concluded Admiral Radford, it was going to take some little time yet to define the role of Iran in the defense of the Middle East.

The President pointed out the important contribution the Germans had earlier made to the development of the Turkish Army, and the great contribution which the British had made to developing the armed forces of what is now Pakistan. In the light of these historical facts, was it not possible that with the right help and guidance the Iranian Army could likewise be developed into something effective?

Mr. Cutler suggested that the point raised by Secretary Hoover could perhaps be met by the insertion of the words “early determination of” between “the” and “role” in paragraph 21–c.

*The National Security Council:*⁸

a. Discussed the subject on the basis of the reference report (NSC 5402/1) by the NSC Planning Board, in the light of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff transmitted by the reference memorandum.

b. Adopted the statement of policy contained in NSC 5402/1, subject to the following amendments:

(1) *Paragraph 14, first sentence:* Delete the word “very”.

(2) *Paragraph 21:* Delete “[controlled by]”⁹ and the footnote relating thereto.

(3) *Paragraph 21–b:* Revise to read as follows:

“b. Iran’s ability and willingness to continue reorganization of its military establishment and its ability by intensive training under the

tutelage of U.S. training teams satisfactorily to utilize present military equipment and to absorb additional equipment.”

(4) *Paragraph 21–c*: Revise to read as follows:

“c. Early determination of the role which Iran is expected to play in Middle East defense, following the conclusion of the current US–UK–Turkey military talks.”

(5) *Paragraph 21–e*: Delete this subparagraph and the footnote relating thereto, on the basis that the principle of this subparagraph is present by implication in all policies recommended by the NSC.

Note: NSC 5402/1, as amended, approved by the President, subsequently circulated as NSC 5504,¹⁰ and transmitted to the Operations Coordinating Board as the coordinating agency.

[Here follow items 7. “Security Requirements for Government Employment” and 8. “Report by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.”]

S. Everett Gleason

¹ Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Drafted by Gleason on January 14.

² See [footnote 8, Document 286](#).

³ [Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. X, p. 865](#).

⁴ NSC Action No. 1266, November 9, 1954, noted an OCB Progress Report on “United States Policy Toward Iran,” October 13, 1954, and noted that the NSC Planning Board was reviewing NSC 5402 in light of the Progress Report. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95) The OCB Progress Report, October 13, is not printed. (*Ibid.*, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5402 Memoranda) ⁵ NIE 34–54, “Probable Developments in Iran Through 1955,” December 7, 1954, is not printed. (*Ibid.*, NIE–INR Files) ⁶ See [footnote 1, Document 287](#).

⁷ The minutes of all National Security Council meetings are in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council, Official Meeting Minutes File.

⁸ Paragraphs a and b and the Note that follows constitute NSC Action No. 1304, approved January 13, 1955. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council) ⁹ Brackets in the source text.

¹⁰ *Infra*.

291. National Security Council Report¹

Washington, January 15, 1955.

NSC 5504

NOTE BY THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ON U.S. POLICY TOWARD IRAN

REFERENCES

A. NSC 5402/1; NSC 5402

B. NSC Actions Nos. 1266 and 1304

The National Security Council, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Director, Bureau of the Budget, at the 231st meeting of the Council of January 13, 1955, adopted the statement of policy contained in the reference report (NSC 5402/1), subject to the amendments thereto which are set forth in NSC Action No. 1304.

The President has this date approved the statement of policy contained in NSC 5402/1, as amended and adopted by the Council and enclosed herewith; directs its implementation by all appropriate executive departments and agencies of the U.S. Government and designates the Operations Coordinating Board as the coordinating agency.

The Financial Appendix and the Staff Study originally contained in NSC 5402/1 are also enclosed for information.²

Accordingly, NSC 5402 is hereby superseded.

James S. Lay , Jr.³

[Here follows a table of contents.]

[Enclosure]

**STATEMENT OF POLICY BY THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ON U.S. POLICY
TOWARD IRAN**

General Considerations

1. It is of critical importance to the United States that Iran remain an independent nation and be capable of resisting any attempt at domination by the USSR. It is in the national interest that Iran proceed to develop closer association with anti-Communist governments. Because of its key strategic position, oil resources, vulnerability to intervention armed attack and political subversion, Iran must be regarded as a continuing objective of Soviet expansion. Therefore in view of Iran's importance to the free world, the United States and its allies will have to assume a larger and continuing responsibility for the independence of Iran. The development of Iran from a weak nation traditionally seeking a "neutral" position in world affairs into an anti-Communist asset in Asia would:

- a. Strengthen the security of the entire Middle East, particularly the "northern tier" of the area.
- b. Enhance United States prestige in nearby countries and strengthen their resolution to resist Communist pressures.
- c. Prevent Communist use of Iranian oil as a weapon of economic warfare.
- d. Have a beneficial psychological impact elsewhere in the free world.
- e. Reduce the Soviet threat to important free world lines of communication.

2. Since Mosadeq's downfall in August 1953 much progress has been made toward the attainment of U.S. objectives with respect to Iran. The Shah has been confirmed in his central role in the

governmental power structure. Relative political stability throughout Iran has been established and maintained, so far, by the Zahedi Government. The mobs and demagogues of the Mosadeq era have been forced into the background, leaving the traditional land-owning, commercial and military groups once again in control of the offices and perquisites of government. The tribal situation is quiescent. Communist activities have been disrupted and a conscientious effort is being made to crush the Tudeh Party.

3. By an agreement with a group of international oil companies, including 40% American interest, the Anglo-Iranian oil dispute has been resolved and Iran is again to receive income from its oil resources. The Government has promised the people early, tangible benefits from this income, and therefore the durability of the oil settlement depends in large part upon the success of an economic development program.

4. It is estimated that Iran will probably remain, at least through 1955, in the hands of predominantly conservative Governments acceptable to the Shah and Western-oriented. However, Iran is likely to remain for some time a basically unstable country plagued with continuing economic and financial difficulties and the social and political problems springing primarily from the basic changes taking place in Iran society. The Parliament, upon which enactment of essential economic and social legislation depends, is composed of heterogeneous groups motivated mainly by self-interest. The lack of qualified Iranian administrative personnel is a serious problem. The Zahedi Government has so far failed to achieve widespread support. At best it appears to be accepted as one which has restored law and order, which may with U.S. support and oil revenue be able to provide some benefits for the country, and which has the will and ability to put down opposition. It has not yet succeeded in checking inflation or in bringing tangible benefits to the dissatisfied and politically influential urban middle and lower classes. These groups are increasingly aware of their lack of opportunity within existing

social, economic and political structures. Unless a better basis for confidence and stability is established among them they will be increasingly vulnerable to extremist demagogues and Communist propaganda. In the long run, unless the traditional land-owning group adjusts to a sharing of political power with urban middle class elements there will probably be an increase in the disruptive potential of popular discontent.

5. Iran is in a better position to attack its problems than before. There is apparent a willingness among Iranian leaders to forsake the traditional policy of refusing to take sides in international rivalries and to develop closer ties with the anti-Communist governments of the free world. A significant new factor in the situation is the emergence of the United States as an acknowledged major influence in Iran. The Shah, who sincerely desires to improve his people's welfare and is profoundly anti-Communist and sympathetic to U.S. objectives, is the ultimate, though not completely unrestricted, arbiter of political affairs. He and Prime Minister Zahedi are clearly determined to use authoritarian means if necessary to maintain stability and carry forward desirable economic and political programs. The prospect of very large future oil revenue offers hope that substantial economic progress can be made and provides a basis for assuming that the country will not need to depend on foreign financing for economic development after another two or three years. It is possible to capitalize on this favorable situation if the Shah and his key officials continue to move forward with hope and determination and if the U.S. continues to support Iranian efforts to overcome the problems described in paragraph 4 above.

6. Since September of 1953 the United States has granted emergency assistance at the rate of approximately \$5 million per month to permit Iran to meet its operating deficit and to provide the necessary foreign exchange for essential imports. This aid was provided for the period prior to January 1, 1955 on a grant basis (a total of \$83.3 million). A loan of \$30 million has been offered to cover the period January 1 to July 1, 1955. An additional loan

of \$30 million is being considered to support Iran until January 1, 1956, when oil revenues are expected to be forthcoming in sufficient amounts to permit Iran to finance its own budgetary expenditures. Since oil revenues in the next year or two will be insufficient to finance politically essential economic development programs, the Export-Import Bank has recently offered a line of credit of \$53 million for this purpose.

7. In addition to the above, the United States has a technical and economic assistance program for Iran of approximately \$21.5 million for FY 1955. A program of \$10 million technical assistance for FY 1956 is being proposed. Even when substantial oil revenues are realized it will be desirable to continue technical assistance to Iran for a number of years, with increasing participation by Iranians. The level of such technical assistance is expected to decrease as individual programs are turned over to the Iranians.

8. Oil revenues from the recently concluded agreement will accrue to Iran on a graduated scale. Direct payments by the consortium (including rial purchases within Iran), plus certain indirect tax benefits and savings, will total about \$145 million in CY 1955, rising to \$235 million in CY 1957, and perhaps increasing thereafter by about 5% per year.

9. On the above basis, in 1957 or soon thereafter, it appears that Iran would have the capacity, without U.S. economic aid, to support an adequate economic development program with some additional military expenses.

10. The Shah told the President on December 13, 1954 that Iran had decided to abandon its historical policy of clinging to a neutral position and to join hands with leading nations of the free world. He emphasized however that the Iranian government and the people would stand up more firmly in the face of pressures, threats and attempts at infiltration on the part of international Communism if they believed Iran could resist if attacked and that the peoples of the free world were interested in Iran's being able

to put up such resistance and were helping to that end. In referring to regional security arrangements he said Iran is willing to adapt its strategy to that of the defense of the area if “it has at least reason to believe that it will soon be in a position to contribute its share to the common defense of the area.”

11. In response, the Shah was informed that we would welcome Iran’s adherence to a regional defense agreement of Turkey, Pakistan and Iraq⁴ and are prepared to help develop in the Iranian armed forces defensive delaying capabilities which would make a useful contribution to the defense of the Zagros line. It was emphasized that intensive training is necessary to improve the Iranian army’s ability to make effective use of modern weapons. It was also pointed out that it was not possible at this time to evaluate the military role which Iranian forces should play in area defense, and that the United States does not want to develop a military establishment in Iran which would be an undue burden on the Iranian economy. No final decisions regarding Iran’s role in area defense can be made until after the entire Middle East military picture has been reviewed.

12. U.S. military aid to a value of \$124 million has been programmed for Iran since 1950, of which about 70% was delivered by September 30, 1954. With the aid thus far provided the Iranian armed forces are capable generally of maintaining internal security but do not possess a capability for significant defensive delaying action against Soviet aggression.

13. The problem presented by the Shah must be measured in more than purely military terms. The presently favorable political and psychological elements of the Iranian situation are not static. The United States should therefore take advantage of this opportunity to bring Iran into closer cooperation with its neighbors in the free world and to change Iran from a liability to a positive anti-Communist asset in Asia. If the political and psychological climate is allowed to deteriorate by failure to provide a sense of increased security and participation in the free world, it is

doubtful that Iran would enter into the desired kind of area defense arrangements. An additional result probably would be disillusion and suspicion among those Iranians currently resolved to resist international Communism; a weakening of public confidence in Iran's ability to withstand Soviet pressures; and a consequent drop in the prestige and morale of the armed forces to a point where even the maintenance of internal security would be weakened.

14. The development of significant defensive delaying capabilities in the Iranian armed forces would require a long-term program involving U.S. expenditures substantially in excess of present levels. In addition to training and military end items, it would depend upon economic and defense support to complement military assistance. Iran does not have a capacity financially to support an increased military program while oil revenues are small, but can be expected to make an increasingly larger contribution in future years. It should also be recognized that full development of Iranian military capabilities depends on a general improvement in national morale, which in turn depends on the political-economic as well as military sphere.

Objectives

15. An independent Iran free from Communist control.

16. A strong, stable government in Iran, capable of resisting Soviet diplomatic and other pressures and of preventing Communist penetration, using all available resources effectively, with an improving economy, and actively cooperating with the anti-Communist governments of the free world.

17. Iranian armed forces capable of maintaining internal security, and having defensive delaying capabilities which would make a useful contribution to Middle East defense.

18. Iranian participation, at an appropriate time, in Middle East defense arrangements.

19. Maximum availability of Iranian oil to the free world and denial of such resources to Communist–dominated areas.

Courses of Action

20.

Take the necessary steps, including, as appropriate, provision of military and related defense support aid for Iran, to help

a. Develop in the Iranian armed forces defensive delaying capabilities which would make a useful contribution to Middle East defense.

b. Improve the ability of the Iranian armed forces to maintain internal security.

c. Enhance the prestige of the monarchy and the morale of the Iranian Government and the military services.

d. Give the Iranian Government and the people a greater degree of confidence in the ability of the Iranian armed forces to defend Iran.

In carrying out this course of action keep the UK informed in general of the program and its objectives, and coordinate the program with the capabilities and plans of the UK, Turkey, Iraq and Pakistan for the defense of the area.

21. The amount and the rate of such military and defense support aid to Iran should be directly related to:

a. The attitude of Iran with regard to this aid and with regard to political, economic, and military cooperation with the free world, including Turkey, Pakistan and Iraq.

b. Iran's ability and willingness to continue reorganization of its military establishment and its ability by intensive training under the tutelage of U.S. training teams satisfactorily to utilize present military equipment and to absorb additional equipment.

c. Early determination of the role which Iran is expected to play in Middle East defense, following the conclusion of the current US–UK–Turkey military talks.

d. The ability of Iran to make increasingly larger contributions toward supporting its military establishment by effective use of its own resources, thereby progressively reducing reliance on foreign aid.

22. Encourage Iran to enter into military cooperation with its neighbors as feasible, and to participate at an appropriate time in any regional defense arrangements which may be developed for the Middle East.

23. Facilitate the successful operation of the recent oil settlement,

24. Until Iran receives substantial revenues from its natural petroleum resources, provide economic development aid to Iran in the form of loans, unless exceptional circumstances justify grants.

25. Continue technical assistance to Iran, turning individual programs over to the Iranians as soon as they are capable. Where appropriate, utilize such private institutions and international organizations as may provide technical assistance more effectively.

26. Endeavor to persuade Iran to avoid financial over-commitment and to make effective use of its total revenue in such a way as to contribute to economic stability and growth, improved effectiveness of the armed forces in support of a stable

government, and provision of early and tangible benefits to the people.

27. Support U.S. private enterprise in the development and expansion of Iranian oil resources and encourage U.S. private investment in other fields.

28. Endeavor to lessen widespread dissatisfaction among the potentially influential urban middle and lower classes by:

a. Continuing to encourage the adoption by the Iranian Government of reforms in the financial, judicial and administrative fields, with the objective of improving governmental efficiency and of giving the people greater confidence in the integrity and effectiveness of Iranian officialdom.

b. Encouraging the careful and gradual introduction of political and social reforms that will make the democratic forms in Iran more of a reality.

c. Seeking to increase the participation of intellectuals and students in Western oriented activities.

d. Strengthening U.S. cultural, educational and information programs.

29. Support Iranian approaches to the IBRD for long-term development financing consistent with a sound Iranian development program.

30. Recognize the strength of Iranian nationalist feeling, try to direct it into constructive channels and be ready to exploit any opportunity to do so, bearing in mind the desirability of strengthening in Iran the ability and desire of the Iranian people to resist Communist pressure.

[Here follow a 4–page Financial Appendix and a 21–page NSC Staff Study, entitled “Certain Problems Relating to Iran,” dealing with the following problems: 1. Strategic Importance of Iran, 2. Support of Iranian Armed Forces, 3. Economic Situation in Iran, and 4. Significance of the Irano–Soviet Treaty of 1921.]

¹ Source: Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5504 Series. Top Secret.

² Attached but neither printed.

³ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

⁴ On January 13, Turkey and Iraq issued a joint communiqué indicating their intention to form a military alliance and to invite other nations to join it. On February 24, Turkey and Iraq signed at Baghdad a Pact of Mutual Cooperation, generally known as the Baghdad Pact. For text, see 233 UNTS, p. 199. The Pact was adhered to by the United Kingdom on April 5, by Pakistan on September 23, and by Iran on November 3. Regarding U.S. policy toward the Baghdad Pact, see [Documents 1](#) ff.

⁵ The following declassified footnote in the source text is attached to one of these paragraphs: “At the present time the United States has no commitment to employ U.S. forces in Iran. If it is found necessary for the United States to provide military forces in this area, implementation will require either an augmentation of United States forces or a reduction of present United States military commitments elsewhere.”

292. Letter From the Under Secretary of State (Hoover) to the Director of the Foreign Operations Administration (Stassen)¹

Washington, January 27, 1955.

DEAR MR. STASSEN: You will recall that prior to the visit of the Shah of Iran to Washington in December the future of the Iranian armed forces was the subject of considerable discussion between the Foreign Operations Administration, the Defense Department and the State Department. While there were different views expressed as to the extent of military assistance which might be rendered to Iran, it was the consensus that the most important and useful step which could and should be taken at this time was an intensive program of training designed to improve military efficiency and enhance the military capabilities of its existing forces. In the ensuing talks with the Shah we stressed this point and the Shah agreed that all efforts would be turned toward making the best use of the training offered.

As you are aware, the Department of Defense is sending a series of training teams to Iran, arriving there between January and June, which will commence training in all the major fields of military activity. In an effort to learn if the Iranians were in a position to make full use of training being offered, our agencies sent a joint telegram, No. 1236 of December 24, 1954, to Tehran² requesting this information and further inquiring if additional costs could be met from counterpart funds of the aid program now in effect. Tehran's telegram 1464 dated January 9³ replying, set forth the Country Team's view that there are several basic categories of items urgently needed to enable the Iranian army to realize fully the training advantages offered. The cost of these needs is \$4,065,000 of which approximately \$1,500,000 are requirements for local currency. The Country Team believes that these costs should not be taken from resources presently available to the Iranian Government which are badly needed for economic development and recommends that additional assistance be allotted to cover these costs.

The needs set forth are the most elementary requirements for training activities, i.e. rifle and other types of ranges, classrooms, a training aids center, small additional petroleum requirements needed to move troops

back and forth for training, clothing, and minimum provisions for shelter in the training areas. Noting the Country Team's view that it would be most unwise to meet this need by reducing economic development, I believe that it is urgently necessary to assist the Iranian Government to make provision for these elementary requirements essential to making effective use of the training being offered.

When the Shah was in Washington a month ago the United States Government on the highest levels expressed to him a willingness to assist in the program of training for the Iranian armed forces. In view of the desirability that the Shah be given some tangible evidence of our interest before his departure from this country early next month, and in view of the fact that training teams will be giving instruction very shortly, I should like to recommend that you give favorable consideration to the immediate establishment of an ad hoc committee composed of representatives from the Foreign Operations Administration, State Department, and Defense Department to explore means of providing at the earliest possible time the assistance requested by the Country Team, giving consideration to what portion of these requirements might be taken from counterpart funds without serious detriment to economic development.

I am forwarding a copy of this letter to the Department of Defense.⁴

Sincerely yours,

Herbert Hoover, Jr.⁵

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 788.5-MSP/1-2755. Secret. Drafted by Dixon and concurred in by Jernegan, Baxter, and Frechtling (in substance).

² Not printed.

³ Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 788.11/1-955) ⁴ Sent under cover of a letter from Hoover to Anderson, January 27. (*Ibid.*, 788.5-MSP/1-2755) ⁵ Printed from a copy that bears this stamped signature.

293. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Allen) to the Acting Secretary of State¹

Washington, January 31, 1955.

SUBJECT

President's Interest in Additional Military Aid for Iran

Discussion:

When the Shah of Iran was in Washington, the President, aware of the opportunity we have to build up strength in a hitherto weak country in Asia, told you that he did not want the Shah to leave this country without receiving definite evidence of our interest in assisting his country to become a stronger member of the free world community. The President indicated that he would be favorably inclined to give an additional increment of military aid to Iran this fiscal year, and an amount of \$10–\$20 million has been mentioned in this connection.² It is believed that the training program being initiated in Iran is most important and has need of further support in order for its full effectiveness to be realized.

The Shah plans to leave the United States on February 11 and will have a final conversation with senior officers of the Department of State just prior to his departure. When he was in Washington, he was told that United States Government officials would give urgent consideration to the questions he raised about further development of the Iranian armed forces. It would be, therefore, appropriate and, in our view, very useful to inform the Shah before he leaves this country that, in view of the importance we attach to improved training of Iran's armed forces, the President has directed an immediate increase in military aid to Iran for that purpose.

*Recommendation:*³

That you forward to the President the attached recommendation (Tab A) for an additional increment of military aid to Iran and suggested language (Tab B) which the White House staff might find useful in preparing a directive from the President to Defense and FOA, if he concurs in your recommendation.

[Tab A]

Draft Memorandum for the President

SUBJECT

Increased Military Aid for Iran

The Shah of Iran will complete his visit to the United States on February 11. He has gained a favorable impression from his visit, but he has continued to ask whether any decisions have been made in Washington concerning the questions he raised about possibilities of developing his armed forces. Increasing the efficiency of the Iranian army will be a crucial element in continuing and strengthening the recent movement of Iran toward Western orientation, toward developing greater potential for resistance to aggression, and toward an eventual role in Middle East defense arrangements.

All interested United States agencies agree the first problem to be met in developing strength in the Iranian military establishment is better training. The Department of Defense is sending special training teams to accomplish this purpose. A request has been made by our military and civilian representatives in Iran for \$4 million to provide the Iranians with such essential training facilities as firing ranges, training aids, field equipment and clothing to permit maneuvers. As training proceeds, the absorptive capacity and needs of the Iranian army will increase and additional equipment will be necessary to allow full advantage to be taken of our training teams.

You have expressed the wish that the Shah receive, before his departure from the United States, some tangible evidence of our earnest desire to help him and mentioned that you would be willing to consider between \$10 and \$20 million of additional military aid for this fiscal year. It is believed a supplementary program of \$15 million would achieve your purpose. This sum would directly facilitate a fuller utilization of potentialities offered by the training program which is the first requisite in Iran and, if given at this time, would have most favorable psychological and political effects.

I, therefore, recommend that you direct appropriate officers of this Government to provide approximately \$15 million as an additional increment to support our training program in Iran. The Shah could then be informed of the substance of this decision just prior to his departure from the United States when officials of the Department of State will be holding conversations with him in New York. A suggested text is attached.

[Tab B]

Draft Memorandum for the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense (Wilson), and the Director of the Foreign Operations Administration (Stassen)

SUBJECT

Additional Military Assistance for Iran

1. After a discussion with the Shah of Iran on December 13, 1954 concerning the Iranian armed forces, the President indicated his desire to give the Iranian Government some help in meeting additional costs incidental to developing more effective armed forces.
2. The President wishes the Shah to be informed before his departure on February 11 of the fact that the United States Government will provide additional assistance, and requests that the Department of State, the Department of Defense, and the Foreign Operations Administration consult together in order to

provide funds roughly in the order of \$15 million, in addition to existing military and economic assistance programs. These additional funds should be devoted principally to assist the Iranian Government to meet additional costs arising from the military training program being initiated and should be available for defense support type of requirements as well as military equipment.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 788.5–MSP/1–3155. Secret. Drafted by Baxter, Stutesman, Kitchen, and Dixon. George V. Allen became Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs on January 26.

² At this point the following marginal notation by Hoover appears: “\$10 m H”.

³ Regarding Allen’s recommendation to the Acting Secretary, see [footnote 5, *infra*](#).

294. Memorandum From the Secretary's Special Assistant for Mutual Security Affairs (Nolting) to the Acting Secretary of State¹

Washington, February 1, 1955.

With regard to the attached memorandum,² I would like to bring to your attention the following points, the first of which has to do with the substance of the proposal to grant \$15 million additional military assistance to Iran during this fiscal year, and the second having to do with procedure. I am not aware how far this matter has progressed by decision of yourself or the President.

1. The funds for this proposed purpose would come from the appropriation for military assistance. The status of funds available to Defense for this purpose on a world-wide basis is roughly as follows:

Requirements exist for approximately \$400 million for high priority end-item assistance which must be financed this year against present fund availability of approximately \$150 million (not including possible allocation of Section 121³ funds for MDAP purposes). Thus, it is evident that the filling of this Iranian requirement would be at the expense of other military assistance programs which have a higher priority in the judgment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

2. As to procedure, I would strongly urge that this proposal be cleared both with the Department of Defense and with Governor Stassen before it is sent to the White House, unless this has already been done.

Views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff relevant to this matter, dated January 7, 1955,⁴ are contained in the attached memorandum (paragraphs marked in blue).⁵

FEN

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 788.5–MSP/2–155. Top Secret.

² Reference is to the memorandum from Allen to Hoover, January 31, not attached, but printed *supra*.

³ Apparent reference to section 121 of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act, approved August 26, 1954, which authorized up to a \$700–million appropriation to be used at the President’s discretion for support of nations in Southeast Asia and the Western Pacific. For text of the MDA Act, see 68 Stat. 832.

⁴ [Document 287](#).

⁵ The source text indicates that a copy of this memorandum was sent to NEA. On February 2, in a memorandum to Hoover, Allen summarized the positions taken herein and in his memorandum to Hoover, *supra*. He added: “Unless you or the President feel strongly that we should do something substantial for the Shah, I suggest we limit our commitment now to \$4,000,000 for the training mission.” A note in Hoover’s handwriting addressed to Jernegan and attached to Allen’s memorandum of February 2 reads: “Hensel is going to get together the Defense picture and try to justify \$10 m.” (Department of State, Central Files, 788.5–MSP/2–255)

295. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of the Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs (Kitchen) to the Acting Secretary of State¹

Washington, February 2, 1955.

SUBJECT

Report [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] Regarding the Shah’s Current Attitude

An American source travelling with the Shah has reported the following [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]:²

1. The Shah inquired if his message to the President had been delivered. This refers to the oral request which he made [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] in Palm Beach that the President be informed that His Majesty would not respond to the President's invitation that the Shah submit a memorandum regarding his position and views at the conclusion of his visit. The Shah asked [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] to indicate that he still hoped to obtain further information regarding U.S. plans involving the strategic role of Iran in Middle East defense and our intentions with regard to increasing the efficiency of the Iranian Army.

2. The Shah at one point apparently made the offhand remark that he "hoped the ground would not be cut out from under certain countries in the Middle East as was now apparently happening in the Far East." [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] described this as symptomatic of a combination of uncertainty and petulance which the Shah occasionally gives vent to. He clearly continues to be uncertain about our interest in defining his military role and aiding him in accomplishing it.

3. The Shah has emphasized to [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] that what happens in the next few days as far as receiving information from us is very important, and that it will affect his actions in the immediate future.

I understand that Mr. Allen Dulles did report on the substance of paragraph (1) above at a recent meeting of the National Security Council,³ although it is not clear whether Mr. Dulles made reference to the question of submitting a memorandum.

¹ Source: Department of State, GTI Files: Lot 58 D 338, Military Aid 1955. Confidential. Also sent to Allen and Jernegan.

² In a subsequent memorandum, February 2, Kitchen informed Allen and Jernegan of a further discussion with the Shah. The only additional point of importance, Kitchen believed, was that the Shah was “deadly serious” in considering an approach to the British for military assistance. (*Ibid.*) ³
[Footnote (21 lines of text) not declassified]

296. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs (Baxter) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Allen)¹

Washington, February 4, 1955.

SUBJECT

Background Information for your Conversation with the Shah on February 7

You will see the Shah at 5:00 p.m. on February 7 in New York.² He will probably take the occasion to discuss with you his impressions of his visit to the United States and aspects of the following questions:

Tab A—Iran's Role in Middle East Defense

Tab B—Adherence to Regional Defense Arrangements

Tab C—Increase in Military Aid to Iran

The responses suggested in the attached memoranda are all based on the assumption that Iran's primary problem during the next three years is essentially one of economic development in order to improve political and social conditions. The Shah must be warned against seeking to develop a military establishment which will become an undue burden on Iran's economy or which would disrupt economic development plans in the immediate future.

[Tab A]

IRAN'S ROLE IN MIDDLE EAST DEFENSE

The Shah is anxious to know what role we would like Iran to play in Middle East defense. We are, in fact, awaiting an opinion from the Defense Department, which in turn is awaiting results from the US-UK-Turkey

military talks now in progress in London. We have avoided mentioning these talks to the Shah, although it has been indicated that following the settlement of the Suez dispute and in view of new concepts of atomic war, an overall review of our strategy in the Middle East is being conducted. Also, Defense Department officials, in their talks with the Shah, laid great stress on training exercises which can give a better basis for evaluation of Iran's military potential.

It is possible that the Shah has heard through newspaper reports of the US–UK–Turkey talks. If he should mention them, it is suggested that you deprecate the importance of these talks and emphasize that they are concerned primarily with logistical requirements.

The President told the Shah in Washington that he knew of no officer “on his staff” who did not recognize the strategic significance of Iran. He also said that we are prepared to help develop in the Iranian armed forces defensive delaying capabilities which would make a useful contribution to defense of the Zagros Mountains line. These mountains lie almost entirely within Iranian territory and are considered the first line of defense in the Middle East. The Shah has discussed with General McClure in Iran and with General Ridgway here his willingness to prepare defensive positions in the Zagros Mountains [*3 lines of source text not declassified*].

You may wish to emphasize the following points:

- 1) We want the Iranian Army to be more than a police force and are prepared to help it make a useful contribution to area defense.
- 2) We consider training to be the first step in the development of such defensive capabilities and are sending special teams for this purpose.
- 3) We recognize the strategic significance of Iran and will want to work out with the Shah, as training progresses and regional defense arrangements develop, the role his armed forces should play.

[Tab B]

ADHERENCE TO REGIONAL DEFENSE ARRANGEMENTS

The Shah and many Iranian leaders would like to participate in a regional defense arrangement backed by the West, and they will probably continue to advance the idea both for motives of prestige and as a means of securing maximum US military aid and defense support. The President told the Shah when he was in Washington that we would welcome Iran's adherence to a regional defense arrangement. The Shah has also been encouraged to respond favorably to known Iraqi desires to commence military staff talks.

This question has, however, not been discussed in detail with the Shah. He was told and Iranian Government leaders were assured that no commitments would be asked of him while he was in the United States. At the same time, he was advised not to expect to obtain, during his visit, US Government decisions on such questions as Iran's role in Middle East defense, commitment of Iran to regional defense arrangements or increase in military aid.

It is likely that the Shah, upon his return to Iran, will be willing to commence staff talks with the Iraqis. Nuri³ is known to want this, but there may be some hesitation as to who initiates such talks. It would be useful to give the Shah another nudge of encouragement in this direction before he leaves the United States.

Although we have no definite information, there have been indications that the Turks and Pakistanis might also approach the Shah, following his return, with suggestions for military staff talks or visits of high civilian officials designed to advance the proposition of joining Iran to a regional defense arrangement with Turkey, Iraq and Pakistan. In line with the President's views we would welcome such moves, and the Shah should be encouraged in this direction. There are certain considerations, however, to be borne in mind.

1) *Iranian Opinion*—Before joining regional defense arrangements, the Shah (and we too) should be confident that such a move would not encounter serious opposition within Iran. Despite the increasing enthusiasm of the controlled press and radio for joining with anti-communist nations in an open defensive agreement, it is not certain that the Iranian people or at least the articulate city group have given up their traditional fears of joining sides in big power rivalries. While it is, of course, important that firm leadership be demonstrated, it would be unwise for the Shah to take a step which would not have some degree of public confidence.

2) *Indigenous Character*—Iran's adherence to a regional defense arrangement would probably not be permanent unless the Iranians themselves are satisfied that it is to their advantage and was not prompted by foreign interests. The Iranians are traditionally suspicious of foreigners. They are aware of US support for the Turkey-Pakistan and Turkey-Iraq agreements. They know that the British have commitments to Turkey (Treaty of Mutual Assistance, 1939 and NATO), Iraq (Mutual Defense Treaty) and Pakistan (Commonwealth). The Iranians have a heritage of fear of Turkish expansion and realize that Turkish military power far outbalances their own. There are religious, racial and historical differences between the Iranians and their Moslem neighbors which would affect any formal relationship. Therefore, it is extremely important that regional defense arrangements be viewed in the area as having an essentially indigenous character.

3) *Soviet Reaction*—It is believed there will be a strong Soviet reaction to Iran's joining a regional defense arrangement, although its exact nature cannot be perceived now. It is certain that heavy pressures will be brought upon Iranian leaders to remain neutral, possibly including threats to have recourse to the Treaty of 1921.

4) *British Reaction*—The UK Government has agreed with us that Iran's military establishment should be more than a police force

and that Iran should eventually join Middle East defense arrangements. However, the British military are known to have grave suspicions [1 line of source text not declassified] concerning the dangers of overcommitting British resources for a defense of Iran. British civilian authorities suggest giving priority to Iran's economic problems, and wonder if the Shah is sufficiently determined to be relied upon to carry through a positive and somewhat dangerous foreign policy. It may be expected, therefore, that the British will not be very encouraging to the Shah when he visits London, although they will apparently not object if Iran should open staff talks with the Iraqis or if we increase our military aid to Iran.

5) *Turk–Iraq Agreement*—Although the exact text is not available, it is believed that the Turk–Iraq agreement will provide for staff talks, exchange of information, transit facilities and possibly assurances of mutual assistance in the event of attack. This agreement is better than the Turkey–Pakistan agreement, although not so strong as the Balkan Pact. It will probably be viewed as the main agreement to which Pakistan and Iran would adhere. This is another reason for encouraging the Shah to open talks with the Iraqis.

6) *US Security Guarantees*—Nuri reportedly would like to see the US and UK join in a regional defense agreement. The question of the form and extent of any US participation has not been resolved. However, the Secretary has said informally that he could envisage some type of Manila engagement for us in the “Northern Tier”, but not if it upset Arab–Israeli relationships. Should the Shah inquire about this matter, it would be necessary to reply in general terms about UN arrangements and our general interest in the area.

7) *Iranian Concern About Afghanistan*—When Mr. Hoover talked to the Shah in Washington, he asked him on two occasions what part could be played by Afghanistan in regional defense arrangements. In each instance the Shah appeared troubled and

abruptly changed the subject without answering. Subsequently, an Iranian Embassy official again raised the question of how Afghanistan might fit into the regional defense pattern. It would probably be desirable, therefore, for you in a general way to reassure the Shah that we do not expect him to await an establishment of Afghanistan's position in regional security arrangements before he goes ahead.

8) *Pakistan's Attitude*—Although the Pakistanis were not directly involved in the negotiations on the Turkey–Iraq treaty, they are known to be pleased with the course of events. They are also known to be favorably disposed toward the adherence of Iran to regional security arrangements. It can be assumed, therefore, that so long as they are kept informed they will not object to Iran's opening discussions with Iraq with the intention of joining in the Turkey–Iraq agreement.

[Tab C]

INCREASE IN MILITARY AID

The Shah knows that General McClure asked last summer for a tremendous increase in military and defense support aid in order to improve the Iranian Army and prepare defensive positions in the Zagros Mountains. The Shah constantly talks about the immense quantity of aid given to Greece and Turkey. He is also aware of the general nature of the new military program in Pakistan.

During the past year, the Shah has held generally to the line that he could not join regional defense arrangements unless he was assured that his armed forces were to be given real defensive strength. He feels there must be some balance between the forces of the partners in a defensive arrangement. He tends, however, to think in terms of comparative figures, and it is important to emphasize again on this point that training is the first requirement before his forces can absorb additional equipment.

Secretary Anderson assured the Shah when he was in Washington that we would provide support for the training program. He spoke of the 200 officers and men who are being sent to Iran, without dependents, as special training teams to work with units in the field as small as brigades. Some of these teams have already arrived, and by the end of June all six will be in operation. We have asked the field for specific recommendations as to the type and amount of support required this fiscal year in order to make full utilization of this training offered. The Country Team has replied in some detail (classrooms, firing and other training ranges, ammunition, storage places, training aids, POL and clothing necessary to allow troop maneuvers). This would require approximately \$4 million.

Major General Harkins, Deputy Army G-3, has an appointment to see the Shah on February 8 at which time he will discuss in detail the training program and what we are prepared to do.⁵ He will not, of course, mention specific figures. When you talk to the Shah, it is suggested that you inform him that, since his discussions in Washington, the US Government has proceeded to prepare itself to support the training program as required and that General Harkins will go into the details with him during his conversation.

FYI a total of \$124 million of military aid has been programmed for Iran since 1950. Roughly 70% of this has been delivered. By comparison, Turkey has received roughly a billion dollars in the same period; \$50 million has been programmed for Pakistan and \$10 million for Iraq of which very little has yet been delivered.

The question whether there will be a substantial increase in military aid for Iran next fiscal year still has not been resolved. Therefore, you will not be able to be completely responsive to the Shah's expected inquiry about increased military aid, even if he announces a willingness to join in regional defense arrangements. However, you can point to the major effort being made to train Iranian troops, and you can, of course, remind him of the President's statement that we are prepared to help develop in the Iranian armed forces defensive delaying capabilities which would make a useful contribution [to defense] of the Zagros Mountains line.

In this connection, it is interesting to note that the Shah has asked retired General Van Fleet to visit Iran soon, apparently hoping to get some benefit from his experience in training Greek and Korean troops, and possibly to serve as public evidence of the Shah's intention to move forward on military development.

¹ Source: Department of State, GTI Files: Lot 58 D 338, Military Aid—1955. Secret. Drafted by Stutesman.

² No record of this meeting has been found.

³ General Nuri Pasha al-Said, Prime Minister of Iraq.

⁵ See [infra](#).

297. Letter From the Director of the Foreign Operations Administration (Stassen) to the Under Secretary of State (Hoover)¹

Washington, February 5, 1955.

DEAR MR. HOOVER: Acting on the recommendation made to me in your letter of January 27² that an ad hoc committee be established to consider additional assistance for Iran to support training for the Iranian armed forces, staff of the Foreign Operations Administration met with representatives of the Departments of State and Defense on February 3. I understand that agreement was reached at this meeting on the following points: (a) the program requested by the Country Team, variously priced at \$3,752,000 and \$4,065,000, is a desirable initial step to support the Iranian training effort; (b) to this end the Department of Defense will provide MDAP funds in the amount of up to \$3,500,000 to finance purchases of clothing, training facilities, classrooms, and POL; (c) it is tentatively planned that of this amount, \$1,500,000 will be transferred to FOA for implementation of all items except the provision of clothing; (d) the Country Team will consider the desirability of diverting local currency generated under the current Development Assistance to provide immediately a portion of the local currency costs of the package—the dollar value of this additional assistance to be in the amount of \$272,000–\$565,000; and (e) the Shah be informed prior to his departure from the United States that the general elements of the training support program proposed by the Country Team will be assisted, although no specific dollar amounts will be mentioned.

The foregoing recommendations of the ad hoc committee were discussed by me with Mr. Nolting and representatives of the Department of Defense and the Bureau of the Budget on the afternoon of February 3 and there was unanimous agreement that these recommendations should be supported. The same meeting agreed that the source of the \$3,500,000 of dollar financing should be the \$20,500,000 of MDAP funds previously earmarked for Egypt which has been the subject of prior correspondence between the Departments of State and Defense.³ Accordingly, we stand ready to approve the programming of the additional assistance in the amount of \$3,500,000

and to authorize the United States Operations Mission in Iran to seek agreement with the Government of Iran to reprogram up to \$565,000 in rials generated from the present program for immediate support of the training operation. Sincerely yours, **Harold E. Stassen**

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 788.5–MSP/2–555. Secret.

² [Document 292](#).

³ For documentation on the earlier question of MDAP funding for Egypt, see [Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol IX, Part 2, pp. 1743 ff.](#)

298. Memorandum of a Conversation, New York, February 8, 1955¹

New York, February 8, 1955

SUBJECT

Shah's Conversation With [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*], February 8, 1955

[*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] dined with the Shah February 8 in New York. The conversation was somewhat desultory due to a pre-dinner interruption by the Queen and, later, the presence of other dinner guests. The Shah indicated he was pleased to have had a talk with Deputy Under Secretary Henderson and later with Assistant Secretary Allen and Ambassador-designate Holmes. Although little new of a substantive nature had come up in these conversations, he had been very favorably impressed by Mr. Holmes and looked forward to having him in Iran.

The Shah also mentioned his half-hour's conversation with Major General Harkins, Deputy Chief of Staff for G-3. While he had appreciated General Harkins calling on him, he had not understood entirely the objective of Harkins' mission. (The Iranians had been carefully informed General Harkins was calling at General Ridgway's request to clarify the planning underlining [*underlying*] the dispatch of the military training teams to Iran. General Harkins had also been ready to inform His Majesty that the United States was now planning to provide the essential field training facilities and supplies to get the Army training program under way and to facilitate the work of the United States Army teams. The Shah's remark to [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] may have been in the nature of a "fishing expedition" for any further information that might be available on the subject of military aid—JCK.) At one point the Shah complained that he still didn't know "where he stood" on aid. [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] then told the Shah he had not been very specific in stating what he wanted the United States Government to do. He offered the opinion the Shah should set forth in concrete terms exactly what he would like the

United States Government to do for him. [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] remarked that even in their friendly, informal conversations in Florida, His Majesty had not been explicit in saying what he personally wanted in order to carry out his general program.

The Shah's rejoinder was that what he really had in mind was budgetary aid for defense support purposes. He was facing at least three lean years before there would be any quantity of Iranian funds available for him to use in increasing the efficiency of his forces. He wanted to increase pay and allowances in order to attract better quality junior officers, and to give his troops decent food and quarters. This was important for morale, and to make training effective. He had no definite figures available but he thought "not a great deal of money" was involved as far as the United States was concerned. He estimated that approximately \$20 million a year for three years would do the job. This, of course, would be in addition to the military end-item assistance required to equip and arm his forces as they were trained.

[*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] said that while any discussion in this field was outside his competence, he urged the Shah to make these specific views known to the United States Government. The Shah said that he preferred to do so after his return to Iran and would plan to place his ideas before Ambassador Holmes after the latter's arrival.

[*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] said the Shah gave him the impression that he had thoroughly enjoyed his visit and was leaving this country with a feeling of understanding and accomplishment.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 788.1½-955. Secret. Drafted by Kitchen on February 9.

299. Memorandum for the Record by the Under Secretary of State (Hoover)¹

Washington, February 26, 1955.

I was advised this morning by Mr. Eakens that the American Independent Oil Company had failed to provide Price Waterhouse with a satisfactory statement of financial resources in order to qualify for participation in the Iranian oil consortium,² and they were therefore advising the American companies that it was not eligible to participate. I understand that American Independent has formally written to the State Department demanding that they be allowed to participate notwithstanding their failure to meet the standards set by Price Waterhouse.³

I telephoned to Mr. George Koegler, of Standard Oil of New Jersey, at Noon today and made two points clear:

- (1) That any decision to exclude American Independent was one which would have to be made, and for which full responsibility must be taken, by the existing American members in the consortium, and that the Department of State had no responsibility for such a decision.
- (2) It was the informal suggestion of the Department that notwithstanding this preliminary decision by the consortium, nevertheless, American Independent should be allowed to take part in the present negotiations on condition that satisfactory financial responsibility be established prior to any actual admission as a participant.

Mr. Koegler said he appreciated all of these considerations. Having in mind that the sole responsibility devolved upon the American companies, they felt that they could not admit American Independent because of that company's failure to satisfy Price Waterhouse. He would bear in mind the

suggestion that we had made and would present it to the other companies on Monday, February 28. If there was any change in the decision, he would advise the Department immediately.

H

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 888.2553/2–2655. Confidential.

² The five American companies participating in the Iranian Oil Consortium, Gulf, Socony–Vacuum, Standard (New Jersey), Standard of California, and Texas Company, were prevailed upon to allow other American companies to participate in their share of the Consortium. The total participation, according to the Participants Agreement, October 25, 1954, of these additional American companies could amount to 5 percent of the Consortium. There was a time limitation on any such transfer of 6 months from the date of effective agreement between the Government of Iran and the Consortium, October 29, 1954.

At the insistence of the Department of Justice, a common agent was designated to examine the applicants' financial data and to determine if they had adequate financial responsibility to join the Consortium. The commercial accounting firm of Price Waterhouse and Company was chosen. The procedure was fully outlined in a Department of State press release on December 7, 1954. Any established American oil company interested could file an application with supporting financial data with Price Waterhouse. If the applicant was found to possess the required financial responsibility, the Department of State would assist in obtaining determination of Iran's approval of the company's participation in the Consortium.

For text of the press release, December 7, see Department of State *Bulletin*, December 27, 1954, pp. 985–986. For text of the Participants Agreement, October 25, 1954, and related documentation, see U.S. Congress, Senate, Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations of the Committee on Foreign Relations, *The International Petroleum Cartel, the Iranian Consortium and*

U.S. National Security, Committee Print, 93d Cong., 2d sess., 1974, p. 95 and passim.

³ Dated February 16, not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 888.2553/ 2-1655)

300. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Allen) to the Acting Secretary of State¹

Washington, March 3, 1955.

SUBJECT

Five Percent Participation in the Iranian Oil Consortium

I have talked with Mr. Phleger on this subject. Two questions are involved at the moment:

1. Should American Independent Oil Company be ruled out at this stage?
2. Should State call a meeting to hand out the documents to the eleven companies which have been certified and accepted by Iran?²

Mr. Phleger sees no legal question involved and feels that the problem is therefore not his direct concern. However, from a policy point of view he does not think State should take any responsibility for ruling out American Independent and he doubts the advisability of State's calling a meeting unless we have undertaken a commitment we cannot avoid.

I have a good deal of sympathy for Mr. Phleger's point of view and have looked at the question from every angle I can think of to find some way of adopting it, but I cannot find a way out. Mr. Waugh feels as I do.

We have not and are not ruling out American Independent. The five majors have done so, even after you telephoned Mr. Koegler suggesting informally that American Independent should be allowed to take part in present negotiations. Price Waterhouse has completed its task and the case seems to be closed. Hence the attached draft telegram to Ickes. I suggest that it go out in Mr. Jernegan's name since the incoming letter was addressed to Jernegan and a reply by Jernegan would be somewhat less "institutionalized" although at the same time official.

As regards the meeting, I would much prefer that the five majors get the independents together. However, I understand that the majors flatly refuse to do so. Mr. Koegler has sent us 67 pounds of documents, which arrived today, to hand or send out to the independents. Moreover, I'm told that the Department has already agreed to assume the responsibility for getting the independents together and I'm afraid it is too late to change the procedure now.

Instead of calling a meeting, we could simply mail the documents to the eleven independents. However, I'm not certain what would happen next. No one would assume the initiative for getting them together. We would be deluged by inquiries from each of them separately. I view the meeting primarily as a procedural convenience. Time is pressing. I hope you will approve the meeting and will indicate who should assume responsibility for it. I am not anxious for the job. It lies more in Sam Waugh's field. However, NEA has perhaps a greater continuing interest in seeing the matter through. If NEA is tagged to do it, I shall of course lean heavily on Mr. Waugh and his Petroleum Division.

Recommendations:

- 1) That you approve the attached telegram (Tab A) to the American Independent Oil Company stating that the Department is not in a position to intervene to change the Price Waterhouse decision.³
- 2) That you approve the convening of a meeting of representatives of the eleven approved companies by the

Department⁴ as soon as feasible in order that they may be given the documents provided by the companies.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 888.2553/3–355. Official Use Only. Drafted by Allen and concurred in by Willis C. Armstrong and Eakens.

² The 11 independent oil companies were Anderson–Prichard Oil Corporation, The Atlantic Refining Company, Cities Service Company, Hancock Oil Company, Pacific Western Oil Corporation, Richfield Oil Corporation, San Jacinto Petroleum Corporation, Signal Oil & Gas Company, Sinclair Oil Corporation, Standard Oil Company (Ohio), and Tide Water Associated Oil Company. According to a February 28 letter from Iran’s Minister of Finance Amini, text of which was transmitted to the Department in telegram 1803 from Tehran, February 28, the Government of Iran had no objection in principle to the 11 companies joining the Consortium. (*Ibid.*, 888.2553/2–2855) ³ A telegram to this effect was sent to Raymond Ickes, Vice President of American Independent Oil Company, on March 4. (*Ibid.*, 888.2553/3–455) ⁴ The minutes of a meeting between Department of State officials and representatives of the 11 independent oil companies, March 8, is *ibid.*, 888.2553/3–855.

301. Paper Prepared by R. Bernard Crowl of the Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs¹

Washington, March 18, 1955.

SUMMARY OF TEHRAN'S TELEGRAM 1905 OF MARCH 17²

The country team, composed of the Embassy, USOM/I and MAAG express serious concern and request Washington review of the proposed 1956 aid request, which reduces the total for Iran to slightly more than half of the field's original recommendation.

Included in the arguments for increased aid are the following quotations:

1. "In our judgment would be unwise at this stage developments to reduce aid below minimum level sufficient attain US security objectives Iran, provide essential financial support to Shah and his government, and continue technical cooperation program that has established firm basis for economic progress Iran."
2. "US influence still in ascending phase. A momentum exists that coincides US interests. Would be costly error however to overestimate this momentum and to assume both continued political stability and foreign policy developments increasingly favorable to US viewpoint in disregard of Soviet pressures if need and expectations US aid so severely disappointed as to create serious economic and financial problems and impair confidence in continuity US interest in Iran."
3. "Order of magnitude US aid needed by Iran not large in terms of what is at stake. Nor is period long in which budgetary support and other substantial financial aid estimated as necessary. But consequences of failure to extend adequate aid in this transitional period could be painfully severe both for Iran and for West, inasmuch as political balance Iran delicate, stakes high, and

Soviets ready to aggravate any deterioration our position this area.”

As indicated in the attached table,³ an additional \$12.1 million is requested for FY 1956 (\$4.5 million for technical assistance and \$7.6 million for defense support funds). This request assumes that an additional \$9.5 million of direct forces aid, recently requested, will be forthcoming. (Washington has not yet replied to this \$9.5 million request.) On the basis of estimates regarding rial and foreign exchange receipts and expenditures, if U.S. aid in the amounts requested is forthcoming, the Bank Melli's holdings would increase by about \$15 million. Against this increase, a requirement of about \$18 million to permit a note [*net*] increase of 1.5 billion rials, is described.

¹ Source: Department of State, GTI Files: Lot 58 D 338, Military Aid—1955. Secret.

² Not printed. (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 788.5–MSP/3–1755) ³ Not printed.

302. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State¹

Tehran, March 23, 1955—6 p.m.

1948. This is joint Embassy, USOM/I, MAAG message. Following condensed text revised narrative program justification for Iran pouched March 22 as enclosure 3 of Tousfo A-1733² (pouch No. 2352) copy to GTI (pouch No. 2353). This narrative is part of material requested Usfoto 1262.³ Aid levels used correspond tentatively to country team recommendations contained Embtel 1905,⁴ adjustments as result further FOA/W guidance to be supplied by telegram.

Introductory.

Iran key country ME. Long vulnerable border Soviet Union. Independent Iran stands between Soviet Union and Persian Gulf area, which long object Soviet ambitions. Iran economic social progress limited. Political structure brittle and vulnerable.

Serious crises recent years both economic and political. Degree political stability now achieved. Attainment 1957 of level income from petroleum when petroleum production and refinement reach maximum output will give Iran position considerably greater financial strength than previously. However, economic strength Iran strictly limited even with revenues from petroleum. Real economic strength will depend on effective application financial resources including external aid to economic development virtually all areas economic activity appropriate Iran, which essential to establish and maintain minimum basis economic viability, political stability and defense posture adequate to circumstances country. Iran still in transitional stage, with recent gains financial strength and political stability yet to be fully consolidated, Iran foreign policy yet to be fully formulated, and Iran future still in delicate balance.

View existing international tensions, evolution domestic situation and foreign policy of Shah and Government will in this transitional stage be

influenced by evidences depth and continuity US interest in security and welfare Iran. This interest expressed partly through specific policies and aid measures designed support efforts Iran Government lay foundations enduring internal security and political stability, develop limited defense capability and establish technical and other bases prolong economic progress in response aroused aspirations people.

Order magnitude US aid Iran not large relative to risks to US and West from any failure Shah and Government obtain minimum external aid necessary to cope with political, security and financing problems with which they now confronted. Future might exact high price for small economy in allocation aid from [for] Iran if required margin safety underestimated.

US aid programs have contributed to atmosphere Iran conducive understanding of constructive aims and objectives US and West. Tendency now exists for Iran associate self more fully and openly these aims and objectives despite Soviet pressures. Tendency however could be checked by severe disappointment in amounts aid received if they below minimum required by Government Iran to manage problems giving rise need external aid. Such disappointment could arouse doubts Iran leaders as to nature, extent, or stability US interest in Iran, and give rise serious economic and political problems.

Scope US aid.

Aid Iran has taken these forms:

- (1) Technical cooperation and economic development combined in one technical cooperation program.
- (2) Emergency budgetary support.
- (3) Military end-item and training aid to Iran Forces including gendarmérie. This form aid outside purview this presentation, but bears important relation to proposed defense support.

Proposed extend in FY 1956 defense support aid including direct forces support, budgetary support, and economic aid for improvement port and

highway facilities, no further creation of better defense posture taking account political, economic and military interrelationships.

Economic programs past FYs.

Introductory.

Serious obstacle to attainment US economic objectives Iran lay in fact that Iran Government after oil nationalization 1951 was obliged liquidate foreign exchange reserves and resort deficit financing and printing press.

Obstacle to attainment economic stability Iran has been dearth foreign exchange and balance payments difficulties since 1952, causing shortage essential imported commodities. These shortages contributed inflation and increasing stagnation country's economic life. Also compelled government postpone economic development projects and retarded increases agricultural and industrial production.

Although Iran cost living index has reached highest point since 1936 and is higher than during World War II government has had to put off pay raises government employees, minimize expenditures needed to improve lot of poorly fed and housed and extremely low paid troops and gendarmes, and postpone essential development projects that would also give work to some of millions unemployed and under-employed throughout country. Government income from oil not expected reach level FY 1956 permitting government meet these added costs.

Budgetary support.

Budgetary financial support begun FY 1954 gave Iran economy badly needed imports and generated local currency to help meet Zahedi government operating expenses. US economic aid made contribution to strengthen Zahedi regime at time when its margin strength narrow, made it easier for Iran Government to resume relations with UK and helped oil settlement. Budgetary support has helped retard inflation, restored confidence in rial, effected reduction number unemployed by enabling resumption work on unfinished public works type projects and initiation under joint US-Iran emergency aid program of number urgent construction

and demonstration projects, and made possible Iran Government grant small badly needed additional temporary compensation to low paid members Armed Forces including gendarmerie. US aid has strengthened economic base which should make it easier for Iran intensify defense effort and reactivate economic development plan when oil revenue again substantial.

Technical cooperation.

Contributing to fundamental objective strengthening Iran economic base and ensuring social stability, technical cooperation activities have considerably improved living conditions. Malaria, for example is no longer country's number one health problem. In 3 years it should be virtually wiped out. Serious epidemics contagious diseases now much less frequent owing operations Iran-US Public Health cooperation which, in effect, has become department in structure Ministry Health.

Many farm families today enjoy larger return from labor and bigger food supplies as result of technical cooperation that introduced seed giving higher yields, improved Iran cattle and chickens through crossbreeding, and demonstrated value more economic methods irrigating and growing crops.

Other technical cooperation projects have given thousands Iran teachers first training in methods American specialists such fields education as agriculture, home-making, vocational skills. Modern textbooks based US models being put in most elementary schools. US Government techniques and administrative practices have been introduced Tehran University through creation of Institute Administrative Affairs and into real government ministries, including Ministry Finance and Plan Organization. Ministry Labor has been helped to develop modernized employment service and apprentice system, and introduce safety programs. Factories have been assisted in raising production levels, improving personnel practices, and providing better working conditions.

Iran Government direct contribution to technical cooperation has risen from initial cash 20 million to 180 million rials FY 1955, with additional

contributions to projects in cash and kind that in FY 1956 are estimated at 600 million or more.

Proposed technical cooperation FY 1956.

Great importance attached to maintenance of effectiveness existing projects in health, education and agriculture in order foster and develop Iran human and other resources and lay foundation for orderly progress Iran economy and society. Iran Government progressively assuming full administrative responsibility for anti-malaria operations, administration health clinics, agricultural extension work, operation livestock breeding, poultry hatching and plant improvement stations, and all educational programs. In FY 1956 further steps planned institutionalize projects, when Iran Government expected assume greater financial responsibilities.

Increased technical aid will be extended in public administration to create sound base for needed improvement in government performance. Assistance to Plan Organization in fields industrial management and industrial engineering will be expanded to assist that agency in returning many plants to private ownership. Ministry Finance will be further aided in development orderly budgeting and tax collection.

Increased technical aid will be given Ministry Labor in providing country-wide services to mobilize labor resources for economic development. Greater emphasis will be given urban programs, including low cost housing, improvement law and order, and encouragement youth activities to combat Communism.

Important programs now being launched by Iran Government. Proposed to furnish aid in effecting these reforms to provide firm basis for political stability and development. Part of aid would be grant under land distribution program for credit to new peasant proprietors essential to their use of land, and to insure that Iran Government undertakes program on sufficient scale for dramatic impact.

Estimated technical cooperation program FY 1956 provides dollars million 4.7 for US technicians, 2.6 for contract personnel, 0.5 for participants, 1.1 for commodities for project demonstrations, 4.6 for other costs, totalling 13.5, and additional 1.0 rural credit for land distribution, making 14.5 total.

Defense.

Introductory.

Iran occupies important strategic position with key relation to defense ME. If by any means Iran should fall within Communist orbit, consequences would be extremely serious for West.

US defense objectives in relation Iran take account developments along two lines. First, individual [*internal?*] security in form of capacity deal effectively internal subversion, and limited defense capability against possible Soviet invasion. Second, full association Iran with aims and objectives US and West. Second includes possible adherence Iran to ME regional security pact such as Turkey has with Pakistan and Iraq. However, while US looks with favor on such Iran adherence decision is one Iran Government should make without outside pressure.

Trend Iran opinion is in favor Iran aligning self fully with free world in opposition expansive Communism. Psychological momentum exists that coincides US and Western interest. If no contrary developments, and if situation satisfies minimum conditions Iran Government, Iran may adhere security pact with such countries as Turkey, Pakistan and Iraq.

Iran decision re adherence security pact will be influenced by Iran capacity contribute to collective defense and by Iran strength relative that of other participants. Both these factors in turn influenced by US aid policy for Iran.

Not simple matter for Iran disregard Soviet pressures to dissuade it from alignment Western or ME defense. In order to make bold pro-West decisions, Shah and government must have mutual confidence, solidarity, and adequate degree popular support. This intangible fabric of government

depends on strength of Shah, who exerts decisive influence in foreign policy decisions, and on degree confidence Shah and supporters have that they can rely on constant US backing. Strength of Shah himself depends partly on this factor. US backing extends beyond defense realm into economic and technical cooperation which have important bearing on popular contentment and political ability.

Re Iranian individual defense capability, establishment of substantial degree internal security has been attained and basis is being laid for development limited defense capability against possible Soviet aggression. To this end, expanded US military aid and training program has been proposed and certain approved segments are being implemented. Required defense aid falls into two parts: Military end-item and training aid, administered by Department Defense; and defense support aid which subdivides into direct forces support and other defense support. First subdivision covers projects exclusively or primarily of military utility. Second includes budgetary support, civilian road construction, and other aid primarily civilian in character but contributing also to defense posture of country.

Direct forces support.

This closely complements military end-item and training aid. Each depends on other.

To make best use Iran defense capabilities in event Soviet invasion in force, it would be necessary for Iran forces to occupy different positions and have their supplies and equipment in different locations from present ones. [8 lines of source text not declassified] Military roads of limited immediate economic value should be built or repaired to permit lateral communications between units of armed forces in new on-site defense positions. Tactical jet airwing should be stationed with adequate facilities at suitable point some distance to southwest of Tehran, and facilities required to make forces effective in new positions should be constructed.

Direct forces support proposed this purpose includes \$9.5 million requested as supplemental allocation fiscal year 1955 funds, and \$25.0 million proposed as total direct forces support Iran fiscal year 1956. The \$25.0 million includes \$9.1 million for barracks.

Other Defense Support.

Economic and financial affairs continue furnish some primary domestic problems. Economic policies and programs adopted or encouraged by government have profound effect on internal financial and fiscal situation, foreign exchange needs and reserves, tendency to inflation of domestic price level, and requirement for commodity imports to offset inflationary tendencies.

Estimated that budgetary deficit approaching \$60 million will occur Iran fiscal year ending 22 March 1956. This takes account of increase in budget Iranian Armed Forces to 5.5 billion rials, compared with present annual 3.8 billion; transfer of most development expenses from government to Plan Organization budget; and subsidy by Ministry Finance to offset losses of certain government commodity agencies. It does not, however, take account any significant increases in pay of civilian government employees. Estimated fiscal year 1956 deficit includes some uncovered accrued liabilities from previous year.

Estimated that about \$225 million of commodity imports on private conversion by consortium to finance local costs its operations. Requirement indicated for foreign exchange of \$55 million from other sources to make total \$225 [275] million.

No net increase domestic production likely to reduce significantly country's need imports. In fact, agricultural crops may suffer seriously as result anticipated water shortage.

Taking account all information now available, including budgetary deficit about \$60 million and estimated foreign exchange deficiency about 55 [it is] believed US interests would be well served by allocation defense support funds to meet these requirements. Under loan agreement with US Government 30 made available FOA FY 55 appropriations will be applied against part of the government budgetary and balance of payments deficits. In addition to this amount, it is recommended that \$27.6 million (25.0 for budgetary and balance payment support and 2.6 for defense support

projects) be made available out of FY 56 defense support funds. Believed that by January 1956 oil revenues will reach level at which possible for some oil revenues to be diverted from politically important program of economic development to support of government budget. This would require Parliamentary approval of amendment to law relating Plan Organization. If Government Iran can show substantial economic progress during first two years following oil settlement, government will probably be strong enough to obtain approval of amendment.

Aside from the \$25.0 million for budgetary and balance of payments support, US defense support funds for FY 56 needed is sum 2.6 of which 1.2 for high priority projects in field port improvement, 1.1 in field transportation, and 0.3 for immediate improvements in radio needed to support economic development and service direct forces support program. Transportation project provides for extension highway maintenance stations and services token areas where this activity would help direct forces support program. Improvement port facilities would meet critical need in weak sector Iran economy. Expansion radio facilities has high US priority and political and strategic importance.

Budgetary support funds will be used to support some of technical cooperation projects now conducted in cooperation with interested Ministries. Cost of essential increase in pay and allowances of armed forces, including increase in pay and in certain other costs of gendarmérie, which may total \$11.0 million, will also be met this way.

Clear that Government Iran not yet in position to finance budgetary deficit from [garble] sources, and that cut back in government expenditures to reduce deficit would have undesirable high impact on some essential programs Iran Government has undertaken with encouragement US. These programs contribute to attainment US policy objectives [garble].

Loan and grant relationship.

Foregoing sums recommended as aid to Iran for FY 56 amount to sum of \$67.1 million and consist of 14.5 technical aid, 27.6 budgetary and project support, and 25.0 direct forces support. Amount of 67.1 for FY 56

compares with 140.3 for FY 55, latter including a recommendation of 9.5 to permit early initiation of direct forces support program.

Proposed division of recommended sum of \$67.1 million is 25.0 loans and 42.1 grants. Loan portion is composed of aid for budgetary and balance of payments support. Grant portion consists of 14.5 technical aid, 2.6 for projects related to direct forces support, and 25.0 for direct forces support. Once Iran oil revenues resumed at level planned for 1957, believed Iran capacity repay will be sufficient to ensure servicing interest and principal on its foreign obligations.

Rountree

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 788.5–MSP/3–2355. Secret. Passed to FOA, Treasury, and Defense.

² Not printed. (Washington National Records Center, FOA Files: FRC 56 A 632, Box 137, Tehran) ³ Not printed. (*Ibid.*, Box 112, Tehran) ⁴ See [supra](#).

**303. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State,
Washington, March 30, 1955¹**

Washington, March 30, 1955

SUBJECT

Report and Request for Advice by Twelve Additional Companies
Certified for Participation in Iranian Oil Consortium

PARTICIPANTS

Mr. George H. Hill Jr., Director, Cities Service Company

Mr. Dwight T. Colley , Vice President, Atlantic Refining
Company

Mr. Warner W. Gardner, Attorney, American Independent Oil
Company

Mr. Carroll Bennett, Attorney, Signal Oil and Gas Company

Mr. Herbert Hoover, Jr., Under Secretary of State

Mr. Robert Eakens—FSD

Mr. Hill opened the meeting by expressing his appreciation to the Under Secretary for the fact that through his efforts the five per cent interest in the Iranian Oil Consortium was made available to additional American oil companies. [At the first meeting of the twelve companies² certified by Price Waterhouse and approved by the Iranian Government Mr. Hill was elected chairman of the group. He has since been serving in this capacity in the efforts of the group to distribute among themselves the ownership of the five per cent interest available in the Iranian Oil Consortium.]³

The Under Secretary replied that the surprising thing was that it was possible for the five per cent to be made available. While the five American

consortium companies were willing for some participation to be made available to other American oil companies and might have been willing for the participation to have been larger, it was only with great difficulty that Sir William Fraser⁴ had been persuaded to permit additional American oil companies to acquire even five percent. He also said that there was no practicable possibility of increasing the five per cent interest now available.

Mr. Hill then proceeded to outline and to present to the Under Secretary the problem of the twelve companies. He said that in leaving it up to the twelve companies to decide on the distribution of the five per cent interest available, the Department had put the companies in a very difficult spot. While the companies have discussed a number of other problems in the course of their meetings, their main problem is how to divide the five per cent interest.

There are two viewpoints. The five companies who were certified by Price Waterhouse as being qualified for a five per cent interest⁵ believe that the division of the available five per cent interest should be proportionate to the amounts for which the companies applied and were certified. The seven companies who were approved for amounts varying between one and three per cent believe that the division should be [made] equally among all twelve companies. The companies had not been able to resolve these different views and Mr. Hill left the impression that there was no hope that they would be able to do so without assistance. What they had been able to agree on, and this agreement was unanimous, was to seek the advice of the Under Secretary on this issue. All had agreed that they would abide by the Under Secretary's advice without question or protest as indicated in the letter attached as Tab A.⁶

In reply the Under Secretary stated that the problem of the twelve companies seemed to him to be in large measure parallel to that of the larger companies who had decided among themselves to divide the 40 per cent available to them equally. He said that he would hesitate to express any view on the question presented because he did not know whether it would be possible for him in giving such advice to separate himself from his

official position. This was a point on which he would need to consult the Department's Legal Adviser.

Mr. Hill then discussed the arguments of the group in favor of a proportional division of the five per cent along the lines set forth in Tab B.⁷

Following Mr. Hill's presentation, Mr. Colley spoke, along the lines set forth in Tab C,⁷ for the seven companies in favor of an equal division.

The Under Secretary commented that he had no idea that so many companies would be interested. He had thought that only two or three might possibly be interested and was surprised that all twelve of the companies seemed to want to stay in.

The Under Secretary then inquired whether the question of who owns whom had been set aside. Mr. Hill said that as chairman he had taken the position that it was not appropriate for the group to question the qualifications of any one of the twelve companies who had been certified by Price Waterhouse and approved by the Iranian Government. He also said that he had discussed this point with Mr. Armstrong. [Mr. Armstrong's memorandum of March 17, 1955 to Mr. Allen⁸ indicates that Mr. Hill sought the Department's view on this general question in connection with the qualifications of American Independent. Mr. Armstrong informed Mr. Hill that insofar as the Department was concerned there were two criteria, namely certification by Price Waterhouse and approval by the Iranian Government, and American Independent had met both.]⁹

Mr. Gardner said the miracle was that American Independent had signed the letter agreeing to seek the Under Secretary's advice and to abide by it.

Both Mr. Hill and Mr. Colley considered that because of his special position in the settlement of the Iranian oil problem and his wider knowledge of all of its aspects and ramifications than possessed by anyone else, the Under Secretary was in a unique position to give advice on the issue presented to him. The Under Secretary did not think, however, that arbitration of the issue was very closely related to any special knowledge which he might

have. Mr. Hill suggested that the Under Secretary not look at the problem as being one for arbitration but rather as a matter on which the companies were seeking his personal advice. They would be pleased to accept his advice on any basis that he was able to give it, however informal the basis might be.

The Under Secretary inquired whether the companies would accept his suggestion of a fair and impartial individual to arbitrate the issue. Both Mr. Hill and Mr. Colley indicated that they would be glad to have the Under Secretary's recommendation but both made it clear that they did not believe anyone other than the Under Secretary would be acceptable to both groups. They emphasized that in their opinion the Under Secretary was the only person whose advice in the matter would be taken without question.

There was then some discussion of the manner in which the twelve companies would be organized and the obligations the group would be required to assume. The Under Secretary pointed out that the five per cent interest would have to be held by a wholly owned American corporation, mentioning among the other reasons that Iran has strong feelings on this point.

The Under Secretary said that he would consider the matter and the meeting adjourned.

About an hour later the Under Secretary invited the group to discuss the matter further with him. He said that he had discussed it with several individuals in the Department and that he had in draft a memorandum which he wished to read to the group. A copy is attached as Tab D.¹⁰ When the group agreed that the memorandum set forth the Under Secretary's advice in satisfactory form, the Under Secretary had the memorandum typed in final form and signed a copy and gave it to Mr. Hill.

The group expressed their deep appreciation for the attention which the Under Secretary had given to the matter and for his willingness to comply with their request for his advice. They indicated that they could now proceed to organize and to begin negotiations with the five present

American consortium companies for the transfer of the five per cent interest to their group.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 888.2553/3–3055. Official Use Only. Drafted by Eakens on April 4 and approved by Hoover.

² On March 11, a representative of American Independent Oil Company submitted a letter from the Bank of America National Savings and Trust Association of San Francisco indicating that the bank had made financial arrangements with American Independent which would enable that firm to qualify as an established company with sufficient financial responsibility to participate in the Consortium. Price Waterhouse then formally certified American Independent by means of a letter to Hoover, March 14. (Memorandum from Allen to Hoover, March 14, with attached letter from Price Waterhouse to Hoover, March 14, and letter from Price Waterhouse to American Independent Oil Company; *ibid.*, 888.2553/3–1455) ³ Brackets in the source text.

⁴ Chairman of the Board of the Anglo–Iranian Oil Company (AIOC).

⁵ American Independent Oil Company, Cities Service Company, Pacific Western Oil Corporation, Richfield Oil Corporation, and Tide Water Associated Oil Company.

⁶ Not attached.

⁷ Attached but not printed.

⁷ Attached but not printed.

⁸ Not found in Department of State files.

⁹ Brackets in the source text.

¹⁰ Not printed.

304. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State¹

Tehran, April 8, 1955—7 p.m.

2048. Following is Embassy's present analysis reasons for current Government change,² reactions to it, and prospects of new government:

1. Decision to remove Zahedi, timing of this decision, and choice of Ala have all been Shah's own. Believe Shah motivated primarily by desire effect social and economic reforms and development program along lines he had proclaimed both in US and to Senators and Deputies prior his departure and immediately after his return and which he believes people are counting on. He had reached conclusion Zahedi and most his Cabinet not sufficiently capable this field or so enthused over such plan as to make prompt beginning demanded by Shah. Factors counting against Zahedi in this context were his opposition to plan director Ebtehaj and his devotion to certain cronies among Ministers who were neither particularly effective nor interested in Shah's program. Moreover, Shah had come to regard Zahedi Government's reputation for corruption as real liability. Embassy believes that fear of strong Prime Minister long attributed to Shah did not play significant role in decision oust Zahedi, especially since popular regard for Prime Minister if anything on decrease and Zahedi was making no moves to enhance his personal power.

2. Popular attitude toward change is as yet difficult to judge. First factor to be noted is perfect calm with which change is taking place. There have been no demonstrations for Zahedi, who apparently believes his own return to power in not too distant future will be necessary for welfare Iran and has conducted himself in loyal and dignified manner at departure. Newspapers are commenting very carefully, generally praising Zahedi in broad terms for past accomplishments but leaving clear implication that new team may be better for new tasks. To some extent, calm

reflects lack of popular enthusiasm for Zahedi, cynical indifference of many to membership of any government, and wait-and-see attitude as to what improvements new government will actually bring about. Few if any, take ill health as imperative reason for Prime Minister's departure, especially in view imminent trip of Ala to undergo operation.

3. Parliamentary attitude promises to be one of acceptance Ala Government, with no marked enthusiasm. Some Deputies of course still loyal to Zahedi and may not vote confidence in Ala, but they not expected to create real difficulties at this time. Coupled with lack of enthusiasm for Ala Government there has been some resentment among Deputies and Senators at manner of change-over, which is taking place during Parliament recess and thus without chance for organized Parliament expression of opinion. Ala has however been in constant touch with President of Majlis and through him with heads of factions, and President Hekmat expects no troubles over vote of confidence, which is to take place April 10. Postponement of presentation of Cabinet to Senate may reflect greater opposition in that body which contains number of would-be Prime Ministers, but it very unlikely that Senate would fail give overwhelming vote of confidence to Shah's choice.

4. No significant change in direction of either foreign or domestic policy is to be anticipated; Ala informed us he intended emphasize this point when he appears before Majlis. New Government might in itself be inclined to go slow on association with neighbors on defense matters, but pace of developments particularly in this respect will depend on Shah. Presumably emphasis in immediate future will be put on anti-corruption program and economic development, with some effort to bring down cost of living and gesture in direction social reform. Concrete proposals for action may, however, not emerge even from Ala's speech when he presents Government to Majlis. Prospect for reforms suggested more by reputation for honesty of members new Government than by shift in Government

composition to give important places to intelligentsia or progressives from other than old ruling class, which some claim to be Shah's long-term intent. Furthermore, Parliament not itself inclined toward reform and has great power kill Government efforts through delaying tactics. Although Ala and Alam, now Minister of Interior, far less strong personalities than Zahedi, change need not affect vigor of anti-Tudeh campaign since this inspired by Shah and conducted largely through military, and Ministry of War and Military Governor of Tehran unchanged.

5. Expect composition of new Government gives generally favorable impression. Three most important hold-overs from Zahedi Government (Foreign Minister, Minister Finance, and Minister War) were soundest and most capable on Zahedi team. New men in other Ministries, especially those in economic field, promise in each case to be as good as or better than predecessor. Furthermore, qualified Iranians consider proposed Government as a whole more homogeneous and capable of relatively effective team work. (Remains to be seen whether team work will include Ebtehaj, who remains as Plan Organization director.) Detailed comments on Cabinet by despatch when membership official.

6. Weakness of new Government, as reported Embassy telegram 2031³ is that Prime Minister unable start Government off and in fact is unlikely to provide strong leadership even when he returns. As President Majlis put it, Ala is "moon that shines only by reflection of light from sun, the Shah." There is of course possibility that Shah will, after decent interval, accept resignation Ala and appoint another Prime Minister, and anticipation that development on part many is itself weakening factor. But Shah may decide keep Ala and exert increased direct influence on Governmental policies and actions. Under such circumstances, progress along commendable lines of Shah's announced desires for country would be subject his tendency to listen to too many advisers, vacillate, and indulge whims. Furthermore, as Shah takes more active role in politics he will be unable avoid blame as well as take credit for developments. Therefore, while Embassy

believes Ala Government best solution in present circumstances given Shah's determination oust Zahedi, it considers it likely best interests will be served if Shah at first suitable opportunity should elevate Deputy Prime Minister (either Amini or Entezam) to be head of Government.

Rountree

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 788.00/4-855. Confidential. Repeated to London, Meshed, Isfahan, and Tabriz.

² The Ala Cabinet was presented to the Majlis on April 10 and the Senate on the following day and was approved by the Majlis and Senate on April 17 and 18, respectively. But as of April 11, Cabinet Ministers had begun functioning informally as heads of their Departments. (Telegram 2053 from Tehran, April 10, and despatch 458 from Tehran, April 15; *ibid.*, 788.00/4-1055 and 788.13/4-1555) ³ Dated April 6, not printed. (*Ibid.*, 788.00/4-655)

305. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State¹

Tehran, April 11, 1955—7 p.m.

2062. Ala told me early April Shah concerned about question US military aid and would ask me soon to discuss this and other questions. At Shah's request I had audience today. Following summarizes main points of conversation.

1. Shah said with governmental change Iran now ready embark upon programs which promised great success all fields. Communists already virtually eliminated and remnants would be ruthlessly wiped out; new Cabinet would carry out vigorous anti-corruption program which he confident would provide integrity and efficiency in government operations; Economic Minister and Ebtehaj would get development rolling as quickly as possible with help foreign technical advisers who he had decided were to

be employed by Plan Organization. He stated Iran had made clear decision to side with its friends of West-regional security arrangements foremost in his mind, but closely associated this question was that of American aid.

2. Shah said he had mentioned proposed Iraq-Iran-Turkey-Pakistan staff talks to officials Washington and London and had received encouragement proceed.² Iraq had agreed to talks and suggested they be held London or Washington, preferably with US and UK participation. Turks most amenable and had left to Shah decisions regarding representation, site and timing. Preliminary reply Pakistan indicated they glad participate. He said there had been some suggestion (source unspecified) that staff talks would be premature until Iran in position make political decision regarding treaty alignment. He commented latter not possible in near future since before making political decision they would want to know more than at present about concepts of neighbors regarding military collaboration, and also what Iran could count on from US in matter of military aid. He could not join defense arrangements if Iran were to be weak link with no prospects being otherwise. Key to future developments was US assistance program and particularly military aid which would enable him carry out his carefully laid plans for development of force which would be real asset to defense of Iran and of area. He deplored time which already had been lost and emphasized again that next three years extremely crucial; that military improvements must commence immediately if objectives to be met. In our lengthy discussion this matter Shah made most points included in memorandum which he prepared for discussion with President Eisenhower.³ He underlined need for early decision by US so that he would know how to proceed.

3. In course conversation I responded Shah along following lines:

(a) Gratification regarding smoothness and dignity with which governmental change had taken place;

(b) Admiration for various members new Cabinet and confidence their ability implement programs Shah had outlined;

(c)

Gratification that Shah was taking steps he considered essential in connection Iran eventual collaboration with neighbors in security matters.

I took opportunity again to emphasize US attitude that Shah should without pressure decide regarding adherence to regional pact (Deptel 1794).⁴ I stated that while I had not yet received Washington's reaction proposed staff talks I felt sure US would welcome them if area participants felt they would be useful. I expressed some doubt that US and UK should participate since, if fact talks held should become known, this might give rise to charge they were joining other pact countries in bringing pressure upon Iran. I said I would give him more definitive reaction as soon as I had heard from Washington.

(d) Regarding aid, I reviewed both economic and military programs already authorized for Iran and pointed out significance of assistance particularly during past two years. I said that as Shah knew, executive branch considering question of additional military aid, which Shah had previously discussed with Ambassador Henderson and General McClure. I knew Washington officials greatly impressed their conversations with Shah in Washington, and would do their utmost in light real difficulties which existed in obtaining congressional appropriations. Whether or not it would be possible obtain additional monies for military purposes this FY still in doubt since we had not recently heard from Washington regarding this matter.

4. Shah ended conversation by asking me again urge Washington to decide as quickly as possible on military aid. He said Iran house had been put in order and prospects for future extremely bright if we acted now, before it was too late. He appreciated all we had done, but what had been gained should not be permitted to fade away.

Country team has been increasingly concerned lest failure to act promptly upon recommendations now being considered in Washington will operate greatly to detriment US interests in Iran. We realize formidable difficulties which confront agencies in obtaining additional military aid funds from current FY appropriations. However, we hope that some way can be found to make start in expanded military program before end of FY 1955 and that sufficient monies will be included in FY 1956 budget to meet what we consider extremely important military objectives here, as set forth in our previous recommendations.

We earnestly hope that it will be possible in near future for Department to provide information regarding prospects of approving and meeting requirements of (a) recommended FY 1956 program set forth Embtel 1905,⁵ (b) recommended additional FY 1955 program for direct forces support set forth Embtel 1748,⁶ and (c) recommended revised military force basis with adequate funds begin implementation FY 1956 and also to advise regarding US position on proposed staff talks.⁷

Rountree

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 788.5–MSP/4–1155. Secret.

² Regarding the proposed staff talks, see [Document 6](#).

³ Printed in summary form as Tab A to memorandum from Jernegan to Dulles, December 9, 1954, [Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. X, p. 1066](#).

⁴ Dated March 24, not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/3–2255) ⁵ See [Document 301](#).

⁶ In telegram 1748, February 19, the Embassy, MAAG, and OMI recommended a series of self-contained projects to ensure sustained improvements in Iran's defense capability. As part of a suggested interim program of \$9.5 million, the United States would fund development of a detailed plan for construction of major military facilities in Iran, improve Meherbad Airport at Tehran, and construct a series of lesser military facilities throughout Iran. (Department of State, Central Files, 788.5-MSP/2-1955) ⁷ The Department responded in telegram 2009 to Tehran, April 20, that, regarding item (b), "fair chance pick up funds for some of requirements set forth urtel 1748. Matter under active consideration." (*Ibid.*, 788.5-MSP/4-1155)

306. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson)¹

Washington, April 12, 1955.

SUBJECT

MDA Program for Iran

1. In response to memoranda by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs), dated 29 November and 28 December 1954,² concerning the Mutual Defense Assistance Program for Iran, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed the letters from the Director, Foreign Operations Administration³ and the Secretary of State⁴ containing their views with regard to supporting an expanded military assistance program for Iran.
2. Pending an evaluation of Iran's role in the defense of the Middle East and its capability to utilize effectively the matériel being provided, the Joint Chiefs of Staff favor no increase at this time in the present level of military assistance programmed for Iran. However, they consider that some increase in defense support and direct forces support may be required to achieve the optimum balance of United States efforts in Iran. The Joint Chiefs of Staff therefore recommend that you request the Foreign

Operations Administration to reconsider the magnitude of its FY 1956 allocation for Iran in light of the recommendations on defense support and direct forces support recently submitted by the Country Team in Iran.

3. The friendly and cooperative attitude of the present Iranian Government should be encouraged. Some recognition should be given to the receptiveness of the Iranian armed forces to guidance from U.S. Mission and MAAG personnel and to the marked improvement over the past year in Iran's ability to receive and utilize MDAP equipment. Accordingly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approve a change in the Army portion of the force objectives for calendar years 1956–58 for Iran from 12 Infantry Brigades and 3 Armored Brigades to 8 Light Infantry Divisions, 4 Light Armored Divisions, and 5 Independent Infantry Brigades. These force objectives coincide closely with the present organization of the Iranian Army and will facilitate the administration of the MDA Program for Iran.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Arthur Radford⁵
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

¹ Source: National Archives and Records Administration, JCS Records, CCS.092 Iran (4–23–48). Top Secret.

² Neither printed.

³ This letter from Stassen to Wilson, December 13, 1954, is not printed.

⁴ This letter from Dulles to Wilson, November 8, 1954, is printed in [*Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. X, p. 1063.*](#)

⁵ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

307. Editorial Note

On April 25, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union ratified the Soviet–Iranian agreement of December 2, 1954, on border and financial questions. At the 247th meeting of the National Security Council, May 5, Allen Dulles briefed the Council on “Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security” as follows:

“Mr. Dulles moved on to comment on yet another development in the evolution of Soviet foreign policy. He pointed out that on April 25 the Soviet Union had signed an agreement with Iran which had been very generous in its terms to the latter country. The Soviet had agreed to pay \$21 million to Iran as settlement for Iran’s claims on gold removed by the Soviet Union. The agreement had also covered border rectifications, and a few acres more of the disputed lands had gone to Iran than had gone to the USSR. Significantly, the Russians had throughout the negotiations applied no heavy pressures on the Iranians.” (Memorandum of discussion by Gleason, May 6; Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)

The Embassy in Moscow reported and assessed the significance of the ratification process in telegrams 1871, 1900, and 1911, April 21, 25, and 26. (Department of State, Central Files, 661.88/4–2155, 661.88/4–2555, and 661.88/4–2655, respectively)

308. Despatch From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State¹

Tehran, April 25, 1955.

No. 475

REF

The Department's Circular Telegrams No. 559² and 560³ of March 23, 1955

SUBJECT

The Internal Security Position in Iran

The enclosed report entitled "Country Team Analysis of the Internal Security Position in Iran" responds to the request therefor contained in the Department's Circular Telegram No. 559.

In compliance with the wish expressed in the Department's Circular Telegram No. 560, the Country Team members were assisted by the senior members of their respective staffs in the preparation of the report.

William M. Rountree
Chargé d'Affaires ad interim

Enclosure

COUNTRY TEAM ANALYSIS OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY
POSITION IN IRAN

[Here follow sections I. "State of Development of the Threat of Subversion;" II. "Adequacy of Indigenous Countermeasures;" and III. "Analysis of United States Aid Programs."]

IV—Conclusions and Recommendations

A. Conclusions

1. A threat of large scale insurrection existed in Iran in 1953 but was brought under control, and the problem now is to prevent subversion from making important headway. U.S. aid to Iran has played a vital part in the establishment and maintenance of internal security.

2. The Shah is the chief bulwark of internal security. As the symbol of the monarchy, he has the confidence of the people and the loyalty of the Army. He furnishes the principal direction to the drive for measures for social and economic progress. If he were to die either naturally or by assassination and an inter-regnum were to ensue, the resultant situation might divide the anti-communist forces and create new opportunities for communist subversion.

3. The Shah and Government recognize that positive constructive countermeasures to communist subversion are needed as well as repressive measures and in the longer term are an indispensable reward to the hopes of the people for a better standard of life. Iran will require continued outside assistance toward this end.

4. At this time subordination of the military aid objective of developing a defensive delaying capability to the other established objective of maintaining internal security would have a seriously adverse effect upon U.S. relations with Iran. A similarly adverse effect would result from any U.S. indication that outside support, particularly air support, would not be given to the Iranian Army if the Soviet Union were to invade Iran in force. Either of these two things might so discourage the Shah and his Government as to eliminate all possibility of Iran's adherence to an area defense pact and result in a reversion to neutralist policies with a dangerous weakening in its resolve to stand up under Soviet pressure.

5. The Shah's position and the fabric of the Iranian Government would deteriorate if the Shah should fail to receive adequate and consistent U.S. political and material support.

6. The internal security agencies, namely, the Army, Gendarmérie, National Police, military governors, and Frontier Guard, are as a group capable of detecting, apprehending, and detaining Iranian subversives and suppressing armed insurrection.

a.

A major requirement is better coordination among those forces and a clear delineation and, where appropriate, realignment of responsibilities and functions as between the military and civilian type agencies as well as among the latter.

[Subparagraph b (4 lines of source text) not declassified]

c. Expansion of the responsibilities and functions of the National Police and Gendarmerie will generate requirements for an improvement in their present organization and capabilities. Their effectiveness should be improved to the point where they are capable of coping with subversion short of serious insurrection. In addition they should be freed so far as possible from military and political pressures.

d. The ability to detect foreign subversive agents is largely lacking. The ability to detect Iranian subversives now rests mainly with the Army; it is inadequately developed in the Gendarmérie and National Police. These deficiencies should be remedied.

e. The Army is carrying a greater portion of the burden of the internal security effort than is compatible with concentration upon its regular duties or in the long term with the interests of the country. It should be relieved of the functions that are more appropriate for police-type forces as rapidly as the police-type forces can develop the capability for their effective performance. The Army's posture for dealing with riots and armed insurrection should be maintained and development of its CIC organization should continue.

7. The Iranian Army with military aid already programmed can bring to bear adequate force to cope with insurrection on any foreseeable scale if there is no coincident external military threat.

The development of a defensive delaying capability will enhance this ability to cope with insurrection.

8. Improvement in the administration of justice including elimination of officials and judges who sympathize with the Tudeh is needed to permit the transfer of prosecution of subversives from the military to the civil courts.

9. Internal security suffers for lack of a competent, devoted, and adequately paid public service. The security forces (Army, Gendarmérie, and National Police) are grossly underpaid by other Middle Eastern standards.

10. The Iranian people favor the monarchy and the suppression of its enemies. They would welcome positive countermeasures to subversion, progress in which would help public attitudes in relation to other U.S. objectives. Editorial and other informed opinion tends increasingly to favor Iranian alignment with the West.

11. Presently programmed military aid is adequate to maintain the Army for its internal security role. Future assistance as recommended by the Country Team on the basis of plans formulated by the Chief of ARMISH-MAAG/Iran would develop in the Army a defensive delaying capability which would make a useful contribution to Middle East defense. The latter objective has great political and psychological importance in addition to its military significance.

12. Expansion of Gendarmérie activities and their effective performance will require improvements in its organization and capabilities; its needs will include continued aid in equipment and training and some aid for operational facilities.

13. Technical and financial assistance furnished to Iran was a major factor in keeping the political institutions intact during the period of crisis in August 1953. Thereafter it helped the new pro-Western government meet its budgetary deficit and improve its

organization and capabilities to attack some of the causes of social discontent and unrest which subversive elements had seized upon in order to weaken the Government. Continued U.S. technical and defense support aid will be needed for several years in order to help strengthen the Government's capabilities, first, to improve the internal security situation, and second, to speed the development of a more adequate economic and administrative base which would support the forces required for the maintenance of internal security and for the fulfillment of Iran's role in area defense arrangements.

B. Recommendations

1. U.S. Objectives

The Country Team recommends:

- a. That the present broad U.S. objectives with respect to the capabilities of the Iranian armed forces remain unchanged; in particular the development of a defensive delaying capability.
- b. That, pursuant to existing objectives, the organization, effectiveness, and capabilities of Iranian police-type forces for dealing with subversion be improved with a view to relieving, gradually and over a period of time as feasible, the Iranian Army of police-type functions in the internal security field while continuing the Army's ability to put down any serious insurrection.
- c. That U.S. objectives continue to take due account of the short term value and long term indispensability to the maintenance of internal security inherent in positive constructive measures in the realm of economic and social progress.

2. U.S. Advice

The Country Team recommends:

a.

That the Iranian Government be encouraged to strengthen its police-type forces, particularly their capabilities for detecting and coping with subversion, and to improve coordination among all internal security forces.

[Subparagraph b (6 lines of source text) not declassified]

c. That the Iranian Government be further encouraged to provide all of its essential police-type organizations with sufficient budgetary, matériel, and training support to enable them in time and as feasible to relieve the Army of its responsibilities in this field.

d. That the Iranian Government be encouraged to continue its efforts in eliminating corruption and communist influence in the existing judicial system, pressing for reorganization and new legislation where indicated.

e. That operations in Iran of the United States Information Service be maintained on a scale adequate to permit it to continue its informational output at the present level, and to assist and support the information departments of the Iranian Government, by providing technical advice and limited equipment as required, in developing the most favorable possible public opinion for programs supported by the United States.

3. *U.S. Aid*

The Country Team recommends:

a. That military aid continue to be extended to Iran in pursuance of present NSC policy objectives.

b. That the U.S. contribute to the objectives stated in paragraphs 1b and 2a, 2b, and 2c of this sub-section B, by the provision of matériel and training support as required.

c. That technical assistance, supplemented by limited amounts of development aid related to technical assistance projects, be continued at about the level recommended by the Country Team for Fiscal Year 1956; and that defense support assistance on a diminishing scale be provided to accelerate Iran's development program, particularly in specific areas related to the improvement of Iran's security forces.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 788.5/4-2555. Top Secret.

² In circular telegram 559, March 23, the Department instructed recipient Chiefs of Mission "to have the country team, including representatives from FOA, MAAG, (or service attachés), [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] prepare a report on the possibilities and requirements for U.S. assistance in increasing the effectiveness of police-type forces to deal with communist subversion and, in those countries where communist subversion has reached the stage of actual or potential large-scale insurrection, increasing the effectiveness of the regular armed forces to deal with communist subversion and insurrection." (*Ibid.*, 700.5/3-2355) The information was to enable the OCB to formulate a concept for U.S. assistance in the development of forces adequate to provide internal security in countries vulnerable to Communist subversion. Eventually this information was for the use of the NSC. (NSC Action No. 1290-d; see [Foreign Relations, 1952-1954, vol. II, Part 1, p. 844](#), footnote 10) ³ In circular telegram 560, sent to Tehran and 90 other Middle Eastern, Asian, and Latin American posts on March 23, the Department further explained that this attempt to combat Communist subversion grew out of Eisenhower's personal interest and country team assessments would weigh heavily in NSC deliberations; therefore the assessments should be prepared by the best officers of the mission, should include points of disagreement as well as agreement, and should be submitted on schedule. (Department of State, Central Files, 700.5/3-2355)

309. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Waugh) to the Under Secretary of State (Hoover)¹

Washington, May 2, 1955.

SUBJECT

Additional American Oil Companies in Iranian Oil Consortium

In the event you are not aware of the latest developments on this question, the following information may be of interest.

The legal documents transferring title to the additional companies were signed Thursday, April 28. Prior to the signing, Sinclair, Cities Service and Anderson–Prichard withdrew, leaving nine companies in the new group. Since Sinclair and Cities Service withdrew in favor of Richfield and Anderson–Prichard withdrew in favor of American Independent, Richfield has three–twelfths of the 5 percent, American Independent two–twelfths, and the remaining seven companies one–twelfth each.

The new group has organized a company to represent the members in certain Consortium matters. This company is Iricon Agency, Ltd., a Delaware corporation, which is to be known as IRICON. Pending the election of a more permanent president, Mr. R.S. Stewart, Standard Oil Company (Ohio), has agreed temporarily to serve as president.

Very little is known thus far about the scope of activity of IRICON.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 888.2553/5–255. Drafted by Eakens and approved by Armstrong.

310. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Hensel) to the Secretary of State¹

Washington, May 14, 1955.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Reference is made to your letter of November 8, 1954,² commenting on the country team proposals for an expanded MDA Program and related defense support and direct forces support for Iran.

The contents of your letter and additional comments from the Director of the Foreign Operations Administration have been considered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, whose subsequent recommendations are embodied in a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense dated April 12, 1955, a copy of which is attached.³

The proposed reorganization of Iranian Army forces approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in paragraph 3 of the attached letter has been adopted by the Department of Defense as the basis for future MDA planning. The Director of the Foreign Operations Administration is being informed of this in a letter of this date, copy of which is also attached.⁴

The Department of Defense acceptance of this reorganization envisages no increase in the current level of military assistance programmed for Iran at this time. However, it is requested that you join the Department of Defense in requesting the Director of the Foreign Operations Administration to consider an increase in the magnitude of the planned FY 1956 allocations of defense support and direct forces support funds for Iran, in light of the recommendations recently submitted by the country team in cable Tehran 1948⁵ and related cables, and the comments in the attached memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

In the absence of a comprehensive plan covering the role intended for Iran in future Middle East defense, I have requested the Director of the Foreign Operations Administration to confine his consideration to training support and those projects which the country team can assure will not prejudice any

future decision to support or not to support a change or addition to the current mission of the Iranian forces involved.

A copy of this letter has been furnished to the Director of the Foreign Operations Administration.

Sincerely yours,

H. Struve Hensel

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 788.5–MSP/5–1455. Top Secret.

² [Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. X, p. 1063.](#)

³ Not attached, but printed as [Document 306](#).

⁴ Attached but not printed; the letter is substantively the same as the one printed here.

⁵ [Document 302](#).

311. Letter From the Director of the Foreign Operations Administration(Stassen) to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Hensel)¹

Washington, June 16, 1955.

DEAR MR. HENSEL: Your letter of May 14² requested reconsideration of the magnitude of the planned FY 1956 allocation of funds for Defense Support and Direct Forces Support for Iran in light of recommendations from the field and JCS findings of April 12. In my letter to you of December 13 I expressed interest in strengthening training programs and supporting Iran's defense budget on a limited scale. Several efforts were made in the current fiscal year to undertake projects toward this end and a supplementary fund of \$3.5 million is now being programmed to support the expanded training effort. At the request of the Departments of State and Defense, FOA has also considered a \$9.5 million construction program for the relocation of military units and stores in defense sites and for the construction of airfields and military roads. However, because it has not been possible to find funds to meet these added requirements, it now appears that this program, if it is to be carried out at all, will have to be funded in FY 1956 from (a) the \$7.5 million included for this purpose in the FY 1956 Direct Forces Support request and (b) the \$17.5 million illustratively programmed for this purpose in the total Defense Support funds sought for the Near East and Africa in FY 1956.

There remains, however, an important substantive question concerning the desirability of moving ahead with such a large scale defense site reconstruction program in advance of (1) an evaluation of Iranian military capabilities of the kind now being conducted by U.S. training teams in Iran, and (2) a U.S. governmental determination of the role which Iranian forces should play in Middle East defense. Before, and in the absence of, such an evaluation and determination, it is not possible to reach a conclusion as to whether the proposed projects are in fact confined, as your letter suggests they should be, "to training support and those projects which the Country Team can assure will not prejudice any future decision to support or not to support a change or addition to the current mission of the Iranian forces

involved". The proposed projects certainly go well beyond the purposes of training support, and it may also be that the relocation of units and depots, and the construction of new roads and airfields, as contemplated by these projects, would in fact prejudice a decision on the mission of Iranian forces involved. In any event, careful consideration should be given to the question of whether the United States, by financing some of these projects, is likely to lead the Government of Iran prematurely into thinking that the United States has an interest in a particular mission for the Iranian forces and has, through such financing, made commitments toward the support of the forces required to execute such a mission.

The foregoing note of caution and limitation is not intended to preclude the institution for sound political reasons of an expanded Direct Forces Support type of program which might also have important military by-product in terms of a more effective utilization of existing forces. For this reason FOA has recently supported an estimate for Mutual Security funds for Iran for FY 1957 which is based on an increase in Iranian defense construction requirements. Our request to the Budget Bureau, as you know, is composed of \$15 million Direct Forces Support and a complementary \$25 million Defense Support fund, on the assumption that this magnitude of construction and supporting activity can be justified even if there should be no increase in MDAP or the approved force basis for Iranian forces.

Since the beginning of FY 1956 is now close at hand and pressure from the field for a decision as to our future policies and course of action in this area is intense, it is suggested that a thorough study be commenced immediately here in Washington of the currently proposed and possible alternative military support program for Iran. It might also be desirable simultaneously to initiate a field evaluation to determine exactly which of these projects would in fact meet the criteria which you suggest and, therefore, be eligible, within such criteria, for early implementation.

Sincerely yours,

Harold E. Stassen³

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 788.5–MSP/6–2855. Top Secret.

² See [footnote 4, *supra*](#).

³ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

312. Memorandum From the Director of the Executive Secretariat (Scott) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Jernegan)¹

Washington, June 22, 1955.

SUBJECT

OCB—Iran

Mr. Hoover asked that I report to you that Mr. Anderson was not at the OCB meeting today, and the discussion on Iran was basically to inform Defense rather than to press them for a decision.

Mr. Hoover has requested, however, that you prepare immediately a letter for his signature as Acting Secretary to the Secretary of Defense requesting their approval for the additional 2-year MDAP program that you had discussed with him.² He understands that this would run somewhere in the nature of \$20–\$25 million per year for the two years and that it would equip a ten-thousand-man light unit. He understands that Defense will probably be agreeable if we place our request on the basis of political considerations.

Mr. Hoover understands that Ambassador Chapin will leave the 29th, arriving somewhere between the 5th and 10th of July. He would like to have this fully agreed to before the Ambassador's departure so that he may have it in his pocket for his first call on the Shah. If full agreement is not possible by the 29th, a telegram must be awaiting Ambassador Chapin on his arrival.

W.K. Scott

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 788.5–MSP/6–2255. Secret.

² See [Document 314](#).

313. Letter From the Acting Secretary of State to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Hensel)¹

Washington, June 23, 1955.

DEAR MR. HENSEL: In your letter of May 14, 1955,² you requested that the Department of State join the Department of Defense in requesting the Director of the Foreign Operations Administration to consider an increase in the planned FY 1956 allocations of defense support and direct forces support funds for Iran in light of the recommendations recently submitted by the country team and the comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

There is attached a copy of a letter to the Director of the Foreign Operations Administration which endorses your request and recommends specific consideration of an additional allotment of \$9.5 million for Iran.

Sincerely yours,

Herbert Hoover, Jr.³

[Attachment]

Letter From the Acting Secretary of State to the Director of the Foreign Operations Administration (Stassen)⁴

Washington, June 23, 1955.

DEAR MR. STASSEN: The Assistant Secretary of Defense wrote the Department of State on May 14, 1955, requesting support of the Department of Defense's request for consideration of increased allocations of defense support and direct forces funds for Iran. Enclosed with the letter were copies of a letter to you dated May 14, 1955, and a memorandum dated April 12, 1955, from the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the same subject. I understand that copies of these communications were directed to you.

I am pleased to note the affirmative attitude of the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff regarding additional defense support and direct forces aid for Iran and I concur in their views. I suggest that, if agreeable to you, there be consultations between your Agency and the Departments of Defense and State as to the extent of further aid desirable.

I appreciate that over-all demands may prohibit providing the total funds requested by the country team in Tehran's telegram 1948 referred to by the Department of Defense. However, I would like to suggest that the interagency discussions particularly consider the country team's priority request for \$9.5 million to initiate certain self-contained military projects. This request was originally designed to accelerate improvements in Iran's military establishment by getting started this fiscal year. Although this Department had previously hoped that an additional program could be financed from current fiscal year funds, it now understands that such funds are not available. It therefore recommends that planning be started at an early date, looking to a prompt decision regarding providing funds for Iran from next fiscal year's money.

There are distinct advantages to making these funds available promptly. As elaborated in Secretary Dulles' letter of November 8, 1954, to the Secretary of Defense, there exists a favorable situation in Iran for advancing the country's defensive capabilities as well as its closer cooperation with its neighbors in the free world. However, this favorable situation cannot be expected to remain static. Prompt assistance by us will enable Iran, and provide the incentive for Iran, to move forward with its own plans for increased military expenditures in coordination with United States assisted projects.

Sincerely yours,

Herbert Hoover, Jr.⁵

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 788.5-MSP/5-1455. Top Secret. Drafted by Crowl and cleared by Baxter and Jernegan.

² [Document 310](#).

³ Printed from a copy that bears this stamped signature.

⁴ Top Secret. Drafted by Crawl and cleared by Baxter, Dixon, Jernegan, and Frechtling (in draft).

⁵ Printed from a copy that bears this stamped signature.

314. Letter From the Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson)¹

Washington, June 27, 1955.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Recent developments bearing on Iran's possible affiliation with a northern tier Middle East defense arrangement impel me to request that urgent consideration be given to increasing military assistance to Iran.

With hopes that Pakistan may soon accede to the now-functioning Turco-Iraqi Pact, note should be taken of recent evidence indicating that Iran is beginning to move in the direction of affiliation. The Shah has continued to reiterate that he intends that Iran will join. As you know, he recently took the initiative in arranging military staff talks with Turkey, Iraq and Pakistan. The United States and the United Kingdom will be represented by observers at these talks which will take place in the near future.² At the same time, there are also signs that other important political elements in Iran are moving toward acceptance of the Middle East defense idea.

On the other hand, the Shah continues to maintain that before joining he must have some assurance that Iran will be able to play an effective part in Middle East defense and will not be simply the weak link in a chain. Thus, he has frequently expressed his desire for clear evidence that the United States will assist in building up his armed forces in order that they may make a real contribution. Politically, the time has now come when we must give a positive response in order to prevent the growth of doubt concerning the firmness of our intentions.

I realize that it is not possible at this time to make a definitive estimate of the specific role that Iran would play in a northern tier defense system, or of the forces it would be expected to contribute. However, for the purpose of my proposal, it is not necessary that we pre-judge the final decision regarding Iran's place in Middle East defense. This decision must await the completion of efforts to evaluate the Iranian armed forces and the development of a Middle East strategy. Meanwhile, for political reasons, it appears imperative that a start be made in the very near future. Enough has

been learned since our exchange of letters of October 8³ and November 8 last year, to indicate that we do want Iran to join in a Middle East defense arrangement and that there must be an increased military program in that country if Iran is to play any part at all in area defense.

Some clear and positive action taken at this time will also have the important effect of strengthening the hand of the Shah in his efforts to provide firm leadership and strong direction in Iranian internal affairs. The support of the United States has a direct bearing on the strength of his internal position.

Therefore, I believe that political considerations not only justify but strongly demand that we take action immediately to expand the MDAP program. Hence, I recommend that urgent consideration be given to the approval of the following steps:

- 1) that a program of about \$50,000,000 be authorized for military assistance to Iran, this money to be expended at the rate of about \$25,000,000 per year during Fiscal Years 1956 and 1957. The expansion must be of sufficient size to produce the desired political impact on Iran. It is our estimate that a program roughly of this magnitude would be necessary to achieve this desired impact. The Department of State, of course, does not advocate any particular kind of military program and would leave to Defense the question of how these funds might best be used.

- 2) that the new Ambassador to Iran, the Honorable Selden Chapin, be authorized to take the following position at his first meeting with the Shah:

- a) that it is too early to define in exact terms Iran's future role in Middle East defense, or exactly what contribution it will be expected to make or how much assistance it will be necessary for us to give;

- b) but that without committing ourselves to any specific future program (which would depend on many contingent factors) we are prepared to expand our

program in Iran and have therefore planned to provide the following additional military assistance during the next two years. (Here the Ambassador would give an indication of the character and types of assistance to be given, omitting reference to the amount of money involved.);

c) that we believe this aid will greatly benefit the Iranian armed forces and thereby make it feasible for Iran to accede to a Middle East defense arrangement at an early date.

Finally, it is particularly desirable that a favorable decision be made prior to the arrival in Iran of Ambassador Chapin, early in July. Given the Shah's concern over this problem, it is clear that he will expect the new Ambassador to bring with him some definite indication of American intentions. The political advantages of being able to give the Shah such assurances immediately upon Ambassador Chapin's arrival would be considerable. It would also be a propitious moment to encourage the Shah to make an early decision on affiliation with a defense arrangement.

For the foregoing reasons, I would appreciate it if the Department of Defense would give urgent consideration to the approval of the increased military assistance program suggested.

Sincerely yours,

John Foster Dulles⁴

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 788.5-MSP/6-2755. Top Secret. Drafted by Hannah and Dixon on June 25.

² See [Documents 6](#) ff.

³ Reference is to a letter from Wilson to Dulles, October 8, 1954, enclosing JCS comments on a plan for reorganization and expansion of the Iranian Army; see [Foreign Relations, 1952-1954, vol. X, p. 1063, footnote 2](#).

⁴ Printed from a copy that bears this stamped signature.

315. Letter From the Director of Central Intelligence (Dulles) to the Under Secretary of State (Hoover)¹

Washington, July 1, 1955.

DEAR MR. HOOVER: [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] has recently returned here on leave and has reported to us fully on the local situation. He has emphasized particularly his view, based on close personal contact with the Shah, that the latter will be anxious to receive some clarification of the U.S. attitude toward military aid and that the position of our new Ambassador may be seriously prejudiced from the outset if he is unable to provide satisfactory assurances of U.S. interest in strengthening Iran militarily.

We recognize that the aid issue is a complicated one. Iran's ability to absorb and effectively utilize large quantities of aid is still uncertain, and it may be impossible to firm up a realistic long-range aid program at any early date. Nevertheless, the Shah is a sensitive and mercurial individual who occupies a critical role in maintenance of Iran's stability. It is not within my competence to pass judgments on the diplomatic and military considerations involved in the aid issue. However, it is our intelligence appraisal, based [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] on an analysis of the over-all situation in Iran, that failure to provide the Shah with a reasonably precise statement of the role we hope Iran will play in regional defense preparations and of our own intentions may have the following adverse consequences:

- (a) The Shah may conclude that the U.S. has no serious intention of developing Iran's capabilities for defense against possible Soviet attack. This would be a serious blow to the Shah's morale, adversely affecting not only his interest in participation in regional defense activities but also his determination to strengthen his country internally.
- (b) Iranian political and popular opinion would tend to interpret the Shah's failure to obtain satisfaction from the U.S. on the

military aid issue as an indication that U.S. interest in the future of Iran and U.S. support for the Shah himself were diminishing. This would encourage the revival of anti-regime extremist elements and might facilitate the eventual reemergence of another Mossadeq-type government backed by fanatical nationalist elements and the Communists.

This matter was discussed briefly in the OCB meeting² somewhat along the above lines and as Deputy Secretary of Defense Anderson was not present at that meeting, I am sending him a copy of this letter.

Sincerely,

Allen W. Dulles

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 788.5-MSP/7-155. Secret.

² Apparent reference to the June 22 meeting of the OCB; see [Document 312](#).

316. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State¹

Tehran, July 2, 1955—3 p.m.

20. At meeting last night called at Ala's request, Prime Minister told me Soviet Ambassador had recently delivered to Shah letter from Marshal Voroshilov² inviting Shah visit Moscow. Letter had stated situation seemed most appropriate now for such visit in light good effects recent financial and border agreement. Marshal had expressed view friendly, neighborly relations should exist between two countries and to this end he thought Shah and he should seize opportunity discuss subjects of mutual interest including economic matters. Ala stated Shah had replied orally that in principle he accepted invitation but as to timing he would reflect upon matter and would later inform Soviet Ambassador. Written acknowledgment along these lines being drafted by Foreign Office.

Ala said for Shah to have declined invitation would almost certainly have been taken by Soviet Government as deliberate rejection friendly overtures. Shah had no illusions, however, about problems involved in such visit and had asked Ala discuss matter with me and with British Ambassador with request we seek from our respective governments advice and counsel re (a) timing of visit, and (b) topics for discussion and attitudes to be taken. Ala associated invitation with Soviet fear Iran considering formal alliance with West and hope convincing Iran leaders advantages neutrality.

Later same evening I sat with Shah at weightlifting contest between US and Iran teams and he discussed matter at some length. He said that he felt compelled respond favorably to invitation and in fact hoped that something good might come of it if Soviets should by any chance be at all sincere in recent conciliatory attitude. He thought, however, sole purpose of exercise from Soviet viewpoint almost certainly to prevent Iranian adherence to collective security pact. He emphasized he counting heavily upon US for advice as to what would be most propitious time for visit and suggestions as to what attitudes should be taken on various subjects which might arise. I asked what effect this development might have upon timing of Middle East

staff talks, to which Shah replied this one question upon which he would appreciate US-UK advice. He said that from his viewpoint he saw no reason why staff talks should not proceed irrespective Soviet invitation. (Shah said he had heard nothing recently from other participants re timing of staff talks. He expressed pleasure that US as well as UK had decided have observer present when talks held.) In my conversation with Ala he raised question prospective “summit” meeting³ and gave me message which he said Shah wished him convey. (This matter was not raised by Shah in our conversation.) Ala said Iran Government had heard from its Ambassador in Egypt on basis “authoritative information” that Soviets intended bringing up for discussion at Geneva situation Middle East and particularly Iran, presumably with objective creation “neutral belt”. Ala said Iran Government had confidence US would not undertake any negotiations which might be detrimental Iran’s interests. However, Shah and he felt they should state quite frankly to US and UK that Iran would greatly resent any negotiations affecting Iran without Iranian representation. In reply my statement assuring Ala of the validity of his comment that US would not dispose of the rights of other countries, he said “off the record” that while he certain of this, he less sure negotiation policies other participants and felt Iran position this connection should be set forth quite clearly.

I hope Department can instruct me soonest re response which I might give Shah.⁴ Our preliminary reaction with respect some questions involved as follows:

- (a) In circumstances it would be unwise endeavor dissuade Shah from going to Moscow, or even to show that we entertain doubts re wisdom his doing so;
- (b) On assumption advice upon timing of visit and attitude toward specific issues can best be formulated subsequent to summit conference, it might be well advise Shah not to decide upon date until after that meeting;
- (c) One particular factor which US might bear in mind is that, should contemplated staff talks or developments concerning US

military aid be sharply disappointing to Shah, period immediately following such disappointment would be most inauspicious for visit;

(d) As of now believe it would be advisable for Shah's trip take place after visit Turkish President here, now scheduled for September; and

(e) Shah might well be advised limit role in Moscow so far as possible to that of constitutional monarch.

Rountree

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 788.11/7–255. Secret. Repeated to London and Moscow.

² Kliment Yefremovich Voroshilov, Chairman, Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union.

³ Reference is to the meeting of Heads of Government of the United States, United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union, July 18–23, 1955. For documentation, see [vol. v, pp. 36](#) ff.

⁴ In a memorandum to Dulles, July 5, Jernegan raised the issue of the Shah's visit to Moscow and the Shah's request for clarification of U.S. military aid to Iran as reported in the letter supra. Jernegan noted that any reply should be coordinated with the British who had also been consulted by the Iranians. (Department of State, Central Files, 033.8811/7–555) For the Department's instructions, see [Document 319](#).

317. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Allen) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Murphy)¹

Washington, July 5, 1955.

SUBJECT

Attached OCB Documents on Iran

The attached papers are scheduled for consideration at the July 6 meeting of the OCB.² The Progress Report consists of the following sections: a) Summary of Major Actions and Decisions taken by Iran or the United States since January 15; b) an Evaluation of Progress in Implementing NSC Policies; c) a section of emerging problems which have been disclosed during the course of the past six months.

The Outline Plan of Operations consists of a detailed statement of actions planned in implementation of specific policies and directives incorporated in NSC 5504. The new outline plan is a revision of a former document and is based upon an assessment of progress made during the past six months.

Both of these documents were approved by representatives of interested agencies in OCB working committee meetings and in the OCB Board of Assistants. NEA recommends that the documents be accepted and approved in their present form.

The following specific elements in the attached reports are of particular importance:

1) *The Present Situation in Iran and American Relation to It.* Throughout 1955 Iran will remain basically an unstable country led by conservative Western-oriented governments acceptable to the Shah. Since the installation of the Ala Government in April, there has been a tendency toward increasing instability which, if

not arrested, might be exploited by Communists or extreme Nationalist elements. The Shah is the prime political focal point of Iran. Future stability depends largely on his success as a leader. The extent of US backing forms an important element in the Shah's political future. Therefore, if doubt were to arise in Iran concerning the extent of American support, the Shah's strength and the stability of Iran would be weakened.

2) *Important Items of Progress.*

a) Oil production is exceeding the agreed rate, and Iranian oil revenues in CY 1955 may reach \$115 million as against the anticipated \$87 million.³

b) Loans of \$85 million have been authorized as follows: \$53 million from the Export-Import Bank for development assistance; \$30 million from FOA for budgetary support; \$2 million from FOA for technical assistance.

c) On June 2 the USSR returned to Iran \$11.2 million of gold in implementation of the recently ratified USSR-Iran agreement. Since it was already carried as backing for the currency, this gold represents no increase in Iran's fiduciary cover.

d) In 1955 the US provided \$78.6 million of assistance to Iran. Of this only \$4.2 million was for military aid and direct forces support. All types of aid now planned for fiscal 1956 total \$55 million. Thus far Defense has programmed no FY 1956 funds for military assistance.

e) As a result of the Shah's initiative, Iran, Turkey, Iraq and Pakistan have agreed to hold military staff talks this summer. The US and UK will be represented by observers.

3) *Regional Defense and American Military Assistance.*

The Shah desires Iranian affiliation with a Middle East defense arrangement, but wants prior assurance that the United States will give sufficient military assistance to enable Iran to play a significant part in Middle East defense.

On the other hand the Department of Defense has explained that further improvement of Iranian defense capabilities must await an evaluation of Iran's armed forces (not to be available until June 1956), and the development of an overall Middle East defense strategy. There is danger that this time lag may work against American interests by complicating the timing of Iran's entry into a Middle East pact, and by weakening the Shah's internal position.

Meanwhile, the proper scope and objectives of military assistance to Iran will remain in doubt until a Middle East area defense strategy has been devised and until Iranian forces have been evaluated and assigned an area defense role (Para B-19 of the Progress Report). This problem of the relationship between American military assistance and the timing of Iranian entry into a Middle East defense arrangement is now the most important unresolved issue in American policy toward Iran.

¹ Source: Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5504—Memoranda. Top Secret. Drafted by Hannah and cleared by Baxter.

² Reference is to an OCB Progress Report on "U.S. Policy Toward Iran," July 6, and a June 28 version of an OCB "Outline Plan of Operations for Iran," July 6, neither attached nor printed. (*Ibid.*, and *ibid.*: Lot 62 D 430, Iran 1954-1955, respectively) ³ A note on the source text, presumably in Allen's hand, reads: "Treasury slated for Calendar Year 56[?] increase will be from 40 to 140 million."

318. Memorandum From the Officer in Charge of Iranian Affairs (Hannah) to the Director of the Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs (Baxter)¹

Washington, July 6, 1955.

SUBJECT

Problem of Military Assistance to Iran

REFERENCE

Revised OCB Outline Plan of Operations and New Progress report²

It is suggested that at your meeting with Deputy Under Secretary Murphy this morning³ you may wish to discuss the following matter which is closely related to the problems contained in the OCB documents on the agenda for this afternoon.

While not mentioned in the OCB documents themselves, Secretary Dulles in a June 27 letter to Secretary Wilson⁴ proposed the allocation of about \$50 million for military aid to Iran during fiscal years 1956 and 1957. This would continue aid at approximately the level of 1950–1954; i.e., \$20 million a year. [*1½ lines of source text not declassified*] The basis for the proposal is that political factors, such as the timing of Iranian entry into a Middle East defense arrangement, the support of the Shah's internal position in Iran and the necessity for avoiding the growth of doubt in Iran concerning American intentions all justify a new allocation of funds for military assistance. It was also suggested in Secretary Dulles' letter that a decision be made on this proposal in timing [*time*] to enable Ambassador Chapin to offer the Shah some assurances of continued American military assistance at the time that the Ambassador has his first meeting with His Majesty.

Although no reply has yet been received, present indications are that Defense will not agree, on the ground that deliveries of previously programmed matériel can be maintained at approximately the \$20 million annual level throughout 1956 and 1957 with not more than \$6 million of additional funds. While this may be true, it appears to be a dangerous assumption on which to base our policy. If there is as much as a three year lag between allocation and delivery, then once the pipeline is empty it may take another three years to start it flowing again. There is the danger, therefore, that American military assistance to Iran would begin to fall off just at the time when it is hoped that Iran will begin to participate in a Middle East defense arrangement.

This problem has been given an additional degree of urgency by the fact that Soviet Union has now formally (though secretly) invited the Shah to make a State visit to Moscow (Tehran's telegram No. 20, July 2).⁵ The Shah has already accepted the invitation in principle but has requested the advice of the US and UK regarding timing and topics for discussion. Since it appears that it would not be practical to advise the Shah to refuse the invitation outright, we are in the position of having to give him specific advice on timing. We, of course, would prefer to delay the visit as long as possible. However, if we are not in a position to give the Shah some definite advice as to timing Iran's entry into a Middle East defense arrangement and on American intentions regarding military assistance, then it will be very difficult to advise him to delay his visit to the Soviet Union. It appears likely, therefore, that the Shah may regard this Soviet invitation as a tool to be used in smoking out American intentions.

For these reasons it appears all the more urgent that high policy decisions be made in the near future regarding Middle East defense, the Iranian role in that defense and regarding American military assistance to Iran.

¹ Source: Department of State, GTI Files: Lot 58 D 338, OCB 1955. Top Secret.

² See [footnote 2, supra](#).

³ No record of this meeting has been found.

⁴ [Document 314.](#)

⁵ [Document 316.](#)

319. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iran¹

Washington, July 11, 1955—6:27 p.m.

54. As it appears Shah has already agreed in principle acceptance invitation visit Moscow, urtel 20,² we wish to avoid impression in responding to his request for advice that we are trying influence him to change his mind. On other hand approach should not be such as to give Shah justification for saying US encouraged him to go and therefore be held partly responsible for any unfavorable results of visit. You may use following views in discussion with Shah or Ala, pointing out of course it is up to Shah to make decision.

In US view recent spate Soviet invitations to heads of state indicates no fundamental change in Soviet policy but is part calculated peace offensive and attempt divide and weaken free world solidarity. Soviet hope lull fears and win over uncommitted countries or at least convince them to follow course of neutralism. Although USSR has backed up its recent friendly overtures to Iran by such tangible moves as return of gold and agreement for frontier demarcation, it is certainly not Soviet policy to encourage economic and political stability in Iran or to assist it in maintaining its sovereign independence and playing an honorable role in area defense. We agree with Ala's belief invitation at this time is Soviet attempt discourage or intimidate Shah from adhering to Baghdad Pact.

Several factors argue against haste in formal or public acceptance of invitation or early date for actual visit. Perhaps most cogent these reasons is forthcoming Summit Meeting and necessary subsequent period for assessing and observing effects any decisions reached there. It also our view Iranian public, which is gradually coming to realize good effects firm Iranian policy vis-à-vis USSR and is moving from historic neutralism to recognition advantages casting lot courageously on side of free world, would be confused by Shah's visiting Moscow at a time when there is considerable discussion as to possibility Iran entering formal alliance with friendly neighboring states. Without considerable careful preparation,

public opinion might interpret visit as shift in Shah's policy of alignment with free world. It might also be injurious to dignity and prestige of Shah if he should appear to reply with alacrity to bidding of country at whose hands Iran has suffered so much in years just past and which has until recently carried on virulent propaganda campaign against Iran, including assistance to subversive elements within country.

In addition Summit Meeting there are several other upcoming events which it would appear Shah would rather have behind him at time Moscow visit, i.e. staff talks with Turkey, Iraq, and Pakistan and visit of Turk President Bayar to Tehran in September. Because Shah has already indicated acceptance in principle to Soviet Ambassador we see no difficulty or embarrassment if he should take his own time in making next move and let Soviets cool their heels until he ready to indicate date he considers convenient. As sovereign ruler independent country he is under no necessity of making excuses or giving reasons for not setting early date.

Department assumes Shah would limit his role in Moscow to that of constitutional monarch.

You should assure Shah US will be glad to discuss with him fully points that might be taken up in Moscow and answers he might give as well as any subjects on which he desires our advice or which may occur to us.

Dulles

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 788.11/7-255. Secret. Drafted by Baxter; cleared by William A. Crawford, Deputy Director of the Office of Eastern European Affairs; and approved by Allen. Repeated to London and Moscow.

² [Document 316](#).

320. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iran¹

Washington, July 11, 1955—7:21 p.m.

55. For Ambassador. In your first conversation with Shah you may make following statements referring US plans for military assistance to Iran:

1. President sends personal regards, recalling highly useful conversations Washington last year. President wants Shah to know he and US Government are keenly alerted to initiative and efforts made by Shah and Iranian Government in improving defense situation in Middle East.

2. US Government has ascribed very high importance indeed to position and contribution of Iran to defense of Free World, and prizes highly friendship between Iran and US. In connection with Iranian defense efforts, US has noted with warm approval fact Shah has taken steps to begin process of creating a sense of regional solidarity and, as Shah knows, US is prepared send an observer to forthcoming Four-Power Military Staff Talks. It remains hope of US that Iran will see its way clear to adherence to Baghdad Pact at relatively early date, thus completing and closing line of resolute opposition to Communist menace. In this line of opposition it is anticipated Iran can play significant role.

3. As far as US military assistance programs for Iran are concerned, US counting heavily on results from US training teams now working with Armed Forces in Iran, and will give much weight to their findings. On specific question of US aid in support Iranian defense programs it is anticipated deliveries based upon current programs will be maintained during FY 1956 at same general rate that has been accomplished to date. These deliveries, as Shah knows, are calculated in relation to gradual buildup of Iranian manpower, availability of facilities, and other factors entering into capabilities of forces to absorb equipment.

4. Shah undoubtedly recognizes US Mutual Security Program is carried out in collaboration with other free nations and is worldwide in its perspective. US has global objective of developing defensive strength of free world, and as matter of first priority, developing defensive capabilities of those free nations participating in collective security arrangements.

5. In addition, US must take into account limited availability of funds provided by US Congress, and presently incomplete evaluation of Iranian Armed Forces.

6. However, in view Iran's temporary lack of funds during period necessary for return of revenue from its oil resources, US recognizes special need for timely assistance to assure continued progress of its defensive capabilities in preparation for its rightful participation in plans for collective defense of Middle East area.

7. Therefore, in spite current shortage US funds available worldwide assistance, US is making budgetary arrangements, subject approval funds by Congress and increased capability Iranian forces absorb equipment,² to provide additional military assistance funds which will assure an increase in military assistance during FY 1957 and FY 1958 above average rate prevailing during recent years. Anticipated thereby make possible for Shah proceed with early arrangements for development of a Middle East collective defense organization.

FYI Statements Paragraphs 3 and 7 re future deliveries imply deliveries against remaining \$34 million (as of 31 March 55) in existing programs and additional \$25 million each FY 57 and 58. This aid not necessarily limited exclusively end-items since we prepared include some forms military assistance other than end-items and training if necessary for balanced program. Dollar figure should not be communicated GOI.

Dulles

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 788.5–MSP/7–1155. Secret. Drafted by Crowl and cleared in NEA and S/MSA; cleared in draft with Hoover and Ohly of ICA; and approved by Allen. Effective July 1, 1955, FOA was abolished and its functions and personnel were transferred to the International Cooperation Administration (ICA).

² Telegram 68 to Tehran, July 12, reiterated the condition of Congressional approval for the increased future military program. The telegram concluded: “In other words, we wish avoid implication of binding commitment to Iran for additional two year period even though Iran might swing towards neutralist bloc or otherwise show unsatisfactory performance.” (*Ibid.*, 788.5–MSP/7–1255)

321. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State¹

Tehran, July 19, 1955—4 p.m.

108. Following presentation of credentials today (Embtel 100),² Shah took me to his private study where we had some forty minutes talk. After exchange of pleasantries, I stated I had personal message of some importance to give him and read from prepared memorandum containing substance Deptels 55³ and 68.⁴

Shah listened without interruption until I had finished and thanked me for the message. While formality of occasion might have restrained any apparent emotional reaction, he did not, however, seem particularly elated, his reaction being that of one who had heard nothing unexpected. He said that five years ago he had attempted to draw attention of US to necessity building up GOI military forces in order that Iran should take its place in northern defense line against Soviet Union. While appreciating the considerable military assistance extended, he implied that to his regret, for reasons of which he was unaware, the US had not seen fit to act fully upon his suggestion. He was, however, gratified at recent interest shown by President Eisenhower and others.

Shah agreed Iran should eventually join in regional security pact, but felt that staff talks should take place well in advance of any Iran political

decision to join such pact. He stated that telegram just received from Iranian Ambassador Ankara reported Turks had suggested these talks be held Habaniya August 4. At a later period when acting Foreign Minister Samii joined us Shah instructed latter to reply date was perfectly satisfactory to Shah who felt that sooner these talks took place the better, but that decision as to date in last analysis naturally lay with Iraqi Government.

Shah reiterated frankly what I understand has already been reported to Department on several occasions as regards his willingness to adhere to the Baghdad Pact. He said Iran must have defense forces which were not markedly inferior in equipment or training to those of Turkey and Pakistan, and that even more important a feeling of confidence should have been built up in Iranian Army and people that their armed forces were capable of taking their place in the line as co-equals with other participants. He also said that eventual political decision would depend to an important extent upon whether Iran would be able financially to maintain an army of that size. While statements I had given him covered this contingency in part he was not at all sure that future revenues of Iran would be sufficient to meet greatly expanded military costs. It was important, moreover, that Iran went ahead with its program to expand economy and to raise standard of living since this was not only humanitarian but was the best defense against communism.

Conversation then turned to summit talks and he asked if we had any information which might be of interest to him. He had read extracts of President's speech⁵ but said he would be grateful for the text, which Embassy will supply. In response to his direct question I said it was my purely personal impression from statements which had been made by President and Secretary of State that we did not necessarily expect any startling concrete results out of summit but hoped that meetings might contribute to development of atmosphere of lessened tension and greater understanding during which constructive work might be achieved by further direct negotiations.

He said he was in no doubt as to reasons behind Soviet invitation to him to visit Moscow and obviously he had digested arguments which under Dept's

instructions Rountree has passed onto Ala (Embtel 20).⁶ He said he of course had had to accept invitation in principle, but he had no intention of making visit in near future. Here also much would depend on forthcoming developments and he again mentioned Habaniya military talks and visit of Turkish President who he said had indicated strong interest in early adherence of Iran to Baghdad pact.

Since this was our first meeting I gathered impression that Shah although cordial was naturally somewhat reserved and did not express his opinions quite as frankly as he might later. I therefore do not feel that I should attempt any evaluation beyond that given above until I have seen more of him.

Chapin

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 788.5–MSP/7–1955. Secret.

² Dated July 19, not printed. (*Ibid.*, 123–Chapin, Selden) Chapin was appointed Ambassador on May 31.

³ [Supra](#).

⁴ See [footnote 2, supra](#).

⁵ Apparent reference to Eisenhower’s “Opening Statement at the Geneva Conference,” July 18, 1955; for text, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1955*, pp. 707–712.

⁶ [Document 316](#). Presumably, however, the reference should be to telegram 54 to Tehran, [Document 319](#).

322. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iran¹

Washington, August 5, 1955—5:56 p.m.

226. Urtels 166, 177 and 189.² FYI In view Shah's obvious desire speed up timetable Moscow visit, Department believes inadvisable counsel further delay. Also there are factors recommending fairly early trip: a) As Shah pointed out, continued uncertainty re his plans may create atmosphere equivocation in Iran which might operate against current political trend toward West, b) In absence overall Middle East defense plans and until complete evaluation Iranian military capabilities (not forthcoming for another year) US not in position answer specifically Shah's request for greatly expanded military aid. During this difficult but unavoidable interim Shah's frustrations likely increase. Might be better for him visit Moscow soon while still relatively confident his position rather than next spring when he may be plagued with irritating frustrations, c) Difficult counsel protracted delay when next few months likely see increased number high level visits to and by Soviet leaders.

Would be useful obtain Shah's ideas on matters of substance Soviets might raise and his anticipated reply which we hope would be non-committal in line his role of constitutional monarch. Has he any indication Soviets might offer economic assistance, suggest non-aggression pact, propose increased trade, or attempt dissuade him from joining Middle East Pact. US interested his views these questions because they have important bearing on US planning re substance and timetable of programs in Iran. Discussion along these lines designed a) assist Shah in formulating his own ideas, and b) modify Shah's evident belief US has sole responsibility for creating conditions permitting Iran to join Middle East Pact by hinting Shah himself responsible for conducting Iranian affairs in such way as to make it possible for US to assist him. End FYI.

In discussing Moscow trip you may advance following as Department's views, making clear decision on timing is of course for Shah to make and he in best position weigh all factors.

1. We previously suggested delay until after Summit and FonMin meetings in order be able estimate more accurately Soviet intentions. Early analysis summit talks (Deptel 2 17)³ does not offer reason believe current Soviet friendship maneuvers signify any fundamental change Soviet policies. While October FonMin meeting may produce further grist for analysis we think Shah will be on safe ground if he conducts himself in Moscow on basis foregoing evaluation Soviet position.

2. Shah's view Summit and FonMin meetings of no concern to him unless Iran directly discussed overlooks value these meetings as test Soviet intentions which makes them important for whole world and certainly pertinent to Shah's problem of deciding how react to Soviet overtures.

3. Department recognizes validity Shah's point that delay and continuing public uncertainty regarding Moscow trip may cause Iranian speculation visit will be followed by changes in GOI policies. Fact that invitation and Shah's acceptance now public knowledge does cast shadow over Iran's policies which might well be removed by early visit.

4. Shah may consider desirable postpone trip until Tehran visit Turkish President. In view Turkey's dual position in NATO and new Middle East pact and view its long successful experience dealing with Russians Shah may wish profit from Turkish views on present Soviet posture. Visit of Turkish President before Shah's Moscow visit might also have effect restraining public speculation as to possible shift Iranian foreign policy.

5. Hope Shah will continue keep Embassy informed his plans and if he later desires discuss subjects for conversation in Moscow, Department glad offer assistance possible.

6. In event Shah again requests specific data re US increased military aid (urtel 164)⁴ he should be informed matter under active consideration Washington. He should be given no further specific assurances at this time nor be encouraged connect your

previous assurances of military assistance with ARMISH MAAG submittal May 26.

Dulles

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 788.00/8–555. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Hannah and Baxter. Repeated to London and Moscow.; ² In these telegrams, dated July 31, August 2, and August 4, respectively, the Embassy reported that the Shah was contemplating visiting the Soviet Union in the near future. (*Ibid.*, 788.00/7–3155, 788.00/8–255, and 123–Chapin, Selden) ³ Dated August 4, not printed. (*Ibid.*, 396.1/8–455) ⁴ Dated July 30, not printed. (*Ibid.*, 788.5–MSP/7–3055)

323. Letter From the Secretary of Defense (Wilson) to the Secretary of State¹

Washington, August 5, 1955.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Reference is made to your letter of June 27, 1955,² and subsequent oral requests from Under Secretary of State Hoover to Deputy Secretary of Defense Anderson, stressing overriding political factors and requesting consideration of increased military assistance to Iran, in light of current prospects for accession by Iran to the Turco-Iraqi Pact.

From the military point of view, additional military assistance funds for Iran to the extent of \$50 million, as proposed, could not be justified prior to completion of the current evaluation of the Iranian Armed Forces, or prior to a decision as to the role Iran might be expected to play in Middle East defense arrangements. Even when this had been accomplished, consideration of additional military assistance funds for Iran should be made in the light of other Middle East area requirements and worldwide competition for the limited MDAP funds then available, as well as the increasing reluctance of Congress to provide new funds.

It should be noted that the worldwide Mutual Defense Assistance programs for the fiscal years 1950 through 1955 are presently unfunded in the amount of approximately \$500 million, and the MDA losses under section 1311 of the Appropriations Act of 1954³ result in an additional shortage of \$228 million. From this it can be readily seen that any additional military assistance for Iran in fiscal year 1956 would have to be accomplished at the expense of higher priority programs for other countries.

It has been established that, as of March 31, 1955, out of the Mutual Defense Assistance matériel programs for fiscal years 1950 through 1955 totaling \$115.8 million for Iran, a total of \$81.7 million has been shipped. It is considered that the undelivered balance of the fiscal years 1950 through 1955 programs will assure the continuation of deliveries at the current rate through fiscal year 1956, which appears to be the extent of the Iranian forces' ability to absorb military matériel.

For the cited political reasons, and in spite of the lack of a firm military basis, the Department of Defense concurred in the transmission of a Department of State cable (Number 55 to the Embassy in Tehran dated July 1.1, 1955)⁴ authorizing Ambassador Chapin to assure the Shah of Iran that military matériel deliveries will be continued at the current rate throughout fiscal year 1956, and that military assistance will be increased during fiscal years 1957 and 1958.

While the Shah of Iran was not informed of the dollar figures, he has been assured of the planned increase in military assistance above the current delivery rate, which is approximately \$20 million annually. Hence, it is considered necessary to include the planned \$25 million annually for fiscal years 1957 and 1958 as valid commitments in the presentation of tentative military assistance programs to the Congress for each of the two years involved.

Sincerely yours,

C.E. Wilson

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 788.5–MSP/8–555. Top Secret.

² [Document 314](#).

³ Apparent reference to the Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1955, approved August 26, 1954; 68 Stat. 830.

⁴ [Document 320](#).

324. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State¹

Tehran, September 1, 1955—1 p.m.

370. This is joint Embassy, USOM/I, ARMISH–MAAG message. Country team convinced basic contradiction requiring early policy reviews exists (Embtels 164² and 316³ and Deptel 226⁴) between US encouragement Iran proceed with adherence Baghdad Pact and US delay in decisions respecting military and other aid required for effective Iranian participation regional defense on minimum basis. This contradiction could delay Iranian adherence Pact and seriously embarrass whole US plan and policy for Middle East defense. We are moving either too rapidly on Pact or too slowly on assurance minimum aid Iran clearly implied by our expressed interest Iranian Pact adherence. Decision to encourage Pact presumes acceptance of at least its minimum aid implications and, despite limited and vague nature US aid assurances given Shah, provides Iran with strong basis for requesting adequate expanded aid after Iranian adherence Pact. If Iran adheres to Pact on urging Turkey and Pakistan, it will be on assumption by all three that US will come through with necessary aid to make arrangements effective. Ambassador's statement to Shah on instruction Dept (Deptel 55),⁵ although not specific, would appear to give Shah some basis for such an assumption. There is obviously no other source than US from which to meet military deficiencies. We think it possible however that Shah will delay Pact adherence pending receipt further US aid assurances.

Shah states and Chief ARMISH–MAAG also believes that moderate forces recommended ARMISH–MAAG submittal May 26 represent minimum Iranian ground forces capable reasonable contribution regional defense. This assumes truncated defense Iran along Zagros Mountains. Northern (Elburz) defense concept favored by Turkey and Pakistan as required by their own defense would be far more expensive.

US military aid now envisaged appears to fall short of support even for forces recommended by ARMISH-MAAG May 26. Moreover, full account not yet taken of complementary aid, namely, direct forces support and defense support, concurrently necessary with military aid to support military buildup, strengthen civilian economic complement of military strength and avoid intolerable inflation. Importance civilian factor emphasized by vulnerability political structure Iran.

Question of training team results and Iranian military capability seems overstressed if position so far taken respecting Pact not premature. Sharp disparagement Iranian military capability some quarters seems to neglect some training results to date as well as Middle East defense perspective and necessity of working with material at hand to achieve US defense objectives.

Approaching visit Iran of Turkish President in September should intensify issues of Iranian Pact adherence and US aid Iran over which Shah restive. Habbaniya talks complicated question somewhat owing partly attention given northern [tier] defense concept. Fact of Shah's pending visit Moscow probably also having some effect Iranian thinking. Most auspicious time Iranian Pact adherence may now be heard [*at hand*].

Country Team in view above and having perused OCB documents Iran July 6⁶ re NSC 5504⁷ finds conclusion inescapable that time has come for review of central issues of US aid policy Iran in relation US basic objectives Iran and plan and policy for defense Middle East, taking due account new factors such as Summit conference.

Further Country Team views this subject contained Emb desp 104 air pouched August 31.⁸

Decision Icato 258⁹ just received to reserve \$25 million direct forces and defense support based on AMA estimate Dec 15 as target date for Defense Dept consideration this FY 56 program submittal renders the problem described above more acute and a policy decision more imperative. It also creates additional immediate and embarrassing problems in relations Iran owing to Washington publication tentative \$55 million non military end-

item aid figure at earlier date and to familiarity Shah and GOI with planned FY 56 program \$25 million defense construction.

Chapin

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 788.5–MSP/9–155. Secret.

² See [footnote 4, Document 322](#).

³ In telegram 316, August 23, the Ambassador reported on a conversation he had with the British Chargé and the Shah on August 22; Chapin summarized the conversation in telegram 316 as follows: “Summing up, although conversation lengthy, it would appear that chief purpose of Shah’s summoning us was put himself in favorable light on both domestic and foreign issues and then appeal again for Western, i.e. US, military and also budgetary aid in order that he might go ahead and adhere to Baghdad Pact. It is possible, moreover, that Shah felt that by bringing in British on his appeal, he believed this might increase pressure on US.” (Department of State, Central Files, 788.00/8–2355) ⁴ [Document 322](#).

⁵ [Document 320](#).

⁶ Reference is to the OCB Progress Report, “U.S. Policy Toward Iran,” and OCB “Outline Plan of Operations,” both dated July 6; see [footnote 2, Document 317](#).

⁷ [Document 291](#).

⁸ Dated August 26, not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/8–2655) ⁹ Not printed. (Washington National Records Center, ICA Files: FRC 57 A 248, Box 81, Tehran)

325. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State¹

Tehran, September 3, 1955—1 p.m.

386. Following is text of confidential memorandum handed me Sept 2 (Embtel 385, Sept 3)² by PriMin:

*Begin text.*³ The US should realize that the adherence of Iran to the Turkish-Iraqi Pact is a matter of vital importance which must

be considered very carefully.

At a time when the USSR is showing unexpected conciliation in settling differences and making friendly overtures, early adherence, in our present weak condition, might provoke hostile reaction and dangerous retaliation.

An examination of the Turkish-Iraqi treaty does not anywhere reveal a guaranty on the part of the US to come to the defense of Iraq (or of Iran should she join the Baghdad Pact) in case of attack by Soviet forces. Would a transgression of our border by Russia constitute a casus belli?

Turkey of course is amply protected being a member of NATO, with American and British warships close by in the Eastern Mediterranean, and military aerodromes constructed by the US.

Public opinion and the feeling of parliament must be taken into account. The ground must be prepared; at present, opinion is divided (e.g. Taqizadeh⁴ who is hesitant and in favor of neutrality and enjoys the confidence of the people in contrast with Djamal Emami⁵ who is distrusted and all for joining the Baghdad Pact at once).

(a) A greater amount of financial assistance by the US (60 percent of our revenue is now spent on our small army which must be increased and improved. Should we borrow money to finance our army? The ordinary budget cannot stand the strain of both civil and military expenditure and, as is well known, the oil revenues are by law earmarked for the carrying out of development projects by the Plan Organization);

(b) The betterment of the lot of the people;

(c) The recognition of Iranian sovereignty over the Bahrain Islands by the US and Great Britain (which would have a tremendous psychological effect on the people at large, making Great Britain and the US extremely popular);

(d) A guaranty that the US and Great Britain would immediately come to the defense of Iran should she be attacked by the USSR;

—all of these would strengthen the hands of the Iranian Govt in taking a decision. There is no idea of bargaining or of blackmail.

I am merely putting the facts clearly before you. Our sympathies are entirely with the West and our friendship for America is wholehearted and unshakeable. There is no thought of our going behind the Iron Curtain which, by the way, is being lifted after the Geneva talks. But we, we must know where we are going and calculate all the risks involved.

Although the Turkish President's visit is really in return for the late Shah's visit to the late Ataturk, we must be prepared to reply to any proposals or suggestions of Mr. Bayar. We must be clear about our requirements: Security and peace to improve the lot of the people; American financial, economic, and military assistance; a guaranty of our independence and an assurance that the US and Great Britain will come to our help if and when we are attacked.

(When Iran joins a regional defensive collective security pact she must do so with prestige and honor; with sufficient strength to protect her borders; with a clear assurance that the US and Great Britain will come to her assistance if attacked, i.e. a guaranty of her political independence and territorial integrity.) *End text.*

Chapin

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/9–355. Secret; Priority.

² In telegram 385, the Ambassador reported a discussion with Ala on September 2 which touched on many subjects including Iran's adherence to the Baghdad Pact and American military assistance to Iran. At the end of this discussion, Ala handed Chapin the text of the memorandum transmitted in telegram 386. (*Ibid.*, 780.5/9–355) ³ The original memorandum in Ala's handwriting was transmitted to the Department in despatch 131 from Tehran, September 8. (*Ibid.*, 780.5/9–855) ⁴ Seyed Hasan Taqizadeh, President of the Senate.

⁵ Elected Senator from Tehran.

326. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State¹

Tehran, September 5, 1955—noon.

391. Following are country team comments on my discussion with Prime Minister Ala and his memo reported Embtels 385 and 386, September 3:²

1. Although having no official status, memorandum represents considered Iranian initial negotiating position and has backing of Shah, who may well have inspired it. It constitutes most complete price tag, in political, economic and military terms, that Iranians have so far placed on their adherence to regional defense pact. Factors leading to various components this price have been building up gradually over some time. Presentation now constitutes important element of Iranian preparation for imminent visit Turkish President and anticipated strong Turkish pressure for pact adherence.

2. It is conceivable that price has been set so high in order provide GOI with excuse for indefinite delay and eventual refusal enter pact, but we do not think Iranian Government has made or is likely in near future make any such negative decision. In stating its conditions GOI may anticipate response that will give grounds for not making decision at time of Turkish visit. Basic intent memorandum probably, as Ala states, find out where they stand as step towards eventual adherence to pact, adherence on which Ala at best lukewarm but which has been a constant in Shah's policy both because of his serious interest in defense of Iran and sentimental attachment to army and because of ambitions for additional prestige, for greater personal power within country and greater influence with neighbors.

3. Despite this intent join pact, completely negative and unsympathetic reply from US would mean at very least indefinite delay actual adherence to pact. Such delay would be publicly

regarded as tantamount refusal and might in fact bring about reversion traditional Iranian avoidance of foreign commitments.

4. Without assessing merits of case, there is little question that leaders public opinion Iran as elsewhere have been greatly affected in their thinking by course of world events, apparent West–East détente and new “sweet reasonableness” of Soviet Union. They may feel both consciously and subconsciously that there is now less reason for them take on additional burdens and incur additional risks in face what appears to them to be diminishing US aid and interest. Reflection of a corresponding attitude in US, namely that it is no longer worth our while building up Iran’s forces—could very well be taken as confirmation of such doubts by those responsible for Iranian policy.

5. With respect to request for additional financial, economic and military assistance, Ala’s approach serves to underscore real inadequacy of US assurances so far given (Embtels 164, July 30,³ and 370, September 1,⁴ and Embdes 475, April 25,⁵ 41, July 9,⁶ and 104 August 26⁷). Meeting increased defense budgets as armed forces expand is a real problem in Shah’s mind, and he has emphasized to Ambassador need for US budgetary support for this purpose. Although US might be able resort to some aid formula other than continuing budgetary support, we consider that US cannot escape need for providing additional military and complementary aid in order assist Iran meet range of problems that must be solved if Iran to make desired contribution to regional defense.

6. With respect request for US/UK guarantee territorial integrity, believe that Shah will ultimately be satisfied with considerably less than face value of request. Essence of what Shah and Ala have in mind is that US and UK undertake to come to aid of Iran if attacked by Soviets. Although ultimate decision will be Shah’s, he is undoubtedly influenced on this point by widespread genuine apprehension among Iranians that adherence to pact without some

assurance of US protection would gratuitously expose Iran. (Ala correct that few Iranians now see concrete benefits from mere membership in pact.) Ambassador would much appreciate early indication, and in any case in advance of visit Turkish President, as to what assurances US might be ready to give.

7. With respect to bid for recognition Iranian sovereignty over Bahrein, this is clearly bargaining counter and Iranians may well have put it forward in order to provide prompt example of their “moderation” when they withdraw it.

8. US is now faced with necessity for determining US actions and assurances necessary to obtain Iranian pact adherence, readiness of US to pay this price, and consequences for US policy of possible Iranian decision not to adhere to pact owing absence adequate US measures. Failure of Northern Tier concept to be brought to completion within reasonable period of time would be regarded in Iran as US political failure that would weaken our influence on other aspects Iranian policy. We assume that loss of prestige would extend to pact members and other Middle East states. In this connection would point to fact Soviet propaganda already trying to make capital out of claim that policy of neutrality and non-participation military blocs and coalitions is developing in Middle East (Embassy Moscow telegram 541 to Department September 1).⁸

Chapin

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/9–555. Secret; Priority. Repeated priority to London.

² Telegram 386 is *supra*. Regarding telegram 385, see [footnote 2 thereto](#).

³ See [footnote 4](#), [Document 322](#).

⁴ [Document 324](#).

⁵ [Document 308](#).

⁶ Despatch 41, “Semi-Annual Evaluation of Progress Toward Attainment of United States Mutual Security Objectives” in Iran, is not printed.

(Department of State, Central Files, 788.5–MSP/7–955) ⁷ Not printed. (*Ibid.*, 780.5/8–2055) ⁸ Not printed. (*Ibid.*, 396.1–GE/9–155)

327. Memorandum of Discussion at the 258th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, September 8, 1955¹

Washington, September 8, 1955

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and items 1. “Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security,” 2. “Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles Program,” 3. “Activation of a Volunteer Freedom Corps,” and 4. “Evacuation of U.S. Civilian Population Abroad Prior to Hostilities Involving Regimes Hostile to the United States.”]

5. *U.S. Policy Toward Iran* (NSC 5504;² Progress Report, dated July 6, 1955, by OCB on NSC 5504³) At the conclusion of his briefing of the Council on the reference Progress Report, Mr. Anderson indicated that Secretary Hoover was prepared to comment on developments in Iran which had occurred since the end of the period covered by the Progress Report.

In response to Mr. Anderson’s request, Secretary Hoover read from paragraph 22 of the Progress Report,⁴ dealing with the subject of the role of Iran in the defense of the Middle East. He then summarized a recent message from the U.S. Embassy in Tehran which gave Iran’s asking price for adhering to the Baghdad Pact.⁵ Secretary Hoover pointed out that this constituted Iran’s initial bargaining position. The Iranians were of course very astute traders and bargainers, but Secretary Hoover thought that the price that they had set was too high and that the Shah would be satisfied with rather less. Nevertheless, the United States could not possibly afford a completely negative reply to the Iranian message, and must be prepared to do a little trading and bargaining itself. Over and beyond this, it was obvious to Secretary Hoover that the United States Government must determine within the next few weeks what price it was willing to pay to secure the adherence of Iran to the Baghdad Pact. Finally, Secretary Hoover said that our Embassy in Tehran believed, and the State Department agreed, that the United States would be obliged to provide more military and economic aid to Iran. “We were smack up against the wire.”

*The National Security Council:*⁶

Noted and discussed the reference Progress Report on the subject by the Operations Coordinating Board.

[Here follow items 6. “Antartica,” 7. “Expansion of the Labor Service Organization in Germany,” and 8. “United States Objectives and Courses of Action With Respect to Latin America.”]

S. Everett Gleason

¹ Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Drafted by Gleason on September 15.

² [Document 291](#).

³ See [footnote 2, Document 317](#).

⁴ Paragraph 22 reads as follows: “The U.S. position is that no determination as to the size and character of aid programs for Iran can be made until the exact role of Iranian forces in supporting a regional defense concept is determined. Accordingly, the Shah should be informed that, while the U.S. is prepared to help, the U.S. cannot support a large-scale development of the defensive delaying capabilities of the Iranian armed forces until the forces’ requirements are determined and an evaluation of training teams is known (in about a year) and unless we are assured that the ability of the Iranian Army to maintain internal security is not impaired thereby. It appears that the U.S. will not be in a position to give early military advice to the Shah regarding the role which Iran should play in Middle East defense or to provide at an early date large-scale military aid as envisaged by him.”

⁵ [Document 325](#).

⁶ The following paragraph constitutes NSC Action No. 1435, September 8. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

328. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs

(Jernegan) to the Acting Secretary of State¹

Washington, September 9, 1955.

SUBJECT

The Analysis of the Internal Security Situation in Iran and Recommended Action Pursuant to NSC Action 1290-d²

The attached paper on the internal security situation in Iran is scheduled for consideration by the OCB on September 14.³

1. Surveys of the subversive potential in Iran and of the Iranian security forces indicate that:

a) While the Tudeh Party is now incapable of seizing power, it could rebuild itself rapidly if present Iranian security programs were relaxed or if lack of effective national leadership resulted in further political disunity.

b) Iranian security forces are capable of repressing internal disturbances provided the Army remains loyal to the Shah and provided he is able to supply the necessary leadership.

c) Lack of effective coordination of the various rival Iranian anti-subversive agencies (among other factors) prevents the security forces from destroying the remaining vestiges of Tudeh organization.

2. Consideration of U.S. assistance for improving the anti-subversive potential of Iran must take account of two prime political factors:

a) In view of the relationship between U.S. aid and the Shah's attitude toward Iranian participation in Middle East defense, it would be dangerous to inform him that

the development of defensive delaying capacities is to be subordinated to internal security.

b) If U.S. advice and assistance in the internal security field were to operate to reduce the value of the Army as the prime guarantor of the Shah's political strength, it would be met with royal and military resistance and, even if accepted, would tend to weaken the most important elements of stability in Iran.

3. Within the framework of these political limiting factors, two specific recommendations in the paper require special mention:

[Subparagraph a (10 lines of source text) not declassified]

b) The Shah expects Iranian entry into the Baghdad Pact to be followed by U.S. action to build up his forces for participation in Middle East defense. Efforts to urge the Shah to join have elicited Iranian requests for increased assistance which the U.S. does not intend to give. Therefore, because of the political repercussions which will result when the Shah learns that Iranian entry into the Baghdad Pact will not be followed by substantially increased U.S. aid, it is recommended the United States not press Iran to join the Pact now. The urgency and dangers implicit in this situation are emphasized by recent Tehran telegrams, reporting new efforts by the Iranians to extract specific commitments from the United States prior to Iranian entry into the Pact.

Recommendation

That you approve the paper.⁴

¹ Source: Department of State, GTI Files: Lot 58 D 338, NSC 155. Top Secret. Drafted by Hannah.

² See [footnotes 1](#) and [2, Document 308](#).

³ The paper is not attached. See the editorial note, *infra*.

⁴ The final text of this paper, as approved by the OCB on December 14, is in Department of State, OCB Files: Lot 62 D 430, Iran 1954–1955.

329. Editorial Note

At the September 14 meeting of the OCB, the paper on the internal security situation in Iran (see [supra](#)) was discussed. The following extract from a memorandum from Max Bishop, Operations Coordinator in the Office of the Under Secretary of State, to Allen, September 15, contains a report on the discussion of Iran at the OCB meeting:

“1290–d Report on Iran

“Mr. Hoover discussed the problems of Iran at considerable length and made inter alia the following points: The NSC has recently discussed the Iranian problem; both the Department of State and CIA are deeply concerned at general developments, trends and attitudes in Iran; that whether Iran stays active on the side of the Free World or reverts to its traditional role of neutralism depends in great part on the military program and military developments in Iran; and that the Shah has personally built a great deal on the armed forces program.

“Mr. Hoover went on to point out that a year ago last February the Shah had burned his bridges and come firmly over to the side of the United States, that subsequently he had come to the United States and had been given promises and commitments by the President and other officials of the United States. These promises were not in goods or dollars but in programs. Mr. Hoover urged Assistant Secretary Gray of Defense to dig into this problem and take a good look at it in the expectation that in the very near future State will be sitting down with Defense for a thorough review of the entire Iranian situation. Mr. Hoover felt that we would have to face up to this problem and make some basic decisions on the proposals which Iran has made recently, undoubtedly with the Shah’s full blessing. In regard to these proposals, Mr. Hoover said once we strip away the ‘rug bargaining’ items, such as Bahrein, we have to take the Shah seriously. General Cabell of CIA expressed complete agreement

with everything that Mr. Hoover had said and added that the British are also greatly concerned about developments and trends in Iran. Dr. FitzGerald pointed out that at the end of the year we will have to tell the Iranians that we will not continue budget support. Mr. Hoover discussed this problem briefly, stating that we are certainly not going to give the Iranians budget support and balance their budget for them; that they have adequate oil revenues, in fact, more oil revenues than they had anticipated. He said again that he and General Cabell would be sitting down with Gordon Gray and others from their respective agencies soon to discuss this problem.

“The report was noted.” (Department of State, Central Files, 100.4-OCB/9-1555)

330. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iran¹

Washington, September 17, 1955—3:23 p.m.

460. Department recognizes import problems raised your 370² and 391.³ Broad aspects under consideration (since your 164)⁴ by interested agencies. Meanwhile, suggest you explain following to Shah and Ala:⁵

1) Department concerned by Iranian tendency (implicit in Ala memo) regard accession Baghdad Pact as favor to U.S. for which latter should pay high price. U.S. position is we believe Iran will find it in her interest to join but Iran must make up own mind strictly on basis own interests. Basic principle regional pacts is coherent defense based on broad participation. Iran must decide whether inherent advantages this principle as well as advantages regular military political liaison with ME neighbors and increased Iranian prestige are sufficiently important to warrant accession to pact.

2) As for guarantee Iran's frontiers against USSR aggression, you may reiterate your point that Korea experience shows Iran has great protection in commitments undertaken by U.S. in U.N. GOI will recall effective U.S. help in Azerbaijan crisis. However, U.S. cannot commit itself to conditions, some relating to military problems which cannot be settled outside regional context and others which not germane, e.g. Bahrein.

3) U.S. surprised Ala would raise Bahrein claim, legal basis of which extremely doubtful.⁶ If GOI attempts link Bahrein question with ME defense, it might well provide Govt's internal enemies with new vehicle for launching move unseat Govt, start chain reaction dubious claims involving other Iranian frontiers, and perhaps culminating in repetition irrational Mosadeq period which made possible by fanatical and Commie exploitation oil issue. Such irresponsible action would not only make ME defense

pact impossible but might well impede successful continuation U.S. aid programs in Iran.

4) U.S. doubts USSR would go so far as take actions which would prejudice its assiduously developed current peace campaign. Believe Shah's reported answers to Lavrentiev well-taken.⁷ As Iran knows, USSR continually probes for weak spots by making threats which it fails implement when confronted by strength or firmness. In 1954 Soviets adopted milder policy and negotiated frontier-financial agreement with strongly anti-Commie, pro-West Iranian Govt rather than with previous vacillating, Commie-infiltrated Mosadeq regime. As for internal sabotage this is matter for Iran security forces. U.S. gratified by effective anti-Commie campaign of last 2 years which appears have given security forces effective control, to benefit of Iran as well as free world.

5) As for U.S. assistance, we have in past demonstrated willingness aid Iran financially, economically and have given substantial military assistance without reference to Iran's adherence to any regional pact. Your first speech to Shah explained decision continue military aid to Iran at somewhat higher level than in past, despite U.S. financial limitations. Surely no question can arise of sincerity and good intentions of U.S. toward Iran. U.S. now reviewing military equipment situation in effort find maximum assistance for Iran within current fund limitations and Iranian capabilities but unable make specific commitments at this juncture beyond those already made. Any event, believe Iran should consider question Pact adherence on own merits as outlined above. Although Shah and PriMin can be sure U.S. will do all it can to assist in strengthening armed forces, believe GOI would err if it based its policy toward regional defense solely upon the size of anticipated aid rather than upon its own self-interest and improved Iranian ME prestige.

6) If Turk President discusses Baghdad Pact, believe Shah should carefully consider what Bayar says since Turkey's role of great

importance in ME defense. Turks have considerable experience in multinational defense problems and intimate Turk-Iran exchange views would be especially desirable.

FYI: Although U.S. favors Iranian accession Baghdad Pact, extreme financial stringency which has developed in recent months, plus increased evidence Shah's desire make accession contingent on large U.S. commitments, compel U.S. move slowly order counteract GOI inclination put increasing price tags on accession. Although U.S. Govt seriously re-examining equipment availabilities and seeking all possible ways assist Iran, nevertheless, for financial reasons we unable increase dollar aid substantially to any country simply because of adherence Baghdad Pact. In view retarded status regional defense planning, U.S. cannot commit itself, even indirectly, to any specific concept ME defense. Furthermore, U.S. not prepared join Pact pending substantial alleviation Arab-Israel conflict. Therefore, to extent possible, U.S. desires separate question adherence Baghdad Pact from level of military aid.

U.S. does not desire so to discourage Shah that he loses heart for Western association, interest in Baghdad Pact or confidence in his internal position. However, given above factors it would be dangerous mislead him into believing U.S. prepared purchase Iran's adherence. Difficult though it be, U.S. object now is maintain Shah's appreciation importance laying political foundation of Northern Tier while persuading him specific questions re level and types of aid are long-run continuously changing problems which cannot be irrevocably decided at any given moment.

Will provide further guidance when available.

Dulles

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/9-1755. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Hannah and cleared with Baxter, Jernegan, Hoover, and DOD/ISA. Repeated to Ankara, Baghdad, and London.

² [Document 324](#).

³ [Document 326](#).

⁴ See [footnote 4](#), [Document 322](#).

⁵ Done, according to telegram 511 from Tehran, September 23. (Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/9–2355) ⁶ The Iranian claim to Bahrein was based in large part on the fact that Persia had ruled Bahrein from 1602 to 1783.

⁷ Reference is to a conversation between the Shah and Soviet Ambassador Lavrentiev, September 8, reported in telegram 424 from Tehran, September 9. Lavrentiev protested “in strongest terms” against “heavy pressure brought to bear upon Shah and Iranian Government to adhere to Baghdad Pact.” The Soviet Ambassador continued that Iran’s adherence to the pact “would be a blow to world peace and to international understanding, and distinctly prejudicial to friendly relations between USSR and Iran.” The Shah replied that “no pressure had or was being exerted upon him or Iran to join any pact. However, like all other independent countries and members of the United Nations, Iran reserved to itself complete liberty of action to take any defensive measures it might think fit. Iran had no aggressive intentions against Soviet Union, nor was it in position even if it wanted to resort to such aggression. Moreover, Shah requested Soviet Ambassador to inform his government that Iran did not intend to allow establishment upon Iranian soil of military bases of any country unless Iran were attacked.” (Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/9–955)

331. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State¹

Tehran, September 27, 1955—5 p.m.

532. Foreign Minister Entezam asked me to call today. He told me that Government of Iran (Shah) had definitely decided during Turco-Iranian conversations to join Baghdad Pact sometime before October 26. Exact date of announcement not yet determined and depended upon progress shown preparing ground in Majlis. Factor in Iran’s decision was feeling that announcement of adherence prior to Geneva conference would increase Iran’s prestige. If it joined afterwards Iran might seem to be climbing on the band wagon. He had been fully informed of my comments to Ala under Department’s instructions (my telegram 511);² I repeated these to make quite sure. He wished to make it clear that Iran is taking this step because of

its own self-interest and “unconditionally”. However, he could not hide Iranian concern over difficult budgetary situation. Iran hoped that after adherence U.S., in its (U.S.) own self-interest, would find it possible to give some additional assistance to military budget. I repeated now familiar arguments and told him that I could not hold out any hope of support beyond that already indicated. I told him I would be less than frank if I did not point out that it would be most unlikely, if not impossible, for U.S. to justify further budgetary assistance to Iran in light availability oil revenues. U.S. recognizes Iran’s need for economic development, and most certainly would not advocate that entire amount of oil revenues be used to meet military deficit. I reminded Mr. Entezam that vague statement of a need for budgetary assistance had been raised many times before, but Iranian government had given no evidence that Government itself knows what aid is required and for how long.

I said our repeated requests for data on this subject have been unanswered. Mr. Entezam said that he could assure me that crisis was only temporary; if they could weather next 2 or 3 years, they would take care of their own budget. Shah was, however, worried over middle of the road majority of the Majlis which, while willing go along with adherence, is itself deeply concerned over Iranian budgetary situation, and Shah hoped for something concrete with which he could reassure this important majority.

Chapin

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/9–2655. Secret. Repeated to Ankara, Baghdad, and London.

² Dated September 23, not printed. (*Ibid.*, 780.5/9–2355)

332. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iran¹

Washington, September 30, 1955—7:18 p.m.

536. Urtels 542, 543, 547, 560.²

1. Secretary Humphrey's version Ebtehaj conversation will be forwarded shortly.³

2. Present attitude US Govt additional budgetary aid (after \$15,000,000 FY 1956) not justified because:

a. US original intent was provide budgetary aid for approximately 2 years following Mosadeq downfall or through December 1955. US envisaged, with concurrence responsible Iranians that after 2 years increased tax collections and some use oil revenues would balance budget. In FYs 54 and 55 US furnished over 150 million dollars economic and technical assistance plus Ex-Im credit 53 millions. Meanwhile GOI has done little on own initiative to improve financial position.

b. Anticipating negative Congress reaction to aid requests for FY 1956 Dept made following statement re Iran to House Committee For Aff: "Our assistance to civilian economy planned on loan basis, repayable in dollars, as income from oil industry expected make repayment possible. Except for technical assistance, future aid to civilian economy will, after this year, be limited to such institutions as Ex-Im Bank and IBRD."

c. Provision additional budgetary aid would be disservice to Iran by encouraging it further procrastinate on fiscal problems it alone able solve, namely increased tax collections and/or some use oil revenues for non-development purposes.

d. Iran's problem basically political not economic. At worst GOI could authorize use oil revenues for budget deficit and borrow abroad funds required for specific development projects. US negative attitude toward budgetary aid does not preclude US consideration this approach.

3. If Iran does make useful new presentation its fiscal problems and requirements, US will of course give consideration due proposal by friendly govt but any new request by Iran will have to overcome weight above factors which predicate US present position.

4. However, Iran must allow US reasonable time study facts, figures and arguments which presumed forthcoming. For Amini to appear early October⁴ clearly would not allow sufficient time and would assure that he would meet attitude outlined above. This timing also very unfortunate view Under Secy Hoover's absence for several weeks⁵ and Asst Secy Allen's absence for indefinite period.⁶ Concur that unsuccessful Amini trip would be damaging his position in Iran and inimical US interests. Hoover unable visit Tehran on return from Far East.

5. Using above as you see fit, Dept leaves your discretion how best discourage Amini visit or any other visit re budgetary assistance. Discouragement may serve impress on GOI seriousness present US attitude toward additional budgetary aid.

6. Highly gratified by your question to Entezam re joining Pact unconditionally and by his answer which serves reinforce US position that financial aid must be based on its own merits and not tied to Pact.

7. Completely agree Entezam–Amini team visit to UK and US dangerous as calculated attempt create semblance US UK pressure. (Ur 548 just received.)⁷ Believe unwise for any high level Iranian visit US until Iran has either joined Pact or at least established clear public position on adherence.

Dulles

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/9–3055. Secret. Drafted by Crawl and cleared by Baxter and the Department of the Treasury and ICA.

² In these telegrams from Tehran, respectively dated September 28, 28, 29, and 30, the Embassy reported a series of conversations in which high-ranking Iranian Government leaders argued for additional U.S. budgetary support for Iran in view of the high percentage of Iran's budget required for defense. (*Ibid.*, 888.10/9–2855, 888.10/9–2855, 780.5/9–2955, and 780.5/9–3055, respectively) ³ In telegram 542, the Embassy reported a conversation with Abdol Hasan Ebtehaj, Managing Director of the Plan Organization. The Embassy transmitted Ebtehaj's version of a conversation he had with Secretary of the Treasury Humphrey at a recent IMF-World Bank conference in Istanbul. According to Ebtehaj, Humphrey endorsed the view that no more than 40 percent of Iran's oil revenues should go to purposes other than economic development. Ebtehaj also claimed from Humphrey "a most satisfactory reaction" to representations that Iran was spending 60 percent of its budget for defense.

In telegram 560 to Tehran, October 5, the Department reported Humphrey's view of the conversation as follows: "Conversation informal and general. Secretary Humphrey expressed sympathy with idea using as much oil revenues possible for development but no specific figure or percentage mentioned. Re military program, Secretary expressed sympathy with idea Iran not undertake program beyond its capacity."

⁴ In telegram 543, Iranian Minister of Justice Amini informed the Embassy that the Shah had designated him to go to Washington in early October to discuss Iran's financial problems with American officials.

⁵ Reference is to the Hoover–Hollister trip to the Far East which began on September 30; documentation is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 59 D 95, CF 534–541.

⁶ Reference is to Allen's trip to Egypt; see [vol. XIV, pp. 533](#) ff.

⁷ Dated September 29, not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/ 9–2955)

333. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State¹

Tehran, October 5, 1955—6 p.m.

588. 1. As I foresaw (my 572 paragraph 3)² Shah asked me to fly today in his private airplane to his Caspian retreat where we had long talk both before and during lunch.

2. Shah explained to me very convincingly his current problem re joining pact. He said Majlis members are aware of budget difficulties (which he put presently as \$35 million deficit with judges and teachers salaries already in arrears) and in consequence he must have something which will partially satisfy Majlis members who ask “how can you reconcile adherence to pact, which in long run is going to cost Iran more money, when you already have a budget deficit”? He stressed that this seeming inconsistency is the soft point upon which Soviet propaganda and sympathizers likely to harp with telling effect. Therefore, Shah asked me to endeavor obtain for him from Washington before October 8 assurances that US will issue a post-adherence statement which in addition to welcoming Iran’s adherence and restating US interest in Iran’s territorial integrity, stability and well-being would contain a phrase to effect US will continue to entertain sympathetically Iranian requests for military and economic assistance. He said that if I can inform him prior to October 8 that such a statement will be forthcoming he will include in his speech a strong statement “inevitably leading to Iran’s adherence in a few days”. He said his hand would be immeasurably strengthened by US reference to military and economic assistance and he thought this would be sufficient to still the doubters in Majlis and to assure early Majlis ratification.

3. Shah said if assurances along above lines are not received prior October 8 he would have to consult Cabinet both as regards content of his speech (“which could be all platitudes”) and timing of adherence (“we could adhere later in month or even after Geneva”).

4. Among additional points made by Shah: a. “When I talked to President Eisenhower he told me we would receive military aid but that Iran’s greater need is for economic development”; b. “Egyptian arms order must be disappointing to Department and I should think Egyptian behavior would lead to greater US appreciation of Iran’s steadfast pro-West and cooperative attitude notwithstanding Iran’s temporary budget difficulties”.

5. This was my first opportunity for man to man talk with Shah. We got on well. He impressed me with his sincerity, good will and realism although last seemed clouded by an inadequate appreciation of the fact and figures of Iran's budgetary problems. He showed interest in joint fact-finding exercise described paragraph 2 my 582, October [4]³ about which he seemed to have heard little, but hoped desired statement from US would not be held up pending results of exercise.

6. I believe if Shah does not use his October 8 speech to pave way for entry into pact this will be clear sign that pact schedule has been set back. I did not get impression that Shah is attempting to hijack US into commitments newer or broader than those already inherent in our recent policy toward his country; all evidence now reaching Embassy confirms Shah's estimate that he faces real problem with Majlis.

7. Only Department can determine how important it is to our global policy for Iran to announce its adherence to pact within coming days or whether it can afford risk of appreciable delay, during which Shah under pressure from Majlis may waver from his present determination.

Chapin

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/10-555. Secret; Priority. Repeated to London, Baghdad, Ankara, and Paris.

² Dated October 3, not printed. (*Ibid.*, 780.5/10-355) ³ Telegram 582 reported that Amini proposed a joint U.S.-Iranian planning effort to divide Iran's oil revenues based on the principle that the major part be used for development projects. (*Ibid.*, 780.5/10-455)

334. Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation Between the Director of Central Intelligence (Dulles) and the Secretary of State, Washington, October 6, 1955, 6:37 p.m.¹

Washington, October 6, 1955, 6:37 p.m.

TELEPHONE CALL TO ALLEN DULLES

The Sec. told AWD about the British Amb.'s call² and said he is not happy re our giving assurances etc. to Iran now as Russia might regard it as a reprisal against Egypt and any hopes of quieting the situation would disappear and it would lead to a step against us and things would be worse. AWD said that is his view. The Sec. said Radford is keen on getting Iran into the Pact and he sent a memo to Wilson that the JCS favor it.³ W. will call soon.⁴ AWD said he wishes they could delay this a bit. The Sec. said we have to get a cable off tonight⁵ —it is the a.m. of the 7th [in Iran?]. AWD said his reaction is we are pressing it a bit. The Sec. said we are not—the Shah is ready to act. He read the Oct. 5 cable from Chapin.⁶ AWD said you are not in a position to give assurances of aid. The Sec. said pretty good size military but not much economic aid. AWD said he would prefer to see it deferred a bit until we analyze Egypt. [3½ lines of source text not declassified] AWD asked if we told about the aid they are going to get. He has been told about military aid and no budgetary assistance, but this cable says he wants it. He is trying to bargain as a condition to making the speech. Radford said we can step up military aid, but the Sec. doesn't know where we will get it. We could take some from Egypt but we have already given it to Iraq. AWD would like to see it left as something that could be used in the overall negotiating position in that area rather than throw it away for nothing now. They agreed that then we may never get it. The Sec. said if the opposition is strong enough to prevent their joining the Pact a few months from now, he thinks they would not be strong enough to get much value from it now. AWD said an out could be in the time allowed we can't be sure we can do better than what we have done, but can't give the result now.

¹ Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations. Transcribed by Phyllis D. Bernau.

² See the memorandum of conversation, October 6, [vol. XIV, p. 558](#).

³ Not further identified.

⁴ See *infra*.

⁵ [Document 336](#).

⁶ *Supra*.

335. Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation Between the Secretary of Defense (Wilson) and the Secretary of State, Washington, October 6, 1955, 6:48 p.m.¹

Washington Bern, October 6, 1955, 6:48 p.m.

TELEPHONE CALL FROM SEC. WILSON

The Sec. returned his call, and the Sec. said he is still dubious about urging the Iranians into the Baghdad Pact now. The Sec. told re the British Amb.'s call. W. said he understands the Pres. promised the Shah another 25 million for '57 and '58 is in the wind. W. said that is our previous position of the military—they regard it as important and the Iranians now have only sufficient power to maintain law and order in their own country. The other would imply the neighbors would come to their help too. W. said he sees the Sec.'s point. W. said if he is asking for more than our commitments, the Sec. could let it slide. The Sec. said our people said they don't think the Shah knows the actual figure. The Sec. described his worries in the matter. W. said he respects the Sec.'s judgment in the matter, if he thinks the timing is not right. The Sec. said the Shah said he can do it later in a month or so—the Sec. is inclined to take that gamble. W. said he can go along with that. W. said he wouldn't worry if they think it is because the Pres. is sick² that it is being delayed. W. said we know if you thought it right, we would do it. Looking at it purely as a military thing, they are anxious and it is our objective. The Sec. said he agrees but there are new factors and the paper needs to be reviewed. The Sec. will see if Chapin thinks it could be delayed and if so, will let him do it. If they do it anyway, we will issue a statement supporting them. It has to be done today. W. suggested without quite saying he is going to sign, he could go on record that he favors cooperation with his neighbors—prepare the groundwork. The Sec. thinks that might be better if we can get him to do it that way.

¹ Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations. Transcribed by Phyllis D. Bernau.

² Reference is to Eisenhower's September 23 heart attack.

336. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iran¹

Washington, October 6, 1955—7:46 p.m.

569. The global consideration referred to in your 588² would make it preferable not to have Shah announce intention to adhere to Pact at this time when it could be interpreted as a move brought about by UK and US in retaliation Soviet-Egyptian arms deal. We feel there is danger that announcement under these circumstances might lead to strong Soviet counter moves and that danger of war in area might thus be increased whereas we are hoping that through various pending moves with Soviet Union situation can be quieted down and Soviet intervention minimized. However, we also realize the danger of losing present momentum behind Pact adherence and we do not feel that global considerations above referred to are so compelling as to justify our taking any substantial risk that present delay would lead to a total loss of Iran's adherence to the Baghdad Pact and northern tier concept.

Therefore, if in your judgment action is necessary now in order to prevent loss you may inform Shah and Prime Minister urtels 572³ and 588 that immediately following formal Iranian adherence Baghdad Pact US prepared issue welcoming statement which will also re-emphasize US policy of support for and assistance in maintenance Iranian independence. When telling Shah you are unable at this time to indicate exact wording of such statement, you may refer to numerous clear declarations US policy toward Iran made during past decade, giving oral quotes from previous public statements summarized Deptel 518⁴ and emphasizing US policy has not changed.

Following is working draft possible statement⁵ for your comments and estimate as to whether it would satisfy Shah:

“The United States welcomes the announcement by the Government of Iran of its adherence to the Pact of Mutual Cooperation signed by Iraq and Turkey on February 24, 1955, and subsequently adhered to by the governments of the United Kingdom and Pakistan.

“Iran’s decision to adhere to the Baghdad Pact is further evidence of the desire and ability of the nations of the Middle East to provide for their legitimate self-defense through regional collective security agreements. The United States has often expressed its belief that such an agreement, particularly between the ‘Northern Tier’ nations of the Middle East, represents the best possible foundation for effective area collaboration on questions of mutual interest. It constitutes a framework within which peace and stability can be strengthened and in which can be developed an atmosphere conducive to progress and constructive cooperation among the member states.

“In the view of the United States, it is especially gratifying that Iran has decided to associate itself with this regional organization. The long-standing interest of the United States in the territorial integrity and sovereign independence of Iran remains a cardinal point of American policy.

“The U.S. takes this occasion to reiterate its deep concern, amply demonstrated in the past, for the well-being of Iran, as well as its continuing interest in assisting Iran and other free nations which are making their own determined efforts to achieve defensive strength and economic and social progress.”

Department concerned by Shah’s implied desire use US and UK statements to bargain for Parliamentary ratification following October 8 speech in which apparently he will not announce firm decision of Government but only attempt “prepare way”. Do not desire that contents any statement contemplated by US Government shall be subject bargaining between Shah and Parliament. Bargaining this kind might result in Parliament demanding stronger statements or commitments on part US before it willing agree to adherence, and in Shah appealing to us to give such commitments. In

Department opinion it would be tactical error for Shah to indicate in any way to Parliament that Iran is expecting anything from US as reward for adherence to Pact. If he cannot rest his case on advantages of stability and security-strengthening inherent in regional defense, his position likely become almost untenable.

Question of when Shah can be given text proposed US statement depends largely on sequence of overt official steps under Iran Constitution to effect adherence. Would presentation of Pact to Parliament be preceded by official signature of its text? Request Embassy information on subject of steps involved in process and Embassy opinions on following:

- a) At what point will prestige of Shah and authority of Government be irrevocably committed?
- b) When could statement be most usefully and safely communicated to Shah privately, bearing in mind uses he might make of it?
- c) Should it be assumed that publication US statement would await final Parliament ratification?⁶

Personal from Secretary

I realize that above telegram places upon you a very heavy responsibility but I do not know where else it can be placed and I know you will use your best judgment and whatever the outcome this will be recognized.

Dulles

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/10–555. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Baxter and Hannah; cleared by Crawford of EE; and approved by Dulles. Repeated niact to London, Baghdad, and Ankara.

² [Document 333](#).

³ See [footnote 2, Document 333](#).

⁴ The public statements selected for inclusion in telegram 518, September 28, range from an extract of Truman's message to Congress on March 12,

1947, announcing the Truman Doctrine, to a statement by Dulles upon receiving Ambassador Entezam on October 22, 1953. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.88/9–2355) ⁵ For text of the statement as released by the Department on October 12, see Department of State *Bulletin*, October 24, 1955, p. 653.

⁶ The Embassy answered these questions in telegram 600, October 8, as follows:

“Question a: Prestige of Shah will be irrevocably committed whenever decision to adhere forthwith is announced formally and publicly.

“Question b: Statement could most usefully and safely be communicated to Shah following formal announcement, but if necessary, few hours previous.

“Question c: For best effect, US statement should appear at same time as those of UK and other pact members, immediately following Iranian announcement. To withhold statement until ratification would alienate Shah and severely reduce support for ratification, since undertone of Shah-Majlis relationship is not too good at present, particularly over issue extension term present Majlis.” (Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/10–855)

337. Letter From the Director of the Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs (Baxter) to the Ambassador in Iran (Chapin)¹

Washington, October 7, 1955.

D_{EAR} M_{R.} A_{MBASSADOR}: I want to get out to you as soon as possible a brief note of explanation concerning the niact telegram sent you last night.²

As drafted in GTI and approved all the way up to the Secretary (two important links in the chain were missing because of the absence from Washington of Hoover and George Allen but we had Loy Henderson's blessing) the telegram started with the second paragraph of the one you received and of course did not have the final personal postscript from the Secretary. Yesterday was a bad day to be working against a deadline because of the Secretary's very full schedule: he attended a meeting of the NSC for most of the morning³ and then the somewhat protracted burial service in Arlington for Jack Peurifoy. He saw Sir Roger Makins in the late afternoon on several subjects, including Iran.⁴ It was after six o'clock before he was able to consider our telegram. Four of us were with him—Ray Hare,⁵ Francis Russell, Norman Hannah and I. (As you may not know, Ray and Francis are pinch hitting for George Allen and Bill Rountree.) I am setting the stage somewhat elaborately because I want you to realize that the Secretary was personally giving serious and undivided attention to the problem. He discussed it with us thoroughly for the better part of an hour, so that we were able to bring forward all the pertinent arguments and background information. The Secretary said that Iran had been discussed informally in the NSC that morning and that he had felt some hesitancy from many people as to the advisability of Iranian adherence to the Baghdad Pact at this particular moment. Although he knew that the U.S. and probably he personally were credited with the idea of the northern tier, he too had some doubts about the suggested timing and noted the Shah's statement in your 588⁶ that the announcement of intention to adhere could

be done later in the month if the assurances he felt necessary were not forthcoming in time for the October 8 speech. I should point out that the Soviet arms deal with Egypt is a new element which is causing a great deal of concern in all branches of the government and a growing feeling that many formerly accepted policies should be re-examined.

While we were with the Secretary he talked on the phone with Admiral Radford, Secretary of Defense Wilson and Allen Dulles. Radford reported that the Joint Chiefs were strongly in favor of Iran's entry into the Pact; it was not quite clear what Wilson's attitude was, but the conversation had something to do with amounts of money available for military assistance; Allen Dulles, the Secretary said, did not think that now was the time. The Secretary then dictated what is now the first paragraph of telegram 569 and the introductory clause of paragraph two. After doing so, he commented that he was placing a tremendous amount of responsibility on you and wondered if he was being fair to put you in such a position. At the same time, he expressed confidence in your doing the right thing in light of local circumstances and so dictated the final personal message.

One point the Secretary made which does not appear in the telegram was that the basis for Iranian adherence seemed rather precarious if it could be accomplished only on the date of October 8 and with strong US-UK assurances. If the Shah had to overcome such great opposition with a knife at the throat of the Majlis, could we not expect that opposition to develop later in such a way that we would find the Shah's announcement to adhere did not really mean much after all. If there were a firm basis for the Shah bringing Iran into the Pact, the implementing steps to that end could be done a few weeks from now just as well as at the immediate present.

In my view it is most unfortunate that the Iranians have made so much of their need for budgetary assistance. I am sure it frightened many people in Washington to have Iranian officials talk calmly about the need for that kind of assistance *for the next two or three years*. Any statement which the U.S. makes at the Shah's request is sure to be considered very carefully by many people here because they think it will be interpreted by the Iranian Government as a commitment to foot bills for the ordinary governmental budget in Iran when Iranian resources are not being tapped.

You have our confidence and our sympathy. We will keep our fingers crossed the next few days.

Sincerely,

William O. Baxter⁷

¹ Source: Department of State, GTI Files: Lot 59 D 654, Political Letters—Notes, 1955. Secret; Official-Informal; Personal for the Ambassador.

² [supra](#).

³ See [Document 66](#).

⁴ See [footnote 2](#), [Document 334](#).

⁵ Director General of the Foreign Service and Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs.

⁶ [Document 333](#).

⁷ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

338. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State¹

Tehran, October 7, 1955—8 p.m.

598. Following receipt Department's telegram number 569² I requested interview with either Shah or Prime Minister Ala. Former being unavailable, I saw Prime Minister at 5 p.m. (Amini and Ala also present) and spoke from following notes which he took down verbatim: (underlining mine)³

“1. When Iran *formally* adheres to the pact, a strong statement will be issued by the US Government, including reference to assistance and US interest in the territorial integrity of Iran.

“2. The US Government believes that it would be a tactical error for the Shah to bargain with the Majlis over the prospect of a United States Government statement and US rewards for joining the pact. He should, in the opinion of the US, act *only* because of the advantages of stability and increased security for Iran.

“3. The Soviet-Egyptian arms arrangement brings in a completely new factor for consideration by His Majesty. The US hopes that through various pending moves with the Soviet Union the situation can be quieted down and Soviet intervention minimized. There is a possibility that Iran's adherence to the pact at this moment might be viewed as retaliation, brought about by the US and the UK for the Czechoslovak arms arrangement, and strong Soviet countermoves might result. The US Government suggests that His Majesty would do well to weigh the problem and to delay action until the situation becomes clearer, although US views regarding Iran's adherence to pact remain unaltered.”

It will be seen from the foregoing that I elected to risk delay in the belief that there would not be a “total loss”. I am happy to say I was confirmed in this by Prime Minister’s reply to my later question as to whether there was any danger impetus might be lost by delay, to which he and Amini replied “no”. Prime Minister stated Shah had wished to adhere at early date because of Soviet activities with press and Majlis.

Unless it is changed tonight in conference between Shah and Ministers, Shah’s October 8 speech will make reference to possibility Iranian adherence to a security pact of type compatible with UN Charter and endorsing substance Prime Minister’s statement to Majlis (my telegram 491 September 21).⁴ Prime Minister made it clear there was no commitment as to timing in this speech.

My comments and answers to Department’s questions will be forwarded tomorrow.⁵

Chapin

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/10–755. Secret. Repeated to London, Baghdad, and Ankara.

² [Document 336](#).

³ Printed here as italics.

⁴ Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 688.00/9–2155) ⁵ See [footnote 6, Document 336](#).

339. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State¹

Tehran, October 8, 1955—noon.

599. 1. Within hour of drafting my 598,² Prime Minister sent me urgently. At Prime Minister's house I found Prime Minister, Ala and Amini who had left Shah only few minutes previously.

2. Prime Minister said, "I gave Shah a faithful account from my verbatim notes of what you had to say. Shah has instructed me to tell you that he is most grateful for US views. Shah has, however, after due consideration of points made by US, including that of possible Soviet reaction, decided that if Iran is to join pact it is case of now or never. Shah has decided not to alter his plans to adhere within next few days: His speech will be as planned earlier. Shah asked me to explain to you that maneuvers designed to prevent adherence are growing stronger and stronger and only way to stop them is by taking plunge.

3. Prime Minister smiled and said jokingly, "I know this early action is contrary to advice contained your instructions. Perhaps you would like us to leak this fact to the press." (*Comment:* He obviously has no intention so doing.) 4. Ala went on to say that Shah will immediately proceed with steps necessary to join pact, i.e. he will call a combined meeting of foreign affairs committees of Senate and Majlis to lay before them his decision "without at this time asking their advice". Next step, he said, will be formal diplomatic notes to embassies of pact powers here expressing desire to adhere. Upon receipt their formal replies (presumably invitations to join), there will be signature with one of contracting parties of an adherence instrument and simultaneous public announcement.

5. I said that it was possible my government might wish to amplify its views already expressed and asked how long these formalities would take to complete. Amini (who appears in reality to be acting Foreign Minister) said, "Perhaps until Wednesday." I said, "Why not Thursday?" He agreed that

action would not be completed before Thursday and said that I could so inform my government.

6. Whether or not Iran adheres to this schedule, I think there is little chance now of Shah receding from decision described above unless Department wishes me to go so far as first part of second sentence paragraph 1 of Department's 569, October 6. This I am loathe to do without clarification and facts with which to answer Shah's questions.

Chapin

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/10-855. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Ankara, Baghdad, and London.

² *Supra*.

340. Editorial Note

On October 8, the Shah delivered his speech from the throne marking the ceremonial opening of the Iranian Senate and declared Iran's intentions of joining the Baghdad Pact. On October 12, Prime Minister Ala presented the Senate with a bill calling for ratification of Iran's adherence to the Pact. On that same day, Soviet newspapers in Moscow reported that Molotov had warned the Iranian Chargé in Moscow that the Soviet Union attached serious significance to Iran's adherence to the Pact, which Molotov described as contrary to good Soviet-Iranian relations and existing treaty relations. (Telegrams 603 and 622 from Tehran, October 8 and 12, and telegram 880 from Moscow, October 13; Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/ 10-855, 780.5/10-1255, and 661.88/10-1355, respectively)

341. Editorial Note

On October 13, during the 261st meeting of the National Security Council, Secretary Dulles briefly discussed the situation in Iran. For portions of the memorandum of discussion pertaining to the Middle East, see [Document 68](#).

342. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Allen) to the Under Secretary of State (Hoover)¹

Washington, December 2, 1955.

SUBJECT

Démarche to Shah on Iranian Budgetary Aid Requests

Discussion:

Ambassador Chapin recently strongly urged (Embtel 682—Tab C)² that additional budgetary aid be provided to Iran for FY 1956 to avoid the political crisis that may well result from approaching imbalance, and to strengthen the Shah's hand following Iranian adherence to the Baghdad pact.

Iranian revenue would be adequate to meet this deficit only if it were politically possible to take legislative action to revise substantially the formulae for dividing it. (The bulk of oil revenue is allocated to the Plan Organization for development, and none is presently available for the ordinary budget, although sporadic consideration is being given to proposed legislation, now before the Majlis, calling for the diversion of a small portion of this revenue to the budget.) The Ambassador believes that it is a psychologically hopeless moment, Iran having just reversed its traditional policy of neutrality, for us to urge the Shah to force a showdown on this revision, which is an explosive issue, unless we are prepared to give substantial help.

We concur with the Ambassador's estimate of the political situation and believe that in view of developments in the Arab states and the establishment of the Baghdad Pact Council, this is a dangerous time to risk political upheaval in a Northern Tier State. Moreover, we believe there would be great advantage to assisting a nation which has given up its

traditional policy of neutrality and declared itself openly allied with the West.

However, before recommending further budgetary aid, we believe it is necessary that the U.S. make a démarche to the Shah on the economic issues implicit in the recent decision to build the Karaj Dam out of Plan Organization oil revenues rather than utilize available Export-Import Bank credits (Embtel 803—Tab D).³

The attached telegram⁴ instructs Ambassador Chapin to make the following points to the Shah:

- a) It is difficult to justify budgetary aid as long as Iran fails to use the available development credit.
- b) Iran's budgetary deficit is closely related to the lack of balance between development program and ordinary budgetary requirements.
- c) We are concerned that this decision not to use the Ex-Im Bank credit for the Karaj Dam is related to apparent discrimination by the Plan Organization against American business.
- d) In order to consider further budgetary aid we need detailed information on Iran's financial operations and on its plans for reducing the deficit by using its own resources.

We believe this approach will cause the Shah to consider seriously practical fiscal reforms and a temporary diversion of some oil revenues to the budget. We hope that it will also serve to protect the interests of the Morrison-Knudsen Co. in the Karaj Dam project.

We do not expect this to result in the immediate solution of the budgetary deficit problem. Given the present political conditions this would be virtually impossible. Therefore, we anticipate there will still be a need for additional budgetary aid. If the Iranians make some reasonable efforts to

deal with the issues raised in this telegram and if they take some measures designed to reduce the deficit, it will be necessary to provide additional budgetary aid during FY 1956. Aid funds now available will be exhausted by February 1, 1956. Ambassador Chapin has recommended, and we agree, that \$20 million will be required to cover the budgetary deficit from February to the end of FY 1956.

Because the Shah will probably find the substance of this démarche difficult to understand and, in some respects, unpalatable, we are instructing Ambassador Chapin by separate telegram (Tab B)⁵ to be prepared to give the Shah an encouraging reaffirmation of U.S. overall policy of support to Iran, an expression of awareness of the importance of Iranian accession to the Baghdad Pact and a reminder of previous statements regarding the continuation of military aid.

Recommendation:

1. That, if you approve this line of action, you sign the attached telegram to Tehran (Tab A),⁶ bearing in mind that if the Iranians give a favorable performance on the points raised it will be necessary to allocate \$20 million from FY 1956 funds to be available for budgetary aid by February 1, 1956.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 788.5–MSP/12–255. Secret. Drafted by Hannah and cleared by Baxter, E, the Export-Import Bank, Department of the Treasury, and ICA.

² Dated October 26, not attached. (*Ibid.*, 780.5/10–2655) ³ Dated November 18, not attached. (*Ibid.*, 888.2614/11–1855) ⁴ Telegram 933 to Tehran, December 2, not attached. (*Ibid.*, 780.5/10–2655) ⁵ Telegram 932 to Tehran, December 2, not attached. (*Ibid.*, 780.5/10–2655) ⁶ The following note, apparently initialed by Baxter, appears at the top of the first page of the source text: “Showed to Mr. Hoover 12/2, who signed the telegrams attached.”

343. Telegram From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Radford) to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson)¹

Baghdad, December 21, 1955—8:20 a.m.

BD 443 from Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff. During my visit to Iran, I have had opportunities to meet and talk with Iranian officials, both civilian and military, as well as the members of our own Country Team. From what I have heard and seen, it is apparent that Iran has made a remarkable comeback from her low point 2 years ago. Her present firm alignment with the West is almost entirely due to United States efforts and assistance, and the Iranian people from the Shah on down give us full credit. Our programs for financial assistance have necessarily often been on a crash basis during the past 2 years and will continue that way unless we can evolve with the Iranians a sound program of economic development and budget control. Unlike some other countries, the Iranian Govt is not only willing but anxious to receive detailed help and advice. I urge that you discuss this with Sec of State and Under Secretary of State and propose that some outstanding American, such as Joe Dodge, be sent to Teheran in the near future to work out a long range program. There is every reason to believe that Iran has the resources and the capability to establish a sound economy within the next few years. It is equally evident that another financial crisis is due some time around the end of February, and we should firm up our own plans before that time.

From a purely mil point of view, Iran is a valuable ally and most cooperative. I was impressed with the personnel of our MAAG and the standing which it enjoys with the Iranian Govt as well as with our other US representatives. The Iranian armed forces have a long way to go to come up to our own standards, but it is evident that they are trying hard and have made great improvement under MAAG guidance.

I do not intend to send report on individual countries as I go along, but felt that the situation in Iran could become critical before I returned and that

from a defense point of view we cannot afford to lose time in deciding what we are going to do in the economic field which is the key to the basic problem of keeping Iran aligned with us.

¹ Source: National Archives and Records Administration, JCS Records, CCS 092 (8-22-46) (2). Top Secret. Sent as Naval message 6198, ALUSNA Baghdad to the Secretary of Defense for the information of the JCS.

Radford was on a tour of military installations and personnel in the Near and Far East. See [Document 97](#).

344. Memorandum From the Director of the International Cooperation Administration (Hollister) to the Under Secretary of State (Hoover)¹

Washington, January 23, 1956.

SUBJECT

Policy Decision on Iran Military Support Program

The purpose of this memorandum is to secure a basic high-level consideration of, and specific decision concerning the nature and scope of, a military support build-up in Iran before actually undertaking a program, the scope and ramifications of which, while obscure, are obviously far-reaching.

As I understand the situation, it is about this:

Although there are JCS approved force bases and goals² and a general statement of military objectives in Iran,³ these do not provide specific guidance as to the nature of the military program that the U.S. should pursue, and there seems to be no agreed mission for Iranian troops in any regional defense plan. U.S. training teams are now at work in Iran attempting to test the susceptibility of the Iranian troops to Western (Army) training, so that a realistic evaluation can be made of Iran's proper place in a Middle East defense arrangement, but decisions based on the training team experience are not expected before 1957. NSC has indicated an emphasis on an internal security mission for the Iranian army and, also, suggested progress toward building defensive capabilities.

The country team has proposed a major relocation program which would move the major army strength to defensive positions in the south, and has proposed as a first step that specific projects be undertaken in FY 56, including a jet air base, barracks, roads, and fortified positions in the mountain passes.⁴ The Department of Defense position is that given a general objective of building increased defensive strength, these are the

types of projects which are financeable and which will contribute to that goal.

The Department of Defense has not yet asked formal program approval for those projects, having found it necessary to go back to the MAAG for additional information, but has requested approval for \$950,000 and one million rials under Direct Forces Support and Defense Support, respectively, to finance engineering contracts so construction can begin.

It seems to me that the above facts raise a major issue. We seem to be in the position of starting a large construction and relocation program without specific determination that this is the program which the U.S. finds in our interest. This is a major undertaking with numerous implications and certainly deserves careful consideration. If we are going to go ahead with this program, we ought to so *decide*, as a matter of major policy rather than in the course of a routine program approval. For that reason, I am calling this directly to your attention. It is getting late in the year; if much progress is to be made, we will have to start quickly on the procurement of commodities designed to generate the local currency required. Aside from the general principle, a few of the considerations which make me reluctant to approve the beginning of such a program without a specific decision are:

A. Economic implications.

While the construction requirements for this program have not been defined, the MAAG proposal indicates that there is an insufficiency of both skills and materials in Iran; both must be imported. Even with some imports, there is obviously added strain on the local resources, competition for building materials, increased wages and consequent demand for consumer goods, creation of new industries to provide materials, etc. It is, of course, difficult to appraise the total economic implications in the absence of knowledge concerning an acceptable plan to be effective over the course of years; but it is obvious that the ramifications are significant if such construction is undertaken and continued.⁵

B. Implications for U.S. aid program.

Equally insusceptible of appraisal are the implications for U.S. aid. The field proposal for FY 56 is about \$7.5 million Direct Forces Support and \$17.5 million Defense Support for local currency to be obtained by the import and sale of commodities. It is quite clear, however, that this will not complete the projects. The field proposal for FY 57 is another \$14 million Direct Forces Support and \$25 million Defense Support, part of which would be to complete (or enlarge) the projects to be begun with FY 56 funds. Neither these nor other "budgetary support" proposals take into consideration the economic implications in Iran, referred to above, of such expanded activity. While I am not aware that decision has been reached to accept or approve the so-called McClure plan, of which these projects appear to be part, the total cost of that plan has been estimated in the hundreds of millions.

C. Effect on attainment of other U.S. objectives in Iran.

It is my understanding that the Iranian forces are still far from properly equipped physically or from the standpoint of morale to become completely effective on internal security, and while the proposed projects together with MDAP deliveries may have some effect, there is still the problem of pay raises and improved allowances and subsistence. Even without further improvements in this regard, the budgetary deficit is now running at about \$80 million per year, and it does not appear possible for us to cease all support for the regular government activities. This support has been running about \$5 million per month. I understand that the Mission is about to propose a firm program, identified principally with such items as internal security, of about \$4 million per month. FY 56 aid presently programmed for Iran is reported to meet the deficit only through this month, and you are well aware of the pressures building up to continue this type assistance. Our technical cooperation program is large and it requires substantial commodity assistance for the generation of local currency, in addition to the TC appropriation. It is clear that we have not made sufficient provision for all of these programs in our proposed request to the Congress for FY 57 funds. (\$45 million Defense Support, \$14 million Direct Forces Support, \$8 million TC.) It seems to me that we are heading toward the very kind of situation in Iran which we should seek to avoid and which the Cabinet and NSC looks to us to avoid, except on the basis of conscious decision in the

U.S. interest. There are impressive reasons for a careful evaluation, completely aside from considerations strictly military (ability of Iranian forces to become effective; defensibility of the area; internal security versus national or regional defense) and political (the adverse reaction of the populace to the “Zagros line” movement, which might be considerable judging from the repercussions of the December 5th *Time* article which resulted in a government denial, the repression of Iranian newspaper speculation, efforts to prevent public discussion, and the Prime Minister’s request that we seek to keep such stories out of American publications). Finally, there is our own ability within the resources made available to us by the Congress. I realize full well that there are also compelling reasons for undertaking programs which will facilitate progress, build strength, and demonstrate our association with this country which has taken an historic step in aligning itself with the West. I therefore recommend:

1. Temporary deferment of program approval for the engineering contracts.
2. Careful further appraisal by JCS of more detailed military objectives and plans.
3. Priority consideration of the above questions by the Committee on Certain U.S. Aid Programs under Mr. Prochnow⁶ since this is a case where findings can have an almost immediate effect on our operations.
4. Specific decision on a program on which we are to proceed, including FY 56 program and FY 57 program to be assumed in the forthcoming Congressional presentation.

John B. Hollister

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 788.5–MSP/1–2356. Secret. Also addressed to Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Gordon Gray.

² Apparent reference to a memorandum from the JCS to the Secretary of Defense, January 4, 1956, “Modification of MDA Programming Guidance for FY 1957,” and enclosure A, “Revised MDAP Force Objectives.” The statement of objectives for Iran reads as follows: “1. *MDAP Objectives*

“Consistent with Iran’s ability to utilize it efficiently to continue to provide such military assistance as is required to maintain internal security and to provide some resistance to external aggression. Further, if Iran becomes a member of a regional multilateral defense organization satisfactory to the United States, the United States should consider assisting Iran in equipping forces required by the plans of such an organization.” (National Archives and Records Administration, JCS Records, CCS 092 (8–22–46)(2)) ³

Apparent reference to a memorandum from the JCS to the Secretary of Defense, February 25, 1955, “Objectives for the Department of Defense Internal Security Plan,” and appendix A, “Major Military Objectives for the Period Through June 30, 1959 for Major Strategic Geographic Areas.” The statement of objectives for Iran reads as follows:

“1. Insure availability to United States and its Allies of the military resources, strategic positions and passage rights of Iran as may be required, and the denial of the area to the Soviet Bloc.

“2. Assist in development of Iranian armed forces capable of maintaining internal security and having defensive delaying capabilities which would make a useful contribution to Middle East defense.

“3. Promote Iranian participation in Middle East defense arrangements.

“4. Be prepared to provide military support to any non-Communist Iranian government or elements, in the event of either an attempted or an actual Communist seizure of power in Iran.” (*Ibid.*, CCS 381 U.S. (1–31–50))

⁴ Reference is to telegram 1748 from Tehran; see [footnote 6, Document 305](#).

⁵ A note in an unidentified hand at this point in the margin of the source text reads as follows: “There is currently unemployment which will hold wages steady. Cement mill at Shiraz may cut [?] imports.”

⁶ See [Document 358](#).

345. Editorial Note

British Prime Minister Anthony Eden and Foreign Minister Selwyn Lloyd visited Washington January 30–February 1 for talks with President Eisenhower, Secretary Dulles, and other U.S. officials. Regarding the Eden talks, including material relating to Iran, see [Documents 94](#) ff.

346. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iran¹

Washington, February 2, 1956—12:11 p.m.

1295. January 31 Amini strongly urged on Hoover need for some positive act of US support for Iran view Soviet overtures² and growth public doubts re Baghdad Pact. Urged US join Pact or make new statement re US interest in maintaining Iranian independence. At minimum wanted strong statement support Baghdad Pact in US-UK communiqué.³

Amini was told that while mention one specific country in communiqué would open Pandora's box, we hope include statement support for Pact. Hoover explained inability US join Pact now. Reminded Amini of many previous US statements supporting Iran and explained Iran need feel no doubt re US continued interest and desire support Pact.

Suggest you use above in modifying Deptel 1277⁴ when speaking to Shah and Prime Minister.

Amini also mentioned briefly Iran's urgent need for financial aid. Was told US would continue view Iran's problem sympathetically.

Amini reported he had cabled Tehran recommending all oil revenues resulting from increased production over agreed levels would go to budget. Government reportedly approves and will submit proposal to Senate.

Re para 6 Embtel 1166.⁵ French aide-mémoire January 16 contained discursive survey conditions Middle East. Emphasized French desire cooperate in seeking solution Arab-Israel problem. Strongly urged establishment new economic development program in Middle East. Press reports of criticism Baghdad Pact grossly exaggerated. While French unenthusiastic toward Pact their aide-mémoire did not attack it and made no

proposals hostile to Pact. This information passed to Iran Embassy confidentially.

Dulles

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/2–256. Secret. Drafted by Hannah, cleared by Kitchen and Baxter, and approved by Rountree.

² In telegram 1094 from Tehran, January 17, Chapin reported a conversation with Foreign Minister Ardalan. Ardalan informed him that Molotov on January 13 had suggested to the Iranian Ambassador in Moscow that the 1927 Soviet-Iranian Treaty of Non-Aggression be replaced by a guarantee of Iran's neutrality from the four great powers. According to Ardalan, Molotov stated that the Soviet Union would be willing to give such a pledge if Iran left the Baghdad Pact. To counter these Soviet moves, Ardalan suggested to Chapin that the announcement of U.S. economic assistance to Iran would be an effective counterweight. (*Ibid.*, 661.88/1–1756) ³ For text of the joint statement, February 1, which does mention the Baghdad Pact, see Department of State *Bulletin*, February 13, 1956, pp. 232–234.

⁴ Telegram 1277 to Tehran, January 30, reads as follows: “As you deem appropriate you may inform Shah as follows: “While difficult prejudice communiqué Eisenhower Eden talks we believe it will be general in scope and in all probability will not provide suitable occasion for special mention detailed problems of particular concern of Iran.” (Department of State, Central Files, 033.4111/1–2656) ⁵ Not printed.

347. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Gray) to the Director of the International Cooperation Administration (Hollister)¹

Washington, February 7, 1956.

SUBJECT

Policy Decision on Iran Military Support Program

I have carefully considered your memorandum of 23 January 1956² in which you state that a necessity exists for seeking a basic high-level consideration of, and specific decision concerning, the nature and scope of a military support build-up in Iran before undertaking such a program, the scope and ramifications of which, while obscure, are obviously far-reaching.

My understanding of the situation is that the U.S. has a statement from the Joint Chiefs of Staff of their conclusions concerning an interim role and mission for Iran.³ The OCB Board Assistants have seen fit to submit a statement to the Board that the Iranian Army and other security forces are deemed capable of maintaining internal security.⁴ I am also aware that our Ambassador to Iran was authorized to inform the Shah of Iran last July that the U.S. would maintain the current rate of funds in FY 1956 and increase it in FY 1957 and FY 1958.⁵

I believe that activities in connection with the engineering survey to validate the FY 1956 projects, as well as the approval of specific projects for construction, can be conducted so as to clearly indicate to the Iranian Government that the approval and construction of any project is based solely upon the current availability of funds and its military value at the time of approval and not upon any overall defense plan for Iran developed by the Iranian Government or the MAAG.

I consider, therefore, that a firm policy exists under which we can proceed with the engineering survey of the FY 1956 projects and eventual approval

of specific projects when the results of the survey are available for evaluation. Should you desire to initiate action to obtain a reexamination of this current policy, I do not feel that such action should serve to further delay execution of the engineering surveys for the FY 1956 Program.

Gordon Gray⁶

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 788.5–MSP/2–756. Top Secret.

² [Document 344](#).

³ See [footnote 3](#), [Document 344](#).

⁴ The reference is not clear, but OCB Progress Report on “U.S. Policy Toward Iran” (NSC 5504) stated that the Iranian Army and other security forces were capable of maintaining internal security. See [footnote 2](#), [Document 349](#).

⁵ See [Document 320](#).

⁶ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

348. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iran¹

Washington, February 8, 1956—7:24 p.m.

1344. Several subjects Ambassador's letter January 31 to Rountree² under active consideration and will be covered in separate telegrams.

FYI re question additional military aid we now exploring with Defense possibility obtaining at least some portion end-item list submitted by MAAG for 1956 but which not included in Department Defense 1956 military aid program. Also exploring possibility additional economic aid to assist Iranians meet budgetary deficit through end this US fiscal year (Deptel 1335).³ We hopeful any favorable decisions can be made known to Shah before he leaves for India.⁴ We well aware advantage leaving him in no doubt re our determination support Iran. End FYI.

In your talks with Shah and Government you no doubt are emphasizing that our desire support Iran as strong today as ever. Our ability be of assistance depends in large measure on reports concrete steps Iranians have taken put their financial house in order and further measures they firmly intend to take. Passage of bill authorizing allocation ten percent oil revenues to general budget, and clear determination that income from additional oil production will go to general budget would be very helpful our consideration of matter. While increased income from these sources (estimated at approximately \$20 million) would not close budgetary gap, clear application principle of self-help most important. (FYI This connection we were awaiting further status report and recommendation from Embassy. End FYI.) Re Baghdad Pact our position further elucidated and set forth in connection recent conversations with British Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary.⁵ Separate cable reports on meeting Foreign Secretary with Pact countries' ambassadors in Washington. We think it would be well to restate to Shah our present thinking. If he concerned failure US adherence, could be recalled that at time Shah made his decision

join Pact there was no indication US intended soon to join and Iranians raised no specific question this connection. Our position is to support the Pact and to encourage members in developing collective security organization and in obtaining benefits which accrue in economic, political and cultural fields from such association. However question of US adherence at this time involves many considerations, including fact that we attach great importance remaining in position effectively influence settlement Arab-Israel dispute. We feel that too hasty action re joining pact would jeopardize chances success in this matter which is of great concern to Free World as whole. US interest and support Pact has been demonstrated in many ways, most recently in joint communiqué following British-American talks. Notwithstanding fact non-member Arab states strongly opposed, we included in communiqué unequivocal assertion our firm intent to support and encourage Pact. Additionally we are giving constant consideration to Iranian economic and military problems but Iranians must give clear and recognizable indication of firm intention put their fiscal house in order. Nearly quarter billion dollars US aid to Iran since 1951 is no small indication interest of US. There absolutely no reason for Shah or Government to doubt continuing interest and concern of US.

Informal Russian offer four-power guarantee should be transparent to Shah and Government. Guarantee would provide nothing not now provided by UN Charter to which Soviets and Iran have both adhered. Offer clearly designed undermine Iran's confidence in policy course which it has set. Very proposal shows Soviets still entertain concept of right of great powers to guide destiny of small nations.

Dulles

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 788.5-MSP/2-856. Confidential. Drafted by Kitchen and Rountree, cleared by Baxter, and approved by Rountree.

² In this letter from Amini to Rountree, the Iranian Ambassador enclosed a 6-page survey of the income and expenses of the Government of Iran, the causes of the budget deficit, and measures adopted to achieve a balanced budget. (*Ibid.*) ³ Dated February 7, not printed. (*Ibid.*, 788.5-MSP/10-2655) ⁴ The Shah left Iran on February 16 for a State visit to India and

returned on March 9. En route home from India on March 9, the Shah met with Secretary Dulles, who was attending the SEATO Council Meeting at Karachi. For a report of their conversation, see [Document 352](#).

⁵ See [Document 345](#).

349. Memorandum of Discussion at the 276th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, February 9, 1956¹

Washington, February 9, 1956

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and items 1. “Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security,” 2. “Nuclear Energy Projects and Related Information Programs,” 3. “Background and Status of Small Output Reactor,” and 4. “Security Requirements for Government Employment.”]

5. *U.S. Policy Toward Iran* (Progress Report, dated January 18, 1956, by OCB on NSC 5504²) At the conclusion of Mr. Anderson’s briefing of the contents of the Progress Report on Iran, Secretary Dulles stated that it would be relevant to the problem for him to explain what distress he and Admiral Radford both felt over the slippage in the deliveries of military matériel to Iran under the MDA Program. The mechanics of delivery were painfully slow and contrasted sadly with speedy Soviet action in the same field. In support of this contention, Secretary Dulles cited the figures in the Financial Appendix to the reference Progress Report. He also noted that his complaints applied to other countries than Iran.

The President interrupted to agree heartily with Secretary Dulles, and to point out that the Egyptians have already received thirteen shiploads of arms from the Soviet Union. Secretary Dulles went on to say that he did not know where responsibility for these slow deliveries actually belonged, but that it was obvious that there were too many hands involved in our program. Deliveries must be speeded up. To that end Under Secretary Hoover was creating a small group.

Admiral Radford said that the first point he wished to make was that it was absolutely essential to clear the \$20 million which we were proposing to provide Iran by way of budgetary support to meet the Iranian payroll up to June 1956. Failure to meet this deadline would mean trouble. The Iranians were estimated to be likely to run out of cash by the first of March.

Secondly, said Admiral Radford, he had felt that his recent visit to Iran was one of the most important of his trip around the world. He had been briefed at length both by the country team and by American Embassy officials. Admiral Radford expressed great sympathy for the Shah's plight. His civil service was much too large and included too many lazy and incompetent officials. The pay was poor. A smaller and better-paid civil service would be highly desirable. The Shah also suffered from an excess of senior officers in the army. The President interrupted to say "What army does not suffer from such an excess?" (Laughter) Admiral Radford went on to point out that when officers were discharged from the army as over-age, there was no place in the Iranian economy which could absorb them. It was for reasons such as this that the Shah was insisting on the great importance of the long-term plan for the economic development of Iran. The country team seemed to agree with the Shah's position. Nevertheless, some of the advice which we wished to give to the Shah was useful and should be taken seriously. Accordingly, it might be a good idea to send some very distinguished American official to Tehran to make a thorough study of Iran's short-term and long-term economic problems. In any case, we should realize that the situation in Iran could "go bad" again very quickly, despite the fact that Iran had very considerable natural resources which were not being exploited. Pressure from Russia had also been quite heavy of late. Accordingly, Admiral Radford repeated his insistence that we make the decision promptly to provide Iran with the \$20 million necessary to meet the payroll through June. After that we should attempt to assist Iran to decide what proportion of the growing oil revenues should be devoted to current budgetary support and what proportion to long-term economic development.

Thirdly, Admiral Radford said, he was inclined to take issue with the statement in the Progress Report that Iran's military capabilities were such that Iran could only maintain internal security and would be incapable of delaying any external aggression.³ This latter might be true if Iran was left to act alone without any outside assistance, but this was unlikely. Admiral Radford noted that our Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) had been doing an outstanding job in Iran under very adverse circumstances.

The MAAG were quite optimistic about the development of the Iranian armed forces, though they were worried because the Shah seemed to be seeking the wrong kind of military equipment—that is, equipment which would contribute more to prestige than to practical military use under probable conditions of warfare.

At the conclusion of Admiral Radford's comments, the President asked the Director of the Budget why we were faced with a continual slippage in our deliveries of equipment under the MDA Program. Director Hughes replied that over a long period of years our planning for the deliveries of military equipment had always been in excess of what actually could be delivered. Moreover, our planners had long been aware of this discrepancy.

By way of further answer to the President, Admiral Radford pointed out that our largest MDA Programs—those, for example, concerned with our NATO allies—were based on appropriations covering a program of several years. For Iran and other countries planning was on a year-to-year basis. This applied to economic assistance as well as to military assistance programs. Director Hughes commented that the Bureau of the Budget favored Congressional appropriations on a longer-term basis for the aid programs, but that the Congress did not.

After further discussion of the reasons for the slippage in our delivery of military equipment, Secretary Robertson explained that the Department of Defense was making strenuous efforts to solve this problem. To that end the new Assistant Secretary, Mr. Gordon Gray, had called in a firm of management engineers. The result had been the creation of a whole new organization to deal with military assistance. The set-up in the Defense Department would now correspond with the divisions in the State Department. This would help to cut the time required to resolve issues between State and Defense. Moreover, Mr. Gray would have much greater coordinating responsibility than had his predecessors.

The President said that he had one more question. Had this \$20 million problem been staffed through the Executive Branch? If so, why should it not be sent today?

Secretary Humphrey pointed out that Iran was fortunate in having a very able Minister of Finance. The oil royalties were still meager, but when they begin to rise, as they soon will, more of these funds can be used to support current budget charges without adversely affecting Iran's long-term economic development. Certainly we should help promptly by advancing the \$20 million. The President asked Director Hughes to look into the matter at once. He did not wish us to "fool around" with this problem.

*The National Security Council:*⁴

- a. Noted and discussed the reference Progress Report on the subject by the Operations Coordinating Board.
- b. Discussed the necessity of finding means to expedite and keep up to date deliveries under the Military [*Mutual*] Defense Assistance Program.
- c. Noted the President's directive that the Director, Bureau of the Budget, assure the immediate allocation of \$20 million additional budget support for Fiscal Year 1956 to Iran.

Note: The action in b above subsequently transmitted to the Secretaries of State and Defense. The action in c above subsequently transmitted to the Director, Bureau of the Budget.

[Here follow items 6. "U.S. Objectives and Courses of Action in Korea" and 7. "United States Policy Toward Italy."]

S. Everett Gleason

¹ Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Drafted by Gleason on February 10.

² Not printed. (Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5504—Memoranda) ³ Reference is to paragraph 17 of the January 18 Progress Report, which reads as follows: "*Defensive Delaying Capability*. The Army and other security forces are deemed capable of maintaining internal security. There is presently, however, little defensive delaying

capability. The role of Iranian forces in Middle East defense will be determined by the Baghdad Pact Council, and the capability of the Iranian Army for defensive delaying action can be determined from reports to be received from U.S. Army training teams. The present MDAP program, therefore, is the first step in the training and equipping of Iranian armed forces for participation in Middle East defense. Any assignment of mission within the context of the Baghdad Pact Organization is likely to require a significant increase over the amount of military assistance presently contemplated.”

⁴ Paragraphs a–c and Note that follow constitute NSC Action No. 1518, approved February 10. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

350. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Hoover) to the Deputy Director for Operations, International Cooperation Administration (FitzGerald)¹

Washington, February 9, 1956.

SUBJECT

Budgetary Assistance to Iran

The President decided at the National Security Council meeting this morning that we should proceed without delay to provide to the Government of Iran \$20 million, over and above sums already provided for that Government, to assist in meeting its urgent budgetary problems.

As you know, the Shah and the Iranian Government have been pressed by the Embassy and the ICA Mission to Iran to undertake as a matter of urgency self-help measures which will contribute substantially to the capability of the Iranians to meet their budgetary requirements from their own resources. We have been informed of several measures taken and contemplated which will be helpful in this regard, but there nevertheless remains a substantial gap between anticipated expenditures and revenues.

The urgency in making known to the Iranians our decision to help in this respect derives from two factors: (a) their need to know what we are prepared to do in order that they can plan with intelligence; and (b) the desirability that the Shah be given this additional evidence of American support before he departs for India within the next several days where he will be undergoing very heavy pressures from Prime Minister Nehru, who has been violently opposed to the Baghdad Pact and to Iranian adherence thereto.

I would appreciate it if you would take such action as is necessary to permit the allotment of \$20 million to Iran for the above purpose, so that appropriate instructions can be telegraphed to the Embassy and the ICA Mission at Tehran with the least possible delay. As to whether this aid should be rendered to Iran on a grant or loan basis, I suggest that this question might be left for later determination in consultation with the Iran Country Team. My tentative views are that the reasons for providing this assistance suggest that the greatest benefit to the United States would accrue if it were made available on a grant rather than a loan basis.

Herbert Hoover, Jr.²

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 888.00/2-956. Confidential. Drafted by Rountree and cleared by U/MSA and E.

² Printed from a copy that bears this stamped signature.

351. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iran¹

Washington, February 14, 1956—7:29 p.m.

1387. Although US not yet able join Pact nor willing undertake bilateral guarantee in “reply” to Molotov proposal four-power neutrality “guarantee” as desired by Shah and Prime Minister (Embtels 1094 and 1104)² we attempting by other measures reassure Iran of continued US support. This connection believe Shah and Government should be assisted in preparing diplomatic, political and propaganda countermeasures to Soviet maneuver. Suggest in your discretion you discuss (without leaving written memo) matter with Government and if possible Shah prior his departure India along following line:

1. Department has considered carefully implications Molotov suggestion and agrees with Shah it is maneuver to isolate Iran from neighbors and dismember Baghdad Pact. In this regard it is similar to recent Bulganin proposal bilateral treaty with US designed undermine NATO and create false sense security. Soviets may not attempt push four-power Pact idea immediately to conclusion but proceed by stages, analyzing reaction each stage, probing for soft spots before proceeding. Even if they plan make major issue of proposal, their timetable may well be geared to trip of Shah to Moscow in June unless circumstances surrounding Shah’s forthcoming visit to India provide them with some unexpected opening. (Although idea first broached about January 13, Soviets have not introduced theme into propaganda or addressed formal note.) Therefore, would suggest Iran’s objective should be give no sign uncertainty which USSR can exploit. Iran should plan its reaction carefully order be constantly prepared in advance to check next Soviet step.

2. Iran’s present treaties provide good basis for parrying Soviet maneuvers and placing USSR on propaganda defensive. Following points may be of use to Iran in event USSR later

makes four-power neutrality guarantee subject of formal note or propaganda.

a. Soviet Union protected by Iran's obligations as member United Nations. Additionally Soviet-Iran agreements provide USSR with unusually well-defined explicit guarantees against Iranian aggression alone or in concert other nations.

b. While Iran protected against Soviet aggression by same guarantees, Soviet claims right under all treaties with Iran to introduce forces on Iranian territory as means protection against any threat posed by pro-Czarist elements. Although this should be dead letter since no threatening pro-Czarist forces remain in world, still this provides pretext which has been used in Soviet threats and against which Iran must protect itself. Event USSR should later argue that Iran's security adequately guaranteed by existing Soviet-Iran treaties, it might become useful to Iran to point out that this claimed Soviet right of intervention creates element of inequality in Soviet-Iran relations to Iran's disadvantage.

c. Estonia, Latvia, Poland and Roumania all signed non-aggression conventions with USSR identical to that signed by Iran in July 1933.³ Past violations and present threats to Iranian independence by Soviets do not result from lack treaty guarantees from USSR.

d. Pact by four outside powers to preserve any given status quo in Iran would be retrogressive in an era of dying colonialism. In previous Iranian experience, such Great Power Pacts have resulted in exploitation Iran. Fact Soviet attaches condition that Iran withdraw from Baghdad Pact proves treaty suggested by Soviets would restrict Iranian freedom manage own affairs.

3. Above points intended only as suggestions to assist GOI in analyzing strength of Iran's diplomatic position and as fruitful line of consideration for developing suitable diplomatic and propaganda approach to future Soviet maneuvers as necessary. Would be tactical error to use these lines prematurely, that is, before clearly required by situation. Iranian objective would be to force USSR onto diplomatic defensive and thereby lessen likelihood of stronger Soviet diplomatic action.

FYI: Department aware broader implications Soviet maneuver in context present Middle East situation. As re Iranian desire for some new evidence US support to use as counterweight Soviet maneuver, Department sought urgent action on budgetary aid and is endeavoring expedite solution problems of DFS military construction program and military aid deliveries in FY 1956. However, fact USSR has not yet pushed four-power pact in propaganda or most recent note to GOI (Embtel 1218)⁴ suggests Molotov comment only preliminary feeler in slowly developing campaign of nerves. We believe not advisable for US offer new commitment after each step in Soviet campaign nor to do so now as result Molotov suggestion.

In effort supply Embassy with further grist for discussing Soviet maneuvers with GOI Department pouching elaboration points 2a through d. End FYI.

Hoover

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/2-656. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Hannah; cleared by Kitchen and NEA/UN, NEA/L, NEA, and EE; and approved by Allen. Repeated to Moscow and London.

² Neither printed. Telegram 1104, January 18, reported the Shah's concern with the effect the Soviet offer might have on the Iranian public. (*Ibid.*, 661.88/1-1856) ³ Reference is to the Convention for the Definition of Aggression, Annex and Protocol of Signature, signed at London, July 3, 1933.

⁴ Dated February 6, not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/2-656)

352. Memorandum of a Conversation Between Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi and Secretary of State Dulles, Governor-General's Residence, Karachi, March 9, 1956, 9–10 a.m.¹

Karachi, March 9, 1956, 10 a.m.

I expressed my appreciation of the courageous action of the Shah in committing his nation to the Baghdad Pact, and doing so entirely on his own responsibility without prior bargaining with any other countries. The Shah explained in some detail why he had taken this action, emphasizing that he believed that it would be more effective and his country would be in a stronger position if he could honestly say he had done so entirely free of any foreign influence and without any bargaining with, or promises from, others.

I said that I thought it was that kind of courage which usually paid off in the long run. I recalled Czechoslovakia's unwillingness to take a risk in the Munich period, and said I thought that if they had had the courage to act alone, they would in fact have won allies, but that when an endangered people were not willing themselves to take risks unless they could first get distant people to take risks, they did not give a good impression of their own patriotism.

The Shah then went on to say that this policy was his policy—that he could never change—and that while circumstances might change so as to discredit his policy, he himself would never change it. It was his irrevocable commitment to stand against Russia and never to give in. He had taken this position at the time of the trouble about Azerbaijan. He recalled that George Allen was our Ambassador at the time. He believed that this action deserved, and should receive, strong support from the West and particularly from the United States as the leader of the anti-Communist forces. He pointed to the strategic importance of Iran and his view that it was the most critical spot in the world today.

I explained that there were a good many countries in the world which regarded themselves as the most critical spot. I said I had been told that by

Pakistan and now I was going to India where Nehru would undoubtedly say the same thing and then on through my trip where at each place the demands would be tremendous on the ground that their support was necessary to prevent a critical break-through of Communism. I said this trip only covered a small part of the world, but that wherever I went, I found a similar point of view. I said if all these things were added up, the total would be of astronomical proportions.

I said that the American people and the Congress were in my opinion enlightened to a remarkable degree. Never before had a country done so much for long-range objectives. I explained however that the American people generally did not appreciate the significance of the Middle East and South Asia. I hastily sketched the American foreign policy in terms of the piece of paper annexed hereto,² pointing out that the first American foreign policy had been in defense of the hemisphere and was expressed by the phrase “the Monroe Doctrine”. Then we had come to realize the importance of there being friendly nations on the other side of the Atlantic, and in defense of that concept we had taken part in the First and Second World Wars. Then, particularly as our population shifted toward the West, we had taken a similar view with respect to friendly countries on the west of the Pacific Ocean. However, the Middle East and South Asia as a vital area for the United States represented a fourth foreign policy, the development for which American and congressional opinion was perhaps not yet fully prepared. I said that it must be realized that in a country with representative political processes it was not enough for the Executive to decide on what was the national interest and then extract the money from the people. I said that could be done in Russia where a decision of the Kremlin could automatically be reflected in turning the screw down a bit tighter on the Russian people. They had no choice as to whether or not to contribute to “foreign aid”. In the United States it was a process of education. The people themselves had to vote away their money, and it was, I thought, very remarkable that they had done so to the extent that they had. There were, however, limits. It was particularly difficult during a political year to get Congress when it wanted to cut taxes to refrain from doing so and perhaps unbalance our budget in order to help some foreign people to balance their budget and not to pay taxes.

We discussed the tax problem. The Shah said it was extremely difficult to increase the indirect taxes which were quickly reflected in the cost of living and which could produce inflation. It was hard to collect direct taxes.

I said I recognized that only a very high sense of civic responsibility made it possible to have an adequate system of direct taxes. I said that in much of the world paying taxes was a bargaining process such as an ordinary deal in the market place where it was smart to try to make a deal which would benefit the individual at the expense of the government. It took time to educate people to the fact that paying full taxes was a civic duty, but I said that every effort needed to be made along this line. I agreed that taxes on the cost of consumers' goods was the worst form of taxation.

I expressed the thought that perhaps they were devoting too much of their oil revenues to development and not enough for budgetary purposes. I said I understood that only 10% went to the government budget. He said this was not so, but that the amount was 40% and only 60% for economic development.

The talk then moved again toward the international situation. I asked whether he had any implications from Nehru that he wanted to give me. He said nothing in particular except he thought he had perhaps persuaded Nehru of the integrity of their position and that Nehru would be more disposed to respect it and to keep his nose out of their affairs.

I said that I doubted that in the long run a country could defend itself from Communism unless it took a more belligerent attitude toward it and recognized it as something evil. The Shah said that the Indian Government did take a very strong view against the Communist Party in India. I said that was so but I thought they treated it as a political party that they did not like but not as something inherently evil. I said that as a Republican I rated that Party higher than the Democratic Party, but that was something different from treating the opposition party as something evil. The Shah said he felt there was very real fear of the Communist Party at least domestically. I said that Nehru's foreign policy almost always coincided with the Soviet policy. The Shah conceded that this was so, and said it was hard for him to understand.

The Shah went on to say that he thought the Arab States were playing with fire—that they had not had the experience Iran had had with the Russians—if they had, they would realize the definite danger that they were walking into.

The Shah went on to say that one of the things that was hard to explain was the fact that neutralism, playing both sides, seemed to be a successful game. He said that the Egyptian ambassadors boasted that they were quite successful in blackmailing both sides to their advantage. I said I thought that what the United States was doing was being greatly exaggerated and that in fact there was very little new in the measure of our economic aid to Egypt although now it might be concentrated on the Aswan Dam.

I discussed Yugoslavia—the reasons for our policy there. The Shah conceded that there might be reasons in particular cases for treating a neutralist well, but it was very difficult to explain to his people.

He said that we were perhaps spending too much in other countries such as Vietnam although he recognized that that was important. He said that was because we had come in too late. He did not want to see us make the same mistake in Iran as it might cost us much more if we did not move now. He said he had cleaned out the Army and crushed the Tudeh Party and Mossadegh was in jail and now was the time to consolidate the pro-Western position.

He mentioned that in this connection, and somewhat apologetically, that he would probably have to go to Moscow but that was not going to change his point of view.

He then ended with an almost emotional plea for United States financial assistance. He said this would not have to be great—“perhaps 75 million dollars a year for the next three years would suffice”. The Shah said that before Iran could be self-sustaining economically, it would be necessary for the oil production and corresponding royalties to go up from the present level of 32 million tons annually to 50 million annually. I said that while we certainly would try to find ways to help, I would have to say that such a

dollar figure as he suggested was surely excessive. I then said also that some of our assistance would have to be in the form of loans and not mere grants. The Shah said this would be very awkward for them because they could not make loans without approval of the Majlis and they were going on vacation very soon. I said that I doubted that would be a very persuasive reason for us to give to our own Congress. He then seemed somewhat ambiguously to suggest that loans might be o.k. for economic aid but that military aid should be on a grant basis.

By that time it was 10 o'clock when the Shah and I were slated to leave for the airport, so I got up saying in conclusion that I felt that this had been a very useful talk, that I was confident that good would come of it, and I hoped he understood better our position. Above all I wanted him to realize how much we respected the forthright position that he had taken to defend his country against Russia. The Shah expressed his gratification at the talk.

John Foster Dulles³

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 110.11–DU/3–956. Secret. According to a covering note by Macomber, March 9, the Secretary dictated this memorandum, and a note on the source text indicates that the Secretary later approved it. A copy of this memorandum was distributed in the Department of State as USDel/MC/11, March 9. (*Ibid.*, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199) A summary of this conversation was sent to Washington in Secto 37 from New Delhi, March 9. (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 110.11–DU/3–956) ² Not found attached.

³ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

353. Summary Paper Prepared by the Officer in Charge of Iranian Affairs (Hannah)¹

Washington, March 13, 1956.

On March 13 [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] conferred three hours with Shah² with following results:

- 1) The Shah stated the grant-loan package³ deal was impossible of acceptance. It is illegal without Majlis approval. The remaining time of the present Majlis session (6 days) is too short to obtain approval. It is politically impossible to inform the people that the U.S. holds Iranian friendship so lightly. Egypt obtained \$50 million grant by blackmail and Afghanistan \$5 million after opening its arms to the USSR.
- 2) In dejected despondency the Shah said this requires him to cut back on needed education, health, roads and military programs. This will result in a loss of face for him and for the U.S.
- 3) In view of the U.S. attitude he is without hope regarding the future aid program he discussed with the Secretary.
- 4) He will be embarrassed by having been duped when he makes his forthcoming trips to Turkey and the USSR.
- 5) The source reminded the Shah of U.S. disappointment over Iranian failure to make budgetary improvements. The Shah stated he is trying but it can't be done all at once. He is committed to a three year program of financial stability.
- 6) Source pointed out that the revenue bill had been emasculated by removing certain taxes, such as one on private home building. The Shah stated the bill was passed today, and he claimed the home tax would net only 15 million rials (\$200,000). He also said this tax would only hit the poor. He asked [for?] more time,

saying the people would be educated to paying taxes, and he pointed out that “taxes were paid under my father’s reign”.

7) The Shah stated that Secretary Dulles thought only 10% of the oil revenues were going to the budget. Actually, he claimed 40% were being diverted from the economic development program. The source stated that the Shah and the Government were putting all their bets on this single item of the U.S. aid program, ignoring larger aid of other kinds. The Shah agreed but stated that military aid is kept confidential. He claimed that the previous Iranian Government was granted \$100 million a year whereas the present Government gets only \$20 million and half of that is in the form of a loan.

8) The Shah stated that apparently the U.S. is ready to help only those countries in danger of falling to Communist subversion. He added “I know that one day the U.S. will come to Iran’s aid—on the day that a Gamal Nasser sits where I sit”.

¹ Source: Department of State, GTI Files: Lot 59 D 654, Iran Budgetary Aid 1955–56. Secret.

² In a parallel démarche, Iran’s Foreign Minister talked to Chapin on March 13 and used similar arguments as the Shah. A report of that conversation is in telegram 1419 from Tehran, March 14. (*Ibid.*, Central Files 788.5–MSP/3–1456) ³ Reference is to the \$20 million U.S. aid to Iran, approved by the NSC on February 9 and offered to Iran as a \$10 million grant and a \$10 million loan.

354. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iran¹

Washington, March 16, 1956—7:31 p.m.

1616. Embtels 1419² and 1429.³ Ambassador Amini called Department with instructions convey disappointment over loan-grant package plan and to urge U.S. reconsideration.

Amini was told of U.S. domestic problems in continuing grant budgetary aid which only rarely given and then only to meet temporary emergency. These overcome only with difficulty and problem had been increased by disappointment and concern over GOI budget increase. He was advised GOI should begin now plan its future finances on assumption further grant assistance for budgetary purposes in the future highly unlikely. Amini stated he also much disappointed in GOI budget increases and would urge GOI revision toward Foruhar levels, but hoped that in view immediate emergency and practical difficulties obtaining Majlis action and internal political implications re Baghdad Pact, U.S. would give consideration \$20 million grant. He was told U.S. giving urgent consideration this request but U.S. finds it impossible separate question of grant budgetary aid from need for serious GOI efforts reduce budget. He was told Department would communicate with him in next few days on results U.S. reconsideration GOI to this request but in meantime we hoped he would urge GOI take immediate steps reduce budget. End Amini conversation.

View practical difficulties getting Majlis approval and based on factors raised Embtel 1419, U.S. has decided make whole \$20 million in form grant. However we desire this decision be conveyed Shah and GOI in context substance Deptel 1587.⁴ We hope GOI will understand U.S making this decision in face great difficulties and that we view decision as inseparable from GOI assurances administratively hold 1335⁵ expenditures to overall Foruhar levels.

Same time desire you weave into presentation fact that it highly unlikely U.S. will be able give grant budgetary aid in future. We hope our agreement

give latest \$20 million in grant form will provide GOI adequate lead time to enable it formulate long-range budgetary plans on this assumption.

You should also disabuse Shah and GOI of frequently expressed notion that U.S. aid programs favor neutralist nations or those attempting international blackmail. In fact comparison will show that magnitude of aid to nations aligned openly with Free World greatly exceeds that to others. No grant military aid or budgetary aid has been made available to neutral nations. Economic aid to Iran in recent years has exceeded that to other friendly countries such as Greece (long a target for invidious comparison). It is not true that U.S. has made large grant to Egypt. Consideration being given to moderate long-term loan for financing Aswan Dam but even if finally agreed by Egypt and U.S this will fall far short of aid to Iran in any one of last 3 years. In fact Iran has been among those nations receiving largest amount of grant aid in last 3 years outside of those which have been engaged in actual hostilities. In order to understand its position in a realistic context it is extremely important that GOI realize its own record of U.S. aid compares most favorably with that of other countries. Sensational news stories about U.S. aid to neutralist or unfriendly countries should be heavily discounted in favor study of facts. Recent statement in Indonesia by Secretary Dulles (mentioned by Amini) simply records facts that, as GOI well knows, we do not extract advance commitments to military pacts as condition for U.S. aid, nor do we deny some economic assistance to uncommitted countries. To illustrate above point suggest you review with Shah and Government leaders aid amounts which Iran has received from U.S. since 1951.

Hoover

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 888.10/3-1556. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Hannah; cleared by GTI, E, U/MSA, and ICA; and approved by Hoover.

² See [footnote 2, supra](#).

³ In telegram 1429, March 15, the Embassy reported that Iran's budget of \$262.7 million had been presented to the Majlis and was on the verge of passage. The budget was \$26.4 million over previous levels proposed by Finance Minister Foruhar and any démarche by the Embassy to have it

recalled and reduced, as the Department instructed the Embassy in telegrams 1577 and 1578, both March 13, was “out of the question.” Telegram 1429 from Tehran is *ibid.*; 1577 to Tehran is *ibid.*, 888.10/3–356; and 1578 to Tehran is *ibid.*, 888.10/3–1356.

⁴ Reference is apparently an error and should be to telegram 1578.

⁵ The Iranian year 1335 began on March 20, 1956.

355. Letter From Howard D. Page, Director of Standard Oil Company, New Jersey, to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree)¹

New York, May 1, 1956.

DEAR BILL: In your conversation last week with Dave Shepard, you suggested we give you a memorandum of the reasons we felt it would not be in the best interests of a Middle East country, like Iran, now having oil production on a 50/50 basis, to sign new agreements giving them more than 50% of the profits.

Let me first make clear we have no claim or feeling such government lacks the legal or even moral right to do this. They clearly have such rights. We do believe, however, that such action would not be in their long-term interests. While having no doubt on this point, we have some difficulty in demonstrating it decisively, as there are clearly some short-term advantages that might accrue from the action. We do believe that such gains would prove to be short-term, and that the net, long-term effect of terms giving such a government more than 50/50 would be to its disadvantage.

We wish to suggest the following for your consideration.

1. The capacity of the large companies already producing oil in the Middle East to develop and market oil from new areas far exceeds that of the remainder of the oil industry. None of these companies would bid more than 50/50 for a new area, and the knowledge that bids higher in this respect would be considered might deter them from bidding at all. Thus the proposal to consider terms higher than 50/50 would deprive a country of many bids, including those from the most capable companies in the industry.
2. Company payments above 50/50 would add to the cost of oil from a new area, making it less competitive in comparison with

that from other areas, thus tending to restrict marketing and development.

3. Where the reason for offering new areas is the immediate need for cash (as the Iranians allege) this is much better served by the receipt of a cash bonus payment on signing of the agreement, than by a higher government share of profits which would not materialize for several years. Obviously a company could offer a much larger bonus payment if not faced with taxation above 50% when production started.

4. Terms giving the government more than 50/50 on a new area might put it under fire for not having obtained better terms on present agreements. This might have serious consequences to such a government, particularly in Iran, where strong opposition to the Consortium Agreement, at present without much of a case, would be thus given fresh ammunition.

In hoping and urging that 50/50 not be breached in the Middle East agreements, we are, of course, not trying to deprive governments from getting the most they can, taking advantage of a competitive market for their resources. We think these governments should do this very thing—and can, without deviating from 50/50. Our constructive suggestion is that governments asking for bids specify 50/50, but invite bids as to initial premium or bonus payments. This, of course, is the pattern followed almost universally in the U.S., where the landowner (including U.S. and state governments) is invariably given only a 1/8 royalty, but is offered premiums per acre to induce him to sign an oil lease.

Very truly yours,

Howard

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 888.2553/5–156.

356. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of the Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs (Kitchen) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree)¹

Washington, May 17, 1956.

SUBJECT

Political Situation in Iran

Reports from our Embassy [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] and comments by Iranians visiting the U.S. present a disturbing picture in Iran of political corrosion, evaporating public confidence, loss of governmental momentum and chronic royal indecisiveness. These developments are having an important impact on the position of the Shah, are adversely affecting prospects for the future of the monarchy and call into question the viability of the present disposition of power. They have serious implications for U.S. interests in Iran and the Middle East.

The following conclusion to a recent Embassy despatch² represents only the most recent and most succinct formulation of a problem which has been developing during the past year:

“As long as the Shah was towering behind the Government, possessed of power and prestige but not really using it except in emergencies, Iran had great latitude for experiments in governments and governing personalities. But the factor which has made for this latitude, this freedom of action, this political insurance, is slowly melting away. Time is running short.

“The question arises: Should the United States rely entirely on the Shah’s Government, if danger signs are already appearing that it might not last?”

1. The removal of Zahedi signaled the Shah's assumption of near-dictatorial power to an extent not seen since his father was Shah. Since responsibility must follow power, the failure or discrediting of the present regime will signify the failure of the monarch. It may be doubted that the institution (let alone the present Shah) can successfully withstand such a failure.

2. The Shah has staked his future on four things: (a) his own qualities of political leadership, (b) social reform, (c) economic development and (d) the support of the United States.

a. *Political leadership*—In this field the Shah has been a notable failure. He has vacillated through the entire political spectrum. At times he has flirted with Nationalist reformist elements and at others has entertained capitulation to the wishes of arch-conservatives. He has angered the clergy, the liberals, and the landowners. He threw fear into Majlis deputies by threatening to dissolve that body. Later he virtually promised to extend the Majlis term from two to four years. Next he planned the election of a whole new and highly liberal Majlis. Now, in fact, he is re-electing 85% of the present Deputies. He oscillates between military dictatorship, cynicism and cowardice. As the Embassy states, "the shah is living off his political capital—the enthusiasm of the 28th Mordad (overthrow of Mosadeq) and the traditional respect for the monarch. The first of these reservoirs is already empty and the level of the second is dropping." Political elements of all stripes express the fervent wish that the Shah would withdraw from active leadership and resume his status as a reigning constitutional monarch.

b. *Social reform*—Despite oft-repeated and widely publicized promises, very little has been accomplished. Land reform is nearly dormant. Conservative elements have been angered by tax reform laws but the people

see no improvements. Although there have been no major scandals, corruption and sloth continue throughout the bureaucracy. The present elections are blatantly “fixed” and clumsily managed and, as a result, ten enemies are created for every friend retained.

c. Economic development—Iran is stirred by two great urges, nationalism and the desire for a better life. Iranians accepted the humiliating defeat of Mosadeq’s nationalism in the hope that an oil agreement would at least obtain a better economic standard of living. The Plan Organization is the instrument for obtaining this objective. But after two years the people are beginning to doubt the effectiveness of the Organization which seems only to compound long-range plans while sitting on millions of dollars. The Shah has staked his future on Ebtehaj who is widely hated and must be counted a political liability. If, within the next two years, the Plan Organization could capture the people’s confidence and imagination by starting construction projects, the Shah’s political credit could be replenished. But to capitalize on this hope, a high degree of speed is required for which the Government of Iran is ill-prepared.

d. The United States—U.S. political and economic support has contributed heavily to the support of the present Government. But despite this aid, Iranians are disillusioned with and cynical about the present regime. In order for U.S. influence to continue to shore up the Iranian Government, under present conditions, it is necessary that there be a continuing series of U.S. steps to deflect the attention of Iranians from their troubles and dissatisfactions. But this continuing need for new dramatic U.S. measures only highlights the inadequacies of a regime which cannot stimulate the basic internal progress necessary to maintain the confidence of the people. Furthermore, in view of

financial limitations on the U.S. Government, the changing nature of the Cold War and the inhibiting effects of the Arab-Israel dispute, it may be doubted that the U.S. can continue indefinitely to provide the stimuli necessary to substitute for the deficiencies of the Iranian regime.

3.

After a brief élan, stimulated by the overthrow of Mosadeq, the negotiation of an oil agreement, the crippling of the Tudeh apparatus, extravagant (but unredeemed) promises of reform and economic development under the leadership of the Shah, and adherence to the Baghdad Pact, Iran is settling back toward the dead center where it stagnated for many decades.

However, the present situation differs from former times:

- a. The Shah now is held personally responsible, while lacking the qualities to discharge the responsibility.
- b. The forces of opposition to and dissatisfaction with the status quo are stronger and are increasing steadily.
- c. The experience of the Mosadeq era and the current shift of Soviet policy show clearly that Iran can no longer exist indefinitely, vegetating in a trough between balanced Russian and British influences. It is on a razor's edge and must move one way or another.
- d. The end of Mosadeq's prison term on August 20 will provide anti-status quo elements with a popular center of political attraction.

4. The U.S. is identified with the downfall of Mosadeq and the return of the Shah to power. A disaster in Iran is a disaster for U.S. interests in the M.E. Considering the disturbed state of the Arab World, the new Soviet political and economic initiatives,

and the frailty of the Baghdad Pact, the U.S. can ill afford to allow the present drift and stagnation in Iran to result in upsetting the stability of one of the few countries in the Middle East which is intimately associated with us.

5.

Courses of action might include the following:

a. Continue the present policy of supporting the Shah's Government but begin to seek ways to reduce our dependence on him, and other ways of facilitating U.S. eventual cooperation with other elements which may take over political leadership.

b. Try to stimulate and induce the Shah and Ebtehaj to redirect the Plan Organization with a view to capturing the initiative through a more dramatic and immediate program of urgent public works.

c. Convey to the Shah our estimate of the seriousness of the situation and obtain his agreement to support and protect an impact program of industrial development sparked by U.S. private companies in partnership with Iranians, the object being to start a rising spiral of productivity which would help to meet the as yet unsatisfied rising expectations of the Iranian people.

d. Strengthen the military forces by a greatly-expanded military aid program, both bilaterally and through the Baghdad Pact, with a view to creating military forces which can maintain the Shah in power despite his political weaknesses.

e. Endeavor to persuade the Shah to retire to the proper position of a constitutional monarch and to give a free hand to some strong and vigorous young Prime Minister.

(All of the above have some disadvantages and are only suggested as illustrations.)

6. We propose to initiate discussions of this subject in the OCB working committee in an effort to determine what U.S. courses of action might improve the situation before it is too late and/or how U.S. policy objectives in Iran could be revised to take into account the trends outlined above.

7. This summary is prepared primarily for information, although we would welcome any guidance and suggestions you may choose to provide. We believe that the interest of the United States would be served by the immediate inauguration of working level studies on this problem rather than waiting for the situation to reach the point where urgent high-level decisions are required. We anticipate that the results of such studies will certainly appear in the semi-annual Progress Report on NSC 5504 which must be completed by July.

¹ Source: Department of State, GTI Files: Lot 59 D 654, Iran 1956 Memoranda. Secret. Drafted by Hannah.

² Despatch 892 from Tehran, April 21. (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 788.00/4-2156)

357. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Allen) to the Under Secretary of State (Hoover)¹

Washington, June 22, 1956.

SUBJECT

Reply to Ambassador Amini's Request for More Aid to Iran²

Discussion:

As a part of its new politico-economic offensive in the Middle East, the USSR last summer invited the Shah to visit Moscow. He accepted and will

depart Monday, June 25. On July 19, 1955, under instructions, Ambassador Chapin told the Shah of U.S. plans to increase military aid and put this in the context of considerations relating to a possible Iranian decision to join the Middle East collective defense organization. Believing that the newly-formed Baghdad Pact represented the realization of the American concept of a "northern tier" defense line, Iran indicated its desire to join but endeavored to attach a heavy price in terms of U.S. aid and support. Although the U.S. refused to meet these demands, Iran joined the Pact on November 3, 1955. Nevertheless, it has been perfectly obvious that Iran (and other members of the Pact) assumed that adherence would be followed by increased aid.

In the view of Iranians, the Middle East is now going through a period of trial during which American firmness and ability to lead the area will be measured, in terms of the Baghdad Pact and increased aid, against the effectiveness of the new Soviet politico-economic line as manifested in Egypt and Afghanistan. The Shah and leaders of Iran generally prefer open association with the U.S., but they are hedging in an effort to determine just how far the United States will go. They will attempt to compensate for any uncertainty regarding the United States by improving their relations with the USSR.

While the real solution to this problem lies in broad policy decisions affecting the role of the U.S. in this new phase of the Cold War, the present letter from Dr. Amini can be answered on other grounds. This letter, like previous messages from the Iranian Government, is designed to extract maximum advantage from the situation by encouraging competition between the Soviet Union and the United States for Iran's favor. A similar tactic was employed just before the Shah's visit to India, when we decided to extend an additional \$20 million for budgetary aid. It would be unwise in our reply to encourage Iranian hopes for aid at this time since to do so would only put us in the position of being continually blackmailed. Although the attached proposed letter to Dr. Amini will avoid this problem, we can, of course, expect that the question will be put to us again.

The specific points raised in Dr. Amini's letter can be answered. We can agree with his comments about the importance of Iran's adherence to the

Baghdad Pact. We can correct his wild misapprehensions about the scope of our aid to neutral countries. We can refer to Ambassador Chapin's promise of increased military aid and point out that this is being programmed. With regard to helping Iran cover its increased defense costs, the allocation of an additional \$20 million in grant budgetary aid last spring would nearly cover the increases in the Iranian defense budget if they chose to use it that way. We have previously given the Shah our views on how he should conduct himself during his visit to Moscow.

Recommendation:

That you sign the attached letter to Dr. Amini.

[Tab A]

BACKGROUND FOR REPLY TO DR. AMINI'S LETTER³

- 1) In June 1955 the Shah accepted in principle the invitation to visit Moscow.
- 2) On July 19, 1955, the Ambassador informed the Shah of the U.S. plan to increase military aid and expressed the hope that this would make it possible for the Shah to proceed with early arrangements for development of a Middle East collective defense organization. Reference—Deptel 55 and Embtel 108.⁴
- 3) Embassy reported that rumors heard in Tehran and northern Iran that as U.S. aid diminishes USSR prepared provide both economic and technical assistance on large scale. Reference—Embtel 177, August 2, 1955.⁵
- 4) Embassy Tehran expressed the belief that the U.S. is either “moving too rapidly on the Pact or too slowly on assurance of minimum aid to Iran clearly implied by our expressed interest in Iranian Pact adherence⁶ If Iran adheres to Pact on urging of Turkey and Pakistan, it will be on assumption of all three that the U.S. will come through with necessary aid to make arrangements effective.” Reference—Embtel 370, September 1, 1955.⁷

5) A personal memorandum from Prime Minister Ala to Ambassador Chapin⁸ set forth the Iranian price for adherence to the Pact. The price included:

- a) greater financial assistance by the U.S.;
- b) recognition of Iranian sovereignty over Bahrein;
- c) the guarantee that the U.S. and UK would come to Iran's defense in the event of attack by the USSR.

6) Department instructed Embassy to explain to Iran that accession to the Baghdad Pact should not be regarded as a favor to the U.S. but should be based strictly upon Iran's estimate of its own interests. "Although Shah and Prime Minister can be sure U.S. will do all it can to assist in strengthening armed forces, believe GOI would err if it based its policy toward regional defense solely upon the size of anticipated aid rather than upon its own self-interest and improved Iranian Middle East prestige." Reference—Deptel 460, September 17, 1955.⁹

7) On October 5 the Shah asked for assurances that if Iran joined the Pact the United States would issue a statement of support including a reference to military and economic assistance.¹⁰

8) On October 7 [6] on instructions from the Secretary of State¹¹ the Ambassador told the Prime Minister that when Iran formally adhered to the Pact a statement would be issued by the U.S. Government. However, he added that, in view of the possibility that Iran's adherence to the Pact at that particular moment might be viewed as retaliation against the Soviet-Egyptian arms arrangement, the U.S. Government suggests that Iran might do well to weigh the problem and delay action until the situation becomes clearer although U.S. views regarding Iran's adherence to the Pact remained unaltered.

9) Despite this caution, the Shah decided to go ahead and join the Pact and notified the Embassy of this decision within hours after

the above described advice was given.

10) On November 3 Iranian adherence to the Pact became effective.

11) As a result of a misunderstanding between U.S. officials in Tehran and the Shah regarding the means of implementing the U.S. commitment to increase aid, it was decided in January 1956 to add approximately \$17 million to the FY 1956 Iranian military aid program. Although this decision was based partly on the belief that falling off in military deliveries would be very unfortunate coming right after adherence to the Baghdad Pact, the United States obtained little, if any, political credit for this action since the Iranians had anticipated an FY 1956 program of this magnitude.¹²

12)

During February 1956, as a result of Iranian requests and a continuing budgetary deficit and also for political reasons related to the Baghdad Pact and the Shah's trip to India, \$20 million additional budgetary aid was granted to Iran from the President's Fund.

Shortly after this was done the Iranian budgetary deficit for the forthcoming year was increased by about \$25 million. The Shah expressed gratitude for this additional aid, saying "it goes far to relieve my mind. I have been worried about evidence U.S. support I can show to counter grandiose offers which the Russians may make to me while I am there." Total figures for U.S. aid to Iran were pointed out to the Shah, and he agreed they were most impressive and constitute an ample response to Soviet offers. Reference—Embtel 1454, March 19, 1956.¹³

On March 9, during a conversation between the Secretary of State and the Shah, the latter stated that it was difficult to explain to his people the fact that "neutralism, playing both sides, seemed to be successful gambit, mentioning that the Egyptian Ambassador had

boasted of blackmailing both sides to Egypt's advantage." The Shah then asked the Secretary for "perhaps \$75 million a year for the next three years." The Secretary said that while the U.S. would try to find ways to help, he thought the figure mentioned by the Shah was "excessive." Reference—New Delhi telegram Secto 37, March 10, 1956.¹⁴

14) The U.S. and UK agreed that if the Shah requests our views we should advise him not to raise any question of modifying the 1921 or 1927 Treaties during his visit in Moscow since this would give the Soviet Union a lever for attempting to drive a bargain. It was also agreed that the Shah should conduct himself in Moscow as a constitutional monarch, making no commitments. References—Embtel 1696, May 3, and Deptel 2133.¹⁵

15) Another agency of the U.S. Government quoted the Shah as saying on May 31, 1956, "you have given the Turks 450 planes and Iran only 2 How can the U.S. be so casual about our needs? Our position, my position personally, is greatly exposed. The Soviets are planning a most elaborate reception. If they make and publicize great offers without strings, where do I stand with my people? I do not trust the Soviets, but my people are desperate for aid, progress and development. They are impatient. Gold from any hand glitters the same. Tempting offers are bound to result in great pressures." When the source expressed his pleasure that the Shah had had such a successful trip to Turkey, the Shah replied "I hope you can still say that after my next trip."

16) On June 7 Ambassador Chapin expressed the opinion that we shall have to face a difficult period with the Shah's return from Moscow "when his head will be full of impressions of Soviet might and of hints and offers of assistance. We must be prepared for additional demands of assistance by him at this time, and the Department may wish to consider what we can offer." Reference—Embtel 1863, June 7.¹⁶

17) We agreed with the UK that the Shah should be advised that if the Soviet Union attempts to obtain from him amplification of his March 20, 1955 assurances to the effect that Iran would not become a military base if it joined the Baghdad Pact, he should not make any new commitments, but, if necessary, could repeat orally what he had said previously. Reference—Deptel 2263, June 12, 1956.¹⁷

18) Through a personal emissary the Shah informed the Ambassador that he was unhappy because, contrary to his expectation, the U.S. had not increased aid since Iran joined the Baghdad Pact but on the contrary had cut it. He disavowed any intention to indulge in Nasr-type blackmail tactics but reemphasized his need for aid. He seemed to take the view that by joining the Pact and taking certain measures to correct the budgetary situation Iran was actually performing a favor for the United States. He also expressed his irritation over the fact that the United States has given no support to Iran's claims to Bahrein. Reference—Embtel 1884, June 11, 1956.¹⁸

19) The same emissary quoted the Shah as saying, "I have been receiving aid from the U.S., but they now appear no longer interested although I still hope they will revise their policy. In my trip to Russia I must cultivate friendly relations, because it is possible that, if I can get no more help from the Americans, I may have to accept something from the Soviets. Reference—Embtel 1885, June 11.¹⁹

20) The UK indicated that while the Shah should not reject all Soviet overtures out of hand he should be wary of suggestions for the exchange of persons or joint Soviet-Iran commercial enterprises. The UK would suggest that the Shah might give favorable consideration to increases in trade relations.²⁰

21) On June 14 the Shah reiterated to the Ambassador his impression that U.S. aid had decreased since Iran joined the Baghdad Pact. He expressed the hope that it would be possible for

the U.S. to assist in bearing the military budget. He reiterated his view that the Iranian Army must be strengthened considerably if it is to take its place in the Baghdad Pact line. He again referred to the advantages being gained by the neutrals from “playing both sides of the street.” Although the Shah expressed his intention to behave as a constitutional monarch while in Moscow, he continually repeated his belief that he needs some kind of public assurances of further U.S. aid in order to bolster his position. Reference—Embtel 1914, June 14.²¹

22) Press reports have been appearing in Iran indicating that the United States plans to increase aid to the Baghdad Pact countries and has allocated \$800 million in aid to these countries.

[Tab B]

Letter From the Under Secretary of State (Hoover) to the Iranian Ambassador (Amini)²²

Washington, June 22, 1956.

DEAR MR. AMBASSADOR: I have read your letter of June 19 with which you enclosed a memorandum describing the views of your Government on several matters. I have noted your reference to the departure of His Majesty on June 25 on a visit to the USSR. Consequently, I have hastened to reply in order that you may be able to report to your Government promptly.

First, I should like to emphasize that the United States Government clearly recognizes the importance of Iran's adherence to the Baghdad Pact. We appreciate fully the weighty considerations involved in accomplishing such a basic reorientation in a traditional foreign policy. We feel certain that such a major decision was founded on a careful study of the long-range advantages of regional cooperation and the increased strength that would result therefrom, rather than on any short-term tactical advantages which might have been envisaged.

Similarly, we have noted the series of threats, protests and other maneuvers launched by the Soviet Union in efforts to prevent the taking of this decision and then to nullify its effects. We have also noted the calm firmness of the Iranian Government's reaction to these Communist efforts. As the prime target of Soviet threats and maneuvers for at least ten years, the United States is well aware that the Soviet Union will adopt any means available to frustrate the efforts of free nations to seek strength in mutual cooperation. Many other free nations have resisted such threats and false inducements for many years and the fact of their steadfast devotion to the concept of mutual cooperation coupled with the strength generated by this policy have enabled them to retain their independence and improve their situation despite the actions of the USSR.

At the same time, I cannot agree with your statement that in its aid programs the United States appears to favor certain countries in direct proportion to the degree to which they have condemned the United States or approached the Soviet Union. Although I know that such generalizations have been heard from time to time, I was surprised to know that the plain facts of the case apparently are not in your possession. There has been discussion of this point in Tehran between our Embassy and the Iranian Government.

I believe that the following facts will disclose that in its aid programs the United States has demonstrated a clear and unequivocal policy of supporting its friends. A review of United States non-military aid to non-Communist Asian countries from Japan to Turkey during the United States fiscal year 1956 shows that such aid to countries aligned openly in mutual defense systems was approximately seven times larger than aid to countries which have chosen to adopt a neutral position. The same figures, when apportioned on a per capita basis in the countries concerned, show that non-military aid in those countries formally allied in mutual defense was about twelve times larger than in the neutral countries. Over the period from 1950 to 1956 non-military aid to Iran was more than twice the equivalent aid to all of the Middle East Arab countries combined. When military aid provided to the countries associated with collective security arrangements and not provided to the so-called uncommitted countries is added, the comparison of the degree of American support is far more striking.

We recognize the desirability of strengthening and improving the armed forces of Iran and appreciate the burdens this creates. Iran has been making progress in this direction and we are hopeful it will continue. We also recognize the need for United States assistance in this field. I need not relate to you the considerable size and scope of military aid already provided to Iran. The intention of the United States to continue and increase military aid to Iran was confirmed to His Imperial Majesty by our Ambassador on July 19, 1955, and sizable increases already have been programmed. It is our plan that such aid in the forthcoming United States fiscal year will, subject of course to favorable Congressional action on the related appropriation bill, be provided in significant quantities.

As for the secondary burden that increased military aid imposed on Iran, this is a matter of importance since the ability of Iran usefully to employ additional military aid obviously is a major factor in determining the extent and timing of military aid programs. I understand that of the currently estimated deficit of approximately \$53 million in the Iranian budget for the present year, somewhat less than half is attributable to increased defense costs. As you will recall, last February the United States Government, in response to requests for aid additional to the regular program, made available \$20 million to assist the Iranian Government in meeting its total ordinary deficit.

With regard to His Imperial Majesty's visit to Moscow, I believe that he has discussed this matter with our Ambassador, as well as with the British Ambassador. It is my understanding that he intends to conduct his visit entirely along lines appropriate for a State visit, deferring any substantive matters raised by the Soviet leaders for consideration in consultation with the Government after his return to Tehran. I believe there is much wisdom in this decision of His Majesty since this will provide ample opportunity to assess carefully and deliberately any suggestions which the Soviet leaders may make. In advance of firm information regarding proposals made by the Soviet leaders it would be difficult for Iran to plan its next steps or for the Department to comment on them.

I am quite confident that His Imperial Majesty's devotion to freedom and constant support of regional cooperation will be in no wise influenced by

false blandishments any more than by coarse threats. I believe this so firmly that I should not even have mentioned it had you not commented on the matter in your letter.

I know that I need not assure you that the United States continues to regard the independence and integrity of Iran as cardinal points in its foreign policy and will continue, within the limits of available funds and its world-wide commitments, to give aid and assistance.

Sincerely yours,

Herbert Hoover, Jr.²³

¹ Source: Department of State, GTI Files: Lot 59 D 654, Iran, Military Aid 1956. Secret. Drafted by Hannah.

² This request, in the form of a letter of June 19 and an attached memorandum, was transmitted to the Embassy in Tehran in telegram 2430, June 22. In his letter, Amini reiterated arguments that Iran's adherence to the Baghdad Pact had subjected it to criticism, opposition, and hostility from the Soviet Union; but that when it came to financial aid the United States had not treated Iran "any better than some countries which are neutral." Amini requested "positive action" before the Shah's departure for Moscow on June 25 and raised the possibility of Soviet aid to Iran: "But, just as HIM did not waver during Indian visit despite Nehru's persistent arguments favour neutrality, instead defending Iran's membership in Pact strengthen its defense against aggression, so, without doubt, will he also reject proposals which may now be made to him." (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 788.5-MSP/6-2256) ³ Secret. Drafted by Hannah.

⁴ [Documents 320](#) and [321](#).

⁵ See [footnote 2](#), [Document 322](#).

⁶ All ellipses in this memorandum are in the source text.

⁷ [Document 324](#).

⁸ See [Document 325](#).

⁹ [Document 330](#).

¹⁰ See [Document 333](#).

¹¹ See [Document 336](#).

¹² More information is in DEF 997024 from the Secretary of Defense to the Chief ARMISH-MAAG Tehran. (National Archives and Records Administration, JSC Records, CSS 092 (8-22-46) (2)) ¹³ Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 888.10/3-1956) ¹⁴ See [footnote 1](#), [Document 352](#).

¹⁵ Neither printed. (Both Department of State, Central Files, 788.11/5-356)

¹⁶ Not printed. (*Ibid.*, 788.11/6-756) ¹⁷ Not printed. (*Ibid.*, 788.11/6-856) ¹⁸

Not printed. (*Ibid.*, 788.5-MSP/6-1156) ¹⁹ Not printed. (*Ibid.*) ²⁰ As reported in telegram 5741 from London, June 13. (*Ibid.*, 033.8861/6-1356)

²¹ Not printed. (*Ibid.*, 888.00/6-1556) ²² Transmitted to the Embassy in Tehran in telegram 2341, June 22. (*Ibid.*, 788.5-MSP/6-2256) ²³ Printed from a copy that bears this stamped signature.

358. Report of the Interdepartmental Committee on Certain U.S. Aid Programs¹

Washington, July 3, 1956.

IRAN

Problem

The present pro-West Government of Iran, in power since 1953, inherited a virtually bankrupt economy, due largely to the loss of oil revenues following nationalization of the industry, and Iran has since been beset with the problem of achieving order after the economic and political debacle into which the country had been plunged. Communist efforts to exploit Iranian nationalism have complicated the problem. Inflationary pressures have remained great and domestic resources have been inadequate to cope with the problems of internal security and the ever present Russian threat from the north.

The United States during the past three years (FYs 1954, 1955 and 1956) has taken a leading role in efforts to achieve security and stability in rehabilitating and rationalizing the oil industry and in encouraging plans for sound economic development. Nearly \$150 million in economic support has been provided largely to meet usual budgetary requirements and only a part of which has been related to build-up of military strength. However, in addition, over \$75 million in direct military assistance has been provided and about \$18 million in defense support has been provided for military construction.

At the present time the Government of Iran is launching a new Development Program and is beginning to receive sharply increasing oil revenues which, over the next five years, may run close to a billion dollars. Nevertheless, heavy internal and external financial deficits persist.

The present Iranian army can maintain internal security, preserve the existing government and provide limited resistance against aggression, but

is not capable of sustained combat against Russian forces. However, if redeployed and built up to a level of approximately one-third of U.S. TOandE's, it is estimated that this force could, with outside operational and logistical support, provide limited resistance to a Russian attack. About \$195 million in military assistance plus \$35 million to generate local currencies for construction projects would be required during the period 1957–1960 both to maintain existing forces and to accomplish this buildup.

In addition to the military costs, about \$100 million² in further outside support over the same period may be needed if Iran maintains its present level of defense expenditures and expands developmental, social and welfare programs without continuing sizable budget deficits (even with the expected increase in oil income).

The problem facing the U.S. Government is accordingly whether to:

- a) hold military aid down to the minimum needed to fulfill U.S. commitments (\$25 million per year in FY 1957 and 1958);
- b) provide aid through 1960 in the general magnitude mentioned above which would build up Iran's military position;
- c) provide the external assistance necessary to carry out Iran's planned development program, or if not, what alternative level of aid.

U.S. Military Commitments to Iran

The U.S. has maintained military advisory missions in Iran since 1943 and has agreed to continue them through March 1958. In July 1955 the U.S. undertook to maintain deliveries during FY 1956 at the previous general rate and to provide an increase in military assistance during FY 1957 and FY 1958, tacitly relating the level of future military aid to Iranian adherence to the Baghdad Pact. This would mean deliveries of approximately \$25 million per year with a corresponding requirement of annual funding in FYs 1957 and 1958. The scale of future U.S. military aid to Iran awaits decisions on Middle East defense plans by both the Baghdad Pact nations

and the U.S. and will be limited by Iran's ability effectively to absorb military aid.

U.S. Military Objectives and Missions

The JCS' current force objectives are:

Army—8 light infantry and 4 light armored divisions and 5 infantry brigades

Navy—11 combatant vessels

Air Force—5 squadrons

The force missions are:

- a) to assist in the maintenance of internal security,
- b) to resist external aggression, and
- c) to assist in regional defense arrangements.

These force objectives were based generally upon the size of the military establishment currently maintained by Iran (170,000 men, including 22,000 Gendarmes) with a view toward modernization rather than expansion.

The JCS' specified military objectives include:

- a) insuring the area to the West (denying it to the Soviet Bloc),
- b) developing capacity for maintaining internal security and providing defensive delaying capabilities contributing to Middle East defense, and
- c) Iranian participation in Middle East defense arrangements.

Military Capabilities

The Iranian Army, equivalent in numbers of men to about 5 U.S. divisions, can maintain internal security, preserve the existing government and provide limited resistance against aggression. At present, the Iranian Army is not capable of sustained combat against Soviet forces. If built up to presently contemplated equipment levels (one-third of U.S. TO&E), partially redeployed and with outside operational support (principally U.S. air) and logistical support, it might hold back 15–20 Russian divisions at the Zagros Passes for 30 days.

The Air Force is weak and incapable of resisting air attack.

The Navy is weak and ineffective.

The Iranian forces are deployed primarily to maintain internal security, but some units are being moved to make possible more effective resistance against Soviet attack where this does not adversely affect internal security.

*Costs of Military Build-up and Maintenance*³

Military assistance to Iran, under DOD established criteria, is limited to filling screened equipment deficiencies in existing units and maintenance and support of existing units with possible limited improvement in tactical and logistical capabilities.

The cost of maintaining existing forces (including the Gendarmérie) at present strength and level of effectiveness is estimated at approximately \$103 million annually, of which \$15 million represents U.S. military assistance (training ammunition, training, spare parts, attrition and POL) and \$88 million represents local currency costs contained in the Iranian defense budget.⁴

To raise existing forces to approximately one-third of U.S. TO&E and to improve their logistical support capabilities would require approximately \$128 million⁵ in military aid and an additional \$3 million in dollar maintenance costs each year thereafter. Also, a \$35 million U.S. local currency contribution for construction may be required.

This program does not provide for any increase in personnel strength or for further increases in pay and allowances. For the period FY 1957/1960 new funds averaging about \$50 million a year in military aid and \$9 million a year in defense support (for construction) would be required for both maintenance and build-up. After FY 1960, U.S. military assistance costs should level off at \$18 million annually. Thus, of a total estimated cost of the build-up and maintenance of \$584 million, the U.S. would contribute in military assistance and defense support \$230 million, or about 40%.

Iranian divisions presently comprise two combat and one training regiments. To support a third combat regiment in each division would cost an additional \$124 million in military aid, as well as an additional \$15 million annually in personnel costs.⁶ The Department of Defense does not recommend this program, which in any event probably could not be carried out before 1960.

Economic Situation in Iran

Iran, in spite of holding one of the largest oil reserves in the world, is underdeveloped, has a low per capita productivity, is essentially agricultural and suffers chronic serious budgetary and balance of payments deficits. Lack of power, transportation facilities and technically competent workers and low domestic consumption are among the retardants to economic growth.

Iran has been unable to cope with a chronic and increasing budgetary deficit, partly, perhaps, because it has been unable or unwilling to improve its taxation system or to introduce budgetary reforms. With the aid of about \$150 million provided by the U.S. for budgetary support over the past three years the Government of Iran has been able to avoid resort to bank financing and perhaps uncontrollable inflationary pressures. Recent upward movements in prices coupled with the prospective 1956/1957 budget deficit give rise to concern about future price increases. Even with defense expenditures stabilized at the FY 1957 level, prospective increases in government expenditures relative to revenue will probably result in annual budget deficits of 10–15% of total government expenditures for many years.

If Iran carries out its presently scheduled development expenditures, it is estimated that, despite substantial foreign exchange earnings from oil, Iran's balance of payments (not including military payments) may also run a deficit of about \$70 million annually through FY 1960. If revenues level off by that time, this deficit may increase thereafter, in view of Iran's contemplated increase in development expenditures and improvements in consumption level.

A Seven Year Development Plan launched in 1949 has not been carried out. A second Seven Year Development Plan is, however, being worked out under which nearly a billion dollars of revenue is to be used for economic purposes, roughly one-fourth for programs under way.⁷ About one-third of government expenditures are currently used for economic development purposes, and this proportion is expected to rise to 40% for the four years ending with FY 1960. This increase is largely in connection with the new Development Plan.

*Economic Projections*⁸

Although national accounts data are unavailable for Iran and physical production statistics are incomplete and unreliable, it is estimated on the basis of analysis of major segments of the Iranian economy and projections based thereon, that the GNP of Iran might increase about 8½% annually through 1959/1960, which increase would add about \$250 million annually of new resources over the next four years. Since this rapid rate of growth is partially explained by the rehabilitation of productive resources, the rate of increase may diminish after 1960, depending on the effectiveness of the economic program. The lack of information regarding the relation between government and private consumption and government and private investment makes it difficult to predict what part of Iranian resources, including their potential increase, can be used for defense and/or investment programs without inflationary consequences, or whether the projected sums can be effectively spent for development purposes.

Rough projections indicate that \$50 million annually of the above increment on the GNP would be required to maintain current consumption

levels, \$60 million more would be required to raise per capita consumption by perhaps 3% a year.

If development with economic stability is to be maintained, increases in private and government investment, defense expenditures and other government financing would have to be met from the \$140 million residual increment. We have no way of knowing how the Iranian Government can or will use these resources. However, estimates indicate that the competing claims exceed these anticipated additional Iranian resources. If the Iranian Government does not reduce requirements or more effectively utilize its resources, the resulting gap may lead to pressures for continued U.S. economic aid.

Estimated Iranian defense expenditures of about \$88 million per year⁹ over the next four years constitute a substantial share of total government expenditures (e.g. about 1/5 in FY 1956/57). Since improved means for raising revenues pose serious political difficulties, an increase in expenditures would probably increase Iran's budgetary deficit unless projected increases in government outlays for other purposes, including development programs, were curtailed. Although politically difficult, reductions in government and Plan Organization development programs could be effected without short range adverse economic consequences.

On the basis of the foregoing conclusions drawn from the Study Group's projections, external support of about \$100 million¹⁰ over the four year period would be required provided that Iran's projected developmental expenditures are carried out, social services also expand as projected, and defense expenditures remain constant at about \$88 million. This would be in addition to deliveries of military end items and dollar DFS (about \$195 million) and local currency for military construction (about \$35 million). If the \$33 million of budgetary support and technical aid requested of Congress for FY 1957 is obtained, about \$70 million of external resources would be needed for the years 1958–1960, primarily to reduce budgetary deficits.

Military Capabilities of an Unaided Iran

Despite the fact that U.S. military aid has supported a substantial portion (30%) of the Iranian military program in the last three years, the Iranian Government has run sizable budget deficits (16.5% last fiscal year) which have been covered by U.S. economic aid. Although these deficits can, in part, be attributed to military expenditures, other items (such as social welfare and governmental investment) have had an equal impact.

If all further U.S. aid were discontinued, Iran could assume the \$15 million annual cost of maintaining existing forces by holding down projected increases in other governmental expenditures. Theoretically it could also assume the cost of building up its forces during the period FY 1957/1960 at an additional annual cost of \$45 million; however, the impact on development programs, on other governmental expenditures, and on consumption standards, would be such as to make this economically and politically difficult.

Aside from the military and economic significance of cutting of U.S. aid, such a development probably would result in a major reorientation of Iranian foreign policy in the direction of neutralism and/or closer cooperation with the U.S.S.R.

Alternative Courses of Action

It is recommended that the NSC determine what choice or combination of choices the U.S. should make among the following alternative courses of action:¹¹

- 1.

Fulfill existing U.S. military aid commitments which extend through FY 1958 and thereafter assist in the maintenance of forces at this level, exclusive of any economic assistance given.

Implications:

a) cost to U.S. of about \$50 million for the period through FY 1958 and possibly about \$15 million annually thereafter for assistance toward maintenance. Iran would probably not go ahead with the military build-up in 2. below;

b) would leave Iranian forces weak, ill-equipped, and able only to maintain internal security;

c) might not create insurmountable political problems in the immediate future, but would increase the danger of adverse Iranian reaction due to doubts concerning U.S. intentions.

2.

In addition to 1. above, increase combat and logistical capabilities through providing additional end items and redeploying selected units.¹²

Implications:

a) cost to U.S. about \$150 million in addition to \$80 million for 1. above through FY 1960; construction projects in the military build-up might compete with Iran's development program for scarce commodities, such as skilled labor;

b) this program, which represents the maximum Iranian forces can effectively utilize, will give these forces increased capabilities for sustained combat; with outside operational support (primarily U.S. air) and logistical aid might delay Soviet forces at Zagros Passes for 30 days;

c) although not meeting Iran's desires for increased forces, arising from Baghdad Pact strategic concepts,

this program would help greatly to solidify its pro-Western affiliations.

3.

Limit economic aid beginning in FY 1958 to technical assistance.

Implications:

a) cost to U.S. about \$33 million in FY 1957 plus \$8–10 million annually thereafter.¹³ Iran would have some difficulty in completing the projected Development Program, but might do so with deficit financing running risk of serious inflation;

b) this would create uncertainty regarding U.S. intentions and might lead Iran to seek funds elsewhere (Consortium, additional loans, dealings with USSR) and possibly create conditions for growth of extreme nationalism.

4.

Provide economic aid and technical assistance over the four year period FYs 1957–1960 up to an amount of about \$100 million in new funds to assist Iran in carrying out its contemplated Development Plan.

Implications:

a) Iran's Development Program more likely to be achieved without serious difficulty. Would permit an appreciable advance in living standards and in government sponsored social improvements;

b) political realities may, however, require continued aid of this magnitude.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 700.5–MSP/7–356. Secret; U.S. Eyes Only. According to a cover sheet attached to a copy of this report *ibid.*, OCB Files: Lot 61 D 385, Iran, it was submitted to the Secretaries of State, the Treasury, and Defense and to the Director of the International Cooperation Administration. The report was the work of the Prochnow Committee, formally titled the Interdepartmental Committee on Certain U.S. Aid Programs, which was established by the NSC on December 8, 1955, to prepare reports on the coordination of military and economic aid programs in Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, Vietnam, the Republic of China, and Korea. The committee was headed by Deputy Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Herbert V. Prochnow and consisted of representatives of the Departments of Defense and the Treasury, the Bureau of the Budget, ICA, and CIA. For documentation on the establishment of the committee, see [volume x](#). The Prochnow Committee submitted a final composite report to the NSC on August 3. (Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5610 Series) This combined report was discussed by the NSC at its 301st meeting on October 26, 1956; see [vol. x, p. 124](#).

² This is exclusive of \$173 million of external resources which appear to be readily available from other sources. [Footnote in the source text.]

³ The financial data and cost estimates contained in this Chapter represent the cost of deficiencies screened by ARMISH–MAAG–Iran and reviewed by the foreign aid divisions of the military departments. They have not received a budget review by the Comptrollers of the military departments nor by the Office of the Secretary of Defense. They, therefore, represent order of magnitude values only. [Footnote in the source text.]

⁴ An unknown amount of the \$88 million comes from U.S. budgetary support to Iran which in FY 1956 was programmed at \$35 million. [Footnote in the source text.]

⁵ This includes \$75 million for additional equipment, \$18 million for a 30-day war reserve of ammunition, and \$35 million in DFS dollar construction costs. [Footnote in the source text.]

⁶ \$71 million in unit equipment, \$7.5 million military construction, \$45 million for a war reserve of ammunition for new units, and \$15 million annually for increased personnel costs for an additional 50,000 men. [Footnote in the source text.]

⁷ Annual direct oil revenues are expected to rise from \$92 million in FY 1955/56 to a stable level of about \$237 million by FY 1958/59. At the same time, foreign exchange earnings from Consortium rial purchases are expected to rise from about \$46 million in 1955/56 to a level of about \$64 million in 1958/59. Current Iranian law requires that most of the oil revenue go for development purposes, thereby limiting the sums available for defense and other government expenditures. [Footnote in the source text.]

⁸ Wide margins of error must be allowed, considering the questionable nature of statistical data available and the need to rely on assumptions which may not always be valid. [Footnote in the source text.]

⁹ This excludes about \$10 million per year over the present level to cover local currency costs involved in the build-up (i.e., \$35 million over the four year period to come from U.S. aid—see Annexes I and II). It also excludes cost of police, but includes cost of Gendarmérie. [Footnote in the source text. Annexes I and II are not printed.]

¹⁰ This is exclusive of \$173 million of external resources which appear to be already available from other sources. [Footnote in the source text.]

¹¹ Each implication set forth below should be considered in light of possible combinations in courses of action selected and upon methods of implementation. [Footnote in the source text.]

¹² These measures do not meet Iranian desires for increased forces to carry out the agreed strategic concept of the Baghdad Pact powers. The strategic concept and country capabilities are still under study by the JCS. While Iran will undoubtedly press for large increases in military aid, no determination as to aid levels can be made until military analyses have been completed, and interdepartmental agreement reached on all factors involved. [Footnote in the source text.]

¹³ As shown in Annexes I and II, if the projected military construction build-up were to be carried out, a total additional \$15 million (included in the \$230 million in alternative 2a) in local currency for military construction projects would have to be generated after FY 1957 from defense support assistance. [Footnote in the source text.]

359. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree) to the Acting Secretary of State¹

Washington, July 20, 1956.

SUBJECT

Progress Report on Iran (NSC 5504)

The attached Progress Report covering the period from January to July 1956, is scheduled for consideration at the July 26 meeting of the OCB.²

Principal developments during the period were:

1. The USSR apparently failed to weaken the Shah's attachment to the West during his trip to Moscow. No dramatic offers of aid were made by the USSR. The Shah strongly defended Iran's adherence to the Pact.
2. Iran's confidence in the Pact was increased as were hopes of greater U.S. aid by U.S. adherence to the Pact's Economic Committee.
3. Despite a U.S. grant of \$20 million in March and a small allocation of oil revenues to the budget, increased expenditures presage continued deficits.

The operations of U.S. programs were generally satisfactory, although hampered by certain unsatisfactory trends in Iran, e.g. continued budgetary deficits, uncoordinated commitments of the country's financial resources, rivalries between various intelligence services, and increasing criticism of the Shah's arbitrary and vacillating leadership.

These trends are gradually leading to a loss of the temporary unity and momentum which resulted from the overthrow of Mosadeq and from large infusions of U.S. aid. To compensate for its own weaknesses, Iran

periodically needs stimulating injections, such as U.S. affiliation with the Pact's Economic Committee or new increments of aid. While this is not a new problem in Iran, it is imperative that the West maintain the political initiative in Iran and thereby prevent a reversion to the stagnation which is susceptible to exploitation by irresponsible Iranian elements and by the USSR.

In compliance with a request by the Board Assistants, the Working Group is attempting to prepare suggested courses of action which would help in achieving this result.

Recommendation

I recommend that you approve this Progress Report.

[Tab B]

RECENT INFORMATION ON SHAH'S TRIP TO MOSCOW³

1. When, at a reception, Voroshilov criticized Iranian foreign policies and the Baghdad Pact, the Shah made the following reply:

“... Iranian Government has never entered alliances having an aggressive character toward the Soviet Union and I can reaffirm that this will never happen. We always reject the principles of colonialism. Iran is not a new state. It is a country which counts more than 26 centuries of independent and full sovereign existence. ...⁴ If Iran takes measures for its defense, this is dictated by reasons of state and the experience of the past and the general international situation.”

2. Since returning to Tehran, the Shah has given the following information to Ambassador Chapin:⁵

- a. The Shah reiterated orally to the Soviets his previous assurances that Iranian territory would not be used in peacetime as a base for attacks against the USSR, but simultaneously he stressed Iran's need to maintain strong defense forces.
- b. The Soviets admitted past errors in their policy toward Iran and Turkey and blamed them on "that damned crowd of Georgians."
- c. Shepilov told the Shah no additional Arab states would ever join the Pact.
- d. The Soviets made no specific offers of assistance but told the Shah of their willingness "to give assistance of any kind and in any amount should the Iranian Government so desire."
- e. The Shah accepted a general proposal for common development of resources, e.g., power and irrigation, along the common frontier.
- f. The Soviets indicated interest in expanding the present trade agreement, and in increasing rice imports.
- g. In conversation with Khrushchev, the Shah claims he taxed the former with continued Soviet espionage and plotting in Iran despite their professions of friendship. The Shah claims he even referred to a recently uncovered assassination plot which Communists supposedly planned. Khrushchev's replies are unclear.
- h. In the same conversation, Khrushchev boasted that England could be knocked out with 7 nuclear bombs and Turkey with 11. The Shah presumes the point was indirectly addressed to Iran.

i. As a matter of courtesy, the Shah extended a general invitation to a return visit but he believes no visit is likely within the next six months. He says he intends to put it off as long as possible.

¹ Source: Department of State, OCB Files: Lot 62 D 430, Iran 1956. Top Secret. Drafted by Hannah and cleared by Baxter.

² A draft of the progress report, Tab A, is not attached. A copy of the approved Progress Report on “United States Policy Toward Iran” (NSC 5504), July 25, is *Ibid*. For a report of the discussion at the OCB meeting on July 26, see [Document 361](#).

³ Top Secret. Drafted by Hannah on July 20 and cleared by Baxter.

⁴ Ellipses in the source text.

⁵ As reported in telegrams 82, 83, and 84 from Tehran, all July 18. (Department of State, Central Files, 123–Chapin, Selden; 788.11/7–1856; and 788.11/7–1856, respectively)

360. Memorandum From the Acting Secretary of State to the President¹

Washington, July 24, 1956.

SUBJECT

Return of Shah of Iran from Visit to the Soviet Union

The Shah of Iran returned from a state visit to the Soviet Union on July 13. There had been some concern regarding the possible damage that might be done if the Shah allowed his trip to be made the occasion for negotiations with the Soviet Union on substantive matters. Although he had previously indicated his intention to avoid such eventualities, his actual performance exceeded our expectations. Politely but unequivocally, he defended Iran’s present foreign policy, including its recent abandonment of neutrality and adherence to the Baghdad Pact. He avoided all substantive negotiations on the ground that such matters would have to be taken up with his Cabinet. He refused to authorize a joint communiqué at the end of the trip.

I agree with Ambassador Chapin that a brief message from you to the Shah, complimenting him on the success of his visit, would be received by him with deep gratitude. As the Shah's performance may actually tend to strengthen Iran's present alignment with the West, I think it would be desirable to encourage him by taking note of the astute manner in which he carried out a difficult mission.

Enclosed is a suggested letter from you to the Shah. If you agree, Ambassador Chapin will be authorized to convey the text of this letter to the Shah, mentioning that it will be shortly followed by the signed original and asking that he treat it as confidential.

Herbert Hoover, Jr.²

[Enclosure]

Draft Letter From President Eisenhower to Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi³

YOUR IMPERIAL MAJESTY: From Ambassador Chapin I have learned of Your Majesty's return to Iran, and I have been particularly interested to receive your comments and impressions regarding your recent trip. These first-hand observations are of considerable value to the United States Government.

Especially, I wish to offer my compliments on the forthright but astute manner in which Your Majesty carried out a difficult mission on behalf of the people of Iran. The respect accorded by the nations of the World to the position of Iran has been greatly increased by the courageous foreign policies adopted in recent months under Your Majesty's guidance. I believe that your recent trip has served to confirm this fact.

Please accept my heartiest congratulations on the occasion of your return and that of Her Majesty to your homeland.

Sincerely,

Dwight D. Eisenhower⁴

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 661.88/7–2456. Secret. Drafted by Hannah on July 23 and cleared by Baxter and Crawford.

² Printed from a copy that bears this stamped signature.

³ Secret. Drafted by Hannah on July 23 and cleared by Baxter and Crawford. Approved by Eisenhower and sent to Tehran for delivery to the Shah in telegram 132, July 25. (Department of State, Central Files, 123–Chapin, Selden) ⁴ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

361. Preliminary Notes on the Operations Coordinating Board Meeting, Washington, July 26, 1956¹

Washington, July 26, 1956

[Here follow items 1 and 2.]

3. Progress Report on Iran

Mr. Rountree, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs, was present and presented the Progress Report on Iran.

Mr. Rountree reviewed developments in Iran in some detail, commenting particularly on the Shah's visit to Russia and on the political and economic conditions in the country. The Chairman remarked that it was difficult to know what to do in Iran until we had determined our overall policy in the Near East. On the other hand, it was difficult to know what to do in the Near East until we know the course which Iran would follow. He expressed the hope that Defense might soon clarify the military objectives and requirements in the area as requested some time ago by the President. Mr. Lay commented that policy regarding Iran would probably be reviewed by the Planning Board after study of the Prochnow Report.² There was some discussion to the effect that the paper was too pessimistic in tone. Mr. Dulles commented that there was nothing new in Iran to justify exceptional gloom; the problems in Iran were inherent in the country and he considered that a more cheerful tone should be expressed. Mr. Rountree commented that the paper as written was not overly optimistic as regards the future. The future of Dr. Mosadeq was discussed and Mr. Rountree, stating that we had this very much in mind, reported that three courses of action seemed to be under consideration in Iran:

1. Mosadeq might be sent to Switzerland;
2. He might be exiled to his village with appropriate guards; and,
3. He might be rearrested on some new charge.

Mr. Gray inquired whether consideration was being given to US adherence to the Baghdad Pact. Mr. Rountree stated that the matter was under constant review but that our position had not changed and that it was still considered inadvisable to adhere to the Pact at this time.

Subject to editorial revision, the Board concurred in the paper and ordered it forwarded to the NSC.

[Here follows item 4.]

¹ Source: Department of State, OCB Files: Lot 62 D 430. Secret. Drafted by Arthur L. Richards.

² [Document 358](#),

362. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State¹

Tehran, August 9, 1956—5 p.m.

214. Unfortunately Deptel 241 August 8² was received too late for my audience with Shah this morning, although Shah expressed to me his hope Egypt in fact would attend conference.

First ten minutes of audience devoted to discussion recent floods from which area he just returned. Shah expressed much gratitude for US assistance.

Conversation naturally turned to Suez situation and I handed him summary President's remarks thereon in his press conference yesterday. Shah was impressed with moderate tone, which he felt reflected statesmanlike attitude. I asked him if he had received Ardalan's notes on proposed resolution for Suez conference August 16 and handed him paraphrase outline. After perusing them he replied he was not yet ready to take position on matter, which would require some study. He said that prior to conference Iranian Government would have to make some official statement. He believed Iranian policy was thoroughly in line with that of US, namely that while recognizing right of Egypt to "nationalize" a purely Egyptian company, some means must be found for guaranteeing free and secure use of Suez Canal as international waterway.

Shah recalled that on several occasions he had told me and other American representatives that in his opinion US was following wrong policy in giving

in to Nasser, who was a “mad man”. He also cited warnings sounded recent Baghdad Pact conference Tehran by Nuri of Iraq and Menderes of Turkey, and his disappointment we had not acted sooner put Nasser in his place.

Shah hoped sincerely West would take strong stand in matter although he deprecated resort to force, as apparently threatened by UK and France, even though this might eventually be necessary as Indian Ambassador had told him yesterday. He could not understand why UK had given such publicity to military moves in Mediterranean. This had effect of stiffening Egyptian resistance. There would have been plenty of time for military mobilization after conference if necessary.

He felt every effort should be made to prevent consolidation of “Arab imperialism”. To his mind most effective counterweight would be immediate strengthening of BP. While he did not raise question of immediate US adherence he felt it was to US interest to strengthen Turkey, Iran and Pakistan both militarily and economically.

In this connection he inquired whether it would not be feasible to obtain US assistance immediately on construction of oil pipeline from Iranian oil fields through Turkish territory. He said while alternative route might be more feasible in engineering sense and certainly cheaper, i.e., through Iraq to Turkey, one should always remember Iraq was still Arab state and there is no guarantee Iraq would not follow eventually other Arab states. He therefore strongly urged pipeline should be entirely within non-Arab states. In his opinion it was most essential for peace of ME that non-Arab Muslim states should be encouraged to feel distinct from Arabs and made to feel importance of their ties with West. Shah said if Nasser were permitted to get away with his “steal”, precedent would undoubtedly be followed by similar moves on part other Arab states and pressure would inevitably build up in Iran and even Pakistan and Turkey so as to force nationalistic reaction of Mossadegh variety against wishes governing groups.

I told him that if “nationalization” pattern should continue—and I informed him of Indonesian repudiation of Dutch debt—it would be impossible persuade foreign private capital to come into undeveloped countries as had

been so fervently advocated by Iran and other ME countries. Shah agreed and at my suggestion said it might be useful for him to pass on the thought through his ambassadors to other Middle East governments.

Shah said of course if conference successful in imposing some kind international control over Suez Canal, difficult problems to which he referred would be postponed but if Egypt is successful, with or without Russian backing, in defying West, something drastic in way of realignment of ME would be necessary.

When I asked him specifically if he had any other thoughts with respect to forthcoming conference he replied he had none, other than the very tentative suggestion that conference might wish to consider possibility of making “international authority” a dependent organ of UN. He believes such formula more acceptable both to Egypt and Soviet Union, and if governing instrument were properly drawn up it would guarantee to maritime nations free and secure use of Suez.

On my departure I again stressed hope that Iran might find it possible to agree with principles of proposed resolution, to which he replied matter would require study but he hoped very much conference would result in establishment of international body guaranteeing free and secure use this international waterway.

Chapin

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 974.7301/8–956. Secret; Priority. Repeated to London, Cairo, and Paris.

² Telegram 241 suggested it would be useful if the Shah were to use his influence to persuade Nasser to attend the London Conference on the Suez Canal, August 16–23. (*Ibid.*, 974.7301/8–756) For documentation on the conference, see [vol. XVI, pp. 212](#) ff.

363. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Iranian Ambassador (Amini) and the Under Secretary of State (Hoover), Department of State, Washington, August 13, 1956¹

Washington, August 13, 1956

SUBJECT

Suez Canal Conference

Dr. Amini called at his request to convey through Mr. Hoover to the Secretary a message from the Shah. The Shah wished to thank Mr. Dulles for his message concerning the Suez situation.² He realized the great importance of the London conference and earnestly hoped that it would lead to a peaceful solution of the problem. The Iranian Delegation had been instructed to support the American Delegation in finding such a solution.

Commenting personally, the Ambassador said that this matter was one of great importance to Iran, particularly since any difficulties in the Near East inevitably would hurt Iran. He said that if Nasser were a wise man there would be no problem but unfortunately his actions had not demonstrated wisdom. One of the main factors was that if Nasser should win in this issue his ambitions would be greatly increased.

Mr. Hoover thanked the Ambassador for his message and said that we would greatly value the cooperation of the Iranian Mission in London. He handed Dr. Amini a copy of the principles which might govern a settlement of the issue, as suggested by the US, British and French.³ He said that he wondered whether Dr. Amini would agree that it might be possible to devise a formula with respect to the Suez, similar to that employed in Iran, particularly with respect to the collaboration of a number of countries in assuring the efficient operation of the Canal without requiring “denationalization” by the Egyptian Government. This would, of course, require some kind of international guarantee.

Dr. Amini responded that he thought this might work. He was particularly impressed with the possibility of several small countries such as Switzerland, Holland and certain Near Eastern states, assuming a major role in this regard.

Dr. Amini inquired about the possibility of a pipeline being run from Iran through Iraq and Turkey to the Mediterranean. Mr. Hoover discussed in general terms the highly tentative thought which had been given to this possibility.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 974.7301/8–1356. Secret. Drafted by Rountree and approved by Hoover.

² Reference is to a personal message from Dulles to the Shah, transmitted to Tehran in telegram 211, August 3. Dulles expressed his pleasure that the Iranian Government had been invited to the London Conference, and concluded: “Your Government can, I am confident, exert an important and constructive influence, and I trust you will do so.” (*Ibid.*) Foreign Minister Ardalan attended the first London Conference; For his public statement, see Department of State, *The Suez Canal Problem, July 26–September 22, 1956*, pp. 127–130 and 187.

³ Apparent reference to the joint statement of August 2. For text, see [vol. XVI, p. 126](#).

364. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State¹

Tehran, September 11, 1956—1 p.m.

393. Ebtehaj asked Gregory and Kerr to call on him Sept 10 to seek their assistance in resolving following issue: In connection with IBRD insistence that Plan Org oil revenues be pledged against proposed IBRD loans, Amb Amini was instructed seek waiver of EXIM prior claim. (Art 6 of EXIM agreement appears contain relevant language.²) Stambaugh³ of EXIM refused. Ebtehaj considers Amini misrepresented facts, maintains essentially that Plan Org share of oil revenues is not part of govt's revenues, being allocated by legislation not to govt but to Plan Org. Comparably, Ebtehaj maintains state railways are not part of govt.

Ebtehaj explained that proposed line of credit is exceptional for IBRD and, to protect itself against other borrowers, IBRD must insist on first-priority pledge of oil revenues. He pointed out it is widely known that his principal business during forthcoming Washington visit is to negotiate line of credit with IBRD and is imperative he be able announce on return that this credit will be granted.

Ebtehaj requested Gregory and Kerr to pose issue to Washington now, urging all possible sympathetic consideration be given prior his visit Sept 23 to Oct 8 since he will have no time for extensive discussions this subject. He agreed first need is determine whether IBRD prepared extend credit if EXIM refuses renounce prior claim on oil revenues, said he would query IBRD directly but time is short and he lacks code facilities for telegram. Kerr therefore offered request Dept seek answer this question from IBRD.

It is relevant to describe Ebtehaj's manner in this conversation. Although Gregory and Kerr were calm and noncommittal in exploring Ebtehaj's position, he worked himself into [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] a state of fury [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*], proclaiming that if US does not wish help him it should at least not hinder and if EXIM persists in maintaining petty legalistic attitude he will ignore

them because he will not permit either US Govt or EXIM to stand in way of his development program.

Allen Dulles was subjected to milder version of emotional tirade on same subject at my reception for him few days ago and I am informed he proposed send telegram re impression Ebtehaj made on him.⁴

Ebtehaj's [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] fury over this issue may possibly be explained as follows: He has stated to Shah, Cabinet, and leading members Parliament that IBRD credit is a certainty and has attributed this to his personal prestige with Black of IBRD and others. Therefore, if line of credit not forthcoming, he would suffer such loss of face, particularly with Shah, that he might well be forced to resign.

Chapin

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 888.2553/9–1156. Confidential.

² On March 31, 1955, the Iranian Ambassador in Washington and General Glen E. Edgerton, Managing Director of the Export-Import Bank, signed loan agreements, part of which was an understanding in principle that the Bank would make available to Iran a line of credit of \$53 million for economic development. According to article 6 of the agreement, the Iranian Government would agree not to pledge any of its assets or revenues as security for other loans unless any outstanding Bank loans were equally secured. From May 12 to 26, 1955, Bank officials visited Tehran for discussions with Iranians on the details of the loans. On June 15, 1955, a formal agreement on the \$53 million line of credit was signed by Iran and the Bank. (Telegrams 1997 and 2332 from Tehran, March 31 and May 26; *Ibid.*, 788.5–MSP/3–3156 and 888.10/5–2655, respectively) A text of the June 15 agreement is *Ibid.*, 888.10/6–2155.

³ Lynn U. Stambaugh, First Vice President and Vice Chairman of the Export-Import Bank.

⁴ Not found.

365. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree) to the Secretary of State¹

Washington, September 26, 1956.

SUBJECT

Progress Report on Iran dated July 25, 1956²

Discussion:

Since July 25, the Iranian Government has cooperated with the U.S. in the Suez negotiations. By so doing the government has extended itself beyond public opinion which tends to sympathize with Nasser. If a settlement of the Suez dispute is long delayed with the Iranian Government continuing to support the Western position, the Government will be weakened internally. A cutback of oil production below the guaranteed minima, or reduced Iranian access to essential imports would gravely weaken the Government and cause loss of confidence in the U.S.

On August 25, an American company operating near Tehran under contract to the National Iranian Oil Company, brought in one of the largest wells ever drilled in the Middle East, gushing 80,000 barrels per day.³ While the size of the field is still unknown, its location in north central Iran suggests that it could eventually alter the Middle East oil pattern, particularly in connection with the possible pipelines through Turkey or as a means of supplying refined products to Turkey and Afghanistan.

Recent developments cast Iran in two contrasting roles. Internationally, Iran is an asset to the West as is reflected by its abandonment of neutrality, the Shah's excellent performance in Moscow and Iran's cooperation in the Suez negotiations. Yet, this Report reflects concern over internal political drifting, ineffective use of resources, delayed reforms and continuing reliance on U.S. support to compensate for these weaknesses. While this is not a new problem and while it may be questioned whether these

weaknesses are susceptible to treatment from outside sources, the Working Group is attempting to devise courses of action to modify or compensate for them, since it is essential to prevent a reversion to past stagnation which is susceptible to exploitation by the USSR.

In the long run, however, the ability of the U.S. to influence the course of events in Iran will be at least partially dependent on the resolution of larger questions, such as the determination of U.S. plans for the defense of the Middle East and the extent to which the U.S. is prepared practically to support and develop the northern tier area as a positive factor of strength in the area.

Recommendation:

That you urge the adoption of this report by the NSC at its meeting on September 27.⁴

¹ Source: Department of State, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 61 D 167, Iran, U.S. Policy Towards (NSC 5504). Top Secret. Drafted by Hannah. Rountree was appointed Assistant Secretary of State on July 26 and entered duty on August 30.

² See [footnote 2, Document 359](#).

³ In the future Qum oil field.

⁴ Consideration of the Progress Report by the NSC was postponed to the 299th meeting on October 4; see [Document 367](#).

366. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree) to the Under Secretary of State (Hoover)¹

Washington, October 4, 1956.

SUBJECT

Ambassador Amini's Call at 4 p.m. October 4. Proposed IBRD Loan to Iranian Plan Organization

Discussion:

Ambassador Amini intends to raise the question of the \$75 million loan requested of the IBRD by Mr. Ebtehaj (Director, Plan Organization) and the related question of Mr. Ebtehaj's request that the Export-Import Bank waive the negative pledge which it has from the Iranian Government. This negative pledge stipulates that no other foreign credit will receive priority over the \$53 million line of credit extended by the Export-Import Bank.

In addition to the \$53 million line of credit (\$19 million of which has been utilized), the United States Government has a \$23.5 million loan to Iran covering surplus property sales and \$42.0 million of ICA loans. The ICA loans have exactly the same negative pledge clause as does the Export-Import Bank credit.

The IBRD is prepared to grant a \$75 million loan to the Plan Organization providing there is the positive pledge of revenues as originally proposed by Mr. Ebtehaj. The IBRD does not require a waiver of the Export-Import Bank negative pledge as a condition of the loan. No Iranian parliamentary approval is required for a positive pledge of the Plan Organization revenues. If, however, the IBRD does grant the \$75 million loan, the Iranian Government would be required to make a positive pledge to the Export-Import Bank.

Mr. Ebtehaj is now reluctant to give a positive pledge to the Export-Import Bank because such a pledge presumably will require Iranian parliamentary approval. He apparently fears that a request for such approval, growing out of the IBRD loan to the Plan Organization, might pave the way for parliamentary interference in Plan Organization financing. He has consequently requested the Export-Import Bank to waive its negative pledge. The Bank has refused to do so.

The IBRD recently learned that Mr. Ebtehaj has been negotiating for a \$50 million loan from a group of Belgian, Dutch, French and German banks. We understand Mr. Ebtehaj has agreed to drop these negotiations as a condition to receiving the entire \$75 million loan requested of the IBRD.

[1 paragraph (3 lines of source text) not declassified]

Recommendations:

It is recommended that, in view of the policy implications of subordinating United States credits generally to those of the IBRD and in view of IBRD's continued optimism that a formula can be worked out:

1. We support the Export-Import Bank's refusal to waive the negative pledge.
2. We encourage Mr. Ebtehaj to continue his negotiations with the IBRD.

Mr. O. T. Jones will accompany Ambassador Amini. Mr. Jones is Director of the Office of Greek, Turkish and Iranian Affairs.²

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 888.10/10-456. Secret. Drafted by Smith and Jones and cleared with U/MSA, E, and ICA.

² A memorandum of conversation by Jones, October 4, describes the discussion between Hoover and Amini. It reads in part as follows: "Mr. Hoover assured the Ambassador that he would dig into the problem at once. He gave the Ambassador no encouragement, however. He pointed out that the Export-Import Bank was a semi-autonomous agency and that the

Department did not ordinarily concern itself with specific problems of a technical nature in Export-Import Bank operations.” (*Ibid.*)

367. Memorandum of Discussion at the 299th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, October 4, 1956¹

Washington, October 4, 1956

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and items 1. “Status of U.S. Military Program,” 2. “Recommendations of the Report to the President of the Technological Capabilities Panel of the Science Advisory Committee, ODM,” and 3. “Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security.”]

4. *United States Policy Toward Iran* (NSC 5504; Progress Report, dated July 25, 1956, by the Operations Coordinating Board on NSC 5504²) Mr. Jackson summarized briefly the main points made in the OCB Progress Report. He added that certain members of the OCB seemed to feel that the report was a little too much on the pessimistic side though certainly the manner in which the Iranians were handling their financial and economic problems was far from satisfactory.

Secretary Humphrey said that some small problems had arisen in the current negotiations with Iran for new loans. He believed that these problems could be ironed out without real difficulty however.

Admiral Radford said that he was inclined to doubt whether the Progress Report was too pessimistic on the basis of what he knew of the current situation in Iran. He cited the most recent Soviet offer to provide Iran with just about any kind of assistance it desired.³ Admiral Radford also pointed out that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had lately revised the Iranian armed forces structure on the basis of recommendations made by the Chief of our Military Assistance Advisory Group in Iran. Essentially, this revision cut out some of the heavy arms which had earlier been programmed as U.S. military assistance to the Iranian armed forces.

*The National Security Council:*⁴

a. Noted and discussed the reference Progress Report on the subject by the Operations Coordinating Board.

b. Noted that, in accordance with NSC Action No. 1486–e,⁵ the NSC Planning Board will review the policy on Iran, in the light of the report on Iran⁶ prepared by the Interdepartmental Committee on Certain U.S. Aid Programs (NSC 5610).⁷

[Here follows item 5, “United States Policy Toward Italy.”]

S. Everett Gleason

¹ Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Drafted by Gleason on October 4.

² See [footnote 2, Document 359](#).

³ As reported in telegram 505 from Tehran, October 1. (Department of State, Central Files, 661.88/10–156) ⁴ The paragraphs that follow constitute NSC Action No. 1615, approved by the President on October 8. (*Ibid.*, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council) ⁵ For text of NSC Action No. 1486–e, approved by the President December 8, 1955, see [vol. x, pp. 62–64](#). It directed the review of assistance programs in Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, Vietnam, Formosa, and Korea.

⁶ [Document 358](#).

⁷ NSC 5610, “Report by the Interdepartmental Committee on Certain U.S. Aid Programs,” August 3, 1956. (Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351)

368. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iran¹

Washington, November 2, 1956—8:40 p.m.

864. Re Embtels 609, 664, 685, Deptel 814.² Present status loan negotiations substantially as follows: (a) IBRD submitted to Ebtehaj loan agreement containing clause calling for effective pledge of Plan

Organization share oil revenue. IBRD expressed no objection to Ebtehaj's according EXIM Bank similar treatment, (b) Ambassador Amini week or more ago informed EXIM Bank he prepared recommend to his Government that Iranian Government portion oil revenue be pledged to EXIM Bank, (c) EXIM Bank gave serious consideration to all aspects this problem but unable arrive at any answer other than Iran Government either not giving positive pledge to anyone or giving EXIM same pledge given IBRD. Amini so informed by EXIM Bank on 31 October. He now informing his Government.

Ambassador Amini in his various approaches here has been conciliatory and helpful. Upon Ebtehaj's return Tehran he may criticize US Government and EXIM Bank for his difficulties. You authorized therefore in your discretion and as circumstances require to set record straight on basis following background material.

1. When high level US decision made two years ago to extend Iran \$53 million EXIM credit, decision was also made not to tie such credit to pledge of oil revenues. At that time Black IBRD was consulted and he was then strongly opposed to such pledge, stating IBRD would ask for oil pledge if such previously given others. On current proposal IBRD loan Black states Ebtehaj offered pledge of oil revenues and Black believes he should now have pledge because of nature of loan and also because he hopes obtain commercial bank participation. Black asserts his earlier remarks were in context of long term project development type loan and that current loan request is for short term non-project type in anticipation revenue collection. FYI Avoid any criticism of IBRD in your discussion of its role in this entire problem. End FYI.

2. Ebtehaj has argued with EXIM Bank that it made loan in face of prior existing allocation of oil revenues by Majlis to Plan Organization. EXIM Bank convinced that legal situation is not as Ebtehaj puts it and that spirit of \$53 million loan agreement is to contrary. This according EXIM Bank is evidenced in part by

GOI's seeking waiver EXIM Bank's rights under negative pledge clause in order make positive pledge to IBRD.

3. EXIM Bank preference throughout has been that of no positive pledge being given anyone and of IBRD accepting same type of negative pledge now held by EXIM.

4. EXIM Bank does not seek pledge but in view existing negative pledge clause and in order protect its position it wants share pledge insisted upon by IBRD. Both broad policy and political considerations preclude US Government subordinating to IBRD US Government claims against Iran.

5. In addition to outstanding EXIM loan of approximately \$19 million (against \$53 million credit), there are also \$42 million ICA loans outstanding that contain same negative pledge as EXIM Bank. EXIM acting as agent for ICA loans and has informed Amini in writing that it seeking same protection for ICA loans as for EXIM Bank loans.

6. Amini earlier proposal mentioned (b) of first unnumbered para hereof would provide pledge of 10 percent of oil revenues (representing government share) to cover \$61 million loans (and possible \$95 million if full EXIM Bank credit utilized) whereas 60 percent oil revenues (representing Plan Organization share) to be pledged to cover IBRD \$75 million loan. EXIM regards that as inequitable although it believes ten percent share would probably be sufficient to cover loan service.

7. FYI. History negotiations show EXIM made this loan after strong Departmental urging on politico-economic grounds following conclusion Consortium agreement and unavailability of any other similar credit facilities (including IBRD) at that time. Because of this, the considerations set forth above and Ebtehaj's historic hostility towards EXIM Bank, Department has not sought influence EXIM Bank in its decision. End FYI.

EXIM Bank has expressed gratification over your response Foruhar and its continued desire assist Iranian development program.

Dulles

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 888.2553/11–256. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Jones and cleared by OFD, Treasury, Export–Import Bank, E, and ICA.

² In telegram 609 from Tehran, October 18, Iranian Finance Minister Foruhar, acting on instructions from the Shah, asked for Ambassador Chapin’s personal intervention in the matter of the \$75 million IBRD loan and the waiver of the Export-Import Bank’s negative pledge. (*Ibid.*, 888.2553/10–1856) In telegram 664 from Tehran, October 29, the Embassy asked for guidance on the IBRD credit in light of Ebtehaj’s return to Iran. (*Ibid.*, 888.2553/10–2956) In telegram 685 from Tehran, November 1, the Embassy noted press reports attributed to Ebtehaj that the IBRD was prepared to grant the \$75 million loan and requested guidance. (*Ibid.*, 888.2553/11–156) In telegram 814 to Tehran, October 26, the Department informed the Embassy of Ebtehaj’s departure from New York for Iran and promised a cable containing guidance on the status of Ebtehaj’s negotiations. The promised cable is the telegram printed here. (*Ibid.*, 888.2553/10–2656)

369. Letter From the Director of the Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs (Jones) to the Ambassador in Iran (Chapin)¹

Washington, November 7, 1956.

DEAR MR. AMBASSADOR: I would like to give you a few words of background to our Deptel 864² on the Ebtehaj–Eximbank–IBRD negotiations. The Eximbank position has not been quite as simple as that set forth in the cable, i.e., that of either the IBRD accepting a negative pledge like Eximbank’s or the Exim being given a positive pledge like IBRD’s. It appears that, just before Deptel 864 was sent, Ambassador Amini, with Mr. Black’s help, finally came up with a suggestion that went a long way toward meeting the second

of Eximbank's alternatives. At the very least, a basis for negotiation and further discussion seemed still to exist. Eximbank continued, however, to be very pessimistic on the prospects of working out a satisfactory formula.

It is the consensus here that the root of the trouble lies in the long rivalry between the Eximbank and the IBRD on the one hand, and the bad relations between the Eximbank and Ebtehaj on the other. Now that the Exim is in Iran, it would probably prefer to have all this business itself. The difficulties with Ebtehaj have perhaps obscured that basic fact and probably the immediate reason why Eximbank would prefer not to go along on any basis. At the present time, it would mean that Ebtehaj would be the central figure in administering the Eximbank and IBRD credits, a prospect that the Exim quite understandably does not relish. [4 lines of source text not declassified]

[1 paragraph (17 lines of source text) not declassified]

A final word on where we go from here on the Ebtehaj–Eximbank–IBRD negotiations: We understand IBRD is all ready to go but only with a positive pledge. I personally believe that a formula can eventually be found to satisfy Exim—providing patience is exercised and the need for time is recognized. There is no disposition here to push Exim on this matter.

Sincerely yours,

Owen T.Jones³

¹ Source: Department of State, GTI Files: Lot 59 D 654, Eximbank–IBRD. Secret; Official-Informal.

² *Supra*.

³ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

370. Letter From Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi to President Eisenhower¹

Tehran, November 20, 1956.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I am happy to congratulate you most warmly on your recent successful campaign, and on the American People's wise choice in selecting you again to guide the destinies of the United States for another presidential term.

Innumerable anxious minds abroad were, indeed, set at rest when the election results were formally made known, for in no other period of human history has so much depended on one man and on one country.

We pray God to bestow upon you health and strength to carry through with wisdom your immense responsibilities at a time when civilization itself is being threatened with utter destruction.

Recent regrettable events in the Middle East and in Europe, tragic as they are, have, in our opinion, amply demonstrated that in this age of atomic warfare, the occurrence of regional armed conflicts with conventional weapons is not to be ruled out as a thing of the past. In fact, prolonged localized fighting, without resort to the use of nuclear weapons, may continue to take place, and only countries prepared for any emergency can hope to survive or to be able to bear the brunt of initial onslaughts, which, if not effectively met in time, are likely to lead to disastrous consequences.

Indeed, aggression itself can be forestalled, if countries occupying key positions are well prepared and their military as well as financial and economic needs supplied. That Iran occupies such a position in this region and that she must be assisted to grow and stay strong has too often been stressed to need further emphasis.

The present military weakness of Iran would, in the event of an atomic or non-atomic clash of arms, constitute a danger not only to herself, but also to the Middle East region and, as a corollary, to the whole free world.

I feel confident that, from time to time, your diplomatic and military missions in this country do not fail to report to you on the economic and military conditions of Iran, and as to the degree American aid has contributed to the improvement of these conditions. We highly value your government's generous assistance.

Nevertheless, in fairness to the cause of world peace and of the preservation of stability in this area, I must say that we are sadly lacking in preparation to face any situation which may suddenly arise in these critical and uncertain times.

It has been my view, and still is, that Iran has not received the attention her unique position demands. My earnest desire is that this matter may receive the close scrutiny it deserves.

The matter is of such immediate importance that, to my mind, it would justify the sending of a special and personal representative of the President to examine the situation carefully.

I need hardly point out that Iranian public opinion will be considerably reassured if, at this critical juncture, increased American aid, designed to further improve conditions in my country, both economically and militarily, is forthcoming.

I know full well that you have always shown keen interest in the welfare of Iran and in the strengthening of her resources. At no time has she needed this more, owing to her strategic and geographic position which makes her practically the shield of the Middle East.

Believe me my dear Mr. President

Yours sincerely²

M.R. Pahlavi

¹ Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International Series.

² The salutation, the two lines of the complimentary close, and the signature are handwritten.

371. Memorandum From the Director of the International Cooperation Administration (Hollister) to the Acting Secretary of State¹

Washington, November 23, 1956.

SUBJECT

FY 1957 Aid for Iran

We have great difficulty in finding any economic basis for an FY 1957 economic assistance program to Iran of the magnitude contemplated at the time of our Congressional submission last Spring. At that time we expected at least \$20 million of the proposed \$45 million would be needed to develop local currency to support military construction projects. It is now clear that, while the local currency requirements for military construction are not yet wholly determined, they will be much lower than our earlier estimates. The maximum rial needs for FY '57 and FY '58 together are now estimated at \$19 million, and we obligated from FY '56 funds \$16.5 million for this purpose. Thus, not more than another \$2.5 million are needed to be obligated for military construction support and even this could as well be obligated in FY '58 as in FY '57.

We doubt the desirability of undertaking any large-scale development program in Iran in view of the resources available to the Plan Organization from oil royalties.

I suppose that the Iranians would always be willing to take as much budget support as we cared to give them, but there appears to be no critical need for such assistance. Furthermore, we advised the Iranians in very firm terms last year that we were not going to continue to provide budget support in the light of the ability which we felt Iran had to balance its own budget. I think it would be most undesirable now to reverse our position. As you know, budget support is, to say the least, unenthusiastically looked upon by the Congress, and particularly so in Iran, in view of its own substantial and rapidly increasing revenues, particularly from oil.

Thus, this leaves us with only a few million dollars worth of requirements for local currency to support our joint technical cooperation programs, and not much else. We could rationalize small additional programs to be sure that we had military support costs covered, but another \$5 million would seem to be adequate for that purpose.

Unless there are overriding political reasons, we believe that the FY '57 program for Iran, as a maximum, should be the \$25 million we have heretofore carried as a firm program for that country. If the current crises, particularly in the Middle East, do not demand emergency programs which have not yet come to our attention, the balance of the funds originally requested for Iran might be considered as available for regional projects in the area. Some of the expenditures for such projects would be in Iran and some of the benefits would accrue to Iran, but the balance would be for activities in neighboring countries, such as Turkey and Iraq.

We would appreciate the views of the Department of State on this matter and particularly the political aspects thereof.

John B. Hollister

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 788.5-MSP/11-2356. Confidential.

372. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson)¹

Washington, November 30, 1956.

SUBJECT

Report by the Interdepartmental Committee on Certain Aid Programs

1. Reference is made to your memorandum, subject as above, dated 7 November 1956,² in which you requested the recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as to the minimum level of indigenous forces which in the best interests of the United States should be maintained in Pakistan, Turkey, Taiwan and Iran, over the next two years.
2. By memorandum dated 16 November 1956, subject: "Minimum Level of Indigenous Forces to be Maintained in Pakistan",³ the Joint Chiefs of Staff provided you with recommendations regarding Pakistan. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the following discussion of force levels is applicable to Pakistan and Iraqi forces.
3. Although a capability for the maintenance of internal security must continue to have first priority in the development of the indigenous forces of the countries with which the United States has bilateral aid agreements, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that U.S. programs for development and support of these forces must be oriented toward the military situation most likely to be faced in event of external aggression and toward the mission which they can best perform.
4. A realistic appraisal must recognize that direct U.S. military intervention will probably be necessary in the event of external attack, particularly by the Chinese Communists or the USSR, if

the area attacked is not to be lost. Based on the recognition that U.S. intervention may be necessary, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that a concept based on cooperative effort involving the pre-planning for the use of combined forces (U.S. and indigenous) in which each member contributes that which it can do most effectively, must be adhered to. While we should not specify in detail the forces which we would make available in the event of war, we should conduct joint planning with each of the nations involved and give a broad indication of a strategic plan whereby the United States would come to their assistance.

5. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the force levels recommended herein represent the best estimates of minimum force levels that can be made based on the present guidance regarding the intentions of the United States to intervene in the event of external aggression against the countries involved.

6.

The following comments on levels of indigenous forces to be maintained in Turkey, Iran, Taiwan, and Iraq over the next two years concern those levels in the current FY 58 MDA Programming Guidance.

[Here follow comments on indigenous force levels in Turkey.]

b. *Iran*

(1)

By reason of its geographic position, Iran is the keystone to the defense of the Baghdad Pact area against an aggression from the North. Although the United States is not a member of the Baghdad Pact, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider it in the best interests of the United States to provide an adequate defense of the Baghdad Pact countries.

[Numbered paragraph (2) (6 lines of source text) not declassified]

(3) The Joint Chiefs of Staff further consider that the pattern of forces of Iran, with its extensive natural defense barriers, should emphasize the development of a guerrilla warfare capability. However, until combined planning between the United States and Iran is undertaken, it is believed that responsible Iranian officials probably would not agree to any change of conventional forces.

(4)

The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the minimum levels of indigenous forces which, in the best interests of the United States, should be maintained in Iran for the next two years are:

- (a) Army 6 Infantry Divisions, full strength
 6 Infantry Divisions, reduced strength
 5 Independent Brigades, reduced strength
- (b) Navy 11 combatant ships
- (c) Air Force 5 squadrons

[Here follow comments on indigenous force levels in Taiwan and Iraq.]

7. In the absence of authoritative determination of how far the U.S. can proceed with military bilateral planning with the nations mentioned above, it would be unrealistic to consider force objectives lower than those set forth above.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Arthur Radford⁴
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

¹ Source: Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5610 Series. Top Secret. Transmitted to the NSC under a December 5 memorandum from Gleason.

² Not printed.

³ Transmitted by Memo for NSC from the Executive Secretary, subject: “Report by the Interdepartmental Committee on Certain Aid Programs,” dated November 21, 1956. [Footnote in the source text; the memorandum of November 21 regarding JCS minimum force levels for Pakistan is in Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5610 Series.]

⁴ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

373. Memorandum From the Secretary of State to the Director of the International Cooperation Administration (Hollister)¹

Washington, December 7, 1956.

SUBJECT

FY 1957 Aid to Iran

In response to your memorandum of November 23, 1956,² there are urgent political reasons for immediately announcing an FY 1957 level of aid to Iran in the magnitude of \$45 million. It is important that we do this because of the critical situation now prevailing in the Middle East, because we are unable at this time to join the Baghdad Pact, and because of Iran's urgent pleas for military and economic support of an order that would justify her recent abandonment of traditional neutrality by joining the Baghdad Pact. In view of Soviet exploitation of the Middle East situation in order to penetrate that area, it is particularly important that we give strong support to Iran in its dangerously exposed position.

I believe the \$45 million figure should be announced now to obtain maximum political effect. It should then be handled in a manner to provide a basis for developing with the Iranians a meaningful program for the utilization of these funds. The Iranians should be informed that the Mission is authorized, but not directed, to work out with the Iranian Government a program not to exceed \$45 million, based on mutually agreed projects. Thus, the level of aid announced would be a maximum figure, the full utilization of which would be dependent on the extent to which valid projects are developed by the Iranian Government and our mission and are approved by the United States Government.

In general, I believe the following criteria might be useful in guiding the Iranians toward the preparation of a program:

1. No general grant budgetary aid unless urgently required by some as yet unforeseen major development.

2. The allocation of a portion of the dollar funds for the financing of consumer goods imports to generate local currency for the support of the technical assistance and military construction programs.

3. The allocation of a significant portion of the dollar funds to imports of capital goods on a project basis and the allocation of appropriate amounts of generated local currency for related local currency costs and essential training.

4. The allocation of a significant portion of both dollars and generated local currency funds for practical economic projects having a regional significance in, for example, the fields of rail, highway and radio communications. Such projects would tend to strengthen the Northern Tier area and might be coordinated with, but not replace, projects which may eventually be undertaken under the aegis of the Baghdad Pact.

I do not believe that we can afford to delay or temporize on this matter. Iran, along with its Baghdad Pact neighbors, constitutes one of the best political assets the United States has in the area at this time. Iran is a vital and exposed part of the Middle East and must be dealt with, not solely on the basis of its own internal requirements within its own narrow frontiers, but on the basis of the requirements of United States interests in a most dangerously threatened area of the world.

John Foster Dulles³

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 788.5–MSP/12–756. Confidential. Drafted by Hannah and Jones and cleared by G, U/MSA, E, and S/P. A memorandum from Rountree to Dulles, December 1, recommending that this letter be sent to Hollister is *Ibid.*, GTI Files: Lot 59 D 654, Iran 1956 Memoranda.

² [Document 371](#).

³ Printed from a copy that bears this stamped signature.

374. Memorandum From the Secretary of State to the President¹

Washington, December 7, 1956.

SUBJECT

Suggested Reply to a Letter from the Shah of Iran

In his letter to you, dated November 20, 1956,² the Shah of Iran offered his congratulations for your recent re-election.

The Shah took the occasion to refer to recent events in the Middle East and Europe and to draw your attention to Iran's strategic position, its military weakness and need for increased military, economic and financial aid. He suggested that you send a personal representative to Iran to examine the situation.

This letter is similar to previous requests by the Shah. I do not believe your response should include new offers of aid or acceptance of the proposal to send a personal representative. We are going forward with substantial military and economic aid programs. Since Iran's real problem stems from its exposed strategic position and sense of insecurity, we believe that the November 29 Department of State press release on the Baghdad Pact³ will be of considerable help.

I suggest that your reply be responsive to the Shah's genuine fears but that the point be made that Iran's true safety lies in collective security and cooperation with the Free World. I also suggest that, in line with the recent press release, you affirm personally to the Shah the gravity with which the United States would view a threat to the territorial integrity or political independence of Iran.

Enclosed is a suggested reply from you to the Shah. If you agree, Ambassador Chapin will be authorized to convey the text of this letter to the Shah, mentioning that it will be followed shortly by the signed original.

John Foster Dulles⁴

[Enclosure]

Letter From President Eisenhower to Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi⁵

Y_{OUR} I_{MPERIAL} M_{AJESTY}: Thank you most sincerely for your letter of November twentieth and for your kind words about my re-election.

Your views regarding recent events in Europe and in the Middle East I have read with care and with great interest. As we face the dangers of which you speak, there can be no doubt in our minds that the free world must base its hopes for peace more and more upon the joint efforts of free nations and upon their regional associations.

Iran can indeed be proud of the part it is playing, along with its neighbors, in the efforts to restore peace and to maintain security in the Middle East. Given close cooperation between free nations in collective efforts to maintain peace, even the largest nations cannot act with impunity and the nations that may be exposed to danger are not alone. The validity of this principle was clearly demonstrated in 1946, when Iran regained sovereign control over its northwest territories.

I have especially noted Your Majesty's words about the lack of preparation to face a sudden emergency. This is, indeed, a problem of mutual concern. The United States has in recent years attempted to assist Iran in strengthening its economy and its armed forces. Such assistance will, of course, continue, insofar as our capabilities and the requirements of the rest of the free world will permit. I am confident that with continued close cooperation between the Government of Iran and the various United States Missions in Iran this aid will produce even more important gains for Iran than have been registered in the past.

The needs of Iran and the demands of her unique position in the Middle East are being given our constant attention. Our Ambassador and the members of our missions have reported fully on the requirements of Iran

and the problems with which it is faced. Moreover, the Congress is soon to have the benefit of Mr. Armour's special study of conditions. In the circumstances, I do not believe a special representative is required for further study at this time.

The causes of the dangers which have threatened the Middle East and the means of dealing with them are being given the most careful and urgent consideration by the United States Government. The firm and helpful position adopted by Iran is one of the very reassuring elements in the present situation. I continue to regard any threats to Iran's territorial integrity and political independence as a matter of the utmost gravity.⁶

With best wishes and warmest regard,

Sincerely,

Dwight D. Eisenhower

¹ Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 64 D 206, King Saud/Eisenhower. Drafted by Hannah.

² [Document 370](#).

³ See [Document 152](#).

⁴ Printed from a copy that bears this stamped signature.

⁵ Transmitted initially in telegram 1111 to Tehran, December 10. (Department of State, Central Files, 711.11–EI/12–1056) ⁶ The last two sentences in this letter as transmitted to Tehran in telegram 1111 originally read as follows: “The firm and helpful position adopted by Iran is one of the very reassuring elements in the present situation and, for this reason, I continue to regard any threats to Iran's territorial integrity and political independence as a matter of the utmost gravity.” As Chapin pointed out in telegram 895 from Tehran, December 11, the sentence was misleading and ill-constructed, equating Iranian help in the Suez crisis with support for Iran's territorial integrity. Chapin suggested elimination of the phrase “and, for that reason,” and beginning a new sentence with “I continue.” According to telegram 1126 to Tehran, December 12, the President approved the change. Telegrams 895 from Tehran and 1126 to Tehran are both *Ibid.*, 711.11–EI/12–1156.

375. Memorandum of a Conversation, Washington, January 3, 1957, 10:30 a.m.¹

Washington, January 3, 1957, 10:30 a.m.

SUBJECT

Export-Import Bank Board Meeting re Iranian Proposal to Meet Negative Pledge Clauses of Exim Loan Agreements

PARTICIPANTS

ICA:

Hale Shenefield

Carter Ide (Iranian Desk Offer)

State Department:

Jack Corbett—OFD

Murat Williams—GTI

Francis Lincoln—GTI

Harry Smith—GTI

Eximbank:

Lynn Stambaugh—Exim Bank Board Member

Hawthorne Arey—Exim Bank Board Member

George Blowers—Exim Bank Board Member

Vance Brand—Exim Bank Board Member

Harry Rountree—Chief Economics Division

Arthur Lord—Counsel

Rodney French—Loan Ofcr.

Edward Houston—Economist

Raymond Jones—Chief, Loan Division

Sidney Sherwood—Secretary

At the invitation of the Export-Import Bank, representatives of ICA and the State Department were present at an informal Bank Board meeting, Thursday, January 3, 1957 (10:30 to 11:30 a.m.). This meeting was devoted to considering the Iranian proposal presented to the Bank by the Iranian Ambassador on December 26, 1956. The proposal was advanced to meet the requirement of the negative pledge clauses of Exim loan agreements for equal and ratable security in view of a pending specific pledge of certain oil revenues to the IBRD to secure a \$75 million loan. Exim credits so far extended comprise \$19 million from its funds and \$42 million from ICA funds; \$34 million of additional credits are available to Iran from Exim funds during CY 1957 for suitable projects.

Mr. Stambaugh opened the meeting with a review of the history of the Exim Bank credits to Iran and the relation of the negative pledge clauses to the pending IBRD loan. Discussion then centered about the proposed solution and the comments of Mr. Arthur Lord (Bank counsel) contained in his memorandum dated December 31, 1956.² While Mr. Lord's memorandum sets forth the problem in detail, it is briefly summarized in attachment No. 1 to this memorandum. Basically, the Iranian proposal fails to meet the equal treatment of the Exim negative pledge clauses because the IBRD loan will have twice the security given the Exim loans.

Messrs. Williams and Corbett led the discussion for the State Department representatives. The Department would be pleased if the Bank found that

the Iranian proposal met the requirements of the negative pledge clause, but the decision rested with the Bank. There are no over-riding political considerations causing us to urge favorable consideration.

The Bank decided to call in the Iranian Ambassador in the afternoon. He would be told that the Iranian proposal is a constructive suggestion opening the door to a solution of the problem. A counter proposal would then be made that all oil revenues (both Midland accounts) be pledged to secure jointly the IBRD and the Exim loans with the understanding that Iran may actually service the loans from separate accounts (as proposed by Iran). Thus, both sets of loans would be equally secured.

The ICA representatives indicated agreement to this line of action.

Note:

The Eximbank meeting with Ambassador Amini occurred as scheduled on January 3. The Ambassador stated that the counter proposal was impossible to accept for legislative and political reasons. He urgently requested reconsideration as an exceptional matter. The Bank agreed to reconsider the original proposal.

Attachment No. 1

SUBJECT

Iranian Proposal of December 26, 1956 to Meet Negative Pledge
Clauses of Exim Loan Agreements

The proposed solution presented to the Exim Bank by the Iranian Ambassador involves pledging oil revenues representing the share of the Plan Organization to the IBRD to secure a pending \$75 million IRBD loan and pledging the remaining oil revenues to secure the Exim Bank loans. In practice, the oil revenues are paid to the Midland Bank into account "G" for the Plan Organization and "O" for Iranian Government and NIOC.³

The coverage of the IBRD loan service under this arrangement would be at a ratio of 7 to 1, while coverage of Exim Bank loan service would be 3½ to 1.

While the manner in which Iran Government proposes to effect these two pledges would require certain technical modifications, the major problem arises from the difference in coverage ratio. The 3½ to 1 ratio taken alone would be satisfactory, especially since it would steadily improve as interest charges were reduced by semi-annual payments of principal. However, there remains the question of the Exim Bank accepting security less satisfactory than that given to the IBRD.

A possible solution of this question of principle would be to give the IBRD loan and Exim loans an equal and ratable pledge of accounts “G” and “O” as a whole; then, as an internal matter, the Iranian Government could arrange to have service of the IBRD and the Exim Bank loans made from separate accounts in accordance with the original Iranian proposal.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 398.14/1–357. Confidential. Drafted by Smith.

² Not printed, but see [footnote 3](#) below. (*Ibid.*, GTI Files: Lot 59 D 3, Export-Import Bank, 3.212–A) ³ The distinction between these two accounts is spelled out in more detail in Lord’s memorandum to the Board of Directors of the Export-Import Bank, December 31. These two accounts in the Midland Bank in London represented the deposit of income taxes paid to Iran by the eight oil companies of the Consortium, in effect, Iran’s major oil revenues. In the Midland Bank these payments were segregated into two accounts: “G” would receive 60 percent of the amounts deposited until March 1958 and 80 percent thereafter until March 1963. Account “O” would receive the remainder, 40 percent until March 1958 and 20 percent thereafter until March 1963.

376. Memorandum for the Record by the Chief of the Military Advisory Assistance Group in Iran (Seitz)¹

Tehran, January 3, 1957.

On the morning of 3 January 1957, I had a two and one-half hour audience with His Imperial Majesty by previous appointment. Lieutenant General Hedayat² was present during the entire time.

The primary purpose for this appointment was to present for approval to HIM a reorganization of the Iranian Air Force. The project was approved after a few minor questions. During these questions, it was disclosed that action was to be taken to provide the Air Force with the same service departments as in the Army organization. I protested this decision and HIM deferred final decision until hearing further from me.

I informed His Majesty that I had received information that Iran was to be delivered one squadron of F-84G jet planes by July 1957. He expressed dissatisfaction with this type of aircraft saying that they were obsolete, hard to maintain and hard to fly. I assured him that this was not an accurate statement, but he persisted and requested that I press for F-86's. With regard to F-86's, I explained the time lag in delivery and insisted that the F-84G's were good planes, more easily maintained and thus more suitable for his Air Force at this time. He remarked that by the time F-86's were allocated to Iran, they would be obsolete.

The subject of absence from duty by officers and enlisted men was raised by me. I requested that as a minimum punishment, pay be deducted for all absences. He concurred with reservations, explaining that such an action could be taken only after officers' pay had been raised sufficiently to insure them a minimum satisfactory standard of living. This, in addition to other remarks, indicated clearly that he is aware of the fact that many officers are absenting themselves to earn additional money in civil pursuits.

His Majesty then began a discussion on next year's budget (1336), saying that War, Health and Education would have to be increased. Specifically, he

pointed out that the War budget would be increased by \$31 million to provide for an officers' pay increase. I asked him if he anticipated an increase in his revenues to offset these additional expenditures. He avoided an answer to the question by asking about U.S. support for the budget during the forthcoming year. I replied that the position of my government was that further direct budgetary assistance was highly unlikely and that no provision has been made for such a grant. He then asked if I, through my channels, could not support the military part of the budget or, at least, the proposed increase. I answered that I had no means of rendering such support to his budget. The Shah then asked about PL 480 citing the enormous amount given to India. I told him a new PL 480 agreement would have to be negotiated between the governments but that the amount would be limited to Iran's ability to distribute the commodities.

At this time, he again emphasized the necessity for a pay increase for officers and appealed to me for help expressing the belief that except for that item he felt he could attain a balanced budget. It is clearly evident that HIM realizes that the budget for 1336 can be balanced if held to the level of this year (1335). If the additional \$31 million for a pay increase is included in the Minister of War's budget, it will be with the full realization that a balanced overall budget is impossible. At this time, HIM is weighing which of two courses to follow: (1) To hold the line and seek a balanced budget or, (2) to permit the officers' pay increase, and trust that the U.S. will bail him out.

The Shah then spoke of his Navy and said it must be enlarged since Iran was the logical country to police the Persian Gulf. I explained that his Navy was being increased by several units this year but that we would be hard pressed to train the technicians to man them. He disregarded my remarks by asking if I knew the reason given by Egypt in refusing his recent request for a conference of Middle East countries.³ I replied that I did not. His Majesty, with great scorn, said that Egypt had declined because they could not sit at a conference table with Iran as long as they occupied Arab lands (islands recently seized by Iran in the Persian Gulf). The Shah said that Nasser was attempting to lead the Arab world and perhaps next he would claim southwest Iran as an Arab land. I replied that he could not possibly be apprehensive of Nasser after the showing his army had made recently. The

Shah replied that a real navy was needed for prestige in addition to the other reasons.

HIM then made reference to President Eisenhower's forthcoming message to Congress proposing the dispatch of U.S. troops to the Middle East to meet an emergency.⁴ I pointed out that the message had not been delivered and, in my opinion, it would not mean garrisoning. He replied he was sure of that but, in the event of an emergency in Iran, troops would have to be flown in and he thus would need more airfields. He then requested that I build fields at Kerman-Shah, Shiraz and Gom. I made no commitment.

Other points were discussed: his need for a 225 plane Air Force, the necessity for raising the standard of living in Iran, the support of Turkey and Pakistan for an increase in the Iranian Army, etc. No U.S. commitments were made.

J.F.R. Seitz
Major General USA

¹ Source: Department of State, GTI Files: Lot 60 D 533, Iran, U.S. military assistance to, 1957. Secret.

² Abdullah Hedayat, Chief, Iranian Supreme Armed Forces Staff with rank of Cabinet Minister.

³ On December 9, 1956, Foreign Minister Ardalan suggested a summit meeting of Middle East leaders to resolve outstanding problems and proposed that the meeting coincide with the Shah's visit to Riyadh in March 1957. While Turkey, Iraq, and Pakistan initially agreed to the idea, the majority of Middle Eastern states were unresponsive and the Iranian Government abandoned the idea. (Despatch 538 from Tehran, January 5; Department of State, Central Files, 788.00/1-557) ⁴ Reference is to President Eisenhower's address to Congress on January 5 describing a policy for the Middle East subsequently known as the Eisenhower Doctrine. For additional information concerning the Eisenhower Doctrine, see [Documents 183](#) and [193](#).

377. Letter From the Counselor of the Embassy in Iran (Stevens) to the Officer in Charge of Iranian Affairs (Hannah)¹

Tehran, January 14, 1957.

DEAR NORM: Enclosed is a summary of a conversation which [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] had with HIM on January 5.

I understand that in the past summaries of this kind have not been provided either to the Embassy or to the Department. We have now agreed that in the future the Embassy will receive such summaries and [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] pass copies of the original report to the Department. If this system does not operate satisfactorily please let me know and we will provide you copies from here.

Sincerely yours,

Francis

[Enclosure]

2

1. In a 2 hour session with the Shah on January 5 the following political-economic information was obtained:

A. Ahmad Mehbod, designated by the Prime Minister as “Co-negotiator”, with NIOC Chief, for foreign contracts to develop offshore oil, has “no authority to sign anything.” U.S. oil firms should deal with NIOC. However, the only deal acceptable to Iran is (and “soon will be written into law”):

(1) NIOC must have 50% stock in any operating company.

(2) Foreign company will be required to advance all costs of exploration.

(3) NIOC will pay for 50% ownership from its half of profits after production begins.

(4) Foreign company must pay Iranian income tax on its 50% of profits.

B. Qum oil “must remain in Iranian hands.” U.S. technical and financial help is needed to develop the field, construct a pipeline to Alexandretta, Turkey, and install port facilities cost estimated by the Shah at “450–500 million.”

C. Iran has “no air force,” and “although we have long, vulnerable coast line to control, we have only two gunboats.” Vehemently: “We must have a navy. We hope to obtain it from the U.S. but if it is not available there we must have it from whatever source available.”

D. In answer to the recent Iranian invitation to a proposed Mid-East conference, Nasr declined saying he could not confer with a nation which occupied “an Arab island”; Saud did not “formally” decline but passed word it would not appear proper for him to meet with leaders of armed forces which expelled his troops from El Arabi Island.³

E. In transiting Iran enroute to Washington, Nehru sent the Shah only Christmas greeting (“apparently he doesn’t know I am Moslem”).

F. During his Moscow visit the Shah never promised the Soviets that “no foreign military bases will be built in Iran.” Although he was aware of the West’s “lack of interest” in such bases, he always responded to Russian urging with only the following words: “Iran will not be

used as a spring board for launching aggression against the Soviet Union.”

G. The Shah still feels that Iran is “not ready” for the establishment of formal political parties. He is aware that several small groups are convening “but they are unimportant.”

H. The Shah is irritated by rumors that the U.S. is sympathetic to, and in touch with, NRM leaders. He is constantly striving to “broaden political base,” and all useful, loyal former followers of Mossadeq have been taken into the government (specifically Iran party members in the Plan Organization) but he is highly critical of Allayer Saleh, “who wears Mossadeq likeness on his label.”

I. Re “Taylor Report”³ —the Shah is obviously cool; stated that “committee is studying this, and I think the Minister of Finance favors it slightly.” However, the Shah continued by saying it was his understanding that only a few “highly organized nations such as America, England and Scandinavia collected any such tax. How do you expect us to? Anyway it will take four or five years to make the required land surveys.” From this, the Shah launched into a revealing discourse on “unfairness” of penalizing the present generation and allowing the future ones to realize all blessings from “vast” oil income. He indicated that he is giving serious thought to widespread borrowing now to finance development and meet budgetary needs, with future generations repaying from expected rising oil revenues.

2. The Shah repeated his old pledge that he is fully committed to the West and “can never change.”

3. In the discussion of Mehbod, [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] pointed out (at Embassy request) that U.S. firms are

puzzled as to Mehbod status; viewed him as “ignorant of oil business, irresponsible, opportunist and corrupt to extent he is openly asking for bribes to be passed on to higher levels.” The Shah said that Mehbod had denied these allegations and, in the absence of proof, the Shah is reluctant to take any action, but U.S. firms should be assured that they need pay nobody anything. He said he felt Mehbod “useful” because of his “energy, industry, imagination and commercial contacts.”

4. During the conversation, the Shah expressed optimism (probably reflected from Mehbod) that several U.S. firms would accept proposal outlined in Para 1 A above. He added that an Italian firm already had accepted, (*[less than 1 line of source text not declassified]* note: Embassy Economic Counselor subsequently revealed that the Italians turned the proposal down; Americans highly unlikely to consider. He added that he felt the Shah was not getting the true picture through Mehbod.)

5. At the conclusion of the meeting, the Shah *[less than 1 line of source text not declassified]* urged: “Please keep me advised on any oil developments. This is most important to us.” (The Ambassador and the Economic Counselor, told of this—as well as other subjects reported—approved *[less than 1 line of source text not declassified]* acting as channel to the Shah to expose false claims he is apparently receiving about progress toward anticipated “deals” for new oil areas.)

¹ Source: Department of State, GTI Files: Lot 60 D 533, Iran, Official Informal Letters from Tehran, 1957. Secret; Official–Informal.

² Secret.

³ Reference is to the dispute between Saudi Arabia and Iran over Arabi and Farsi Islands in the Persian Gulf. The Saudis landed troops on Arabi island in October 1956 shortly after Iranian occupation of Farsi in September of the same year. In November, Iranian forces dislodged the Saudis from Arabi and took control of the island. (Despatch 613 from Tehran, January 24; Department of State, Central Files, 788.022/1–2457) ³ Reference is to recommendations by Dr. Philip Taylor on ways Iran might increase its

revenues by changing taxes on cultivated land and real estate from an income to capital value basis. (Toica A-337 from Tehran, August 17, 1956; Washington National Records Center, ICA Files: FRC 58 A 403, Box 18, Tehran)

378. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs (Jones) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning (Bowie)¹

Washington, January 11, 1957.

SUBJECT

U.S. Policy Toward Iran—Revision of NSC 5504

The suggested draft statement of Policy Toward Iran² was intended to focus attention on certain new political problems in Iran which have emerged since the last policy paper was written and to revise policy on military and economic aid programs in consonance with the Prochnow Report on Iran.³

With regard to the first point, the great improvements which have developed in Iran since 1953 are largely the result of U.S. aid and support. Underlying these apparent strengths, Iran still is afflicted with age-old fundamental weaknesses which could undermine the gains of the last three years. Under these circumstances, it is important that the U.S. continue to aid and support Iran while bending every effort to induce reforms that will enable the country as a whole to catch up with the remarkable rapid superficial improvements in its economic resources, internal security and international posture. Some attention has been devoted to the impact of the Shah's assumption, in April 1955, of personal leadership and direction of the Government. Finally, in the Policy Conclusions, an effort has been made to identify the principal internal factors affecting the ability of Western-oriented Iranian elements to continue in effective power, and the importance of U.S. aid and support in conditioning the ability of the U.S. to influence the Shah and Government of Iran.

With regard to military and economic aid programs, the suggested draft policy paper has been based on the selection of Alternatives 2 and 4 as set forth in the Prochnow Report on Iran. Alternative 2 describes a military aid program which would give Iranian forces “increased capabilities for sustained combat”, which, “with outside operational support (primarily U.S. air) and logistical aid might delay Soviet forces [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*]”. Considering the progress Iran has made in the past three years, the highly cooperative attitude it is taking in supporting the U.S. in international affairs, the extremely vulnerable position occupied by Iran and the importance of strengthening the Northern Tier states at this time, we believe that a program of this size and scope is essential to the protection of U.S. interests. We have modified the cost figures given in the Prochnow Report only to the extent of eliminating from them the FY 1957 program which has now been funded. On the advice of “E” we have also stretched out the program so as to phase it through FY 1962 instead of FY 1960.

In addition, we believe that the U.S. should continue an economic aid program in order to maintain Iranian confidence in strong U.S. support of Iran’s radically new posture of open alignment with the West. Such a program will also enhance the U.S. ability to continue to influence Iran in the direction of economic improvements and fiscal and administrative reforms. The program outlined in Alternative No. 4 of the Prochnow Report would appear to be the minimum program that the U.S. could safely undertake. We have modified the Prochnow Report figures only by eliminating the FY 1957 program.

While there may be questions raised regarding these estimates, we felt that we were on the firmest possible ground in adopting the figures given in the Prochnow Report since it has the concurrence of Defense, Treasury and ICA.

¹ Source: Department of State, GTI Files: Lot 60 D 533, Iran, U.S. Iranian Relations, 1957. Secret. Drafted by Hannah. Bowie was also the Department of State representative on the NSC Planning Board.

² Reference is to a draft revision of NSC 5504, December 26, 1956. (*Ibid.*, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 61 D 167, Iran, U.S. Policy Toward (NSC 5504)) This

draft was subsequently submitted to the NSC in revised form as NSC 5703, January 28, and was approved by the NSC in final form as NSC 5703/1, February 7, with further revisions. Regarding the revisions and the final text of NSC 5703/1, see [Documents 387](#) ff.

³ [Document 358](#).

379. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State¹

Tehran, January 17, 1957—3 p.m.

1086. In confidence, Minister of Finance Forouhar dictated (to Embassy employee) contents of draft oil legislation (re terms for exploration and exploitation outside Consortium area) which Shah wishes him introduce Parliament immediately, and lent copy draft agreement with AGIP (subsidiary of Italian Government agency) which conforms with proposed legislation. Bill and draft agreement being pouched.

Bill provides (1) in agreements with foreign companies 50 percent of shares shall belong to NIOC and half of directors appointed by NIOC, (2) foreign companies pay 50 percent of their share of net income as taxes plus annual payment (called “compensation right”) to be determined each case by NIOC when agreement negotiated. In lieu latter foreign company may agree pay all exploration expenditures. When considerable capital required and foreign company agrees provide all capital plus transportation facilities and markets for considerable quantities oil, NIOC may reduce its 50 percent ownership but not 50 percent tax. Agreements to become effective on approval by Council Ministers.

Forouhar considers bill ill advised, says will resign if Shah continues insist he introduce and defend it in Parliament, says Foreign and Justice Ministers also strongly opposed. Shah presented bill Council Ministers Jan 9, reportedly drafted at Shah’s instructions by Rouhani and Naficy (NIOC directors) without prior consultation any ministers. Mehbud very much in picture, tells Forouhar agreement with AGIP be signed soon as bill passed, maintains agreement also indicated with Standard of Jersey.

If Department wishes representations to Shah, please instruct.²

Chapin

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 888.2553/1–1757. Secret.

² See [Document 384](#).

380. Editorial Note

On January 18, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development approved the \$75 million loan for Iran at 5 percent interest with 7 principal payments over a 3-year period beginning September 15, 1959. The loan agreement was signed in Iran on January 22. In view of the difficulties reiterated by Ambassador Amini, as last mentioned in [Document 375](#), the Export-Import Bank waived its negative pledge on Iranian revenues by agreeing that for the duration of the IBRD loan it would service its own loans from Iran's oil revenues accruing to the National Iranian Oil Company and the Iranian Government (account "O" in the Midland Bank). (Telegram 1348 from Tehran, January 18; Department of State, Central Files, 888.10/ 1-1857, and *Current Economic Developments*, issue no. 511, January 22, 1957, pages 20-23; *Ibid.*, *Current Economic Developments*: Lot 70 D 467)

381. National Intelligence Estimate¹

Washington, January 23, 1957.

NIE 34-57

THE OUTLOOK FOR IRAN²

The Problem

To estimate probable trends in Iran's stability and orientation over the next few years.

Conclusions

1. We believe that over the next few years the present regime in Iran can rely upon police controls and the support of the armed forces to maintain itself in power. However, its ability to govern effectively for a period beyond the next two years or so will depend greatly upon the extent to which current plans for economic development are carried out and the progress made in social and political reforms. Should it not be able to show significant progress along these lines, the urban classes are likely to become increasingly restive. In such an event, the position of the monarchy might be endangered, since the Shah has identified himself closely with the government in power.
2. So long as the Shah retains control, Iran will almost certainly seek to identify its interests with the US and the anti-Communist states of the Middle East. However, the continuation of such a course depends heavily on US support of Iran and the maintenance of US prestige in the Middle East.
3. The succession to the throne is not clearly established, and the death or incapacity of the Shah would probably open up a period

of factional disturbances and a struggle for power. The outcome of such a situation would depend largely on whether the armed forces remained united and on what leader or leaders they supported.

Discussion

4. The Shah of Iran, through his increasing direct intervention in government and with the support of many of the traditional power elements—senior army officers, landlords, and wealthy merchants—has had a substantial measure of success in restoring the position and authority of his government since the overthrow of Mossadeq in 1953. The Tudeh (Communist) Party and extreme nationalist opposition groups as exemplified by the followers of Dr. Mossadeq have been repressed and offer no immediate threat to internal security.³ Oil production and revenues are increasing steadily under the basic agreement reached with the Consortium in 1954. The tribal areas are more quiet than they have been in many years. The opportunities for dissident political elements to thwart the government in the Majlis have been curbed by rigging elections and by throwing the full weight of the monarchy behind the government's program. The press has been under vigorous censorship, and open criticism of the government has been virtually silenced.

5. In this situation, the Shah has been able to pursue foreign policies consistent with his own view of Iran's national interests and generally parallel to those of the US and the West. The Shah and his government under Prime Minister Ala have been concerned primarily with defense against Soviet expansionist ambitions in Iran and the Middle East, with developing Iran's economic strength, and with enhancing Iran's prestige in international affairs. These interests have led the government of Iran to welcome US support for the regime and to seek additional military and economic aid from the US. Both publicly and privately they have endorsed President Eisenhower's proposals of 5 January 1957 concerning the Middle East. Despite the

traditional leaning toward neutrality and anti-foreign feeling within the country, and despite US unwillingness to provide prior additional aid and security commitments as a quid pro quo, Iran joined the Baghdad Pact in October 1955 and has since played an active role in its affairs. With the settlement of the oil dispute in 1954, and the reduction in British ability to influence affairs in Iran, the Iranians have welcomed the restoration of relationships with the UK, particularly in the commercial field.

6. Iran has not become directly involved in Arab rivalries or in the nationalist, anticolonial maneuvers of the Afro-Asian Bloc. Despite public sympathy for Egypt during the recent hostilities, the government has remained cool towards Nasser. Concern over the movement of oil has probably played an important role in Iran's continued identification of its interests with the West on the Suez issue.

7. The Shah has firmly resisted Soviet blandishments and occasional veiled warnings designed to lure or coerce him into a neutral posture. At the same time, he has welcomed friendly Soviet gestures such as the payment of a World War II claim amounting to about \$21 million in gold and dollar exchange, offers of expanded trade, and settlement of the boundary disputes.

8. Iran's essentially agrarian and underdeveloped economy has experienced a period of recovery since the resumption of oil production in 1954. Up until the present Iranian fiscal year,⁴ expenditures had been rising at a higher rate than the expanding government revenues. The resulting deficits since August 1953 would have had an inflationary impact on the economy had it not been for additional imports financed by US budgetary assistance amounting to about \$150 million. Due to the recent allocation of part of the oil revenues to the ordinary budget and the probable increase in oil production, about \$50 million of oil revenues is likely to be available for the ordinary budget in each of the next two Iranian fiscal years.⁵ This and the rising trend of other government revenues should permit the government to cope with

its ordinary budget requirements without further US budgetary support. However, Iran is now seeking and will almost certainly continue to seek US budgetary support. Over the course of the Second Seven-Year Plan (1956–1963) oil revenues, which are estimated to reach an annual level equivalent to \$237 million⁶ by early 1959, will probably be adequate to cover the requirements of the Plan Organization. During the next two years, however, Iran will probably have to depend on loans from such sources as the Export-Import Bank and the IBRD if its ambitious development schedule is to be met.

9. Although a major share (60 percent in 1956 and 1957, and 75–80 percent in the next five years) of the steadily increasing oil revenues has been committed to the Seven-Year Plan, few visible results have been obtained. Government efforts so far have been principally confined to planning and contracting activities and a large proportion of them have been for projects beyond the capacity of Iranian administrative, technical, and management capabilities. Despite the fact that the current plan is but a first and very inadequate approximation of what an Iranian development plan ought to contain, it does set forth priorities in communications, transportation, irrigation, and power that are prerequisites to any longer-run development of the country. However, public disillusion with the Plan Organization, due to delays and an exaggerated expectation of what the oil revenues can accomplish, makes it politically necessary that visible progress on projects of immediate impact value both in Tehran and the provincial cities be realized in the next few years. The government is depending for such progress on a number of foreign firms to whom it has contracted out many of the projects. Whether it will be successful will depend in large measure on the support that the Plan Organization gives these firms.

10. The Iranian military and security forces, numbering some 168,000 officers and men, are presently organized, equipped, and deployed primarily for internal security duties, and these forces are clearly strong enough to deal with any prospective internal

opposition.⁷ The purges of 1954–1956 effectively reduced a dangerous Tudeh infiltration among officers and men. We believe that over the next few years the armed forces will remain responsive to their senior officers, most of whom are loyal to the Shah, although there will continue to be signs of dissatisfaction with the regime. Many field grade and lower officers are sympathetic to the Mossadeq type of nationalism, but they would be unlikely to initiate any movement against the regime. The loyalty of the officer corps to the monarchy would be uncertain in the event of the death or incapacity of the Shah.

11. The Shah has accepted US recommendations for a reorganization and redeployment of his army which are designed to increase combat effectiveness and might provide some capability for conducting a limited delaying action along Iran's northern frontier. However, improvement in the ability of the Iranian armed forces to make any useful contribution to local or regional defense will almost certainly be slow and difficult to realize because of the generally low level of morale among the poorly paid conscripts, the lack of technical competence and military experience, and the prevalence of corruption. Moreover, the implementation of this program will probably be possible only on the basis of continuing US military advice and an increase in US aid over current levels.

12. Iran's present orientation depends heavily upon the Shah's personal leadership, continued US support, and the achievement of internal improvements sufficient to increase confidence in the regime and prevent a reversion to extreme nationalism. President Eisenhower's proposals of 5 January 1957 will probably ease Iranian pressure for a US security commitment against an attack by the Soviet Union, but will not satisfy the Shah's desire for substantial US military aid. In Iran's present posture of open alignment with the West the Shah will thus expect continued US aid and support, including establishment of a modern armed force. If he should be substantially disappointed in this expectation, if the Baghdad Pact should collapse, or if US

prestige should suffer serious blows in the Middle East, the Shah might feel compelled to adopt a neutral position and to make accommodations to the USSR and the internal opposition. To do so, however, would involve a considerable loss of his domestic prestige.

13. Internally the government has made little progress in coping with the fundamental causes of discontent that gave strength to the ultranationalists and Communists in the Mossadeq era. Despite the increased directness of his leadership, the Shah has not overcome lethargy and corruption in the government machinery, and some of his own maneuvers have added to the debilitating atmosphere of intrigue and factionalism among responsible officials. The Shah's efforts to encourage land reform and to satisfy widespread peasant aspirations for land ownership have met stubborn opposition from the landlord class. Little progress has been made in alleviating the economic grievances of the urban workers.

14. Largely as a result of these factors, the regime has been unsuccessful in developing a solid basis of popular support and in fact has actually lost ground in this regard since the events of 1953. Popular hopes that the restoration of the Shah's authority and the solution of the oil dispute would provide a solid basis for economic and social progress have given way to a general sense of frustration. The Ala government has become the object of word-of-mouth criticism by all classes of the Iranian public because of its suppression of civil liberties, its apparent indifference to popular grievances, and the preoccupation of its leading figures with matters of personal advantage. This criticism has come increasingly to involve the Shah whose intervention in day-to-day government operations has deprived him of some of his prestige as a national symbol above the political struggle. Although criticism of the regime is strongest among intellectuals and reform elements, who especially resent their lack of opportunity to express their views openly, it exists among virtually all elements of the politically conscious public both in

Tehran and in the provinces, including even those closely associated with the regime. The Shah will be faced increasingly with such criticism and will have to take steps to satisfy it if he is to avoid an internal crisis dangerous to the monarchy.

15. The Shah is at the moment in firm control of the situation, and political activity largely revolves about the efforts of various interests and personalities to gain his favor. Despite the existence of widespread grumbling and cynicism about the government, there is little disposition by any opposition groups to challenge the status quo as long as the Shah can effectively command the loyalty of the armed forces. Nevertheless, unless greater progress in economic development, especially that benefiting the urban classes, and general modernization of the social and political structure is made in the next few years, the government's ability to maintain internal stability is likely to become increasingly dependent on uninterrupted maintenance of strong police controls. Because of the firmness of these controls and because of the Shah's assumption of responsibility for government policy, future opposition and reform movements are likely to include him as a target and to take on a more revolutionary cast than in the past. The Tudeh Party—which continues to exist covertly—has the potential to exploit such conditions and will almost certainly attempt to join forces with other opposition elements.

16. The succession to the throne is not clearly established, and the death or incapacity of the Shah would probably open up a period of factional disturbance and a struggle for power. The outcome of such a situation would depend largely on whether the armed forces remained united and on what leader or leaders they supported.

¹ Source: Department of State, INR–NIE Files. Secret. National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) were high-level interdepartmental reports on foreign policy problems, drafted by officers from those agencies represented on the Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC), discussed and revised by an interdepartmental working group coordinated by the Office of National

Estimates of the CIA, approved by the IAC, and circulated under the aegis of the CIA to the President, appropriate officers of cabinet level, and the NSC. The Department of State provided all political and some economic sections of NIEs.

NIE 34–57 superseded NIE 34–54, “The Outlook for Iran,” December 7, 1954. (*Ibid.*)² According to a note on the cover sheet, the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, The Joint Staff, and the CIA participated in the preparation of this estimate. All members of the IAC concurred in this estimate, with the exception of the representatives of the Atomic Energy Commission and Federal Bureau of Investigation who abstained on the grounds that the subject was outside their jurisdiction.

³ Since the spring of 1955 the Iranian security forces have disrupted the Tudeh organization structure to such an extent that its present capabilities for effective political and subversive activity are extremely low. [Footnote in the source text.]

⁴ The Iranian fiscal and calendar year begins on 21 March. [Footnote in the source text.]

⁵ Oil revenues (including taxes and other stipulated payments) were \$88 million in 1955, will probably total \$160 million for 1956, and may reach \$200 million in 1957. [Footnote in the source text.]

⁶ Consortium payments to Iran are in sterling. Under a secret UK-Iranian convertibility agreement 40 percent of these sterling payments are convertible into dollars. [Footnote in the source text.]

⁷ The armed forces consist of a conscript army of 137,000, a gendarmérie or rural police force of 23,000, and a small air force (3,700 officers and men) and navy (3,970 officers and men), as well as a frontier guard. The three services have coequal status under a Supreme Staff. The gendarmérie is under the control of the Ministry of Interior except in wartime, when it comes under army command.

The army is currently organized into nine light infantry divisions, three light armored divisions, and five independent brigades. The air force has a total of 130 aircraft, including 6 T33 jets and 18 F47s. The navy consists of two

patrol escorts, one submarine chaser, one yacht, 14 patrol vessels, and three small service craft. [Footnote in the source text.]

382. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State¹

Tehran, January 23, 1957—7 p.m.

1130. Over past several months reports submitted by Emb, Service, [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] Attachés here have indicated rising discontent with govt and increasingly articulate criticism of govt, regime and of Shah himself. Criticism expressed in private or carefully worded if stated in Majlis. More recently rumors have been circulating in military circles concerning possibility of a coup. No talk of coup has been heard in NRM groups. Source of these rumors is unknown. Seems more in nature whispering campaign not believed to be part of a plot. Much of public discontent is directed against poor record Plan Org and focuses particularly on its director Ebtehaj. Hatred of him in Parl and govt circles has become almost pathological.

Exhaustive discussion of factors present internal situation by senior Emb Service [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] officers has resulted in consensus that while open criticism steadily mounting and now more vocal, this has been going on in varying degrees for months and while there is no evidence of various groups of critics consolidating, [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] reports indicate existence of increasing liaison among some of them. Any violent action against regime in Emb view would require first class leadership and organization, at most only loosely knit at present. There would also have to be major participation by military whose present leadership is divided by dissension and rivalry.

[*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] reports that at least as of several weeks ago Shah aware these rumors and inclined dismiss them.

When I inquired as to general domestic situation at outset audience with Shah this morning, he replied that “Everything is quiet, and my govt has complete control of country.”

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 788.00/1–2357. Secret.

383. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State¹

Tehran, January 24, 1957—1 p.m.

1133. Ref mytel 1129 Jan 23.²

1. In our conversation Shah said it his firm intention create climate favorable investment foreign capital without which he knew country could never be developed (Embtel 1037).³ I said if I might speak frankly and although I not petroleum expert I believed Iranian views re their share oil revenues from new developments were “exaggerated”. Iran, as he stated, needed money for internal development as well as public revenues. Oil industry undoubtedly had enormous potential. Important thing, it seemed to me, was to get responsible companies interested and operating. Although of course I held no preference for any particular American company or group of companies I naturally hoped some responsible US companies could participate in new projects. He mentioned that Shell, which originally had evinced no interest in participating offshore development now seemed to have changed mind. However he hoped very much some American independent companies would participate. I said above all he should discourage small irresponsible companies which might accept unfavorable conditions demanded by GOI since they lack sufficient capital for development but might later withdraw or go bankrupt.

2. Shah mentioned proposed new oil bill (Embtel 1086).⁴ I said I familiar with its provisions and expressed earnest hope bill would not be so tightly drawn that if really advantageous offer were made not complying entirely with provisions of bill it would have to be rejected. Shah said he personally would ensure suitable escape clause included in bill to cover such contingencies.

3. Shah said GOI felt Qom was national project. There was substantial oil and although of course size field remained to be proved was essential pipeline be built from Qom field through Turkey to Mediterranean with refinery at Iskenderun. Response my query he said estimated cost would run to half billion dollars but believed this could be liquidated in three years. I laughingly rejoined this was tall order; there were few sources from which to obtain sum this magnitude and again it seemed to me only possibility would be group major oil companies supported by several large banks with companies assured long-term marketing agreement. Shah assented.

4. Shah said Bayat was returning from London. If sufficiently vigorous he would resume position NIOC (Embtel 1106).⁵ Mehbud had been useful but he agreed in last analysis contracts with foreign companies must be approved by NIOC board as whole. I observed that some US oilmen who had been here felt Mehbud did not report to him accurately; he acknowledged this might be case. He then said he had heard “fantastic” rumors Mehbud was demanding cut not only for himself but for some third party which he could only interpret as referring to Crown estates or to himself personally. He wished deny this categorically.

Chapin

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 888.2553/1–2457. Secret.

² In telegram 1129, January 23, Chapin summarized briefly his 1-hour discussion with the Shah on January 23. (*Ibid.*, 788.13/1–2357) The discussion is reported in more detail in telegram 1133 printed here and in telegram 1135 from Tehran, January 24. (*Ibid.*, 780.5/1–2457) ³ Dated January 8, not processed through usual Department of State communication channels.

⁴ [Document 379](#).

⁵ In telegram 1106, January 19, Chapin reported on a discussion with Ala in which the Iranian Prime Minister informed him that Chairman Morteza

Qoli Bayat of the NIOC was recuperating from an illness and would retain his position with the NIOC. Chapin cited other reports that Bayat was still seriously ill. (Department of State, Central Files, 888.10/1–1957)

384. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iran¹

Washington, January 26, 1957—2:09 p.m.

1401. Embtel 1086.² Embassy requested make strong representations Shah view prevent introduction suggested legislation.

Suggested legislation would restrict NIOC negotiating freedom of action and make rigid compensation formula greatly exceeding standard 50–50 principle. Thus NIOC may expect exceptional difficulty if not impossibility in negotiating future agreement with any reputable qualified oil extracting, transporting and marketing organization. Importance should be emphasized of entrusting only to qualified company development large oil resources FYI AGIP generally not considered experienced type problems inherent oil development Iran. Some doubt has been expressed as to the legal basis for AGIP foreign operations and its financial capabilities. AGIP has failed take adequate measures develop Italian oil despite favored position there. Currently is under severe criticism Italy for this failure especially since now dabbling in foreign oil concessions.

Iranian departure from 50–50 compensation principle would create additional problems regarding terms consortium agreement. End FYI.

Standard New Jersey categorically denies understanding affirmed by Mehubud (Despatch 570).³ States no relaxation 50–50 principle contemplated. Firmly opposed participation any operation involving Government ownership especially where oil export involved.

Advise developments.⁴

Dulles

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 888.2553/1–1757. Secret; Priority. Drafted by W. Van Dusen of FSD and Smith, cleared by GTI and WE, and approved by Rountree.

² [Document 379](#).

³ Despatch 570, January 15, transmitted a memorandum of conversation between an Embassy official and Finance Minister Foruhar on January 14. (Department of State, Central Files, 788.13/1–1557) ⁴ The Embassy advised in telegram 1163, January 28, as follows: “Deptel 1401 arrived after Amb’s departure on leave. Substance communicated this morning FonMin Ardalan who stated he would transmit Dept’s views to Shah in audience today and would inform Shah I am at his disposal to discuss in greater detail. Ardalan’s reaction was sympathetic and he pointed out Iran’s past experience clearly indicated futility of attempting deal with small companies on oil problems if major companies opposed.” (*Ibid.*, 888.2553/1–2857)

385. Editorial Note

On January 28, the House Committee on Government Operations released its First Report on “United States Aid Operations in Iran.” The report was the work of the Subcommittee on International Operations headed by Representative Porter Hardy, Jr., of Virginia. Department of State and international Cooperation Administration officials had cooperated with the Hardy Subcommittee investigation by agreeing to provide background information and documentation, classified or otherwise. (Memorandum from L.J. Saccio to Hollister and memorandum for the files, both April 11, 1956; Washington National Records Center, ICA Director’s Files: FRC 61 A 32, Box 309, Iran) The report was highly critical of the United States aid and technical assistance program in Iran. (U.S. House of Representatives, 85th Congress, 1st Session, House Report No. 10, “United States Aid Operations in Iran,” January 28, 1957, pages 2–6)

386. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State¹

Tehran, January 31, 1957—10 p.m.

1184. During audience today (Embtel 1182)² Shah referred my conversation Ardalan (Embtel 1163)³ and asked me state US position on proposed oil legislation. I communicated substance Deptel 1401.⁴ Shah said perhaps his intentions misunderstood and he desired make his views perfectly clear. Said over year ago he had discussed with Amb necessity obtaining foreign capital to develop Iran’s vast oil resources. Amb had urged nothing be done disturb arrangements with Consortium and Shah had agreed. Consortium agreement provided assured income on which entire development program dependent. Accordingly GOI had first discussed development project with Consortium which showed no interest expanding area’s activity. Subsequently negotiations had been undertaken with individual companies both in and outside Consortium. Rumors had been circulated by some of these companies that cut had been demanded by Iranian negotiators (Embtel 1133, para 4).⁵ Shah considered such rumors reflection on his personal

integrity which he would not tolerate. For this reason oil legislation has been framed to lay down specific conditions under which agreements might be reached and to obviate possibility suggestions in future that private individuals were benefiting.

I reiterated US apprehension lest proposed legislation impose formula which would prevent agreements with qualified reputable firms. Shah said he would change law to fix maximum Iranian participation at 50 percent ownership but permit negotiation agreements in which Iranian share less than 50 percent. This would provide sufficient flexibility to permit agreements with companies not accepting this formula. Insisted 50 percent limit be included since already accepted by Italian firm “backed by Italian Govt” (AGIP).

With respect Qom field Shah reiterated this strictly Iranian venture which would be developed without foreign participation in ownership. Field had been discovered through Iranian efforts and would not be shared. Concessions to foreign companies should be near sea and not deep interior country. He desired foreign participation in development and operation Qom field under contract with NIOC. Separate agreement for term perhaps 25 years to be sought with reliable company for construction pipeline to Mediterranean and for marketing product. Cost pipeline could be amortized from profits over period years. Shah indicated strong preference for independent companies in all development projects. Requirements European market steadily expanding and major companies already enjoy adequate share. Strong independent companies should be able win place in expanding market. Shah specifically mentioned Cities Service group and Hunt group now active Pakistan.

Shah said he felt foregoing views fair and reasonable and hoped Dept would agree. I undertook communicate Wash immediately and expressed hope I might transmit to him any observations Dept might have.

Shah displayed acute sensitivity to rumors impugning his integrity, reverting to that point at least three times.

Stevens

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 888.2553/1–3157. Secret.

² In telegram 1182, January 31, the Chargé reported a 1-hour audience he had with the Shah on January 31 in which the Shah “discoursed on a wide range of topics mostly covering familiar ground.” (*Ibid.*, 788.11/1–3157) ³

See [footnote 4, Document 384](#).

⁴ [Document 384](#).

⁵ [Document 383](#).

387. Briefing Paper¹

Washington, February 5, 1957.

NSC 5703 (U.S. POLICY TOWARD IRAN), JANUARY 28, 1957²

1. This paper covers the *third* “Prochnow Committee” country which the Planning Board is presenting, pursuant to the President’s direction last October: first, *Pakistan*—last week, *Korea*—now, *Iran*.

2. This paper is presented in traditional form, and not as Alternative Programs as we did for Korea—for reasons I shall mention. We have assumed in the paper that the Joint Resolution will be approved by Congress.

3. In preparing the paper, the PB considered:

a. *The existing policy paper* on Iran (NSC 5504, January 1955).

b. *U.S. basic national security policy*, as implemented by military and economic aid programs to Free World nations.

c. *The Council’s injunction of May 1956* that the PB in reviewing country policies in the light of the Prochnow Report keep always in mind that the aggregate of US aid programs to foreign countries would require total U.S. resources beyond amounts likely to be available for such purposes and would in many instances place burdens on recipient countries which their resources will be unable to bear over a sustained period.

d. *The Prochnow Committee Report*, which suggested alternative levels of military and economic aid for Iran and analyzed the effects of adopting each such level.

e. *The JCS statement of minimum force objectives for Iran (December 5, 1956), prepared pursuant to the President's directive.*³

4. Under the *existing Iran policy* adopted in January/55:

a. *Military and related aid*: Total: \$42.7 million in fiscal years 1955–56 (expenditures) to develop forces:

(1) with defensive delaying capabilities at Zagros line

(2) with improved capabilities for internal security

(3) to enhance the prestige and morale of the government, and

(4) to increase the Iranian people's confidence in Iran's ability to defend itself. (NSC 5504, paras 11, 20)

b. *Economic and technical assistance*: Total: \$132 million in fiscal years 1955–56 (expenditures)—primarily to help Iran's budget and also for economic development until she should receive sufficient oil revenues. (NSC 5504, paras 6, 9, 24)

5. *Prochnow Committee Alternatives* (F 1957–60 in NOA)

	<i>First Alternative</i>	<i>Second Alternative</i>
Military:	\$80 million ^a	\$197 million ^b
Economic and Technical:	\$57–63 million ^{aa}	\$135 million ^{bb}

a. Forces capable only of maintaining internal security; a level risking adverse Iranian reaction.

aa. Only technical assistance after FY 1957; a level risking serious inflation and uncertainty as to U.S. intentions.

b. Adds, with outside air and logistical support, capabilities for fighting delaying actions against Soviets at *Zagros* passes; a level solidifying Iran's pro-West affiliations.

bb. Includes economic and technical assistance through 1960; a level improving likelihood of completing development program without serious inflation.

6. *Recommendations of JCS as to Minimum Force Objectives*

a. Six full strength and six reduced strength infantry divisions (instead of 8 light infantry and 4 light armored divisions), and 5 infantry brigades.

b. Premised on *initial* defense at the Elburg rather than the *Zagros* line. (For basis of JCS recommended force objectives see memo for NSC of 12/5/57 [12/5/56] paras. 3–5 and 6–b)

7. *PB recommendations in NSC 5703*

a. Accepts missions on which JCS recommendation as to forces were based—para 18–b.

b. *Cost for 4 year period of military aid*: \$224 million—more than higher Prochnow level of \$197 million (Reason: \$48 million for military construction arising from Elburg defense concept, not included in Prochnow estimate, partly offset by reduced costs resulting from new military assistance pricing policy.)

c. *Cost for 4 years of economic and technical aid*: \$145 million— more than higher Prochnow level of \$135 million

million (to be on a declining scale; to be insofar as possible on a loan basis; to avoid general budgetary aid and emphasize economic development so far as possible; to be administered so as to influence the Iranians to make effective fiscal and administrative reforms).

8. Basis for PB recommendation

a. Iran has gone all-out for the West—suppressed the local Communist party, joined the Baghdad Pact, sided with the U.S. in the UN.

b. Iran is basically vulnerable to Soviet attack and penetration (1200 mile contiguous frontier), and feels over-extended (paras 3, 7).

c. Iran is not absolutely certain of U.S. military support when the cards are down—no mutual defense treaty; U.S. not Baghdad Pact member. The implications of the Joint Resolution are not yet known, (e.g., will it mean more aid to Iran?) (paras 3, 8, 9).

d. Despite progress since 1953, age-old weaknesses plague the Iranian Government and threaten its continued existence. It seems incapable of efficient Western-style administration. Oil revenues are up to \$160 million a year and rising; there has been some recent progress toward balancing the budget, but deficits continue (paras 4–6).

e. The Shah needs military aid to enhance his prestige as well as for security. Bolstering Iran's security will improve U.S. influence toward solutions of internal problems (paras 7, 9, 17).

f. U.S. wants to keep Iran independent, pro-Western and stable. Substantial military and economic aid are the

price needed to achieve this result. U.S. aid has very great political impact on Iran (paras 6–a, 7, 9–11,17, 25).

[Here follows a table entitled “Comparison of Programs.”]

¹ Source: Department of State, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, NSC 5703/1 Series. Top Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text. According to a covering memorandum from Marion W. Boggs to the Planning Board, February 5, this paper was for the use of Cutler in briefing the NSC on February 7.

² NSC 5703 was initially prepared by the Department of State on December 26 and submitted to the NSC Planning Board on December 27; see [footnote 2, Document 378](#). The draft was revised by the Planning Board Assistants on January 14 and discussed at a meeting of the Planning Board on January 22. A memorandum from Cutler to Sherman Adams, January 28, summarizes the situation as of the January 22 meeting and after: “Thereafter the Board went to work on a proposed new statement of policy on *Iran*. Not only is this country one of the so-called ‘Prochnow’ problem areas, but it is, of course, affected by the Joint Resolution now pending in the Congress. I was far from satisfied with the draft as presented and have been working since with the NSC Staff in order to suggest improved organization of this report and clearer analysis of the real issues confronting the United States in Iran.” (Eisenhower Library, Staff Secretary Records) The draft submitted to the Planning Board on January 22 is in Department of State, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, NSC 5703/1 Series. It was revised by the Planning Board Assistants and submitted to the Planning Board on January 25, where it was approved for NSC consideration. (NSC Planning Board Record of Meeting, January 25; *Ibid.*) On January 28, NSC 5703 was submitted to the NSC; a copy dated January 28 is *Ibid.*, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5703 Series. The paper was discussed by the NSC on February 7 (see [Document 391](#)) and was approved as NSC 5703/1, February 8, [Document 392](#).

³ [Document 372](#).

388. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Kalijarvi) to the Secretary of State¹

Washington, February 5, 1957.

SUBJECT

NSC Policy Paper on Iran²

We do not disagree with the policy outlined in the attached paper on Iran. However, we do wish to record our views with respect to certain facets of the programs which are being proposed pursuant to the policy.

The military program discussed at the time of the Prochnow study involved a very substantial amount of assistance for the provision of end-item maintenance and construction. At the time that this program was discussed we had some questions about the effects on the Iranian economy. The present paper incorporates (in the detailed annex) a substantial increase in construction expenditures which apparently would require additional aid.

In addition to our military objectives, we wish to encourage the Iranians to establish internal financial stability, to divert more of their oil revenues to basic economic development projects and thereby to increase the living levels of the Iranian people. These steps are necessary in order to maintain long-term political stability in Iran by meeting some of the aspirations of the people for better living conditions. It is also in our interest to build-up the Iranian economy in order that in the future it may be able to support its military efforts without our aid. If contemplated military programs are carried out during the next three years, the impact on the Iranian economy will be such that it will run seriously counter to these policy objectives.

It is, of course, not our function to judge the necessity of the military programs nor the timing which is necessary. However, I would recommend that every effort be made to appraise the need for such substantial increases

in the military program and to phase such a program at a reduced annual rate over a considerably longer period of time.

¹ Source: Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5703 Series. Top Secret. Drafted by James A. Lynn and Milner L. Dunn of the Bureau of Economic Affairs.

² Reference is to NSC 5703; see [footnote 2, *supra*](#).

389. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree) to the Secretary of State¹

Washington, February 6, 1957.

SUBJECT

NSC 5703—Draft Policy Toward Iran

There will be a Departmental briefing on this paper February 6 at 11:00 a.m.²

Discussion:

The attached draft (NSC 5703), which is scheduled for consideration by the Council on February 7, points out that Iran has made significant progress in recent years; under the Shah's personal leadership the Government has strengthened internal security, begun a development program financed out of rising oil revenues and aligned the country with the West. The paper also notes the effects of the Shah's personal weaknesses and the failure to make budgetary and administrative reforms or to meet rising popular expectations of a better living standard.

Internationally, as the paper explains, Iran is becoming a positive Free World asset, as evidenced by its adherence to the Baghdad Pact and its support of the United States on major Middle East issues. But, in view of its exposed position and relative weakness Iran continues to need U.S. political, military and economic support. This draft paper takes the position that it is in the U.S. interest to support Iran within reasonable limits in order to bolster its confidence in its new international posture. This is particularly important at a time when the U.S. is trying to obtain Middle East support for the President's January 5 proposals.

Politically, the President's proposals have strengthened the Iranian Government's confidence in itself, in the U.S. and in the future of Middle

East defense. The proposals will ease the pressure for a U.S. guarantee of Iranian territorial integrity but will encourage the Shah to hope for more military aid.

Militarily, the paper proposes a somewhat stepped-up aid program designed to give the armed forces some defensive delaying capability within a framework of JCS-approved goals (which the Shah has agreed to) and of Iranian limited military and economic capacities. Besides the usual end-items, the plan includes a large military construction program to relocate Iranian units in better defensive positions.

Economically, the paper recommends a declining scale of aid after FY 1958. Since the Government of Iran has adequate resources to meet its normal budgetary requirements, provided reforms are made, it is planned to avoid direct budgetary aid unless required by unusual circumstances to protect U.S. interests in the area.

While the sources of many of Iran's weaknesses are internal, the ability of the U.S. to encourage difficult reforms depends on preserving confidence in the U.S. The recommended aid programs are calculated to maintain the U.S. ability to influence Iran while simultaneously tending to reduce the present Iranian over-reliance on the U.S. to compensate for internal weaknesses.

Recommendation:

That you recommend NSC approval of the proposed new policy.

¹ Source: Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5703 Series. Top Secret. Drafted by Hannah and concurred in by Barnes, Murphy, and Kalijarvi, who added as a comment a copy of his memorandum to the Secretary, *supra*. According to a covering note from Fisher Howe to Dulles, February 6, Murphy approved this paper and read Kalijarvi's comment. Murphy did not, to use Howe's words, "feel that any disagreement on policy is involved, but has suggested to Mr. Kalijarvi that he attend the NSC briefing in order to present E's views."

² See *infra*.

390. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning (Bowie) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Cutler)¹

Washington, February 6, 1957.

SUBJECT

NSC 5703

1. In briefing the Secretary today on NSC 5703, we made two points with reference to the proposed military aid program of \$212 million through FY 1960:

a) The total costs assume completion of the military construction program by FY 1960. Consideration is now being given to phasing the program through FY 1962. It is estimated that this would reduce the total through FY 1960 by about \$22 million.

b) The total costs include construction of two airbases at Qom and Kerman Shah. There is still considerable doubt about whether or when they should be built. If their construction were eliminated or postponed beyond FY 1960, it is estimated that the program would be further reduced by about \$21 million.

2. The net effect of both actions, if decided upon subsequently, would be to reduce the total costs of the program through FY 1960 to about \$169 million or substantially below the Prochnow B estimate of \$197 million.

3. The language for these qualifications (which we would ask to have inserted as footnotes to the revised table on page 23 of the Financial Annex)² was agreed to at the working levels of State and Defense yesterday. It is intended to clarify and make more

specific the final paragraph of the *Defense Comments*, at page 24 of the Annex.³ The text is now being cleared in both Departments for transmittal to you prior to the NSC meeting.

4. I have thought that you would wish to know that these points will be in the Secretary's mind during the Council's discussion of NSC 5703.

Robert R. Bowie⁴

¹ Source: Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5703 Series. Secret. Drafted by William Leonhardt, Department of State NSC Planning Board Assistant.

² These changes were reflected in the Financial Appendix to NSC 5703/1, [Document 392](#).

³ The Defense comments on NSC 5703/1 are part of the Financial Appendix.

⁴ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

391. Memorandum of Discussion at the 312th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, February 7, 1957¹

Washington, February 7, 1957

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and items 1. “The Human Effects of Nuclear Weapons Development” and 2. “Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security.”]

3. *U.S. Policy Toward Iran* (NSC 5504; NSC 5610;² NSC Action No. 1624–c;³ Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject:

“Report by the Interdepartmental Committee on Certain U.S. Aid Programs”, dated December 5, 1956;⁴ NIE 34–57;⁵ NSC 5703; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated February 6, 1957⁶)

Mr. Cutler briefed the Council in great detail as to the military and economic assistance programs—past, present and future—for Iran. (Copies of Mr. Cutler’s brief had been distributed to the members of the Council prior to the meeting, and a copy is incorporated in the minutes of the meeting.)⁷

The President interrupted the briefing to refer initially to the new proposal to conduct the military defense of Iran against external aggression at the Elburz Mountain line in northern Iran as opposed to the Zagros line, from which point the defense of Iran was to be conducted under the previous policy. Apropos of this, the President inquired whether the natural route of a Soviet invasion of Iran would not be along the west of the Caspian Sea. When Admiral Radford replied that this would be the likely route, the President looked at the map and asked why, in this case, the Soviets would not readily succeed in outflanking and turning the Elburz Mountain line. Admiral Radford then explained the concept of a defense of Iran on the Elburz Mountain line. He pointed out that he had flown over this entire region, and he himself believed the Elburz line superior to the Zagros line for the defense of the country. In any case, he added, the Iranians will not

make any military plans with us at all if our plans do not appear to involve the defense of their country, which would not be the case if the defense was based upon the Zagros mountains in the extreme south of the country. He added, finally, that he was optimistic about Iran's ability to support itself in the future if it made sensible use of its very ample natural resources.

Mr. Cutler then resumed his briefing, pointing out that the Planning Board had accepted the JCS statement of missions for the Iranian armed forces. He then went into the basis of the Planning Board recommendations to the Council that it adopt NSC 5703. Some of these arguments of the Planning Board would appear legitimate to Secretary Humphrey, notably the first three. Others would doubtless seem illegitimate to the Secretary of the Treasury. In concluding his briefing, Mr. Cutler apologized for the length of his remarks, and then asked that Secretary Robertson or Admiral Radford comment on the possibility, which had been brought to his attention last evening, that there might be a reduction in the hitherto estimated costs for military construction and for airfields along the Elburz line.

Secretary Robertson stated that the Council might find it desirable to postpone any finalizing of the figures for our military assistance program for Iran until such time as we could reach a decision [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*]. This decision, perhaps, could be reached in another few months, and would naturally have an effect on the size of the military assistance program deemed desirable for Iran.

Admiral Radford pointed out that once the Joint Resolution⁸ had passed and we could sit down and talk over our plans with the Iranians, we might be able to convince them of the desirability of reducing the size of our military assistance program; but he warned that we certainly needed the Iranians on our side. He also expressed himself again as hopeful that a real economic development could be achieved in Iran as a result of the ever-increasing oil revenues which that country would enjoy.

The President inquired whether, when we thus sat down with the Iranians, we could bring up with them the question of those islands which the Arabs are insisting that the Iranians have wrongly seized and occupied.⁹ Secretary

Dulles believed that this was a possibility, [*1½ line of source text not declassified*].

Secretary Dulles then pointed out that, as NSC 5703 made clear, the great lack in Iran was the lack of a competent administration, and this was a problem which was centuries old. Accordingly, perhaps the most important work being done in Iran was the work of our technical assistance program in the production and training of good administrators. The Shah, of course, could not produce such administrators by a fiat or a decree. We are doing a good training job, and once we complete this job Iran will have enough natural resources to be self-sustaining. It will take time, however, warned Secretary Dulles, and in the meantime we cannot say to the Iranians that we are simply going to let them go, even though, of course, we must keep the pressure on them to reform their ways. Secretary Dulles was also hopeful that once the Joint Resolution has been passed we could persuade the Iranians, as Admiral Radford had suggested, that they do not need military forces on the scale that they have hitherto been insisting they required. Secretary Dulles then referred to his recent conversations with the Crown Prince of Iraq on the general problem of the desire of so many governments for “prestige” military equipment.¹⁰ He had explained his views to the Crown Prince on the unfortunate effect of too much such equipment, and insisted that we must keep on constantly preaching the desirability that weaker nations put greater dependence for their defense on our U.S. retaliatory capability and less dependence on large indigenous forces and the latest military equipment. This general approach, said Secretary Dulles, offered the only hope of safely cutting down the heavy expenses of the U.S. military assistance program worldwide. The President commented on how very difficult it was to sell such a doctrine as that advocated by Secretary Dulles to people like King Saud. He described the King as [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] introspective, and said that he had given him quite a lecture on the subject of military forces and military equipment, not only with respect to their initial cost, but the heavy costs of maintaining this equipment once it had been secured. The President showed exasperation over the fact that King Saud had insistently demanded new and additional military equipment from the United States in return for every concession which he might be willing to make to the United States.

The President then turned to Admiral Radford and asked whether Iran would be a practical area for his task force to operate in; that is, both planes and ships. Admiral Radford replied in the affirmative, but the President then inquired whether the Soviets invading Iran would not immediately capture airfields close to the border along the Elburz line; and after all, these airfields were very difficult to destroy, even with nuclear weapons, and once they had been seized, the Soviets would be in a position quickly to restore them to operational use.

Mr. Hollister said he thought it was his duty to call the Council's attention to a domestic political problem involving our aid programs to Iran. He said that he was referring to the savage attack by a Congressional subcommittee on the past administration of our aid programs in this country.¹¹ The attack was largely unjustified, but nevertheless Mr. Hollister predicted that the situation would plague us when we came up to Congress with our future aid programs for Iran. Mr. Cutler also called attention to the highly critical article on the administration of our aid to Iran in past years in the current issue of the *Readers Digest*.¹²

The President replied philosophically that whatever we have done, good or bad, in our assistance programs to Iran in the past, we can at least have the satisfaction that we have saved Iran from Communism and kept it on our side against the Soviet Union. This should be cast in the teeth of the politicians who criticize our aid programs to Iran. Secretary Dulles commented that he had pointed out this very thing at a recent Congressional hearing. He nevertheless thought we ought to get somebody in Mr. Hollister's shop to write a vigorous reply to these criticisms of the Iranian program.¹³

Secretary Humphrey said he had two things to comment on with respect to the proposed new policy toward Iran. In the first place, the financial figures with respect to the new policy don't mean too much. For example, on military aid the size of the figures depends to a large degree on how we price military equipment, and for all practical purposes you can price this material about any way you want to. Mr. Cutler pointed out that the figures in the Financial Appendix were based on the depreciated value of the items of military equipment. However, Secretary Humphrey went on to say that as

far as “real money” was concerned, this was his second point, and he wanted forcibly to support the suggestion earlier made by Defense that the figures for the military aid program not be firmed up and finalized at the present time. As he had often done in the past, Secretary Humphrey insisted that we should not act on individual military aid programs for one country at a time. This was a very dangerous proceeding, and the Council ought instead to go over such individual country policies tentatively, and then file each one of them until we had secured a complete and composite picture of our military programs world-wide. Secretary Humphrey said he had two reasons for making this recommendation. The first reason was that this particular country, Iran, was bound to have a lot of money in the next four or five years as the oil market in Europe developed. Secondly, we were facing other very serious matters of which we must take account before acting on Iran. Enlarging on this second point, Secretary Humphrey indicated that two of our principal allies, Britain and France, are on the point of going broke. In fact, Britain just escaped this time as a result of our action, and we are going to face a terrible problem with France in the next few weeks. In point of fact, the French are just going down the drain. As for the British, our only recourse will be to ask Congress for a thorough readjustment of the terms of the British loan. This will mean, actually, that the United States will supply Britain with a \$1 billion loan over a period of forty years either with no interest whatsoever or not more than 2%. If we add the French situation to this, you can see what terrible problems we are facing.

Secretary Humphrey repeated that he did not see how we could say “yes” to the French on their request for a \$500 million loan, nor yet how we could say “no”. But in any case, instead of approving this new aid program for Iran we could put that in the deep freeze. And above all, let us not talk about assistance programs with any foreign government whatsoever. If we do, they will insist that we have made commitments and will accuse us of bad faith if subsequently we find that we cannot appropriately carry out such commitments.

Secretary Dulles pointed out that in spite of everything Secretary Humphrey had said, we were simply obliged to talk with some foreign governments. For example, if you refuse altogether to even sit down with the Iranians,

you may as well say goodbye to Iran. Secretary Humphrey responded that if Secretary Dulles were right, perhaps the best thing for the National Security Council to do was to sit down here together for the next thirty days and work out every single one of our individual military assistance programs in order to see what the whole thing looked like. Secretary Dulles pointed out that, after all, a ceiling on what we could spend on Iran would be set by the FY 1958 budget. Secretary Humphrey stated that he was not convinced by this argument because, for one thing, the figures in NSC 5703 covered the period from 1957 through 1960.

Mr. Cutler reminded the Council that the figures given in the Financial Appendix for this or any other policy were not binding on anyone, and were merely an estimated order of magnitude. The crucial paragraphs in NSC 5703 were paragraphs 18 and 19, dealing with the military and economic assistance programs for Iran. These were necessary in order to provide guidance, and Mr. Cutler read the paragraphs to the Council. He stated that he believed the guidance in these paragraphs was sound, and that the Council could approve them as guidance, while at the same time placing a ceiling on expenditures under these programs, at least until such time as our people have talked with the Iranians subsequent to the passage of the Joint Resolution. For example, pending these conversations we could agree that expenditures to carry out the programs in NSC 5703 were not to be larger than they had been in the last Fiscal Year. Secretary Humphrey said that he could not approve of Mr. Cutler's suggestion for the reason that he did not believe that the expenditures for the assistance programs to Iran last year represented an acceptable minimum, as apparently Mr. Cutler believed.

Secretary Dulles commented that with respect to the British currency problem to which Secretary Humphrey had just referred, we faced a situation that required immediate action. In reaching a decision we did not wait until we got the financial figures pertaining to all our aid programs for all the countries all over the world that we were assisting. Secretary Dulles said he believed that we must deal with Iran in much the same fashion that we had dealt with the British, and not await the returns from all the other military assistance programs. Secretary Humphrey said that there was no analogy between the British and Iranian cases because we were not facing a crisis in Iran as we were in Britain. Secretary Dulles said he was very glad

indeed to hear that we faced no crisis in Iran. This was news to him. He added that perhaps a precise knowledge of Iran was outside the ken of the Secretary of the Treasury, for there certainly was a critical situation in Iran. When Secretary Humphrey indicated that he knew a fair amount about the situation in Iran, Secretary Dulles replied that all he really wanted to say was that if we refuse for three months to sit down and talk with the authorities in Iran on our programs for military and economic aid, we will certainly lose Iran.

The President turned to Secretary Humphrey and warned him that he must not forget [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] this great struggle which was going on between the United States and the USSR [*1½ lines of source text not declassified*]. He pointed out that King Saud had given him a long and detailed list of offers by the USSR to provide Saudi Arabia with military equipment. Saud had informed him that he had held out against all these Soviet enticements, but that there was the heaviest kind of pressure by his own people on him to secure arms from the United States. He had indicated that he would face a genuine crisis in Saudi Arabia if he did not secure the latest military equipment from the United States. There ensued a brief discussion of the problem [*2 lines of source text not declassified*].

Secretary Humphrey returned to his earlier suggestion that in the circumstances perhaps the sensible thing to do was for the NSC to devote itself to nothing else than our assistance programs for a period of the next thirty days. He warned that in its present mood Congress might well cut our foreign aid programs in half or eliminate foreign aid altogether. The President observed that if they did so, our own military programs would have to rise commensurately, with which point Secretary Humphrey expressed agreement.

At this point Mr. Cutler again made his suggestion for approving paragraphs 18 and 19 of NSC 5703, but putting a ceiling on expenditures in behalf of these programs. Secretary Humphrey repeated his opposition to Mr. Cutler's proposal. Admiral Radford then suggested that perhaps what worried the Secretary of the Treasury was the very wide distribution which would be given to the Financial Appendix to NSC 5703. Would it not be possible to limit or cut out the distribution of the Financial Appendix? Mr.

Cutler agreed with Admiral Radford's suggestion, and asked the Council to agree to approve the policy statement in NSC 5703, to omit the Financial Appendix, and to state that there should be no increase in the level of expenditures for assistance to Iran for a period of three months after Admiral Radford and the Joint Chiefs of Staff would have held their conversations with the Iranian military authorities.

The President accepted this proposal, and stated that he was beginning to feel a very deep sympathy for the ancient Israelites who had tried to make bricks out of straw (laughter).

*The National Security Council:*¹⁴

- a. Discussed the draft statement of policy on the subject contained in the reference report (NSC 5703), prepared by the NSC Planning Board pursuant to NSC Action No. 1624–c, in the light of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff transmitted by the reference memorandum of February 6, 1957.
- b. Adopted the statement of policy contained in NSC 5703, subject to deletion of the Financial Appendix thereto pending the Council's action under c below.
- c. Agreed that no commitment as to a new or additional military assistance program for Iran based upon NSC 5703 should be made pending Council consideration of a study by the Department of Defense of the military implications for the Middle East of the Joint Resolution (such study to be completed not later than July, 1957).

Note: NSC 5703, as adopted and approved by the President, subsequently circulated as NSC 5703/1,¹⁵ together with the action in c above, as approved by the President, for implementation by all appropriate Executive departments and agencies of the U.S. Government, and referred to the Operations Coordinating Board as the coordinating agency designated by the President.

The action in c above also referred to the Secretary of Defense for preparation of the study referred to therein.

[Here follows item 4. “The Suez Canal Situation.”]

S. Everett Gleason

¹ Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Gleason on February 8.

² See [footnote 7](#), [Document 367](#).

³ NSC Action No. 1624–c, approved October 31, 1956, directed the Planning Board to review the military and nonmilitary foreign aid programs for, among others, Iran and recommend to the NSC appropriate revisions. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council) ⁴ This memorandum transmitted [Document 372](#) to the NSC.

⁵ [Document 381](#).

⁶ This memorandum transmitted the views of the JCS, in the form of a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense, to the NSC. The JCS gave their opinion that NSC 5703 was “acceptable from a military point of view” and recommended that the Secretary of Defense concur in its adoption. (Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5703 Series) ⁷ [Document 3870](#).

⁸ See [footnote 4](#), [Document 376](#).

⁹ Reference is to Arabi and Farsi Islands; see [footnote 2](#), [Document 376](#).

¹⁰ See [Document 452](#).

¹¹ Reference is to the Hardy Committee report; see [Document 385](#).

¹² By Bernard S. Van Rensselaer, in the February 1957 issue of *The Reader’s Digest*, pp. 25–30.

¹³ Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs Burke Wilkinson transmitted to Herter on February 19 an ICA paper for Cutler dated February 15, on what the ICA was doing about the Van Rensselaer article. (Department of State, Central Files, 788.5–MSP/2–1957) ¹⁴ Paragraphs a–c and Note that follow constitute NSC Action No. 1667, approved by the President on February 8. (*Ibid.*, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council) ¹⁵ *Infra*.

392. National Security Council Report¹

Washington, February 8, 1957.

NSC 5703/1

NOTE BY THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ON U.S. POLICY TOWARD IRAN

REFERENCES

A. NSC 5504

B. NSC 5610

C. NSC Actions Nos. 1624–c² and 1667³

D. Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: “Report by the Interdepartmental Committee on Certain U.S. Aid Programs”, dated December 5, 1956⁴

E. NIE 34–57

F. NSC 5703

G. Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated February 6, 1957⁵

The National Security Council, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Attorney General, the Special Assistant to the President for Disarmament, the Acting Director, Bureau of the Budget, the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, and the Federal Civil Defense Administrator, at the 312th NSC meeting on February 7, 1957 (NSC Action No. 1667–b and –c):

b. Adopted the statement of policy contained in NSC 5703, subject to deletion of the Financial Appendix thereto pending the Council’s action under c below.

c. Agreed that no commitment as to a new or additional military assistance program for Iran based upon NSC 5703 should be made pending Council consideration of a study by the Department of Defense of the military implications for the Middle East of the Joint Resolution (such study to be completed not later than July, 1957).

The President on this date approved NSC 5703 as amended and adopted by the Council and enclosed herewith as NSC 5703/1, and the action in c above; directs their implementation by all appropriate Executive departments and agencies of the U.S. Government; and designates the Operations Coordinating Board as the coordinating agency.

NSC 5703/1 supersedes NSC 5504.

James S. Lay, Jr.⁶

[Attachment]

U.S. POLICY TOWARD IRAN

General Considerations

Importance of Iran for U.S. National Security.

1. Iran's location between the USSR and the Persian Gulf, as well as its great oil reserves, makes it critically important for the United States that Iran's friendship, independence and territorial integrity be maintained. On the other hand, Iran is a tempting and important target of Soviet expansion because of its vulnerability to overt and covert penetration and its suitability as a route to the Near East, South Asia and Persian Gulf oil. Since 1953, Iran has been regarded in the area as a symbol of U.S. influence, and its subjection to anti-Western control would be a major psychological setback with chain-reaction repercussions for U.S. prestige elsewhere in Asia. By the same token, the more Iran develops into a positive political and economic asset the greater would be U.S. influence beyond Iran's borders.

International Political Orientation.

2. Iran is disposed to be friendly toward the West and, in particular, looks to the United States for guidance and support. There is deep distrust of the British, exacerbated by the British-French invasion of Egypt. Iran is not directly involved in intra-Arab rivalries or Arab-Israeli hostilities, nor is the Government attracted by the Afro-Asian bloc. Strategically, Iran belongs to the Northern Tier area along with Turkey and is concerned with the problem of defense against Soviet expansion. Iran has actively supported the United States in international affairs. There could, however, be a reorientation toward the Arab-Asian bloc if Iran felt itself becoming isolated by expanding Soviet influence in Afghanistan and the Arab states. There are extreme left-wing, right-wing and nationalist elements which, given an opportunity, might well form an alliance of convenience in order to take office, turn their backs on Turkey and the West, and lead Iran into cooperation with a neutralist bloc of Arab and Asian states.

3. Iran has felt over-extended by its formal alignment with the pro-Western Baghdad Pact which involved the abandonment of traditional neutrality without either the greatly increased military aid or the U.S. commitment to Iranian security which the Shah anticipated.⁷ The President's proposed Joint Resolution of January 5 is expected to bolster Iranian confidence in the concept of Middle East defense and in the future effectiveness of the Baghdad Pact. But, while the Resolution will probably help to ease the pressure of Iranian demands for a U.S. guarantee of Iranian security, it will not, apart from the measures that may be taken to implement it, alter Iran's basic vulnerability to Soviet pressure and penetration. Iran remains concerned by the Soviet penetration of Afghanistan and exploitation of Arab disorder which threaten to outflank Iran, already exposed along a 1200-mile frontier with the USSR. Nor will the Resolution, in itself, satisfy the Shah's desire for increased military aid. Indeed, the Shah will probably expect the implementation of the Resolution to include greater U.S. military and economic aid to Iran as a component part of an announced U.S. intention to pursue a more active and positive course of supporting pro-Western and anti-Communist forces in the Middle East. Iran's strong pro-Western position, while a political asset for the United States, is regarded in Iran as a claim for additional U.S. support, a claim which will be

strengthened by the strong support given to the January 5 Resolution by Iran and her Baghdad Pact neighbors.

Internal Strengths and Weaknesses.

4. Outwardly, Iran's political and economic prospects are more favorable than at any time since the war. However, despite the progress made since 1953, there remain fundamental weaknesses which hamper the achievement of U.S. objectives and which could, during the next two or three years, undermine the achievements of the past three years, thereby increasing the opportunity for the USSR to dominate Iran.

a. Internal security has been established. Neither the Tudeh Party nor Nationalist opposition elements are currently capable of concerted effective action. However, serious weaknesses still exist in limiting the subversive potential of Communist and other dissident elements.

b. The present Government's prestige is enhanced by its exceptionally close relation to the monarchy which results from the Shah's assumption, since April 1955, of personal leadership and policy-making responsibility in the Government. However, the Shah's personal involvement, coupled with his arbitrariness and vacillation, imperils the effectiveness of the monarchy as the guarantor of continuity and symbol of national unity.

c. Oil revenues, which are expected to reach the agreed level by the end of 1957, would provide Iran with the foreign exchange resources to make possible appreciable progress toward national economic improvement. However, unless action is taken to overcome mismanagement, political rivalries, inertia and lack of skills, the Government will be unable to translate this growing economic potential into tangible benefits fast enough to gratify popular aspirations.

d. The Government in adopting a strong pro-U.S. position has gone further than politically conscious opinion in Iran will actively support.

5. The very considerable strengths of Iran today were, to a large extent, induced by the policies and aid programs of the United States. Conversely, the weaknesses reflect fundamental factors which permeate Iran. The people's rising aspirations have been frustrated by archaic institutions. These frustrations of a volatile people tend to build up dangerous political pressures which are periodically released. The country lacks reserves of political confidence, military strength and economic contentment to withstand such pressures. Iran must meet the rising expectations of its people or some other release must be found for accumulating pressures, if the present regime is to succeed it must capture the nation's imagination and confidence by proving in tangible ways its ability to cope with Iran's age-old weaknesses.

Economic Problems and U.S. Aid.

6. Iran's current economic and financial position is improving as the result of increased oil revenues and limited progress toward balancing the central government budget. During the first six months of the current Iranian fiscal year, non-oil revenues rose some 32% above the previous year, while expenditures increased only 17%. Oil revenues are expected to continue their growth from the \$29 million in Iranian FY 1955 and \$92 million in FY 1956 to \$160 million in FY 1957 and \$200 million in FY 1958.

a. *Budgetary.* Although Iran has the financial resources to meet its ordinary budget requirements without U.S. support, deficits in the Iranian regular budget are likely to continue in the absence of thorough-going tax and administrative reforms. The Shah has frequently indicated his belief that the United States should make up such deficits.

b. *Economic Development.* Prospective oil proceeds are sufficient for the requirements of Iran's ambitious 7-year Development Plan. Although the results of the Plan will have a great bearing on the political stability of the country, the administrative chaos in the Plan Organization and its slowness to produce visible results are causes of serious concern. There is almost complete lack of over-all coordination and rational planning of the country's total efforts to capitalize on its assets. Although the financial position

is improving, Iran cannot now undertake, unaided, regional economic or military projects of importance to the development of Northern Tier strength.

Military Problems and U.S. Aid.

7. Militarily, Iran is dangerously and directly exposed to Soviet expansion. Iran's defenses are totally inadequate for such a threat. The Army is capable of maintaining internal security, preserving the existing Government in power and offering very limited resistance to aggression. The Air Force is weak and incapable of resisting air attack. The Navy is weak and ineffective. Despite this meager capability, the missions of the armed forces consist of assisting in the maintenance of internal security, resisting external aggression by defensive delaying action, and assisting in regional defense. The Shah has accepted the U.S.-recommended pattern for the Iranian armed forces, although periodically he reverts to his oft-repeated desire for forces comparable to those created in Turkey with U.S. assistance. However, if built up to presently contemplated levels and partially redeployed, Iranian armed forces could make an increased contribution to Middle East security by providing, with outside air and logistic support, a defensive delaying capability against Soviet forces, initially from positions in the Elburz Mountains along Iran's northern frontier.⁸ Failure to achieve forces of this minimum capability may result in discrediting the Shah's policy at home, weakening the Government, and causing a gradual reversion to neutrality and a reduction in U.S. influence.

8. The military implications for Iran of the Joint Resolution on the Middle East cannot as yet be assessed. However, the future size and composition of the Iranian armed forces can be effectively worked out only in joint U.S.-Iranian planning because political considerations are involved.

Political Impact of U.S. Policies and Programs.

9. It is difficult to exaggerate the political impact in Iran to U.S. policies and programs. They are regarded as criteria of American ability and willingness to ensure or participate in the defense of the Middle East. U.S.

aid offsets the political impact of Soviet aid offers. U.S. political and financial assistance are important pillars supporting the Shah in his present paramount position. U.S. military aid is particularly important as a partial offset to the U.S. decision not to join the Baghdad Pact at this time or give Iran the security guarantee it desires. The technical assistance program is important as a means of making the presence of the United States felt at all levels of the population and throughout the country. On the other hand, there is a clear tendency in Iran to place too much reliance on U.S. aid as a means of compensating for Iranian deficiencies. Every effort should be made to overcome this tendency but, during the next few years, it will continue to be important to the United States to continue various programs in Iran.

Objectives

10. An independent, friendly Iran, free from Communist control.
11. A strong stable government with the capability and determination to resist Soviet pressures, to prevent Communist penetration and to cooperate actively with the anti-Communist governments of the Free World.
12. A government that can and will make maximum balanced use of all available resources in order to provide early and visible progress toward economic improvements that will meet rising popular expectations.
13. Iranian armed forces capable of maintaining internal security and resisting external aggression by defense delaying action.
14. Active Iranian participation in Northern Tier defense arrangements.
15. Continued availability of Iranian oil to the Free World and denial of such resources to Communist-dominated areas.

Major Policy Guidance

General.

16. Iran presents a peculiar difficulty. Ostensibly there has been rapid progress toward achievement of U.S. objectives. However, below the surface, fundamental political and economic strength has not developed. The next two or three years will be particularly important in consolidating the gains already made. A combination of carefully controlled influence and inducements will be necessary to strengthen the forces working for change and to guide them into constructive channels.

17. While the Government is now in the hands of Western-oriented, predominantly conservative elements, acceptable to the Shah, the ability of such elements to govern effectively in the future is largely dependent on the following factors:

a. The extent to which oil revenues are rapidly translated into tangible economic improvements benefiting the growing middle and working classes.

b. The extent to which political means can be found to appeal to liberal, nationalist and intellectual elements, thereby preventing a polarization which would force these elements into a unified opposition.

c. The extent to which the stabilizing institution of the monarchy can be protected against the Shah's personal inconstancy and arbitrariness.

d. The extent to which the Shah's commitment of his country to the West is underwritten by the strengthening of Iran's security vis-à-vis the Soviet Union.

The ability of the United States to guide the Shah and the Government toward solutions of the internal problems set forth in a, b, and c, will be heavily conditioned by the extent to which the Shah's confidence in his country's security is bolstered as indicated in d, above.

U.S. Military Support.

18. Accordingly, the United States should:⁹

- a. Study the implications which the Joint Resolution may have on the mission, size and composition of Iranian armed forces.
- b. Provide necessary military assistance for the purpose of assisting Iran (1) to build up, maintain and properly deploy armed forces which will be capable of maintaining internal security and with outside air and logistic support, fighting defensive delaying actions initially from positions in northern Iran against Soviet forces; (2) to accomplish necessary military construction incident to this build-up and redeployment.
- c. Encourage Iran to continue to participate actively and effectively in military cooperation with its neighbors, looking toward the development at the earliest possible time of regional defense arrangements which will provide the Northern Tier area with an increased element of security.

U.S. Economic Aid.

19. In order to improve regional cooperation, to maintain confidence in the United States and to reduce as far as possible Iranian dependence on the United States for its ordinary requirements, the United States should continue to provide aid on a declining scale, such aid to be in the form of loans, unless exceptional circumstances justify grants. General budgetary aid should be avoided to the maximum extent practicable. Aid funds, apart from those necessary to meet the appropriate U.S. share of local currency costs of the military construction program, should be devoted, in so far as practicable, to development assistance which will increase Iran's economic capability. Technical assistance programs should be emphasized, especially those related to public administration activities. U.S. economic aid should be administered in a manner best calculated to influence the Iranian Government to make effective fiscal and administrative reforms.

Exercise of U.S. Influence Toward Solution of Iranian Internal Problems.

20. The United States should exert its influence to induce and assist Iran to:

- a. Translate the country's financial and economic resources more rapidly into politically valuable tangible benefits for the masses of people.
- b. Take effective steps to introduce better over-all coordination and national planning of the use of the country's resources.

21. The United States should endeavor to strengthen internal political stability by:

- a. Encouraging the adoption by the Shah and the Government of policies designed to provide a better accommodation between the Government and the presently disorganized but widespread and potentially important nationalism.
- b. Endeavoring to enhance the prestige of the monarchy as the symbol of national unity and continuity, while encouraging a more consistent institutionalized relationship between the Shah's function of broad national guidance and the Government's specific administrative responsibilities.
- c. Encouraging the adoption of reforms which will increase popular confidence in the gradual emergence of better government.

22. The United States should encourage private U.S. enterprise to participate in the development of Iranian resources.

[Heading and 10 paragraphs (1 page of source text) not declassified] [Here follow Annex A and Annex B, "Proposed Resolution on the Middle East Program," submitted by President Eisenhower to Congress, January 5, 1957.]

Annex C

1. Force Goals prior to 28 September 1956 were as follows: **Army**

8 Light Inf. Div.

4 Light Armored Div.

5 Independent Inf. Brig.

Air Force

3 Fighter Bomber Sqdns. (UE 25 A/C Jet)

1 Reconnaissance Sqdn. (UE 20 A/C)

1 Transport Squadron (UE 12 A/C Prop)

Navy

3 Gunboat (PG PY)

4 Patrol Craft (CGPB)

4 Coastal Minesweepers (MSC)

2. The Secretary of Defense approved the following as major combat force objectives for the Imperial Iranian Army: (Note that Air Force and Navy force goals remain unchanged)

6 Infantry Divisions, full strength

6 Infantry Divisions, reduced strength

5 Independent Brigades, reduced strength

(The full strength Infantry Divisions are generally composed of 3 regiments; reduced strength Divisions have one regiment and reduced support forces.)

3. Force goals for the Iranian Navy and Air Force remained unchanged resulting in total Iranian Armed Forces of approximately 152,000 divided as follows:

	Approximately
Imperial Iranian Army	143,000

Imperial Iranian Navy 4,500
Imperial Iranian Air Force 4,500

4. F 84 G's from Europe are currently programmed for the fighter bomber squadrons. Type of planes for the reconnaissance and transport squadrons will depend upon availability of planes at time they are programmed.

Financial Appendix[10](#)

[Here follow pages 1–16 of the Financial Appendix.]

Defense Comments

The proposed levels of military assistance for Iran are based on the force goals recommended by the JCS and approved by the Department of Defense, together with a plan for the reorganization and redeployment of these forces.

Estimated expenditures through 1960 are based on continuation of the buildup of combat equipment, motor transport vehicles, and other equipment, together with the provision of a 30-day war reserve of ammunition. In addition, provision is made for a sizable construction program for troop housing and related facilities, and airfields. Provision is also made for annual recurring cost of spares, attrition, training ammunition, and other consumption items.

Total expenditures for the fiscal years 1957–1960 are estimated at \$185 million. These expenditures are based on undelivered balances as of June 30, 1956, plus an illustrative program for the period FY 1957–1960 of about \$225 million, comprised of the following:

(Millions of dollars)

Material and supplies	\$106.3
Construction	88.2
Training	15.0
PCH&T	15.5
	\$225.0

With the exception of construction, the estimated cost of the U.S. military aid program is, in general, consistent with the cost of Alternative 2 of the Prochnow Report. The recosting of certain military equipment in accordance with the new Department of Defense pricing policy has resulted in some reduction from the Prochnow estimates.

The Prochnow Report included an estimated \$70 million to cover the U.S. cost of construction for Iran, divided equally between dollars (MAP) and local currency. This amount was based on an Army construction program of about \$64 million for troop housing, depots, facilities, and new roads incident to the reorganization of forces and limited redeployment of troops, together with about \$6 million for airfield construction.

With the adoption of the new overall defense concept in mid-1956 embracing a more extensive defense zone in both the Elburz and Zagros Mountains, the estimated cost of construction has increased considerably. The total U.S. cost of this construction, estimated in January 1957 (NSC 5703) at \$152 million, is now estimated at approximately \$230 million, the increase reflecting higher costs based on construction contracts actually awarded during the past few months. Of the \$230 million, \$120 million is estimated to be financed in dollars (MAP) and \$110 million in local currency (including \$2 million provided through the U.S. Operations Mission). This new defense concept would entail an estimated cost to the U.S. of about \$197 million for Army housing, access roads and other facilities—an increase of approximately \$133 million over the estimated cost of the previous construction program included in the Prochnow Report. The new construction program would also involve an increase in U.S. costs for air bases from approximately \$6 million (Mehrabad and Dezful), as indicated in the Prochnow Report, to \$33 million (Mehrabad, Dezful and Ghom). The costs to the U.S. for the construction of the airfield at Kermanshah—included in the January 1957 estimates at \$10 million—is not included in the present Financial Appendix, inasmuch as the construction of this airfield is no longer contemplated.

Of the \$120 million total estimated dollar cost of the construction program chargeable to MAP appropriations, \$89.2 million is assumed to be programmed over the fiscal years 1956–1960. Of this amount, \$28 million

was funded in FY 1956–1957 (including the \$6 million Richards’ commitment), and \$21.2 million is being proposed for FY 1958. Specific approval has not yet been given to completion of the construction program by the Department of Defense. Based on estimated construction schedules and assuming total annual appropriations for construction of approximately \$40 million, covering total dollar and local currency costs, the above program would take approximately seven years to complete.

¹ Source: Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5703 Series. Top Secret.

² See [footnote 3, supra](#).

³ See [footnote 14, supra](#).

⁴ This memorandum transmitted [Document 372](#) to the NSC.

⁵ See [footnote 6, supra](#).

⁶ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

⁷ For U.S. declarations April 9, 1956 and November 29, 1956, see Annex A. [Footnote in the source text. Annex A is not printed. The April 9 declaration was White House (Augusta, Georgia) press release on the Middle East, and the November 29 declaration was Department of State Press Release No. 604.]

⁸ Delaying action in the Elburz Mountains represents a change in planning since the adoption of NSC 5504, which referred to “defense of the Zagros line.” [Footnote in the source text.]

⁹ This paragraph was subsequently revised; subparagraph a was eliminated and subparagraphs b and c became a and b. See [Document 402](#).

¹⁰ NSC Action No. 1770–b (see [footnote 12, Document 402](#)) authorized the insertion of an August 5 revision of the Financial Appendix into NSC 5703/1. Each page of the source text of the Financial Appendix bears the notation: “(Revised 8/5/57).”

393. Despatch From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State¹

Tehran, March 11, 1957.

No. 806

REF

Embdes 736, December 20, 1951²

SUBJECT

The Shah of Iran, 1957—A Revised Study

Enclosed is a memorandum entitled *The Shah of Iran, 1957—A Revised Study*, prepared by Second Secretary Thomas A. Cassilly before his recent transfer from this post. Mr. Cassilly's study is based on, and brings up to date, the basic study by then Second Secretary John H. Stutesman written in 1951.

In preparing the enclosed study, Mr. Cassilly utilized information made available by the Ambassador, by other officers of the Embassy, and by officers of other United States Government agencies in Iran, in addition to his own wide experience in Iran and the particular information gained through his own friends and acquaintances in Court circles.

For the Chargé d'Affaires a.i.:
Philip Clock
First Secretary of Embassy

Enclosure

[Here follows a table of contents.]

Introduction

The last comprehensive study of the Shah was drawn up by the Embassy in December 1951. The real value of this report can be judged only now, more than five years later, when its comments and conclusions have been borne out to a considerable degree.

Nevertheless, the past five years have also been critical ones in the development of the Shah, especially the period of his temporary exile and triumphant return in August 1953. In many respects this crisis may be considered as the turning point in His Majesty's career. In any case, these events have had such an important effect on the Shah's personality that they warrant bringing the 1951 study up to date.

Growing Self-Confidence

During the past five years probably the most significant aspect of the Shah's development has been his growing self-confidence and assertiveness.

The 1951 study lays special emphasis on His Majesty's lack of confidence and almost obsessive need for advice. It explained how thoroughly he had been suppressed by his domineering father and that, even when he reached the throne in 1941, it was only to find his office without meaning since the country had been occupied by foreign armies.

When the young King was himself exiled in August 1953, he is reported to have been dazed and despondent. Apparently no one had risen to protest his overthrow; the Army seemed to be as unmoved as when his father was deposed, and all his hopes and illusions seemed to be shattered. Then almost unbelievably, he received reports in Rome of mass popular uprisings in his behalf, and in great excitement he was brought back in triumph to Iran. These demonstrations of loyalty held all over the country convinced him of what he had hoped all along but had hardly dared to believe: that he, Mohamad Reza Pahlavi, was the embodiment and symbol of the Iranian people and their aspirations.

From that time on the Shah seems to have grown in confidence. General Zahedi, who was something of a “strong man”, was removed as Premier shortly after No Ruz, 1955, and in his place the Shah designated a respected, completely loyal courtier and then proceeded to be his own prime minister. Since his appointment almost two years ago, Hosein Ala has proved to be one of the least assertive premiers in recent Iranian history. Although Ala was appointed less than two years after Mosadeq, the extraordinary contrast between their respective administrations points up a similar change in the role of the Sovereign himself.

Another event which has contributed to the Shah’s increased maturity is his recent trip to the Soviet Union. At the time the foreign press speculated on whether the young monarch would be swayed by Soviet achievements and whether he might not have second thoughts about his alliance with the West. During the trip, however, His Majesty handled himself with dignity and restraint, ably defending Iran’s adherence to the Baghdad Pact even though he was aware that it was anathema to the rulers in the Kremlin. Both his international stature and his own self-confidence increased as a result of this visit.

At the same time the Shah has completed a number of other trips, less critical perhaps but also contributing to his development. Since his return from exile in 1953, His Majesty has successfully toured the U.S., Great Britain, Germany, India and Turkey and is scheduled to go to Saudi Arabia and possibly other nations during the coming year. (In fact, the Shah has taken such a fancy to his new role as international statesman that he has neglected some of the less exciting aspects of internal administration.) When it was announced in October 1955 that Iran would join the Baghdad Pact, it was no secret in Tehran that the final decision had been made by the Shah himself. Of course, His Majesty must have realized that there was not much choice since he had seen in 1946 that it was impossible for Iran to preserve its independence without outside help. Nevertheless, this decision took real courage, and since his return from exile, the Shah has not hesitated to align his country firmly on the side of the West.

Another indication of the Monarch's growing maturity was his symbolic break with his old tutor and former personal secretary, Ernest Perron. Probably not even his own brothers had been more closely and continuously associated with the Shah. The precise reasons for the sudden break in 1955 are not certain, but apparently His Majesty decided that Perron had been meddling too much in politics. In a recent conversation with a member of the Embassy, the former Swiss tutor rationalized this break as necessary for the full development of the Shah's personality. Perron now envisages himself as a sort of father image with whom His Majesty had to break in order to assert his own influence. He feels that since the 28th of Mordad the Shah has made significant strides in developing his own self-confidence and has provided Iran with a more stable government than at any time since 1941.

Whereas formerly the King tended to change ministers on impulse, during the past two years he has seemed determined to provide a continuity which Iran has not known since Reza Shah. Despite continuous pressure, he has—for example—firmly backed such unpopular officials as Plan Director Ebtehaj.

The Shah's decision to rule, rather than reign, has aroused an increasing amount of covert criticism, however. Recently even conservatives have confided to members of the Embassy their fear that the King's present policy will end up by undermining the institution of the monarchy. Liberal sentiment is even more critical of the Shah's new role.

Advice

The previous study on the Shah stressed the lack of confidence which "impels him to seek advice at every turn from older and successful men". In the intervening five years this excessive reliance on the advice of others has definitely declined.

The apparently very intimate relations between His Majesty and certain Western diplomats, as described in the 1951 report, are no longer in effect. Mr. Valentine Lawford, the former British Chargé who is mentioned as a

confidant in this study, has recently written an article on the Shah indicating an exceptionally close personal relationship.³ The contrast between this friendship and the rather correct but distant relations between the King and the present British Ambassador is significant. In fact, the British Embassy reports that the Shah is quick to resent any suggestion of advice from the present U.K. Ambassador.

Naturally the Shah still seeks advice before embarking on a course of action, but his method is different now. His Majesty may receive as many as 10 to 20 callers a day for several weeks; as far as is known, no notes are taken during these interviews, but out of this mass of information, the Shah will eventually come up with what he regards as an inspired solution. When he does make a decision, it is probably impossible for him to recall which particular influence has been predominant, and he probably genuinely feels that these thoughts are his own creation. Rather than accepting advice, the Shah reportedly believes that he is seeking confirmation of his own ideas.

Of all his current advisors, probably General Hedayat has the most influence on military matters although the Shah considers himself a military expert and listens to the General on the administrative side only. On internal politics he is more likely to be persuaded by Minister of Court Eqbal and the Interior Minister, Mr. Alam, although of late the latter's influence has dropped sharply. While the King is reported to listen to dozens of persons, none of the courtiers is currently believed to have much real influence with His Majesty. And never does the Shah forget that he is an oriental monarch who must always be (and at the same time appears to enjoy) playing off one advisor against another. The recurring competition between General Bakhtiar, head of the new security agency, and General Alavi-Moqadam, chief of the national police, between Hedayat and Ariana, between Alam and Eqbal is never completely resolved because the Shah wants them all to be loyal only to himself. The Shah also has his private intelligence service, and even relatively minor officials report directly to him as well as their immediate superiors. Evidently these informants also report on one another.

As far as economic matters are concerned, His Majesty continues to show confidence in the Director of the Plan Organization. The Shah has remarked in private that he supports Mr. Ebtehaj because he is the only Iranian he

knows with a progressive, Western outlook and the only man with the strength to say no. In the meantime, as the Plan Director demonstrates his uncompromising energy, he has become possibly the most controversial figure in Iran.

Like many sovereigns, the Shah of Iran is surrounded by a host of sycophants who tell him what they think he wants to hear. It is doubtful, for example, whether he is really conscious of the growing dissatisfaction throughout the country. He is also reported to believe that the Plan Organization is a substantial success. It seems almost impossible for the Shah to break out of this insulating wall and find out for himself what is really going on in Iran.

Despite his growing confidence, the Shah is still not so securely in control that he can afford to dispense with all advice. Now that he is assured of his own position, however, he seems less prepared to consult foreign advisors than in 1951. Perhaps this is the only way for him to learn because eventually he will have to stand on his own. The Shah is still maturing and still has a chance to do so. Possibly he is the one man in Iran who can afford to learn by trial and error.

Personality

Although the Shah is increasingly making his own decisions, the process is still a slow and rather reluctant one.

The tendency to vacillate, noted in 1951, is still present, and His Majesty remains enough of an oriental monarch so that, rather than make an unpleasant decision face to face, he will appear to agree and later have some one on his staff telephone that the decision has been changed. In the same way he will not take a firm stand against anyone who is himself firm but will work in an underhand manner to negate his influence. Like most of his compatriots, the Shah still seems more devious than direct in his actions as well as his reasoning. Except on a very few issues which are personal, he is reluctant to face up to a strong “yes” or “no”. People who have had occasion to work with His Majesty tend to agree that if he were suddenly faced with the need for a rapid, clear-cut decision (such as what to do in the event of invasion), the Shah would probably fail to rise to the occasion.

In addition to being indecisive, the Shah still does not seem to have developed all the firmness necessary for a man in his position. Despite his recent signs of asserting himself, he remains a sensitive person and an insecure one who is likely to cave in under pressure. The Shah talks of worthy objectives for his people but does not, in fact, have the organizational ability for the determination to push through the economic and social reforms that are so essential to Iran.

As pointed out in the previous study, the Shah responds to flattery and likes to have his own way. At the same time he has moments when he is despondent and moody. The King has known the depths of despair (when he landed in Rome in 1953 and not one Iranian came out to greet him) and moments of intoxicating triumph (when he returned to Iran after the 28th of Mordad). He is probably torn between an optimistic and pessimistic outlook on his own future and that of Iran.

Although the Shah goes through the motions of religious piety (including an annual pilgrimage to the Shrine in Heshed), he is not believed to have any deep or conventional religious feelings. Instead there is a pronounced mystical streak in his makeup that used to be appealed to by Ernest Perron. Also, the King seems to have a firm, almost messianic belief that he has been destined by God to lead his people to a greater future.

Conception of Own Position

Despite his tendency to vacillate, the Shah now seems convinced of his own position as the undisputed ruler of Iran and feels that the country is moving forward under his inspired leadership. Always behind this conviction lies the image and example of his late father.

By showing his intention to rule, rather than reign, Mohamed Reza Pahlavi has probably not stopped to consider whether this will be a temporary or permanent arrangement. Now that he has made the decision to rule, however, it would probably be very difficult for him to shift back to a more passive role. So far he has given no indication that he would be content to be merely a constitutional monarch.

One aspect of the Shah's character that has definitely not changed since 1951 is his overriding fear of any "strong man" in Iran besides himself. Former Premier Zahedi had built up his position to such an extent that, even though he is now out of office and is also the prospective father-in-law of the Shah's only child, the General has been sent off to Switzerland in virtual exile. Furthermore, it has been suggested that one reason why the Shah has so much confidence in the Director of the Plan Organization (and has no fear of him as a potential rival) is that he realizes that Mr. Ebtehaj has practically no standing outside his support from the King. In any case, His Majesty continually interferes in the details of running the government and undermines any Minister who seems to be showing too much initiative.

Unfortunately, this fear of a rival forces the Shah to rely on such [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] men as Hosein Ala. Nothing could be more revealing and at the same time more discouraging than the following quotation from the 1951 study: "Unfortunately, he (the Shah) holds the concept that a monarchy is as strong as a Government is weak. His good intentions founder on this belief. We therefore find a Shah who, out of patriotism, prevents progress in his nation. And this policy and fear must be contended with by those who want to help Iran."

The Shah's way of dealing with the budget deficit points up some of his serious shortcomings: i.e., his failure to appoint and then support a strong Finance Minister and his failure to push through real economic reforms. Instead, he appears to be content with someone like Qolam Hosein Foruhar, who is [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] unwilling to enforce tax collections, and then appeals to the United States for urgent budgetary support.

Inevitably the King's attitude towards the Constitution and constitutional government is passive. Although he may refer to it with respect, in practice he uses the Constitution as a convenient instrument for attaining his ends or as a crutch if he prefers inaction.

Because of his early education in Switzerland, the Shah continues to be influenced by the abstract ideals of democracy, but at the same time he is not dissuaded from playing a direct role in internal politics. As described in the earlier study, His Majesty declared in 1949 that he favored truly

democratic elections. When these were actually held in Tehran and Kashan, a National Front minority was elected to the Majlis, and the way was open for Dr. Mosadeq. The Shah has learned his lesson. During the 1956 elections there was a minimum of even lip service to the ideals of democracy. The Shah played such a dominant role in these elections that it may be assumed that every member of the 19th Majlis was approved by the Throne. And outwardly at least, the Shah did not seem to suffer any qualms.

The 1951 study emphasized that the Shah “sincerely seeks economic reform and social progress”. In the intervening years this reforming zeal has turned out to be less profound than had originally been hoped. His Majesty likes to think of himself as a reformer and is capable of saying on impulse, as he did to a group of students during the summer of 1955, that 200 families are blocking the progress of Iran. Yet when the results of the King’s “reforms” are examined, it turns out that he has done little more than distribute (for payment) a portion of the Crown lands which were seized by his father in the first place.

It has sometimes been asked whether the Shah believes that he or Mosadeq is more popular with the masses in this country. It seems clear that, on his return to Iran in 1953, His Majesty interpreted the uprising of the 28th of Mordad as a sweeping mandate in his favor and a repudiation of Dr. Mosadeq and all he stood for. Since the Shah is convinced that Mosadeq is finished, he is no longer believed to fear competition from this quarter. The Iranian masses are probably as fickle as those in any country, and the Shah is now probably more of a symbol of his country’s aspirations than before the 28th of Mordad; nevertheless, it is doubtful whether Mohamad Reza Pahlavi has ever managed to evoke the same fervent response among the masses as his recent Prime Minister.

Royal Family

[10 paragraphs (2 pages of source text) not declassified]

The serious question of succession to the throne is one which weighs constantly on His Majesty. As long as there is a possibility of his having his

own son, the Shah will probably refrain from designating a crown prince. In the meantime, there are several possible contenders, none of whom has a clear-cut, legal claim to the throne. With the betrothal of Princess Shahnaz to Ardashir Zahedi, it is now considered likely that any son of theirs would be the most promising claimant to the throne. Nevertheless, there are reliable reports that Ali Reza's son, Prince Ali Patrick (age 9), has returned to Iran and is being brought up as the ward of the Shah. There are legal complications to this claim, however, as well as to the claims of the Shah's five half-brothers, all of whom had a mother from the deposed House of Qajar. Moreover, the Shah has always been reluctant to name an heir because of his fear of arousing the ambitions of any other member of the family. Meanwhile, in the absence of a definite heir, there would undoubtedly be confusion and unrest if the Shah should die or be removed at this time.

Army

In the same way as his late father, the present Shah has a passionate interest in the Army. He probably realizes that Iranians instinctively respect force and despise what they consider to be weakness. Of all the institutions in this country, he is most immediately concerned with the Army (and to a lesser extent the Air Force and Navy) and is reported to pass on the promotions and assignments of even junior officers.

At the same time the Shah must be constantly reminded that, despite all the favors his father heaped on the Army, they deserted him almost without protest in the final hour of need. Underneath, the Shah must have half-expected the same thing to happen when he himself was exiled in 1953. Nevertheless the Army turned out to be more loyal than had been thought, and there seems to be little doubt that most officers—when faced with the choice—favored their king over Dr. Mosadeq. This backing from the Army turned out to be stronger than was reflected in the 1951 report.

Both the Shah and his officers realize that he relies on the Army to keep him in power. His Majesty is well aware of the corruption and nepotism in the armed forces, but he is not prepared to take the necessary steps to correct them. It is reliably estimated that as much as one-third of the officers of the Army, Navy and Air Force are absent without leave every

day, and this situation has been brought to the attention of the Shah. But His Majesty is so anxious to do nothing that would offend the officer cliques and possibly turn the Army against him that he is willing to ignore even some of the most flagrant abuses of power.

The Shah not only believes that he is a superior soldier, but American military authorities report that he does actually have a good grasp of strategy. In the event of invasion, he is likely to insist on assuming personal command of the armed forces. Considering his lack of forcefulness, however, it is doubtful whether the King would prove to be much of a military asset in a crisis unless he were backed by a firm [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] officer.

Foreign Influence

The Shah does not seem to fear the major foreign powers as much as he did when the 1951 study was made. He appears to be trying to convince himself and the nation that the days of overt foreign influence in Iran are over, but at the same time he must be aware that his country cannot survive without some form of foreign assistance.

As indicated above, the Shah continues to meet with Western diplomats, although not on the same intimate basis as before. He sees mainly the American and British Ambassadors and only occasionally the French. (Reportedly His Majesty almost never receives any of the Ministers who are assigned to Tehran.) He also has regular contact with the Commanding General of the American Military Assistance Advisory Group. Now that the United States has assumed a predominant role in this country, undoubtedly the advice of Americans has more influence here than that of other foreigners, but the Shah still stubbornly likes to feel that he makes his own decisions.

As far as the British are concerned, His Majesty is reported to have a great deal of respect for the professional competency of the U.K. intelligence system. Although he may not be convinced (like many Iranians) that the British are practically omniscient, he has remarked on occasion that their secret service is the most effective in the world. As the previous report pointed out, he is painfully aware of the part that the "hidden hand" of the

British played in setting up and then destroying his father. This fear and respect will probably continue long after it is justified. There continue to be reports that the Shah has millions of pounds in Great Britain which have remained blocked ever since the overthrow of his father. The UK government is said to be holding these funds to reinforce their influence over the King. Although the British Embassy has vigorously denied such rumors, there are many well-informed persons who continue to believe them.

The Shah seems to have few illusions about Soviet goals in Iran although he was reportedly impressed by the economic advances he observed in the Soviet Union. Because of Iran's proximity to the USSR, he realizes that he must maintain cordial relations with the neighbor to the north. His Majesty's fear of Communism is undoubtedly sincere, if only because he realizes he would have everything to lose if the Tudeh assumed power.

Conclusion

The Shah's development over the past five years presents an interesting combination of growing self-confidence and a continuing lack of firmness, as noted in the previous report. Which tendency will assume the upper hand during the next five years depends largely on events in the outside world and how they affect Iran. For the present he continues to play the dangerous role of dictator without the necessary strength to back it up.

Despite his weakness and obvious drawbacks, the Shah and the institution of the monarchy represent at the present time an element of stability in an unsettled country. Since His Majesty is staunchly anti-Communist and is favorable to the U.S., it would seem to be indicated that the United States Government should continue to support and attempt to influence the Shah of Iran.

If, however, it turns out that by attempting to rule directly he has bitten off more than he can chew and that he is arousing serious resentment against himself, then it might be advisable to use American influence to convince the Shah that he should step back and assume a more passive, ceremonial role. *End of Enclosure Sources*

American Embassy personnel

[less than 1 line of source text not declassified]

Commanding General, ARMISH-MAAG

Members of Diplomatic Corps

Embassy Despatches:⁴

No. 344, November 12, 1955 (Confidential)

No. 237, October 12, 1955 (Official Use Only)

No. 805, March 24, 1956 (Secret)

No. 422, November 21, 1956 (Confidential)

No. 535, January 3, 1957 (Confidential)

No. 660, February 4, 1957 (Confidential)

No. 677, February 6, 1957 (Confidential)

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 788.11/3–1157. Secret. Also sent to KhorramShahr, Isfahan, Tabriz, and Meshed. Passed to London, Moscow, Ankara, Baghdad, Kabul, Karachi, Jidda, New Delhi, Madrid, Rome, Bern, Dhahran, and Kuwait.

² Not printed. (*Ibid.*, 788.11/12–2051) ³ See Attachment No. 1 (to Department only). [Footnote in the source text; the attachment was not with the source text.]

⁴ None of the despatches listed is printed. (All in Department of State, Central File 788.11)

394. Telegram From the Embassy in Italy to the Department of State¹

Rome, March 18, 1957—6 p.m.

3702. Re Embtel 3701.² Conclusion of petroleum agreement calling for 75–25 division benefits between Iran Government agency NIOC and Italian Government agency AGIP would not only:

- (a) Adversely affect relations all international oil companies with oil producing countries, especially in Middle East;
- (b) Increase difficulties US Government and UN in present efforts ameliorate Middle East problems;
- (c) Give undesirable impetus to nationalization trends in Middle East; but would also:
- (d) Have unfavorable impact US-Italian relations, as in American public eye, at least, Italian Government would be cast in role of irresponsible opportunist unmindful of international responsibilities.³

In conversation with Ferrari Aggradi (present at informal lunch where I met Mattei) he inquired whether I had heard rumors about a Mattel Iran deal. I replied I knew all about it and after he indicated lack of information, I offered to give him full particulars.

I urge Department move to kill this agreement at least in present form and suggest as part of operation that I be authorized make representations along foregoing lines.⁴ Department may wish encourage similar approaches Italian Government British and Netherlands Governments.

Zellerbach

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 888.2553/3–1857. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Tehran, London, and The Hague.

² Telegram 3701 from Rome, March 18, reported information from American oil company officials that AGIP and NIOC had completed negotiations for an oil agreement, and AGIP's share was "a little better than the 75/25 gossip." Also, according to the telegram, AGIP's representative claimed to have excellent relations with political figures in the Middle East, and threatened, if the major oil companies refused to cooperate with ENI, to "upset whole applecart in Middle East." (*Ibid.*) ³ This matter came up at the Secretary's Staff Meeting on March 26. During the discussion, Dillon stated that he "felt that the Italians were possibly trying to blackmail their way into the Iranian consortium. Mr. Rountree, however, felt that the Italians were seeking concessions in new Iranian areas and that this situation could develop into a new and fundamental problem with regard to the relationship between the private oil companies and the various Middle East governments. He believed it would be difficult to square any new arrangements which might be reached with the present fifty–fifty setup and thought that this was a very serious development. The Secretary asked whether ARAMCO exhibited the same concern and Mr. Dillon said that they did not seem to be as concerned as Mr. Rountree because they subscribe to the blackmail theory, as did the British." (Notes of the meeting; *ibid.*, Secretary's Staff Meetings: Lot 63 D 75) ⁴ 4 The Department authorized such action in telegram 3779 to Rome, March 19. (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 888.2553/3–1857)

395. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State¹

Tehran, March 19, 1951—6 p.m.

1461. Reference: Rome's 3702 to Department.² While agreeing that conclusion NIOC–AGIP agreement would create unfortunate precedent believe USG should proceed with caution in attempting prevent it. Shah will be certain resent interference in what he considers strictly Italian-Iranian matter and might become more unreasonable with respect proposed oil legislation. If he becomes aware of US pressure on Italian Government

to modify or withdraw from agreement effect on US-Iranian relations and particularly upcoming visit Richards Mission would be detrimental and prospects for participation by American companies in Iranian oil development would be worsened. Suggest Batzell may be in best position influence Shah if his services as consultant obtained.

Our understanding is that agreement has been initialed by contracting parties but that to become effective it requires ratification by Iranian Parliament which now recessed for spring holidays and will only reconvene in early April.

Stevens

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 888.2553/3–1957. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Rome, London, and The Hague.

² [Supra](#).

396. Telegram From the President's Special Assistant (Richards) to the Department of State¹

Tehran, March 25, 1957—5 p.m.

1489. From Richards. Had satisfactory initial meeting 24th with Prime Minister Ala and other key Iranian officials. Good feeling prevailed with no expression disappointment over limited prospects new aid from Mission. Following present besides Prime Minister: Foreign Minister Ardalan, Minister War Vosuq, Minister without Portfolio Taleqani, Minister Interior Alam, Minister Roads and Comm. Ansari, Minister PTT Eshraqi, Treasurer General Pirnia, Deputy Minister Health Amuzikar, Prime Minister Aide Ansari.

In opening remarks Prime Minister expressed special pleasure at news US would join Military Committee Baghdad Pact and hoped it meant early US adherence Pact. Prime Minister recalled Iran's statement approval American Doctrine at time declaration and said Iran had for some time before that endeavored obtain firm assurance security such as Turkey had from NATO membership, but Iran had never before received guaranty as strong as now received under American Doctrine. With new sense security and confidence in future Iran leaders could dedicate themselves not only to defense but to peaceful economic and social development Iran.

In response Prime Minister's remarks I recognized Iran had lacked guaranty equal NATO membership and stressed central importance in American Doctrine of assurance US would come to aid any country requesting aid to resist attack by international Communism. This evidenced also in US readiness to join Military Committee of Pact. If Iran were attacked, US would be at its side; US had "put its hand to plow" and did not intend to turn back.

Re aid, I said US responsibilities world-wide and resources spread thin; new aid Iran from Mission would be small; Mission funds limited and 18 countries to consider. Described limitations applicable Mission funds and our purpose primarily meet exigencies immediate situation. Indicated

possibility small amounts new aid in support for projects of regional interest to Pact economic experts, such as railways, roads, communications; also some addition to military construction program and small increment military end-items. Pitts added US would take small arms requirements under consideration.

Prime Minister made formal presentation Iran aid request based on memo which he handed me at end presentation. Reviewed events recent years leading to present economic position, expressed Iran's attitude American aid so far, expressed confidence Iran's future, but stated need for further present aid in support Iran's own efforts. In many fields Iran had relied on technical cooperation which had done good job here. Asked help to undertake essential projects government had omitted regular budget in order achieve balance.

Prime Minister asked aid for following: railway link with Turkey and Pakistan to provide route to Europe alternate to present routes through Persian Gulf and Soviet Union; construction telecommunications net; construction airports at Qom, Kermanshahr, and improvements Abadan and Shiraz; port improvements Bandar Abbas, and possibly additional gulf ports; technical survey Qom-Iskenderun pipeline. Prime Minister estimated total aid requirement projects \$102 million in four years with \$33 million needed first year. Re regional highway, Prime Minister and Taleqani explained Iran intensely interested in completion railway link Turkey and Pakistan, believed undertaking highway at this time would hamper railway project. Iran of course interested in highway but at later date. Agreed refer discussion of US aid to subgroups and meet again on results.

I said US interested strengthening whole region. Believed Iran would recognize that countries in rear of tier contiguous Soviet Union needed strengthening and that US funds so spent would be spent in interests Iran also. Therefore we especially desirous furthering projects in Iran having regional aspects.

I believe Iranian sense importance pleasantly augmented by my request for views on other countries; e.g., Afghanistan, Syria, Egypt which may take some of bite out of any disappointment on aid results. Some interesting sidelights developed which reported separate telegram.³ In general Iran

leaders concede US should endeavor consolidate positions other ME countries on side West, but Ardalan took opportunity Afghan discussion to make almost vehement statement that Pact countries had to justify policies to peoples and Parliaments and were entitled to privileged position. See also separate telegram. In sum, US should help Afghan but not too much; no hope in Syria until military clique defeated; Arabia coming around and Saud solidly on side US and could be helpful in Syria; no US aid for Egypt unless Nasser accepted Suez Canal settlement roughly equivalent Menzies Committee proposals. Iran was really concerned over Afghanistan, owing favorable impression Russians making on people, especially in villages; danger long term.

I said US would not submit blackmail by wavering or neutral countries, or trade old friends for new; but would try acquire additional genuine friends to strengthen area where possible; US did not believe friends could be purchased in any case.

Agreed to have communiqué to be jointly drafted by working party.

Meeting again with Prime Minister late this afternoon and proceeding tonight by rail and road to see Shah tomorrow at Babol.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 120.1580/3–2557. Secret. Repeated to Karachi, Kabul, London, Paris, Amman, Cairo, Damascus, Baghdad, Tripoli, Jidda, Beirut, Athens, Rabat, Tunis, Addis Ababa, Aden, Khartoum, New Delhi, Rome, and Tel Aviv.

Ambassador James P. Richards was sent as Eisenhower's Special Assistant to 15 Middle East nations between March and May 1957 with the task of explaining the Eisenhower Doctrine. Richards visited Iran March 23–27. (Despatch 936 from Tehran, April 16; *ibid.*, 120.1580/4–1657) See also [Document 214](#). For additional documentation on the Richards Mission, see [Document 184](#) ff.

³ Reference is to telegram 1495 from Tehran, March 25. (Department of State, Central Files, 120.1580/3–2557)

397. Telegram From the President's Special Assistant (Richards) to the Department of State¹

Karachi, March 27, 1957—8 p.m.

2610. From Richards. Text aide-mémoire given Iranians March 26 follows. Unessential words omitted.

“During discussions between Prime Minister Hussein Ala and other high officials of Iranian Government, and Ambassador James P. Richards, Special Assistant to President of US, various measures were considered which might further purposes of Middle East proposals which are supported by both governments.

“Ambassador Richards informed Prime Minister Ala officially of US willingness to join Military Committee of BP if invited to do so.

“Representatives of two governments discussed ways in which US could further assist Iran in economic field. Ambassador Richards stated US was prepared to furnish assistance to regional economic activities under auspices of BP. He agreed in principle that US would contribute on grant basis towards completion of Iranian portion of regional telecommunications system approved by four area members of Pact, following meeting of BP economic experts held in Baghdad from February 23 to March 1, 1957. He further in principle agreed US would finance on grant basis cost of contract with firm of consulting engineers to survey Iranian portion of railway line linking to railway system of Turkey. This project was also approved after meeting of economic experts in Baghdad. It is understood that Government of Iran plans to discuss with Government of Turkey desirability of utilizing services of single firm of consulting engineers for requirements of both countries with respect to this particular stretch of railroad. Regarding Iranian request for assistance in the survey of proposed railroad from Yazd to Zabadam, linking Iran with Pakistan, Ambassador Richards is prepared to consider matter further upon completion of his visits to BP capitals. Ambassador Richards explained that having obtained views of Iran and

Turkey he wished to consult with Pakistan and Iraq before finally deciding upon specific surveys to be financed and projects toward which US financial contributions would be directed. When these consultations were completed, he was prepared to initiate necessary procedural and legal steps.

“After discussions between military representatives and on recommendation of MAAG in Iran, Ambassador Richards said US Government is prepared to undertake following additional military assistance program:

(1) Increase in funds allocated for military construction in Iran to expedite completion of currently planned projects;

(2) Provision of some small arms for Royal Iranian Army, exact amount to be determined by US Department of Defense after consultation with Chief of US Military Assistance Advisory Group in Iran;

(3) Provision of 100 two and one-half ton 6 by 6 trucks for Royal Iranian Army”.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 120.1580/3–2757. Secret. Also sent to Ankara and Baghdad and repeated to Tehran.

398. Telegram From the President's Special Assistant (Richards) to the Department of State¹

Karachi, March 27, 1957—9 p.m.

2612. From Richards. Had two hour audience with Shah March 26 at Babol, accompanied by Mission members and by Stevens Embassy, Gregory USOM, Seitz ARMISH-MAAG and Matlock² Embassy of [and] Country Team Tehran.

Audience marked by good feeling with no discordant note. (However, believe his remarks largely repetition of previous presentations.) None of previous day's expressions of disappointment were reiterated by Shah. Shah made number of informed comments on own position and other countries ME. He welcomed US interest in ME, which had never been imperialistic. Reviewed occasions beginning with Schuster Mission when US had been helpful to Iran. Noted fidelity US and UK to Second World War agreements with Iran, which Soviets had not respected. Delighted that US had at last committed itself to aid ME in defense its freedom and liberty.

Iran, Shah said, wished to be prepared for defense against any threat from any quarter, especially international Communism. Only hope of strength adequate this purpose was for US to provide necessary military equipment.

Iran had abandoned mistaken traditional policy of neutrality and joined propaganda. During visit Moscow Shah had told Soviets he had adopted policy defense because of their own actions. He now held duty to make policy successful. This was not easy matter in view Iran border with powerful aggressive Soviet Union. In addition to Soviet propaganda, Iran had also to face various forms subversive actions. Was necessary to inspire confidence of people by undertaking economic development to raise living standards and other steps to assure social justice. He hoped foreign capital would be interested in Iran. Had great hopes of Qom oil field's development which would require foreign capital investment. Wanted pipeline to Turkey. Thought project would cost \$400 million but if twenty million tons oil moved per annum, investment would be amortized in two years. Oil

revenues including those from Qom would soon provide enough money for Iran's economic development.

Reverting to military, Shah said he was worried by military weakness Iran, which was only country whose defense discussed in Baghdad Pact military committee. Iran was pivot of defense ME and obvious target potential attack. Defeat of Iran would outflank Turkey, yield Mesopotamian plain and Persian Gulf and jeopardize Indian subcontinent. Iran needed strength to hold line pending receipt US help and effect action US strategic Air against Soviet targets. He had decided on northern Elburz defense, which approved by Radford, but Iran was still weak link which invited attack. Needed much more military aid to achieve deterrent and defensive strength which would establish desirable "balance of power" with Turkey for Baghdad Pact area defense. Knew that US would win war if it came and was gratified by that for sake of world, but as Iranian he had to consider danger to Iran and what good to Iran if Soviets lost war but Iran destroyed in process. Iranian soldiers basically good material as Americans knew. US should help create with them an effective force. Would help deter war and if it still came, would reduce cost of US in money and blood.

In response to Shah's remarks, I recognized general validity of what Shah had said. Indicated that assurances American Doctrine and US joining military committee gave at least as much security assurances as if US adhered to Baghdad Pact. Shah interrupted to say "even more" to which I agreed. I continued with explanations purposes and intent American Doctrine generally.

When US joined Baghdad Pact military committee, military planning would become easier and better on a regional basis. I said we would indeed win if war came but our object was to avoid war as we did not wish to make the world into a desert with nuclear weapons. Iran would, of course, pay a price for such a war but US would pay also through hostile nuclear attacks on American industrial cities. By making our intent clear to the Soviets we reduced the chances of a world war.

I stated that for our deterrent strength to be effective we had to conserve economic strength backing our military strength and had to conserve resources as we were already spread thin on world-wide basis. Warned Shah congressional attitude for future would give greater emphasis to loans in preference to grants. Gave Shah résumé decisions yesterday re aid to Iran (see aide-mémoire submitted separately).³ Shah expressed faith in American intentions and said he knew help would come in event war but as soldier he knew also that it would take time. He detailed practical difficulties from a military point of view bringing in US forces quickly. Deprecated possibility any British help. He saw nothing but American strategic Air as an immediate possibility of help. Reiterated arguments for Iranian troop strength, stressed need for Iranian tactical Air Force together with ground defense of airfields. Regarded ground to air guided missiles as the requirement in view of inability small tactical force to perform military mission and defend airfield too. Made strong plea for help in building additional airfields in Iran.

Shah did not press for any additional aid decision by Richards Mission but asked that later consideration his views and needs be given in formulation coming regular programs.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 120.1580/3–2757. Secret. Repeated to Tehran, Kabul, Baghdad, London, Paris, Cairo, Amman, Jidda, Ankara, Tel Aviv, Damascus, Aden, Beirut, Athens, Khartoum, Rabat, Tunis, Tripoli, Addis Ababa, and New Delhi.

² Clifford C. Matlock, First Secretary and Counselor of Political Affairs of the Embassy in Tehran; also special assistant to the Ambassador.

³ [Supra](#).

399. Telegram From the President's Special Assistant (Richards) to the Department of State¹

Karachi, March 28, 1957—9 p.m.

2632. From Richards. My observations on Iran following:

(1) Shah is in effect head of government. Prime Minister Ala administers his policies. Although sincere in desire to advance his concept of Iran's interest Shah vain, indecisive, inclined to meddle in details and unable to delegate authority. On positive side he considers himself committed to anti-Communist course.

(2) Traditional landlord group still dominant force in country. This group remains feudal in outlook paying little more than lip service to reform.

(3) Iran's own economic resources are now sufficient and soon will be more than adequate to meet development needs. It is not question of real need for cash as in Libya. Economic progress is dictated by ability to absorb and put financial resources to effective use. Thus scant economic justification exists for US aid.

(4) Shah, present government group, and generally speaking landlords firmly opposed to Communism, although latter likely shortsightedly to support any regime in effort maintain their position. Shah says he made decision in 1955 of joining Baghdad Pact to throw Iran's lot in Western camp, having reached conclusion that in present world "neutrality" no longer feasible.

(5) However, I believe would be imprudent to discount habit of thought built up over years and instinctive preference of Iranians for trying to play both sides. In deciding to join West, Iran bent in unnatural direction and strong inclinations remain to whip back to neutral position.

(6) Shah appears obsessed with military matters which are obviously reserved as his personal sphere (Prime Minister stated at first meeting things are “outside my competence”). Our long discussion with Shah of Iranian problems included only passing reference made by him to economic and social needs. In essence, his military concept calls for “forward defense policy” involving defense of Iran at Elburz mountain passes. He argues Iran should have sufficient ground and air forces of its own to hold up attack until US strategic weapons have been brought into play. Iran is pivotal state in ME and its present weakness attracts attack. Shah obviously counts on expanded US military aid resulting from ME Doctrine and decision join Military Committee of Baghdad Pact. He spoke of need for guided missiles and area radar screen, admitting plans for latter should be developed through BP. Also spoke of Iranian willingness put airfields at US disposal in time of war. I said that strategic plans for area should be worked out through combined planning in BP Military Committee. I believe special effort may be necessary to get and keep Iranian military planning (and US support thereof) within framework of BP. Shah pressed mission to finance airfield at Qom for use by fighter aircraft. (Understand that field would be built to US specifications providing in time of war refueling point on way to USSR.) When I suggested such matters be discussed in BP Military Committee and pointed out US must be careful about direct support to bases on Russian periphery, Shah reacted by saying Iran sovereign country and would soon have financial resources to construct as many airfields as it wished. Believe that we should not delay unduly exercise of our influence in Military Committee directed toward keeping Iranian and other local aspirations within bounds.

(7) Unhealthy concentration on military is made more serious by bogging down of economic development. Plan Organization appears to have no coherent program. Apparently Plan director Ebtehaj, personal appointee of Shah, responsible in considerable part for ineffectiveness development effort because of vanity and failure delegate authority. View importance this mission believe it was discourteous and neglect his part to be absent visiting gulf

ports. Believe fuller cooperation from him needed, [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] Failure of present regime to offer people homes clearly makes them receptive to promises from elsewhere. Mossadeq played effectively upon desperation of people. I was struck on trip to Caspian by apparent apathy of villagers along road. Faces showed no hostility but feeling of helplessness and resignation. Need is to use period of grace earned by removal of Mossadeq to show that in cooperation with West, present government can offer prospects of better way of life. So far government has failed to do so effectively.

(8) One important value of US aid may be in stimulating and pressing government to take necessary initiative. At present Iran welcomes US advisors without hostility and on surface accepts US advice. For example budget balanced on paper as result our urging. But we have not yet succeeded in breaking through long standing social and governmental apathy and inefficiency to spark necessary vigorous actions.

(9) Second principal reason for aid is purely political, in that it gives government necessary confidence and incentive to stay aligned with West.

(10) As in case of Turkey both Shah and Prime Minister emphasized desirability US membership BP. They also argued that aid should be channeled to friendly countries and US should beware of blackmail. Shah hoped American Doctrine would force countries of ME to take sides.

(11)

No problems arose regarding Iran's acceptance of ME proposal. Shah welcomed US decision assume responsible role in Me. Prime Minister Ala described himself as "very much heartened by guarantee". Particular value was attached to provision regarding use of US forces. Proposals viewed as means of putting pressure on Egypt and Syria.

Iran tried to obtain as much economic and military assistance as possible. \$102 million package presented covering four-year period and calling for \$33 million in first year. Projects listed were railroads (\$58.5 million), telecommunications (\$4.7 million) airports (\$28 million), ports (\$6 million), pipe line (\$5 million).

After consultations with Embassy, I decided to offer package substantially equivalent to that drawn up in Washington: (1) membership in Military Committee BP; (2) increase in military construction fund of \$11 million (\$6 million from military assistance funds plus \$5 million as local currency component from FY 57 economic development funds); (3) small arms for Iranian army (estimated cost \$1.5 million); (4) 100 two and one-half ton six by six trucks for army (estimated cost \$.5 million); (5) regional projects under auspices BP—(A) telecommunications (approximately \$2 million); (B) consulting engineer contract for Iran section of railroad linking to Turkish system (approximately \$4 million). All of above aid would be on grant basis.

Iran which has extensive road construction program itself, showed no interest in regional roads such as stretches of Istanbul–Karachi highway. Instead emphasis placed on construction of Yazd–Kerman–Zahedan rail link, carrying railroad to Pakistan border. We agreed consider this project further after visiting other Pact countries but gave little encouragement. I made clear that final decisions regarding all regional projects must await completion my consultations with other BP members.

Copy of aide-mémoire left with Iranians transmitted separately. I also called attention orally to 15 day provision in Joint Resolution, growing opposition in Congress to foreign aid programs in general and sentiment in favor of loans. Nevertheless, after making clear I could make no commitments regarding future aid, I said I personally anticipated assistance to Iran would be continued in FY 58.

Both at technical meeting and in last plenary session Iranians expressed profound disappointment regarding magnitude economic aid. Prime Minister said Iran “had every reason expect more.” Before final meeting, one Minister asserted “this means exit of Ala.” It seemed however that above attitude assumed in considerable part for balancing purposes. At

conclusion of discussions Director General of Foreign Office admitted this tactic followed and that Iran happy at outcome. Government and Shah particularly pleased at military assistance. As in case of other countries visited there was little evidence of gratitude but on contrary assumption that aid should properly be forthcoming from US.

Regarding economic assistance we believe regional funds would come from authority of Joint Resolution.

Re military assistance. Construction program essential for redeployment in support of forward defense strategy running into increased costs. Current approved program could not be accomplished without additional funds. Accordingly, authorized \$6 million be added from defense funds plus utilization \$5 million approved in the FY 1957 ICA program for Iran (and already available to USOM) to provide local currency component of these projects. Director USOM and CHMAAG concur. Through consultation with country team determined great impact possible, especially on Shah, from offer small arms. I told Iranians we would help but gave them no figures (or even order of magnitude). I have asked Major General Seitz who proceeding US March 27 consult with Defense on basis \$1.5 million total to determine arms to be provided. Together with 100 trucks, funds involved approximately same as in package three prepared by Defense in Washington. We assume these programs do not require authority of Joint Resolution.

Action requested from Washington: (1) authorization additional \$6 million for military construction; (2) approval use of \$5 million ICA 57 program for local currency component military construction project; (3) program approximately \$1.5 million small arms for Iran to be selected by CHMAAG in consultation Defense; (4) program 100 two and one-half ton six-by-six trucks for Iran; (5) confirmation that none of these programs (except regional economic projects) require authority of Joint Resolution.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 120.1580/3-2857. Secret. Also sent to Tehran, London, Paris, Ankara, and Baghdad; repeated to Tripoli, Cairo, Khartoum, Addis Ababa, Jidda, Amman, Tel Aviv, Damascus, Beirut, Kabul, Athens, Tunis, Rabat, Rome, and New Delhi.

400. Telegram From the Department of State of the Embassy in Iran¹

Washington, April 9, 1957—6:41 p.m.

1940. Deptels 1401 and 1850;² Rome tel 3830;³ Tehran tel 1547.⁴ Recent developments in connection with reported AGIP contract call for your again discussing this matter with Shah. You should approach him by way of follow-up to your earlier approach pursuant to Deptel 1401. You should point out that AGIP's entering into picture on basis reported raises serious problems that may adversely affect not only American interests, but also Iranian interests as well. Within that context you should make following points orally (no note verbale to be delivered):

1. Reported agreement would upset present 50–50 principle governing distribution of oil revenue in Iran and world at large and might threaten present advantageous marketing arrangement now enjoyed by Iran.
2. Present marketing arrangements now enjoyed by Iran are unique in their breadth and provide greater diversity of outlets than had previously or have since been made available to oil producing country. At time when there is potential oil surplus, efforts under this particular agreement to market its share of Iranian oil at perhaps reduced prices, may have unsettling effect on industry's price structure and may actually result in less oil revenue to Iran.
3. Agreement will be interpreted as 75–25 split by other oil producers in Mid-East countries. This may have world-wide as well as area-wide repercussions on present arrangements for distribution of oil revenue. It may have very detrimental impact on political and economic stability of area. It will deter responsible foreign oil groups from participating in Iranian oil development.

4. Public knowledge in Iran of 75–25 split arrangement may lead extreme nationalist groups, aided and abetted by Communists, to publicly attack present consortium arrangements which call for 50–50 split. This could set in motion chain reaction that might not only jeopardize present highly advantageous consortium arrangements but as in 1951–53 immobilize Iranian oil production and have grave political consequences.

5. It is in Iran's interest for NIOC to associate itself with firms commanding financial resources to carry out extensive programs involved, technical experience to cope with Iran's unusual oil development problems and marketing facilities to market oil in orderly manner. Unless such arrangements are made with such firms, both Iranian Government and NIOC will suffer and chances will be reduced of making other arrangements covering other areas in Iran with reputable, well-financed, widely experienced firms with adequate marketing facilities.

You should inform Shah that since AGIP is an Italian state enterprise, industry-wide implications of this arrangement have also been discussed with Italian Government.

Herter

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 888.2553/3–2957. Secret; Priority. Drafted in GTI and cleared with FSD, ITR, WE, RA, and NE. Repeated to London and Rome.

² Telegram 1401 is [Document 384](#). In telegram 1850, March 28, the Department informed the Embassies in London, Rome, and Tehran that the United Kingdom was delivering an aide-mémoire to the Italian Government expressing concern over the breaching of the 50/50 principle. (Department of State, Central Files, 888.2553/3–2757) ³ In telegram 3830, March 25, the Embassy in Rome reported that it had made an informal approach to the Italian Foreign Office expressing concern over the possible adverse effects of the Iranian-Italian oil agreement. (*Ibid.*) ⁴ Dated March 29, not printed. (*Ibid.*, 888.2553/3–2957)

401. Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation Between Mr. McLaughlin of the Socony Mobil Oil Company, Inc., and the Chief of the Fuels Division (Beckner), Washington, April 16, 1957¹

Washington, April 16, 1957

SUBJECT

Socony's views on Agip-Iranian Contract

Mr. McLaughlin stated he had been requested by Mr. Arnold Stebinger, Manager of the Socony Middle Eastern Affairs Department, to call me regarding the company's views on the Agip-Iranian Agreement. He stated that the company is seriously concerned about the Agip agreement on several grounds.

(1) While it could be said that the proposed agreement does not necessarily breach the 50-50 formula since each of the partners to the agreement has a 50 percent share in the stock, nevertheless since the NIOC does not put up any risk capital the agreement actually represents a 75/25 deal. Agip is reimbursed for the risk capital it provides if oil is found and profits are made. If the project is unsuccessful Agip has of course put up the entire 100 per cent and bears all of the loss. The NIOC does not put up any money at any time. Even the reimbursement of Agip will come out of earnings, not out of capital advances by NIOC.

(2) Socony does not like the agreement to the extent that it would put the NIOC in business as a potential seller of oil on the international market. Socony does not welcome this prospect.

(3) Socony does not like the oil pricing arrangement which is based on Agip's return on sales to consumers in Italy for refined oil products rather than on the posted price principle. Socony believes that the posted price principle should be used.

(4) Socony does not like the idea of granting the NIOC a share in the administration of the enterprise. The Consortium successfully fought off this idea.

Mr. McLaughlin asked me about the current status of the Agip contract. I told him that we thought that the contract had been initialed by someone on the Iranian side but that we understood that the contract could not go into effect until it had been approved by the Majlis and signed by the Shah. We understood that the Iranian government had made arrangements with Mr. Elmer Batzell to prepare a draft oil law and that it was unlikely anything would be done by the Iranians about the Agip contract until after an oil law had been adopted. This would presumably require a considerable period of time.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 888.2553/4-1657. Official Use Only. Drafted by Beckner on April 22.

402. Memorandum of Discussion at the 334th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, August 8, 1957¹

Washington, August 8, 1957

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and items 1. “U.S. Policy Toward South Asia,” 2. “U.S. Policy Toward South Asia: Ceylon,” 3. “Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security,” and 4. “U.S. Policy on Hong Kong.”]

U.S. Policy Toward Iran (NSC 5504; NSC 5610; NSC Actions Nos. 1624–c, 1667 and 1753;² Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: “Report by the Interdepartmental Committee on Certain U.S. Aid Programs,” dated December 5, 1956;³ NIE34–57;⁴ NSC 5703;⁵ Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: “U.S. Policy Toward Iran,” dated February 6, 1957;⁶ NSC 5703/1;⁷ Memo for NSC from Acting Executive Secretary, subject: “Military Implications of Joint Resolution 117 on the Middle East,” dated June 27 [261, 1957];⁸ Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: “Military Implications of Joint Resolution 117 on the Middle East,” dated July 16, 1957;⁹ Memos for NSC from Acting Executive Secretary, subject: “U.S. Policy Toward Iran,” dated August 5 and 7, 1957¹⁰) Mr. Cutler briefed the Council, going into particular detail on the new Financial Appendix to NSC 5703/1 and on the construction costs to the United States for new military facilities in Iran. He then read the Planning Board’s recommendations for Council action on the Iranian policy and noted the approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the actions proposed by the Planning Board. (Copy of Mr. Cutler’s briefing note filed in the minutes of the meeting.)¹¹

After Mr. Cutler had called for comment, the President inquired whether the Iranians really had a military capability of manning the Elburz and Zagros lines and of effectively resisting aggression. Or were we going to adopt this policy primarily as a sop to Iranian national pride?

Admiral Radford pointed out that the Council had already discussed at some length the military concept of the defense of Iran along the Zagros

Mountain line. He insisted that the Elburz line was a much better defensive line than the Zagros, that the Elburz line had been accepted by the Baghdad Pact planners, and that the completion of the construction work would assure that this line provided more effective defense than the line of the Zagros. The President then said that the proposed new policy seemed perfectly proper to him.

Mr. Brundage said that he was concerned by the figures in the Financial Appendix, which showed an increase year after year. Would it not be better to try to hold down the rate of expenditures in Iran to the level of FY 1958 and FY 1959, at least until such time as the worldwide review of our military assistance programs had been completed by the Defense Department? Mr. Brundage warned that once such expenditures as these begin to grow, it is very difficult to reverse the direction.

Secretary Wilson disagreed with Mr. Brundage, and expressed the view that it would be sound to go ahead and adopt the proposed new policy with respect to Iran, trying to find the additional money somewhere else. After all, Iran was pretty important to the United States.

Mr. Cutler turned to Mr. Brundage and pointed out that the presently-estimated expenditures over a four-year period were less than we had estimated when this policy paper was first considered by the National Security Council in February. The President added his view that we really couldn't kick about these expenditure figures. We had been too worried about this country ever since the Administration came into office. Apropos of Mr. Brundage's remark, the President inquired as to when we could expect to see the great study of U.S. military assistance programs worldwide. Mr. Cutler replied that he wished to talk about this matter with the President at another time.

*The National Security Council:*¹²

- a. Canceled NSC Action No. 1667-b and -c, in view of Council discussion of the report by the Department of Defense on "Military Implications of Joint Resolution 117 on the Middle

East,” transmitted by the reference memorandum of June 27, 1957.

b. Noted the revised Financial Appendix to NSC 5703/1 transmitted by the reference memorandum of August 5, 1957, and authorized its insertion in all copies of NSC 5703/1.

c. In accordance with the recommendation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (enclosure to reference memorandum of August 7, 1957), authorized the deletion of subparagraph 18–a of NSC 5703/1 and the relettering of the remaining subparagraphs of paragraph 18 accordingly.

d. Agreed that U.S. policy toward Iran would continue to be governed by the statement of policy contained in NSC 5703/1 (February 8, 1957), pending a review of world-wide military assistance programs, which will include a review of military assistance to Iran.

Note: The action in a above, as approved by the President, subsequently circulated to all holders of NSC Action No. 1667–b and –c.

The actions in b and c above, as approved by the President, subsequently circulated to all holders of NSC 5703/1.

The action in d above, as approved by the President, subsequently circulated to all interested departments and agencies.

[Here follow items 6. “U.S. Military Capabilities To Meet Situations Arising in the Middle East,” 7. “U.S. Policy Toward Korea,” and 8. “Retirement of Admiral Radford as Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.”]

S. Everett Gleason

¹ Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Gleason on August 9.

² Regarding NSC Action No. 1624, see [footnote 3, Document 391](#). Regarding NSC Action No. 1667, see [footnote 14, Document 391](#). Regarding NSC Action No. 1753, see [Document 256](#).

³ This memorandum transmitted [Document 372](#) to the NSC.

⁴ [Document 381](#).

⁵ See [footnote 2, Document 378](#).

⁶ See [footnote 6, Document 391](#).

⁷ [Document 392](#).

⁸ This memorandum transmitted a JCS paper on the “Military Implications of Joint Resolution 117 on the Middle East” to the NSC; neither was declassified [*4 pages of source text*]. (Department of State, OCB Files: Lot 61 D 385) ⁹ This memorandum transmitted a series of questions concerning the implications of Joint Resolution 117. (*Ibid.*) ¹⁰ In the August 5 memorandum, Gleason submitted to the NSC the Planning Board’s proposed draft of NSC Action No. 1667 revised in light of the previous discussion of the military implications of Joint Resolution 117 at the 331st NSC meeting. This revision authorized the inclusion of the Financial Appendix to NSC 5703/1. (*Ibid.*, S/ S-NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5703 Series) In the August 7 memorandum, Gleason transmitted to the NSC the views of the JCS, in the form of a memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, dated August 6, which stated that the revised NSC Action No. 1667, as outlined in Gleason’s memorandum of August 5, was “acceptable from a military point of view.” (*Ibid.*) ¹¹ Not printed.

¹² Paragraphs a–d and the Note that follow constitute NSC Action No. 1770, approved by the President on August 9. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

403. Memorandum From the Secretary of State’s Special Assistant for Intelligence (Cumming) to the Under Secretary of State (Herter)¹

Washington, August 20, 1957.

SUBJECT

Intelligence Note: Iranian-Italian Oil Agreement

The Iranian lower house on August 15 ratified an agreement concluded March 14 with Italy's state-owned oil agency (ENI) to explore and develop oil resources in Iran. The agreement, expected to be approved by the upper chamber,² provides 75% of the net profits for Iran. The Iranian government is to contribute 50% of the capital only if oil is discovered. Should oil not be discovered, the Italians will bear the full cost of exploration. This represents a significant and radical change from the pattern now prevalent throughout the Middle East in which profits are split 50–50 and all investment is made by the concessionaire. The result is almost certain to be demands in the Middle East that current arrangements be revised. Should the Italian concession prove to be successful, these pressures will become increasingly difficult to resist. And the opening of this bargaining may well further contribute to the instability of the Western position in the area.

The Italian firm has had considerable post-war experience in Italy with oil and natural gas exploration, equipment production, refining and marketing. In these operations it has engaged foreign, including U.S., technical advice and equipment. Nevertheless, some observers still doubt ENI's technical ability. Capital is not expected to be a problem. It is reported, and is probably true, that ENI will commit only about 5% of its total annual exploration budget for the Iran concession. Should oil be discovered, finding additional capital would probably not be difficult. Nor are serious transport problems anticipated. However, should production become significant, exceeding the capacity of the Italian market, ENI might have marketing problems.

ENI is also active elsewhere in the Mediterranean basin. It claims to have a Libyan concession in the Fezzan adjacent to the French Sahara oil finds. In this case, Libya will invest only 25% of the capital (compared to 50% in Iran) for exploitation after discovery, the consequent profit split being somewhat less favorable to Libya than to Iran. In Egypt the Italian firm is part owner of the Egyptian Petroleum Company, which has exploration and some production rights in Sinai and owns shares in the National Egyptian Petroleum Company. Moreover, ENI built the new 81-mile pipeline from the Suez Canal to Cairo. ENI is also conducting some exploration in Spain.

There are unconfirmed reports that the Italian firm is negotiating for a 210,000 square-mile concession in Saudi Arabia and that ENI has had contacts with the Japanese concerning possible joint development of a Saudi concession. Other reports last spring indicated that ENI was trying to win concessions from the Kuwait and Yemeni Governments. ENI already has distribution facilities in Lebanon, Eritrea, Ethiopia and Somaliland. The head of the organization, Enrico Mattei, went to Morocco on August 19, presumably to negotiate with that government.

The causes for this Italian initiative are many. Foremost is the aggressive character of Mattei, a powerful figure in the Catholic Christian Democratic Party, who is reputed to be one of the most energetic and enterprising business leaders in Western Europe. Closely associated with his ambition is his rivalry over exploration rights in Italy with the great foreign oil companies whom he has successfully fought for some years. Presumably, Mattei is trying to force his way into Middle Eastern oil production either through new concessions or participation in existing companies. He probably has government support for his efforts which could cut the cost of petroleum to Italy. Apart from any direct benefits which might accrue to Italy in terms of lower oil costs, Mattei has Italian support for his Middle East activities because of other considerations. Many Italian leaders, from all parts of the political spectrum, see the underdeveloped Mediterranean basin as a potential market for Italian industrial products, know-how, technicians and excess labor, as well as a traditional area of Italian and Vatican political interest.

A similar memorandum has been addressed to the Secretary.³

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 888.2553/8-2057. Secret. Drafted by C. Dirck Keyser, Seymour Goodman, Herbert Glantz, and Thomas Fina all of INR.

² Done on August 24. (Telegram 383 from Tehran, August 24; *ibid.*, 888.2553/ 8-2457) ³ Not printed.

404. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree) to the Ambassador in Iran (Chapin)¹

Washington, August 24, 1957.

DEAR MR. AMBASSADOR: Your recent telegrams (288 and 290)² regarding Iranian attitudes toward the British position in the Persian Gulf and the bordering shiekhdoms, including Muscat and Oman, have coincided with a formal British approach to the Department on the question of Bahrein (Deptel 351).³ From here it appears that the Iranians see the present British difficulties as a possible avenue to the acquisition of Bahrein. In view of the visits of the rulers of Kuwait and Dubai and the forthcoming visit of the sheikh of Qatar, the Iranians, in addition, are probably contemplating a general enhancement of Iranian prestige and influence in the Persian Gulf. Tied directly to this problem are, of course, Iranian aspirations toward the potentially oil-bearing waters of the Gulf.

It would be a mistake, as we see it, for Iran to muddy the waters further. The Iranians must realize that not only would it be resented by the British but Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries would also be opposed to any Iranian ventures into this area. While we plan to have bilateral talks with the British on the subject of the Persian Gulf sea bed in Washington in September and November of this year, we do not feel that this is a subject that we can profitably discuss with Iran at this time.

It is our feeling consequently, that any further approaches from the Iranians regarding a possible U.S. re-examination of its policy in the Persian Gulf should be met by a tactful restatement of our present position, i.e., territorial disputes in the area are properly a matter for negotiation among the parties concerned and that barring the development of a mutually acceptable modus vivendi, or a recognized international understanding, the United States in its relations in the area will continue to be governed by recognition of the status quo. In light of the foregoing it would, of course, be inappropriate for us to take the initiative in raising this subject, except in the case of Bahrein, and then only in accordance with the instruction of July 25,

1956 (CA-769).⁴ In this connection, I am enclosing for your information copies of the aide-mémoires recently exchanged with the British Embassy here.⁵

We were glad to see Fraser Wilkins and Charlie Stelle get on their way this week. You have been faced with some unusual personnel turnover problems this summer and I hope that the arrival of these two other officers will round out your staff to your entire satisfaction.

Sincerely yours,

BILL

¹ Source: Department of State, Tehran Embassy Files: Lot 62 F 43, 322.1 Bahrein Dispute. Secret; Official-Informal.

² Both dated August 12, neither printed. (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 641.86E/8-1257 and 786E.00/8-1257) ³ In telegram 351, August 19, the Department informed the Embassy in Tehran of a British aide-mémoire of July 31 requesting U.S. support in calming potential Iranian public agitation against Great Britain over conflicting claims to Bahrein. The United States replied in an aide-mémoire of August 16 that the Embassy in Tehran had discretionary authorization to advise the Iranians to consider carefully the consequences of pressing Iran's claim to Bahrein or stimulating popular agitation over the issue. (*Ibid.*, 746D.022/8-1957) ⁴ In this instruction, the Department gave the Embassy discretionary authorization to approach the Iranian Government over its claims to Bahrein as described in [footnote 3](#) above. (*Ibid.*, 746D.022/7-2556) ⁵ Attached but not printed; see [footnote 3](#) above.

405. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree) to the Secretary of State¹

Washington, September 7, 1957.

SUBJECT

Progress Report on Iran (NSC 5703/1)

Discussion

You will find attached for consideration by the National Security Council at its meeting on September 12, 1957, a paper entitled "Progress Report on Iran (NSC 5703/1)."² The report was concurred in by the Operations Coordinating Board on August 21, 1957 for transmittal to the NSC. U.S. Policy toward Iran (NSC 5703/1) has been found to be consistent with National Security Policy (NSC 5707/8).³

Your attention is invited to paragraph A,1,a headed "Iranian Strength and Stability" and paragraph B,2 and 3, relating to the role of the Shah in Iran. He now appears determined to exercise strong, direct and continuing control over his government. His disinclination to assume the role of a constitutional monarch and the consequent criticism directed at him, rather than against his government and ministers, may serve to weaken his position and that of the monarchy over a period of time.

The paper, in paragraph A,1,e, refers to an agreement between AGIP, a subsidiary of the Italian Government oil agency, and the National Iranian Oil Company. This agreement appears to involve a 75–25 distribution of profits from oil revenues in favor of Iran without a commensurate capital contribution by the latter. This apparent departure from the existing 50–50 international formula, now prevalent in the Middle East, might lead to repercussions in other oil-producing states. Our Embassy has reported that the agreement was passed by the Iranian Senate on August 24, 1957, and signed by the Shah.

Recommendation:

That you recommend Council approval of the Progress Report on Iran at the Council's meeting on September 12, 1957.⁴

¹ Source: Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5703 Series. Secret. Drafted by Howard Ashford and cleared by Jones.

² Dated August 21, not printed. (*Ibid.*) ³ [Vol. XIX, p. 507](#).

⁴ The NSC noted the Progress Report. (Memorandum of discussion at the 336th meeting of the NSC, September 12; Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)

406. Memorandum of a Conversation Between Secretary of State Dulles and Foreign Minister Ardalan, Waldorf Towers, New York, September 17, 1957, 6 p.m.¹

New York, September 17, 1957, 6 p.m.

TGA/MC/13

SUBJECT

Middle East Situation

The Secretary said that the situation in the Middle East was particularly dangerous at this time. There was an increased recklessness evident in present Soviet policy which was difficult to explain. Perhaps this recklessness reflected the personal temperament of Khrushchev who was known to be unpredictable. About two weeks ago, we had received a note from the Soviet government dealing with the Middle East,² which was the most violent diplomatic note that the Secretary had ever seen. In fact, we had debated whether to return the note. Moreover, the statements of Foreign Minister Gromyko in his recent press conference had been very violent in tone. His reference to the Soviet intercontinental missiles had been unnecessarily belligerent. The Soviets had been extremely active in Syria. They almost had Syria in their hands.

Foreign Minister Ardalan said that he would like to refer to what his government considered to be the two most dangerous recent developments. One of these was the increasing infiltration of Russia in the Middle East. This problem was a very delicate one and it was important not to take any action which might have the effect of increasing Soviet penetration. The other main danger was the aggressive nationalism of Nasser. This policy created complications throughout the Near East. For example, Nasser sent Egyptian teachers to work in the Persian Gulf area and his only purpose in doing so was to enable them to propagandize for Egypt.

In response to the Secretary's question, the Foreign Minister said that the Iranians were "closing their eyes" to Saudi actions in connection with the disputed islands in the Persian Gulf. The Iranians had suggested to the Saudis that a mixed commission be established to which each country could present its case. He could not anticipate any great difficulty in connection with this problem as the Iranians had been able to establish very good relations with the Saudis.

The Director General of the Iranian Foreign Office had recently been sent to Saudi Arabia to hold talks with King Saud. The King had said that nothing should be done which might provoke drastic action in Syria. He was in touch with moderate elements in the Country. The Secretary said that we were not so optimistic regarding the Syrian situation as was King Saud. We feared that his influence in Syria was not so great as he thought. [2½ lines of source text not declassified]

The Foreign Minister said that the Iranians had again proposed to King Saud that a conference of all Moslem countries be held. The King had replied that he favored such a conference in principle but thought that its convocation should be delayed until it appeared probable that all Moslem states would attend.

The Secretary commented that we had done a great deal to build up King Saud in the Arab nations. We thought that he was sincerely anti-Communist in contrast to certain other leaders in the Arab area.

The Foreign Minister said that the Iranians were also concerned about the Afghanistan situation. During the recent visit of the Afghanistan King to Turkey, the President of Turkey had attempted to impress upon him the dangers of too close an association with the Soviets. As the U.S. knew, the policy of Iran towards the Soviet Union was to “smile” and to try to be friends with them. However, the Iranians, as a result of their long association with the Russians, were fully aware of Soviet objectives in the area.

The Foreign Minister would like to convey a message from His Majesty, the Shah, to the Secretary. Recently, a high Soviet military official had said that the Soviet Union would have no difficulty destroying bases in countries unfriendly to the Soviet Union and that even ordinary bombs would be sufficient to destroy the foreign bases in Turkey and Iran.³ The Iranian Government had instructed its Ambassador to protest this statement. No reply to the Iranian representations had as yet been received, however. It was the firm conviction of the Shah that Iran had not received the tangible military aid which it deserved. Nothing had been done which would enable Iran to defend itself “even for a couple of days.” The U.S. Ambassador to Teheran had been told about this but nothing concrete had been done. He would be grateful if the Secretary would consider the question.

The Secretary said that we of course wanted to be helpful. He was concerned, however, at the extent of the requests of friendly countries for more and more arms. When King Saud made his recent visit to Washington,⁴ he asked for increased military assistance, pointing out that the Soviet Union was furnishing Egypt with tremendous quantities of arms. In commenting upon the King’s request, the Secretary had asked what good these arms had done for Egypt. Actually most of the arms were now reposing on Abraham’s bosom. What had gotten the Israelis out of Egypt? Neither the Arabs nor Soviet arms but the position which the United States had taken. What kept the Soviets from committing aggression against free world countries was their knowledge that they could not aggress against one country without becoming involved with the United States. As the Foreign Minister was aware, the U.S. Congress had passed a resolution authorizing the President to use the armed forces of the United States to defend Middle East countries against Soviet aggression. Pursuant to the resolution, the

U.S. had joined the military committee of the Baghdad Pact. The Secretary understood that the Pact countries were now engaged in preparing military plans. Additional military strength would be needed and we understood that the Chief of our MAAG Mission in Iran was returning to the United States to discuss the Iranian needs.

The Secretary said that it was clear that Iran could not defend itself from aggression through its efforts alone. If the free countries joined together, they could help each other. This was the principle of collective defense. We of course recognize the need to have enough strength in forward areas to carry on delaying actions until other forces could be brought into action. We were familiar with Iranian problems, and were committed to stand with Iran.

The Foreign Minister said that he would like to bring up another question: the need for a military airfield south of Teheran, Now there was only one airport and both commercial planes and military jet planes used it. This was undesirable and the Iranian Government therefore hoped it would be possible to receive U.S. assistance for an airport at Kum.

The Secretary commented that the U.S. was confronted with a very difficult problem. All our free world allies desired to build up their military forces and sought U.S. support to do so. A complication to the problem was congressional action in cutting down on the funds for military assistance. We had to plan the utilization of our funds for defense in such a way that we could obtain the most effective defense for the least expenditure of money. We were very mindful of Iran's problem, however. It now seemed that the Soviet activities were most intense in relation to the Middle East area and this factor would also be taken into account in considering Iran's needs.

The Foreign Minister stated that the Government of Iran wanted help to continue its present policy.

The Secretary asked the Foreign Minister to tell His Majesty, the Shah, that he had received His Majesty's message with great consideration. The Secretary well remembered the last talk he had had with the Shah when the

latter was in Karachi en route to Iran for [from] India.⁵ He had great respect for the courage which the Shah had shown. The Shah had not bargained before taking action which might have had the effect of exposing the country to Communist reprisals. This constituted courage.

The Foreign Minister thanked the Secretary and said that he would be very grateful for the Secretary's consideration of the questions he had raised.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 110.11–DU/9–1957. Secret. Drafted by J. Jefferson Jones, III, Adviser to the U.S. Delegation to the 12th U.N. General Assembly.

² For text of the Soviet note, September 3, and the U.S. reply, September 24, see Department of State *Bulletin*, October 4, 1957, pp. 602–603.

³ The statement was made by Soviet Air Marshal Vershinin in Pravda, September 7, 1957.

⁴ Regarding the official visit of King Saud to Washington, January 19–February 1, see [vol. XIII, pp. 414 ff.](#)

⁵ See [Document 352](#).

**407. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State,
Washington, September 25, 1957¹**

Washington, September 25, 1957

SUBJECT

Italian Oil Agreement with Iran

PARTICIPANTS

Italian:

Sig. Giuseppe Pella, Italian Foreign Minister

Amb. Manlio Brosio, Italian Ambassador

Sig. Massimo Magistrati, Director General, Political
Affairs, Italian Foreign Office

Sig. Attilio Cattani, Director General, Economic
Affairs, Italian Foreign Office

U.S.:

The Secretary

Ambassador Zellerbach

Mr. C. Burke Elbrick, EUR

Mr. H.G. Torbert, Jr., WE

Mr. A. Jose DeSeabra, Interpreter

In the course of his meeting with Foreign Minister Pella,² the Secretary commented that there had recently been considerable public discussion of the Italian agreement to develop Iranian oil and it had been implied that the

United States was in some way opposed to Italy's entering international oil markets. He wished to observe that the United States recognizes the propriety of Italy's participation in international oil development. Furthermore, he said, we were not officially committed to the 50-50 principle in division of oil profits as a matter of governmental policy although some of our private oil companies did have an interest in maintaining this formula. The point he would like to make, however, is that we would appreciate consultation and discussion of important developments in such matters which affect us both. We feel that consultation is a two-way street. Many governments would like to have us consult them about things in which they are interested but forget to consult us on their actions in which we are interested. He repeated, however, that we have not taken any offense at all at the operations of Mr. Mattei in Iran. Foreign Minister Pella, in his turn, thanked the Secretary for his clarity. He observed that he had recently been on a trip with President Gronchi to Iran which had been very satisfactory and there had been no developments in conflict with Italy's pro-U.S. policy. It is the policy of the Italian Government that it desires that the actions of all people working in this field should be in accordance with Italy's foreign policy.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 888.2553/9-2557. Confidential. Drafted by Torbert.

² Foreign Minister Pella was in the United States as the head of the Italian Delegation to the 12th U.N. General Assembly. A note by Macomber on the source text reads: "O.K., WM".

**408. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State,
Washington, September 26, 1957¹**

Washington, September 26, 1957

SUBJECT

Budgetary Support for Iran

PARTICIPANTS

Dr. Ali Qoli Ardalán, Iranian Foreign Minister

Mr. Ali Asqar Naser, Iranian Minister of Finance

Dr. Ali Amini, Iranian Ambassador

The Secretary

Mr. Owen T. Jones, Director, GTI

The Foreign Minister opened the meeting by conveying the Shah's appreciation of the Secretary's assurance to the Foreign Minister last week that the question of military aid for Iran was being studied here in Washington.²

Mr. Ardalán then said that Iran had some difficult economic problems ahead on which the Minister of Finance would like to speak. The latter expressed concern over Iran's budgetary position next year. This year they had gotten by without asking us for budgetary help. Next year it will be different. Government salaries will have to be raised. Now the maximum government salary is 7,000 rials a month (a little over \$90 a month). The average is about 4,000 rials, which covers only basic necessities. Anything below that borders on poverty. He asserted that 70 percent of Iranian family income was below this figure. The consequent poor housing and undernourishment created potentially serious social and political problems. Strikes had been threatened, It was a dangerous situation.

This year's Iranian Government budget was 21 billion rials. Forty-five percent of this was for the military. An estimated 6 billion rials will be needed next year to improve the lot of government employees. Efforts are being made to improve tax collections and find new sources of revenue but these efforts will not pay off within the year. They will pay off after that, however, and no special budgetary assistance will be required after next year. The Minister of Finance asked if we could help on the Iranian military budget and thus enable the Iranian Government to increase the salaries of government workers generally.

The Secretary said that this was a difficult problem facing us all. Here in the United States he pointed to President Eisenhower's veto of the Congressional bill to increase the salaries of postal employees. The idea of living wages for people was sound in principle, the Secretary said, but in the case of Iran he understood that more could be done in collecting taxes. In making this observation, he emphasized that he was not preaching a doctrine of perfection and he realized that the tax-paying tradition, which is to be found in the Scandinavian countries, the United Kingdom and the United States, cannot be established overnight. Nevertheless, our Congress is likely to be critical of any assistance, direct or indirect, that could be interpreted as United States taxpayers supporting foreign taxpayers who are evading tax payments.

The basic problem, however, the Secretary said, is the excessive defense burden. The free world must find a way of finding security at less cost. He quoted at length from his December 28, 1950, speech³ which inter alia pointed out that if the twenty nations making up the Soviet frontier build up "static defensive forces which could make each nation impregnable" we would "have strength nowhere and bankruptcy everywhere." The essence of mutual security is to find a formula where the total military effort involves contributions from each country that would be less than if each were obliged to go it alone. Throughout the world nations were being forced to make a choice between economic solvency and a military establishment that in the long run would be excessive.

The United Kingdom has already cut back with a view to relying on deterrent striking power. The United States was moving in the same

direction. The⁴ President has imposed budgetary ceilings for our military. It had elicited shrieks of great agony. There were many who felt that it was not safe to rely on deterrent striking power, but the President was being firm. In the evolution of our policy we had abandoned the former principle of build ups against estimated target dates of crisis and were now simply maintaining steady levels that could be supported and that would enable us to cope with crises as they might arise. Under this program we were making studies on how to get more security at less cost through a modification of our existing foreign military aid programs.

The Soviet Union was faced with the same problem. There is evidence that it is cutting back on its conventional arms. It cannot maintain the present pace of capital expansion and development of new weapons in competition with us. With a gross national product only about two-fifths of ours, the Russians are bound to be in trouble if they keep up the present pace. Indeed, some of the recent Russian political developments can best be understood in this context. Meanwhile, they are furnishing obsolete military equipment to the Arabs. The Secretary said that he was appalled at the present orgy of the Arabs for arms. The first cost is the least cost for such equipment. Its maintenance will be a terrific load. The Arabs will find that they cannot support it.

The Secretary concluded by saying that the free world must find a balance on the matter of defense. The United States cannot assume the responsibility for world-wide military establishments that the United States economy cannot support over a sustained period of time. Iran, as well as other members of the free world, would suffer from an overextension of the United States economy. We are not an inexhaustible source of help.

The Secretary assured his visitors that the problem posed by the Minister of Finance would be studied and that the one raised by the Foreign Minister last week was already under study. In connection with the latter, the psychological value of having armaments visibly available was appreciated, but this also brought us back to the same basic problem that had been discussed earlier. When the Foreign Minister pointed out that Iran's present force levels represent the minimum requirements recommended by the American military mission to Iran, the Secretary said that the United States

Government cannot accept uncritically the recommendations of its military representatives abroad. These recommendations have to be examined in the context of the larger problem that he had outlined in the course of this discussion.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 788.5/9–2657. Confidential. Drafted by Jones on September 27. A note by Macomber on the source text reads as follows: “O.K., WM (note deletion on p. 2)”. See [footnote 4](#) below for explanation of the deletion.

² See [Document 406](#).

³ For text of the speech, made before the American Association for the United Nations on December 29, see Department of State *Bulletin*, January 15, 1951, pp. 85–89.

⁴ At this point Macomber deleted the adjective “present” referring to the President.

409. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree) to the Secretary of State¹

Washington, October 12, 1957.

SUBJECT

U.S. Aid for Iran: Qom Airfield

Discussion

The Shah of Iran expects far more military aid from us than we can give him. Recent events in the Middle East have intensified the pressure which he has exerted upon our Ambassador and the Chief of our military mission in Iran. An Iranian general recently submitted a list of requirements to the Defense Department which would cost between \$300 and \$500 million. The Shah has talked in terms of 2,000 jet aircraft, weapons with atomic capability and a greatly enlarged navy. The total military aid of \$40 million which is programmed for Iran in FY 1958, \$20 million of which is earmarked for military construction, will fall far short of the Shah's expectations and his disappointment may shake his confidence in United States support for Iran in her exposed position. While the Shah is grateful for U.S. assurances of support, as expressed to you recently through the Foreign Minister (Tab A),² he believes that he must be in a position to demonstrate to his people the material advantages, in a military sense, to be derived from association with the West. He is fully aware of the latest opposition in his country to Iran's present foreign policy alignment as contrasted to Iran's previous policy of neutralism.

To maintain the Shah's confidence we should do more than we are now planning to do. In the category of military equipment we cannot possibly satisfy his demands. As the result of recent consultations in Washington, the Chief of our military mission informed the Shah that we have now added to what was previously programmed for Iran, i.e., recoilless weapons, howitzers and M-47 tanks (Tab B)³ without much reaction from him one

way or another. It seems clear that this step will not assuage the Shah's present frustration and disappointment.

In this same conversation the Shah again urged U.S. support for a project which has become one of his most cherished desires; the construction of a modern jet airfield at Qom, 80 miles southwest of Tehran. While the Department of Defense has informed us that the Qom field has low military priority, the political, economic and prestige arguments for this airport are strong. Qom is close enough to Tehran to make a jet airfield there appear important to the defense of the capital and thus contribute to the morale of the government and the people. Also, Qom is a city that may have a great economic future because it is in an area where large oil deposits have been found. Next, the jet airfield at Qom can help to relieve the heavy pressure on the field in Tehran, where the present operations of jet aircraft are held to endanger commercial traffic. Both because of its practical usefulness and because of its value as a symbol of our close support, we believe this project will bolster the Shah's confidence and strengthen his ties with the West.

Assuming that our policy interests in Iran require U.S. support for the Qom airfield, the funding of this project becomes the paramount question. The project would cost about \$6.5 million for essential facilities, e.g. tower, fuel storage and a landing strip. A fully equipped field, which the Shah might well request at some future date, would cost in the neighborhood of \$16 million or more. In a recent meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff,⁴ Mr. Murphy raised the question of Qom and the funding thereof. General Twining, replying for the JCS, stated that the field might prove useful, but the Chiefs could not give it a sufficiently high military priority to justify the use of MAP funds. The Chiefs agreed, however, to assist the Department in any effort to procure funds from another source.

The only other source of funds for such a project would be from appropriations for special assistance. You will recall that you have approved programs which will lead to the obligation of all but \$100.45 million of the funds available for nonmilitary purposes. Against this availability we now show "potential" requirements amounting to slightly over \$300 million,

including such items as any assistance that might be given to Iceland and Poland and any supplemental assistance necessary in the Middle East or for countries like Tunisia, Morocco, Vietnam, and Korea. Approval of this proposal to finance Qom would reduce this contingency reserve to \$94 million.

Recommendation:

That you authorize Mr. Dillon to request ICA to undertake the financing of construction of the Qom airfield in FY 1958 with up to \$6.5 million from special assistance funds.⁵

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 788.5–MSP/10–1257. Secret. Drafted by Mouser and Williams and cleared by Murphy, Dillon, and Barnes.

² Tab A, not attached, is printed *supra*.

³ Tab B, telegram ARCG 86392, 05115Z (Army Message), from CHARMISH–MAAG Tehran to Defense, repeated to the Department of State, October 5, not attached, is not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 788.5–MSP/10–557) ⁴ As reported in the memorandum on the substance of discussion at the State–JCS meeting, October 4. (*Ibid.*, State–JCS Meetings: Lot 61 D 417) ⁵ Dulles initialed his approval of the recommendation.

410. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State¹

Tehran, November 7, 1957—5 p.m.

907. Re Deptel 922.² Following is our estimate current thinking of Shah:

(1) Soviet penetration in Syria, along with worsening general situation in Middle East, of concern to Shah, who has real stake in Baghdad Pact, and is directly affected by any change in relative strength and influence of US and USSR in area.

(2) Recent technical developments may indicate to him USSR approaching if not outstripping US in terms military potential. Shah may at times feel that the uncompromising pro-Western stance to which he has hitherto adhered may endanger his position to the degree that deterrent power of West relative to that of USSR has diminished.

(3) Soviet diplomatic attitude displays eagerness reach accommodation with Iran Government. Soviet Radio now constantly praising Shah and regime and hinting attractive economic aid terms.

(4) Shah has feeling that due to increasing demands particularly in European economy for oil and what he believes to be vast and easily exploitable Iranian reserves, he is in a commanding position vis-à-vis West.

(5) Shah hears from his advisers that more US economic and financial aid necessary to enable regime fulfill minimum political commitments. While Shah willing back such requests, he far more interested military hardware and installations. Shah personally appears under psychological compulsions which lead him to desire military forces well over and above what might be objectively required for internal security, prestige, or a rational

contribution to regional collective security. Moreover, indications decrease in general level US aid disquieting, since high level aid in all fields believed by him to be not only deserved return for pro-Western attitude of regime, but also barometer of degree of US support and protection.

(6) Against background above, combination [garble] traditional suspicion and deliberate mischief making have resulted widespread impression in Iran, probably shared by Shah to some extent, that US working with urban middle class leaders against regime. Because of his impression that US has been against Italian oil agreement, opposition attacks on this agreement, about which Shah shows great personal sensitivity, have added fuel to fire.

(7) Shah beginning realize his rule, which more and more that of absolute monarch, has not attracted and is not attracting degree of popular hope, confidence, and support he would like. A prime reaction is for him to intensify domestic divide and rule policy, and to some extent encourage counter-weight to US influence.

(8) All factors above combine to tempt Shah make gestures friendship toward USSR. Shah tempted approach Soviets in order: (1) frighten US into more aid and, in his mind, more whole-hearted support his regime, (2) be in position influence Soviets against exerting pressure on him and Iran, and (3) divert public.

(9) Following developments might reverse Shah's current trend thinking and diminish temptation make gestures toward Soviets: (a) spectacular demonstration US technical and scientific superiority, (b) solid diplomatic defeat for Soviet policy in ME, specifically in Syria, (c) switch in Soviet propaganda tactics to tough line including personal attacks on Shah, (d) perceptible increase level US aid to Iran, particularly re military hardware and installations.

(10) Embassy believes Shah will confine self to surface gestures towards Soviets since he will recognize reality Soviet threat regime and Iran independence. At same time, however, Shah and advisers believe selves to be far more clever than Russians, and feel they can play around the trap without springing it if they wish to take necessary risk.³ Embassy still believes Shah too intelligent fall into Soviet trap, although further friendly gestures toward USSR quite likely. In circumstances Embassy believes we should remain calm, reiterate points (1) and (2) set forth in reference telegram, and await opportunities which may be offered by further development.

Chapin

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.88/11-757. Confidential. Repeated to London and Moscow.

² In telegram 922, November 5, the Department of State expressed concern at “recent adverse developments in US-Iranian relations” and suggested frank discussions among Chapin, the Shah, Ala, and Ardalan to counter this deterioration. The Department was particularly concerned with rumors in Tehran that the United States was “playing with” Iranian opposition leaders and with signs that the Iranian Government was adopting a more friendly attitude toward the Soviet Union. (*Ibid.*, 611.88/11-457) ³ At this point the word “dangerous” is written in the margin of the source text in an unidentified hand.

411. Memorandum From the Director of the International Cooperation Administration (Smith) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Dillon)¹

Washington, November 26, 1957.

SUBJECT

United States Aid for Iran: Qom Airfield

Reference is made to your memorandum of November 15, 1957,² requesting ICA to undertake the financing of Qom Airfield [with] up to \$6,500,000 from Special Assistance funds.

In view of the determination by the Secretary of State that the policy interests of the United States in Iran require support for the Qom Airfield, and in view of the decision of the Department of Defense not to include the field in the military construction program, the ICA will prepare a program approval document and take other necessary steps to implement the project. Discussions with the Department of Defense will be initiated on the following assumptions:

1. The airfield will be constructed by the U.S. Corps of Engineers according to the same general arrangements currently prevailing with respect to the military construction program in Iran. Funds to cover the dollar costs of the project will therefore be transferred to the Department of Defense from the Special Assistance Fund. The local currency component of the project will be generated by allocating Special Assistance funds for the importation into Iran of saleable commodities, the counterpart of which will be made available to the Gulf District Engineers. A special effort will be made to utilize Section 402 Commodities for the purpose of generating this counterpart.
2. The commitment of the U.S. is limited to \$6.5 million, which your memorandum indicates to be the estimated cost of minimum

facilities (a runway, a control tower and fuel storage facilities). It is hoped that this limitation on the United States commitment will be made clear to the Government of Iran. No provision for the contingency of additional financing is being made in the FY 1959 Congressional presentation.

I am particularly concerned that the nature of the U.S. commitment is made definite, in view of the fact that initial review of this project in ICA indicates that its cost will probably be in excess of \$6.5 million and that it may prove difficult to adhere to the minimum standards contemplated. General Seitz, the MAAG Chief in Tehran, in reporting a conversation with the Shah on the subject of Qom Airfield, noted that “when he speaks of an airfield he means complete to the last detail.”

J. H. Smith, Jr.³

¹ Source: Department of State, GTI Files: Lot 60 D 533, Iran, Qom Airfield, 1957. Secret.

² Not printed. (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 788.5–MSP/1 1–1557) The arguments used in this memorandum were similar to those in [Document 409](#).

³ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

412. Letter From the Counselor for Political Affairs of the Embassy in Iran (Stelle) to the Officer in Charge of Iranian Affairs (Mouser)¹

Tehran, November 18, 1957.

Dear Grant: I think the Embassy's telegram 984 of November 17,² which gave our initial comments on the Shah's loan request,³ could usefully stand some informal amplification. The telegram refers to the possibility that U.S. aid may be necessary in getting the Iranians to use their own resources to meet their budget problem and the desirability that such U.S. aid should to the greatest degree possible come from readjustment of the present U.S. programs. As you are well aware, the military construction program is in dollar terms the largest and most important.

There is ground for difference of opinion, and there is difference of opinion, as to whether the military construction program brings us the political returns here which its expense should warrant. To the degree that it reinforces the idea that the U.S. has a permanent interest in Iran it is of obvious political importance, and a move on U.S. initiative to cut it down or to stretch it out drastically would have immediate political repercussions. The program is also useful in providing housing for military personnel and thus contributing to morale of the Army and its political dependability. The fact that much of the construction is outside of Tehran is also of political value since it helps to counter the widespread feeling that the regime only does things in Tehran and for Tehran.

On the other hand the program, considering its expense, has political shortcomings. The nature of the program is such that it will call for continuing U.S. contributions over a period of years. The resources we put into it are bound to have less political impact than the same amount of resources applied flexibly as occasion might warrant. Important elements of the population here ascribe little value to what we do for the Army and will judge the progress of the regime primarily in terms of political and

economic developments. Even those people who are deeply concerned with the role of the Army, including the Shah, tend to think of the construction program as being directed primarily toward facilitating a redeployment of the Iranian Armed Forces which is being made in response to U.S. rather than Iranian wishes.

Those of us here who are primarily interested in the political returns from the construction program are not competent to judge its military and strategic value, but we do from time to time run into people who should be competent in this field who have questions even on this score.

The questions that can be raised about devoting so much of U.S. resources to the Military Construction Program naturally lead to the further question of whether or not this program might not be further stretched out and the resultant savings used as part of the leverage to get the Iranians to put their house in order. In the course of drafting the telegram referred to above there was discussion of the possibility of referring specifically to a stretch-out of the construction program as one of the readjustments we might undertake in meeting the Shah's request. There was some feeling, however, even on the part of those who thought that it might be useful at this time to divert resources from the construction program, that suggestion of the possibility of a stretch-out might lead merely to a cut in funds for construction without compensatory addition of funds for other purposes. And of course there are some who feel that any diversion of money from the construction program would be unwise even if this money could be used for other assistance purposes. Accordingly the telegram contained no specific reference to the possibility of a stretch-out of the Military Construction Program.

Although it is not by any means an agreed Embassy view, I think it may be useful to you to know that some of us here have the feeling that if we could use some of the dollars that are now going to military construction for other purposes, and if the suggestion of such diversion did not just lead to loss of money for any kind of assistance, it would be a good idea.

Tehran is a fascinating place. I have been here long enough now to have some grasp of the fact that there are wheels within wheels on almost everything that happens, but I must confess that I am very far from knowing just what the wheels are.

Yours sincerely,

Charles C. Stelle⁴

¹ Source: Department of State, GTI Files: Lot 60 D 533, Iran, Official and Informal Letters from Tehran, 1957. Confidential; Official–Informal.

² Not printed. (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 888.10/11–1757) ³ On November 9, the Shah requested from the United States through Ambassador Chapin a \$50 million loan. [*11/2 lines of text not declassified*] The Shah stated that unless the loan could be secured for budgetary support, it might be impossible to justify to the Iranian people failure to accept Soviet assistance. (Telegrams 929 and 937 from Tehran, November 9 and 12; *ibid.*, 988.724/11–957 and 788.5–MSP/11–1257, respectively) ⁴ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

413. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iran¹

Washington, December 10, 1957—5:47 p.m.

1160. Deptel 1492, February 9;² Embtels 1066, 984, 964, 951, 937 and 939;³ Embdes 440.⁴ Appreciate excellent analysis and comment Embtel 984 and line taken as reported despatch 440. Suggest you reply to Shah as outlined below: Request for budgetary assistance made in spirit great frankness which appreciated. Our comment likewise in spirit frankness and sincere friendship.

Sure you understand USG most sympathetic problems of Iran and will do what it can to assist. Not necessary to list evidence past cooperation but most recent illustration is that of construction Qom airfield. Our hope and anticipation is to continue friendly help in coming years in variety of ways.

Believe you will permit me make certain comments as to underlying causes your budgetary situation and certain suggestions as to meeting problem in accordance spirit friendly cooperation which prevails between us. Experts indicate that Iran's deficits are not likely to be of one or two year character but rather reflect longer range social and economic problems. This seems to mean further expansion of Iran's national budget. Would hope that Iran would grapple with this expansion through resources available to it and by measures that will not result inflation. Seems clear that Iran itself has internal resources which can be used and capacity to borrow abroad from existing institutions such as World Bank.

Hope and believe you will understand following suggestions related to raising funds internally made in most friendly way.

1. Diversion of more oil revenues to general budget.
2. Acceleration of measures for reform tax collections.

3. Limited borrowing from Treasury with due regard for need to avoid inflation. It recognized this last step might make necessary some increase in permitted borrowing from Bank Melli. Officers in Embassy, USOM and international institutions have frequently discussed with Iranian officials means to avert inflationary effect of this procedure. In this connection it might be relevant to mention likely necessity for USG to raise its present debt ceiling of 275 billion dollars. You will see difficult position it puts Executive Branch USG in if point can be made that some of our debt increase is necessary because other countries are not taking similar action to extent their ability.

Another possibility might be found in measures to reduce budget requirements. Perhaps best of such measures would be transfer of certain projects for capital investment from general budget to Plan Organization. It recognized this might mean some relatively minor reshaping of program of Plan Organization itself. Your officials also no doubt continuously searching for ways to reduce existing expenditures under what might be called conditions of stringent need.

Possible U.S. may be able participate in financing some development projects and you should make maximum use IBRD, Eximbank or other foreign credits. DLF financing may also be possible for projects which do not meet criteria of other institutions.

In all honesty should tell you that there are prospects of smaller amount of dollars for assistance next fiscal year than was case this year. You are aware I am sure that Executive Branch USG can only determine use of funds after Congress makes appropriations so that amount available is firm. Such determination will be made after most careful study. In light present understanding it only fair and right that you know it likely be most difficult or even impossible find funds for straight budget support for next fiscal years. Regret not in position make any promise but confident that continuing cooperation will be fruitful. You may be assured our deep interest and continuing help in ways open to us and within our means. This

continuing help will include military end item deliveries, military construction, technical assistance and regional BP economic projects.

FYI. 1. Suggest you put above in proper form as talking piece and if you believe it useful leave copy with Shah.⁵

2. Question FY 1959 programs under study here. Possibility additional military soft goods being examined. We would like your further thoughts on this, on use PL 480 and on possible “readjustment” in defense support mentioned Embtel 984. DLF credits for specific projects might be available after Iran has exhausted possibility further credit facilities with IBRD and Eximbank for each project. Iranians should sound out Eximbank.

3. IBRD’s concern over inflationary aspect Treasury financing was clearly set forth in Knapp’s letter to Nasser June 6.⁶ You may wish consider this in further discussions.

4. We believe US Executive Branch would be endangering its foreign aid programs generally if it did not take account of strong private sentiment and legislative history here unfavorable to US providing further budgetary support to Iran.

5. We are deeply concerned over possible impetuous reaction from Shah to contents this cable. While there may be element of bluffing in Shah’s present attitudes, we do not want to appear to be calling his hand. We would deplore his taking action that he would later regret and consequently urge you to give most careful consideration to timing of this presentation. End FYI.

Dulles

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 888.10/11–1357. Confidential. Drafted by Mouser, Jones, Williams, and Kennedy; cleared with ICA, U/MSA, Defense, and Dillon; and approved by Rountree.

² In telegram 1492, February 9, the Department of State instructed the Embassy to impress upon the Shah that the U.S. Government believed that further budgetary aid for Iran could be avoided and that it was doubtful that

such aid would be available from the United States. (*Ibid.*, 888.10/1–3157)

³ In telegram 1066, November 30, Chapin reported an audience with the Shah on November 30 in which the Shah immediately inquired of the status of his request for a loan to cover the projected budgetary deficit. (*Ibid.*, 788.5–MSP/11–3057) Regarding telegram 984, see [footnote 2, supra](#). Telegram 964, November 14, reported Minister Without Portfolio Taleghani's call on Chapin to reiterate the Iranian request for a loan. (*Ibid.*, 888.10/11–1457) Telegram 951, November 13, reported an informal conversation with Ebtehaj about budgetary support and the Plan Organization's share of oil revenues. (*Ibid.*, 888.10/11–1357) Regarding telegrams 937 and 929, see [footnote 3, supra](#).

⁴ Despatch 440, November 13, contained memoranda of discussion between Ebtehaj and Embassy officials concerning budgetary problems and a memorandum sent to Ebtehaj suggesting Iran raise the Iranian Treasury borrowing limit at the Bank Melli to alleviate the projected budgetary deficit. (Department of State, Central Files, 888.10/ 11–1357) ⁵ See [infra](#).

⁶ Not found in Department of State files.

414. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State¹

Tehran, December 15, 1957—2 p.m.

1164. Paris for Secretary.² Shah received me this morning and seemed in cordial mood. After presenting message of sympathy from President on earthquake disaster³ I then read to him, leaving copies, a memorandum based upon Department's 1160, December 10.⁴ Shah listened attentively but made no particular comment. It was evident to me that he either did not understand full import of my statements or that he had discounted in advance possibility of budgetary aid as such. He did however state that he hoped we would examine all avenues with respect to supplying military soft goods. This question he touched on at several later points in our audience. When I told him that his own procurement system was such as to render it difficult for us to supply under PL 480 anything other than wheat and barley he replied that if that were the case his procurement system could easily be changed. He thanked me for the memorandum and said that of course it would have to be closely studied by the competent authorities of his government. I told him that during his absence the Embassy would discuss the problem with the Prime Minister and the Finance Minister and anybody else the Prime Minister should designate.

It was clear to me that as I have reported several times before the Shah's primary interest is in increased military aid. He referred to previous conversations with me and General Seitz and to his message conveyed by Ardalan to Prime Minister Menderes of Turkey.⁵ He reiterated in strongest terms that he felt that he must have sufficient increased military aid in the form of military hardware and training to equip additional divisions so that Iran could take its place in the line with its neighbors. He noted that at Yugoslav request US military aid to that country had been suspended and inquired whether the savings from such action could not be re-directed towards Iran. In particular he felt that he should be supplied with Nikes and Honest Johns. He did not accept my explanation that the missiles supplied to Turkey were part of an over-all NATO plan but said he needed missiles for defense of the right flank of NATO and of Iran itself. He was perfectly

prepared to send Iranians to US schools to learn their use and maintenance. He also complained that the US was not giving sufficient attention to his fleet and said that he had been deeply disappointed with the British who last summer first indicated they would sell him cheaply two destroyers and then reneged. He left implication that he felt that British reneging may have been US inspired. (See in this connection Embtel 1166)⁶

Shah said that he was prepared to accept Baghdad Pact military recommendations with respect to the size of his forces. (See Embtel 1165)⁷ He emphasized however that he must have satisfaction in the buildup of his forces because of his particularly exposed position with respect to the Soviet Union. Otherwise he had no choice but to reevaluate his position with respect to the Baghdad Pact.

Shah said he delighted General Taylor would visit Iran prior to rather than after BP Council meeting.

Shah concluded substance of interview with a statement that he would be grateful for an indication at the earliest possible moment of the extent to which we could help him in his prospective budget deficit by the supply of military soft goods including not only food but particularly boots and surplus uniforms or cloth.

Meeting ended in pleasant atmosphere with Shah joking about poor performance of Soviet dancers at command performance last night.

Chapin

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 888.10/12–1557. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Baghdad, London, Ankara, Karachi, and Paris.

² Dulles was in Paris for the North Atlantic Council Ministerial meetings, December 16–19.

³ In the Hamedan-Kermanshah area, December 13–15.

⁴ *Supra*.

⁵ The Embassy in Tehran described this message in telegram 1156 from Tehran, December 13, as follows: “Menderes will undoubtedly take up with

Secretary Shah's oral message to him delivered by Foreign Minister Ardalan at recent Ankara meeting to effect that US does not pay due attention to Iranian views that military aid to Iran has been neglected and that Iranian situation is becoming precarious both from point of view military preparedness and domestic politics. Ardalan further quoted Shah as stating that in event continued failure US supply military assistance 'we will be compelled to effect a phased-appraisal of our policy'." (Department of State, Central Files, 888,10/12-1357) ⁶ Dated December 15; see [footnote 2](#), infra. (Department of State, Central Files, 746D.022/12-1557) ⁷ In telegram 1165, December 15, the Embassy reported the Shah had stated that a Baghdad Pact working paper that envisioned Iran's land forces at 16 full-strength divisions, 5 skeleton divisions, and a palace guard brigade, was a realistic estimate of the forces needed by Iran to carry out its commitments to the Baghdad Pact. (*Ibid.*, 780.5/ 12-1357)

415. Staff Summary Supplement Prepared in the Department of State¹

Washington, December 17, 1957.

693. *Iranian Desire for Bahrein*—The Shah of Iran has expressed to our Ambassador in Tehran his belief that the US does not fully appreciate the importance which Iran attaches to the "recovery of its rightful sovereignty over Bahrein."² The Shah said that he would be glad to let Britain (as a friendly power in the Baghdad Pact) continue its base there and would guarantee full freedom of operation for the Canadian-registered oil company, even though everyone knew the reserves at Bahrein would be exhausted in ten years. He indicated that he could not understand why Britain insists upon keeping this piece of land which to them is worthless but whose recovery lay in the very heart of Persian national aspirations. He said the return of Bahrein would go far to promote in Iran the popularity of the UK and other Western countries since it would be a rectification of a wrong done to Iran.

The Shah brushed aside our Ambassador's suggestion that perhaps the Iranian legal claim was not as sound as he thought it was. He also dismissed Arab protests as inconsequential and unfounded and wondered if the Iraqi

protests had not been British-inspired. He concluded by expressing the hope that the US would understand his position although he accepted the statement by our Ambassador that the matter was not one of direct concern to the US.³

¹ Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles–Herter Series. Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text. Initialed by Eisenhower.

² As reported in telegram 1166; see [footnote 6](#), *supra*.

³ On December 19, the Counselor of the Iranian Embassy in Washington pressed the Iranian claim to Bahrein with Jones in the course of a meeting on another subject. Jones advised the Iranian Counselor that “Iran would do well to consider its legal case before pressing it before any international body or tribunal.” (Memorandum of conversation by Ashford, December 19; Department of State, Central Files, 788.022/12–1957)

416. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State¹

Tehran, December 18, 1957—3 p.m.

1195. Initial relatively mild reaction Shah to US position on budgetary assistance (Embtel 1164)² may have stemmed in part from fact Shah’s personal interest primarily in field military rather than economic assistance. With BP Council meeting upcoming we can expect repeated requests from Shah for greater military assistance.

Important factor is Shah’s strong feeling he has not received degree military assistance which he believed he was assured he would receive by reason his entry BP. Conversations between Yazdanpenah and Byroade,³ Shah and Allen,⁴ and my remarks under instruction when presenting credentials 1955,⁵ were susceptible interpretation by Shah as assurance his military forces would be built up by US. Whether or not these statements actually constitute “clear assurance”, they have from outset been taken by Shah as promises of major buildup for his forces.

The British have not been completely helpful on this score. UK representatives Iran cannot help regret to some degree their past power and prestige in this country. This leads them sometimes to statements which are not malicious but are irresponsible. I have reason to believe that from time to time certain British have given Iranians idea that UK felt Iran was not getting from US the degree of military assistance it deserved.

Iranian military forces are of course necessary for internal control but Shah admits present level of forces more than adequate this purpose. There is also legitimate basis for Shah's desire for modern equipment and aircraft to maintain his domestic and international prestige. There is some merit in position that Iran should not be too clearly differentiated against in comparison with Turkish and Pakistan neighbors, although Shah's frequently reiterated conviction that his forces should be as strong as Turks clearly unwarranted.

Situation complicated by fact that Shah's interest in military forces is in part emotional rather than logical. We can never really hope to convince Shah that any given level military forces will be adequate to what he imagines are his requirements. His personal psychological bias renders him immune to logical persuasion in this field.

Since it is probable US will not be able increase military assistance Iran and since any level of increase military assistance would not completely satisfy Shah's appetite, we must look for other ways persuade Shah of constancy of US support, while at same time attempting disabuse him of notion that US has not lived up to its promises. Shah's present attitude might, therefore, providing other factors were propitious, suggest that time is opportune for US adherence BP. I repeat therefore the recommendations made in Embtel 922.⁶

Chapin

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 888.10/12-1857. Secret.

² [Document 414](#).

³ No record of the conversation between Lieutenant General Morteza Yazdanpenah and Henry A. Byroade, former Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, has been found.

⁴ Apparent reference to a discussion between the Shah and Assistant Secretary Allen in New York, February 7, 1955. No memorandum of conversation has been found, but see [Document 296](#).

⁵ See [Documents 320](#) and [321](#).

⁶ In telegram 922, November 9, the Embassy recommended that the United States adhere to the Baghdad Pact as the only way to correct the current unfavorable trend in U.S.-Iranian relations. (Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/11-957)

Iraq

Contents

[The Question of U.S. Military Assistance to Iraq, U.S. Interest in the Political Stability of Iraq, and the Visit to the United States of Crown Prince Abdul Il Ah](#) (Documents 417-464)

The Question of U.S. Military Assistance to Iraq, U.S. Interest in the Political Stability of Iraq, and the Visit to the United States of Crown Prince Abdul Il Ah¹

¹ For previous documentation on U.S. relations with Iraq, see [Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. IX, Part 2, pp. 2325 ff.](#)

[417. Telegram From the Embassy in Iraq to the Department of State](#)

Baghdad, January 5, 1955—5 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 787.5–MSP/1–555. Confidential. Repeated to London.

[418. Telegram From the Embassy in Iraq to the Department of State](#)

Baghdad, January 5, 1955—7 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 787.5–MSP/1–655. Secret. Also sent to Ankara and Cairo and repeated to London, Karachi, Tehran, Amman, Beirut, Damascus, Tel Aviv, and Jidda.

[419. Telegram From the Embassy in Iraq to the Department of State](#)

Baghdad, February 18, 1955—1 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 787.5/2–1855. Confidential. Repeated to London.

[420. Telegram From the Embassy in Iraq to the Department of State](#)

Baghdad, March 22, 1955—noon.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 787.5/3–2255. Secret. Repeated to London.

[421. Editorial Note](#)

[422. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iraq](#)

Washington, August 21, 1955—6:07 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 787.5–MSP/8–2155. Secret. Repeated to London. Drafted by William C. Burdett, Jr., cleared by Secretary Dulles, and approved by Francis H. Russell.

[423. Report by the Joint Strategic Plans Committee](#)

Washington, September 9, 1955.

Source: National Archives and Records Administration, JCS Records, CCS 092 (8–22–46) (2) Sec 15. Top Secret. This report was transmitted by the Joint Strategic Plans Committee to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on August 23. Colonel E.W. Williamson, USA, and Colonel F.B. Elliott, USAF, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), were consulted informally in the preparation of this report. After making amendments, the Joint Chiefs approved the recommendations in paragraph 7 at their September 9 meeting.

[424. Telegram From the Embassy in Iraq to the Department of State](#)

Baghdad, November 12, 1955—1 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 787.5–MSP/11–1255. Confidential.

425. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iraq

Washington, November 19, 1955—4:09 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 787.5–MSP/11–1755. Confidential. Repeated to London. Drafted by Newsom and approved by Rountree.

426. Telegram From the Embassy in Iraq to the Department of State

Baghdad, November 29, 1955—4 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 787.5411/11–2955. Secret.

427. Operations Coordinating Board Report

Washington, December 14, 1955.

Source: Department of State, OCB Files: Lot 62 D 430, Iraq. Top Secret. A covering note of December 20 by the OCB Secretariat Staff indicates that the analysis and recommendations contained in this report were concurred in by the OCB at its December 14 meeting, and that the Department of State was “negotiating with the British in London in an effort to improve the internal security situation in Iraq by working through and supporting the British effort in that country.”

428. Editorial Note

429. Telegram From the Embassy in Iraq to the Department of State

Baghdad, January 15, 1956—2 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 787.00/1-1556. Secret. Repeated to London.

430. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

Washington, March 6, 1956—2:52 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 787.5-MSP/-656. Secret. Drafted by Hoover, cleared by Goodpaster, and approved by Robert G. Barnes.

431. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iraq

Washington, March 15, 1956—10:19 a.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 787.5-MSP/3-356. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Hallett and approved by Rountree.

432. Telegram From the Chief of the Military Assistance Advisory Group in Iraq (Hannah) to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

Baghdad, March 24, 1956—11:30 a.m.

Source: National Archives and Records Administration, JCS Records, CCS 092(8-22-46)(2) Sec. 26. Secret. Repeated to Paris for CINCEUR.

433. Telegram From the Embassy in Iraq to the Department of State

Baghdad, March 28, 1956—2 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 787.11/3-2856. Top Secret; Niact.

434. Editorial Note

435. National Intelligence Estimate

Washington, July 17, 1956.

Source: Department of State, INR–NIE Files. Secret. According to a note on the cover sheet, “The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff.” This estimate was concurred in by the Intelligence Advisory Committee on July 17, 1956. “Concurring were the Special Assistant, Intelligence, Department of State; the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Director of Naval Intelligence; the Director of Intelligence, USAF; and the Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff. The Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the IAC and the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the subject being outside of their jurisdiction.”

436. Editorial Note

437. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iraq

Washington, August 8, 1956—7:28 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 787.5–MSP/8–856. Secret. Drafted by Hallett and Eli Stevens and approved by Allen. Repeated to London.

438. Memorandum From the Director of Central Intelligence (Dulles) to the Acting Secretary of State

Washington, November 22, 1956.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 787.00/11–2256. Secret; Noforn.

439. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iraq

Washington, November 24, 1956—5:43 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/11–2456. Secret; Noform. Drafted by Newsom and approved by Murphy. Also sent to Ankara, Moscow, and Paris; repeated to Tehran, Karachi, London, and Paris (to be passed to Ridgway Knight for General Lauris Norstad).

440. Telegram From the Embassy in Iraq to the Department of State

Baghdad, November 26, 1956—5 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 787.5/11–2656. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Ankara, Moscow, Tehran, Karachi, London, and Paris.

441. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, November 26, 1956

Washington, November 26, 1956

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.87/11–2656. Secret. Drafted by Newsom.

442. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, December 21, 1956

Washington, December 21, 1956

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 787.5–MSP/12–2156. Confidential. Drafted by Newsom.

443. Editorial Note

444. Memorandum of a Conversation, White House, Washington, February 5, 1957

Washington, February 5, 1957

Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles–Herter Series. Secret. Drafted by Rountree.

[445. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, February 5, 1957](#)

Washington, February 5, 1957

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 787.11/2–557. Secret. Drafted by Eilts.

[446. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, February 5, 1957](#)

Washington, February 5, 1957

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 787.11/2–557. Secret. Drafted by Eilts.

[447. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, February 5, 1957](#)

Washington, February 5, 1957

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 787.11/2–557. Secret. Drafted by Eilts.

[448. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, February 5, 1957](#)

Washington, February 5, 1957

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 787.11/2–557. Secret. Drafted by Eilts.

449. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, February 5, 1957

Washington, February 5, 1957

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 787.11/2–557. Secret. Drafted by Eilts.

450. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, February 5, 1957

Washington, February 5, 1957

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 787.11/2–557. Secret. Drafted by Eilts.

451. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, February 5, 1957

Washington, February 5, 1957

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 787.11/2–557. Secret. Drafted by Eilts.

452. Memorandum of a Conversation, Mayflower Hotel, Washington, February 6, 1957

Washington, February 6, 1957

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 787.5–MSP/2–657. Confidential. Drafted by Berry.

453. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iraq

Washington, February 20, 1957—1:44 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 787.5–MSP/2–2057. Secret. Drafted by Newsom and approved by Rountree. Repeated to London and Paris for the Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council.

[454. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iraq](#)

Washington, March 14, 1957—8:31 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 787.5–MSP/3–457. Secret. Drafted by Newsom and approved by Rountree. Repeated to London, Beirut, and Tripoli.

[455. Telegram From the President's Special Assistant \(Richards\) to the Department of State](#)

Baghdad, April 8, 1957—1 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 120.1580/4–857. Secret. Repeated to Jidda, Cairo, Dhahran, Tehran, London, Damascus, Amman, Beirut, Tripoli, Ankara, Athens, Rabat, Karachi, and Paris.

[456. Telegram From the President's Special Assistant \(Richards\) to the Department of State](#)

Baghdad, April 9, 1957—10 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 120.1580/4–957. Secret. Repeated to Addis Ababa, London, Paris, New Delhi, Rome, Beirut, Cairo, Tripoli, Tel Aviv, Karachi, Kabul, Ankara, Tehran, Khartoum, Rabat, Tunis, Jidda, Athens, Damascus, and Amman.

[457. Editorial Note](#)

[458. National Intelligence Estimate](#)

Washington, June 4, 1957.

Source: Department of State, INR–NIE Files. Secret. According to a note on the cover sheet, “The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff.” This estimate was concurred in by the Intelligence Advisory Committee on June 4. “Concurring were the Special Assistant, Intelligence, Department of State; the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Director of Naval Intelligence; the Director of Intelligence, USAF; and the Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff. The Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the IAC and the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the subject being outside their jurisdiction.”

459. Editorial Note

460. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iraq

Washington, July 31, 1957—7:23 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 887.00–TA/7–3157. Secret. Drafted by Newsom and approved by Berry. Also sent to London.

461. Telegram From the Embassy in Iraq to the Department of State

Baghdad, August 3, 1957—noon.

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 887.00–TA/8–357. Secret. Repeated to London.

462. Operations Coordinating Board Report

Washington, August 7, 1957.

Source: Department of State, OCB Files: Lot 62 D 430, Near East: January–July, 1957. Secret. A covering note by Charles E. Johnson, Executive Assistant to the OCB, indicates that the Board concurred in this Plan for

implementation by the responsible agencies of the actions and programs contained therein at its meeting of August 7. According to minutes of the OCB meeting of July 31, the OCB discussed and revised a July 27 draft of the Operations Plan for Iraq, and deferred final action on the paper pending the preparation by the Working Group of an annex covering U.K. past and present programs and future plans for military aid to Iraq, and the resolving of any questions that might have remained with respect to paragraph 52 of the paper. The OCB noted a report by the Department of Defense that the Military Committee of the Baghdad Pact was making a series of planning studies on the Pact countries, including one on air defense. Upon completion of these studies, the Department of Defense would be able to define more clearly Iraqi military needs within an overall Baghdad Pact context, and the relation of possible U.S. assistance thereto. The OCB noted that it was important that no impression be given the British or the Iraqis that the United States might assume any greater responsibility for the Iraqi military program. (Ibid.)

[463. Editorial Note](#)

[464. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, October 15, 1957](#)

Washington, October 15, 1957

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 787.5-MSP/10-1557. Confidential. Drafted by Rockwell.

417. Telegram From the Embassy in Iraq to the Department of State²

Baghdad, January 5, 1955—5 p.m.

411. Nuri received me this morning at his home (Embassy telegram 405 January 4).³ He looked ill and at first seemed quite listless but livened up considerably as our talk developed.

I reminded him of his earlier statements to me that if Iraq was to have an expanded arms program the money would have to come from the UK and the US. I had now, I said, received some observations from Washington on this subject which I wanted to pass on to him.

We felt, I said, that Iraq could not only maintain an armed force of the present size out of her own resources, but perhaps even somewhat expanded one. We were in agreement, though that any considerable expansion would no doubt have to be at the expense of the development program.

I told Nuri that we were now engaged with the British in working out an agreement covering direct aid and offshore procurement and that this was being done on the basis of Iraq's present requirements.

My final statement on the subject of arms aid was that any decisions on the amount of aid we were prepared to extend would in the last analysis be influenced by how much was being done locally toward building up regional defense and to what extent facilities for the common defense of the free world were made available.

Nuri without mentioning British Chargé's call on him yesterday said "the British want money from us. They have a lot of old equipment at Suez that they want to get rid of. I have told them that I could not divert money from the development program for any kind of arms. If I cannot get the money

from the UK or the US for more arms, then I will have to just go along as at present.

I reiterated my statement that the extent of aid that the US was prepared to supply was dependent on how quickly and extensively Iraq moved with her neighbors in the field of regional defense, and on just what facilities for common defense were made available.

We then passed on to other subjects that are being covered in separate messages.⁴

Gallman

² Source: Department of State, Central Files, 787.5–MSP/1–555. Confidential. Repeated to London.

³ Telegram 405 informed the Department of Ambassador Gallman's efforts to obtain an appointment with Nuri. (*Ibid.*) ⁴[*Infra*](#).

418. Telegram From the Embassy in Iraq to the Department of State¹

Baghdad, January 5, 1955—7 p.m.

412. When I called on Nuri at his home this morning and discussed the question of arms supplies (Embtel 411)² I also brought up the visit of Prime Minister Menderes who arrives in Baghdad tomorrow. I told Nuri that we were very happy about this further evidence of close neighborly relations. Nuri thanked me for bringing this message on the eve of the visit (Deptel 374, December 31).³

Having mentioned Menderes coming the conversation quite naturally turned to area defense. No reference of any kind was made by Nuri to the Turkish-Pakistan pact⁴ or even the eventual possibility of Iraq signing a bilateral pact with Turkey. Nuri talked at first in general terms and then asked what the US was prepared to do. I reminded him again of what I had said when we were on the subject of army aid. The extent of our aid depended on how much initiative Iraq and her neighbors showed in the interests of regional defense. He had, I recalled, on a previous occasion referred to US NATO commitments and had asked what commitments we were prepared to make in this area. On the same occasion he had also mentioned the desirability of having a regional pact based on Articles 51 and 52 of the UN Charter.⁵ In the matter of self-defense I commented Article 51 seemed appropriate but how did Article 52 fit into the picture. It was concerned primarily with the pacific settlement of disputes and just where would the US and the UK fit into the defense plan he envisaged.

Nuri replied that his present thinking was that the best plan for regional defense would be a pact made up of Iraq and neighboring countries along with the US and the UK based on Article 51 of the Charter and “in the spirit of Article 52”. In connection with Article 52, he continued, he had the Soviets in mind. As Western Germany rearms, it is conceivable that the Soviets would assume a less belligerent attitude. He was taking the long view that in the long run Article 52 might appeal to the Soviets. These, he

said, were his present general thoughts on regional defense. He needed more time, however, to work out a proper formula.

“Would it not be a good thing”, I interjected at this point, “if meanwhile staff talks could be initiated by Iraq with her neighbors. What about such talks with Iranians?” (Deptel 379, January 3)⁶

Nuri said such talks would be a good thing. He could not take the initiative, however. Iran’s frontier is contiguous to the Soviet Union. Iran was in a very delicate position. The initiative and timing of Iraq-Iran staff talks would have to come from Iran. He could not risk embarrassing Iran.

As I was about to leave, Nuri said with obvious relish, “did you see what I did to the Russians?” (Embtel 407, January 4)⁷ I said I had but I observed, running my hand under the surface of the coffee table at which we were seated, “What will be left under ground after the Soviets have pulled out?” Nuri promptly placed both his hands under the table, fingers tip to tip, and laughingly said, “We are in touch with developments”.

Gallman

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 787.5–MSP/1–655. Secret. Also sent to Ankara and Cairo and repeated to London, Karachi, Tehran, Amman, Beirut, Damascus, Tel Aviv, and Jidda.

² *Supra*.

³ In telegram 374, the Department of State informed Gallman that he could, at his discretion, tell Nuri that the United States welcomed the visit of Turkish Prime Minister Menderes as evidence of close friendly relations in the area. (Department of State, Central Files, 033.8287/12–3154) ⁴ On April 2, 1954, Turkey and Pakistan signed an “Agreement for Friendly Cooperation,” under which the two nations agreed, among other things, to exchange some types of military information, and study the possibility of joint action in the event of an unprovoked attack on them from the outside. (211 UNTS 263) ⁵ Article 51 of the U.N. Charter expressly reserved the right of individual and collective self-defense of member nations. Article 52 stated that the Charter did not preclude the existence of regional security arrangements or agencies if those arrangements or agencies and their

activities were consistent with the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

⁶ Telegram 379 dealt with several proposals by the Department on the subject of Middle East defense arrangements. One of these proposals was that the Embassy in Baghdad might wish to suggest that it would be appropriate for the Iraqi Government to indicate directly to the Iranians its willingness to engage in staff talks. (Department of State, Central Files, 033.8287/1–355) ⁷ In telegram 407, the Embassy informed the Department that Nuri had ordered the closure of the Soviet Legation at Baghdad. According to the Embassy, Nuri regarded the Soviet mission as a focal center of subversive activities. (*Ibid.*, 661.87/1–455)

419. Telegram From the Embassy in Iraq to the Department of State¹

Baghdad, February 18, 1955—1 p.m.

593. I question advisability communicating to Nuri substance of US–UK memorandum of understanding of February 26, 1954² (Deptel 508).³ Doing so at this late date is likely to be ill received and may give rise to charge that Iraqis have been misled with attendant suspicion there may be more as yet unrevealed commitments between US and UK to Iraq.

At same time I feel we should seek at every opportunity to eliminate suggestion that US–UK rivalry exists in supplying military equipment to Iraq. I have made it clear to Nuri and other responsible Iraqi officials, and will continue to do so on suitable occasions, that US and UK are engaged in continuing consultations re defense needs of free world, which includes Iraq and that our military aid program here is designed to complement rather than to replace that of the British with a view to furthering common interests.⁴

Gallman

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 787.5/2–1855. Confidential. Repeated to London.

² The text of this memorandum is printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1952–1954, vol. IX, Part 2, p. 2371. The memorandum dealt generally with the provision of military aid to Iraq by the United States and the United Kingdom. The United States pledged to coordinate its military aid to Iraq “as far as possible” with existing agreements between Iraq and the United Kingdom. The United States also agreed to impress upon the Iraqi Government that it should continue to look primarily to the United Kingdom for both arms and training.

³ Telegram 508, February 16, noted the recent Iraqi requests for U.S. Air Force assistance. The Department said that it was considering whether Gallman should clarify the U.S. position by giving Nuri the substance of the U.S.–U.K. Memorandum of Understanding of February 26, 1954, and requested Gallman’s comments. (Department of State, Central Files, 787.5/2–1655) ⁴ On March 11, the Department informed the Embassy in Baghdad that it was considering means of giving Nuri “tangible evidence” of its appreciation of “his forthright stand” on the Baghdad Pact which was signed on February 24. After discussions with the British, the Department had agreed to expedite delivery of guns for Iraq. (Telegram 587 to Baghdad, March 11; *ibid.*, 682.87/3–1155) Gallman informed Nuri of this decision on March 12, and Nuri “expressed warmest appreciation.” (Telegram 702 from Baghdad, March 12; *ibid.*, 787.5/3–1255)

420. Telegram From the Embassy in Iraq to the Department of State¹

Baghdad, March 22, 1955—noon.

739. Since sending Embtel 603 February 21² Embassy has given considerable thought to basic provisions possibly warranting inclusion in eventual new memorandum understanding to replace US–UK memorandum of February 26, 1954 as necessitated by anticipated early termination present Anglo-Iraqi treaty and substitution for it of new Anglo-Iraqi arrangements within context Turk-Iraqi Pact.³ After obtaining view Chief MAAG as well Army and Air Attachés following observations are submitted for Department’s consideration:

1. All indications to date point to likelihood that new Anglo-Iraqi arrangements now being negotiated will vary mainly in form rather than in substance from existing arrangements. Primary responsibility for equipping and training Iraqi armed forces will probably continue be vested in British. I see no reason believe that termination Anglo-Iraqi treaty of 1930 likely be accompanied by British withdrawal from Iraq as was case when British relinquished their military commitments in Greece and Turkey.

2. Moreover as far as I am aware there is no indication of any desire on our part substantially to increase our political or military commitments in Iraq as long as British continue be willing assume the larger share of responsibility. It follows that any new memorandum of understanding which may be evolved in light of new Anglo-Iraqi arrangements will still be postulated on assumption it remains in US interest support British position in Iraq and that US arms aid to Iraq continue be complementary to that currently supplied by British.

3. Any new memorandum understanding should be considered from both procedural and substantive view points. Procedurally I submit such memorandum might usefully be cast in terms of a tripartite memorandum including US, UK and Iraq, perhaps after initial informal agreement, recent terms thereof, has been arrived at between British and ourselves. This would have merit of making clear to all interested parties precise nature of commitment of each and may help resolve recurrent suspicions held by one or another.

4. Substantively it seems to me present memorandum understanding continues offer reasonable basis for any new agreement even though experience of past few months suggests desirability incorporating somewhat greater elasticity than is currently the case. Specifically following points may warrant inclusion:

(a) Appropriate language changes throughout memorandum necessitated by new Anglo-Iraqi

arrangements once these have been concluded and by tripartite procedure suggested above if accepted.

(b) While Chief MAAG and Army Attaché both suggest deletion offshore procurement provisions contained paragraph 3(B)⁴ I am inclined to favor its continuation in at least some form as best means avoiding dislocation existing equipment and expansion plans of Iraqi army. I would urge however inclusion of [garble—time-clause?] which would make offshore procurement obligation dependent upon British ability deliver expeditiously. If for example British deliver or at least supply required equipment within reasonable period of time say three to six months (although exact time could be determined by the experts) Iraqis should seek other sources of supply including US. In anticipation such contingency it may be well stress possibility utilizing reimbursable aid as quick means obtain desired equipment.

(c) Re appended minute to paragraph 4 [5] of existing memorandum⁵ I recommend it not be renewed. Instead I believe it desirable include provision proposed by Army Attaché that where appropriate and not in conflict with existing training procedures training in US military institutions be sanctioned. Apart from this I consider it important too to incorporate a provision that British vested as they are with prime responsibility of training of Iraqi armed forces undertake do so along lines of evolving NATO tactical and staff techniques in order insure possible further association of Iraqi armed forces with those of NATO with minimum of difficulty.

(d) Appended minute on US intentions re air force program⁶ should in my view be allowed lapse at end present FY and not be renewed. While I hold that there probably little advantage to be gained by US

participation in training of modest RIAF which may better remain a function of the British I nevertheless question necessity formally incorporating any such self restraining provision in new memorandum and would prefer that Iraqi requests for any US air equipment or air training be parried locally on informal basis.

(e) In order insure continuing elasticity in light changing circumstances including possibility JCS may at some future time wish increase US military commitment here, provisions should be incorporated calling for periodical review of memorandum by participating parties to determine progress of Iraqi military buildup program to date and allow deficiencies and shortcomings be corrected.

5. As of possible help to Department and Defense in formulating their views on any new memorandum understanding copies of Chief MAAG, Army and Air Attachés' observations on subject being pouched.⁷

Gallman

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 787.5/3–2255. Secret. Repeated to London.

² In telegram 603, Gallman noted that he felt it might be well to consider the nature of any new understanding with the United Kingdom on supplying arms to Iraq. (*Ibid.*, 787.5/2–2155) ³ A Pact of Mutual Cooperation between Turkey and Iraq, generally referred to as the Baghdad Pact, was signed at Baghdad on February 24, 1955. For text, see 233 UNTS 199. Regarding U.S. policy with respect to the Baghdad Pact, see [Documents 1](#) ff. The Pact was adhered to by the United Kingdom on April 5, by Pakistan on September 23, and by Iran on November 3.

⁴ Paragraph 3(B) of the Memorandum of Understanding stated that the United States, in formulating any program of arms aid to Iraq, would give due weight to the possibility of avoiding dislocations in the existing re-

equipment and expansion plans of the Iraqi forces and minimizing logistic difficulties, by means of offshore purchases in the United Kingdom.

⁵ Reference is clearly to the minute in paragraph 5, dealing with the training of Iraqi forces.

⁶ This minute noted that no U.S. program for the Iraqi Air Force was contemplated for fiscal years 1954 and 1955. It also stated that if the United Kingdom could not meet certain equipment or training requirements of the Iraqi Air Force, the United States would consider providing such equipment and training after conferring with the United Kingdom.

⁷ These observations are included in despatch 456 from Baghdad, March 29. (Department of State, Central Files, 787.5–MSP/3–2955)

421. Editorial Note

On August 5, President Eisenhower, in response to a British proposal, agreed that the United States would fund the offshore procurement for Iraq of 10 Centurion tanks on the assumption that the British would contribute 2 tanks. Eisenhower also agreed to indicate an intention to seek funds for the offshore procurement of approximately 40 more Centurion tanks for Iraq during the next fiscal year, to be matched by the United Kingdom, and to accelerate deliveries under the current Iraqi aid program, increasing the number of scout cars and similar articles. (Memorandum of conversation by Dulles, August 8; Department of State, S/S–NEA Files: Lot 61 D 417) During a conversation on August 11, President Eisenhower informed Secretary Dulles that it was preferable that the United Kingdom deal directly with Iraq concerning the Centurion tanks. (Memorandum of conversation by Dulles, August 11; Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Meetings with the President) This decision was made in conjunction with planning for project “Alpha,” a joint U.S.–U.K. effort to encourage an Arab-Israeli peace settlement, which had begun in December 1954. For documentation on “Alpha,” including information concerning Iraq, see [volume XIV](#).

422. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iraq¹

Washington, August 21, 1955—6:07 p.m.

123. We have agreed with UK that British Ambassador Baghdad should inform Nuri in confidence that US and UK have agreed that Iraq forces should be equipped with British tanks and that Iraq will receive twelve Centurion tanks to begin with.

As you know ten of these will be provided under our current grant military aid program by OSP in UK.

We believe Nuri should be informed by British and that use of US funds should be downplayed at present. Accordingly you should not take initiative in discussing matter with IG but if asked may confirm British Ambassador's statement.²

Dulles

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 787.5–MSP/8–2155. Secret. Repeated to London. Drafted by William C. Burdett, Jr., cleared by Secretary Dulles, and approved by Francis H. Russell.

² On August 25, Gallman reported a conversation with Nuri during which the Prime Minister told Gallman that the British Ambassador had informed him of the decision to supply Iraq with 12 Centurion tanks. According to Gallman, Nuri asked, "When are you going to tell us about them?" Gallman replied that there was no need to do that since the British Ambassador already had. (Telegram 163 from Baghdad, August 25; *ibid.*, 787.5–MSP/8–2555)

423. Report by the Joint Strategic Plans Committee¹

Washington, September 9, 1955.

SCOPE OF MUTUAL DEFENSE ASSISTANCE PROGRAM FOR IRAQ

The Problem

1. To provide guidance to Chief, MAAG, Iraq, as to the course of action to be taken with respect to:
 - a. A request² from the Iraqi General Staff for the inclusion of the Royal Iraqi Air Force (RIAF) in the MDA Program for Iraq, and
 - b. An anticipated request³ for certain naval assistance.

Facts Bearing on the Problem

2. On 28 April 1955 the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, forwarded⁴ two memorandums⁵ received from the Chief, MAAG, Iraq, which outlined the following problems:
 - a. The memorandum dated 21 March 1955³ anticipated a request from Iraq to include certain naval assistance in the MDA Program for Iraq and requested guidance as to whether an attempt should be made to encourage or discourage actions which are designed to secure naval assistance, and the desirability of indicating that part of the assistance could be secured through reimbursable aid.
 - b. The memorandum dated 25 March 1955⁶ states that a request² has been received from the Office of the Chief of the General Staff of Iraq for inclusion of the RIAF in the scope of MDAP Grant Aid for Iraq and requests information be furnished upon which to base an interim reply to Iraq with respect to this matter.
3. On 14 July 1955, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) forwarded⁷ to the Joint Chiefs of Staff a copy of a memorandum⁸ approved by the President, subject: "Defense of the Middle East," which stated in part:

“... prospective military aid available will not permit the United States to increase its total level of effort for the Middle East, except in the case of Iran where it is hoped that a moderate increase will encourage its adherence to the Baghdad Pact ... ”⁹

Discussion

4. No funds in the FY 1956 MDA Program or any past MDA Programs have been earmarked for the RIAF or for Iraqi naval assistance. Therefore, any requests by the Iraqi Government for inclusion of these in the present MDA Program for Iraq, could be met only by eliminating or reducing other MDA Programs which are considered to be essential to the accomplishment of U.S. objectives on a world-wide basis.
5. For additional discussion, see Enclosure “B”.

Conclusions

6. Chief, MAAG, Iraq, should be informed that:
 - a. Present and prospective military aid funds available will not permit the United States to expand its Grant Aid MDA Program for Iraq.
 - b. Iraq should be encouraged to seek reimbursable aid under MDAP for the RIAF.
 - c. Any effort on the part of Iraq to secure naval assistance through MDAP reimbursable aid should be neither encouraged nor discouraged, but each specific request should be given detailed consideration.

Recommendations

7. It is recommended that the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

a. Forward the memorandum in Enclosure "A" and its Appendix,¹⁰ together with copies of Appendices "A" and "B" and Annex to Appendix "B" to J.C.S. 2099/481, which reflect the above conclusions, to the Secretary of Defense.

b. Upon receipt of approval by the Secretary of Defense, send the message in the Appendix hereto, to the Chief, MAAG, Iraq.

8. No recommendation is made as to the distribution of this paper to commanders of unified or specified commands.

[Here follow Enclosure "A" and its Appendix.]

Enclosure "B"

DISCUSSION

1. The U.S. presently has an interest in obtaining suitable base rights in Iraq. The special status of the U.K. in Iraq ended with the termination of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty in April 1955. The new U.K.-Iraq understanding of 4 April 1955 provides for British rights on Iraq bases, but the U.S. would not necessarily enjoy the same rights under any reciprocal arrangement with the British because the bases are now under Iraq sovereignty.

2. In light of the above and the factors set forth in the Appendix to Enclosure "A" hereto,¹¹ it would appear expedient that the RIAF be provided such token aid as is possible under the existing circumstances. Since the U.S. can not now, or in the foreseeable future, increase its total level of effort for the Middle East (except for Iran) there appear to be only three lines of approach open as to a solution for this matter; i.e.,

a. *Divert MDAP funds from other countries to Iraq.* This is considered impracticable in view of the relatively small amount of money available and the higher priorities of the other countries concerned.

b. *Divert sufficient MDAP funds from the present MDA Program supporting two divisions, to provide a token MDA Program for the RIAF.* Since present planning envisages only 15 million dollars at the most as being available for the Iraq FY 1956 MDA Program, it is considered that an attempt to stretch this amount to cover both an air and a ground program would result in a weak program for both. This is further magnified by the fact that the amount finally allocated to Iraq for FY 1956 could well be much less than the amount now planned for, i.e. 15 million dollars.

c. *Encourage Iraq to seek reimbursable aid under MDAP for the RIAF.* Since Iraq is eligible and can economically afford to pay for such a token program, it is considered much more desirable to adopt this course of action rather than attempt to provide both an air and ground program under MDAP Grant Aid.

3. By virtue of its geographical location and topography, Iraq includes the most practicable land routes from the USSR to the Mediterranean via Iran. It possesses an estimated seven per cent of the world's known petroleum reserves. Although Iraq might prefer to be free of foreign entanglements, its military and economic weaknesses and the potential threat of the USSR have caused it to retain its ties with the United Kingdom. Iraq, by accepting U.S. military aid and recently by entering into a defense arrangement with Turkey, has moved closer toward alignment with the West.

4. The Iraqi Army is currently capable of maintaining internal security and probably could resist invasion by any of its neighbors, excluding Turkey, but could offer no more than brief delaying action against attack by a major power. In this connection, it would be of particular value toward the achievement of U.S. military objectives in the Middle East if the existing Iraqi forces possessed a greater capability for inflicting delay on any

Soviet attack through the Zagros Mountain passes. The development of such a capability, however, would be difficult, time consuming and expensive.

5. From the foregoing, it is apparent that although Iraq is strategically located in the “backstop” area of the Zagros Mountain line and contains the most practicable land routes (via Iran), between not only the Zagros passes and the Mediterranean, but other important inland routes to both Turkey on the north and Kuwait on the south as well, the Iraqi armed forces by themselves could do little to contribute to the defense of the area—in fact could offer only brief delaying action at best—in the event of attack by a major power.

¹ Source: National Archives and Records Administration, JCS Records, CCS 092 (8–22–46) (2) Sec 15. Top Secret. This report was transmitted by the Joint Strategic Plans Committee to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on August 23. Colonel E.W. Williamson, USA, and Colonel F.B. Elliott, USAF, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), were consulted informally in the preparation of this report. After making amendments, the Joint Chiefs approved the recommendations in paragraph 7 at their September 9 meeting.

² Annex to Appendix “B” to J.C.S. 2099/481. [Footnote in the source text; not printed.]

³ See Appendix “A” to J.C.S. 2099/481. [Footnote in the source text; not printed.]

⁴ Enclosure to J.C.S. 2099/481. [Footnote in the source text; not printed.]

⁵ Appendices “A” and “B” to J.C.S. 2099/481. [Footnote in the source text; not printed.]

³ See Appendix “A” to J.C.S. 2099/481. [Footnote in the source text; not printed.]

⁶ Appendix “B” to J.C.S. 2099/481. [Footnote in the source text; not printed.]

² Annex to Appendix “B” to J.C.S. 2099/481. [Footnote in the source text; not printed.]

⁷ Enclosure to J.C.S. 1887/108. [Footnote in the source text; not printed.]

⁸ Annex to Appendix “A” to J.C.S. 1887/108. [Footnote in the source text; not printed.]

⁹ Ellipses in the source text.

¹⁰ Enclosure “A” is a draft memorandum for the Secretary of Defense recommending that the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, did not participate in the Joint Chiefs decision outlined in this report. The Appendix is a draft memorandum to the Chief, MAAG, Iraq, repeating the information contained in points 4 and 6(a) of the report, with additional comments on the subjects of naval assistance and an Air Force reimbursable aid program. Neither is printed. See also [footnote 11](#) below.

¹¹ The Appendix stated, among other things, that the United States had an interest in generating as favorable an atmosphere as possible for future negotiations on obtaining suitable base rights in Iraq.

424. Telegram From the Embassy in Iraq to the Department of State¹

Baghdad, November 12, 1955—1 p.m.

468. This morning I took General Cook, General Dabney, Wallner, and MAAG Chief Colonel Hannah to make courtesy call on Nuri as Minister Defense. Nuri returned only yesterday from annual military maneuvers.

In the course of a half hour's friendly talk Nuri explained that Iraqi military had kept their request for arms from US on modest basis because they did not want to embarrass US and perhaps be confronted with a turn-down. Iraqi military inclined to leave to US as much freedom of action as possible in matter of arms supply. (In making these particular remarks Nuri gave the impression that he was not so sure this was the best course.) As a result of what he had just seen up north at the maneuvers he continued he had come to feel that arms of the Iraqi forces needed modernizing. "Fire-power" too should be increased. It made no difference to him whether arms came from UK or US. The essential thing was to have the assurance of steady replacements.

Nuri did not pursue matter of arms further or press for any comment or commitment.

From arms Nuri turned to current ME situation. Here he repeated in terms that he has so often used recently his concern over leftist trend in Syria and Egyptian and Saudi Arabian intriguing and bribing in Syria. He also repeated that the GOI was prepared at any time to discuss Israeli-Arab relations so long as 1947 UN resolution was accepted as basis for discussions.

General Cook and party left for Tehran directly after call on Nuri, Up to now we have found no evidence in talks we have had with Iraqis or in press

treatment of visit that the visit has given rise to any unusual speculation. It seems to have been very generally accepted as a routine MAAG inspection.

General Cook and his staff seemed genuinely pleased with the friendly reception accorded them by the Iraqis.

Gallman

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 787.5–MSP/11–1255. Confidential.

425. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iraq¹

Washington, November 19, 1955—4:09 p.m.

374. Baghdad's 486.² FYI Col. Hannah's information regarding FY 1956 MDAP program for Iraq is correct. However, some items programmed in FY 54 are still to be delivered. Ten tanks in FY 56 represent increase over initial program made in face general leveling off MDAP. In view Nuri's continuing cooperation tentative FY 57 program will provide additional tanks. Determination MDAP level for Pact countries however is still under consideration in light of present circumstances in area. End FYI.

You should attempt avoid any discussions with Iraqis concerning individual fiscal year figures and ultimate level U.S. MDAP. If question is raised, however, you may emphasize:

1. Decision to supply tanks represents an increase over initial program in view Iraq's support Free World defense and stand on area problems.
2. U.S. is now giving consideration further programming of tanks in next financial year.
3. Portions of program budgeted in any one year will depend on several factors, including world-wide developments and U.S. commitments. U.S. will continue recognize Iraq's contribution to the stability of the Free World and to area defense in programming of MDAP funds.

Dulles

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 787.5-MSP/11-1755. Confidential. Repeated to London. Drafted by Newsom and approved by Rountree.

² In telegram 486, November 17, Gallman reported that Colonel Hannah had told him that he understood that the only MDAP items to be furnished to Iraq during fiscal year 1956 were the 10 Centurion tanks and possibly 59 M-8 armored cars. Gallman requested verification, and stated that any curtailment of the U.S. arms program for Iraq would do “incalculable harm” to U.S.–Iraqi relations. (*Ibid.*)

426. Telegram From the Embassy in Iraq to the Department of State¹

Baghdad, November 29, 1955—4 p.m.

547. Eyes only for Assistant Secretary Allen. Reply your letter of October 28² being pouched November 30.³ Summary requested your telegram 402 November 28⁴ follows: Study of your letter indicates USAF wants combination of transit rights and base rights. Transit rights desired by USAF appear to include: (1) right of transit for military aircraft in peacetime and (2) right to base aircraft limited periods peacetime to meet ordinary maintenance needs. Base rights seem to require (1) right to base aircraft for short periods in peacetime in case of emergencies and (2) transit rights for strategic aircraft during hostilities.

Under existing circumstances do not think USAF could obtain any rights from Iraqi greater than those enjoyed by British or at lesser price. British rights are specified in special Anglo-Iraqi agreement April 4, 1955 and supplementary documents:⁵ (1) staging and overflying facilities in each other's territory; (2) RAF flying units in Habbaniya and Shaiba to be withdrawn progressively and completely within 1 year; (3) existing procedures and facilities for RAF to overfly, land, refuel and be serviced in Iraq to be continued with reciprocity in UK and dependent territories.

British payments for above rights specified in special Anglo-Iraqi agreement include certain service and training facilities by UK to RIAF representing outgrowth of defense relationship between UK and Iraq. Real quid-pro-quo given by British embodied in articles 1 and 8 of special agreement. Former commits 2 contracting governments to “cooperate for their security and defense in accordance with pact of mutual cooperation”.

Latter commits UK at request of Iraq to make available armed forces to defend Iraq against armed attack. Obviously provision of UK armed forces would probably include RAF units.

Right of transit for military aircraft in peace-time desired by USAF is similar that enjoyed by British. Right to base aircraft for short periods in peace-time for necessary maintenance might logically be construed to come within scope British rights. But British accord reciprocity which we have no indication USAF prepared to do. While perhaps more nominal than real reciprocity, clause is politically important to make arrangement palatable to Iraq public.

Base rights apparently desired by USAF raise question of Iraq internal politics. In light of attempts by successive Iraqi Governments to remove British troops from Iraqi bases Iraqis would not welcome granting US base rights in peace-time. While it is conceivable Iraqis would invite USAF use Iraqi airfields in certain emergencies or in event of hostilities involving Iraq this is far cry from granting USAF base rights in advance.

In brief we believe “transit rights” (which we should probably call “transit privileges”) could conceivably be obtained from GOI provided we are willing to pay price. “Base rights” could probably not be obtained in peace-time.

Necessary quid-pro-quo for USAF obtain transit rights previously defined would not be provided by available type US aid for Iraqi air force. Offer of US aid on cash reimbursable basis provided British agree might prove useful preliminary to request for transit rights. Principal price GOI likely to ask in exchange for USAF transit rights as in case of British is active US participation in defense of Iraq. Iraqis would like most of all see early US adherence Baghdad Pact. Should we adhere Iraqis would doubtless make available same overflying and staging rights enjoyed by British. If adherence is not possible Iraqis may accept bilateral defense arrangement calling for US assistance in event of attack upon Iraq. We do not believe we can obtain useful USAF transit rights for anything less.

Re timing any approach to Iraqis, should be in 2 phases: (1) preliminary offer supply aid for RIAF on cash reimbursable basis and (2) request transit

rights for USAF aircraft in peace-time together with indication of what we may be willing to pay. From latter, question should emerge of basing aircraft for short periods in emergencies or longer periods in hostilities.

In recent conversation in which Prime Minister voiced concern over Saudi Arabian intrigue in Syria Nuri said “remember if you ever have any trouble with the Saudis over your base at Dhahran you can always use Habbaniya”. He quickly added this proviso: “Join the Baghdad Pact and Habbaniya is open to you”.

Gallman

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 787.5411/11–2955. Secret.

² Assistant Secretary Allen’s letter of October 28 to Ambassador Gallman notified Gallman of the U.S. Air Force’s informal indication of a desire for base rights in Iraq similar to the rights enjoyed when the British controlled the bases at Habbaniya and Shaiba, before the Anglo-Iraqi agreement of April 4, 1955. Allen informed Gallman that the United States was “not likely to be in a position to offer the Iraqis any substantial quid pro quo for such rights in addition to grant military aid already programmed for the ground forces,” in part because the United States still considered the policies set forth in the February 26, 1954, Memorandum of Understanding with the United Kingdom to be in force. Allen requested Gallman’s comments on the nature and timing of an approach to the Iraqis for such rights. (*Ibid.*, NEA Files: Lot 58 D 332, Iraq–1955–Baghdad Embassy Administration) ³ Gallman’s letter to Allen, November 28, not printed. (*Ibid.*)

⁴ In telegram 402, Allen requested a summary of Gallman’s reply to Allen’s October 28 letter for the Secretary of the Air Force. (*Ibid.*, Central Files, 787.5411/11–1955) ⁵ The Anglo-Iraqi agreement of April 4, 1955, is printed in 233 UNTS 218.

427. Operations Coordinating Board Report¹

Washington, December 14, 1955.

ANALYSIS OF INTERNAL SECURITY SITUATION IN IRAQ AND RECOMMENDED ACTION

(Pursuant to NSC Action 1290–d, December 22, 1954)²

I. Nature of Security Threat

1. Communist party activity has been illegal since 1927 and for the past six months particularly communist-front and left-wing elements have been subjected to severe repression. Diplomatic relations with the USSR were suspended in January 1955.

2. Despite these measures, the communist organization carries on limited underground activity in an effort to continue to exert influence upon left-wing groupings, to infiltrate government and army and to keep open its channels of communications.

3. Communist party strength is estimated at 2,000 with a cadre of 400 in a total population of about 5,000,000. The total number of communists and front group sympathizers may approximate 10,000. These persons are found chiefly in urban centers and are drawn principally from professional groups, as well as students, clerks and laborers, many of whom feel thwarted by lack of professional and economic opportunities. The Kurdish minority (about 800,000) in the north, a group subjected to severe repression in the past, is a source of communist recruits.

4. The Communist Party does not under present restrictive measures seriously jeopardize the present political organization of the country. The threat is principally one of limited infiltration of professional groups and lower and middle levels of government. Such penetration, together with limited communist membership in rail and port worker unions (and a

proven capability to maintain clandestine internal communications, to provide safe haven for fugitives and to communicate abroad) gives the Party a capability to conduct agent operations and to improve its own organization.

5. If present restrictions on political activities were to be relaxed in Iraq, the Party and its front-group sympathizers could be expected to carry out considerable disruptive activity in the form of propaganda, demonstrations, strikes, etc. However, even under these conditions it is unlikely that the communists could infiltrate key government positions on a large scale or would be able to control any government that might emerge.

6. Under war conditions the Party would provide a significant espionage and clandestine support potential (communications, safe haven, etc.) for Soviet agent activity. In northern Iraq the Kurdish element would probably provide a limited para-military potential for Soviet use, particularly if incited and led by Soviet-trained Kurdish elements such as the Barzani Kurds in the Azerbaijan SSR.

7. Attached is an appendix giving more detailed information regarding Communist Party activity in Iraq.³

II. Existing Internal Security Forces and National Military Forces

A. *Primary Internal Security Forces*

8. The Iraqi Police force is by area standards a fair force. It was organized by the British along British Colonial Police lines and continues to use British consultants. The British maintain close liaison with its Criminal Investigation Division (CID) component through their local intelligence service, and provide unknown amounts of technical equipment and assistance.

9. The Iraqi police force numbers approximately 12,500–14,000 and consists of a small traffic police department, a mobile police force component, and a CID, as well as garrison forces, all under the control of

the Minister of the Interior. 3,000–4,000 of this number constitute the “mobile police force,” the military or striking arm of the police which is armed and which constitutes one of the most effective elements of the police. Each of the fourteen provinces (Liwas) has elements of the mobile police, as well as garrison forces. British weapons are used. The force is deficient in transportation and communications. The Police School in Baghdad trains officer and CID personnel.

10. Except for the CID the quality of police personnel is not high. The police are poorly paid, a fact which encourages the acceptance of bribes. In general, police work is made difficult by a widespread public antipathy against the police.

11. The CID, the key agency in the maintenance of internal security and the suppression of subversive activities, is a fairly competent and effective organization. Its personnel are moderately well trained and, at the higher levels, relatively honest. Its present director is a competent and experienced officer who has attempted to establish working relationships with the police in neighboring countries.

12. The police are probably sufficiently well organized to counter quickly any significant subversive activity. Police intelligence forces appear to have penetrated the Communist Party and seem to be well informed in advance of any planned demonstrations. Military intervention might be required, however, to meet simultaneous demonstrations in any one city.

B. Judicial Procedures

13. Since the emergence of the Nuri Government and its promulgation of various restrictive ordinances, the Iraqi courts have been busy trying political offenders. In two important respects the courts have recently changed their procedures: by citing Peace Partisan and Democratic Youth “front” activities as criminal political offenses, and by an unpublicized but nevertheless obvious relaxation of the laws of evidence in Iraqi courts. The courts are almost daily handing down convictions for communist or communist front activities and meting out sentences ranging from three months to three years. During the past eight months at least 200 individuals have been sentenced for proscribed political offenses. Instances still arise,

however, where communist offenders go free, ostensibly for lack of evidence but actually due to intervention by ranking political leaders.

C. Military Forces

14. The Army (53,000) under the Minister of Defense is organized into a headquarters establishment, one infantry division, one mountain division, an independent brigade and cadre units of an additional infantry division. The First Division is located in the southeastern part of Iraq along the lower river plain and near the Persian Gulf. The Second Mountain Division is stationed in the northeastern region. It is concentrated in the oil region, but has battalion size units near the Iranian and Turkish borders. The Third Division in process of formation guards the main route from Iran leading to Baghdad and reinforces the police forces in case of internal disturbances.

15. Top leadership and the state of individual and small unit training are good. The Army is loyal to the Crown. There is little or no communist infiltration. Quantities and qualities of light equipment are sufficient. Weaknesses are lack of combat experience, insufficient technical personnel, and deficiencies in heavy equipment.

16. Air Force personnel totals 1,400 (including 75 pilots) and equipment includes 139 aircraft (25 Jet; 40 P fighters; 13 Transport; 61 Misc.).

III. Evaluation of the Internal Security Situation

17. Under existing political conditions in Iraq the communist apparatus does not have the capacity to overthrow the government by force nor to subvert or influence it significantly. The present repressive measures of the government and its instruments for enforcing those measures are such that communist mass support cannot be expected to increase, but on the other hand the instruments of the government for attacking communism are not sufficiently effective to insure that the organizational integrity and cadre strength of the Communist Party will be effectively and continuously attacked. However, this balance between security forces and the strength of the communists may not be preserved unless steps are taken to improve the

effectiveness of the non-military internal security forces through better training and equipping.

18. There are indications that present restrictions on political activities may be relaxed thereby providing greater opportunities for overt activities (disruptive tactics, strikes, demonstrations, etc.) by the communists and their sympathizers and allowing the Communist Party to increase its mass support.

19. While the Army is deficient in important items of equipment for combat against an enemy force, it is fully capable of maintaining security against armed insurrection. The Air Force could make a contribution to the maintenance of internal security.

20. Recently the Iraqi Government has enjoyed better relations with the country's Kurdish population and there appears to be little likelihood of Kurdish revolt. However, should a major communist insurrection be attempted and in the unlikely event that wide-scale Kurdish participation and support developed, the police would need for its suppression the assistance of at least the Army division located in northeastern Iraq.

21. Under wartime conditions the Communist Party would provide a significant espionage and clandestine support potential for Soviet agent activity. The Kurdish minority in northern Iraq might provide a limited para-military potential for Soviet use.

IV. Inventory of U.S. Programs Bearing on Internal Security

A. Technical Assistance

22. The Iraqi economy has large water and petroleum resources but is poor in human skills. The ICA Technical Assistance Program, initiated in late 1952, is designed to give the Iraqi Government a measure of technical facility in coping with its economic development problems.

23. Emphasis in the Iraqi developmental program has been placed on long-term projects to the virtual exclusion of the short-term immediate impact projects and as a result public criticism of the inadequacy of Government efforts in the economic and welfare fields has been increasing.

24. Program costs from inception through FY 1954 totaled \$2.3 million; the Fiscal Year 1955 program scheduled assistance totaling \$2.7 million; and it is proposed that \$2.3 million be allocated for FY 1956. To date only slightly more than \$500 thousand has been spent on supplies and equipment since most of the funds have been used for supplying technicians to the Iraqi Government.

B. Military Defense Assistance

25. Present U.S. plans call for equipping two combat divisions. A small MAAG (six officers and five enlisted men) helps administer this program initiated by the MDAP agreement signed by the Iraqi Government in April 1954. None of this equipment is intended for Iraq's police forces.

26. Of the \$10.9 million in military assistance presently available and for which there is a firm program, \$1.5 million in end-items had been delivered by January 31, 1955. New funds in the amounts of \$10 million and \$12 million for the fiscal years 1956 and 1957 respectively will be required to complete the present MDAP objectives.

27. Since most of the present equipment is of British origin, much of the MDAP financed supplies and equipment will be purchased from the UK through off-shore procurement.

C. Information Service and Exchange of Persons

28. Objectives of this program are: to convince the people of Iraq and their Government of the threat of communism and of U.S. friendship, to encourage, strengthen and support pro-Western leaders and to explain the significance and purpose of U.S. military and technical assistance. The USIS Program operates today in a favorable atmosphere.

29. A small program with a limited budget (\$249,729, FY 55; \$473,710, FY 56) the USIS operates an Information Center in Baghdad and another in Kirkuk, which is primarily oriented toward the local Kurdish population in its information program.

30. The Educational Exchange Program in Iraq consists primarily of six annual grants to Iraqi leaders and specialists to make short observation visits to the United States under the Smith–Mundt Act (PL 402) and an exchange of American and Iraqi students and professors under the Fulbright Act (PL 584). Amounts involved in FY 1955 total about \$150,000.

V. Political Factors Bearing on Internal Security Programs and Feasibility of U.S. Assistance 31. The Government of Iraq is dominated by elements strongly pro-Western and anti-communist. Their attachment to principles of collective security is demonstrated by conclusion of the mutual defense pact last February with Turkey, an important step in implementation of the Northern Tier defense concept. Iraq's desire for close ties with the U.S. is reflected in the military agreement concluded between the two countries on April 21, 1954.

32. Most responsible political opinion in Iraq is keenly alive to the communist menace both from without and from within. However, the masses of Iraqi people, being miserably poor, depressed and politically apathetic, could be exploited by communist agents if they were able to work without restraint. Thus an effective long range economic development program will continue to be an important element in preventing the expansion of communist influence.

33. Having in mind the fact that a determined minority brought neighboring Iran to the verge of communism during the period 1951–53, the Iraqi Government has been especially sensitive to the danger of internal subversion. The recent drastic anti-communist measures taken by Prime Minister Nuri Said reflect a desire to keep subversive elements under control. It is probable the Iraqi Government would be receptive to U.S. offers of aid for internal security purposes. However, use of a significant portion of available MDAP funds for police equipment or training would be interpreted by the Iraqis as failure on the part of the U.S. to live up to its commitments and would create difficulties in our relations with Iraq.

Similar problems will result if U.S. military aid programs do not satisfy Iraqi aspirations.

34. While a union with Syria does not appear imminent, should it ever occur, control of Syrian communist and left wing elements might considerably increase the security problems of the Government.

35. The present Prime Minister, Nuri Said, is by far the strongest and most effective leader in the country. However, he has been in poor health in the past year and is advanced in years by eastern standards. Should he withdraw from the political scene, there would probably be a relaxation of controls, including resumption of political activity which has been kept to a minimum by the dissolution of political parties in September 1954. However, it is doubtful if radical changes in Government policy would occur in view of the fact that power would probably pass to some other figure from the small pro-Western element that dominates the Government.

VI. Recommendations

36. Since it is important that the Iraqi Government continue to appreciate the scope and nature of the communist threat, U.S. agencies should seek increased opportunities, without appearing to interfere in Iraqi domestic affairs, to ensure Iraqi awareness of the communist threat.

Responsible Agencies: All agencies

Timing: Continuing

37. Efforts to bring a greater understanding of the communist threat to university undergraduates, graduates and faculty should continue to receive strong emphasis in view of the fact that Baghdad University has been historically the major source of CPI recruitment and a breeding ground of subversive action.

Responsible Agency: USIA

[less than 1 line of source text not declassified]

Timing: Continuing

38. The Iraqi police force should be strengthened. The actual weaknesses in training, equipment, organization, morale, etc., can only be determined by a survey of the force made by competent Western police officers. Following such survey, which would include determination of the extent of British assistance, realistic recommendations for strengthening could then be made. It is recommended that a survey of the Iraqi Police Force be made in cooperation with the Iraqi Government.

Responsible Agencies: State, ICA

[less than 1 line of source text not declassified]

Cost: About \$10,000 (not presently programmed)

Timing: As soon as feasible

39. Since at present no segregation of political and criminal offenders exists and prisons often become communist training schools, it is recommended that U.S. assistance in the field of Iraqi penal reform be extended. Promising Iraqi penal officials should be sent to U.S. police schools through exchange of persons program or public administration program of USOM.

Responsible Agencies: State, ICA

[less than 1 line of source text not declassified]

Cost: About \$18,000

Timing: As soon as feasible

40. Because of the traditional association between the British and Iraqi CID, it would be advisable to inform the British of our plans to offer assistance to the Iraqis before such an offer is made. Such a step should imply no right of veto by the British and should be made in the belief that the U.K. would welcome our offer of assistance and would cooperate fully.

Responsible Agency: State

[less than 1 line of source text not declassified]

Timing: Within next six weeks

41. While this study is designed to focus directly on increasing the effectiveness of internal security forces and to exclude related and peripheral matters, it is felt that the contribution to the internal security of the present assistance program might be increased by placing greater emphasis on selected projects with short range visible effects.

Responsible Agency: ICA

Timing: Continuing

42. Until the role of Iraqi armed forces in the regional defense of the Middle East is determined by the Baghdad Pact powers and accepted by the U.S., priority in the allocation of military aid to Iraq should be given to military units appropriate to the internal security function of the armed forces. Pending the foregoing decision, there should be no change in the present military aid program. Any exceptions from the foregoing should be justified on a case by case basis.

Responsible Agencies: Defense, State, ICA

Timing: Continuing consideration

¹ Source: Department of State, OCB Files: Lot 62 D 430, Iraq. Top Secret. A covering note of December 20 by the OCB Secretariat Staff indicates that the analysis and recommendations contained in this report were concurred in by the OCB at its December 14 meeting, and that the Department of State was “negotiating with the British in London in an effort to improve the internal security situation in Iraq by working through and supporting the British effort in that country.”

² NSC Action No. 1290–d requested the Operations Coordinating Board to present to the National Security Council a report on, among other things, “the status and adequacy of the current program to develop constabulary forces to maintain internal security and to destroy the effectiveness of the

Communist apparatus in free world countries vulnerable to Communist subversion.” For text, see [Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. II, Part 1, p. 844.](#)

³ Not printed.

428. Editorial Note

Admiral Arthur Radford, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, met with Prime Minister Nuri and other Iraqi military and political officials December 20–21, during a trip through the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and the Far East. In a memorandum to Secretary Dulles, February 13, 1956, Radford covered the highlights of this trip. In the section of the memorandum concerning with Iraq, Radford described these meetings:

“On my first evening in Iraq, I met with His Excellency Nuri As-Said, the Prime Minister and Minister of Defense of Iraq. My subsequent meetings with Iraqi military and political leaders simply amplified what Prime Minister Nuri discussed with me at this initial meeting. In his meeting with me the Prime Minister particularly stressed two points. First, it was essential that Iraq know in advance what the U.S. aid program was to include for several years in advance (at least three) in order that the Iraqi could properly plan and implement their own budgetary and training efforts so as to dovetail them with the aid program. Second, it was highly desirable that the U.S. join the Baghdad Pact as soon as possible.

“In connection with the need for long-term planning of our aid program, Nuri pointed out that the Iraqi budget was neither large enough nor flexible enough to undertake sizeable projects to be ready to utilize U.S. aid matériel which did not arrive on schedule. He said that the principal problem of the Iraqi in connection with our aid program was not concerned so much with the total amount of the program, but with the lack of a definite timetable to which Iraqi planning could be tied.

“In discussing the desirability of the U.S. joining the Baghdad Pact, Nuri said that Iraq was in disfavor in the Arab world for having been the first and only Arab state to join the Pact. He felt that Iraq was on trial before the Arab world for having taken this step, and that the Arab world in general felt that the Pact was

nothing more than a ‘soap bubble organization.’ U.S. adherence to the Pact would give it strength and substance, and would do much to answer the Arab nation critics.

“In Iraq I also met with His Majesty King Faisal II and with the Crown Prince Abdul Ilah. No matters of substance were discussed at either meeting. Certainly nothing in these meetings tended to invalidate the impression Ambassador Gallman had given me that King Faisal II was a nice youngster, but had as yet no real ability to govern his country, nor even a good understanding of the problems with which Iraq is faced.” (Department of State, Central Files, 711.5890/ 2–1356)

In a message of December 24, 1955, MAAG Chief Colonel Hannah gave a more detailed account of Radford’s December 21 meetings with the Iraqi General Staff. According to Hannah, the Iraqis briefed Radford on their defense plans for the Zagros Mountain passes and their 5-year reorganization plan for the Iraqi Army. They also reportedly stressed the delay in MDAP shipments, and other questions of specific aid requirements. Hannah stated that Radford indicated he would look into the delays in shipments in the approved military aid program, particularly the offshore procurement items. (National Archives and Records Administration JCS Records, CCS 092 (8–22–46) (2) Sec. 21) In telegram 616 from Baghdad, December 21, Ambassador Gallman reported a conversation on a similar subject with General Rafiq Arif, Iraqi Chief of Staff, during which Arif raised questions about the inadequate delivery of military assistance items to Iraq. (Department of State, Central Files, 787.5–MSP/12–2155)

429. Telegram From the Embassy in Iraq to the Department of State¹

Baghdad, January 15, 1956—2 p.m.

692. Recent developments in NE and forthcoming Eden visit² prompt us submit following current appraisal Iraqi political situation.

1. Despite several recent disturbing political crises in area, GOI has remained comparatively stable. Reconstitution of Cabinet by Nuri last month was matter of form rather than substance and connotes no basic change policy. Nuri while somewhat less strong than year ago still holds adequate power.

2. Speaking to Chamber last week Nuri divided Iraqi foreign policy into regional and purely Arab aspects. Seen thus his principal accomplishments have been in sphere regional policy which centers in Baghdad Pact.

3.

Both Nuri and Bashayan³ have recently made statements in Parliament emphasizing immediate objectives prompting conclusion Baghdad Pact were (a) terminate Anglo-Iraqi treaty 1930 and (b) win new friends for Iraq on Palestine problem and other problems. Long-range objective Nuri emphasized was to meet Communist threat highlighted by proximity USSR to Iraqi borders. At same time Nuri reiterated Baghdad Pact requires no GOI commitment outside its borders.

As we see it pact organization now far advanced. Council has been established, deputies are meeting regularly and economic committee has just completed its inaugural session. Military planners will soon meet and other committees including those charged with combating subversive threat expected be functioning soon.

4.

In sphere what he calls Arab policy Nuri government has been static and at times even on defensive. GOI has repeatedly stated Iraqi membership in Baghdad Pact should not be interpreted as Iraqi withdrawal from Arab camp. Iraqi Arab policy Nuri and other leaders have pointed out is to stand by AL charter and ACSP. Government's Palestine policy is in accord with general Arab policy on subject and calls for implementation UN

resolution. Nuri personally would like see Arab-Israeli problem settled now but GOI feels it cannot take initiative in matter. GOI, however, as long as Nuri heads government may be expected place no obstacle in way any Arab state which may seek actively settle problem.

Iraqi relations with other Arab states at present largely unsettled. Egypt and Saudi Arabia continue strongly oppose Baghdad Pact, attack Iraq for having concluded it and seek by overt and covert means prevent any other states from joining. Leftist drift in Syria and apparent inability Syrian Government stand up against leftist elements in Syrian army remains source concern to Iraq. Recent developments in Jordan where Iraq has always felt it had strong voice found particularly disturbing. Only relations with Lebanon appear be on somewhat even keel but latter recognized as traditionally pursuing middle course and no real positive support expected from this quarter. GOI's hope that either [Jordan?] or Lebanon or both might soon join Baghdad IACS [*Pact*] seems at present effectively scotched.

GOI would probably still like take more active measures in both Syria and Jordan to restore normalcy in those countries but would do so only on conditions (a) it invited by competent authorities of either Syria or Jordan intervene to protect legally constituted authority and (b) US and UK gave approval for such action. Long-range Iraqi Fertile Crescent unity objectives incidentally less of a consideration on this score than is immediate Iraqi concern re security of area.

5.

In sphere internal policy Nuri has for past six months or more publicized his proposed internal reform program. Its principal objectives are to purge government of corrupt and inefficient elements, establish new land tax and activate housing program. While these points still largely in formative stage Iraqi development program based upon new five-year plan inaugurated by GOI last year proceeding apace. Level of economic activity

resulting from program steadily rising although benefits not yet fully appreciated by public.

Nuri has indicated too he favors return to political party life and has been seeking induce principal opposition leaders form opposition party after which government party will be formed.

6.

While government remains relatively strong political horizon not without clouds. Some opposition ultimate strength of which still unclear but which certainly greater than last year manifesting itself. This opposition remains heterogeneous and unorganized and includes Salih Jabr⁴ followers, some of Jamali⁵ supporters and small core neutralists.

Opposition's principal arguments to date are:

A. Foreign policy:

1) Baghdad Pact which it contends had initially been accepted by many non-Nuri men in belief it would induce Western Powers support pro-Arab solution to Arab Israel problem based on implementation United Nations resolutions failed bring expected "benefits". Implication is Nuri has failed use it as bargaining factor with West to insure this.

2) On contrary Baghdad Pact has isolated Iraq from rest of Arab world—which no Iraqi wants. Some original supporters of Baghdad Pact have even joined this chorus charging isolation from Arab world has been due inept handling of development Baghdad Pact by Nuri and by United Kingdom.

3) While Egyptian and Saudi hostility not unexpected apparent loss Syria and possible loss Jordan ascribed by some as due failure Nuri policy. There are those who decry Nuri's unwillingness spend more in these countries to counter Saudi bribery.

4) Nuri government has failed obtain needed military assistance from United States in sufficient quantities to meet existing deficiencies. Progress deliveries opponents contend has been slow and has been responsible for whatever lag exists in Iraqi arms buildup plans. United States arms aid to Iraq has unfortunately lacked psychological potential of Egyptian Czechoslovakia arms deal.

B. In sphere internal policy:

1) Promised internal reform programs slow in developing and various critics hold will probably be inadequate in scope, some too question earnestness Nuri desire effect internal reform.

2) Government's new educational policy allegedly short sighted.

3) Development program too slow and not producing sufficient tangible benefits.

4) Normal political life in Iraq still suspended. Despite Nuri's efforts induce his principal opponents form party none has done so—realizing probably that by refraining Nuri remains vulnerable on this score.

7.

It likely in our view that this opposition will grow. While we do not question Nuri's own sincerity regarding internal reform program we fear its actual implementation may well be disappointing. Some of Nuri's Cabinet members unfortunately are probably only giving lip service to it and moreover are not overly competent. Factors beyond his control also of [are] contributing to lag. Thus for example proposed land tax reform for which expert was requested from United States and United Kingdom last May arrived late and possibility is that draft bill on subject when presented will in [be] inadequate. Actual positive accomplishments of promised reform program during coming year we fear likely be minimum and for this reason will probably give rise further criticism.

Pull of Arab Islam ways strong and any lack success in Arab policy whatever [would?] be reasons for it certain be exploited for purpose criticism.

8. Yet notwithstanding its shortcomings Nuri government may fairly be considered most effective friend West can expect in Iraq in near future. It is decisive, reasonable and we can work with it. Unless some positive steps are taken strengthen Nuri government during next few months however Nuri's departure from office sometime later this year cannot be entirely precluded. This need not necessarily be brought about by any attempt to force him out of office for few would question he has strength successfully to resist any such development but rather because he may himself choose to resign. Experience has shown frequent Nuri tactic has been meet mounting criticism by suddenly resigning, thereafter confronting successor with overt or covert opposition calculated to demonstrate to all that nothing can be done in Iraq without his support. Department will recall most recent effective demonstration this tactic was during Jamali Cabinets in 1954.

9. On balance we feel it desirable strengthen Nuri. Following alternatives present themselves to effect this:

a. US adherence Baghdad Pact. While this would not necessarily still criticism of pact cited above it would at least make it clear in Iraq and in area as whole that our concern with Communist danger in ME is in earnest and would help focus attention on gravity this problem.

b. Support efforts strengthen pro-Iraqi elements in Jordan, Lebanon and Syria and conversely use whatever influence we may have curb Egyptian and Saudi intrigue against Iraq. Persistent irresponsible Egyptian press and radio propaganda and Saudi use funds interfering in internal affairs other Arab States bound play into hands Communists and be detrimental to stability of area as whole.

c. As soon as circumstances may allow support Jordanian and/or Lebanon adherence Baghdad Pact with view to counter suggestion Iraq has abandoned Arab camp by concluding pact.

d. Effect prompt deliveries US military assistance in order expedite Iraqi army build up. If existing deficiencies Iraqi army equipment can soon be filled this will give tangible proof to critics that Nuri's pro-Western policy has brought benefits. Occasional talk that Iraqi army buildup needed to fight Israel meaningless unless of course Israel attacks Arabs.

e. Support efforts implement internal reform program by supplying promptly when requested need for competent experts. Should be noted here that while US technical assistance to Iraq cannot be ignored generally speaking it has no great political potential. Question is not therefore one of broadening technical assistance program but rather of concentrating efforts on essential elements such as land tax and on sensitive areas such as Kurdistan to assist government to carry out soonest meaningful internal reform program.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 787.00/1–1556. Secret. Repeated to London.

² British Prime Minister Anthony Eden visited Washington January 30–February 3 for a series of talks with President Eisenhower. Regarding the Middle Eastern aspects of these talks, including material relating to Iraq, see [Documents 94](#) and [95](#) and [volume xv, pp. 101](#) ff.

³ Foreign Minister Burhan al-Din Bashayan.

⁴ Salih Jabr, former Prime Minister of Iraq and leader of the Umma Party.

⁵ Muhammad Fadil Jamali, former Prime Minister and former Foreign Minister of Iraq.

430. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom¹

Washington, March 6, 1956—2:52 p.m.

5037. For Ambassador only. Deliver following message to Prime Minister from President. Copy of Eden's February 18 message sent following telegram² for your information.

“Dear Anthony:

“In your letter of February 18 you requested my assistance in settling some questions relating to the supply of tanks to Iraq, the Netherlands, and Germany.

“In line with our previous discussions, I propose to request of Congress, in connection with the Mutual Security Program for the Fiscal Year 1957, funds to supply Iraq with forty additional Centurion tanks. This is being done only because there are firm understandings that these tanks will not be used for any purpose except defense of the area in connection with the Baghdad Pact. I would not want this information to become known until the program has been presented to the Congress, and then it should be handled in such a manner as not to increase tensions in relation to the Arab-Israeli dispute. It is extremely important that this matter be considered as secret pending further discussions between us.³

[Here follows the part of the reply to Eden concerning the question of supplying tanks to the Netherlands and Germany.]

“Sincerely, D.E.”

Hoover

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 787.5–MSP/–656. Secret. Drafted by Hoover, cleared by Goodpaster, and approved by Robert G.

Barnes.

² Telegram 5038 to London, March 6, contained the text of Eden's February 18 message to Eisenhower. In this message, Eden stated that the United Kingdom was faced with an urgent problem in deciding its future tank production program, and had to decide how much capacity to retain. As part of his request for Eisenhower's assistance in settling this matter, Eden noted that much of the answer depended on U.S. views about the supply of further tanks to Iraq, the Netherlands, and Germany. (*Ibid.*) ³ The text of the President's message to this point was transmitted to Baghdad in telegram 668, March 7. In this telegram, the Department also stated that it agreed that British Foreign Minister Lloyd could inform the Iraqis on the matter of additional tanks on a confidential basis, and without mentioning the total number of tanks involved. (*Ibid.*, 396.1-KA/3-756)

431. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iraq¹

Washington, March 15, 1956—10:19 a.m.

707. Embtel 889.² FYI: Particularly in view British sensitiveness following recent events in Jordan, Department not anxious interfere in relationship between British and Iraqis in equipping and training Iraqi Air Force or take steps which might be interpreted as displacing British in area. In Memorandum Understanding February 26, 1954 re US grant military assistance program Iraq it agreed that should UK not be in position meet requirements of Iraqi Air Force for certain types of equipment and training US, after conferring with UK, would consider providing such equipment and training. We are continuing adhere generally to policies laid down by that memorandum.

In companion message Defense indicating we would like have Embassy's recommendations as to requirements both in equipment and training British are not able meet or will not likely be able meet before discussing Iraqi request further with Nuri or other members Iraqi Government. In light Memorandum Understanding Department will want discuss these requirements with British before considering assistance. End FYI.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 787.5–MSP/3–356. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Hallett and approved by Rountree.

² In telegram 889, March 3, Gallman reported several Iraqi requests for U.S. assistance in training and building up the Iraqi Air Force. Gallman stated that the Iraqis evidently were not satisfied with the kind of equipment they were purchasing from the United Kingdom or with the provisions of the pilot training program. Gallman added that the request for pilot training seemed to present fewer difficulties in terms of U.S. budgetary restraints and relations with the British. Gallman advocated meeting the request for pilot training. (*Ibid.*)

432. Telegram From the Chief of the Military Assistance Advisory Group in Iraq (Hannah) to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs¹

Baghdad, March 24, 1956—11:30 a.m.

IRAQ 9–045. Ref DEF 999351.² This msg in 6 paras.

1 —MAAG is not aware of any specific instances where British unable to meet valid requirements Iraqi Air Force. It is believed Iraqi request US support Iraqi Air Force based primarily on Iraqi desires have flexibility and strengthen Iraqi position in negotiations with UK in air force matters. In addition Iraq would prefer obtain air force equipment and training under grant aid rather than expend available funds for equipment and training in UK. In conversation with MAAG Chief, General Rafiq has never mentioned lack of training spaces in UK but had frequently referred to expense involved. Furthermore, General Rafiq has referred to desirability training pilots in US as an incentive for Iraqis to volunteer for air force.

2 —It is MAAG opinion that US cannot justify MDAP support Iraqi Air Force on basis UK is not in position to meet valid

military requirements. Believe UK is and will continue to provide everything Iraqi AF capable of absorbing and willing to pay for. While Iraqis have indicated some dissatisfaction British equipment and methods it is believed dissatisfaction stems primarily from Iraqi reluctance spend necessary funds rather than British inability provide additional training and more modern equipment.

3 —There is no question as to importance Government of Iraq attributes to US support Iraq AF. The recent arrival of MIGs in Egypt has caused considerable internal political tensions high government circles and the political aspects considered overriding in this matter.

4 —MAAG considers that if State-Defense considerations indicate desirability of US nullifying or circumventing US–UK memo of understanding US position should be on basis Iraqi economic inability to pay for air force build up rather on basis UK unable meet valid air force requirements.

5 —The immediate requirement Iraqi Air Force is pilot training in order to use aircraft now on hand. If decision made to provide MDAP support MAAG recommends initial program 15 pilot training spaces in US and material program 1 squadron (15 U/A) Hawker Hunter or F–86 to replace present squadron Sea Furys. Iraqis have indicated preference Hawker Hunter or F–86.

6 —This msg coordinated with US Ambassador and AIRA.

¹ Source: National Archives and Records Administration, JCS Records, CCS 092(8–22–46)(2) Sec. 26. Secret. Repeated to Paris for CINCEUR.

² Not printed.

433. Telegram From the Embassy in Iraq to the Department of State¹

Baghdad, March 28, 1956—2 p.m.

1007. Eyes only Acting Secretary. My comments on Department's niact 753, March 27,² follow:

1. As reported in Embassy's 692, January 15,³ opposition to Nuri greater this year than it was last. I feel, nevertheless, that today Nuri still retains control of country and that police and army are loyal to him. While some Iraqi political leaders would like to see Nuri leave now, others, even though they feel he has overstayed his usefulness as Prime Minister, maintain that he should not retire in face Egyptian pressure. Significance Nuri's bout with ex-Prime Ministers mentioned by Lloyd should not be overstressed. Meeting was of nature he frequently holds to brief ex-Prime Ministers, and was called specifically to hear report on Hussain-Faisal talks. Those who requested he resign are those who have been opposing him for past eight months or more. Meeting reported in Embassy's despatch 765, March 24,⁴ which has already been air pouched to Department.

2. While present likelihood forcing Nuri out is not great, unless situation in Jordan gets out of hand, possibility his resigning of his own volition cannot be discounted. He has used this political tactic in past to meet mounting criticism and to demonstrate that no successor can hope succeed without his support. Some of his closest advisers have lately again advised him adopt this tactic.

- 3.

Nuri's departure would be most unfortunate from point of view Western objectives, but I feel that consequences as expressed by Lloyd are somewhat overstated. If Nuri leaves now, it is quite likely his successor will be pro-Western too. I doubt, therefore,

that our joint oil interests in Iraq would at once be as seriously threatened as British seem to suggest. I agree, however, that Nuri's departure may very well have deleterious effect on Baghdad Pact.

No successor, even though pro-Western in outlook, would I feel show as keen interest as Nuri has in pact. If someone like Jabr were to come in, for example, price he likely demand for continued Iraqi active interest in Baghdad Pact might well be pro-Arab settlement of Arab-Israeli issue. If this price too high, we might find ourselves no longer as welcome as a prospective member of the Pact as now.

Nor should we overlook fact that any successor governments are likely have only limited tenure in office. Pattern of Iraqi governments in past has been five to six months. Such constant turnover of governments, even if every one of them pro-Western, must inevitably retard Iraqi role in pact. With Baghdad as operational center of pact, any suggestion that GOI lukewarm or hesitant on pact matters will almost certainly affect other member governments as well.

4. I agree fully that if Jordan lost, reaction within Iraq likely be strong. Its loss could topple Nuri government and would probably result in shifting of emphasis in Iraqi foreign policy from northern tier defense to frantic effort rehabilitation within Arab world. We should not overlook strong pull of Arabism on Iraq and dangers which any threatened Iraqi isolation from Arab circles likely have upon long term Iraqi cooperation in achieving US-UK objectives.

5. I have most recently emphasized importance of pact, as I see it, in final paragraph Embassy's telegram 933, March 13.⁵ Since possibility persuading other Arab governments join pact seems out of question at present time, only feasible alternative, it seems to me, is to strengthen pact by our immediate adherence. We could refer to groundwork which has already been laid and point out that real work can now begin at forthcoming Tehran meetings. Our adherence at this time is bound to bolster position of Nuri

government and assist it in continuing concentrate on objectives of pact. It would give much needed increased momentum to Baghdad Pact planning. It would, obviously, have heartening effect in Ankara, Tehran, and Karachi.

Gallman

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 787.11/3–2856. Top Secret; Niact.

² Telegram 753 repeated the text of telegram 4228 from London, March 26, which contained a report of British concerns about the current Middle Eastern situation. In the sections that dealt with Iraq, it noted the British concern over a report of a meeting of “elder Iraqi statesmen” in Iraq during which Nuri Said’s position was challenged, suggesting to the British that the Prime Minister’s control of Iraq was precarious. [4 lines of text not declassified] (*Ibid.*, 674.84A/3–2656) ³ [Document 429](#).

⁴ Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 787.13/3–2456) ⁵ In telegram 933, Gallman told the Department, among other things, that the if the United States or the United Kingdom appeared to be uncertain in support of the Baghdad Pact, Iraq would be unlikely to stand firm. “We should also be fully alive,” Gallman added, “to the fact that if pact breaks up because of this or any similar reason involving lukewarm support on part of Western states possibility reviving something comparable in area is likely be slim for a long time to come.” (“*Ibid.*,” 780.5/3–1356)

434. Editorial Note

Policy toward Iraq was included in the new approach to certain Middle Eastern policies, approved by President Eisenhower on March 28, 1956. See [Document 106](#). For additional information, see [volume XV, pages 409 ff.](#)

435. National Intelligence Estimate¹

Washington, July 17, 1956.

NIE 36.2-56

THE OUTLOOK FOR IRAQ'S STABILITY AND FOREIGN POLICIES²

The Problem

To estimate probable developments with respect to Iraq's internal stability and foreign affairs.

Conclusions

1. Iraq is unique in the Arab world in its political stability, its effective management of a substantial economic potential, and its collaboration with the West. While this is in great part the work of 68-year-old Prime Minister Nuri Said, he has the support of a considerable body of Iraqi leaders. There is, however, considerable discontent among other politically aware Iraqis. (*Paras.* 6-10, 19-22, 25-28) 2. As long as Nuri remains active he is likely to dominate the Iraqi scene, and no radical changes in Iraq's relationships with the West are likely. Iraq will probably remain in the Baghdad Pact and avoid dangerous flirtation with the Soviet Bloc. However, Nuri will almost certainly put various pressures on the US and UK to strengthen the Pact and to confer greater benefits on Iraq as a member. (*Paras.* 8, 10, 26-35, 43) 3. Nuri's policies are likely to increase Iraq's isolation in the Arab world. Iraq's relations with Egypt and Saudi Arabia are likely to remain strained. Present trends in Syria and Jordan are unfavorable to Iraq and will probably provoke increased Iraqi overt and covert attempts to reverse them. However, we believe that Iraq is not likely to intervene militarily unless convinced that this would be the only way of preventing a take over of Syria by militantly anti-Iraqi elements, or of removing an imminent threat to the Hashimite throne in Jordan. Even in these circumstances Iraq would be unlikely to risk military intervention without the backing of substantial

political and military elements in the country concerned, or without prior consultation with the UK and probably the US. (*Paras. 27–30, 36–41*) 4. After Nuri's disappearance, moderate elements would probably initially retain control. However, a struggle for power among moderates and between them and extremists would almost certainly ensue and lead to political instability. (*Paras. 13–16, 34*) 5. Any successor regime would probably make greater concessions toward Arab unity, including de-emphasis of the Baghdad Pact to the point where Iraqi participation would be virtually nil. However, the chances of Iraq pursuing such a course would be substantially lessened if another Arab state joined the Pact or if additional Western support for the Pact resulted in increased benefits for Iraq. (*Para. 34*) Discussion

6. Iraq's present internal situation and foreign policies contrast sharply with those of other Arab states. Under the control of a long-established oligarchy of professional politicians, wealthy landlords, businessmen, and tribal leaders, Iraq has exhibited in recent years a degree of political stability uncommon in the Arab world, where the tide of revolutionary nationalism has toppled several regimes and brought political turbulence to others. Of the principal Arab states, Iraq alone has both extensive economic assets and a sound development program already well under way. Its oil reserves were estimated at 20 billion barrels in 1955—some 16 percent of total Middle East reserves—and in addition it has large areas of undeveloped agricultural land. As a result, despite the extreme poverty of most of its population of some five million, its long-range economic possibilities are bright. Finally, Iraq is the only independent Arab state which has elected openly to cooperate with Western defense efforts in the Middle East—a decision manifested by its adherence to the Baghdad Pact in February 1955.

7. Iraq's current political stability and pro-West orientation are in great part the work of its dominant figure, the 68-year-old prime minister, Nuri Said. Once an officer of the Ottoman Army, Nuri became a leader in the Arab nationalist revolt against the Ottoman Empire, and aided the British against Turkish forces in World War I. He has ever since maintained a close working relationship with the UK, in the belief that British support was essential to the security of the Hashimite dynasty, whose cause has his loyalty.³ He has been the most powerful leader in Iraq, whether actually

holding office or not, for much of the time since 1932 when the country achieved independence following the expiration of the British mandate. Some political power is also exercised by the royal family, which is nominally headed by the 20-year-old King Faisal II, but still dominated by the former regent, the king's uncle, Crown Prince Abdul Ilah. Although other important political figures exist, and certain of them, including opponents of Nuri, continue to enjoy considerable influence, Nuri has largely suppressed organized opposition, banned political parties, and ensured a pliant parliament by rigged elections.

I. The Outlook for Internal Stability

The Political Scene

8. Nuri's political strength and acumen make it likely that he can continue to dominate the Iraqi scene as long as he remains active. Among the comparatively small number of politically conscious Iraqis, there is considerable discontent with the present regime's domestic performance and with Nuri's long monopoly of power, but the opposition is splintered, intimidated, and weakened by deepseated incompatibilities between various individual leaders and groups. Moreover, Nuri remains adept at keeping his opponents on the defensive by a well-trying combination of firm security controls and a monopoly of political patronage. The various banned political parties continue to exist with the government's tacit consent, but their activities are limited, and Nuri's effective use of the army and police deprives the more extreme opposition elements of their one effective means of exerting pressure—the street demonstration.

9. At present, about the only recourse available to Nuri's opponents, in their efforts to unseat him, is that of persuasion and intrigue at the Palace. There they seek to exploit the grievances of Crown Prince Abdul Ilah, whose political activities have been severely restricted by Nuri. At present, however, Abdul Ilah is aware that Nuri has the upper hand, and is unlikely to risk a test of strength with the premier.

10. In these circumstances, even if Nuri elects to step down as prime minister—as he has voluntarily done on occasion before—he would probably be able to name his successor or at least to block the appointment

of a candidate unacceptable to him. Iraq has a number of political leaders, including several former prime ministers, who generally accept Nuri's policies or differ only in minor degree, and who might be selected to succeed him. These include followers of Nuri's (such as Khalil Kunnah, related to Nuri and a member of his cabinet) and certain independents or members of what might be called the "loyal opposition" (such as Fadil Jamali, a sometime protégé of Nuri's who has close relations with the Palace, and the leader of the Umma Party, Salih Jabr). The more extreme opposition leaders, such as Faiq Samarrai of the nationalist Istiqlal Party, and Kamil Chadirchi of the leftist National Democratic Party, are unacceptable to Nuri, and his ban on political parties has been enforced with particular stringency against them as well as against the Communists.

11. So long as Nuri dominates the scene, the domestic policies of the Iraqi government will continue to reflect the conservative views of Iraq's traditional ruling oligarchy. Radical measures of internal reform are not likely to be undertaken. Political freedoms will remain limited; a certain amount of corruption in government ministries will be tolerated; and although constructive results will emerge from the development program, strong conservative opposition will continue to delay tax and land tenure reforms designed to maximize the program's benefits.

12. Iraq will probably continue to have the kind of stability suggested above so long as Nuri remains on the scene. If he should decide temporarily to give up the office of premier in favor of an acceptable successor, there would probably be some increase in overt opposition to the government—both in the form of criticism by dissident political leaders and of attempts to use mass pressure tactics, e. g., street demonstrations, against the regime. With Nuri in the background, however, these would probably not be allowed to get out of hand.

13. Nuri's death or incapacitation would remove a major source of governmental strength and authority. A many-sided scramble for power would almost certainly ensue—involving the Palace and a number of individuals—both moderate and extremist—who aspire to succeed Nuri as Iraq's political arbiter. Iraq's political parties are at best weak organizations

held together by individual leaders, and would disappear or be combined as the leaders maneuvered for personal advantage.

14. In this complex political maneuvering, even the Iraqi army—which by Arab standards has been outstandingly nonpolitical in recent years—might become involved. There is no evidence of a revolutionary-minded military clique among Iraqi officers—such as that which overthrew King Farouk in Egypt—and Iraq’s ruling family is in any case more popular than Farouk. However, such a group would be likely to emerge—probably with Egyptian and Saudi encouragement—if the government’s vigilance should be relaxed.

15. The eventual outcome of such an internal power struggle cannot be clearly foreseen. Initially at least, the odds are in favor of control remaining in the hands of the conservatives or moderates. The influence of the Palace—which might even increase for a period when no longer overshadowed by Nuri—would probably constitute for some time to come an effective barrier to extremist efforts to gain power. In time, however, the prestige and influence of the Palace might be eroded, especially since Egypt would probably exploit any opportunities offered by the situation to encourage antimonarchial elements.

16. It is probable that any government in the circumstances just described would be considerably less stable than the present one. No foreseeable successor to Nuri appears to possess the latter’s ability to keep his own supporters and the “loyal opposition” in line, while also firmly suppressing dissident extremists. A moderate or conservative regime would not only be weakened by internal rivalries, but would almost certainly be less effective than the present one in coping with extremist pressures, including those from the fellow-traveling National Democratic Party, the extreme Arab nationalist Istiqlal Party, and the Communists. It would be confronted with the dilemma of continuing Nuri’s policy of suppressing extremist groups—thereby adding to their bitterness—or of allowing them greater freedom of expression at the price of increasing political turbulence and legal or illegal challenges to conservative or moderate control. Even though such extremist opposition is sharply divided, it has in the past united for political purposes on a common ground of Arab nationalism and anti-Westernism, which

found considerable response among urban elements. It could easily do so again if given the chance.

17. Iraq's Communist Party has been the object of firm repressive measures by Nuri's government. As a result, its leaders are in jail or in hiding, and its numerical strength has been reduced to some 600 members and 2,000 active supporters at present. The party attracts its followers principally from the young urban intelligentsia and industrial workers in the port cities and oil industry centers. The Communists are not likely to exert any very significant influence so long as the regime persists in its present measures of suppression. If given the chance by the government, however, the Communists could probably develop some potential for creating industrial disturbances, and would seek to create a national front of opposition parties.

Economics and Stability

18. The financial position of the Iraqi government is strong—largely owing to annual oil revenues from the Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC) which are now in excess of \$206 million per year and which give Iraq a favorable balance of payments position.⁴ Seventy percent of the government's direct annual oil revenues is earmarked for development purposes under a program first started in 1951 and which is to involve the expenditure of more than \$1.4 billion in the period 1955–1960. This program is administered by the Iraq Development Board, which has a British and an American as well as Iraqi members. The program embraces major flood control and irrigation projects as well as the creation of public health, housing, and educational facilities.

19. While certain of the achievements of Iraq's development program have been impressive (notably in the fields of flood control and irrigation), the program is essentially long range in character and has so far had but limited impact on the living standards of the great bulk of the population—about 80 percent of which ekes out a meager livelihood in agricultural or nomadic pursuits. The majority of the unskilled urban laboring classes live in extreme poverty. The growing group of white collar workers, students, and professional people in the cities of Iraq are increasingly frustrated because the development program has not opened up sufficient opportunities of the type which appeals to this class of urban Arabs—for example in law,

politics, and bureaucracy. They are also impatient at the lack of dramatic progress in bringing the appurtenances of modern industrialism to Iraq.

20. Numerically, these urban groups do not bulk large in Iraq's overwhelmingly rural population, but their attitudes are particularly significant for the future of Iraq's political stability. It is in the cities—Baghdad and the oil industry and port centers—that political consciousness is most developed, and that mass pressure tactics, such as strikes and street demonstrations, can be used against the government by dissident extremists. The rural population remains largely illiterate, tradition-minded, politically apathetic, and inclined to accept traditional leadership and government direction.

21. The prospects for eventually alleviating at least some of the economic sources of discontent in Iraq appear reasonably good. Certain of the basic objectives of the development program—long range flood control projects on the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers, for example—are beginning to yield tangible results; and the next few years will probably witness some expansion of health, educational, and housing facilities and other improvements both in Iraq's cities and in the countryside. Moreover, the Development Board itself is showing increasing awareness of the need to publicize the program and to initiate some projects designed to have favorable impact in the cities.

22. Iraq's development program will not of itself, however, assure conditions of political stability. At best it provides Iraqi leaders with a promising basis on which to work. In the politically conscious cities, extremist opponents of moderate or conservative rule in Iraq will find the real or fancied failings of the development program useful in exploiting popular frustrations. However, such opposition efforts will probably be focused more on the foreign policies of Iraq's present leadership than on domestic issues.

Position of the Iraq Petroleum Company

23. The IPC's position appears at least as secure as that of the other major oil concessions in the Middle East. The regime was confronted with strong pressures to nationalize oil operations at the time Iran started to do so in

1951, but Nuri resisted these pressures and instead secured price and other concessions from the company as liberal as any in the area. Iran's subsequent troubles provided an object lesson which is not lost on the responsible leaders in Iraq. Moreover, the IPC itself continues to demonstrate outstanding political skill and economic astuteness in its relations with the government, its Iraqi employees, and the public generally. Finally, by contrast with Saudi Arabia, Iraq has devoted the greater part of the revenues accruing from oil operations to public improvement projects, a practice which tends to strengthen the company's public position.

24. In these circumstances, the chief potential dangers to the IPC would arise in the event of an extremist take over of the Iraqi government or of a general retreat by Western oil and other interests in the Middle East as a whole in the face of nationalist hostility. Either development would intensify pressures for greater concessions from the company, and probably for nationalization. Barring such crises, the IPC's principal difficulties will probably arise from occasional strikes involving some Communist infiltration, and recurring problems with Syria and Lebanon over oil transit rights. In any event, the company will almost certainly find it necessary to grant to Iraq at least the substance of any concessions yielded by Western interests to other Middle East oil-producing states.

Foreign Affairs Outlook

25. While responsibility for Iraq's present foreign policies is primarily Nuri's, there has been a substantial measure of agreement among his own followers, the Palace, and the "loyal opposition" on the general nature of Iraq's foreign interests. In brief, the Iraqi regime's foreign policy is characterized by: (a) a dependence on the UK (and increasingly on the US as well) for support of Iraq and the Hashimite dynasty against Egypt and Saudi Arabia; (b) adherence to Arab League policies of hostility toward Israel and toward the vestiges of imperialism (particularly French imperialism) in the Middle East; (c) an appreciation—rare in the Arab world—of the threat of Soviet imperialism; and (d) a desire to increase Iraqi influence in the Arab world, particularly in Syria.

Relations With the West

26. Virtually all of Iraq's conservative and moderate leaders agreed on the desirability of terminating the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1932—under which the UK maintained airbases and other military facilities in Iraq—as no longer compatible with Iraq's sovereignty and nationalist sensibilities. Yet most of them also desired to obtain greater material benefits from closer association with the US and to preserve defense ties with the West against the Soviet threat, a desire which has probably been strengthened by Soviet arming of Egypt and Syria. As a result, Iraq's adherence to the Baghdad Pact had the support of Jabr, Jamali, and a number of other former prime ministers representing various shades of conservative and moderate political thinking.

27. In general, these leaders have given Nuri their support against the violent Egyptian and Saudi propaganda attacks leveled at himself and the Iraqi government for entering the Baghdad Pact. Indeed, Egyptian efforts to topple the Nuri government immediately after it signed the Baghdad Pact not only failed but backfired; a widespread feeling among even normally anti-Nuri elements that this was going too far evoked for a time something closer to real national unity than is usually seen in Iraq.

28. During the past year or more, however, Iraq has experienced an increasingly uncomfortable sense of isolation from its sister Arab states. The feeling is widespread among politically aware Iraqis, apart from a handful of top leaders, that alliances with the UK and other non-Arab powers are incompatible with the ideal of Arab solidarity. Misgivings over the Baghdad Pact among influential persons, including those who initially approved Iraq's adherence to it, are growing. In part, opposition to the Baghdad Pact is simply a cynical device for political attacks on Nuri—since Iraq's association with the Pact is increasingly coming to be identified as his personal handiwork. There is, however, real concern over the split which the Pact has occasioned in the Arab world and alarm over the success of the ESS⁵ campaign against the Baghdad Pact. Nuri was particularly disturbed by the failure of efforts to secure Jordan's adherence to the Pact, considering it important that at least one other Arab state join Iraq in the arrangement in order to avoid the stigma that Iraq had “sold out” the Arab cause to the West. Among firm supporters of the Pact, including Nuri and

the influential Chief of Staff, General Arif, there is dissatisfaction over the scarcity of tangible benefits from Pact membership as compared with the arms and other offers which Egypt received from the Soviet Bloc.

29. Despite these misgivings and setbacks, neither domestic criticism nor outside Arab pressures are likely to result in a drastic revision of Iraqi foreign policy so long as Nuri dominates the scene. He is himself probably too committed to a broad policy of collaboration with the West, too conscious of the threat of Soviet imperialism, and too hostile toward the regimes of Egypt and Saudi Arabia to take Iraq into the ESS camp or to flirt dangerously with the Soviet Bloc.

30. Nevertheless, if the Soviet-supported ESS campaign to isolate Iraq continues to enjoy the success it has recently had, and Iraq fails to receive convincing evidences of countervailing benefits from membership in the Baghdad Pact, Nuri's position will become increasingly difficult. If sufficiently frustrated, he might attempt to force the issue by various pressure tactics which have served him in the past. He is capable, for example of turning over the government to weaker and less pro-Western hands, or of allowing mob demonstrations against the West—tactics aimed at extracting concessions from the Western backers of the Baghdad Pact on the grounds that they are necessary to preserve his position and to satisfy local opinion.

31. The Iraqi government urgently desires greater US support for the Baghdad Pact, being convinced that the UK alone is not capable of leading the defense of the area or of providing sufficient economic and political support to render the Pact effective. Nuri would probably not resort to the pressure tactics described above so long as he sees a chance of gaining increased US backing through his present policy of cooperation. Nevertheless, the US will be confronted with persistent and probably increasing Iraqi demands for stronger US backing and early adherence to the Pact, as well as for stepped-up military and economic aid. The Iraqi government will probably urge the US to take these steps on the grounds that the Pact would be ineffective without them, that Iraq must show tangible benefits both at home and in the area from membership in the Pact,

and that in any case the US owes greater support to nations which side with the West than to the neutralist states.

32. In these efforts, Iraq can count on the firm backing of the UK. The British will make strenuous efforts to assure a continuation of their still-extensive influence with Nuri and Iraq's ruling oligarchy, and to protect the extensive British oil and other commercial interests in Iraq. Indeed, one of the present dangers to the UK in Iraq is that its efforts in these respects may prove so heavy-handed as to produce adverse reactions not only among anti-Western extremists but also among elements normally friendly to the British. The UK will also support Iraq's efforts in other parts of the Arab world to counter Egyptian and Saudi influence, though the British may oppose extreme Iraqi measures in Syria and Jordan, for example, in the belief that the risks involved would be justified only in the event of dire emergency.

33. On the whole the British position in Iraq is likely to remain reasonably strong at least so long as Nuri or another of Iraq's present conservative or moderate leaders controls the government. During this period, the UK will probably continue to enjoy certain limited rights of access, on the basis of the Baghdad Pact, to the air fields and other military facilities in Iraq which it formerly controlled. While some leaders would prefer to see the US replace the UK as the principal Western power in Iraq, these men are likely to work for their objectives not through a weakening of UK-Iraqi ties but through a strengthening of Iraq's relations with the US. Their efforts may stimulate a certain amount of British concern that the US will supersede the UK in Iraq.

34. When Nuri goes, Iraq will be more likely to alter its foreign policy in the name of "Arab unity" and in the direction of Egyptian-type neutralism. Since a successor regime would probably be less firm and adroit than Nuri in suppressing nationalist, neutralist, and anti-Western elements among the opposition, its freedom to continue Iraq's present foreign policies would be subject to internal pressures and crises which Nuri contrives to neutralize or avoid. Iraq would probably not, under any foreseeable conservative or moderate successor, actually withdraw from the Baghdad Pact. Such a step would constitute too clear a capitulation to Egypt and Saudi Arabia on the

part of the prestige-conscious Iraqis. Nevertheless, the likelihood would be increased that Iraq would gradually de-emphasize its role to the point where its participation would be virtually nil. The chances of Iraq pursuing such a course would be substantially lessened if in the meantime another Arab state joined the Baghdad Pact or if additional Western support for the Pact resulted in increased benefits to Iraq.

35. Under Nuri or any foreseeable successor, Iraq will remain essentially hostile to France, not only out of sympathy for the Arab nationalist cause in North Africa, but also because of the Hashimite dynasty's rivalry with France for a special position in Syria, from which the French ousted the Hashimites in 1920. Anti-French feeling does not, however, preclude limited cooperation with the French aimed at excluding Egyptian influence from Morocco.

Relations With the Other Arab States

36. The outlook is for continuing tensions in Iraq's relations with Egypt which will profoundly affect Iraq's relations with all the Arab states. Egypt, with Soviet support, will almost certainly continue its efforts to undermine the Baghdad Pact and to strengthen its influence in Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon at Iraq's expense. Iraq, on its part, will continue its efforts to enlist Morocco as an anti-Egyptian ally and to supplant or block Egyptian influence in Libya. Even outright Iraqi capitulation to the Egyptian line of Arab foreign policy, or the coming to power of an Iraqi government more inclined than Nuri's to make concessions in the name of "Arab unity," would create only superficial improvements in relations between the two countries; their longstanding rivalry for influence in the Arab world would continue to be a source of tensions between them. Moreover, a weaker Iraqi government than that of Nuri would probably be confronted with stepped-up Egyptian and Saudi efforts to interfere in Iraq's internal affairs.

37. Anything more than a superficial rapprochement between Iraq and Saudi Arabia is also unlikely. Saudi hostility toward the Baghdad Pact will remain one source of tensions, but an even more fundamental one is the deep-seated hostility between the Saudi regime and the Hashimite dynasty of Iraq.⁶ The Saudis will almost certainly remain basically opposed to any expansion of the prestige or influence of the Hashimite dynasty of Iraq, and

fearful of any developments—such as a strengthening of the Baghdad Pact—which promise to strengthen Iraq or to extend its influence in the Arab world. The focal points of contention between Iraq and the Saudis will be Syria and Jordan, where the Saudis will probably continue to work with Egypt in its campaign to undermine Iraqi influence.

38. In the struggle for influence in Syria and Jordan, Egypt and Saudi Arabia have enjoyed certain advantages over Iraq. Syrians and West Bank Jordanians had been conditioned to fear Hashimite expansionism in the long struggle against the “Greater Syria” scheme of Hashimite King Abdullah of Jordan. Saudi Arabia and Egypt have made much more vigorous efforts to advance their interests than has Iraq, which has exhibited a reluctance to match the expenditure of Saudi funds or to carry on as vigorous a political and propaganda campaign as that of Egypt. In addition, pro-Iraqi elements in both Syria and Jordan have shown themselves too disunited and dispirited to serve as an effective basis for Iraqi political and propaganda efforts to offset those of Egypt and the Saudis. The latter two states, moreover, have had considerable success in exploiting existing anti-Western and anti-Israeli sentiments in Syria and Jordan, using the line that the Baghdad Pact is an “imperialist” plot conceived in the interests of the West and of Israel. A continuation of recent trends in Syria and Jordan would undermine what remains of Iraqi influence in those two states, isolate Iraq in the Arab world, and bring an end to its longstanding aspirations for a drawing together of the northern Arab states under Iraqi leadership.⁷

39. There are indications that Iraq is becoming increasingly perturbed over political developments in Syria and Jordan. Iraq will probably feel compelled to step up its heretofore rather limited overt and covert efforts to reverse anti-Iraqi trends in Syria. Its prospects for stemming the decline of Iraqi influence through political and diplomatic activities appear greater in Jordan than in Syria, since the latter is already closely tied to the ESS bloc, while the former—at least as long as King Hussein remains on the throne—will probably continue actively to seek ties with Iraq as well as the ESS states.

40. The Iraqi government has given occasional indications of a desire to intervene militarily in Syria, [2 lines of source text not declassified]. On balance, however, we believe that Iraq is not likely to intervene militarily in Syria unless convinced that this would be the only way of preventing a take over of Syria by militantly anti-Iraqi elements. It might also intervene in Jordan in the event of an imminent threat to the Hashimite throne; such action could be justified by the terms of the 1947 Iraqi-Jordanian treaty. Even in these circumstances, however, the international implications of military intervention would be so serious that Iraq would be unlikely to risk it without the backing of substantial political and military elements within Syria or Jordan, or without prior consultation with the UK and probably the US. It is possible, though unlikely, that if Iraq received the backing of such elements within Syria or Jordan, it might attempt intervention in the expectation that the US and UK would feel compelled to extend their support even though their prior commitment had not been obtained.

41. A final possibility of Iraqi military action to foster Iraqi influence in Syria and Jordan would arise in the event of an Arab-Israeli war. In contributing military support to the Arab cause, the Iraqis would probably use the opportunity to extend Iraqi influence in Syria and Jordan.

Iraq and Israel

42. Iraq sometimes appears less hostile to Israel than do other Arab states. Israel and Iraq have no common boundary, and over one-third of Iraq's population is either non-Arab or non-Moslem and comparatively indifferent to the Israeli question. However, the bulk of politically conscious Iraqis, including most of the ruling group, share the general Arab attitude on the question and indeed sometimes feel compelled to prove—by expressions of extreme hostility toward Israel—that they have not sold out to the West. In these circumstances, Iraq is unlikely to depart from the policies of the Arab League as a whole on the Israeli issue. If the other Arab states moved toward some form of settlement, Iraq would go along, but it is highly unlikely to take the initiative itself. In the meantime, its leaders will probably continue to demonstrate their devotion to the Arab cause by public expressions of hostility to Israel and readiness to fight on the Arab side. In addition, they will attempt to persuade other Arab states that the Baghdad

Pact is a form of securing protection against Israel as well as against the USSR, and will continue to press for a more pro-Arab policy on the part of their Baghdad Pact partners and the US.

Relations With the Sino-Soviet Bloc

43. Iraq's diplomatic and commercial relations with the states of the Sino-Soviet Bloc are for practical purposes nonexistent. The government is deeply concerned by the threat of Soviet imperialism as well as by the domestic dangers of Communism. As long as the Bloc continues its strong opposition to the Baghdad Pact, and its support to Egypt and Syria, the present regime will probably not be responsive to any Soviet advances which may be made.

III. Military Outlook

44. The Iraqi army numbers some 53,000 men.⁸ Equipment, which is largely British, is for the most part obsolescent. Iraq is currently receiving considerable new matériel from the UK and from the US, the latter under a Military Assistance Agreement signed in 1954. The Iraqi air force has four fighter squadrons, including 23 jet and 40 piston fighters. Both the ground and air forces have been trained by the British, with some recent US MAAG participation in the case of the ground forces. For internal security purposes, the army and air force are supplemented by a mobile police force of some 4,000 men, organized into nine battalions with headquarters at Baghdad.

45. While Iraq's military forces are reasonably well-trained and equipped by Middle East standards, their present capabilities do not go much beyond the maintenance of internal security. They could resist an invasion by any Arab state, but the army is incapable of supplying and supporting more than one infantry brigade outside of Iraq without endangering its ability to maintain internal security at home. Against a Soviet invasion, the Iraqi army could at present offer no more than minor harassing action.

46. Some improvement in the planning proficiency and training standards, as well as the equipment, of the Iraqi army and air force will probably result from Iraq's participation in the Baghdad Pact. However, any substantial increase in the military value of the Iraqi forces to the 'northern tier' grouping would require several years of UK or US military assistance and training support at considerably higher levels than the present ones. In the meantime, the primary military value of Iraq to the "northern tier" arrangement lies in the availability of certain of its base facilities to the Western Powers.

¹ Source: Department of State, INR–NIE Files. Secret. According to a note on the cover sheet, "The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff." This estimate was concurred in by the Intelligence Advisory Committee on July 17, 1956. "Concurring were the Special Assistant, Intelligence, Department of State; the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Director of Naval Intelligence; the Director of Intelligence, USAF; and the Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff. The Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the IAC and the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the subject being outside of their jurisdiction."

² Supersedes the sections pertaining to Iraq in NIE 36–54, "Probable Developments in the Arab States," 7 September 1954. [Footnote in the source text. NIE 36–54 is printed in [Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. IX, Part 1, p. 1695.](#)]

³ Iraq's dynasty is of the Hashimite family, a branch of which also holds the throne of Jordan. After the Hashimites had been ousted from Syria by the French, when the latter received the League of Nations mandate for Syria and Lebanon in 1920, the Hashimite monarchies in Iraq and Jordan were established by the British in return for the efforts of the Hashimites in leading the Arab revolt against the Turks during World War I. [Footnote in the source text.]

⁴ The Iraq Petroleum Company is owned jointly by the British Petroleum Company (formerly Anglo-Iranian) (23.75%); Royal Dutch Shell (23.75%); Compagnie Francaise des Petroles (23.75%); Standard Oil of New Jersey

(11.75%); Socony Mobil (11.75%); and C. S. Gulbenkian estates (5%). The IPC and its subsidiaries now hold concessions covering all of Iraq as well as concessions in several principalities of the Persian Gulf. [Footnote in the source text.]

⁵ “ESS” refers to the states of Egypt, Syria, and Saudia Arabia. [Footnote in the source text.]

⁶ This dynastic enmity originated in the bitter political and religious rivalry between the Saudis—leaders of the puritanical Wahhabi movement of Islam—and the Kingdom of the Hejaz which was founded by the Hashimites with British support in World War I. The Saudis not only resented control of the holy cities of Mecca and Medina by what they regarded as religious backsliders, but also feared that the Hashimite King Hussein would attempt, possibly with British support, to extend his rule throughout the Arabian peninsula. In 1925, Ibn Saud ejected the Hashimites from the Hejaz. Ever since, each side has suspected the other (with some justice) of hostile intentions. [Footnote in the source text.]

⁷ Syria has long been the object of various Iraqi plans for a union or confederation— often called the “Fertile Crescent” plan. Nuri himself put forward one such proposal officially in 1943; and Crown Prince Abdul Ilah has consistently pressed for the idea as a means of extending his own prestige and that of the Hashimite dynasty. Iraqi interest in Jordan results from the latter’s position as a sister monarchy also under Hashimite rule. [Footnote in the source text.]

⁸ It is organized into an infantry division, a mountain division, a provisional division, and supporting units, including 1 tank squadron, 2 field artillery regiments, and 1 anti-tank and 1 anti-aircraft regiment. [Footnote in the source text.]

436. Editorial Note

On August 5, British Ambassador Makins transmitted a personal message from Foreign Secretary Lloyd to Secretary Dulles. The text of Lloyd's message reads as follows:

“The Crown Prince of Iraq and Nuri Pasha tackled me on Friday about the 40 Centurion tanks which they hope to get by way of offshore purchase. Iraq is the one Arab country in the Middle East from which the West has any hope of solid support in dealing with Nasser. Nuri has shown himself most resolute and sensible in his conversations with me. But he has made it clear that the satisfaction of their arms requirements is of first importance if he is to keep the army and the country behind him.

“I know this presents difficulties for you but I really think that a quick assurance to the Iraqis that the United States will finance the order for these Centurions may be of vital importance. Could you possibly do this?

“I hope you had a good flight back and were not too tired.”
(Department of State, Central Files, 787.56/8–556)

In a letter of August 8, Dulles replied to Lloyd as follows:

“I am pleased to inform you that the Department of Defense is now proceeding to the off-shore procurement of the forty Centurion tanks for Iraq included within the fiscal year 1957 program. The Department of the Army will shortly be querying the War Office as to delivery dates. The Iraqis would like to use these tanks in their Army Day celebration on January 6, 1957 and the Department of the Army hopes that this deadline can be met.”
(*Ibid.*, 787.5–MSP/8–855)

On August 6, Secretary Dulles had discussed this subject with Ambassador Makins in a telephone conversation. A record of this conversation,

transcribed by Phyllis D. Bernau, reads as follows:

“The Sec. referred to the message yesterday—he thinks the answer is substantially affirmative though he is not able yet to confirm the precise number, but you can expect an affirmative response within a few days. The Sec. mentioned the question of their own production availabilities—M. thought they were all right. The Sec. said perhaps they are. You are quite sure they are going to be shooting in the right direction. M. thinks so—both the King and PM are in London. The Sec. understands they have come out publicly supporting Egypt. M. said that was the report though he has not seen the text yet. The Sec. said we want pretty strong assurance from you—there won’t be delivery for several months—we expect to keep a string on it.” (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers)

437. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iraq¹

Washington, August 8, 1956—7:28 p.m.

164. Joint State–Defense Message. Off-shore procurement 40 Centurion tanks approved for Iraq 57 FY. Information given British in response personal message from Selwyn Lloyd to Secretary asking if US intended furnish Iraq Centurions this fiscal year. Since time delivery depends on ability UK make Centurions available Dept in reply stressed importance many tanks as possible reach Iraq in time for Army Day celebration on January 6.

You may inform Iraqi government US programming these tanks and striving for early delivery.

FYI. Preliminary British estimate on deliveries 24 by end 56 and 14 about March 57. End FYI.

Dulles

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 787.5–MSP/8–856. Secret. Drafted by Hallett and Eli Stevens and approved by Allen. Repeated to London.

438. Memorandum From the Director of Central Intelligence (Dulles) to the Acting Secretary of State¹

Washington, November 22, 1956.

1. Britain's long standing dominant position in Iraq has now become precarious as a result of the military action against Egypt. The pro-Western government of Prime Minister Nuri Said, the symbol of Iraq's association with Britain and the Baghdad Pact, has been severely shaken. Nuri Said, long regarded in the Arab world as a British stooge, is being popularly indicted as having been involved in the British-French-Israeli action. British-French collusion with Israel is widely accepted in the Arab world and the assumed use of Israel in the attack on an Arab state is bitterly resented. Pressures are building up for an Iraqi break with Britain and the Baghdad Pact, and there is considerable pressure for Nuri to step down. The anti-Western, anti-Nuri, pro-Nasr student demonstrations which broke out in Baghdad when the British-French intervened in Suez have been quelled, but hostility toward Nuri and the British continues. Further demonstrations are feared. Extended negotiations over Suez, British-French, or Israeli refusal to withdraw their forces, or a financial pinch in Iraq due to the loss of oil revenues would continue and heighten the pressures in Iraq.

2. Dissatisfaction over Nuri's inaction is reported in both the government and the Iraqi army. Low level government officials were reported on 1 November to be discussing a change of the pro-British government. Top government officials were not unhappy with the prospect that Nasr might be brought down, but they were shocked and embarrassed by the military action and felt that Britain had let them down badly. Senior Iraqi politicians on 4 November told Nuri before his departure for Tehran that he should continue the Baghdad Pact only on the basis of an alliance of Moslem countries with possibly some sort of US representation. The temper of the country, according to these

politicians, would not permit the continuation of the Pact with British representation.

3. Dissatisfaction is reported in the Iraqi army, particularly among the junior officers. At least 40 officers are reported to have been arrested. In the first flush of shock over the British-French action, the Iraqi director of military operations told the American attaché that if the army were ordered to protect Nuri and the British he doubted if they would obey.

4. The government in response to these internal and external pressures has moved to appease Iraqi opinion and to rid Iraq and Nuri himself of the stigma of collusion by strong pro-Arab public statements and denunciations of the Suez action. On 8 November at Tehran, Iraq in concert with other Muslim members of the Baghdad Pact, condemned the Israeli attack, called for a cease-fire and withdrawal of British, French, and Israeli forces. On 9 November, Iraq broke relations with France and announced publicly that Iraqi representatives would not henceforth sit in Baghdad Pact councils while British were present. In another strong statement the Baghdad Radio broadcast a foreign ministry statement which called for the "liquidation" of Israel, and repeated expressions of solidarity with Egypt. These actions are illustrative of the overall response the Nuri government has felt compelled to make in the present situation.

5. These pressures have also had a direct personal effect on the 68-year-old prime minister. Ambassador Gallman reported on 1 November that he had never seen Nuri so worn and preoccupied. Nuri then told Gallman that the British were making a lot of trouble for him and asked how he could keep control of anti-British feeling "after what they had done."²

6. This situation in Iraq, unless altered dramatically, appears to be one in which the position both of Britain and of the present government is being seriously eroded. Those Iraqis who favor cooperation with the West will as a result of the British-French action increasingly ask the United States to provide leadership

and support. Should the Nuri government fall, however, a new government might well find itself under such pressure from anti-Western elements, in the street and in the army, that it could not afford even this step.

Allen W. Dulles

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 787.00/11–2256. Secret; Noform.

² Gallman's account of his conversation with Nuri on the evening of November 1 is in telegrams 730 and 732 from Baghdad, both November 1. (*Ibid.*, 684A.86/11–156)

439. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iraq¹

Washington, November 24, 1956—5:43 p.m.

898. FYI Only—Department giving urgent consideration to measures which might be taken strengthen US support member nations Baghdad Pact. Meanwhile, we are seeking ways to be responsive requests individual member countries. In this context, we would appreciate your comments on whether following possibilities now under study here would be helpful in Iraq:

1) Supply to Iraq of mobile radar training teams with equipment. Cost of teams would be charged against MDAP; equipment would be on loan.

2) Possible increase in number of Iraqi pilots to be trained in US; program of 15 already approved.

3)

USAF fighter aircraft in Turkey. To what extent would stationing of such aircraft meet Iraqi desires? US Government does not believe fighter aircraft should be moved into Iraq at this time²

because move would be described by opponents of US as contrary to UN resolutions and would thus threaten UN peace efforts.

US also conscious possibility strong Soviet reaction any movement US aircraft into area.

4) Alternatively, USAF fighter interceptor trainers with instructors might be sent into Iraq although antagonists of US would also oppose on the same grounds as the interceptors.

Foregoing Air Force assistance to Iraq would be on assumption UK would be informed in accordance with policies originally laid down in Memorandum of Understanding. We appreciate political difficulties may make UK assistance impractical at this time, but we would hope our measures would be temporary and basic aircraft supply relationship between Iraq and UK would ultimately be restored. End FYI Only.

Ankara, Moscow and USRO requested comment on foregoing in light Deptel 1154 to Ankara (for info) sent Paris 1948, Moscow 630.³

Hoover

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/11-2456. Secret; NoFORN. Drafted by Newsom and approved by Murphy. Also sent to Ankara, Moscow, and Paris; repeated to Tehran, Karachi, London, and Paris (to be passed to Ridgway Knight for General Lauris Norstad).

² The subject of placing U.S. jet fighters in Iraq was discussed at a conference among Eisenhower, Hoover, Goodpaster, and MacArthur on November 23. A memorandum of this conference by Goodpaster reads as follows: "Mr. Hoover said that Defense wants to put some U.S. jet fighter units into Iraq, and he thought this had not been agreed in last night's meeting. The President said he had felt that there might be some U.S. jet-trained officers in the MAAG, and that we might furnish some interceptors, as an offset to Syrian aircraft of Russian origin. He had felt the action might be acceptable if it were done as a training enterprise. After further

discussion, there was tentative agreement that it might be possible to help Iraq indirectly by re-equipping a Turkish squadron with the latest type interceptors.” (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File) For text of the first part of this memorandum, see [vol. XVI, p. 1178](#).

³ Telegram 1154, November 21, requested comments from the Embassies in London, Paris, Moscow, and Athens on several possible lines of action, including providing Turkey with increased radar and more advanced aircraft; establishing U.S. radar units in Turkey and U.S. Air Force and pilots at a base such as Adana; and developing further redeployment of NATO forces to strengthen defenses in that area. The Department also noted, among other things, that it was considering the nature of a reply concerning a political guarantee for Iran as proposed in a Turkish memorandum of November 14. (Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/11-1456)

440. Telegram From the Embassy in Iraq to the Department of State¹

Baghdad, November 26, 1956—5 p.m.

933. Paris pass Knight for Norstad and USRO. Deptel 898.² Embassy’s comments follow on suggestions made in reference telegram re measures which might strengthen Iraq as member Baghdad Pact.

(1) In Embtel 812 of November 9³ I supported Iraqi request for radar equipment. I continue to feel US assistance in this field in addition to filling important gap in US intelligence coverage would have highly beneficial effect locally. Purely defensive nature this equipment provides no reasonable basis for adverse criticism of such assistance. Prime Minister only yesterday expressed great interest in this matter and Chief of Staff has been pressing air attaché for reply. (See Embtel 927, November 26)⁴

(2) We feel announcement our readiness increase scope Iraqi pilot training US from present program of 15 spaces would have good psychological effect.

(3) We note USG's attitude re undesirability moving US fighter aircraft into Iraq now. While stationing such aircraft in Turkey would be recognized by local military authorities as measure which could contribute to Iraq's defense, we believe only very limited psychological benefit would be derived locally from such action.

(4) Alternative proposal that we make available USAF fighter interceptor trainers with instructors is similar to one that Iraqi Chief of Staff has already made. I feel we could in cooperation and with local authorities do something along these lines under our MDAP agreement or on some other basis in way to demonstrate our real concern for defense of this area. Political implications of assistance in this form would of course be rendered less vulnerable to criticism if aid extended within context of Baghdad Pact.

(5) Re memorandum of understanding: Department's attention invited to MAAG Chief's message 9-192 November 7⁵ recommending reappraisal value continuing policy expressed in this document. In my view we should, if we feel it advantageous to continue this policy, interpret the memorandum as liberally as possible.

(6) Other steps which US could take to strengthen position of Iraqi Government:

(a) Department's attention invited Embtel 931 of November 26.⁶ I hope no effort will be spared to ensure that this towing equipment reaches Iraq in time for Iraqi Army Day parade.

(b) While Embassy appreciates that great demands being made on limited MDAP funds we feel any evidence of reduction in US assistance effort would have unfortunate political repercussions locally. On other hand position of GOI would be considerably

strengthened by substantial increase of size of aid equipment, and acceleration of deliveries.

(c) It would be helpful if item content of FY 1957 MDA material program could be made known to GOI at early date.⁷

Gallman

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 787.5/11–2656. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Ankara, Moscow, Tehran, Karachi, London, and Paris.

² *Supra*.

³ Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 787.5/11–1056) ⁴ In telegram 927, Gallman reported both Nuri's inquiry about the status of the Iraqi request for radar units and fighter aircraft defense and General Rafiq Arif's earlier approach to the U.S. Air Attaché on the same subject. Gallman noted that Nuri was deeply concerned about Iraq's "exposed position." (*Ibid.*, 787.5/11–2656) ⁵ Not found in Department of State files.

⁶ Telegram 931 dealt with the Government of Iraq's need for towing equipment for the 8-inch howitzers it recently obtained from the United States. (Department of State, Central Files, 787.5–MSP/11–2656) ⁷ Telegram 918 to Baghdad, November 28, informed Gallman that his various suggestions were being given "urgent consideration." In the meantime, Gallman could inform Nuri Said that Iraq's defense needs, including its recent requests for air defense assistance, were receiving priority attention at the highest levels of the U.S. Government. Ambassador Shabandar was similarly informed on November 26. (*Ibid.*, 787.5/11–2656) See [infra](#).

**441. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State,
Washington, November 26, 1956¹**

Washington, November 26, 1956

SUBJECT

Iraqi-U.S. Relations

PARTICIPANTS

Ambassador Musa Shabandar of Iraq

Brigadier Hassan Mustapha, Iraq Armed Forces Attaché, Iraq
Embassy

Mr. Hashim Khalil, Counselor of Iraq Embassy

Mr. William M. Rountree, NEA

Mr. David D. Newsom, NE

Oil for Syria

Ambassador Shabandar said he wished to discuss a number of questions pertaining to U.S.-Iraqi relations. First, he wished to refer to the approach which Mr. Berry had made to him concerning the Syrian threat to blow up Tapline if American companies did not provide Syrian oil requirements.² The Ambassador said, in view of the state of Syrian-Iraqi relations, the Iraq Government had taken this matter up with Saudi Arabia. He believed King Saud had taken appropriate action.

Syria

The Syrian situation, itself, was most serious, the Ambassador said. Syria did not want a solution to the present crisis and the Russians were encouraging them in this policy. The Russians, he said, were, particularly, exploiting the Palestine issue and minimizing the role of the United States in the area. Their claim was that the United States took the stand it did to keep the Russians out, not to help the Arabs.

The Ambassador believed Syrian propaganda had been particularly helped by growing comment in the United States press that Israel has been the victim of the present circumstances and that the United States must help her. Iraq, also, is disturbed by this propaganda, he said, although the Iraq Government is confident President Eisenhower will not be swayed by these pressures.

U.S. Role

With the decline in prestige of Britain and France, the Ambassador said, the United States should “come openly” into the area. Sooner or later Britain and France, because they appeared to be the allies of Israel, will lose all their influence in the area, particularly in Iraq. Iraq, he said, wants the military and moral support of the United States. Iraq might forget the British action in a year or two, he said, but, right now, only the United States and the Russians had influence. The Russians are already in the area, he said, supported by the young officers in Syria. A strong entry of the United States, however, will make the Syrian officers re-examine their position.

Iraqi Military Needs

Brigadier Mustapha outlined needs of the Iraq Armed Forces which he believed the United States could help to meet. Pointing out that, in the past two years, the United States has helped to meet deficiencies in two infantry divisions, he said that Iraq had plans to develop still a third infantry division and wished, also, aid for her Air Force.

Iraq, he said, had only eight obsolete 3.7 inch anti-aircraft guns and needed new medium and heavy AA equipment. Her Air Force, he said, had three squadrons of obsolete Fury fighters, propellor driven; one squadron of

Vampires, an early model jet fighter, and one squadron of Venoms. The latter are modern, he said, but cannot be compared to MIGs. He asked that the United States increase its military assistance program and include the Air Force. He said he had discussed this with the Department of Defense, but they had stated that the aid allocation was already determined and would be difficult to change. He wished to stress, particularly, the need for a squadron of modern jets and pilot training.

U.S. Position

Mr. Rountree assured both the Ambassador and Brigadier Mustapha that the United States was deeply concerned by the situation in the area and, particularly, in Syria. He recognized that Britain and France were being ostracized in the area and would continue to be the targets of anti-Western and pro-Soviet propaganda. The U.S. role, he said, is not to enter into the area to fill a vacuum through domination, but is to support the integrity and independence of the individual nations. We want no claim of U.S. colonialism, he said. The United States hoped, in its relations with the Baghdad Pact countries and Saudi Arabia, in particular, to establish a mutually beneficial relationship.

Noting that the U.S. position was best in those countries which had substantial resources or were financially sound, such as Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Lebanon, Mr. Rountree emphasized the U.S. desire to help those nations which did not have such advantages. These nations, however, he said, because they are poor, provide fertile fields for anti-U.S. propaganda; the United States would like to help them, but is prevented from doing so by prevalent attitudes in these nations. He mentioned Jordan, Syria and Egypt.

In speaking of these nations, Mr. Rountree noted also that some were receiving large quantities of arms—more than their own forces could effectively use. He agreed with the Ambassador's observation that it was in the interest of these nations that a solution be found for the Arab-Israeli question.

Arab-Israel Question

Mr. Rountree emphasized the desire of the United States to find a mechanism through which the Palestine question could be settled. He said the United States thought it had the answer in the U.N. resolution which was tabled,³ but this had apparently generated much opposition.

The Ambassador said he believed any effort at a solution had to start with the 1947 resolutions to which the Arabs were committed and which provided a legal basis. He said he thought the Secretary-General, who had gained great prestige among the Arabs, would be more acceptable than the committee which the U.S. had proposed. He thought he, personally, might be able to sound out Arab leaders at the U.N. on their thoughts on the U.S. resolution. He agreed to inform Mr. Rountree of their comments when he returned from New York.

He pointed out Iraq was in a difficult position since they had been attacked by Arab extremists. He believed any move to a solution of the Palestine question needed to start with Nasser. The Arabs, he said, are shy of committees; they lost Palestine through committees.

U.S. Support for Iraq

Mr. Rountree said that, in implementing its policies in the area, the U.S. attached great importance to Iraq. He stressed that the United States wished to support Iraq and the Baghdad Pact in material and moral ways. The question of additional aid for Iraq, he said, was being considered at the highest levels of the U.S. Government.⁴ We want you to feel that the policies you are pursuing are the best policies, he told the Ambassador.

He said he hoped that Iraq would not abandon its supply relationship with the United Kingdom completely. The United States, however, would act independently to help and to demonstrate the U.S. good will and U.S. capability to assist those nations which help themselves.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.87/11-2656. Secret. Drafted by Newsom.

² On November 15, Ambassador Shabandar met with Deputy Assistant Secretary Berry to discuss the Syrian threat to Tapline. A memorandum of

this conversation is *ibid.*, 883.2553/11–1556.

³ Text of this draft resolution, introduced by the United States on November 3 and designated as U.N. doc. A/3272, is printed in vol. XVI, p.960.

⁴ In a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense, dated November 30, dealing with Turkish and Iraqi requests for U.S. support, Admiral Radford stated that the Joint Chiefs of Staff considered that the United States could deploy 12 interceptor aircraft (F–86D) and 3 mobile radars, with pilots and crews for both, in Iraq under the guise of a training mission. Radford said: “The Joint Chiefs of Staff are aware that such a move into Iraq is potentially dangerous from a political viewpoint, although Iraq would assume political responsibilities for any actions of these aircraft. In this connection, it might be pointed out that membership of the United States in the Baghdad Pact would help to dispel the political problems associated with these deployments.” The Joint Chiefs recommended expediting the political arrangements for this deployment and stressed that “this deployment of forces should be on a temporary basis only to meet an emergency situation.” (Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 62 D 181, CF 815) The subject of Iraqi desire for U.S. assistance in the form of military aircraft and radar rose during a meeting in Secretary Dulles’ office on December 3; see [Document 156](#).

**442. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State,
Washington, December 21, 1956¹**

Washington, December 21, 1956

SUBJECT

Increase in Military Aid for Iraq

PARTICIPANTS

Ambassador Musa Shabandar of Iraq

Brigadier Hassan Mustafa, Iraqi Armed Forces Attaché

Col. Ishmail al-Arif, Secretary, Iraqi General Staff

The Under Secretary

Mr. Rountree, NEA

Mr. Newsom, NE

Ambassador Shabandar said he wished to discuss Iraq's need for greater military assistance. Col. Arif had been sent by the Iraq Government to assist him in this matter. Iraq was particularly concerned about the growing strength of Syria, he said, and Col. Arif brought word from the Iraqi military attaché in Damascus of substantial Soviet aid, including 60–70 MIGs. When questioned as to Syria's actual military capacity, the Ambassador said it was not a question of capability, but of mentality; Col. Sarraj, he said, was a young and unpredictable military leader whose actions were to be feared.

The Under Secretary said that, while the Department had had reports of Soviet arms shipments to Syria, the U.S. information did not show they were as great as some reports indicated; the number of planes, for example, was smaller than the Ambassador's figure.

Mr. Rountree added that the actual Syrian threat was less than many believed it to be. He pointed out that the Syrians had nothing like the quantity of equipment possessed by the Egyptians, yet the Egyptians collapsed quickly before the Israelis. He said the United States wished to do what it could to improve Iraq's capability as rapidly as possible, but in an orderly fashion. He said the United States did not believe the Syrian threat justified hasty action.

The Ambassador said he agreed that the actual Syrian threat may have been exaggerated, but stressed that Iraq was under fire from her Arab neighbors, as well as being threatened from the Soviet Union, and needed a greater defense capability. He said British deliveries to Iraq over the years had been exceedingly slow. In contrast to this, he said, the Syrians had asked for Soviet arms one week and they were "delivered the next." He feared, he said, that Syria, Iraq's "younger brother," would become a stronger military power than Iraq. He cited, as an example, that Iraq's jet aircraft were obsolete in comparison to the new Soviet types received by Syria. He emphasized Iraq's vulnerability to air attack, particularly with respect to the new dams in the north.

The Ambassador and Brigadier Mustafa, during the course of the conversation, enumerated Iraq's immediate needs as follows:

3 squadrons jet fighter aircraft,

100 M-24 tanks to replace armored cars for which spare parts are no longer available,

Equipment for a third division, in addition to the equipment for two divisions currently being supplied under MDAP, and

Mobile radar stations.

Mr. Hoover said he was aware of Iraq's request for these items and that the State Department had been in discussion with Defense on the matter. He said he had hoped to have an answer in time for the Ambassador's call, but that it now appeared definitely a decision might be reached by December 28.

Mr. Rountree added that the United States had every intention of assisting Iraq in every way possible. In answer to a question by the Ambassador, Mr. Rountree said that the United States still supported the Baghdad Pact and hoped to strengthen the Pact by assistance to Iraq. The Ambassador asked whether the Nehru visit² had changed the U.S. position; Mr. Hoover assured him it had not.

Supplementing what the Ambassador had said, Brigadier Mustafa reported Iraq needed eventually six Army divisions and a nine squadron (one group) Air Force. He said, further, Iraq wished to change to a basic U.S. equipment standard and that he believed the British, in the light of recent circumstances, would agree to this. He said he hoped the pace and volume of U.S. shipments could be speeded up. He commented that shipments from the UK were particularly slow. Col. Arif said that some of the equipment from the UK, purchased under the U.S. program, was second hand. Brigadier Mustafa added that the British had agreed to provide one squadron of jet aircraft starting in June, but that this fell far short of meeting Iraq's needs.

The Under Secretary said he assumed Col. Arif would be in touch with Defense on these matters and suggested that he might wish to review the FY 1957 program for Iraq while he was in the United States. Mr. Hoover reiterated that the United States was aware of Iraq's problem and of the implications of the Syrian situation.

Ambassador Shabandar said he wished also to ask the United States to implement a "propaganda cease fire" between Iraq and Syria and Egypt. Mr. Hoover said the United States had made strong representations on this matter and that, while he did not know how effective the representations concerning propaganda might have been, he hoped they were effective in preventing physical attacks.

The Ambassador said he had also spoken to Foreign Minister Fawzi of Egypt on this matter, but he believed there was little Mr. Fawzi could do.

At the conclusion of the meeting, Mr. Newsom received word from ICA that Mr. Clifford Willson had been nominated as the U.S. member of the

Iraq Government Development Board. This news was passed on to the Ambassador.

(Note: Brigadier Mustafa called Mr. Newsom following the meeting to ask which section of the Department of Defense was considering the Iraqi requests and whether they were considering the latest requests submitted by the Brigadier. Mr. Newsom said the problem was receiving wide consideration and he could not say that any particular section had the responsibility. He said particulars of the program should be worked out with the MAAG in Baghdad and that what was being considered was the general policy in the light of over-all U.S. commitments and budgetary limitations.

Brigadier Mustafa said he wished to correct what the Ambassador had said about Syria. He should have said 60–70 tanks, not MIGs. The actual number of aircraft, he said, were few.)

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 787.5–MSP/12–2156. Confidential. Drafted by Newsom.

² Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru made an official visit to Washington, December 16–20.

443. Editorial Note

Between January 30 and February 8, 1957, King Saud and other Saudi dignitaries visited Washington and held extensive discussions with President Eisenhower, Secretary Dulles, and other high-ranking U.S. officials. For documentation on the Saud visit, which includes information concerning Iraq, see [volume XIII, pages 414 ff.](#)

444. Memorandum of a Conversation, White House, Washington, February 5, 1957¹

Washington, February 5, 1957

SUBJECT

Discussion of Middle East Situation

PARTICIPANTS

Iraq

His Royal Highness Crown Prince Abdul Ilah

Ambassador Al-Shabandar

United States

The President

Assistant Secretary William M. Rountree

The President expressed his pleasure that the Crown Prince's visit was taking place at a time when the American Government and people were thinking so much about the problems of the Middle East. He commented that his talks with King Saud had been very good.² He felt that King Saud really wanted to cooperate with the West.

The Prince agreed that the King's attitude was favorable, but said he was concerned that there were so many bad influences in his entourage.

The President commented that the Syrian situation disturbed him more than most others in the area. He realized that Turkey and Iraq, for example, felt that the situation in Syria posed a danger for them. Also, he observed, Egypt and Yemen had given some indication of their willingness to play with the Soviets. They seemed to believe that they could do this without

danger to themselves, and that belief was hard to combat. The President was amazed that the leaders of those countries seemed to think that they could let the communists come and go without seriously jeopardizing their security.

The Prince recalled that in 1938 and 1939, when the United States interest in the Middle East was not as great as now, the Nazis had concentrated upon propaganda and interference in the area. The good elements were strongly backing the democratic system. The Prince and others had urged that the British do more to provide propaganda and material assistance to put the countries in a position to fight for what they thought was right. However, although the British wanted them to be on their side they provided no arms, and other necessary help. This, the Prince said, should not be repeated in the present critical situation. Through propaganda and material assistance the public must be persuaded to line up with the Western world.

The President said the question was not so simple. Theoretically it might be possible to give as many arms as a population could operate, but that would break a country's economy. The job was to find out what each country could be expected to support in the long run. The present threat may go on for as long as thirty years. The impact of a military program must therefore be viewed in the long-term context. Also, he said, the United States could not be expected to take on the job of arming countries throughout the world and maintaining a high level of arms for years to come.

The Prince said he was interested in arms, but also in the development of his country's economy. Economic progress must be made. The situation cannot be met merely by putting people in jail. Some might have to be jailed, but the masses will have to be persuaded that the policies being pursued are the correct ones.

The President said he was not referring particularly to Iraq, but many countries, in their enthusiasm to become well armed, endeavor to acquire too many arms. He felt, of course, that every nation should have an ample force for its particular purposes; that was one reason why we had gone to

Congress to obtain greater flexibility in assisting countries in the area which wished to maintain their independence. Another and important reason was to bring the problems of the Middle East before the American people so that they would back up what we were trying to do.

The Prince hoped that too much would not be given to those countries which were not friendly to the West; otherwise it would be difficult to demonstrate to the true friends of the West the benefits of that friendship.

The President agreed. He observed that one point not generally recognized was that when countries acquired large quantities of arms from another nation, they thereby assumed a dependence upon the supplier for spare parts and replacements unless they had the capability of producing the equipment themselves.

The Prince, reverting to the situation in Syria, said the Government had gone so far to the left that it had permitted the development of a "base" in North Syria. This had been most disturbing to the Iraqi Government. He said the whole territory surrounding the base had been proclaimed a military area, as had the Port of Lattaquie, and travel to it was prohibited.

The President said this was quite disturbing. He would find out what we knew of the situation and would let the Prince know. It was important to find out who our friends were. We hoped that Iraq and Saudi Arabia, both friendly to the United States and to the West, would be able to get together.

The Prince responded that there were no ill feelings between the two countries. Difficulties had been created, however, by others who were trying to cause trouble. The Syrians and Egyptians were opposed to close relations between Iraq and Saudi Arabia.

The President expressed the hope that improved relations between those two countries would help to keep down Syrian influences. Eventually the situation in Syria might change to our advantage.

The Prince commented that the Syrian people were all right, but that a small number of Syrian leaders were communist and were exploiting the situation to their advantage. They were making the most of the Israeli question to get a solid foothold in Syria.

The President said that one of the great problems was to find a solution to the Israeli question. This was difficult in the highly emotional state now existing in the area. He said the Secretary of State had been extremely patient and had worked hard in this connection. The Secretary had by no means given up hope. He had the complete confidence of the President. Not twice in his term of office had the President disagreed with the Secretary on major political questions. He was a very wise man. The President hoped that before this year was out the Middle Eastern situation would look better. Once the resolution being sought in Congress was passed, we could move forward with bilateral talks with the countries of the area and find out what their needs were—technical assistance, financial aid, arms, etc. He expected that we would be able to work out schemes to inspire hope among the peoples of the area, and with greater hope the situation would improve.

The Prince said that during the meeting in Ankara of the Moslem members of the Baghdad Pact,³ they had asked him to urge the President to adhere to the Pact. They thought that if the United States did not do so the Pact would be of no importance. The British position in the Middle East had been destroyed and the Pact badly needed a big power as a member if it were to be an effective arrangement.

The President said he was aware of the attitude of the members of the Pact. He had of course given the matter continuous thought. However, we believed it important that someone, who was a friend of all the nations in the area, be available to work toward bringing the region as a whole together. This was important to preserve the political independence of the nations and to provide an economic base for their operation. The Israeli problem was more critical in the short-term than the Soviet threat. While the latter in the long-term loomed much larger, the Israeli question served to keep many of the nations of the area apart. We supported the Baghdad Pact but wanted to keep on a basis with, say, Saudi Arabia which would retain them on our side. We were anxious not to take a step which would serve to

divide the area, because until it is brought together we could not find permanent solutions to the problems.

The Prince thought we could not get together with the present regimes in Syria and Egypt since both were committed so fully against the Baghdad Pact and against cooperation with nations outspokenly in favor of free world association. The President agreed that the Syrian situation looked bad in terms of the present regime, but wondered if the Egyptian were quite so hopeless. He thought there might be some better prospect for improvement there.

The Prince reported that the Turks and Pakistanis thought that if the United States had joined the Baghdad Pact in the beginning, Syria and Egypt would not have attacked it as much as they did. Opposition in the early days would have placed them in a position of appearing to be pro-communist.

The President responded that he would be the last to claim that we had always made perfect guesses. He could, however, claim that the objective which we have had, of endeavoring to bring the countries of the area together to maintain their independence and security, was a proper one. If the area were divided, it could not be strong and stable. If it were strong and free the United States would have all that it sought. In those circumstances we could maintain our mutually beneficial trade, participate in the development of oil resources, etc, and in doing this we would seek no special benefits. He thought that that, in the long run, was what our objective must be, and felt that our joining the Baghdad Pact would have impaired that objective. For example, he said, the British wanted us to join the Baghdad Pact and were themselves a member; but they were involved in disputes with Saudi Arabia.

The Prince asked, if the United States could not join the Baghdad Pact, whether it might join the military committee. Mr. Rountree recalled that in supporting the Baghdad Pact, we had also joined the economic committee and the counter-subversive committee and provided liaison with the military committee; however, actual membership in the military committee had presented a problem as between members and a non-member. This was a matter which was under continuing review.

The President observed again that Syria at the moment was a serious obstacle to our effort to bring the area together. However, if the present regime in Syria did not truly represent the will of the people, it probably would not stand.

The Prince said the big question related to the building of a communist base there. There were recent reports of a substantial number of Soviet officers and men having arrived in Syria. His inference was that it might soon be too late to contemplate a change of government in Syria responsive to the will of the people. The Ambassador said that the present Syrian behavior made it appear that they felt very strong and confident. A short while ago they would not have dared blow up the IPC pipelines because they would be fearful of the Iraqi reaction.⁴ Currently they were poisoning local sentiment in Iraq through their propaganda against the Baghdad Pact and against the Iraqi regime.

The President was disturbed to learn of the strength of the Syrian propaganda. He wondered if something should not be done to counteract it. Mr. Rountree said that the members of the Baghdad Pact were doing something along these lines through the Pact committees, and that independently programs were underway in several countries. The question of informational activities might be one which could very usefully be discussed at greater length with the Prince and our other Iraqi friends.

The President repeated that he was very glad that the Prince had come at this time. The President had been giving much thought to the problems which they had discussed. In fact, if he could do so he would be glad to go to the Middle East and discuss these matters directly with the Government. Unfortunately that was not possible. Thus, since we needed the clearest possible picture of the facts and of the views of the people of the area, such visits as that of the Prince were of great benefit to us. He referred to Mr. Nehru's visit and said the latter thought that Egypt was not as bad as we believed it to be. He considered the Egyptians emotional and strongly anti-British, but had observed that Nasser could have gone much further than he did and still be supported by his own people. On the other hand, the President had thought that the policies of Nasser had been extremely harmful. For example, the Fedayeen activities in other countries, including

even other Arab states, had caused great difficulty. The Prince agreed that the Egyptian Fedayeen operations had been shocking and said that they had been carried out in Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, Ethiopia and elsewhere, as well as in Israel.

The President concluded by saying that he was pleased that the Prince would be meeting with the Secretary of State and other officials to go into these matters in greater detail.

¹ Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles–Herter Series. Secret. Drafted by Rountree.

² See *supra*.

³ The four Muslim member states of the Baghdad Pact met in Ankara on January 19.

⁴ On November 3, 1956, the Iraq Petroleum Company's oil pipeline through Syria was damaged, and the flow of oil stopped. For documentation on the subject, see [vol. XIII, pp. 594 ff.](#)

**445. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State,
Washington, February 5, 1957¹**

Washington, February 5, 1957

SUBJECT

Visit of Crown Prince Abdul Ilah of Iraq

I. PALESTINE SITUATION

PARTICIPANTS

For the United States:

The Secretary

Mr. Rountree—NEA

Ambassador Gallman

Mr. Memminger—NEA

Mr. Eilts—NEA

For Iraq:

Senator Salih Jabr

Senator Tawfiq Suwaidi

Senator Ali Jawdat al-Ayyubi

Deputy Fadhil Jamali

Senator Ahmad Mukhtar Baban

Ambassador Moussa Shabandar

Mr. Hashim Khalil, Iraqi Embassy

After welcoming the Prince, the Secretary said he had come at an auspicious time. The fact that King Saud is also here adds significance to the presence of the Iraqi delegation. The Secretary had earlier seen the President, who had told him briefly of his meeting with the Prince.² He then invited the Prince to express any further views he might wish to communicate to us.

The Prince observed that the Iraqi delegation had come to present both the Iraqi viewpoint and that of the other three Baghdad Pact Moslem states. He would ask his colleagues to review the several matters of concern. Thereupon Dr. Jamali listed these as (a) Palestine, (b) Syria, (c) Egypt, (d) Jordan, (e) Saudi Arabia, (f) North Africa.

Jamali then outlined the well-known Iraqi views on Palestine. A great injustice had been done to the Arabs. The million refugees are fodder for Communism. If some justice is to be restored to the Arabs, if the dignity of the UN is to be retained, if Middle East confidence in the United States is to be restored, the 1947–48 UN resolutions should be implemented. The existence of a UN police force should now make this possible. Suwaidi added his view that Nasser had turned to the Soviets largely because of disillusionment over the West's attitude on Palestine. Jabr warned that unless the UN resolutions on Palestine are implemented, it will inevitably lose prestige in the area. Baban felt that permitting Israel to obtain arms superiority was the root of the problem. All emphasized the danger to peace inherent in the problem and urged the United States to take action to resolve it.

The Secretary replied that we know the presence of Israel creates a difficulty in the area and that the refugees are a potential source of danger. He recalled that the UN resolutions had initially been rejected by the Arabs. Since then various other arrangements have evolved, none of which can readily be altered without mutual consent. The Secretary doubted the value of coercion to force acceptance of the resolutions. They might be acceptable to some; others do not find them so. He had hoped a year and a half ago

when making his August 26, 1955 speech that some beginning might be made in resolving certain aspects of the problem. This prospect seems more remote today. The present Administration has proven that it is more disposed to take an impartial view of the issue than have its predecessors. It has refused to be dominated by the Israeli viewpoint. We are ready to approach a solution to be dominated by the Israeli viewpoint. We are ready to approach a solution to the Arab-Israeli and to the refugee problems whenever it appears that something useful may be accomplished. Any approach must take into account all that has gone before. For the moment, we will probably have to continue to live with the issue. We know it offers an opportunity to the Soviets to step in and offer assistance. Yet, as the Secretary had pointed out to King Saud, it was U.S. influence rather than Soviet arms which had saved Egypt. The states of the area should know this. We sympathize with the need for a solution. Perhaps the refugee problem may be resolved first. Some, but not all, may be able to return to their homes in Israel. In any event, the problem will have to be handled piecemeal and within the context of the United Nations.

Other subjects discussed are recorded in separate memoranda.²

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 787.11/2-557. Secret. Drafted by Eilts.

² See the memorandum of conversation, *supra*.

² See [Documents 446-451](#).

**446. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State,
Washington, February 5, 1957¹**

Washington, February 5, 1957

SUBJECT

Visit of Crown Prince Abdul Ilah of Iraq

II. SYRIAN SITUATION

[Here follows the same list of participants as [Document 445](#).]

Referring to the Syrian situation, Dr. Jamali stated Iraq is currently losing \$700,000 per day because of the stoppage of oil. Iraq cannot afford this loss. The anti-Iraqi regime in Syria is responsible for the destruction of the pipeline. Friends of Iraq and friends of the West in Syria are either jailed or in exile. Syria is becoming a serious danger spot for Iraq. It is the center of Communist radiation. Senator Suwaidi added that at the recent meeting of the four Baghdad Pact Moslem member states he had noted considerable Turkish annoyance over Syria. If the present situation continued unaltered, he was worried over the possibility of a Turkish-Syrian clash. Such a development would place Iraq in a difficult position. The Syrian Army's destruction of the oil pipelines was aimed at Iraq as well as at the U.K. and France. There is no sign of improvement in the internal Syrian situation. Iraq hoped that the U.S. might find an early solution to the problem.

The Secretary replied that we are deeply concerned with the trend of developments in Syria and are watchful for any opportunity to reverse this trend. In the meantime, we are doing what we can to get the pipeline reopened. Some hope for this has been held out of late. Mr. Rountree added that the Prime Minister of Syria, in talks with our Ambassador, had seemed much more conciliatory in the last few days. He hoped that other Syrian Cabinet members would react similarly.

The Prince interjected that it is not the Prime Minister or the Cabinet of Syria which has the controlling voice in this matter. It is Col. Sarraj and his leftist-military clique. Mr. Baban observed that Iraq is paying a heavy price for its friendship with the West. Syria and Iraq, which have historically always been together, have drifted apart because of this, with Syria sliding toward Communism.

The Secretary reiterated that we must watch the Syrian situation carefully and seek to do something about it.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 787.11/2-557. Secret. Drafted by Eilts.

**447. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State,
Washington, February 5, 1957¹**

Washington, February 5, 1957

SUBJECT

Visit of Crown Prince Abdul Ilah of Iraq

III. SITUATION IN EGYPT

[Here follows the same list of participants as [Document 445](#).]

Dr. Jamali noted that Egypt had become a principal source of propaganda both against Iraq and against the Baghdad Pact. Iraq has nothing against Egypt, but Egyptian policy against Iraq is a matter of grave concern. He did not feel, however, that Egypt should be penalized for the policy of its leaders. There should be no Israeli occupation of Egypt. He regretted that the problem of Israeli occupation of parts of Egyptian territory has not yet been solved. Senator Jabr interjected that French collusion with Israel had aggravated the problem.

The Secretary opined that some of the problems of the area had been further complicated by British policy. He did not wish to criticize. While mistakes may have been made in the past, we must now look to the future. In any event, there was no great difference between Iraq and the United States with respect to our attitude toward Egypt.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 787.11/2-557. Secret. Drafted by Eilts.

**448. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State,
Washington, February 5, 1957¹**

Washington, February 5, 1957

SUBJECT

Visit of Crown Prince Abdul Ilah of Iraq

IV. SITUATION IN JORDAN

[Here follows the same list of participants as [Document 445](#).]

Dr. Jamali stated that Saudi Arabian money, Egyptian propaganda and Soviet influence have all joined to bring about a serious situation in Jordan. Iraq is anxious that Jordan be saved. One way to accomplish this would be to persuade King Saud, while a guest in the United States, to cease financing hostile propaganda efforts in Jordan and Lebanon.

Recalling that there had been a few days when Israel had agreed not to object to Iraqi troops being sent to the East Bank of the Jordan,² the Secretary inquired, parenthetically, why Iraqi troops had not been sent into Jordan at that time. The Prince replied at once that Iraq had not sent troops to Jordan because of “conditions” imposed by the Jordanians. The latter had insisted that Iraqi troops move to the West Bank of the Jordan where they would have been face to face with the Israelis. This might have resulted in war with Israel. Iraq had been accused of wishing to partition Jordan, and Egyptian propaganda would certainly have sought to depict any movement of Iraqi troops to the West Bank as part of such a design.

The Secretary took due note of the Iraqi views.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 787.11/2–557. Secret. Drafted by Eilts.

² On October 1, Israeli Prime Minister Ben Gurion indicated his approval of the move of Iraqi troops into Jordan, provided they remained east of the

Jordan River. After attaching specific conditions to their acquiescence to the move, the Israeli Foreign Ministry on October 12 issued a statement opposing the move. For documentation on this subject, see [vol. XIII, pp. 55 ff.](#)

**449. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State,
Washington, February 5, 1957¹**

Washington, February 5, 1957

SUBJECT

Visit of Crown Prince Abdul Ilah of Iraq

V. SITUATION IN SAUDI ARABIA

[Here follows the same list of participants as [Document 445](#).]

Dr. Jamali said Iraq would like to be on friendly terms with Saudi Arabia, and in fact would be delighted if Saudi Arabia would join the Baghdad Pact. In any event, Iraq would like to establish cooperation with Saudi Arabia in anti-Communist efforts.

The Secretary stated that he did not think it possible to persuade Saudi Arabia to join the Pact at this time. Any invitation to do so would probably only be rebuffed. It would be a great gain, nevertheless, if SA could be persuaded to take a more tolerant view of the Pact. We must work to bring this about. The Prince might be able to help on this score.²

The Prince agreed. He said he was seeing King Saud tomorrow.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 787.11/2-557. Secret. Drafted by Eilts.

² A memorandum of this conversation by Secretary Dulles reads in part as follows: "The Crown Prince asked me what I thought the real attitude of King Saud was toward Iraq and the Baghdad Pact. I repeated that I thought it would be a great mistake to ask him to join the Pact, but I did feel that King Saud wanted to have more friendly and closer relations with Iraq. I thought something could be done along this line." (*Ibid.*, Conference Files: Lot 62 D 181, CF 833)

**450. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State,
Washington, February 5, 1957¹**

Washington, February 5, 1957

SUBJECT

Visit of Crown Prince Abdul Ilah of Iraq

VI. SITUATION IN NORTH AFRICA

[Here follows the same list of participants as [Document 445](#).]

Dr. Jamali stated that Iraq hoped that the new states in North Africa—Morocco, Tunis and the Sudan—could be won over to our side.

The Secretary remarked that there were good grounds for hope on this score. There remained, of course, the problem of the French in Algeria. We believe that if the Algerian debate in the General Assembly is conducted in a spirit of reason rather than of emotion, it will be beneficial in helping to persuade the French. We do not feel that a concrete substantive resolution could influence the French or Algerians. The Secretary had discussed this matter yesterday with the Tunisian Ambassador. We ourselves have a divided record on independence. Although we fought for it in the Revolutionary War, we fought against it in the Civil War. The situation in Algeria is admittedly somewhat different from that which existed in the U.S. in 1861 since Algeria's population is predominantly non-French. The Secretary felt, however, that the value of UN consideration of the problem will depend largely upon the persuasive power with which reasonable views are expressed.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 787.11/2-557. Secret. Drafted by Eilts.

**451. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State,
Washington, February 5, 1957¹**

Washington, February 5, 1957

SUBJECT

Visit of Crown Prince Abdul Ilah of Iraq

VII. BAGHDAD PACT

[Here follows the same list of participants as [Document 445](#).]

Although time had about run out, the Secretary stated that he wished to add a few words to what the President had discussed with the Prince earlier in the day on the subject of our general relationship to the Baghdad Pact.

We are very sympathetic to the Pact. It represents in part a development of a policy which the Secretary had initiated after his return from the Middle East in 1953. We have been concerned over divisive elements within the Pact. The actions of some Pact members, not Iraq, could be so interpreted. We had again indicated in November our strong support of the Pact.² We have joined its Economic and Counter Subversion Committees. When Congress acts on the President's proposal,³ we hope to be able to go much further in our participation in the Pact's Military Committee, as well as in all activities of the Pact directed against communism.

We do not wish to become involved in anything that might hurt our friendly relations with Saudi Arabia. We hope that the Saudi attitude toward the Pact may change. When we are convinced that United States adherence to the Pact may have a solidifying influence in the area rather than a divisive one, we are prepared to reconsider the matter of adherence. In the meantime, we propose to give increasing support to Pact activities.

The Prince opined that if the United States had joined the Pact at the outset, much of the opposition to it would never have developed. The Secretary merely stated that developments had moved so fast that we could not be certain.

Dr. Jamali thought we should join the Baghdad Pact and develop thereby a single belt, consisting of NATO, the Pact and SEATO, to contain Communism.

Mr. Rountree observed that the President had stated earlier that we were perhaps not always fully accurate in our assessment of the Middle East situation. We could claim, however, that one assessment was entirely valid, viz: the importance of bringing unity to the Middle East rather than fostering divisions.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 787.11/2–557. Secret. Drafted by Eilts.

² On November 29, 1956, the United States issued a statement reaffirming its support of the collective efforts of the Baghdad Pact nations to maintain their independence. For text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, December 10, 1956, p. 918.

³ On January 5, President Eisenhower submitted a resolution for economic and military cooperation with the nations of the Middle East (House Joint Resolution 117, Senate Joint Resolution 19). See [Documents 183](#) ff.

**452. Memorandum of a Conversation, Mayflower Hotel,
Washington, February 6, 1957¹**

Washington, February 6, 1957

SUBJECT

Aid to Iraq

PARTICIPANTS

HRH Crown Prince Abdul Ilah

General Ghazi Daghestani

Deputy Fadhil Jamali

The Secretary

NEA—Lampton Berry

Ambassador Gallman

After the luncheon today,² the Crown Prince asked the Secretary if he could give the Iraqi guests a few more minutes of his time in order that they might express certain views to him. The Secretary having indicated in the affirmative, he and the Iraqis were joined by Ambassador Gallman and Mr. Berry.

The Crown Prince indicated that since this might be the last opportunity of consulting with the Secretary, he and his colleagues would like to put certain proposals to him. The Crown Prince then turned to Jamali (Head of the Iraqi Delegation to the United Nations) and the latter proceeded to put forward his well-known theme to the effect that the United States should make Iraq the American model in the Middle East, militarily, economically and culturally. The Secretary laughingly remarked that he seemed to have heard that before. Jamali and General Daghestani then said that Iraq's needs

in the military field were extensive but that they were not getting what was needed. They requested the Secretary to telephone the Defense Department and extend strong support for Iraq's needs.

The Secretary said that he was depressed by the magnitude of the requests which we are receiving for military aid from a large number of our friends. What good did the large quantities of Soviet arms possessed by the Egyptians do during the recent hostilities? He referred to countries such as Turkey and Korea which had become grossly overcommitted militarily to the detriment of their economies and to the fact that the United Kingdom is actually cutting back militarily. Smaller countries must learn to depend upon the United Nations for protection or, in the event that the latter cannot act, upon military assistance from their friends. He said that he was not opposed in principle to reasonable military assistance to Iraq but that Iraq must bear in mind the cost of maintenance and re-equipment over a period of years. The prevailing sentiment of Congress and of public opinion in this country is such that in the next few years we must be in a position to reduce the amount of military aid which we are called upon to furnish to our friends abroad. Iraq should, therefore, plan its military establishment in such a way that it can be maintained after five or ten years by Iraq's own resources rather than dependence on external aid.

The Crown Prince said that they were not asking for an immense force and General Daghestani added that the foregoing was strictly based on their regional commitments under the Baghdad Pact and that they were very much aware of the financial difficulties.

The Secretary said we would give sympathetic consideration to an arms program for Iraq but he asked them to bear in mind the opposition in Congress even to the military and economic provisions of the "Eisenhower Doctrine".

Jamali said that he sincerely hoped that the friends of the United States in the area would receive the larger share of the funds available under the "Eisenhower Doctrine" and that little would go to "appeasers". The Secretary indicated agreement.

Jamali then indicated that Iraq needed more help in the economic development field. They would particularly welcome private investment. More needed to be done in the rural areas of the country.

Jamali said that there needed to be much more contact between the peoples of Iraq and the United States in order to promote more widespread understanding. He made a plea for bringing a greater number of Iraqi students to the United States for higher technical training and for the establishment of a technical university in Iraq. We were not pushing the “democratic ideology” enough in the Arab world. There needed to be more American lecturers in the country. We should also establish youth centers in Iraq.

The Secretary concluded the meeting by saying that he had listened with sympathy to their persuasive presentation, more sympathetically to the latter part than to the first.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 787.5–MSP/2–657. Confidential. Drafted by Berry.

² On February 6, Secretary Dulles hosted a luncheon at the Mayflower Hotel in honor of Crown Prince Abdul Ilah. During this luncheon, according to a memorandum for the record by Lampton Berry, “the Secretary, in proposing a toast to the Crown Prince, said that it was a source of great satisfaction to us that Iraq had reached a degree of maturity which enabled it to exercise a helpful and stabilizing influence not only in the Middle Eastern area but in international relations generally.” (*Ibid.*, 787.11/2–657)

453. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iraq¹

Washington, February 20, 1957—1:44 p.m.

1411. Joint State–ICA–Defense message. Iraqi Counselor² and General Daghestani were given reply February 15 to several Iraqi requests related

military assistance.³ Following is summary informal memorandum handed Iraqis.⁴ You may inform Prime Minister these details.

1. FY 1957 program represents substantial increase over FY 56 and provides far greater quantity of equipment than total so far delivered under military assistance program. Daghestani given details 57 program which MAAG may now discuss with Iraqis.
2. In response request for accelerated two division program US bringing forward from 58 program equipment including 24 M-24 tanks and various combat vehicles.
3. US providing 5 additional pilot training spaces and two air staff spaces in addition to 15 already programmed.
4. US agrees in principle assist Iraqi internal security forces and ready send civil police expert to discuss requirements, including equipment, training and technical advice.
5. US accepts third infantry division and one armored unit similar to combat command US armored division as additional force objectives for Iraq. While US cannot undertake this time provide equipment these forces on grant basis, every effort will be made expedite requests GOI for purchases military equipment US sources, and consideration will be given possible extension credit. US reaffirms its intention, subject availability funds, consider requirements jointly agreed force objectives which demonstrably beyond long-run capability its allies to meet from their own resources.
6. US not in position present time meet requests Iraqi Air Force, but suggests discussions later date on possibility sale aircraft under existing US-Iraq reimbursable agreement.

In regard par 4 above such survey must under US policies precede any grant of equipment.

Concerning par 5 Department promised Daghestani in response his question investigate possible use US credit facilities for OSP. Purchase under credit arrangements creating problem in connection OSP. FYI. US does not exclude possibility ultimate grant aid but this not raised by Counselor and Daghestani, and not mentioned by Department. We should be especially careful avoid any intimation this position which might be interpreted as commitment. End FYI.

In presenting foregoing Department stressed desire to continue provide effective help Iraq forces and mentioned possibility that Iraqi requirements could also be discussed with experts who will accompany Richards Mission.⁵

Dulles

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 787.5–MSP/2–2057. Secret. Drafted by Newsom and approved by Rountree. Repeated to London and Paris for the Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council.

² Hashim Khalil, Counselor of the Iraqi Embassy.

³ The memorandum of conversation of this meeting is in Department of State, Central Files, 787.5–MSP/2–1557.

⁴ A copy of this informal memorandum is attached to the memorandum of conversation cited in [footnote 3](#) above.

⁵ Eisenhower appointed former Congressman James P. Richards to travel to the Middle East after Congress approved the President’s Middle East Resolution (Eisenhower Doctrine) to gather information and explain U.S. policy to Middle Eastern governments. Regarding the Richards Mission to Iraq, see [vol. XVII, pp. 393 ff.](#) and [Document 217](#). Gallman reported that he called on Nuri Said on February 23 and gave him orally the substance of the appropriate portions of telegram 1411, Gallman said that Nuri was glad to get this information, since no report had reached him about the February 15 meeting with Daghestani and Khalil. According to Gallman, Nuri seemed “genuinely relieved and pleased” to receive the U.S. reply. (Telegram 1432 from Baghdad, February 23; Department of State, Central Files, 787.5–MSP/2–2357) On February 26, during a meeting at the Department of State, Brigadier Hassan Mustafa informed the Department that, in general, the

Crown Prince, General Daghestani, and he had been disappointed in the U.S. response of February 15. Lampton Berry replied that the Department had been notified by the Embassy in Baghdad that Nuri had expressed satisfaction with the contents of the U.S. memorandum. Berry assured Mustafa that Nuri had received no additional information. (Memorandum of conversation, February 26; *ibid.*, 787.5–MSP/2–2657)

454. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iraq¹

Washington, March 14, 1957—8:31 p.m.

1553. Inform Richards. Baghdad's 1473 and USAIRA's C-42.² Joint State-Defense. You may use following in discussion with Prime Minister and General Rafiq to indicate continuing USG interest in effective air defenses Iraq.

Since original Iraqi expression of concern during crisis last fall³ USG has been mindful Iraq's desire for assistance in air defense. In considering requests for military aid however USG has doubted defenses could be effectively strengthened to meet any current threat by introduction US equipment for Air Force through aid program. Possibility eventual discussions re sale of aircraft not excluded in reply given General Daghestani February 15. USG pleased at information received since that UK supplying Hawker Hunters which should provide immediate strengthening RIAF.⁴

FYI. This response based on: 1) fact primary responsibility for Iraq Air Force still rests with UK, and 2) Defense position that aid for RIAF beyond approved pilot training is not justified at this time. Richards recommendations and possible increased US participation in Baghdad Pact military activities may however provide basis for further consideration Iraq air defense problem. Richards Mission will also be empowered discuss possible further ground force assistance which may include some anti-aircraft items. End FYI.

USAF sending separate message to AIRA containing reply from Twining for Rafiq.⁵

Herter

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 787.5–MSP/3–457. Secret. Drafted by Newsom and approved by Rountree. Repeated to London, Beirut, and Tripoli.

² In telegram 1473, March 4, Gallman called the Department’s attention to two messages sent by the Air Attaché to the Director of Intelligence, U.S. Air Force. The first message, February 25, concerned the overflight of Baghdad by an unidentified plane on February 23. The second message, C–42, March 2, reported Rafiq’s “keen disappointment” after receiving word of the negative decision on USAF-MDAP for Iraq. Rafiq reportedly mentioned both recent unidentified overflights of Iraq and information concerning the operation in Syria of Russian-built aircraft, and made a renewed request for adequate radar coverage and some modern fighter aircraft. Gallman requested information concerning the status of the longstanding Iraqi request for air defense assistance, as well as authority to provide the Government of Iraq with some indication of U.S. reassurance concerning U.S. efforts to assist Iraq. (*Ibid.*) Message C–42 has not been found in Department of State files.

³ On November 10, 1956, the Embassy urgently requested the Department’s attention to a message from the Air Attaché regarding an Iraqi request for radar units and fighter aircraft defense. The Embassy hoped that a prompt favorable response would be forthcoming. (Telegram 812 from Baghdad, November 10; *ibid.*, 787.5/11–1056) ⁴ In telegram 1459 from Baghdad, February 26, Gallman reported that the British Ambassador had informed him that the United Kingdom would provide Iraq with five Hawker-Hunter Mark 6 aircraft, with a substantial quantity of spare parts, on a grant basis. (*Ibid.*, 787.5622/2–2857) ⁵ Not found in Department of State files.

455. Telegram From the President's Special Assistant (Richards) to the Department of State¹

Baghdad, April 8, 1957—1 p.m.

1660. From Richards. First meeting morning 7th was half-hour call on King Faisal given over largely to amenities, King expressing cordial welcome to mission.

Mission with Ambassador Gallman and two Embassy officers then spent hour and half with Nuri during which he expanded in rather general terms on what he considers principal dangers peace and stability ME and made plea for assistance largely military items.

Nuri found three main threats ME stability: Israel, Nasser, and Soviets.

Israel

Nuri recalled his conversations with Secretary during latter's visit Baghdad 1953² and mentioned how he had suggested that negotiations looking to peaceful settlement be undertaken on basis 1947 UN resolution. He recognized Israel entitled areas given it by resolution but Israel's claims to additional territory seized not legitimate and Israel must be prepared bargain over disposition these areas. Arab fear of Zionism was weapon Hitler used against West and now Soviets had laid hold of it for same purpose.

Nasser

Nuri views him now as Soviet tool through whom Russians have gotten control Syria and will soon get Jordan also. Nasser will do all he can to thwart US efforts to improve situation in Syria and Lebanon. Noting number of missions exchanged between Egypt and Communist China, Nuri concludes Nasser is anxious imitate latter. He believed from moment he heard of Egypt's acceptance Soviet arms these weapons were intended to be used not against Israel but against West.

Threat From Soviet Union

Nuri referred with pride to his refusal to continue diplomatic relations with Soviet Union “since we regard each other as criminals”. Following their failure in Iraq, however, Soviets seemed to have transferred center their efforts to Damascus. Resulting instability in Syria has created further trouble for Iraq.

Nuri then discussed what he believes Iraq must have for defense against (1) open aggression; (2) subversive activity.

(1) He commenced with words of gratitude for aid Iraq had received so far mentioning particularly the 8-inch howitzers and tanks. Later asserted this aid had been tremendously important attributing “50 percent of my success in keeping order” to favorable impression made on Iraqi people and army by arms received from US. Two of Iraq’s divisions are now nearly complete and although a third reserved division and armored unit require material most important need at moment is air cover. This Nuri believes requires 4 squadrons of interceptors. Iraq possessing ME oil fields geographically closest to USSR must be in position hold off Soviet attack for at least few hours until US help arrives. He would like two squadrons from the US and two from British. Latter, of course, require cash for all arms which Iraq does not have for purpose. Iraq with 70 percent of its oil revenue committed for its vital development program and 60 percent of its ordinary budget going into defense cannot afford purchase unaided air squadrons it needs. Nuri pointed out additional airfields also needed. Iraqi airfields will be available to all those who have interest in defense of area including US, Iran and Britain. Legally Development Board could not give money for airfields. He himself would in fact be most reluctant see development funds diverted military purposes. He mentioned also need for defense purposes of improved rail and road communications in northern Iraq particularly those connecting

with Turkey. Nuri also urged need for closer consultation between US and Iraqi officers on strategy and operations.

(2) Nuri reiterated Iraq's needs police wireless communications, transport and small arms equipment all of which are important for adequate defense against Communist subversive activity.³

In response Ambassador Richards stressed financial limitations his mission and explained fundamental aspect of American Doctrine, i.e. to provide those countries which desire it sense of security against threat of Communist attack. By this means we hope give nations of ME confidence which will enable them successfully to preserve their own internal security and time to settle the intra-regional problems on which Communism feeds. Ambassador pointed out he faced difficult problem in trying make just division of comparatively small sum among some 18 countries. Stressed he was anxious not make promises which could not be kept.

Nuri warned mission against rewarding those who plan to "blackmail" US by dealing with Soviets. In his view the mission might visit Syria or Jordan if both governments issued a clear invitation but only to discuss Doctrine's objectives; aid should not be extended. On other hand he expressed pleasure at result mission's visit Afghanistan.⁴

In closing Ambassador Richards reminded Nuri of onerous and worldwide character US defense burdens. US is determined maintain its commitments but it cannot do everything its friends wish. Nuri replied by urging that US concentrate its own defense efforts on ability to hit vital targets (i.e. Moscow) and help countries like Iraq to prepare defend themselves against local Russian attacks. US should not allow its defense strength to be dissipated in protection of remote less important areas such as Formosa or SE Asia.

Immediately following private meeting with Nuri morning April 7 Richards Mission and Baghdad country team met under Nuri's chairmanship with Iraqi Cabinet committee which has been assembling projects for Richards Mission consideration. Nuri gave each of five Ministers present opportunity describe need their departments. CGS Rafiq Arif present but did not speak no doubt because Nuri had in his talk concentrated on Iraq's military needs.

Minister Development⁵ described overall shortages which had resulted from Syrian oil line severance. Development program and requirements for military installations were placing Iraq in a financial squeeze. Minister Finance⁶ expanded same line reasoning. Minister Interior⁷ discussed briefly Iraq's police equipment request. Minister Communications⁸ described need for certain projects beyond his budget allotments. Minister Economics⁹ described in further detail setback Iraq's expectation resulting from Syrian situation.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 120.1580/4-857. Secret. Repeated to Jidda, Cairo, Dhahran, Tehran, London, Damascus, Amman, Beirut, Tripoli, Ankara, Athens, Rabat, Karachi, and Paris.

² Memoranda of Dulles' conversations on May 18, 1953, with Iraqi officials, including Nuri, who was then Minister of Defense, are printed in [*Foreign Relations, 1952-1954, vol. IX, Part 1, pp. 90 ff.*](#)

³ Nuri had requested additional police equipment in discussions with the Embassy on January 8 and February 13. (Telegrams 1195 and 1380 from Baghdad, January 8 and February 14, respectively; Department of State, Central Files, 787.00/1-857 and 787.5-MSP/2-1457) On February 15, the Department agreed in principle to assist Iraqi internal security forces. See [Document 453](#).

⁴ The Richards Mission visited Afghanistan, April 1-3; see [Document 216](#).

⁵ Dhia Ja'far.

⁶ Khalil Kunna.

⁷ Said al-Qazzaz.

⁸ Salih Sa'ib al-Jaburi.

⁹ Nadhim el-Pachachi.

456. Telegram From the President's Special Assistant (Richards) to the Department of State¹

Baghdad, April 9, 1957—10 p.m.

1667. From Richards. I submit following comments on Iraq:

1. Iraq is booming, Texas fashion. Sense vigorous purposeful activity immediately apparent on arrival Baghdad.
2. Through Development Plan, supervised by non-political competent board, Iraq appears to be making really effective use of oil revenues for benefit country as whole. Impact of development program beginning to reach through to people and board making some adjustments in plans (i.e., more low cost housing) to provide people visible evidence of results. Success of plan is most encouraging and most striking sign of progress I have seen on trip.
3. Development Plan plus greater efficiency of internal security forces reportedly are principal factors accounting for major improvement in public order since riots of 1952.
4. Stability present government appears good and Nuri firmly in control. He takes almost paternalistic attitude towards his ministers. No indications received of serious political opposition to Nuri at present.
5. Group now in power determined to resist international communism. Particular stress placed by Nuri on importance of guarding against subversion.
6. Iraq gives strong support to BP but during our discussions Iraqis put less emphasis on pact than had been done by leaders in other pact countries. Nuri cautioned that as Arab state Iraq must look towards Arab world as well as pact countries.

7. I asked Nuri's advice on Syria, Jordan, and Egypt. He replied—Do not visit in absence firm invitation and do not allow those countries to bluff you. Nuri considers Nasser prime source of trouble in Syria and Jordan and in effect tool of Communists. He mentioned possibility change in government in Syria “Maybe not next few weeks but sooner or later.” However, on whole Nuri did not seem anxious to talk about area problems or advance suggestions re approach to situations in Syria, Jordan and Egypt.

8. Nuri raised question of Israel suggesting “bargained” settlement on basis 1947 UN resolution. However, he did not press subject.

9. Nuri took occasion to express pleasure results mission visit to Afghanistan stating he had not thought such good communiqué would be issued by country on border USSR.²

10.

Nuri inferred that our failure to extend greater help to Iraq stemmed from fear of Saudi Arabian reaction. I rebutted this contention.

Nuri admitted he himself recognized importance better relations with Saudi Arabia and would work toward that end. Foreign Office Under Secretary Gailani told me privately Iraqis plan make major effort remove Saud's fear of Hashemite ambitions to return to Hejaz.

11. Cutback in oil revenue because of destruction of pumping stations in Syria is continuing serious problem, despite partial resumption of oil flow, to which no quick solution in sight. Loss in oil revenue now running at annual rate estimated at \$120 million. Although regular budget balanced for coming fiscal year through IPC loan, continuation of expenditures for development program at planned levels can only be made by operating at deficit and drawing upon reserve funds. Slowing down development program obviously would bring undesirable

psychological and political reactions. However, Iraq has no external debt, has good credit standing and should be able borrow necessary funds from such organizations as IBRD.

12. No economic justification exists for grant economic development assistance. However Iraq does need technical assistance in form advisers and consultant services and I believe we should be prepared to help in this regard. Also Iraq should be able to acquire and support without outside grant assistance sufficient military forces to maintain security and legitimate self defense. Nevertheless, compelling political reasons exist for present grant program and I believe increase authorized by mission is sound. Armed forces are stabilizing influence in country. Nuri said fifty percent of credit for maintenance of order after attack on Egypt last fall attributable to US military aid. Furthermore, younger [garble—folks?] previously critical Western alignment more cooperative now equipment arriving.

13. I believe development program should have first priority in Iraq and that we should discourage any tendency divert funds from development to finance largely [larger] military establishment than Iraqis themselves able to support.

No difficulties arose in presenting Doctrine. Nuri asserted Iraqis believe in sincerity of US and “99%” of them support spirit of Doctrine.

In discussions of aid, Iraq officials concentrated strongly on military assistance. Nuri set example and General Rafik made impassioned plea to Defense representative for jet air wing, air field improvement, radar, more tanks, establishment of ammunition factory, and mine watching facilities in the Shaat-al-Arab River.

After discussions with country team I decided to offer following package on grant basis:

1. Equipment for civil police up to \$1 million, US technicians to assist in training, and study of police communications need.
2. Telecommunications equipment for Iraq section of system recommended by BP economic experts—\$1,150,000.
3. Consultant engineer contract for Baghdad-Kut-Basra Railroad—\$350,000.
- 4.

Military assistance consisting of following:

[Here follows a list of military equipment, totaling \$14,084,000, including 20 medium Centurion tanks.]

CHMAAG is instructed to provide details of other categories.

Text aide-mémoire telegraphed separately.³

In discussions with Iraq officials I called attention to 15 day provision Joint Resolution.⁴ I made clear no assurances could be offered re assistance in FY 1958 but expressed personal belief Congress would approve substantial program for ME.

Iraqis expressed disappointment at magnitude aid offered particularly in economic field, and Nuri made mild try for additional aid for radar, airfields, education and broadcasting. However, I judge from attitude of Iraqis that they probably did not expect much more and believe they were reasonably satisfied. Nuri made point of thanking mission and said fact US not able meet all Iraqi requests would not reduce grateful feeling for what done. He added Iraqis will defend themselves against communism to best of their ability whether they receive help or not.

Re military aid—for political reasons mentioned above I concluded it in interest of US to grant small amount additional military assistance. Items included in DOD package number one valued at \$6.676 million are same as those cited in paragraph 2 of memo handed General Daghestani in

Washington February 15 (Army supplemental MAP II of 4 February 1957).⁵ However Iraqis appeared unsure whether this intended to be provided on grant basis. By confirming that equipment would be grant, mission able obtain some additional political impact. New MDAP funds committed by mission amount to \$7,408 million. Significant departure from DOD proposed package was increase of Centurion tanks from 5 to 20 with compensatory elimination of 300 vehicles. This was necessary to obtain favorable impact in absence aircraft.

Re economic aid at economic committee meetings no request made for university, Abou Ghrai or other educational projects. Few big projects were trotted out, such as need for additional port, need for refinery and so forth. We deemed unnecessary urge upon Iraqis additional support of less expensive variety when they did not push for it. Reference was made to Iraq need for more technical assistance in almost all fields economic development. Railway survey approved was high priority, relatively inexpensive item.

Report on regional projects under auspices BP sent separately.⁶

Communiqué drafted jointly with Iraqis transmitted separately.⁷

Actions requested from Washington:

- 1 — Program military items listed above.
- 2 — Procure civil police equipment and dispatch police advisors and technician to complete communications study. USOM/Iraq submitting PPA listing equipment.⁸ I believe we should make special effort to move quickly on this program thereby increasing considerably its effects.
- 3 — Conclude contract for engineering consultants for railroad.
- 4 — I recommend that in preparation FY 1958 program for Iraq Department and ICA give particular consideration to technical assistance in fields of education and broadcasting. Re latter I understand Iraq has physical equipment needed but is woefully

weak in technical and programming personnel. I told Nuri I would make these recommendations to Department.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 120.1580/4–957. Secret. Repeated to Addis Ababa, London, Paris, New Delhi, Rome, Beirut, Cairo, Tripoli, Tel Aviv, Karachi, Kabul, Ankara, Tehran, Khartoum, Rabat, Tunis, Jidda, Athens, Damascus, and Amman.

² Regarding the Richards Mission visit to Afghanistan, see [Document 216](#).

³ This aide-mémoire, presented to the Iraqis on April 8, was transmitted in telegram 1668 from Baghdad, April 8. It repeated the information contained in telegram 1667, and added the statement that Ambassador Richards officially informed the Government of Iraq that the United States was prepared to join the Military Committee of the Baghdad Pact only if invited. (Department of State, Central Files, 120.1580/4–857) ⁴ The Joint Resolution known as the Eisenhower Doctrine (P.L. 85–7, approved on March 9) included a requirement that the additional authorization of funds contained in this resolution should not be used until 15 days after appropriate committees of Congress had received reports showing the object and recipient of the funds, and the particular appropriations from which the funds were proposed to be derived. (71 Stat. 6) ⁵ For a summary of the memorandum, see [Document 453](#). A list of additional military equipment and services for Iraq tentatively approved by the Department of Defense, similar to the list contained in the February 15 memorandum, was attached to a February 4 memorandum from Rountree to Secretary Dulles. (Department of State, Central Files, 787.11/2–457) ⁶ This report is contained in telegram 1672 from Baghdad, April 9. (*Ibid.*, 120.1580/4–957) ⁷ Text of this joint communiqué, issued in Baghdad on April 8, is printed in *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1957*, p. 841.

⁸ Not further identified.

457. Editorial Note

In April 1957, Jordan underwent prolonged political turmoil, marked by a struggle for power between King Hussein and leaders sympathetic to Syria and Egypt. After a constitutional crisis which included several changes of Cabinet, leftist and pro-leftist military officers unsuccessfully attempted a coup against King Hussein. The Government of Iraq viewed the threat to Hussein with alarm, and requested the United States to supply Hussein with financial aid to combat “Leftist and Communist pressures.” (Telegram 1763 from Baghdad, April 23; Department of State, Central Files, 120.1580/ 4–2357) The Department of State responded that its information had not indicated that Jordan was in immediate financial need, and it hoped that Iraq might be able to assist Jordan in this respect. (Telegram 1938 to Baghdad, April 23; *ibid.*) According to Gallman, Nuri replied that Iraq did not have the reserves to do so. (Telegram 1772 from Baghdad, April 24; *ibid.*, 120.1580/4–2457) The United States also considered the possibility of moving Iraqi troops into Jordan upon invitation by King Hussein. Iraq moved some troops closer to the Jordanian border, but Hussein survived the crisis without Iraqi military assistance. For documentation on the Jordanian crisis, see [volume XIII, pages 102](#) ff.

458. National Intelligence Estimate¹

Washington, June 4, 1957.

NIE 36.2-57

THE OUTLOOK FOR IRAQ

The Problem

To assess Iraq's prospects for stability and economic progress and its probable role in Arab and Middle East affairs over the next few years.

Conclusions

1. Iraq has emerged from the Suez crisis with its internal stability unimpaired and its policy of cooperation with the West unchanged. Use of reserves and borrowings from the Iraq Petroleum Company have enabled it to continue its economic development program despite the shutdown of the pipelines through Syria (now operating at about 50 percent of capacity). Recent developments have lessened Iraq's isolation from the other Arab states, especially Saudi Arabia and Jordan. (*Paras. 6-9*)
2. Iraq will probably retain its present political stability so long as Nuri Said remains active, either as premier or as the power behind the scene. However, undercurrents of opposition to the regime will probably require continuing reliance on authoritarian methods and, over the longer run, demands for broader participation in governmental affairs will probably become increasingly forceful. (*Paras. 10-11, 13*)
3. Political stability would probably decline if the 69-year-old Nuri were to disappear from the scene. Although conservative

elements are likely to retain control at least initially, the ruling group would probably be weakened by internal rivalries, and would probably face increased demands for reform and ultranationalist pressures both from within Iraq and from abroad. A successor regime might not be able to retain the present tight controls. (*Para. 12*)

4. Iraq's development program is just beginning to show tangible results, and future economic prospects remain bright. Although Iraq's economy could at present be endangered by new Syrian interference with the oil pipelines, this vulnerability could be reduced within the next few years by development of new pipelines and other alternate means of delivery. (*Paras. 14-16*)

5. Over the next few years Iraq will probably continue to consider its interests best served by maintaining close political, economic, and military relations with the West, even though its ties with Britain have been weakened and its reliance on US support correspondingly increased. However, Iraq's willingness to support Western policies and objectives in the Middle East will continue to be tempered by its sharing of general Arab aspirations and its desire to avoid becoming completely isolated from its fellow Arab states. On the central issue of Palestine, the Iraqis share the general Arab hostility toward Israel and will continue to demonstrate their loyalty to the Arab cause by anti-Israeli pronouncements or gestures. (*Paras. 17-23*)

Discussion

Iraq and the Suez Crisis

6. Iraq continues to occupy a special position in the Arab world. Among the principal Arab states, Iraq alone has both extensive economic assets and a sound development program well underway. It has resisted the temptation to adopt an extreme nationalist policy and has retained close connections with the

West. Iraq is the only major Arab state still having close ties with the UK and the only Arab member of the Baghdad Pact. Furthermore, its government has refused to accept Egypt's claim to leadership in the Arab world. Political control in Iraq remains in the hands of an established oligarchy of professional politicians, wealthy landlords, businessmen, and tribal leaders. The dominant political figure is the veteran prime minister, Nuri Said, who has the important backing of the Palace. Iraq's relatively high level of political and economic stability and its prospects for economic growth give it a potential importance out of proportion to its present five million population.

7. The Israel-French-UK invasion of Egypt imposed a severe strain on Iraq's foreign policy orientation. The success which Nasser had had in his political efforts to establish a militant nationalistic anti-Western bloc with Syria, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia had already isolated Iraq in the Arab world. Relations with Saudi Arabia were also affected by longstanding dynastic differences. With the outbreak of the hostilities against Egypt, the Nuri Said government came under violent attack for its continued association with the UK in the Baghdad Pact. Egyptian and Syrian pressures against the Nuri regime increased. Ultranationalist and leftist demonstrations broke out after the invasion and continued intermittently until late December 1956. Syria's sabotage of the Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC) pipelines in November forced a virtual shutdown of most oil activities and cut off the source of about 68 percent of the government's revenues. Grumbling in Iraq over Nuri's suppression of opposition activities and his personal dominance over the government increased. In these circumstances, many moderate elements, including some army officers and even some of the prime minister's erstwhile supporters, felt that Nuri's long identification with the British and his sponsorship of the Baghdad Pact made him a liability.

8. Nuri felt compelled to make some gestures to offset the charges of treason to the Arab cause and the demands for withdrawal from

the Baghdad Pact. The Iraqi government supported Egypt's case in the Suez controversy and emphasized its solidarity with the other Arabs in opposition to Israel. For a period of time Iraq took the initiative in excluding the British from Baghdad Pact meetings, and other aspects of Iraq's British connections were deemphasized. However, Nuri made no real concessions and succeeded in riding out the storm by taking advantage of his firm hold on the army and on the machinery of government, his mastery of political maneuver, and the support of the Palace. Serious economic consequences from the virtual stoppage of oil revenues were avoided by utilizing reserves and by borrowing from IPC, thus allowing the development program to continue.²

9. US condemnation of the attack on Egypt, the promulgation of the American Doctrine, and the US decision to join the military committee of the Baghdad Pact strengthened Nuri's foreign policy position both within Iraq and in area affairs. Day-to-day relations with the UK, including Baghdad Pact cooperation, are back to normal. For the moment the British tie has become a less sensitive issue, though British prestige and influence have suffered a net decline. Meanwhile, recent developments have decreased Iraq's isolation in the Arab world. The forces now in control in Jordan under King Hussein include those Jordanian elements most friendly to Iraq. The recent visit of King Saud to Baghdad appears to show at least a temporary submergence of the dynastic problem between Iraq and Saudi Arabia and a recognition of common interests. Relations with the controlling elements in Lebanon are friendly. More importantly, these countries appear to share a common apprehension of Egyptian interference in their internal affairs, of the growth of Soviet influence in the area, and of the rising influence of local Communists in Syria and Jordan.

Internal Political Prospects

10. The Iraqi government will continue to be a major target of Egyptian and Syrian propaganda attacks and subversive efforts.

There is unlikely to be any notable decrease in the opposition to the regime which exists among students, urban labor groups and, to a lesser extent, among professional people, military officers, and certain tribes. Elements among these groups are susceptible to the emotional appeal of Nasser as a champion of Arab interests against Israel and the “imperialists.” Nuri finds it difficult to show the advantages of Iraq’s policies in a way which has an equivalent appeal. The government will probably consider it necessary to continue strict limitations on political freedoms, including the ban on political parties. A certain amount of corruption in government ministries will be tolerated, and the strong conservative opposition will continue to delay tax and land tenure reforms designed to spread the economic development program’s benefits.

11. Nevertheless Nuri appears to be well ensconced in power, and he will almost certainly continue to be a potent influence in the political scene—whether in or out of office—so long as he remains active. In addition to the support of a considerable body of Iraqi leaders, particularly tribal elements, Nuri now enjoys the backing of the Palace. Although Nuri may in time elect, as he has before, to step down as prime minister, his influence even out of office would remain predominant. His successor would probably be one of a small rather static circle of established political leaders who share his basic outlook and orientation. Under a new and presumably weaker premier, a considerable increase in political jockeying for position and overt opposition to the government would be likely. However, Nuri and the Palace would probably be able to prevent the situation from getting out of hand. Thus, a major threat to Iraq’s stability and present orientation is unlikely to arise during Nuri’s active life.

12. In the event that Nuri, now 69, were to die or become disabled within the next few years, conservative elements would probably retain control, at least initially. However, the departure of Iraq’s dominant figure would release internal rivalries which are now either submerged or held in check by the prime minister’s virtually unchallenged control. The relative strength of the

conservative and moderate elements will continue to be threatened by growing political consciousness among urban groups and by peasant agitation for improved living conditions. Political instability would be likely to increase under a successor regime, which might not be able to retain such tight controls. The Communist Party, though now demoralized and ineffective as a result of firm repressive measures,³ probably could under these circumstances develop increased capabilities for creating disturbances, and would seek to participate in political affairs, probably through forming fronts with other opposition groups. Extremist pressures from other Arab states would probably have a greater effect on internal Iraqi politics. The army, which has in recent years been remarkably nonpolitical by Middle Eastern standards, might emerge as an active factor in Iraqi politics.⁴

13. Over the longer run, the natural development of factors already present in Iraqi society will probably confront the present tightly controlled system of rule with increasingly forceful challenges by elements demanding a broadening of the base of public participation in governmental affairs. Moreover, the country's economic progress is likely to increase the force of such agitation for readjustments in the political system.

Economic Prospects

14. Even though poverty, disease, and ignorance are still widespread, Iraq's agricultural and pastoral economy is relatively stable and its long range outlook is potentially bright. Assuming that the IPC oil pipelines across Syria are not cut again for any extended period or that alternative transport is developed, the rising demand for Middle Eastern oil should provide adequate revenues to finance Iraq's ambitious development plan. Seventy percent of Iraq's oil revenues are earmarked for development expenditures, which are projected at more than \$1.4 billion for the period 1954–1960. The result of such development will probably be a marked increase in the standard of living, In an effort to correct the principal cause of poverty—inefficient use and uneven

distribution of land—the Iraq Development Board is concentrating on irrigation, land reclamation and flood control projects rather than on industrialization. The Development Board—composed of the prime minister as chairman, the Minister of Finance as an ex officio member, and six nonpolitical executive members, including one American and one Briton—received \$133 million of the oil revenues in 1956. Iraq also receives US technical assistance and will receive a modest increase in American aid as a result of the Richards Mission.

15. Following a long preparatory period, the development scheme is just beginning to have an impact on the public, and the Development Board is making some adjustments—as in building more low cost housing—to provide additional tangible evidence of progress. Some much needed flood control projects on the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers have already gone into operation, and the next few years will probably witness an expansion of health, educational, and other benefits both in the cities and in the countryside. Iraq will probably continue for some years in the unique situation of being underpopulated in relation to its land, water, oil, and mineral resources. Development plans provide for the extension of irrigation from the present 6.8 million acres to about 13.6 million acres, but unless presently unforeseen political developments result in a large influx of Palestinian Arab refugees, Iraq will for many years lack sufficient peasant manpower to take advantage of this situation. As economic growth continues, Iraq will also continue to feel a shortage of skilled and semiskilled labor, technicians, and managers which may slow the carrying out of the development program. Nevertheless, because of its stable government, its relatively effective development program, and its assured oil income, Iraq will almost certainly make more economic progress than any other Arab country.

16. *Oil Developments.* The Syrian sabotage of the IPC pipeline and the growing importance of Middle East oil in the European economy have raised for active consideration the question of alternative routes for the shipment of Iraqi oil. Private Western

interests are actively discussing the construction of additional pipelines. One would run through Turkey to the Mediterranean; another would run southward to the Persian Gulf and would possibly be linked with lines from Iran. These lines would require up to three years to build. Out of deference to Arab opinion the Iraqi government is unlikely to promote the Turkey pipeline project actively, and may balk at efforts to obtain international treaty guarantees regarding the uninterrupted flow of oil. However, Nuri Said has privately welcomed discussion of plans which would decrease his country's dependence on transport facilities through Arab states whose policies are now or may become hostile to Iraq. Development of additional fields in southern Iraq and port facilities on the Persian Gulf would permit greater oil exports. The IPC, which handles all Iraqi oil exports, enjoys good relations with Iraq. Under its basic agreements the IPC would have to adjust its arrangements in conformity with any important modification in concession terms in other Middle Eastern countries, especially in case of any breach of the general 50–50 profit sharing formula. However, barring a political upheaval in Iraq or a new tide of extreme nationalism throughout the area, nationalization of the company during the next few years appears improbable.

Foreign Affairs Outlook

17. Iraq will probably retain its present orientation in foreign affairs over the next few years. Most Iraqi leaders—including Nuri's most likely successors—recognize that maintenance of their personal positions and what they conceive to be the national interest is bound up with containment of extreme nationalist and revolutionary influences and with the continuation of Iraq's association with the West. These views have almost certainly been strengthened by the increasing sharpness of Egyptian propaganda attacks on the Nuri government over the last two years and by recent indications that the US was prepared to take a more active role in the Middle East. Barring a sharp reduction in US and UK support, Iraq will probably continue to retain its

special ties with the West and its distrust of the USSR. Iraq has no diplomatic relations and no formal trade relationships with the USSR or any member of the Bloc. In addition, Iraqi leaders will probably continue to feel a community of interest with the conservative pro-Western governments of Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan and with similarly oriented elements in Lebanon and other Arab states.

18. Iraq's willingness to cooperate with the West, however, will remain contingent on continuing Western material and diplomatic support. Iraq's leaders have certain bonds of sympathy with the West, but their pro-Westernism is based to a considerable degree on the expectation that they will obtain tangible benefits in return for their cooperation. They will almost certainly continue to press for continued and probably increased Western support, both diplomatic and material, for themselves and the Baghdad Pact organization. Should substantial backing not be forthcoming, their enthusiasm for the Western tie and their willingness to work closely with their Western partners will decline. Iraqi disillusionment would be particularly strong if Egypt and Syria appeared to be deriving substantially greater benefits from their Bloc connections than Iraq was getting from its Western ties.

19. Iraq will probably rely primarily on the US to provide this support. The British are once again being accepted within Iraq and will almost certainly retain political and military ties and important commercial connections for some time to come. However, the Suez crisis has sharpened popular resentment of the British presence and has impressed Iraqi leaders both with the political handicaps of special association with the UK and with the decline in Britain's worldwide power position.

20. Iraq's willingness to support Western policies and objectives in the Middle East will also continue to be tempered by its sharing of general Arab aspirations and its prudent desire to avoid becoming completely isolated from its fellow Arab states. This sensitivity to currents of opinion elsewhere in the Arab world

would almost certainly increase in the event of Nuri's departure from the political scene. On the central issue of Palestine, the Iraqis share the general Arab hostility toward Israel and will continue to demonstrate their loyalty to the Arab cause by anti-Israeli pronouncements or gestures. Iraq, having withdrawn its troops, did not sign an armistice agreement with Israel in 1949, but the absence of a common boundary limits the opportunities for trouble between the two countries. There is little likelihood that Iraq would be willing to accept a sizable number of Palestinian refugees except as part of a generally agreed plan for their resettlement in the Arab states. Although Iraq will probably seek to avoid another outbreak of fighting between the Arab states and Israel, it would almost certainly not make a separate peace.

21. On North African and colonial issues, Iraq will probably continue to identify itself with the Afro-Asian countries. It is thus likely to continue its hostile attitude toward France. Even in Middle Eastern matters in which its own interests are similar to those of the US and the West, Iraq's attitude will depend to a considerable extent on its assessment of Arab reactions. Iraq's willingness to stand openly against Nasser will thus continue to be affected by variations in the latter's prestige and influence in the Arab states. If Nasser should find another opportunity to identify himself with Arab nationalism, as he did in the Suez crisis, Iraq would probably feel compelled to pay at least lip service to his cause.

22. So long as Egyptian and Syrian subversive pressures continue against Iraq and its neighbors, some form of collaboration between the "Three Kings"—Feisal of Iraq, Hussein of Jordan, and Saud—will probably continue, with the pro-Western element in Lebanon also associated with this grouping. Since the continued ascendancy of anti-Western elements in Syria poses a continuing threat to the IPC pipelines, as well as to the stability of the Iraqi government itself, Iraq will probably continue to exert what influence it can toward the establishment of a friendly

government in Syria. Iraq will continue to support King Hussein. Should his regime be overthrown by extremists and a breakup of Jordan appear imminent, however, Iraq would probably feel compelled to occupy adjacent Jordanian territory for the protection of its own interests. Iraq will also probably continue its quiet efforts to develop ties with the generally moderate governments of Libya, Tunisia, Morocco, and the Sudan. While there have occasionally been discussions of "Greater Syria" comprised of Iraq, Syria, and Jordan, this is not an active factor in current Iraqi thinking.

23. Iraq's prospects for influence and leadership in Arab affairs will probably remain limited for some time to come. Despite its long-range growth potential, Iraq still lags far behind Egypt, its principal rival, in most visible aspects of national power and prestige, including population, military strength, press and radio propaganda facilities, and cultural influence. Also, King Saud may continue to harbor some suspicions regarding the Hashemites and is likely to be influenced against strong commitments to Iraq by a desire to smooth over inter-Arab differences and exercise greater leadership in his own right. Iraq's appeal in other Arab states will probably be diminished by the suspected subservience of its leadership to the West and by indecision and fumbling such as marked its policies with respect to Jordan and Syria.

Military Outlook

24. The Iraqi military forces, numbering about 56,000 men,⁵ are capable of maintaining internal security and could probably defend the country against an attack by any neighboring Arab state. However, the capabilities of the Iraqi armed forces to contribute to defense against a major force are limited. In the event it were called upon to support operations outside Iraq, the Iraqi army would face severe logistic problems and would probably be incapable of keeping more than one division in an

area of operations outside its borders without jeopardizing its ability to maintain internal security.⁶ The small air force is fairly well equipped, but poorly trained and supported.

25. Iraq is continuing to receive US and British equipment⁷ and training support, and the planning, proficiency, and training standards, as well as the equipment, of the army and air force will probably improve over the next few years. Moreover, Iraq will co-operate with the US and UK in area defense planning under the Baghdad Pact. However, for Iraqi forces to be improved to the point where they could make a substantial contribution to the area's defense against an aggressor would require several years of Western military assistance and training at considerably higher than present levels. The primary military value of Iraq to the "northern tier" will continue to lie in the availability of certain base facilities to the Western powers in the event of an emergency.

26. The Iraqi army is not directly involved in politics and will probably remain loyal to the regime over the next few years. Although pro-Nasser, pro-Communist, and anti-Nuri sentiments exist, especially among younger officers, dissident elements are not believed to be organized or politically capable of seizing the initiative against the present regime. In the event of Nuri Said's removal from the scene, the army would probably support a conservative successor, at least initially. However, if the internal situation should deteriorate seriously, the army would become more important as a factor and the active participation of military elements in political affairs would be likely. In such a contingency an unstable situation similar to that in Syria might develop, with a split between conservative and radical elements within the armed forces. Such a situation would almost certainly lead to increased efforts by Egypt, the Bloc, and other anti-Western elements to exploit the situation.

¹ Source: Department of State, INR-NIE Files. Secret. According to a note on the cover sheet, "The following intelligence organizations participated in

the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff.” This estimate was concurred in by the Intelligence Advisory Committee on June 4. “Concurring were the Special Assistant, Intelligence, Department of State; the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Director of Naval Intelligence; the Director of Intelligence, USAF; and the Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff. The Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the IAC and the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the subject being outside their jurisdiction.”

² Although the sabotage of the IPC pipelines through Syria and the closure of the Suez Canal resulted in deficits in the regular and development budgets, Treasury and Development Board reserves totaling about \$350 million in fully convertible sterling allowed the government to cover these losses. The substantial restoration in oil shipments, coupled with an IPC combined advance and loan of \$70 million, should see the government on the way to full financial recovery by the end of the present Iraqi fiscal year (31 March 1958). While the Suez crisis caused a rise in consumer demand and an upward movement of prices, as well as some unemployment, the government’s economic stabilization measures were generally effective. The total effect on the economy was thus limited, and there was little interference with normal economic activity. [Footnote in the source text.]

³ The Communist Party’s leaders are in jail or in hiding, and its present numerical strength has been reduced to some 600 members and 2,000 active supporters. The party attracts its followers principally from the young urban intelligentsia and industrial workers in the port cities and oil industry centers. [Footnote in the source text.]

⁴ See also paragraph 26. [Footnote in the source text.]

⁵ The army is organized into three infantry divisions and various independent units, the most important being the Royal Bodyguard Brigade, three medium tank regiments (equivalent to US battalions), and four artillery battalions. The organization of a fourth division, armored, is planned.

The air force at present consists of five fighter-bomber squadrons, including 28 jet fighter-bombers and 43 piston fighter-bombers. Its personnel strength

is about 2,700, including 62 trained pilots and about 450 pilot trainees. The air force has an ambitious four year plan for expansion.

The river force consisting of four river gunboats and 193 men, which is based at Basra, is used exclusively as a unit of the army.

For internal security purposes, the armed forces are supplemented by a mobile police force of some 4,000 men, organized into nine battalions, with headquarters in Baghdad. [Footnote in the source text.]

⁶ As a result of the Jordanian crisis Iraqi forces at the H-3 pumping station, 40 miles from the Jordan border, have been increased to a division minus one brigade—about 5,000 men. However, even this limited deployment forward has placed considerable strain on Iraq's logistic system. [Footnote in the source text.]

⁷ In the period 1954–1957 approximately \$45 million in US military aid has been programmed for Iraq, of which about \$17 million worth of equipment is being obtained through off-shore procurement, almost entirely in the UK. While the UK has recently given Iraq five jet fighters, its future plans for military aid to Iraq on an other than reimbursable basis are not clear at this time. [Footnote in the source text.]

459. Editorial Note

On June 8, Nuri Said resigned as Prime Minister, presumably for reasons of health. King Faisal nominated Senator Ali Jawdat to replace Nuri, and on June 20 a new Cabinet headed by Jawdat was sworn in.

On June 20, during the 327th meeting of the National Security Council, President Eisenhower presiding, Allen Dulles discussed significant world developments affecting U.S. security. According to the memorandum of discussion, Dulles “described the new cabinet in Iraq as essentially of the same political complexion as Nuri Said’s old cabinet. He predicted that after a rest, Nuri would return as Prime Minister.” (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)

460. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iraq¹

Washington, July 31, 1957—7:23 p.m.

237. Baghdad for Ambassador. Department has been asked by Defense consider possible change current US adherence policies set forth US–UK Memorandum of Understanding re military aid to Iraq.² Defense refers message Chief MAAG 9–124 May 27,³ in which you are noted as concurring, and suggests immediate consultation with UK as well as informing Iraq at appropriate time that US military aid program being developed in concert with UK in order avoid duplication, assure practicable degree standardization and efficient logistical support.

Your further comments general problem desired. We inclined believe it neither desirable nor feasible for US attempt replace UK as primary source support Iraqi armed forces as suggested Chief MAAG message. Department prepared however work out within framework continuing cooperation with UK, any problems of operation or practice which currently impede realization effective military assistance program.

London comments requested re British reaction without consultation UK officials.⁴

Herter

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 887.00–TA/7–3157. Secret. Drafted by Newsom and approved by Berry. Also sent to London.

² In a letter dated July 16 to Murphy, Deputy Secretary of Defense Donald A. Quarles stated that the Department of Defense believed that “discontinuance of United States adherence to the policies of the terminated secret U.S.-U.K. Memorandum of Understanding would be in the best interest of the United States.” Quarles noted that the Department of Defense requested the Department of State to “initiate action to provide for the immediate open cooperation of the United States, United Kingdom and Iraq in the support and training of the Iraqi Armed Forces, and to provide for modification of strict adherence to the Memorandum.” The Department of Defense specifically expressed concern about the adequate training of Iraqi forces, Iraqi air defense capabilities and requirements, and coordination of U.S. and British aid programs to Iraq. (*Ibid.*, 787.5/7–1657) ³ Not found in Department of State files. According to Quarles, however, this message “strongly urged” discontinuance of U.S. adherence to the policies of the terminated 1954 U.S.–U.K. Memorandum of Understanding. (Letter from Quarles to Murphy cited in [footnote 2](#) above) ⁴ The reply from the Embassy in London stressed, among other things, that the British reaction would be influenced by a desire to continue as a source of supply for the Iraqi armed forces, and by concern not to lose any prospect of selling equipment under offshore procurement arrangements. (Telegram 962 from London, August 7; Department of State, Central Files, 887.00–TA/8–757)

461. Telegram From the Embassy in Iraq to the Department of State¹

Baghdad, August 3, 1957—noon.

149. Department’s 237, July 31.² I feel that our military aid program for Iraq should be placed on a more realistic basis than is the case now, that in

giving program effect, we should have greater freedom of action than we at present enjoy, and that we should be in position, which we are not in now, to deal with Iraqis in matter of arms needs frankly and openly. MAAG Chief, in his memo 9-124 May 27, stressed desirability of realizing these same objectives. That was why I concurred.

The US/UK memorandum of understanding is based on treaty which no longer exists and, moreover, presupposes for the UK in Iraq a predominant position which the UK no longer enjoys. The memorandum therefore, I feel, should preferably be abandoned or at least rewritten in general terms, as suggested by MAAG Chief. The hard facts are, as I see them from the vantage point of Baghdad, that the UK today has neither the material strength nor moral prestige, especially since the attack on Egypt, to play the primary role in Iraq.

I am not at all suggesting that an end be made to offshore procurement in the UK. I would like though to see us enjoy the unquestioned freedom to procure needed arms for Iraq wherever price and quality are most favorable, just so long as they fit into existing pattern. I feel I should point out, however, that it is just because of price and quality that Iraqi military authorities generally favor US arms and equipment, and incidentally, as observed by MAAG Chief, same preference is being manifested for US training methods.

Iraqis one of our most dependable allies, if not the most dependable one we have in this sensitive part of the world. To continue with the arming of Iraq on the basis of a secret understanding with the UK, knowledge of which is withheld from Iraq and which unrealistically places the UK in a preferred position, is, in my view, endangering our best interests.

Please see our despatch 456, March 29, 1955³ and Department's reply CA-2717, October 5, 1955.⁴

Gallman

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 887.00–TA/8–357. Secret. Repeated to London.

² *Supra*.

³ Despatch 456 contained the views of Gallman, the Chief of MAAG in Iraq, and the Army and Air Attachés on modifications of the 1954 U.S.-U.K. Memorandum of Understanding. (Department of State, Central Files, 787.5–MSP/3–2955) ⁴ In this instruction, the Department stated that it viewed the 1954 Memorandum of Understanding as no longer in effect since the termination of the Anglo-Iraqi treaty. The Department noted that it had told the British, however, that it still planned, for the present, to continue the policies established under the memorandum, especially in regard to offshore procurement. The Department added that it had taken the position that since the memorandum was no longer in effect, there was little to be gained by informing the Iraqis of the existence of the document. (*Ibid.*)

462. Operations Coordinating Board Report¹

Washington, August 7, 1957.

OPERATIONS PLAN FOR IRAQ (NSC 5428)²

I. Introduction

A. References:

1. “U.S. Objectives and Policies with Respect to the Near East”, NSC 5428, approved by the President, July 23, 1954.
2. National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq, NIE 36.2–57, “The Outlook for Iraq”, June 4, 1957.³
3. Basic National Security Policy, NSC 5707/8, approved by the President, June 3, 1957.⁴

B. U.S. Objectives Regarding the Near East are:

4. Availability to the United States and its allies of the resources, the strategic positions and the passage rights of the area, and the denial of such resources and strategic positions to the Soviet bloc.

5. Stable, viable, friendly governments in the area, capable of withstanding communist-inspired subversion from within, and willing to resist communist aggression.

6. Settlement of major issues between the Arab states and Israel as a foundation for establishing peace and order in the area.

7. Reversal of the anti-American trends of Arab opinion.

8. Prevention of the extension of Soviet influence in the area.

9. Wider recognition in the free world of the legitimate aspirations of the countries in the area to be recognized as, and have the status of, sovereign states; and wider recognition by such countries of their responsibility toward the area and toward the free world generally.

C.

Special Operating Guidance: In pursuing the policy objectives set forth above, U.S. actions in Iraq should be guided by the following:

Political

10. The United States should support strongly Iraq's efforts to maintain its independent policies and territorial integrity in the face of threats of communist subversion and pressures from extreme Arab

nationalists. The United States should give general support to the regime, including the Crown, the senior leadership of the Army, and government in power. There should be adequate recognition of and acquaintance with political leaders who represent possible friendly and constructive alternatives to whatever government may be in power. The United States should, at the same time, be aware of the pressures for political reforms within the country and be in a position to exert a constructive influence toward gradual reforms as opportunities arise.⁵

11. Pro-Western leaders in Iraq urgently stress the necessity for assistance from the Western nations that will counteract the psychological and propaganda benefits gained by the Soviets from their arms deals with Egypt and Syria. The United States should be aware that a genuine problem exists in this connection. Iraqi leaders are tempted to use this problem as a bargaining point to secure increased military assistance from the United States. While it may prove feasible and desirable to continue a modest annual military aid program in Iraq for a number of years, caution must be exercised to avoid raising Iraqi expectations as to future programs.

12. The United States should recognize the influence of the United Kingdom in Iraq and should cooperate closely with representatives of the United Kingdom in Iraq in areas where such cooperation can be of common benefit to Iraq, the United Kingdom, and the United States. At the same time, the United States should recognize the value both to itself and to the Free World of an easily identifiable United States role in the support of Iraq's present policy. In this connection, strong support should be given to Iraq in its role as a member of the Baghdad Pact, and for its active and

effective military and economic cooperation with its neighbors in the Pact directly and through the Pact organization to the extent of its capabilities.

13. Due recognition should be given to the strong sentiment existing in Iraq for policies and actions which appear to be in common with the other Arab states. The United States should assist where it can in building influence for Iraq's present policies and leadership in other significant Arab states, particularly Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Lebanon. The possibility of ultimately increasing Iraqi influence in Syria should not be excluded.

14. There should be clear recognition of the political sensitiveness of the Palestine issue in Iraq and of the use made of this issue by Iraqi leaders to maintain an appearance of unity with the other Arab states in the face of the division over cooperation with the West. At the same time, the United States should at an opportune moment move quietly to urge a more constructive Iraqi role in the settlement of the Arab-Israel issues, including an Iraqi contribution to the resettlement of the Arab refugees.

15. There should be continual encouragement of Iraq's anti-communist stand and of Iraq's support for a free world policy. Special recognition should be given to Iraq's unique position as the only Arab member of the United Nations Security Council.

Economic

16. In view of its very favorable fiscal and foreign exchange position, Iraq does not require economic assistance. The United States should, however, provide strong diplomatic and informational support for Iraq's development program with a view to supporting the

efforts of the present government. Iraq should be encouraged to give special emphasis to sound economic projects which will also have an attractive political and psychological appeal to the population. In this way the program may contribute to both political and economic internal stability in Iraq and serve as an example to other nations of the area of a constructive locally-financed development effort. Technical assistance should also continue to be provided to facilitate the successful completion of Iraq's own programs.

17. Those benefits of the Iraq development program should be emphasized which will provide the basis for long-range reforms, particularly through land resettlement and education. A balance is desired in reforms which would bring about gradual improvement, while at the same time not diminishing at a dangerous pace the power and influence of the traditional sources of Iraqi political power.

18. The importance to the United States of the Iraq petroleum industry should be recognized and efforts of the industry in Iraq to insure continued access to the petroleum resources of Iraq should be fully supported.

19. The United States should provide appropriate encouragement and assistance to the role of United States private investors, contractors, and experts in the development and expansion of Iraq's economy.

Military

20. Although the United States considers the U.S.-U.K. Memorandum of Understanding with respect to military assistance to Iraq is no longer legally in effect, the U.K. has been informed that for the present the U.S. is continuing to follow the policies set forth in that memorandum, particularly with reference to the

exchange of information with the British on military programs in Iraq, offshore procurement of equipment in the United Kingdom, consultation on training, and continuance of the British position of primary responsibility for the Iraqi Air Force.

21. Within the over-all U.S.-approved military objectives of creating an Iraqi armed force capable of maintaining internal security and providing resistance to external aggression, the United States should continue programs designed to improve the efficiency and morale of the Iraq Army. Iraqi pressures for increases beyond the country's capacity to absorb and to support should be resisted.

22. The United States has been under pressure from Iraq to supply equipment for Iraqi air defense. Extending United States assistance to the Iraqi Air Force would necessarily require further clarification of United States–United Kingdom military aid responsibilities under the United States–United Kingdom Memorandum of Understanding. Appropriate attention should also be given to United States Middle East defense plans and to major financial responsibilities the U.S. would be required to assume if the U.S. were to support the Iraqi Air Force.

Information and Cultural

23. Informational activities should be designed to emphasize United States interest in Iraq's continued independence and territorial integrity and the benefits to be gained by Iraq from cooperation with the West. The program should also emphasize the direct contribution which the United States is making through technical assistance to social and economic progress in Iraq.

24. To the extent possible, the United States should also lend full support to the improvement of Iraq's own information media, including particularly Iraq radio's internal broadcasting. Special emphasis should also be placed on encouraging Iraq to make its development program more widely understood and supported within the country.

25. The cultural program should be used to nourish the cultural ties with the United States and particularly the ties with those groups who, as students or in other capacities, have visited the United States.

26. In all activities appropriate attention should be paid to the younger educated groups, to the students, to lawyers, and to other professional persons. It is particularly in these groups that communist and other extremist propaganda has made inroads.

27. The U.S. should bring about the distribution of films, press and radio materials on Iraq development in other Asian and African countries to enhance Iraq's prestige in the area, especially with other Arab countries, and with neutral and newly independent countries.

Internal Security

28. Although Communist Party activity has been illegal in Iraq since 1927, the communist organization carries on limited underground activity in an effort to exert influence on left-wing groupings, to infiltrate government and army and to keep open its channel of communications. Party discipline is considered fairly effective, its skill in creating and exploiting fronts is good, and it has shown considerable vitality in recovering rapidly from periods of repression. If political instability should come about by the release of

internal political rivalries which are now either submerged, or held in check, conservative and moderate elements will be threatened by growing political consciousness among urban groups and by peasant agitation for improved living conditions, and the Communist Party could develop increased capabilities for creating disturbances. Such a condition also would permit greater influence on internal Iraqi politics by extremist pressures from other Arab states.

29. The United States, therefore, should assist Iraq in strengthening its internal security forces.⁶ Efforts to this end should be undertaken, however, in such a way that they cannot be interpreted as support for a particular government, but rather to enable Iraq to maintain its political independence against possible weakening and overthrow through external subversion. At the same time, the United States should recognize that nationalist elements in Iraq, including many that are themselves anti-communist, oppose the present regime and regard the police and other organs of control in the country as political weapons designed to maintain the present government. In providing assistance to the maintenance of internal security, as set forth in paragraphs 61 to 63, the United States should be cautious that its efforts in this direction or other United States programs do not become identified with the political aspects of police measures to the detriment of the long-range United States standing in Iraq.

30. To broaden support by the public and above-mentioned groups outside of the government, the program should seek to train the Iraqi police forces in techniques which will engender more public confidence and trust. Concomitant with the delivery of equipment under the Richards' Mission commitment the police advisory group in USOM should assist the Iraqi police

in developing indoctrination and training programs designed to increase the popularity as well as the effectiveness of the police force. The present police training program in the United States should contribute to this reorientation of the outlook of the Iraqi police. The Embassy in Baghdad should be the focal point for keeping the British informed in a general way of the scope and developments of this program.

D. Selected U.S. Arrangements^Z With or Pertaining to Iraq:

31. U.S. Involvements Which May Imply Military Security Guarantees:

a.

The United States indicated its support for the area Baghdad Pact countries by State Department press release 604, dated November 29, 1956, which stated in part:

“... the United States reaffirms its support for the collective efforts of these nations to maintain their independence. A threat to the territorial integrity or political independence of the members would be viewed by the United States with the utmost gravity.”⁸

The United States has participated in the work of the Baghdad Pact through membership in the economic, military and counter-subversion committees.

b. The United States, by a Joint Resolution on the Middle East, signed by the President on March 9, 1957, announced its determination

to assist Middle Eastern nations to maintain their independence. The Resolution declared that the United States is prepared to commit its military force, on the determination of the President, against overt armed aggression from any nation controlled by international communism, whenever a victim requests such aid.

32. *U.S. Commitments for Funds, Goods or Services:*

a. Ambassador Richards informed the Iraqi Government on April 8, 1957, as follows:

(1) The U.S. is prepared to provide Iraq certain equipment on a grant basis for the First and Second Infantry Division in accordance with the second supplemental Army military assistance program dated February 4, 1957 (valued at approximately \$6.2 million). (Financed under FY 1957 approved program.)

(2) The U.S. is prepared, in principle, to furnish additional military assistance to Iraq on a grant basis for tanks, vehicles, artillery, mortars, recoilless rifles and ammunition for the Third Infantry Division and Armored Command, and for a 90mm AAA battery with associated radar control and electronic equipment (valued at approximately \$7.4 million). (Financed under FY 1957 approved program.)

(3) The U.S. is prepared, in principle, to provide Iraq with the following on a grant basis: (a) Modern civil police equipment and training, initially up to the value of \$1 million; (b) telecommunications equipment to the value of \$1,150,000 towards completion of Iraqi portion of regional telecommunications system; and (c) \$350,000 for the engineering survey of the Baghdad–Kut–Basra railroad. (Financed under FY 1957 approved program.)

b. An agreement on atomic energy cooperation for civil uses was signed between the United States and Iraq on May 2, 1957.⁹

33. *Other Arrangements:*

a. The United States agreed to a military assistance program and to the maintenance of a military assistance advisory group in Iraq by an exchange of notes dated April 21, 1954.¹⁰

b. The United States technical assistance program was established under the general agreement for technical cooperation signed April 10, 1951.¹¹ This has been supplemented by subsequent technical agreements, including in particular, an agreement for a program of economic development dated November 16, 1952¹² and an agreement for a cooperative program of community welfare signed March 2, 1955.¹³

II. Current and Projected Programs and Courses of Action

[Here follow specific current and projected programs and courses of action, followed by annexes concerning Iraq's fiscal and foreign exchange position, and British support to the Iraqi armed forces.]

¹ Source: Department of State, OCB Files: Lot 62 D 430, Near East: January-July, 1957. Secret. A covering note by Charles E. Johnson, Executive Assistant to the OCB, indicates that the Board concurred in this Plan for implementation by the responsible agencies of the actions and programs contained therein at its meeting of August 7.

According to minutes of the OCB meeting of July 31, the OCB discussed and revised a July 27 draft of the Operations Plan for Iraq, and deferred final action on the paper pending the preparation by the Working Group of an annex covering U.K. past and present programs and future plans for military aid to Iraq, and the resolving of any questions that might have remained with respect to paragraph 52 of the paper. The OCB noted a report by the Department of Defense that the Military Committee of the Baghdad Pact was making a series of planning studies on the Pact countries, including one on air defense. Upon completion of these studies, the Department of Defense would be able to define more clearly Iraqi military needs within an overall Baghdad Pact context, and the relation of possible U.S. assistance thereto. The OCB noted that it was important that no impression be given the British or the Iraqis that the United States might assume any greater responsibility for the Iraqi military program. (*Ibid.*) ² [Foreign Relations, 1952-1954, vol. IX, Part 1, p. 525.](#)

³ [Document 458.](#)

⁴ [Vol. XIX, p. 507.](#)

⁵ In telegram 20, July 6, the Embassy in Baghdad commented on a draft of this Plan, sent on June 19, as follows: "While concurring in general with reference to influence we should exert for political, social and economic reforms (paras 10, 16, 33), we feel careful consideration should be given to the type of reforms we wish to encourage, time period within which they may reasonably be expected to be achieved and their implication upon various aspects of Iraqi social structure. Careless and unthoughtful

advocacy of all types of reform in a country such as Iraq could easily produce dilemma difficult to resolve in U.S. interests, e.g., hasty and radical reform measures would inevitably diminish power and influence of sheikhs who constitute important political stabilizing factor. Rapid and serious decline in their influence would place tremendous power in hands of few irresponsible extreme nationalists and create forces making for disunity and instability.” (Department of State, Central Files, 611.87/7–657) ⁶ Internal security forces are as follows: The National Police, a semi-military organization with primarily civil duties, which includes a mobile police force; the Army which has a role in maintenance of civil order in instances where the National Police is unable to cope with the situation; and the Directorate General of Security which controls foreigners, passport and nationality functions in addition to counter-intelligence and counter-subversion. [Footnote in the source text.]

⁷ See State Department publication *Treaties in Force* for additional arrangements. [Footnote in the source text.]

⁸ Ellipsis in the source text. The full text of this statement is printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, December 10, 1956, p. 918.

⁹ This unperfected treaty, signed in Washington on June 7, never entered into force, due to the failure of the Government of Iraq to give written notification to the Government of the United States that it had complied with all statutory and constitutional requirements for the entry into force of such an agreement.

¹⁰ For text of this agreement, see TIAS 3108; 5 UST (pt. 3) 2496.

¹¹ For text of this agreement, see TIAS 2413; 3 UST 541.

¹² For text of this agreement, see TIAS 2757; 3 UST (pt. 4) 5882.

¹³ For text of this agreement, see TIAS 3209; 6 UST 701.

463. Editorial Note

In conjunction with the Syrian crisis, on August 28 the United States expedited delivery to Iraq of certain items included in the Military Assistance Program. Documentation concerning the deliveries is in Department of State, Central File 787.56. Regarding the Syrian crisis, see [volume XIII, pages 617 ff.](#)

**464. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State,
Washington, October 15, 1957¹**

Washington, October 15, 1957

SUBJECT

U.S.-U.K. Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Military
Assistance to Iraq

PARTICIPANTS

U.S.

The Secretary

Stuart W. Rockwell, NE

John Dorman, NE

U.K.

Selwyn Lloyd, British Foreign Secretary

Sir Harold Caccia, British Ambassador

Viscount Samuel Hood, Minister, British Embassy

Willie Morris, First Secretary, British Embassy

Denis Laskey, Private Secretary/ Foreign Secretary

The Secretary began the discussion of this item by referring to the 1954 memorandum of understanding between the United States and the United Kingdom with regard to the furnishing of military assistance to Iraq. He said that we are under strong pressure to provide assistance to the Iraqi Air

Force and that other problems have arisen in connection with this memorandum. Mr. Rockwell described the principal aspects of the arrangement which were causing difficulty, and suggested that if the Secretary and the Foreign Secretary agreed, a group of officers from the British Embassy and the Department, and perhaps also American and British military officers, might meet to discuss ways in which greater flexibility under the memorandum might be achieved without departing from the substance of the arrangement.

Mr. Selwyn Lloyd said that he had no objection and the Secretary added that such a procedure would be agreeable to him. It was accordingly agreed that discussions would take place.²

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Files, 787.5–MSP/10–1557. Confidential. Drafted by Rockwell.

² After discussion between the Departments of Defense and State, negotiations began between U.S. and British representatives on the subject of air assistance to Iraq, extending into 1958. In June 1958, the United States established an air force section in its MAAG mission in Iraq. Documentation on this subject is *ibid.*, 787.5–MSP.

Index

Abdul Ilah, Crown Prince, 338–339 [Pg. 338 is part of [Doc. 146](#)], 353–354 [Pg. 353 is part of [Doc. 150](#)], 448 [Pg. 448 is part of [Doc. 192](#)], 894–895 [Pg. 894 is part of [Doc. 391](#)], 987 [Pg. 987 is part of [Doc. 428](#)], 999 [Pg. 999 is part of [Doc. 435](#)], 1011 [Pg. 1011 is part of [Doc. 436](#)]

Abdullah, King, 1008 [Pg. 1008 is part of [Doc. 435](#)]

Abu al–Huda, Tawfiq, 37 [Pg. 37 is part of [Doc. 25](#)]

Abu Dhabi, 500 [Pg. 500 is part of [Doc. 220](#)], 549 [Pg. 549 is part of [Doc. 247](#)]

Aden, 67 [Pg. 67 is part of [Doc. 43](#)], 424 [Pg. 424 is part of [Doc. 178](#)], 509–510 [Pg. 509 is part of [Doc. 222](#)], 595 [Pg. 595 is part of [Doc. 266](#)], 601 [Pg. 601 is part of [Doc. 266](#)], 610 [Pg. 610 is part of [Doc. 266](#)], 624 [Pg. 624 is part of [Doc. 270](#)], 638 [Pg. 638 is part of [Doc. 270](#)]

Afghanistan (see also [Pushtunistan dispute](#)), 89 [Pg. 89 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 274 [Pg. 274 is part of [Doc. 114](#)], 300–301 [Pg. 300 is part of [Doc. 130](#)], 491–492 [Pgs. 491–492 include portions of [Doc. 215](#) and [Doc. 216](#)], 706 [Pg. 706 is part of [Doc. 296](#)], 1045 [Pg. 1045 is part of [Doc. 456](#)]

Soviet bloc, relations with, 63 [Pg. 63 includes portions of [Doc. 42](#) and [Doc. 43](#)], 79–80 [Pg. 79 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 92 [Pg. 92 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 183 [Pg. 183 is part of [Doc. 78](#)], 188 [Pg. 188 is part of [Doc. 78](#)], 191 [Pg. 191 is part of [Doc. 78](#)], 194 [Pg. 194 is part of [Doc. 78](#)], 232 [Pg. 232 is part of [Doc. 92](#)], 239 [Pg. 239 is part of [Doc. 93](#)], 378 [Pg. 378 is part of [Doc. 160](#)]

British position, 253 [Pg. 253 is part of [Doc. 101](#)]

Iranian position, 300 [Pg. 300 is part of [Doc. 130](#)], 902 [Pg. 902 is part of [Doc. 392](#)], 924 [Pg. 924 includes portions of [Doc. 396](#) and [Doc. 397](#)], 942 [Pg. 942 is part of [Doc. 406](#)]

Africa (see also [Algerian conflict](#); *individual countries*), 67 [Pg. 67 is part of [Doc. 43](#)], 107 [Pg. 107 is part of [Doc. 49](#)], 200 [Pg. 200 includes portions of [Doc. 80](#) and [Doc. 81](#)], 620 [Pg. 620 is part of [Doc. 270](#)]

Afro–Asian Conference. See [Bandung Conference](#).

Aggradi, Ferrari, 921 [Pg. 921 includes portions of [Doc. 394](#) and [Doc. 395](#)]

Akers, Col. Russell F., 63*n* [Pg. 63 includes portions of [Doc. 42](#) and [Doc. 43](#)], 135 [Pg. 135 is part of [Doc. 60](#)]

Ala, Hosein, 281 [Pg. 281 is part of [Doc. 119](#)], 488–489 [Pgs. 488–489 include portions of [Doc. 213](#) and [Doc. 214](#)], 748–749 [Pgs. 748–749 include portions of [Doc. 315](#) and [Doc. 316](#)], 822 [Pg. 822 is part of [Doc. 357](#)], 876 [Pg. 876 is part of [Doc. 381](#)], 922–924 [Pgs. 922–924 include portions of [Doc. 395](#), [Doc. 396](#), and [Doc. 397](#)]

Baghdad Pact, 199 [Pg. 199 is part of [Doc. 80](#)], 279 [Pg. 279 includes portions of [Doc. 117](#) and [Doc. 118](#)], 286–287 [Pgs. 286–287 include portions of [Doc. 123](#) and [Doc. 124](#)], 320 [Pg. 320 includes portions of [Doc. 137](#) and [Doc. 138](#)], 365*n* [Pg. 365 is part of [Doc. 155](#)], 765*n* [Pg. 765 is part of [Doc. 325](#)], 766 [Pg. 766 includes portions of [Doc. 325](#) and [Doc. 326](#)], 787–788 [Pgs. 787–788 include portions of [Doc. 338](#) and [Doc. 339](#)]

Political situation, 137 [Pg. 137 is part of [Doc. 60](#)], 726–728 [Pgs. 726–728 include portions of [Doc. 303](#) and [Doc. 304](#)], 911 [Pg. 911 is part of [Doc. 393](#)], 916 [Pg. 916 is part of [Doc. 393](#)], 928 [Pg. 928 includes portions of [Doc. 398](#) and [Doc. 399](#)], 930 [Pg. 930 is part of [Doc. 399](#)]

Alam, Asadullah, 913–914 [Pg. 913 is part of [Doc. 393](#)], 922 [Pg. 922 includes portions of [Doc. 395](#) and [Doc. 396](#)]

Alavi–Moqadam, Gen., 914 [Pg. 914 is part of [Doc. 393](#)]

Aldrich, Winthrop W., 39*n* [Pg. 39 is part of [Doc. 26](#)], 205*n* [Pg. 205 is part of [Doc. 83](#)], 240 [Pg. 240 is part of [Doc. 94](#)], 243 [Pg. 243 is part of [Doc. 95](#)]

Algerian conflict, 172 [Pg. 172 is part of [Doc. 69](#)], 181 [Pg. 181 includes portions of [Doc. 76](#) and [Doc. 77](#)], 287 [Pg. 287 is part of [Doc. 124](#)], 289 [Pg. 289 is part of [Doc. 124](#)], 378 [Pg. 378 is part of [Doc. 160](#)], 624 [Pg. 624 is part of [Doc. 270](#)], 654–655 [Pg. 654 is part of [Doc. 274](#)], 660–661 [Pgs. 660–661 include portions of [Doc. 276](#) and [Doc. 277](#)]

Baghdad Pact and, 115 [Pg. 115 is part of [Doc. 51](#)], 140–141 [Pg. 140 is part of [Doc. 60](#)], 181 [Pg. 181 includes portions of [Doc. 76](#) and [Doc. 77](#)], 389 [Pg. 389 is part of [Doc. 162](#)], 657 [Pg. 657 is part of [Doc. 276](#)]

British position, 140–141 [Pg. 140 is part of [Doc. 60](#)], 290 [Pg. 290 is part of [Doc. 124](#)]

Egyptian role, 165–166 [Pg. 165 is part of [Doc. 66](#)]

Iraqi position, 115 [Pg. 115 is part of [Doc. 51](#)], 288 [Pg. 288 is part of [Doc. 124](#)], 1007 [Pg. 1007 is part of [Doc. 435](#)], 1034 [Pg. 1034 includes portions of [Doc. 450](#) and [Doc. 451](#)], 1055 [Pg. 1055 is part of [Doc. 458](#)]

Ali, Mohamed, 56–57 [Pgs. 56–57 include portions of [Doc. 37](#) and [Doc. 38](#)], 289 [Pg. 289 is part of [Doc. 124](#)], 300–301 [Pg. 300 is part of [Doc. 130](#)], 303–305 [Pg. 303 is part of [Doc. 131](#)], 369–372 [Pgs. 369–372 include portions of [Doc. 157](#), [Doc. 158](#), and [Doc. 159](#)], 657–661 [Pgs. 657–661 include portions of [Doc. 276](#) and [Doc. 277](#)]

Allen, Francis O., 16n [Pg. 16 includes portions of [Doc. 11](#) and [Doc. 12](#)], 27n [Pg. 27 includes portions of [Doc. 18](#) and [Doc. 19](#)]

Allen, George V., 27n [Pg. 27 includes portions of [Doc. 18](#) and [Doc. 19](#)], 38n [Pg. 38 includes portions of [Doc. 25](#) and [Doc. 26](#)], 40n [Pg. 40 includes portions of [Doc. 26](#) and [Doc. 27](#)], 45n [Pg. 45 is part of [Doc. 30](#)], 46n [Pg. 46 includes portions of [Doc. 31](#) and [Doc. 32](#)], 58n [Pg. 58 is part of [Doc. 39](#)], 133n [Pg. 133 includes portions of [Doc. 57](#) and [Doc. 58](#)], 134n [Pg. 134 is part of [Doc. 59](#)], 177n [Pg. 177 includes portions of [Doc. 71](#) and [Doc. 72](#)], 178n [Pg. 178 includes portions of [Doc. 72](#) and [Doc. 73](#)], 180n [Pg. 180 includes portions of [Doc. 74](#) and [Doc. 75](#)], 181n [Pg. 181 includes portions of [Doc. 76](#) and [Doc. 77](#)], 213n [Pg. 213 is part of [Doc.](#)

[87](#)], [702n](#) [Pg. 702 is part of [Doc. 295](#)], [723n](#) [Pg. 723 is part of [Doc. 303](#)], [754n](#) [Pg. 754 includes portions of [Doc. 318](#) and [Doc. 319](#)], [755n](#) [Pg. 755 includes portions of [Doc. 319](#) and [Doc. 320](#)], [805n](#) [Pg. 805 is part of [Doc. 350](#)], [1012n](#) [Pg. 1012 includes portions of [Doc. 437](#) and [Doc. 438](#)]

Baghdad Pact, [48–50](#) [Pgs. 48–50 include portions of [Doc. 32](#), [Doc. 33](#), and [Doc. 34](#)], [135](#) [Pg. 135 is part of [Doc. 60](#)], [140](#) [Pg. 140 is part of [Doc. 60](#)], [151](#) [Pg. 151 is part of [Doc. 60](#)], [219–220](#) [Pg. 219 is part of [Doc. 91](#)], [230](#) [Pg. 230 is part of [Doc. 92](#)], [234–237](#) [Pgs. 234–237 include portions of [Doc. 92](#) and [Doc. 93](#)], [243](#) [Pg. 243 is part of [Doc. 95](#)]

Near East:

Soviet bloc, relations with, [216–217](#) [Pgs. 216–217 include portions of [Doc. 90](#) and [Doc. 91](#)], [222](#) [Pg. 222 is part of [Doc. 91](#)], [228–230](#) [Pgs. 228–230 include portions of [Doc. 91](#) and [Doc. 92](#)], [232](#) [Pg. 232 is part of [Doc. 92](#)], [278](#) [Pg. 278 is part of [Doc. 117](#)], [820–821](#) [Pg. 820 is part of [Doc. 357](#)], [823–825](#) [Pg. 823 is part of [Doc. 357](#)]

U.S. economic aid to, [229](#) [Pg. 229 is part of [Doc. 92](#)], [231–233](#) [Pg. 231 is part of [Doc. 92](#)], [238–239](#) [Pg. 238 is part of [Doc. 93](#)], [772](#) [Pg. 772 is part of [Doc. 329](#)], [790–792](#) [Pgs. 790–792 include portions of [Doc. 342](#) and [Doc. 343](#)], [820–825](#) [Pg. 820 is part of [Doc. 357](#)]

U.S. military aid to, [207–210](#) [Pgs. 207–210 include portions of [Doc. 83](#) and [Doc. 84](#)], [240](#) [Pg. 240 is part of [Doc. 94](#)], [242](#) [Pg. 242 is part of [Doc. 94](#)], [698–700](#) [Pgs. 698–700 include portions of [Doc. 293](#) and [Doc. 294](#)], [701n](#) [Pg. 701 is part of [Doc. 294](#)], [703](#) [Pg. 703 is part of [Doc. 296](#)], [709](#) [Pg. 709 includes portions of [Doc. 297](#) and [Doc. 298](#)], [750–752](#) [Pgs. 750–752 include portions of [Doc. 316](#), [Doc. 317](#), and [Doc. 318](#)], [820–825](#) [Pg. 820 is part of [Doc. 357](#)], [962](#) [Pg. 962 is part of [Doc.](#)

[416](#)], [977n](#) [Pg. 977 includes portions of [Doc. 425](#) and [Doc. 426](#)]

U.S. policy toward, [62](#) [Pg. 62 is part of [Doc. 42](#)], [218](#) [Pg. 218 is part of [Doc. 91](#)], [221](#) [Pg. 221 is part of [Doc. 91](#)], [223–225](#) [Pg. 223 is part of [Doc. 91](#)]

Oil resources, [318n](#) [Pg. 318 includes portions of [Doc. 136](#) and [Doc. 137](#)], [712–713](#) [Pgs. 712–713 include portions of [Doc. 299](#) and [Doc. 300](#)]

Alpha Operation, [1](#) [Pg. 1 is part of [Doc. 1](#)], [46–48](#) [Pgs. 46–48 include portions of [Doc. 31](#), [Doc. 32](#), and [Doc. 33](#)], [175](#) [Pg. 175 is part of [Doc. 70](#)], [970](#) [Pg. 970 includes portions of [Doc. 420](#) and [Doc. 421](#)]

Alphand, Hervé, [431](#) [Pg. 431 is part of [Doc. 181](#)]

American Doctrine. See [Eisenhower Doctrine](#).

Amini, Ali, [729](#) [Pg. 729 includes portions of [Doc. 304](#) and [Doc. 305](#)], [777–778](#) [Pgs. 777–778 include portions of [Doc. 332](#) and [Doc. 333](#)], [844–845](#) [Pgs. 844–845 include portions of [Doc. 362](#), [Doc. 363](#), and [Doc. 364](#)]

Baghdad Pact, [303](#) [Pg. 303 is part of [Doc. 131](#)], [306](#) [Pg. 306 is part of [Doc. 131](#)], [369](#) [Pg. 369 includes portions of [Doc. 157](#) and [Doc. 158](#)], [371](#) [Pg. 371 is part of [Doc. 158](#)], [657](#) [Pg. 657 is part of [Doc. 276](#)], [659–661](#) [Pgs. 659–661 include portions of [Doc. 276](#) and [Doc. 277](#)], [787–788](#) [Pgs. 787–788 include portions of [Doc. 338](#) and [Doc. 339](#)], [797](#) [Pg. 797 includes portions of [Doc. 345](#) and [Doc. 346](#)]

U.S. aid, [797–798](#) [Pgs. 797–798 include portions of [Doc. 345](#), [Doc. 346](#), and [Doc. 347](#)], [799n](#) [Pg. 799 includes portions of [Doc. 347](#) and [Doc. 348](#)], [813–814](#) [Pgs. 813–814 include portions of [Doc. 353](#) and [Doc. 354](#)], [820–821](#) [Pg. 820 is part of [Doc. 357](#)], [826](#) [Pg. 826 is part of [Doc. 357](#)], [848–849](#) [Pgs. 848–849 include portions of [Doc. 365](#) and [Doc. 366](#)], [851–852](#) [Pgs. 851–852 include portions of [Doc. 367](#) and [Doc. 368](#)], [865](#) [Pg. 865 is part of [Doc. 375](#)], [874](#) [Pg. 874

includes portions of [Doc. 380](#) and [Doc. 381](#)], 946 [Pg. 946 includes portions of [Doc. 407](#) and [Doc. 408](#)]

Amuzikar, 922 [Pg. 922 includes portions of [Doc. 395](#) and [Doc. 396](#)]

Anderson, Dillon, 133 [Pg. 133 includes portions of [Doc. 57](#) and [Doc. 58](#)], 159 [Pg. 159 is part of [Doc. 66](#)], 165 [Pg. 165 is part of [Doc. 66](#)], 167 [Pg. 167 is part of [Doc. 66](#)], 171 [Pg. 171 is part of [Doc. 68](#)], 202 [Pg. 202 is part of [Doc. 81](#)], 307–308 [Pgs. 307–308 include portions of [Doc. 131](#) and [Doc. 132](#)], 707 [Pg. 707 is part of [Doc. 296](#)], 742 [Pg. 742 is part of [Doc. 312](#)], 769 [Pg. 769 is part of [Doc. 327](#)], 801 [Pg. 801 includes portions of [Doc. 348](#) and [Doc. 349](#)]

Anderson, Robert B., 53–54 [Pgs. 53–54 include portions of [Doc. 35](#) and [Doc. 36](#)], 63 [Pg. 63 includes portions of [Doc. 42](#) and [Doc. 43](#)], 70n [Pg. 70 includes portions of [Doc. 43](#) and [Doc. 44](#)], 98 [Pg. 98 is part of [Doc. 47](#)], 127 [Pg. 127 includes portions of [Doc. 54](#) and [Doc. 55](#)], 133 [Pg. 133 includes portions of [Doc. 57](#) and [Doc. 58](#)], 250n [Pg. 250 is part of [Doc. 99](#)], 618 [Pg. 618 includes portions of [Doc. 268](#) and [Doc. 269](#)]

Ansari, 622 [Pg. 622 is part of [Doc. 270](#)]

Anschuetz, Norbert L., 648 [Pg. 648 is part of [Doc. 271](#)]

Aqaba Gulf (*see also* [Israel: Alternate pipeline proposals](#)), 246 [Pg. 246 is part of [Doc. 97](#)], 495–496 [Pgs. 495–496 include portions of [Doc. 218](#), [Doc. 219](#), and [Doc. 220](#)], 557 [Pg. 557 is part of [Doc. 251](#)], 561–563 [Pgs. 561–563 include portions of [Doc. 253](#) and [Doc. 254](#)], 615 [Pg. 615 is part of [Doc. 267](#)], 629–630 [Pg. 629 is part of [Doc. 270](#)], 637–638 [Pg. 637 is part of [Doc. 270](#)]

Arab–Israeli dispute (*see also* [Suez crisis](#); Tripartite Declaration of 1950):

Alpha Operation, 1 [Pg. 1 is part of [Doc. 1](#)], 46–48 [Pgs. 46–48 include portions of [Doc. 31](#), [Doc. 32](#), and [Doc. 33](#)], 175 [Pg. 175 is part of [Doc. 70](#)], 970 [Pg. 970 includes portions of [Doc. 420](#) and [Doc. 421](#)]

Armed attack, possible, 163 [Pg. 163 is part of [Doc. 66](#)], 175–176 [Pgs. 175–176 include portions of [Doc. 70](#) and [Doc. 71](#)], 183 [Pg.

183 is part of [Doc. 78](#)], 186–188 [Pg. 186 is part of [Doc. 78](#)], 201 [Pg. 201 is part of [Doc. 81](#)], 595 [Pg. 595 is part of [Doc. 266](#)], 595–596 [Pg. 595 is part of [Doc. 266](#)], 605–606 [Pg. 605 is part of [Doc. 266](#)], 609–610 [Pg. 609 is part of [Doc. 266](#)]

U.S. responses, 165 [Pg. 165 is part of [Doc. 66](#)], 167 [Pg. 167 is part of [Doc. 66](#)], 170–171 [Pg. 170 is part of [Doc. 68](#)], 187 [Pg. 187 is part of [Doc. 78](#)], 613 [Pg. 613 is part of [Doc. 267](#)]

Baghdad Pact and, 65 [Pg. 65 is part of [Doc. 43](#)], 123–124 [Pgs. 123–124 include portions of [Doc. 52](#) and [Doc. 53](#)], 130 [Pg. 130 is part of [Doc. 56](#)], 140 [Pg. 140 is part of [Doc. 60](#)], 153 [Pg. 153 is part of [Doc. 62](#)], 157 [Pg. 157 is part of [Doc. 64](#)], 221 [Pg. 221 is part of [Doc. 91](#)], 330 [Pg. 330 includes portions of [Doc. 143](#) and [Doc. 144](#)], 378 [Pg. 378 is part of [Doc. 160](#)], 988 [Pg. 988 includes portions of [Doc. 428](#) and [Doc. 429](#)]

U.S. participation, 35 [Pg. 35 is part of [Doc. 24](#)], 68 [Pg. 68 is part of [Doc. 43](#)], 132 [Pg. 132 includes portions of [Doc. 56](#) and [Doc. 57](#)], 141 [Pg. 141 is part of [Doc. 60](#)], 152 [Pg. 152 is part of [Doc. 61](#)], 176 [Pg. 176 includes portions of [Doc. 70](#) and [Doc. 71](#)], 180ⁿ [Pg. 180 includes portions of [Doc. 74](#) and [Doc. 75](#)], 181ⁿ [Pg. 181 includes portions of [Doc. 76](#) and [Doc. 77](#)], 182 [Pg. 182 includes portions of [Doc. 77](#) and [Doc. 78](#)], 207ⁿ [Pg. 207 includes portions of [Doc. 83](#) and [Doc. 84](#)], 212 [Pg. 212 includes portions of [Doc. 86](#) and [Doc. 87](#)], 220 [Pg. 220 is part of [Doc. 91](#)], 240–241 [Pg. 240 is part of [Doc. 94](#)], 263ⁿ [Pg. 263 is part of [Doc. 105](#)], 331 [Pg. 331 includes portions of [Doc. 144](#) and [Doc. 145](#)], 361–362 [Pg. 361 is part of [Doc. 153](#)], 389 [Pg. 389 is part of [Doc. 162](#)], 774–775 [Pgs. 774–775 include portions of [Doc. 330](#) and [Doc. 331](#)], 800 [Pg. 800 is part of [Doc. 348](#)]

Bat Galim case, 9 [Pg. 9 is part of [Doc. 8](#)]

Border incidents, 27 [Pg. 27 includes portions of [Doc. 18](#) and [Doc. 19](#)], 90 [Pg. 90 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 124 [Pg. 124 includes portions of [Doc. 52](#) and [Doc. 53](#)], 186 [Pg. 186 is part of [Doc. 78](#)], 229 [Pg. 229 is part of [Doc. 92](#)], 606 [Pg. 606 is part of [Doc. 266](#)]

British position, 201 [Pg. 201 is part of [Doc. 81](#)], 205 [Pg. 205 is part of [Doc. 83](#)], 246 [Pg. 246 is part of [Doc. 97](#)], 254 [Pg. 254 is part of [Doc. 101](#)], 290 [Pg. 290 is part of [Doc. 124](#)]

Egyptian position, 46–47 [Pgs. 46–47 include portions of [Doc. 31](#) and [Doc. 32](#)], 155 [Pg. 155 includes portions of [Doc. 63](#) and [Doc. 64](#)], 221 [Pg. 221 is part of [Doc. 91](#)], 244 [Pg. 244 includes portions of [Doc. 95](#) and [Doc. 96](#)], 250 [Pg. 250 is part of [Doc. 99](#)]

Eisenhower Doctrine and, 455 [Pg. 455 is part of [Doc. 195](#)], 470 [Pg. 470 is part of [Doc. 203](#)], 654–656 [Pgs. 654–656 include portions of [Doc. 274](#) and [Doc. 275](#)]

French position, 246 [Pg. 246 is part of [Doc. 97](#)]

Iranian position, 287 [Pg. 287 is part of [Doc. 124](#)], 660 [Pg. 660 is part of [Doc. 276](#)]

Iraqi position, 301 [Pg. 301 is part of [Doc. 130](#)], 975 [Pg. 975 includes portions of [Doc. 423](#) and [Doc. 424](#)], 989 [Pg. 989 is part of [Doc. 429](#)], 1004 [Pg. 1004 is part of [Doc. 435](#)], 1009 [Pg. 1009 is part of [Doc. 435](#)], 1019–1020 [Pg. 1019 is part of [Doc. 441](#)], 1029–1030 [Pgs. 1029–1030 include portions of [Doc. 445](#) and [Doc. 446](#)], 1041 [Pg. 1041 is part of [Doc. 455](#)], 1044 [Pg. 1044 is part of [Doc. 456](#)], 1049 [Pg. 1049 is part of [Doc. 458](#)], 1055 [Pg. 1055 is part of [Doc. 458](#)]

Israeli position, 9 [Pg. 9 is part of [Doc. 8](#)]

Johnston plan, 228 [Pg. 228 includes portions of [Doc. 91](#) and [Doc. 92](#)], 250–251 [Pgs. 250–251 include portions of [Doc. 99](#) and [Doc. 100](#)], 258 [Pg. 258 includes portions of [Doc. 101](#) and [Doc. 102](#)], 628 [Pg. 628 is part of [Doc. 270](#)]

Lebanese position, 18 [Pg. 18 is part of [Doc. 12](#)]

Pakistani position, 289 [Pg. 289 is part of [Doc. 124](#)], 557 [Pg. 557 is part of [Doc. 251](#)], 561 [Pg. 561 is part of [Doc. 253](#)], 657–658 [Pg. 657 is part of [Doc. 276](#)]

Palestinian refugees, 228 [Pg. 228 includes portions of [Doc. 91](#) and [Doc. 92](#)], 346–347 [Pg. 346 is part of [Doc. 148](#)], 386 [Pg. 386 is part of [Doc. 161](#)], 426 [Pg. 426 is part of [Doc. 178](#)], 557 [Pg. 557 is part of [Doc. 251](#)], 560–561 [Pg. 560 is part of [Doc. 253](#)], 581 [Pg. 581 is part of [Doc. 260](#)], 606 [Pg. 606 is part of [Doc. 266](#)], 610 [Pg. 610 is part of [Doc. 266](#)], 616 [Pg. 616 is part of [Doc. 267](#)], 627–628 [Pg. 627 is part of [Doc. 270](#)], 657–660 [Pg. 657 is part of [Doc. 276](#)]

Regional defense and, 17 [Pg. 17 is part of [Doc. 12](#)], 31 [Pg. 31 is part of [Doc. 22](#)], 47 [Pg. 47 is part of [Doc. 32](#)], 52 [Pg. 52 is part of [Doc. 35](#)], 67–68 [Pg. 67 is part of [Doc. 43](#)], 90–91 [Pg. 90 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 114 [Pg. 114 is part of [Doc. 51](#)], 153 [Pg. 153 is part of [Doc. 62](#)], 155–157 [Pgs. 155–157 include portions of [Doc. 63](#) and [Doc. 64](#)], 163 [Pg. 163 is part of [Doc. 66](#)]

Soviet policies, 104–106 [Pg. 104 is part of [Doc. 49](#)], 175–176 [Pgs. 175–176 include portions of [Doc. 70](#) and [Doc. 71](#)], 183 [Pg. 183 is part of [Doc. 78](#)], 186–188 [Pg. 186 is part of [Doc. 78](#)], 187 [Pg. 187 is part of [Doc. 78](#)], 191 [Pg. 191 is part of [Doc. 78](#)], 201 [Pg. 201 is part of [Doc. 81](#)], 287–288 [Pg. 287 is part of [Doc. 124](#)], 358–359 [Pg. 358 is part of [Doc. 151](#)], 361 [Pg. 361 is part of [Doc. 153](#)], 595–596 [Pg. 595 is part of [Doc. 266](#)], 608 [Pg. 608 is part of [Doc. 266](#)], 620–622 [Pg. 620 is part of [Doc. 270](#)]

Suez crisis and, 422 [Pg. 422 is part of [Doc. 178](#)]

Syrian political situation and, 175 [Pg. 175 is part of [Doc. 70](#)]

U.N. resolutions, 82 [Pg. 82 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 140 [Pg. 140 is part of [Doc. 60](#)], 175 [Pg. 175 is part of [Doc. 70](#)], 191 [Pg. 191 is part of [Doc. 78](#)], 288 [Pg. 288 is part of [Doc. 124](#)], 346 [Pg. 346 is part of

[Doc. 148](#)], 608 [Pg. 608 is part of [Doc. 266](#)], 620 [Pg. 620 is part of [Doc. 270](#)]

U.N. role, 187 [Pg. 187 is part of [Doc. 78](#)], 246 [Pg. 246 is part of [Doc. 97](#)], 287 [Pg. 287 is part of [Doc. 124](#)], 289 [Pg. 289 is part of [Doc. 124](#)], 382 [Pg. 382 is part of [Doc. 160](#)], 386–387 [Pgs. 386–387 include portions of [Doc. 161](#) and [Doc. 162](#)], 397 [Pg. 397 is part of [Doc. 167](#)], 425 [Pg. 425 is part of [Doc. 178](#)], 472 [Pg. 472 is part of [Doc. 203](#)]

U.S. position, 167 [Pg. 167 is part of [Doc. 66](#)], 345–346 [Pg. 345 is part of [Doc. 148](#)], 395 [Pg. 395 includes portions of [Doc. 165](#) and [Doc. 166](#)], 644 [Pg. 644 is part of [Doc. 270](#)]

U.S. policies, 50 [Pg. 50 includes portions of [Doc. 33](#) and [Doc. 34](#)], 173 [Pg. 173 is part of [Doc. 69](#)], 349–350 [Pg. 349 is part of [Doc. 148](#)], 352 [Pg. 352 is part of [Doc. 149](#)], 386–387 [Pgs. 386–387 include portions of [Doc. 161](#) and [Doc. 162](#)], 581 [Pg. 581 is part of [Doc. 260](#)], 619–622 [Pg. 619 is part of [Doc. 270](#)], 626–631 [Pg. 626 is part of [Doc. 270](#)], 645 [Pg. 645 is part of [Doc. 270](#)], 654–655 [Pg. 654 is part of [Doc. 274](#)]

Dulles speech, August 1955, 62 [Pg. 62 is part of [Doc. 42](#)], 579 [Pg. 579 is part of [Doc. 260](#)], 615–616 [Pg. 615 is part of [Doc. 267](#)], 627–628 [Pg. 627 is part of [Doc. 270](#)], 659 [Pg. 659 is part of [Doc. 276](#)]

U.S.–Egyptian relations and, 47 [Pg. 47 is part of [Doc. 32](#)], 85–87 [Pg. 85 is part of [Doc. 46](#)]

U.S.–Soviet agreement proposal, 192 [Pg. 192 is part of [Doc. 78](#)], 196–197 [Pg. 196 is part of [Doc. 78](#)]

Arab League (*see also individual countries*), 7 [Pg. 7 is part of [Doc. 6](#)], 78 [Pg. 78 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 81 [Pg. 81 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 85 [Pg. 85 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 186 [Pg. 186 is part of [Doc. 78](#)], 235 [Pg. 235 is part of [Doc. 93](#)], 251 [Pg. 251 is part of [Doc. 100](#)], 377 [Pg. 377 is part of [Doc. 160](#)], 568–569 [Pg. 568

is part of [Doc. 254](#)], 636 [Pg. 636 is part of [Doc. 270](#)], 652–656 [Pgs. 652–656 include portions of [Doc. 274](#) and [Doc. 275](#)]

Collective security pact (ALCSP), 13–14 [Pg. 13 is part of [Doc. 10](#)], 16 [Pg. 16 includes portions of [Doc. 11](#) and [Doc. 12](#)], 24 [Pg. 24 is part of [Doc. 16](#)], 26ⁿ [Pg. 26 is part of [Doc. 17](#)], 31 [Pg. 31 is part of [Doc. 22](#)], 33 [Pg. 33 is part of [Doc. 23](#)], 108 [Pg. 108 is part of [Doc. 49](#)], 123 [Pg. 123 is part of [Doc. 52](#)], 142 [Pg. 142 is part of [Doc. 60](#)], 255 [Pg. 255 is part of [Doc. 101](#)]

Regional defense, role in, 13–14 [Pg. 13 is part of [Doc. 10](#)], 16 [Pg. 16 includes portions of [Doc. 11](#) and [Doc. 12](#)], 24 [Pg. 24 is part of [Doc. 16](#)], 124 [Pg. 124 includes portions of [Doc. 52](#) and [Doc. 53](#)], 226–227 [Pg. 226 is part of [Doc. 91](#)]

Arab States (*see also individual countries*; Near East):

Anti–Westernism, 6 [Pg. 6 is part of [Doc. 5](#)], 15 [Pg. 15 is part of [Doc. 11](#)], 594–595 [Pgs. 594–595 include portions of [Doc. 265](#) and [Doc. 266](#)], 597 [Pg. 597 is part of [Doc. 266](#)]

Arab nationalism, 424 [Pg. 424 is part of [Doc. 178](#)], 498–499 [Pg. 498 is part of [Doc. 220](#)], 595 [Pg. 595 is part of [Doc. 266](#)], 609 [Pg. 609 is part of [Doc. 266](#)], 621 [Pg. 621 is part of [Doc. 270](#)], 624 [Pg. 624 is part of [Doc. 270](#)], 633 [Pg. 633 is part of [Doc. 270](#)], 635–636 [Pg. 635 is part of [Doc. 270](#)]

Economic union proposal, 213 [Pg. 213 is part of [Doc. 87](#)]

Middle East Development Organization proposal, 586–587 [Pgs. 586–587 include portions of [Doc. 263](#), [Doc. 264](#), and [Doc. 265](#)], 618 [Pg. 618 includes portions of [Doc. 268](#) and [Doc. 269](#)]

Regional economic organization proposals, 350 [Pg. 350 is part of [Doc. 148](#)], 367 [Pg. 367 is part of [Doc. 156](#)]

Soviet bloc, relations with, 162–163 [Pg. 162 is part of [Doc. 66](#)], 172–173 [Pg. 172 is part of [Doc. 69](#)], 175–176 [Pgs. 175–176

include portions of [Doc. 70](#) and [Doc. 71](#)], 183 [Pg. 183 is part of [Doc. 78](#)], 187–188 [Pg. 187 is part of [Doc. 78](#)], 191 [Pg. 191 is part of [Doc. 78](#)], 201 [Pg. 201 is part of [Doc. 81](#)]

United Kingdom, relations with, 201 [Pg. 201 is part of [Doc. 81](#)]

U.S. aid to, 50 [Pg. 50 includes portions of [Doc. 33](#) and [Doc. 34](#)], 64 [Pg. 64 is part of [Doc. 43](#)], 73 [Pg. 73 is part of [Doc. 44](#)], 82 [Pg. 82 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 91 [Pg. 91 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 323 [Pg. 323 includes portions of [Doc. 139](#) and [Doc. 140](#)], 350 [Pg. 350 is part of [Doc. 148](#)], 367 [Pg. 367 is part of [Doc. 156](#)], 625 [Pg. 625 is part of [Doc. 270](#)], 645 [Pg. 645 is part of [Doc. 270](#)]

Ardalan, Ali Qoli, 365n [Pg. 365 is part of [Doc. 155](#)], 797n [Pg. 797 includes portions of [Doc. 345](#) and [Doc. 346](#)], 842 [Pg. 842 is part of [Doc. 362](#)], 844n [Pg. 844 includes portions of [Doc. 362](#) and [Doc. 363](#)], 883n [Pg. 883 is part of [Doc. 384](#)], 922 [Pg. 922 includes portions of [Doc. 395](#) and [Doc. 396](#)], 924 [Pg. 924 includes portions of [Doc. 396](#) and [Doc. 397](#)], 941–944 [Pgs. 941–944 include portions of [Doc. 405](#) and [Doc. 406](#)], 946 [Pg. 946 includes portions of [Doc. 407](#) and [Doc. 408](#)], 948 [Pg. 948 is part of [Doc. 408](#)], 959 [Pg. 959 is part of [Doc. 414](#)]

Arey, Hawthorne, 863 [Pg. 863 includes portions of [Doc. 374](#) and [Doc. 375](#)]

Ariana, 914 [Pg. 914 is part of [Doc. 393](#)]

Al–Arif, Col. Ishmail, 1021 [Pg. 1021 is part of [Doc. 442](#)]

Arif, Gen. Rafiq, 988 [Pg. 988 includes portions of [Doc. 428](#) and [Doc. 429](#)], 1005 [Pg. 1005 is part of [Doc. 435](#)]

Armour, Norman, Sr., 365 [Pg. 365 is part of [Doc. 155](#)]

Armstrong, William P., 215 [Pg. 215 is part of [Doc. 89](#)]

Armstrong, Willis C., 712n [Pg. 712 includes portions of [Doc. 299](#) and [Doc. 300](#)], 725 [Pg. 725 is part of [Doc. 303](#)], 738n [Pg. 738 includes portions of [Doc. 308](#) and [Doc. 309](#)]

Arthur, Geoffrey, 217 [Pg. 217 is part of [Doc. 91](#)], 226–227 [Pg. 226 is part of [Doc. 91](#)], 229 [Pg. 229 is part of [Doc. 92](#)], 232 [Pg. 232 is part of [Doc. 92](#)], 234 [Pg. 234 includes portions of [Doc. 92](#) and [Doc. 93](#)], 237 [Pg. 237 is part of [Doc. 93](#)], 239 [Pg. 239 is part of [Doc. 93](#)]

al–Asali, Sabri, 25–26 [Pgs. 25–26 include portions of [Doc. 16](#) and [Doc. 17](#)], 87 [Pg. 87 is part of [Doc. 46](#)]

Ashford, Howard, 940n [Pg. 940 includes portions of [Doc. 404](#) and [Doc. 405](#)]

Atasi, Fayid al–, 87 [Pg. 87 is part of [Doc. 46](#)]

Atomic energy, 287 [Pg. 287 is part of [Doc. 124](#)]

Austin, Vice Adm. Bernard L., 649 [Pg. 649 includes portions of [Doc. 271](#) and [Doc. 272](#)], 669 [Pg. 669 includes portions of [Doc. 281](#) and [Doc. 282](#)]

Ayub Khan, Gen. Mohammed, 56–57 [Pgs. 56–57 include portions of [Doc. 37](#) and [Doc. 38](#)], 59–61 [Pgs. 59–61 include portions of [Doc. 39](#), [Doc. 40](#), and [Doc. 41](#)], 333 [Pg. 333 is part of [Doc. 145](#)]

Azm, Khalid Pasha al–, 25–26 [Pgs. 25–26 include portions of [Doc. 16](#) and [Doc. 17](#)], 32–33 [Pgs. 32–33 include portions of [Doc. 22](#) and [Doc. 23](#)], 35n [Pg. 35 is part of [Doc. 24](#)], 76 [Pg. 76 is part of [Doc. 45](#)], 87 [Pg. 87 is part of [Doc. 46](#)]

Azzam Pasha, Abdel Rahman, 506 [Pg. 506 is part of [Doc. 221](#)]

Baban, Ahmad Mukhtar, 1029–1034 [Pgs. 1029–1034 include portions of [Doc. 445](#), [Doc. 446](#), [Doc. 447](#), [Doc. 448](#), [Doc. 449](#), [Doc. 450](#), and [Doc. 451](#)]

al–Badr ben Ahmad, Crown Prince Muhammed, 519 [Pg. 519 includes portions of [Doc. 224](#) and [Doc. 225](#)], 638 [Pg. 638 is part of [Doc. 270](#)]

Baghdad Pact, 2 [Pg. 2 includes portions of [Doc. 1](#) and [Doc. 2](#)], 23 [Pg. 23 is part of [Doc. 16](#)], 97 [Pg. 97 is part of [Doc. 46](#)]

Algerian conflict and, 389 [Pg. 389 is part of [Doc. 162](#)], 657 [Pg. 657 is part of [Doc. 276](#)]

Alternate pipeline proposals and, 317 [Pg. 317 is part of [Doc. 136](#)], 570–571 [Pg. 570 is part of [Doc. 254](#)]

Ambassadors meetings, 303–307 [Pgs. 303–307 include portions of [Doc. 131](#) and [Doc. 132](#)], 369–372 [Pgs. 369–372 include portions of [Doc. 157](#), [Doc. 158](#), and [Doc. 159](#)], 657–661 [Pgs. 657–661 include portions of [Doc. 276](#) and [Doc. 277](#)], 800 [Pg. 800 is part of [Doc. 348](#)]

Arab–Israeli dispute and, 65 [Pg. 65 is part of [Doc. 43](#)], 123 [Pg. 123 is part of [Doc. 52](#)], 130 [Pg. 130 is part of [Doc. 56](#)], 140 [Pg. 140 is part of [Doc. 60](#)], 140–141 [Pg. 140 is part of [Doc. 60](#)], 153 [Pg. 153 is part of [Doc. 62](#)], 157 [Pg. 157 is part of [Doc. 64](#)], 176 [Pg. 176 includes portions of [Doc. 70](#) and [Doc. 71](#)], 194–195 [Pg. 194 is part of [Doc. 78](#)], 221 [Pg. 221 is part of [Doc. 91](#)], 330 [Pg. 330 includes portions of [Doc. 143](#) and [Doc. 144](#)], 330–331 [Pgs. 330–331 include portions of [Doc. 143](#), [Doc. 144](#), and [Doc. 145](#)], 378 [Pg. 378 is part of [Doc. 160](#)], 988 [Pg. 988 includes portions of [Doc. 428](#) and [Doc. 429](#)]

Arab League and, 235 [Pg. 235 is part of [Doc. 93](#)], 251 [Pg. 251 is part of [Doc. 100](#)]

British economic aid and, 468 [Pg. 468 is part of [Doc. 203](#)]

British participation, 19–20 [Pgs. 19–20 include portions of [Doc. 13](#) and [Doc. 14](#)], 39 [Pg. 39 is part of [Doc. 26](#)], 46 [Pg. 46 includes portions of [Doc. 31](#) and [Doc. 32](#)], 51 [Pg. 51 includes portions of [Doc. 34](#) and [Doc. 35](#)], 58 [Pg. 58 is part of [Doc. 39](#)], 80 [Pg. 80 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 85 [Pg. 85 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 100 [Pg. 100 is part of [Doc. 47](#)]

Decline of British influence and, 270 [Pg. 270 is part of [Doc. 111](#)], 295 [Pg. 295 includes portions of [Doc. 126](#) and [Doc. 127](#)], 326 [Pg. 326 is part of [Doc. 142](#)], 330–331 [Pgs. 330–331 include portions of [Doc. 143](#), [Doc. 144](#), and [Doc. 145](#)], 378 [Pg. 378 is part of [Doc. 160](#)], 388 [Pg. 388 is part of [Doc. 162](#)], 393 [Pg. 393 is

part of [Doc. 165](#)], 408 [Pg. 408 is part of [Doc. 170](#)], 426 [Pg. 426 is part of [Doc. 178](#)], 1050 [Pg. 1050 is part of [Doc. 458](#)]

U.S. position, 270 [Pg. 270 is part of [Doc. 111](#)], 275 [Pg. 275 is part of [Doc. 115](#)], 330 [Pg. 330 includes portions of [Doc. 143](#) and [Doc. 144](#)], 339 [Pg. 339 is part of [Doc. 146](#)]

British position, 48–50 [Pgs. 48–50 include portions of [Doc. 32](#), [Doc. 33](#), and [Doc. 34](#)], 84–85 [Pg. 84 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 108–109 [Pg. 108 is part of [Doc. 49](#)], 115–118 [Pg. 115 is part of [Doc. 51](#)], 130–131 [Pg. 130 is part of [Doc. 56](#)], 202 [Pg. 202 is part of [Doc. 81](#)], 205–206 [Pg. 205 is part of [Doc. 83](#)], 218 [Pg. 218 is part of [Doc. 91](#)], 225 [Pg. 225 is part of [Doc. 91](#)], 230–231 [Pg. 230 is part of [Doc. 92](#)], 467–469 [Pg. 467 is part of [Doc. 203](#)]

Broadcast cooperation, 256 [Pg. 256 is part of [Doc. 101](#)]

Council meetings, 199–200 [Pgs. 199–200 include portions of [Doc. 80](#) and [Doc. 81](#)], 252–258 [Pgs. 252–258 include portions of [Doc. 100](#), [Doc. 101](#), and [Doc. 102](#)], 265–267 [Pgs. 265–267 include portions of [Doc. 107](#), [Doc. 108](#), and [Doc. 109](#)], 285–292 [Pgs. 285–292 include portions of [Doc. 122](#), [Doc. 123](#), [Doc. 124](#), and [Doc. 125](#)], 428 [Pg. 428 is part of [Doc. 178](#)]

Counter–Subversion Committee, 280 [Pg. 280 includes portions of [Doc. 118](#) and [Doc. 119](#)], 285–286 [Pgs. 285–286 include portions of [Doc. 122](#), [Doc. 123](#), and [Doc. 124](#)], 314–315 [Pgs. 314–315 include portions of [Doc. 134](#) and [Doc. 135](#)], 333 [Pg. 333 is part of [Doc. 145](#)], 403 [Pg. 403 is part of [Doc. 170](#)], 633 [Pg. 633 is part of [Doc. 270](#)]

Durand Line, 277 [Pg. 277 is part of [Doc. 116](#)], 300 [Pg. 300 is part of [Doc. 130](#)]

Economic aspects (see also [U.S. economic aid](#) and below), 255–256 [Pg. 255 is part of [Doc. 101](#)], 274 [Pg. 274 is

part of [Doc. 114](#)], 288 [Pg. 288 is part of [Doc. 124](#)], 291 [Pg. 291 is part of [Doc. 124](#)], 326 [Pg. 326 is part of [Doc. 142](#)], 336 [Pg. 336 is part of [Doc. 145](#)]

British position, 116 [Pg. 116 is part of [Doc. 51](#)], 266 [Pg. 266 is part of [Doc. 108](#)], 281 [Pg. 281 is part of [Doc. 119](#)], 468 [Pg. 468 is part of [Doc. 203](#)]

Economic Committee U.S. membership, 280 [Pg. 280 includes portions of [Doc. 118](#) and [Doc. 119](#)], 283–284 [Pgs. 283–284 include portions of [Doc. 121](#) and [Doc. 122](#)], 286 [Pg. 286 includes portions of [Doc. 123](#) and [Doc. 124](#)], 289 [Pg. 289 is part of [Doc. 124](#)], 312–313 [Pg. 312 is part of [Doc. 134](#)], 333 [Pg. 333 is part of [Doc. 145](#)], 336 [Pg. 336 is part of [Doc. 145](#)], 339 [Pg. 339 is part of [Doc. 146](#)], 375 [Pg. 375 is part of [Doc. 159](#)], 403 [Pg. 403 is part of [Doc. 170](#)], 633 [Pg. 633 is part of [Doc. 270](#)]

Egyptian reactions to (see also [Egyptian–Syrian–Saudi \(ESS\) Pact](#)), 4–6 [Pgs. 4–6 include portions of [Doc. 3](#), [Doc. 4](#), and [Doc. 5](#)], 15 [Pg. 15 is part of [Doc. 11](#)], 17 [Pg. 17 is part of [Doc. 12](#)], 20 [Pg. 20 includes portions of [Doc. 13](#) and [Doc. 14](#)], 27 [Pg. 27 includes portions of [Doc. 18](#) and [Doc. 19](#)], 42 [Pg. 42 is part of [Doc. 28](#)], 85 [Pg. 85 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 124 [Pg. 124 includes portions of [Doc. 52](#) and [Doc. 53](#)], 193 [Pg. 193 is part of [Doc. 78](#)], 221 [Pg. 221 is part of [Doc. 91](#)], 300 [Pg. 300 is part of [Doc. 130](#)], 1027 [Pg. 1027 is part of [Doc. 444](#)]

British position, 263 [Pg. 263 is part of [Doc. 105](#)], 290 [Pg. 290 is part of [Doc. 124](#)]

Egyptian influence and, 78 [Pg. 78 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 82 [Pg. 82 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 623 [Pg. 623 is part of [Doc. 270](#)]

Iraqi position, 7–8 [Pgs. 7–8 include portions of [Doc. 6](#) and [Doc. 7](#)], 11 [Pg. 11 is part of [Doc. 9](#)], 989 [Pg. 989 is

part of [Doc. 429](#)], 1004–1005 [Pg. 1004 is part of [Doc. 435](#)]

Soviet bloc military aid, 202 [Pg. 202 is part of [Doc. 81](#)], 229 [Pg. 229 is part of [Doc. 92](#)], 270 [Pg. 270 is part of [Doc. 111](#)], 402 [Pg. 402 is part of [Doc. 170](#)], 404 [Pg. 404 is part of [Doc. 170](#)], 406 [Pg. 406 is part of [Doc. 170](#)], 780–782 [Pgs. 780–782 include portions of [Doc. 333](#), [Doc. 334](#), [Doc. 335](#), and [Doc. 336](#)], 785 [Pg. 785 is part of [Doc. 337](#)], 787 [Pg. 787 is part of [Doc. 338](#)], 822 [Pg. 822 is part of [Doc. 357](#)]

Eisenhower Doctrine and, 448–451 [Pg. 448 is part of [Doc. 192](#)], 456–457 [Pg. 456 is part of [Doc. 195](#)], 466–467 [Pg. 466 is part of [Doc. 203](#)], 475 [Pg. 475 includes portions of [Doc. 205](#) and [Doc. 206](#)], 494–495 [Pgs. 494–495 include portions of [Doc. 217](#), [Doc. 218](#), and [Doc. 219](#)], 539 [Pg. 539 includes portions of [Doc. 239](#) and [Doc. 240](#)], 943 [Pg. 943 is part of [Doc. 406](#)]

ESS Pact and, 23 [Pg. 23 is part of [Doc. 16](#)], 27–28 [Pgs. 27–28 include portions of [Doc. 18](#), [Doc. 19](#), and [Doc. 20](#)], 30–31 [Pg. 30 is part of [Doc. 22](#)], 33–34 [Pg. 33 is part of [Doc. 23](#)], 36 [Pg. 36 is part of [Doc. 24](#)], 75 [Pg. 75 is part of [Doc. 45](#)], 81 [Pg. 81 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 87 [Pg. 87 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 113 [Pg. 113 is part of [Doc. 51](#)], 221 [Pg. 221 is part of [Doc. 91](#)], 296 [Pg. 296 is part of [Doc. 127](#)]

French participation, 115 [Pg. 115 is part of [Doc. 51](#)], 131 [Pg. 131 is part of [Doc. 56](#)], 140–141 [Pg. 140 is part of [Doc. 60](#)]

French position, 20 [Pg. 20 includes portions of [Doc. 13](#) and [Doc. 14](#)], 82 [Pg. 82 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 88 [Pg. 88 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 92 [Pg. 92 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 112–113 [Pg. 112 is part of [Doc. 51](#)], 115 [Pg. 115 is part of [Doc. 51](#)], 144 [Pg. 144 is part of [Doc. 60](#)], 262–263 [Pg. 262 is part of [Doc. 105](#)], 798 [Pg. 798 includes portions of [Doc. 346](#) and [Doc. 347](#)]

Further Arab participation (see also *individual countries participation below*), 55 [Pg. 55 includes portions of

[Doc. 36](#) and [Doc. 37](#)], 83 [Pg. 83 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 89 [Pg. 89 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 91 [Pg. 91 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 642 [Pg. 642 is part of [Doc. 270](#)]

British position, 48 [Pg. 48 includes portions of [Doc. 32](#) and [Doc. 33](#)], 234–235 [Pgs. 234–235 include portions of [Doc. 92](#) and [Doc. 93](#)]

Egyptian position, 30 [Pg. 30 is part of [Doc. 22](#)], 42 [Pg. 42 is part of [Doc. 28](#)], 50–51 [Pgs. 50–51 include portions of [Doc. 33](#), [Doc. 34](#), and [Doc. 35](#)], 75–76 [Pg. 75 is part of [Doc. 45](#)], 86 [Pg. 86 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 89 [Pg. 89 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 154–155 [Pgs. 154–155 include portions of [Doc. 63](#) and [Doc. 64](#)], 157 [Pg. 157 is part of [Doc. 64](#)], 194 [Pg. 194 is part of [Doc. 78](#)], 250 [Pg. 250 is part of [Doc. 99](#)], 256 [Pg. 256 is part of [Doc. 101](#)]

U.S. position, 30 [Pg. 30 is part of [Doc. 22](#)], 60 [Pg. 60 includes portions of [Doc. 40](#) and [Doc. 41](#)], 125–126 [Pgs. 125–126 include portions of [Doc. 53](#) and [Doc. 54](#)], 130 [Pg. 130 is part of [Doc. 56](#)], 219 [Pg. 219 is part of [Doc. 91](#)], 227 [Pg. 227 is part of [Doc. 91](#)]

Greek participation, 115 [Pg. 115 is part of [Doc. 51](#)], 141 [Pg. 141 is part of [Doc. 60](#)]

Greek position, 93 [Pg. 93 is part of [Doc. 46](#)]

Indian position, 109 [Pg. 109 is part of [Doc. 49](#)], 300 [Pg. 300 is part of [Doc. 130](#)], 404 [Pg. 404 is part of [Doc. 170](#)]

Internal security, 117 [Pg. 117 is part of [Doc. 51](#)], 150 [Pg. 150 is part of [Doc. 60](#)], 231 [Pg. 231 is part of [Doc. 92](#)]

Iranian participation, 21 [Pg. 21 includes portions of [Doc. 14](#) and [Doc. 15](#)], 78 [Pg. 78 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 81 [Pg. 81 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 84 [Pg. 84 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 89 [Pg. 89 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 225–226 [Pg. 225 is part of [Doc. 91](#)], 706 [Pg. 706 is part of [Doc. 296](#)],

775 [Pg. 775 includes portions of [Doc. 330](#) and [Doc. 331](#)], 876 [Pg. 876 is part of [Doc. 381](#)]

British position, 109–110 [Pg. 109 is part of [Doc. 49](#)], 117 [Pg. 117 is part of [Doc. 51](#)], 130 [Pg. 130 is part of [Doc. 56](#)], 140 [Pg. 140 is part of [Doc. 60](#)], 143 [Pg. 143 is part of [Doc. 60](#)], 151 [Pg. 151 is part of [Doc. 60](#)], 705–706 [Pg. 705 is part of [Doc. 296](#)]

Egyptian position, 236 [Pg. 236 is part of [Doc. 93](#)]

Iranian public opinion, 705 [Pg. 705 is part of [Doc. 296](#)], 765–766 [Pgs. 765–766 include portions of [Doc. 325](#) and [Doc. 326](#)]

Political situation and, 778–780 [Pgs. 778–780 include portions of [Doc. 332](#), [Doc. 333](#), and [Doc. 334](#)], 783–784 [Pgs. 783–784 include portions of [Doc. 336](#) and [Doc. 337](#)], 786–788 [Pgs. 786–788 include portions of [Doc. 337](#), [Doc. 338](#), and [Doc. 339](#)]

Preliminary staff talks, 51 [Pg. 51 includes portions of [Doc. 34](#) and [Doc. 35](#)], 729 [Pg. 729 includes portions of [Doc. 304](#) and [Doc. 305](#)], 745 [Pg. 745 is part of [Doc. 314](#)], 751 [Pg. 751 is part of [Doc. 317](#)], 758 [Pg. 758 is part of [Doc. 321](#)]

Soviet bloc military aid to Egypt and, 159–160 [Pg. 159 is part of [Doc. 66](#)], 163–164 [Pg. 163 is part of [Doc. 66](#)], 188 [Pg. 188 is part of [Doc. 78](#)], 202 [Pg. 202 is part of [Doc. 81](#)], 780–782 [Pgs. 780–782 include portions of [Doc. 333](#), [Doc. 334](#), [Doc. 335](#), and [Doc. 336](#)], 785 [Pg. 785 is part of [Doc. 337](#)], 787 [Pg. 787 is part of [Doc. 338](#)], 822 [Pg. 822 is part of [Doc. 357](#)]

Soviet–Iranian relations and, 109–110 [Pg. 109 is part of [Doc. 49](#)], 765 [Pg. 765 is part of [Doc. 325](#)], 767

[Pg. 767 is part of [Doc. 326](#)], 773–774 [Pg. 773 is part of [Doc. 330](#)]

Soviet position, 80 [Pg. 80 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 84 [Pg. 84 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 92 [Pg. 92 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 169–170 [Pgs. 169–170 include portions of [Doc. 67](#) and [Doc. 68](#)], 236–237 [Pg. 236 is part of [Doc. 93](#)], 279 [Pg. 279 includes portions of [Doc. 117](#) and [Doc. 118](#)], 705 [Pg. 705 is part of [Doc. 296](#)], 773n [Pg. 773 is part of [Doc. 330](#)], 774n [Pg. 774 is part of [Doc. 330](#)], 789 [Pg. 789 includes portions of [Doc. 339](#), [Doc. 340](#), and [Doc. 341](#)], 797 [Pg. 797 includes portions of [Doc. 345](#) and [Doc. 346](#)], 801 [Pg. 801 includes portions of [Doc. 348](#) and [Doc. 349](#)], 806 [Pg. 806 is part of [Doc. 351](#)], 820n [Pg. 820 is part of [Doc. 357](#)], 912 [Pg. 912 is part of [Doc. 393](#)]

U.S.–British security guarantee, 766 [Pg. 766 includes portions of [Doc. 325](#) and [Doc. 326](#)], 768 [Pg. 768 is part of [Doc. 326](#)], 773 [Pg. 773 is part of [Doc. 330](#)], 822 [Pg. 822 is part of [Doc. 357](#)]

U.S. military aid and, 63 [Pg. 63 includes portions of [Doc. 42](#) and [Doc. 43](#)], 141 [Pg. 141 is part of [Doc. 60](#)], 210 [Pg. 210 is part of [Doc. 84](#)], 225 [Pg. 225 is part of [Doc. 91](#)], 250n [Pg. 250 is part of [Doc. 99](#)], 281 [Pg. 281 is part of [Doc. 119](#)], 808–809 [Pg. 808 is part of [Doc. 352](#)], 820–821 [Pg. 820 is part of [Doc. 357](#)], 826 [Pg. 826 is part of [Doc. 357](#)], 901–902 [Pg. 901 is part of [Doc. 392](#)]

Air raid warning equipment, 337 [Pg. 337 is part of [Doc. 145](#)], 349 [Pg. 349 is part of [Doc. 148](#)]

Iranian adherence plans and, 63 [Pg. 63 includes portions of [Doc. 42](#) and [Doc. 43](#)], 81 [Pg. 81 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 109–111 [Pgs. 109–111 include portions of [Doc. 49](#) and

[Doc. 50](#)], 159 [Pg. 159 is part of [Doc. 66](#)], 161 [Pg. 161 is part of [Doc. 66](#)], 163–164 [Pg. 163 is part of [Doc. 66](#)], 195 [Pg. 195 is part of [Doc. 78](#)], 684–685 [Pgs. 684–685 include portions of [Doc. 289](#) and [Doc. 290](#)], 707 [Pg. 707 is part of [Doc. 296](#)], 729–730 [Pgs. 729–730 include portions of [Doc. 304](#) and [Doc. 305](#)], 745–747 [Pgs. 745–747 include portions of [Doc. 314](#) and [Doc. 315](#)], 752 [Pg. 752 includes portions of [Doc. 317](#) and [Doc. 318](#)], 758 [Pg. 758 is part of [Doc. 321](#)], 761 [Pg. 761 includes portions of [Doc. 322](#) and [Doc. 323](#)], 763–764 [Pg. 763 is part of [Doc. 324](#)], 767–770 [Pgs. 767–770 include portions of [Doc. 326](#), [Doc. 327](#), and [Doc. 328](#)], 774–776 [Pgs. 774–776 include portions of [Doc. 330](#), [Doc. 331](#), and [Doc. 332](#)], 778–780 [Pgs. 778–780 include portions of [Doc. 332](#), [Doc. 333](#), and [Doc. 334](#)][–782](#) [Pgs. 780–782 include portions of [Doc. 333](#), [Doc. 334](#), [Doc. 335](#), and [Doc. 336](#)], 821–822 [Pg. 821 is part of [Doc. 357](#)]

Political situation and, 778–780 [Pgs. 778–780 include portions of [Doc. 332](#), [Doc. 333](#), and [Doc. 334](#)]

U.S. economic aid to Egypt and, 241 [Pg. 241 is part of [Doc. 94](#)]

U.S. participation and, 362 [Pg. 362 is part of [Doc. 153](#)]

U.S. position, 58 [Pg. 58 is part of [Doc. 39](#)], 64 [Pg. 64 is part of [Doc. 43](#)], 67 [Pg. 67 is part of [Doc. 43](#)], 72 [Pg. 72 is part of [Doc. 44](#)], 127–128 [Pgs. 127–128 include portions of [Doc. 54](#) and [Doc. 55](#)], 168–169 [Pgs. 168–169 include portions of [Doc. 66](#), [Doc. 67](#), and [Doc. 68](#)],

388 [Pg. 388 is part of [Doc. 162](#)], 692 [Pg. 692 is part of [Doc. 291](#)], 704–705 [Pg. 704 is part of [Doc. 296](#)], 719 [Pg. 719 is part of [Doc. 302](#)], 756 [Pg. 756 is part of [Doc. 320](#)], 771 [Pg. 771 is part of [Doc. 328](#)], 780 [Pg. 780 includes portions of [Doc. 333](#) and [Doc. 334](#)], 785 [Pg. 785 is part of [Doc. 337](#)]

U.S. statement, 783–784 [Pgs. 783–784 include portions of [Doc. 336](#) and [Doc. 337](#)], 787 [Pg. 787 is part of [Doc. 338](#)]

Iranian position, 274 [Pg. 274 is part of [Doc. 114](#)], 286–287 [Pgs. 286–287 include portions of [Doc. 123](#) and [Doc. 124](#)], 371 [Pg. 371 is part of [Doc. 158](#)]

Iraqi political situation and, 15–16 [Pgs. 15–16 include portions of [Doc. 11](#) and [Doc. 12](#)], 275 [Pg. 275 is part of [Doc. 115](#)], 296 [Pg. 296 is part of [Doc. 127](#)], 328 [Pg. 328 is part of [Doc. 143](#)], 369–370 [Pgs. 369–370 include portions of [Doc. 157](#) and [Doc. 158](#)], 394 [Pg. 394 is part of [Doc. 165](#)], 402 [Pg. 402 is part of [Doc. 170](#)], 991 [Pg. 991 is part of [Doc. 429](#)], 996–997 [Pgs. 996–997 include portions of [Doc. 433](#), [Doc. 434](#), and [Doc. 435](#)]

Israeli participation, 114 [Pg. 114 is part of [Doc. 51](#)], 140 [Pg. 140 is part of [Doc. 60](#)]

Israeli position, 9–10 [Pg. 9 is part of [Doc. 8](#)], 65 [Pg. 65 is part of [Doc. 43](#)], 78 [Pg. 78 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 81–82 [Pg. 81 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 90 [Pg. 90 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 114 [Pg. 114 is part of [Doc. 51](#)], 270 [Pg. 270 is part of [Doc. 111](#)]

Italian participation, 115 [Pg. 115 is part of [Doc. 51](#)], 141 [Pg. 141 is part of [Doc. 60](#)]

Jordanian participation, 45 [Pg. 45 is part of [Doc. 30](#)], 78 [Pg. 78 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 108 [Pg. 108 is part of [Doc. 49](#)], 140 [Pg. 140 is part of [Doc. 60](#)], 207ⁿ [Pg. 207 includes portions of [Doc. 83](#) and [Doc. 84](#)]

Arab–Israeli dispute and, 180n [Pg. 180 includes portions of [Doc. 74](#) and [Doc. 75](#)], 181n [Pg. 181 includes portions of [Doc. 76](#) and [Doc. 77](#)], 182 [Pg. 182 includes portions of [Doc. 77](#) and [Doc. 78](#)], 212–213 [Pgs. 212–213 include portions of [Doc. 86](#) and [Doc. 87](#)]

British position, 48–50 [Pgs. 48–50 include portions of [Doc. 32](#), [Doc. 33](#), and [Doc. 34](#)], 111 [Pg. 111 includes portions of [Doc. 49](#) and [Doc. 50](#)], 113 [Pg. 113 is part of [Doc. 51](#)], 144 [Pg. 144 is part of [Doc. 60](#)], 177 [Pg. 177 includes portions of [Doc. 71](#) and [Doc. 72](#)], 181n [Pg. 181 includes portions of [Doc. 76](#) and [Doc. 77](#)], 203 [Pg. 203 includes portions of [Doc. 81](#) and [Doc. 82](#)], 211 [Pg. 211 includes portions of [Doc. 85](#) and [Doc. 86](#)], 214 [Pg. 214 is part of [Doc. 88](#)], 218–219 [Pg. 218 is part of [Doc. 91](#)], 235 [Pg. 235 is part of [Doc. 93](#)]

Egyptian position, 226 [Pg. 226 is part of [Doc. 91](#)]

Iraqi political situation and, 991 [Pg. 991 is part of [Doc. 429](#)]

Iraqi position, 1005 [Pg. 1005 is part of [Doc. 435](#)]

Israeli position, 193 [Pg. 193 is part of [Doc. 78](#)]

Jordanian position, 37–38 [Pgs. 37–38 include portions of [Doc. 25](#) and [Doc. 26](#)], 88–89 [Pg. 88 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 181 [Pg. 181 includes portions of [Doc. 76](#) and [Doc. 77](#)]

Pakistani position, 556 [Pg. 556 includes portions of [Doc. 250](#) and [Doc. 251](#)], 559 [Pg. 559 is part of [Doc. 253](#)]

Syrian political situation and, 204 [Pg. 204 is part of [Doc. 82](#)]

Turkish position, 176–177 [*Pgs. 176–177 include portions of [Doc. 70](#), [Doc. 71](#), and [Doc. 72](#)*], 180 [*Pg. 180 includes portions of [Doc. 74](#) and [Doc. 75](#)*]

Turkish–Iraqi military aid and, 203 [*Pg. 203 includes portions of [Doc. 81](#) and [Doc. 82](#)*]

U.S. participation and, 296 [*Pg. 296 is part of [Doc. 127](#)*], 405 [*Pg. 405 is part of [Doc. 170](#)*]

Jordanian position, 20 [*Pg. 20 includes portions of [Doc. 13](#) and [Doc. 14](#)*], 113 [*Pg. 113 is part of [Doc. 51](#)*]

Kashmir dispute, 277 [*Pg. 277 is part of [Doc. 116](#)*], 288–289 [*Pg. 288 is part of [Doc. 124](#)*], 300 [*Pg. 300 is part of [Doc. 130](#)*]

Lebanese participation, 48 [*Pg. 48 includes portions of [Doc. 32](#) and [Doc. 33](#)*], 78 [*Pg. 78 is part of [Doc. 46](#)*], 88–89 [*Pg. 88 is part of [Doc. 46](#)*], 108 [*Pg. 108 is part of [Doc. 49](#)*], 113 [*Pg. 113 is part of [Doc. 51](#)*], 125 [*Pg. 125 is part of [Doc. 53](#)*], 140 [*Pg. 140 is part of [Doc. 60](#)*], 193 [*Pg. 193 is part of [Doc. 78](#)*], 204 [*Pg. 204 is part of [Doc. 82](#)*], 207n [*Pg. 207 includes portions of [Doc. 83](#) and [Doc. 84](#)*], 212–213 [*Pgs. 212–213 include portions of [Doc. 86](#) and [Doc. 87](#)*], 991 [*Pg. 991 is part of [Doc. 429](#)*]

Pakistani position, 320 [*Pg. 320 includes portions of [Doc. 137](#) and [Doc. 138](#)*], 556 [*Pg. 556 includes portions of [Doc. 250](#) and [Doc. 251](#)*], 559 [*Pg. 559 is part of [Doc. 253](#)*]

U.S. participation and, 296 [*Pg. 296 is part of [Doc. 127](#)*], 362 [*Pg. 362 is part of [Doc. 153](#)*], 405 [*Pg. 405 is part of [Doc. 170](#)*]

Lebanese position, 12–13 [*Pgs. 12–13 include portions of [Doc. 9](#) and [Doc. 10](#)*], 17 [*Pg. 17 is part of [Doc. 12](#)*], 20 [*Pg. 20 includes portions of [Doc. 13](#) and [Doc. 14](#)*], 27 [*Pg. 27 includes portions of [Doc. 18](#) and [Doc. 19](#)*], 113 [*Pg. 113 is part of [Doc. 51](#)*]

Middle East Charter proposal and, 380 [Pg. 380 is part of [Doc. 160](#)], 387 [Pg. 387 includes portions of [Doc. 161](#) and [Doc. 162](#)], 394 [Pg. 394 is part of [Doc. 165](#)]

Military Committee (see also [Military__planning participation](#) under U.S. participation below), 199 [Pg. 199 is part of [Doc. 80](#)], 257–258 [Pgs. 257–258 include portions of [Doc. 101](#) and [Doc. 102](#)], 292–293 [Pgs. 292–293 include portions of [Doc. 124](#) and [Doc. 125](#)]

North Atlantic Treaty Organization and, 29 [Pg. 29 includes portions of [Doc. 21](#) and [Doc. 22](#)], 102 [Pg. 102 includes portions of [Doc. 47](#) and [Doc. 48](#)], 116 [Pg. 116 is part of [Doc. 51](#)], 132–133 [Pgs. 132–133 include portions of [Doc. 56](#), [Doc. 57](#), and [Doc. 58](#)], 141 [Pg. 141 is part of [Doc. 60](#)], 145 [Pg. 145 is part of [Doc. 60](#)], 296 [Pg. 296 is part of [Doc. 127](#)], 371 [Pg. 371 is part of [Doc. 158](#)], 374 [Pg. 374 is part of [Doc. 159](#)], 660 [Pg. 660 is part of [Doc. 276](#)]

Pakistani participation, 51 [Pg. 51 includes portions of [Doc. 34](#) and [Doc. 35](#)], 64 [Pg. 64 is part of [Doc. 43](#)], 67 [Pg. 67 is part of [Doc. 43](#)], 72 [Pg. 72 is part of [Doc. 44](#)], 74 [Pg. 74 is part of [Doc. 44](#)], 78 [Pg. 78 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 83 [Pg. 83 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 89 [Pg. 89 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 127–128 [Pgs. 127–128 include portions of [Doc. 54](#) and [Doc. 55](#)], 133 [Pg. 133 includes portions of [Doc. 57](#) and [Doc. 58](#)], 157–158 [Pgs. 157–158 include portions of [Doc. 64](#), [Doc. 65](#), and [Doc. 66](#)]

British position, 109 [Pg. 109 is part of [Doc. 49](#)], 113 [Pg. 113 is part of [Doc. 51](#)], 117 [Pg. 117 is part of [Doc. 51](#)], 130 [Pg. 130 is part of [Doc. 56](#)], 139–140 [Pg. 139 is part of [Doc. 60](#)]

Indian position, 109 [Pg. 109 is part of [Doc. 49](#)], 236 [Pg. 236 is part of [Doc. 93](#)]

U.S. participation and, 56–61 [Pgs. 56–61 include portions of [Doc. 37](#), [Doc. 38](#), [Doc. 39](#), [Doc. 40](#), and [Doc. 41](#)]

Pakistani position, 21 [Pg. 21 includes portions of [Doc. 14](#) and [Doc. 15](#)], 40–41 [Pgs. 40–41 include portions of [Doc. 26](#), [Doc. 27](#), and [Doc. 28](#)], 289 [Pg. 289 is part of [Doc. 124](#)], 556 [Pg. 556 includes portions of [Doc. 250](#) and [Doc. 251](#)], 559 [Pg. 559 is part of [Doc. 253](#)], 660 [Pg. 660 is part of [Doc. 276](#)], 706 [Pg. 706 is part of [Doc. 296](#)]

Preliminary staff talks, 110 [Pg. 110 is part of [Doc. 49](#)], 729 [Pg. 729 includes portions of [Doc. 304](#) and [Doc. 305](#)], 745 [Pg. 745 is part of [Doc. 314](#)], 751 [Pg. 751 is part of [Doc. 317](#)], 965–966 [Pgs. 965–966 include portions of [Doc. 417](#) and [Doc. 418](#)]

Propaganda, 304–306 [Pg. 304 is part of [Doc. 131](#)]

Saudi participation, 115 [Pg. 115 is part of [Doc. 51](#)], 328 [Pg. 328 is part of [Doc. 143](#)], 362 [Pg. 362 is part of [Doc. 153](#)], 389 [Pg. 389 is part of [Doc. 162](#)], 396 [Pg. 396 includes portions of [Doc. 166](#) and [Doc. 167](#)], 399 [Pg. 399 is part of [Doc. 169](#)], 405 [Pg. 405 is part of [Doc. 170](#)], 556 [Pg. 556 includes portions of [Doc. 250](#) and [Doc. 251](#)], 559 [Pg. 559 is part of [Doc. 253](#)], 1033 [Pg. 1033 includes portions of [Doc. 448](#) and [Doc. 449](#)]

Saudi position, 20 [Pg. 20 includes portions of [Doc. 13](#) and [Doc. 14](#)], 23–24 [Pg. 23 is part of [Doc. 16](#)], 27 [Pg. 27 includes portions of [Doc. 18](#) and [Doc. 19](#)], 78 [Pg. 78 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 81–82 [Pg. 81 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 87–89 [Pg. 87 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 194 [Pg. 194 is part of [Doc. 78](#)], 538 [Pg. 538 is part of [Doc. 239](#)], 989 [Pg. 989 is part of [Doc. 429](#)], 1004 [Pg. 1004 is part of [Doc. 435](#)]

South African participation, 115 [Pg. 115 is part of [Doc. 51](#)], 141 [Pg. 141 is part of [Doc. 60](#)]

Southeast Asia Treaty Organization and, 132–133 [Pgs. 132–133 include portions of [Doc. 56](#), [Doc. 57](#), and [Doc. 58](#)], 141 [Pg. 141 is part of [Doc. 60](#)], 371 [Pg. 371 is part of [Doc. 158](#)], 374 [Pg. 374 is part of [Doc. 159](#)]

Soviet influence on the Near East and, 105 [Pg. 105 is part of [Doc. 49](#)], 185 [Pg. 185 is part of [Doc. 78](#)], 206 [Pg. 206 is part of

[Doc. 83](#)], 374–375 [Pg. 374 is part of [Doc. 159](#)]

Soviet military aid to Egypt and, 202 [Pg. 202 is part of [Doc. 81](#)], 229 [Pg. 229 is part of [Doc. 92](#)], 270 [Pg. 270 is part of [Doc. 111](#)], 402 [Pg. 402 is part of [Doc. 170](#)], 404 [Pg. 404 is part of [Doc. 170](#)], 406 [Pg. 406 is part of [Doc. 170](#)], 780–782 [Pgs. 780–782 include portions of [Doc. 333](#), [Doc. 334](#), [Doc. 335](#), and [Doc. 336](#)], 785 [Pg. 785 is part of [Doc. 337](#)], 787 [Pg. 787 is part of [Doc. 338](#)], 822 [Pg. 822 is part of [Doc. 357](#)]

Soviet position, 91 [Pg. 91 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 185 [Pg. 185 is part of [Doc. 78](#)], 202 [Pg. 202 is part of [Doc. 81](#)], 235 [Pg. 235 is part of [Doc. 93](#)], 276 [Pg. 276 is part of [Doc. 115](#)], 278–279 [Pgs. 278–279 include portions of [Doc. 117](#) and [Doc. 118](#)], 287 [Pg. 287 is part of [Doc. 124](#)], 289 [Pg. 289 is part of [Doc. 124](#)], 404 [Pg. 404 is part of [Doc. 170](#)], 450 [Pg. 450 is part of [Doc. 192](#)], 611 [Pg. 611 is part of [Doc. 266](#)]

Suez crisis and, 318*n* [Pg. 318 includes portions of [Doc. 136](#) and [Doc. 137](#)], 319*n* [Pg. 319 is part of [Doc. 137](#)], 328 [Pg. 328 is part of [Doc. 143](#)], 330–331 [Pgs. 330–331 include portions of [Doc. 143](#), [Doc. 144](#), and [Doc. 145](#)], 394 [Pg. 394 is part of [Doc. 165](#)], 633 [Pg. 633 is part of [Doc. 270](#)], 1050 [Pg. 1050 is part of [Doc. 458](#)]

Syrian participation, 83 [Pg. 83 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 86 [Pg. 86 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 88 [Pg. 88 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 113 [Pg. 113 is part of [Doc. 51](#)], 126 [Pg. 126 is part of [Doc. 54](#)], 140 [Pg. 140 is part of [Doc. 60](#)]

Syrian position, 12 [Pg. 12 is part of [Doc. 9](#)], 20 [Pg. 20 includes portions of [Doc. 13](#) and [Doc. 14](#)], 25–26 [Pgs. 25–26 include portions of [Doc. 16](#) and [Doc. 17](#)], 48 [Pg. 48 includes portions of [Doc. 32](#) and [Doc. 33](#)], 112 [Pg. 112 is part of [Doc. 51](#)], 193 [Pg. 193 is part of [Doc. 78](#)], 296 [Pg. 296 is part of [Doc. 127](#)], 404 [Pg. 404 is part of [Doc. 170](#)], 1027 [Pg. 1027 is part of [Doc. 444](#)]

Turkish position, 23*n* [Pg. 23 is part of [Doc. 16](#)], 55–56 [Pgs. 55–56 include portions of [Doc. 36](#), [Doc. 37](#), and [Doc. 38](#)], 224–225

[Pg. 224 is part of [Doc. 91](#)], 274 [Pg. 274 is part of [Doc. 114](#)]

U.S.–British talks, 218–221 [Pg. 218 is part of [Doc. 91](#)], 225–227 [Pg. 225 is part of [Doc. 91](#)], 234–241 [Pgs. 234–241 include portions of [Doc. 92](#), [Doc. 93](#), and [Doc. 94](#)], 243–245 [Pgs. 243–245 include portions of [Doc. 95](#) and [Doc. 96](#)], 262–263 [Pg. 262 is part of [Doc. 105](#)], 800 [Pg. 800 is part of [Doc. 348](#)]

U.S. economic aid and, 164 [Pg. 164 is part of [Doc. 66](#)], 227 [Pg. 227 is part of [Doc. 91](#)], 236 [Pg. 236 is part of [Doc. 93](#)], 266 [Pg. 266 is part of [Doc. 108](#)], 286–289 [Pgs. 286–289 include portions of [Doc. 123](#) and [Doc. 124](#)], 456–457 [Pg. 456 is part of [Doc. 195](#)], 466–469 [Pg. 466 is part of [Doc. 203](#)], 494–495 [Pgs. 494–495 include portions of [Doc. 217](#), [Doc. 218](#), and [Doc. 219](#)], 609 [Pg. 609 is part of [Doc. 266](#)]

U.S. military aid and (*see also* U.S. military aid to *under individual countries*), 126 [Pg. 126 is part of [Doc. 54](#)], 141 [Pg. 141 is part of [Doc. 60](#)], 159 [Pg. 159 is part of [Doc. 66](#)], 161 [Pg. 161 is part of [Doc. 66](#)], 174 [Pg. 174 is part of [Doc. 70](#)], 192 [Pg. 192 is part of [Doc. 78](#)], 208 [Pg. 208 is part of [Doc. 84](#)], 211 [Pg. 211 includes portions of [Doc. 85](#) and [Doc. 86](#)], 225–227 [Pg. 225 is part of [Doc. 91](#)], 260 [Pg. 260 is part of [Doc. 103](#)], 291 [Pg. 291 is part of [Doc. 124](#)], 456–457 [Pg. 456 is part of [Doc. 195](#)]

U.S. participation, 19–20 [Pgs. 19–20 include portions of [Doc. 13](#) and [Doc. 14](#)], 102 [Pg. 102 includes portions of [Doc. 47](#) and [Doc. 48](#)], 133 [Pg. 133 includes portions of [Doc. 57](#) and [Doc. 58](#)], 216 [Pg. 216 includes portions of [Doc. 90](#) and [Doc. 91](#)], 260 [Pg. 260 is part of [Doc. 103](#)], 265–266 [Pgs. 265–266 include portions of [Doc. 107](#) and [Doc. 108](#)], 348 [Pg. 348 is part of [Doc. 148](#)], 390–391 [Pgs. 390–391 include portions of [Doc. 163](#) and [Doc. 164](#)]

Abandonment proposals, 184–185 [Pg. 184 is part of [Doc. 78](#)], 195–197 [Pg. 195 is part of [Doc. 78](#)], 215 [Pg. 215 is part of [Doc. 89](#)], 230 [Pg. 230 is part of [Doc. 92](#)]

Arab–Israeli dispute and (see also [Israeli security guarantee](#) and below), 35 [Pg. 35 is part of [Doc. 24](#)], 68 [Pg. 68 is part of [Doc. 43](#)], 132 [Pg. 132 includes portions of [Doc. 56](#) and [Doc. 57](#)], 141 [Pg. 141 is part of [Doc. 60](#)], 152 [Pg. 152 is part of [Doc. 61](#)], 176 [Pg. 176 includes portions of [Doc. 70](#) and [Doc. 71](#)], 180n [Pg. 180 includes portions of [Doc. 74](#) and [Doc. 75](#)], 181n [Pg. 181 includes portions of [Doc. 76](#) and [Doc. 77](#)], 182 [Pg. 182 includes portions of [Doc. 77](#) and [Doc. 78](#)], 207n [Pg. 207 includes portions of [Doc. 83](#) and [Doc. 84](#)], 212 [Pg. 212 includes portions of [Doc. 86](#) and [Doc. 87](#)], 263n [Pg. 263 is part of [Doc. 105](#)], 331 [Pg. 331 includes portions of [Doc. 144](#) and [Doc. 145](#)], 361–362 [Pg. 361 is part of [Doc. 153](#)], 389 [Pg. 389 is part of [Doc. 162](#)], 774–775 [Pgs. 774–775 include portions of [Doc. 330](#) and [Doc. 331](#)], 800 [Pg. 800 is part of [Doc. 348](#)]

British position, 109 [Pg. 109 is part of [Doc. 49](#)], 115 [Pg. 115 is part of [Doc. 51](#)], 131 [Pg. 131 is part of [Doc. 56](#)], 206–207 [Pgs. 206–207 include portions of [Doc. 83](#) and [Doc. 84](#)], 235 [Pg. 235 is part of [Doc. 93](#)], 241 [Pg. 241 is part of [Doc. 94](#)], 249–251 [Pgs. 249–251 include portions of [Doc. 98](#), [Doc. 99](#), and [Doc. 100](#)], 262–264 [Pgs. 262–264 include portions of [Doc. 105](#), [Doc. 106](#), and [Doc. 107](#)], 280–281 [Pgs. 280–281 include portions of [Doc. 118](#) and [Doc. 119](#)], 301 [Pg. 301 is part of [Doc. 130](#)], 405 [Pg. 405 is part of [Doc. 170](#)], 429 [Pg. 429 includes portions of [Doc. 178](#) and [Doc. 179](#)]

Congressional approval, 100 [Pg. 100 is part of [Doc. 47](#)], 250–251 [Pgs. 250–251 include portions of [Doc. 99](#) and [Doc. 100](#)], 270 [Pg. 270 is part of [Doc. 111](#)], 275 [Pg. 275 is part of [Doc. 115](#)], 294 [Pg. 294 is part of [Doc. 126](#)], 333 [Pg. 333 is part of [Doc. 145](#)], 336 [Pg. 336 is part of [Doc. 145](#)], 339 [Pg. 339 is part of [Doc. 146](#)], 361 [Pg. 361 is part of [Doc. 153](#)], 370 [Pg. 370 is part of [Doc. 158](#)], 376 [Pg. 376 includes portions of [Doc. 159](#) and

[Doc. 160](#)], 389 [Pg. 389 is part of [Doc. 162](#)], 400 [Pg. 400 is part of [Doc. 169](#)], 659 [Pg. 659 is part of [Doc. 276](#)]

Counter–Subversion Committee participation, 280 [Pg. 280 includes portions of [Doc. 118](#) and [Doc. 119](#)], 285–286 [Pgs. 285–286 include portions of [Doc. 122](#), [Doc. 123](#), and [Doc. 124](#)], 314–315 [Pgs. 314–315 include portions of [Doc. 134](#) and [Doc. 135](#)], 333 [Pg. 333 is part of [Doc. 145](#)], 403 [Pg. 403 is part of [Doc. 170](#)], 633 [Pg. 633 is part of [Doc. 270](#)]

Decline of British influence and, 320–321 [Pgs. 320–321 include portions of [Doc. 137](#) and [Doc. 138](#)], 326 [Pg. 326 is part of [Doc. 142](#)], 328 [Pg. 328 is part of [Doc. 143](#)], 335–336 [Pg. 335 is part of [Doc. 145](#)], 338–339 [Pg. 338 is part of [Doc. 146](#)], 368 [Pg. 368 is part of [Doc. 157](#)], 402 [Pg. 402 is part of [Doc. 170](#)], 404 [Pg. 404 is part of [Doc. 170](#)]

Defense Department position, 63–65 [Pgs. 63–65 include portions of [Doc. 42](#) and [Doc. 43](#)], 69 [Pg. 69 is part of [Doc. 43](#)], 98 [Pg. 98 is part of [Doc. 47](#)], 267 [Pg. 267 includes portions of [Doc. 108](#) and [Doc. 109](#)], 294 [Pg. 294 is part of [Doc. 126](#)], 314 [Pg. 314 is part of [Doc. 134](#)], 331 [Pg. 331 includes portions of [Doc. 144](#) and [Doc. 145](#)], 333 [Pg. 333 is part of [Doc. 145](#)], 372–374 [Pgs. 372–374 include portions of [Doc. 158](#) and [Doc. 159](#)], 390 [Pg. 390 is part of [Doc. 163](#)], 440 [Pg. 440 includes portions of [Doc. 185](#) and [Doc. 186](#)]

Economic Committee membership, 280 [Pg. 280 includes portions of [Doc. 118](#) and [Doc. 119](#)], 282–284 [Pgs. 282–284 include portions of [Doc. 120](#), [Doc. 121](#), and [Doc. 122](#)], 286 [Pg. 286 includes portions of [Doc. 123](#) and [Doc. 124](#)], 289 [Pg. 289 is part of [Doc. 124](#)], 312–313 [Pg. 312 is part of [Doc. 134](#)], 333 [Pg. 333 is part of [Doc. 145](#)], 336 [Pg. 336 is part of [Doc. 145](#)], 339 [Pg. 339 is part of [Doc. 146](#)], 375 [Pg. 375 is part of [Doc. 159](#)],

403 [Pg. 403 is part of [Doc. 170](#)], 633 [Pg. 633 is part of [Doc. 270](#)]

Egyptian position, 220 [Pg. 220 is part of [Doc. 91](#)], 406 [Pg. 406 is part of [Doc. 170](#)]

Eisenhower Doctrine and, 448–451 [Pg. 448 is part of [Doc. 192](#)], 539 [Pg. 539 includes portions of [Doc. 239](#) and [Doc. 240](#)], 943 [Pg. 943 is part of [Doc. 406](#)]

ESS Pact and, 36 [Pg. 36 is part of [Doc. 24](#)]

Financial contributions, 280 [Pg. 280 includes portions of [Doc. 118](#) and [Doc. 119](#)], 282 [Pg. 282 includes portions of [Doc. 120](#) and [Doc. 121](#)], 284–285 [Pgs. 284–285 include portions of [Doc. 122](#) and [Doc. 123](#)], 312 [Pg. 312 is part of [Doc. 134](#)], 333 [Pg. 333 is part of [Doc. 145](#)]

French position, 405 [Pg. 405 is part of [Doc. 170](#)]

Indian position, 389 [Pg. 389 is part of [Doc. 162](#)], 400 [Pg. 400 is part of [Doc. 169](#)], 406 [Pg. 406 is part of [Doc. 170](#)]

Iranian participation and, 236 [Pg. 236 is part of [Doc. 93](#)]

Iranian political situation and, 296 [Pg. 296 is part of [Doc. 127](#)], 783–784 [Pgs. 783–784 include portions of [Doc. 336](#) and [Doc. 337](#)]

Iranian position, 273 [Pg. 273 is part of [Doc. 114](#)], 286 [Pg. 286 includes portions of [Doc. 123](#) and [Doc. 124](#)], 318–319 [Pgs. 318–319 include portions of [Doc. 136](#) and [Doc. 137](#)], 321–322 [Pgs. 321–322 include portions of [Doc. 138](#) and [Doc. 139](#)], 333 [Pg. 333 is part of [Doc. 145](#)], 338 [Pg. 338 is part of [Doc. 146](#)], 365 [Pg. 365 is part of [Doc. 155](#)], 706 [Pg. 706 is part of [Doc. 296](#)], 797 [Pg.

797 includes portions of [Doc. 345](#) and [Doc. 346](#)], 922 [Pg. 922 includes portions of [Doc. 395](#) and [Doc. 396](#)], 930 [Pg. 930 is part of [Doc. 399](#)], 963n [Pg. 963 is part of [Doc. 416](#)]

Iraqi political situation and, 275 [Pg. 275 is part of [Doc. 115](#)], 296 [Pg. 296 is part of [Doc. 127](#)], 369–370 [Pgs. 369–370 include portions of [Doc. 157](#) and [Doc. 158](#)], 394 [Pg. 394 is part of [Doc. 165](#)], 991 [Pg. 991 is part of [Doc. 429](#)], 996–997 [Pgs. 996–997 include portions of [Doc. 433](#), [Doc. 434](#), and [Doc. 435](#)]

Iraqi position, 174–175 [Pg. 174 is part of [Doc. 70](#)], 179–180 [Pgs. 179–180 include portions of [Doc. 73](#), [Doc. 74](#), and [Doc. 75](#)], 271 [Pg. 271 is part of [Doc. 112](#)], 300 [Pg. 300 is part of [Doc. 130](#)], 321–322 [Pgs. 321–322 include portions of [Doc. 138](#) and [Doc. 139](#)], 325–327 [Pgs. 325–327 include portions of [Doc. 141](#), [Doc. 142](#), and [Doc. 143](#)], 333–334 [Pg. 333 is part of [Doc. 145](#)], 338 [Pg. 338 is part of [Doc. 146](#)], 371 [Pg. 371 is part of [Doc. 158](#)], 978–979 [Pgs. 978–979 include portions of [Doc. 426](#) and [Doc. 427](#)], 987 [Pg. 987 is part of [Doc. 428](#)], 1006 [Pg. 1006 is part of [Doc. 435](#)], 1026 [Pg. 1026 is part of [Doc. 444](#)], 1035 [Pg. 1035 is part of [Doc. 451](#)]

Iraqi withdrawal and, 276 [Pg. 276 is part of [Doc. 115](#)]

Israeli position, 193 [Pg. 193 is part of [Doc. 78](#)], 327–329 [Pg. 327 is part of [Doc. 143](#)], 407 [Pg. 407 is part of [Doc. 170](#)]

Israeli security guarantee and, 65 [Pg. 65 is part of [Doc. 43](#)], 68 [Pg. 68 is part of [Doc. 43](#)], 240–241 [Pg. 240 is part of [Doc. 94](#)], 270 [Pg. 270 is part of [Doc. 111](#)], 275 [Pg. 275 is part of [Doc. 115](#)], 296 [Pg. 296 is part of [Doc. 127](#)], 331 [Pg. 331 includes portions of [Doc. 144](#) and [Doc. 145](#)], 335 [Pg. 335 is part of [Doc. 145](#)],

375 [Pg. 375 is part of [Doc. 159](#)], 390 [Pg. 390 is part of [Doc. 163](#)], 407 [Pg. 407 is part of [Doc. 170](#)], 431 [Pg. 431 is part of [Doc. 181](#)]

British position, 220 [Pg. 220 is part of [Doc. 91](#)], 235 [Pg. 235 is part of [Doc. 93](#)], 250–251 [Pgs. 250–251 include portions of [Doc. 99](#) and [Doc. 100](#)]

Congressional position, 250–251 [Pgs. 250–251 include portions of [Doc. 99](#) and [Doc. 100](#)], 294 [Pg. 294 is part of [Doc. 126](#)], 336 [Pg. 336 is part of [Doc. 145](#)], 339 [Pg. 339 is part of [Doc. 146](#)], 361 [Pg. 361 is part of [Doc. 153](#)], 370 [Pg. 370 is part of [Doc. 158](#)], 376 [Pg. 376 includes portions of [Doc. 159](#) and [Doc. 160](#)], 396 [Pg. 396 includes portions of [Doc. 166](#) and [Doc. 167](#)], 400 [Pg. 400 is part of [Doc. 169](#)], 415 [Pg. 415 is part of [Doc. 175](#)], 659 [Pg. 659 is part of [Doc. 276](#)], 675 [Pg. 675 is part of [Doc. 285](#)]

Iranian position, 660 [Pg. 660 is part of [Doc. 276](#)]

Iraqi position, 370 [Pg. 370 is part of [Doc. 158](#)], 399 [Pg. 399 is part of [Doc. 169](#)]

Turkish position, 319 [Pg. 319 is part of [Doc. 137](#)], 371 [Pg. 371 is part of [Doc. 158](#)], 399 [Pg. 399 is part of [Doc. 169](#)], 660 [Pg. 660 is part of [Doc. 276](#)], 675 [Pg. 675 is part of [Doc. 285](#)]

JCS position, 72–74 [Pg. 72 is part of [Doc. 44](#)], 100–101 [Pg. 100 is part of [Doc. 47](#)], 258 [Pg. 258 includes portions of [Doc. 101](#) and [Doc. 102](#)], 261 [Pg. 261 is part of [Doc. 104](#)], 264–265 [Pgs. 264–265 include

portions of [Doc. 105](#), [Doc. 106](#), [Doc. 107](#), and [Doc. 108](#)], 275 [Pg. 275 is part of [Doc. 115](#)], 327–330 [Pgs. 327–330 include portions of [Doc. 143](#) and [Doc. 144](#)], 361–363 [Pgs. 361–363 include portions of [Doc. 153](#) and [Doc. 154](#)], 373n [Pg. 373 is part of [Doc. 159](#)], 390 [Pg. 390 is part of [Doc. 163](#)], 416 [Pg. 416 is part of [Doc. 175](#)]

Jordanian political situation and, 296 [Pg. 296 is part of [Doc. 127](#)]

Jordanian position, 406 [Pg. 406 is part of [Doc. 170](#)], 674 [Pg. 674 includes portions of [Doc. 284](#) and [Doc. 285](#)]

Middle East Charter proposal and, 387 [Pg. 387 includes portions of [Doc. 161](#) and [Doc. 162](#)]

Military planning participation, 248 [Pg. 248 is part of [Doc. 97](#)], 259–260 [Pgs. 259–260 include portions of [Doc. 102](#) and [Doc. 103](#)], 280 [Pg. 280 includes portions of [Doc. 118](#) and [Doc. 119](#)], 291 [Pg. 291 is part of [Doc. 124](#)], 313–314 [Pg. 313 is part of [Doc. 134](#)], 326–327 [Pgs. 326–327 include portions of [Doc. 142](#) and [Doc. 143](#)], 333 [Pg. 333 is part of [Doc. 145](#)], 336 [Pg. 336 is part of [Doc. 145](#)], 362 [Pg. 362 is part of [Doc. 153](#)], 374 [Pg. 374 is part of [Doc. 159](#)], 403 [Pg. 403 is part of [Doc. 170](#)], 943 [Pg. 943 is part of [Doc. 406](#)]

British position, 116 [Pg. 116 is part of [Doc. 51](#)]

Eisenhower Doctrine and, 431 [Pg. 431 is part of [Doc. 181](#)], 448–450 [Pg. 448 is part of [Doc. 192](#)], 459–460 [Pgs. 459–460 include portions of [Doc. 196](#), [Doc. 197](#), and [Doc. 198](#)], 553 [Pg. 553 includes portions of [Doc. 247](#), [Doc. 248](#), and [Doc. 249](#)], 663 [Pg. 663 includes portions of [Doc. 278](#) and [Doc. 279](#)]

Iraqi position, 1027 [Pg. 1027 is part of [Doc. 444](#)]

JCS position, 553–555 [Pgs. 553–555 include portions of [Doc. 247](#), [Doc. 248](#), [Doc. 249](#), and [Doc. 250](#)]

Liaison establishment, 128 [Pg. 128 is part of [Doc. 55](#)], 141–142 [Pg. 141 is part of [Doc. 60](#)], 177–178 [Pgs. 177–178 include portions of [Doc. 71](#), [Doc. 72](#), and [Doc. 73](#)], 198 [Pg. 198 is part of [Doc. 79](#)], 245 [Pg. 245 is part of [Doc. 96](#)], 301–302 [Pg. 301 is part of [Doc. 130](#)], 428 [Pg. 428 is part of [Doc. 178](#)]

Military Committee meeting, June 1957, 539–543 [Pgs. 539–543 include portions of [Doc. 239](#), [Doc. 240](#), [Doc. 241](#), [Doc. 242](#), and [Doc. 243](#)], 554 [Pg. 554 is part of [Doc. 249](#)]

Turkish position, 462–463 [Pgs. 462–463 include portions of [Doc. 199](#), [Doc. 200](#), and [Doc. 201](#)]

U.S.–British discussions, 466 [Pg. 466 is part of [Doc. 203](#)], 468 [Pg. 468 is part of [Doc. 203](#)], 514 [Pg. 514 is part of [Doc. 222](#)]

U.S.–Iranian discussions, 924 [Pg. 924 includes portions of [Doc. 396](#) and [Doc. 397](#)], 927 [Pg. 927 is part of [Doc. 398](#)]

NSC consideration, 69 [Pg. 69 is part of [Doc. 43](#)], 295–298 [Pgs. 295–298 include portions of [Doc. 126](#), [Doc. 127](#), [Doc. 128](#), and [Doc. 129](#)], 324–325 [Pgs. 324–

325 include portions of [Doc. 140](#), [Doc. 141](#), and [Doc. 142](#)], 329 [Pg. 329 is part of [Doc. 143](#)], 333 [Pg. 333 is part of [Doc. 145](#)]

Pakistani position, 56–59 [Pgs. 56–59 include portions of [Doc. 37](#), [Doc. 38](#), [Doc. 39](#), and [Doc. 40](#)], 277 [Pg. 277 is part of [Doc. 116](#)], 289 [Pg. 289 is part of [Doc. 124](#)], 319–322 [Pgs. 319–322 include portions of [Doc. 137](#), [Doc. 138](#), and [Doc. 139](#)], 333 [Pg. 333 is part of [Doc. 145](#)], 338 [Pg. 338 is part of [Doc. 146](#)], 369–370 [Pgs. 369–370 include portions of [Doc. 157](#) and [Doc. 158](#)], 657 [Pg. 657 is part of [Doc. 276](#)]

Political liaison, 177–178 [Pgs. 177–178 include portions of [Doc. 71](#), [Doc. 72](#), and [Doc. 73](#)], 180 [Pg. 180 includes portions of [Doc. 74](#) and [Doc. 75](#)], 198 [Pg. 198 is part of [Doc. 79](#)], 265 [Pg. 265 includes portions of [Doc. 107](#) and [Doc. 108](#)], 279–280 [Pgs. 279–280 include portions of [Doc. 117](#), [Doc. 118](#), and [Doc. 119](#)], 282 [Pg. 282 includes portions of [Doc. 120](#) and [Doc. 121](#)]

Saudi position, 335 [Pg. 335 is part of [Doc. 145](#)], 338 [Pg. 338 is part of [Doc. 146](#)], 368 [Pg. 368 is part of [Doc. 157](#)], 375 [Pg. 375 is part of [Doc. 159](#)], 390 [Pg. 390 is part of [Doc. 163](#)], 399 [Pg. 399 is part of [Doc. 169](#)], 415 [Pg. 415 is part of [Doc. 175](#)], 431 [Pg. 431 is part of [Doc. 181](#)], 659–660 [Pg. 659 is part of [Doc. 276](#)], 674 [Pg. 674 includes portions of [Doc. 284](#) and [Doc. 285](#)]

Soviet influence and, 184 [Pg. 184 is part of [Doc. 78](#)], 194 [Pg. 194 is part of [Doc. 78](#)], 196 [Pg. 196 is part of [Doc. 78](#)], 328 [Pg. 328 is part of [Doc. 143](#)], 401 [Pg. 401 includes portions of [Doc. 169](#) and [Doc. 170](#)], 406 [Pg. 406 is part of [Doc. 170](#)]

Special National Intelligence Estimate, 401–409 [Pgs. 401–409 include portions of [Doc. 169](#) and [Doc. 170](#)]

State Department position paper, 331–337 [Pgs. 331–337 include portions of [Doc. 144](#) and [Doc. 145](#)]

Suez crisis and, 335–336 [Pg. 335 is part of [Doc. 145](#)], 338 [Pg. 338 is part of [Doc. 146](#)], 374–375 [Pg. 374 is part of [Doc. 159](#)], 394 [Pg. 394 is part of [Doc. 165](#)], 399 [Pg. 399 is part of [Doc. 169](#)], 407 [Pg. 407 is part of [Doc. 170](#)], 1026 [Pg. 1026 is part of [Doc. 444](#)]

Syrian political situation and, 327–328 [Pg. 327 is part of [Doc. 143](#)]

Syrian position, 406 [Pg. 406 is part of [Doc. 170](#)]

Turkish position, 182 [Pg. 182 includes portions of [Doc. 77](#) and [Doc. 78](#)], 319–322 [Pgs. 319–322 include portions of [Doc. 137](#), [Doc. 138](#), and [Doc. 139](#)], 333 [Pg. 333 is part of [Doc. 145](#)], 338 [Pg. 338 is part of [Doc. 146](#)], 353 [Pg. 353 is part of [Doc. 150](#)], 462 [Pg. 462 includes portions of [Doc. 199](#) and [Doc. 200](#)], 673–675 [Pgs. 673–675 include portions of [Doc. 283](#), [Doc. 284](#), and [Doc. 285](#)]

U.S.–British cooperation and, 35 [Pg. 35 is part of [Doc. 24](#)]

U.S. economic aid and, 335–336 [Pg. 335 is part of [Doc. 145](#)], 402 [Pg. 402 is part of [Doc. 170](#)], 405 [Pg. 405 is part of [Doc. 170](#)]

U.S. military aid and, 192 [Pg. 192 is part of [Doc. 78](#)], 329 [Pg. 329 is part of [Doc. 143](#)], 337 [Pg. 337 is part of [Doc. 145](#)], 375 [Pg. 375 is part of [Doc. 159](#)], 402 [Pg. 402 is part of [Doc. 170](#)], 405 [Pg. 405 is part of [Doc. 170](#)], 904 [Pg. 904 is part of [Doc. 392](#)]

U.S.–Saudi relations and, 297 [Pg. 297 includes portions of [Doc. 127](#) and [Doc. 128](#)], 389 [Pg. 389 is part of

[Doc. 162](#)], 1026–1027 [Pg. 1026 is part of [Doc. 444](#)], 1035 [Pg. 1035 is part of [Doc. 451](#)]

U.S.–Soviet relations and, 219–220 [Pg. 219 is part of [Doc. 91](#)], 297 [Pg. 297 includes portions of [Doc. 127](#) and [Doc. 128](#)], 321 [Pg. 321 is part of [Doc. 138](#)], 328–329 [Pg. 328 is part of [Doc. 143](#)], 335 [Pg. 335 is part of [Doc. 145](#)], 338 [Pg. 338 is part of [Doc. 146](#)], 374 [Pg. 374 is part of [Doc. 159](#)], 406 [Pg. 406 is part of [Doc. 170](#)]

U.S. position, 2–5 [Pgs. 2–5 include portions of [Doc. 1](#), [Doc. 2](#), [Doc. 3](#), [Doc. 4](#), and [Doc. 5](#)], 13 [Pg. 13 is part of [Doc. 10](#)], 23n [Pg. 23 is part of [Doc. 16](#)], 34 [Pg. 34 is part of [Doc. 23](#)], 38–39 [Pgs. 38–39 include portions of [Doc. 25](#) and [Doc. 26](#)], 45 [Pg. 45 is part of [Doc. 30](#)], 55–56 [Pgs. 55–56 include portions of [Doc. 36](#), [Doc. 37](#), and [Doc. 38](#)], 59–61 [Pgs. 59–61 include portions of [Doc. 39](#), [Doc. 40](#), and [Doc. 41](#)], 94 [Pg. 94 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 129–130 [Pgs. 129–130 include portions of [Doc. 55](#) and [Doc. 56](#)], 133 [Pg. 133 includes portions of [Doc. 57](#) and [Doc. 58](#)], 139 [Pg. 139 is part of [Doc. 60](#)], 349–350 [Pg. 349 is part of [Doc. 148](#)], 582 [Pg. 582 is part of [Doc. 260](#)], 613 [Pg. 613 is part of [Doc. 267](#)]

Press release, 360 [Pg. 360 includes portions of [Doc. 151](#) and [Doc. 152](#)], 363–365 [Pgs. 363–365 include portions of [Doc. 153](#), [Doc. 154](#), and [Doc. 155](#)], 370 [Pg. 370 is part of [Doc. 158](#)], 372 [Pg. 372 includes portions of [Doc. 158](#) and [Doc. 159](#)], 396 [Pg. 396 includes portions of [Doc. 166](#) and [Doc. 167](#)], 404 [Pg. 404 is part of [Doc. 170](#)]

Yugoslav position, 93 [Pg. 93 is part of [Doc. 46](#)]

Bahrein (see also Persian Gulf states), 106 [Pg. 106 is part of [Doc. 49](#)], 253 [Pg. 253 is part of [Doc. 101](#)], 552 [Pg. 552 is part of [Doc. 247](#)], 601 [Pg. 601 is part of [Doc. 266](#)], 638 [Pg. 638 is part of [Doc. 270](#)]

British–Iranian dispute, 281 [Pg. 281 is part of [Doc. 119](#)], 766 [Pg. 766 includes portions of [Doc. 325](#) and [Doc. 326](#)], 768 [Pg. 768 is

part of [Doc. 326](#)], 772–773 [Pgs. 772–773 include portions of [Doc. 329](#) and [Doc. 330](#)], 822 [Pg. 822 is part of [Doc. 357](#)], 824 [Pg. 824 is part of [Doc. 357](#)], 939–940 [Pgs. 939–940 include portions of [Doc. 404](#) and [Doc. 405](#)], 961 [Pg. 961 is part of [Doc. 415](#)]

Baig, M.S.A., 559 [Pg. 559 is part of [Doc. 253](#)]

Bailey, Ronald, 103 [Pg. 103 includes portions of [Doc. 48](#) and [Doc. 49](#)], 106 [Pg. 106 is part of [Doc. 49](#)], 112 [Pg. 112 is part of [Doc. 51](#)], 114 [Pg. 114 is part of [Doc. 51](#)], 118 [Pg. 118 is part of [Doc. 51](#)], 234 [Pg. 234 includes portions of [Doc. 92](#) and [Doc. 93](#)]

Bakhtiar, Gen. Taymur, 913–914 [Pg. 913 is part of [Doc. 393](#)]

Bakr, Abdullah Ibrahim, 353 [Pg. 353 is part of [Doc. 150](#)]

Balafrej, Ahmed, 533 [Pg. 533 includes portions of [Doc. 236](#) and [Doc. 237](#)]

Balkan Alliance, 83 [Pg. 83 is part of [Doc. 46](#)]

Bandung Conference, 9 [Pg. 9 is part of [Doc. 8](#)], 39 [Pg. 39 is part of [Doc. 26](#)], 43–44 [Pgs. 43–44 include portions of [Doc. 28](#) and [Doc. 29](#)], 86 [Pg. 86 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 113 [Pg. 113 is part of [Doc. 51](#)]

Barbour, Walworth, 262–264 [Pgs. 262–264 include portions of [Doc. 105](#), [Doc. 106](#), and [Doc. 107](#)], 544–545 [Pgs. 544–545 include portions of [Doc. 243](#), [Doc. 244](#), and [Doc. 245](#)]

Barker, William, 217 [Pg. 217 is part of [Doc. 91](#)], 229 [Pg. 229 is part of [Doc. 92](#)]

Barnes, Robert G., 377 [Pg. 377 is part of [Doc. 160](#)], 383n [Pg. 383 is part of [Doc. 161](#)], 890n [Pg. 890 is part of [Doc. 389](#)], 949n [Pg. 949 is part of [Doc. 409](#)], 992n [Pg. 992 includes portions of [Doc. 429](#) and [Doc. 430](#)]

Bashayan, Burhan al–Din, 24 [Pg. 24 is part of [Doc. 16](#)], 25n [Pg. 25 includes portions of [Doc. 16](#) and [Doc. 17](#)], 256 [Pg. 256 is part of [Doc. 101](#)], 321n [Pg. 321 is part of [Doc. 138](#)], 988 [Pg. 988 includes portions of [Doc. 428](#) and [Doc. 429](#)]

Bat Galim case, 9 [Pg. 9 is part of [Doc. 8](#)]

Batzell, Elmer, 934 [Pg. 934 includes portions of [Doc. 401](#) and [Doc. 402](#)]

Baxter, William O., 40n [Pg. 40 includes portions of [Doc. 26](#) and [Doc. 27](#)], 312n [Pg. 312 is part of [Doc. 134](#)], 676n [Pg. 676 is part of [Doc. 286](#)], 684n [Pg. 684 is part of [Doc. 289](#)], 696n [Pg. 696 includes portions of [Doc. 291](#) and [Doc. 292](#)], 698n [Pg. 698 is part of [Doc. 293](#)], 743n [Pg. 743 is part of [Doc. 313](#)], 750n [Pg. 750 includes portions of [Doc. 316](#) and [Doc. 317](#)], 754n [Pg. 754 includes portions of [Doc. 318](#) and [Doc. 319](#)], 759n [Pg. 759 includes portions of [Doc. 321](#) and [Doc. 322](#)], 773n [Pg. 773 is part of [Doc. 330](#)], 776n [Pg. 776 includes portions of [Doc. 331](#) and [Doc. 332](#)], 782n [Pg. 782 includes portions of [Doc. 335](#) and [Doc. 336](#)], 790n [Pg. 790 is part of [Doc. 342](#)], 797n [Pg. 797 includes portions of [Doc. 345](#) and [Doc. 346](#)], 799n [Pg. 799 includes portions of [Doc. 347](#) and [Doc. 348](#)], 837n [Pg. 837 is part of [Doc. 359](#)], 838n [Pg. 838 is part of [Doc. 359](#)], 839n [Pg. 839 includes portions of [Doc. 359](#) and [Doc. 360](#)], 840n [Pg. 840 includes portions of [Doc. 360](#) and [Doc. 361](#)]

Iran, 703–708 [Pgs. 703–708 include portions of [Doc. 296](#) and [Doc. 297](#)], 752 [Pg. 752 includes portions of [Doc. 317](#) and [Doc. 318](#)], 784–786 [Pgs. 784–786 include portions of [Doc. 336](#), [Doc. 337](#), and [Doc. 338](#)]

Near East, Soviet policy toward, 216 [Pg. 216 includes portions of [Doc. 90](#) and [Doc. 91](#)], 228 [Pg. 228 includes portions of [Doc. 91](#) and [Doc. 92](#)], 234 [Pg. 234 includes portions of [Doc. 92](#) and [Doc. 93](#)]

Bayar, Celal, 61n [Pg. 61 is part of [Doc. 41](#)], 176 [Pg. 176 includes portions of [Doc. 70](#) and [Doc. 71](#)], 180 [Pg. 180 includes portions of [Doc. 74](#) and [Doc. 75](#)], 766 [Pg. 766 includes portions of [Doc. 325](#) and [Doc. 326](#)]

Bayat, Morteza Qoli, 882 [Pg. 882 is part of [Doc. 383](#)]

Beale, W.T.M., Jr., 664 [Pg. 664 is part of [Doc. 279](#)]

Becker, Loftus E., 671 [Pg. 671 is part of [Doc. 283](#)]

Beckner, Earl R., 460n [Pg. 460 includes portions of [Doc. 197](#) and [Doc. 198](#)], 515n [Pg. 515 includes portions of [Doc. 222](#) and [Doc. 223](#)], 933–934 [Pgs. 933–934 include portions of [Doc. 400](#), [Doc. 401](#), and [Doc. 402](#)]

Beeley, Harold, 464 [Pg. 464 is part of [Doc. 202](#)], 466 [Pg. 466 is part of [Doc. 203](#)], 470 [Pg. 470 is part of [Doc. 203](#)]

Belcher, Taylor G., 234 [Pg. 234 includes portions of [Doc. 92](#) and [Doc. 93](#)]

Ben–Gurion, David, 27 [Pg. 27 includes portions of [Doc. 18](#) and [Doc. 19](#)], 90 [Pg. 90 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 270 [Pg. 270 is part of [Doc. 111](#)], 529 [Pg. 529 includes portions of [Doc. 233](#) and [Doc. 234](#)], 1032n [Pg. 1032 includes portions of [Doc. 447](#) and [Doc. 448](#)]

Ben Halim. See [Halim, Sayyid Mustafa Ben.](#)

Bennett, Carroll, 723 [Pg. 723 is part of [Doc. 303](#)]

Bennett, W. Tapley, 553 [Pg. 553 includes portions of [Doc. 247](#), [Doc. 248](#), and [Doc. 249](#)]

Bennsky, George M., Jr., 515n [Pg. 515 includes portions of [Doc. 222](#) and [Doc. 223](#)]

Bergus, Donald C., 3n [Pg. 3 includes portions of [Doc. 2](#) and [Doc. 3](#)], 234 [Pg. 234 includes portions of [Doc. 92](#) and [Doc. 93](#)], 238 [Pg. 238 is part of [Doc. 93](#)], 524n [Pg. 524 is part of [Doc. 229](#)]

Bermuda Conference, 462–474 [Pgs. 462–474 include portions of [Doc. 199](#), [Doc. 200](#), [Doc. 201](#), [Doc. 202](#), [Doc. 203](#), [Doc. 204](#), and [Doc. 205](#)], 547 [Pg. 547 is part of [Doc. 246](#)]

Bernau, Phyllis D., 780n [Pg. 780 includes portions of [Doc. 333](#) and [Doc. 334](#)], 781n [Pg. 781 includes portions of [Doc. 334](#) and [Doc. 335](#)], 1011 [Pg. 1011 is part of [Doc. 436](#)]

Berry, J. Lampton, 412 [Pg. 412 includes portions of [Doc. 171](#) and [Doc. 172](#)], 1017 [Pg. 1017 includes portions of [Doc. 440](#) and [Doc. 441](#)], 1036 [Pg. 1036 is

part of [Doc. 452](#)], 1039n [Pg. 1039 includes portions of [Doc. 453](#) and [Doc. 454](#)], 1058n [Pg. 1058 includes portions of [Doc. 458](#), [Doc. 459](#), and [Doc. 460](#)]

Bevin, Ernest, 560 [Pg. 560 is part of [Doc. 253](#)]

Birgi, Nuri, 44n [Pg. 44 is part of [Doc. 29](#)], 55 n [Pg. 55 includes portions of [Doc. 36](#) and [Doc. 37](#)], 272 [Pg. 272 is part of [Doc. 113](#)], 353 [Pg. 353 is part of [Doc. 150](#)]

Bishop, F.A., 464 [Pg. 464 is part of [Doc. 202](#)]

Bishop, Max, 772 [Pg. 772 is part of [Doc. 329](#)]

Bitar, Salah al-Din, 652 [Pg. 652 is part of [Doc. 274](#)]

Black, Eugene R., 852–853 [Pgs. 852–853 include portions of [Doc. 368](#) and [Doc. 369](#)]

Blake, Robert O., 216 [Pg. 216 includes portions of [Doc. 90](#) and [Doc. 91](#)], 228 [Pg. 228 includes portions of [Doc. 91](#) and [Doc. 92](#)], 232 [Pg. 232 is part of [Doc. 92](#)], 278 [Pg. 278 is part of [Doc. 117](#)]

Bliss, Don C., 484n [Pg. 484 includes portions of [Doc. 210](#) and [Doc. 211](#)], 486 n [Pg. 486 is part of [Doc. 212](#)], 487n [Pg. 487 includes portions of [Doc. 212](#) and [Doc. 213](#)], 488n [Pg. 488 includes portions of [Doc. 213](#) and [Doc. 214](#)], 490n [Pg. 490 is part of [Doc. 215](#)], 491n [Pg. 491 includes portions of [Doc. 215](#) and [Doc. 216](#)], 493n [Pg. 493 is part of [Doc. 217](#)], 494n [Pg. 494 includes portions of [Doc. 217](#) and [Doc. 218](#)], 495n [Pg. 495 includes portions of [Doc. 218](#) and [Doc. 219](#)], 519n [Pg. 519 includes portions of [Doc. 224](#) and [Doc. 225](#)], 520n [Pg. 520 is part of [Doc. 226](#)], 523n [Pg. 523 is part of [Doc. 228](#)]

Blowers, George, 863 [Pg. 863 includes portions of [Doc. 374](#) and [Doc. 375](#)]

Boggs, Marion W., 563n [Pg. 563 includes portions of [Doc. 253](#) and [Doc. 254](#)], 573 [Pg. 573 is part of [Doc. 256](#)], 574n [Pg. 574 is part of [Doc. 257](#)], 577–578 [Pgs. 577–578 include portions of [Doc. 259](#) and [Doc. 260](#)], 612–616 [Pg. 612 is part of [Doc. 267](#)], 619n [Pg. 619 is part of [Doc. 270](#)], 649n [Pg. 649 includes

portions of [Doc. 271](#) and [Doc. 272](#)], 662–663 [Pgs. 662–663 include portions of [Doc. 277](#), [Doc. 278](#), and [Doc. 279](#)], 886n [Pg. 886 is part of [Doc. 387](#)]

Bohlen, Charles E., 278–279 [Pgs. 278–279 include portions of [Doc. 117](#) and [Doc. 118](#)]

Bonesteel, Brig. Gen. Charles H., 98 [Pg. 98 is part of [Doc. 47](#)]

Boone, Adm. Walter F., 536 [Pg. 536 is part of [Doc. 238](#)]

Bourguiba, Habib, 532 [Pg. 532 includes portions of [Doc. 235](#) and [Doc. 236](#)], 535 [Pg. 535 is part of [Doc. 238](#)], 557 [Pg. 557 is part of [Doc. 251](#)]

Bowie, Robert R., 324 [Pg. 324 includes portions of [Doc. 140](#) and [Doc. 141](#)], 330 [Pg. 330 includes portions of [Doc. 143](#) and [Doc. 144](#)], 351n [Pg. 351 includes portions of [Doc. 148](#) and [Doc. 149](#)], 366 [Pg. 366 is part of [Doc. 156](#)], 367n [Pg. 367 is part of [Doc. 156](#)], 376 [Pg. 376 includes portions of [Doc. 159](#) and [Doc. 160](#)], 383n [Pg. 383 is part of [Doc. 161](#)], 393 [Pg. 393 is part of [Doc. 165](#)], 563 [Pg. 563 includes portions of [Doc. 253](#) and [Doc. 254](#)], 683 [Pg. 683 is part of [Doc. 288](#)], 871 [Pg. 871 includes portions of [Doc. 377](#) and [Doc. 378](#)], 891–892 [Pgs. 891–892 include portions of [Doc. 389](#), [Doc. 390](#), and [Doc. 391](#)]

Baghdad Pact, 216 [Pg. 216 includes portions of [Doc. 90](#) and [Doc. 91](#)], 225–227 [Pg. 225 is part of [Doc. 91](#)], 231 [Pg. 231 is part of [Doc. 92](#)], 240 [Pg. 240 is part of [Doc. 94](#)], 243 [Pg. 243 is part of [Doc. 95](#)], 329 [Pg. 329 is part of [Doc. 143](#)], 559 [Pg. 559 is part of [Doc. 253](#)]

Eisenhower Doctrine, 535 [Pg. 535 is part of [Doc. 238](#)], 537 [Pg. 537 is part of [Doc. 239](#)], 539 [Pg. 539 includes portions of [Doc. 239](#) and [Doc. 240](#)]

Near East, Soviet policy toward, 228 [Pg. 228 includes portions of [Doc. 91](#) and [Doc. 92](#)], 230 [Pg. 230 is part of [Doc. 92](#)], 232–233 [Pg. 232 is part of [Doc. 92](#)]

Brand, Vance, 863 [Pg. 863 includes portions of [Doc. 374](#) and [Doc. 375](#)]

Brook, Norman, 464 [Pg. 464 is part of [Doc. 202](#)]

Brosio, Manlio, 584 [Pg. 584 is part of [Doc. 262](#)], 661–663 [Pgs. 661–663 include portions of [Doc. 276](#), [Doc. 277](#), [Doc. 278](#), and [Doc. 279](#)], 945 [Pg. 945 is part of [Doc. 407](#)]

Brundage, Percival F., 936 [Pg. 936 is part of [Doc. 402](#)]

Budget, U.S. Bureau of the, 103 [Pg. 103 includes portions of [Doc. 48](#) and [Doc. 49](#)], 592–593 [Pg. 592 is part of [Doc. 265](#)], 708 [Pg. 708 includes portions of [Doc. 296](#) and [Doc. 297](#)], 803 [Pg. 803 is part of [Doc. 349](#)]

Bulganin, Nikolai A., 290 [Pg. 290 is part of [Doc. 124](#)], 415 [Pg. 415 is part of [Doc. 175](#)], 806 [Pg. 806 is part of [Doc. 351](#)]

Buraimi dispute. *See* Persian Gulf states.

Burdett, William C., Jr., 4n [Pg. 4 includes portions of [Doc. 3](#) and [Doc. 4](#)], 38n [Pg. 38 includes portions of [Doc. 25](#) and [Doc. 26](#)], 43n [Pg. 43 includes portions of [Doc. 28](#) and [Doc. 29](#)], 45n [Pg. 45 is part of [Doc. 30](#)], 153n [Pg. 153 is part of [Doc. 62](#)], 178n [Pg. 178 includes portions of [Doc. 72](#) and [Doc. 73](#)], 367n [Pg. 367 is part of [Doc. 156](#)], 448n [Pg. 448 is part of [Doc. 192](#)], 452n [Pg. 452 includes portions of [Doc. 193](#) and [Doc. 194](#)], 454n [Pg. 454 includes portions of [Doc. 194](#) and [Doc. 195](#)], 971n [Pg. 971 includes portions of [Doc. 422](#) and [Doc. 423](#)]

Near East:

Soviet policy toward, 278 [Pg. 278 is part of [Doc. 117](#)]

U.S. policy toward, 366 [Pg. 366 is part of [Doc. 156](#)], 368 [Pg. 368 is part of [Doc. 157](#)], 393 [Pg. 393 is part of [Doc. 165](#)]

Burke, Adm. Arleigh A., 247 [Pg. 247 is part of [Doc. 97](#)], 258 [Pg. 258 includes portions of [Doc. 101](#) and [Doc. 102](#)], 299 [Pg. 299 includes portions of [Doc. 129](#) and [Doc. 130](#)], 302 [Pg. 302 is part of [Doc. 130](#)], 328 [Pg. 328 is part of [Doc.](#)

[143](#)], 330 [Pg. 330 includes portions of [Doc. 143](#) and [Doc. 144](#)], 414 [Pg. 414 is part of [Doc. 174](#)], 669 [Pg. 669 includes portions of [Doc. 281](#) and [Doc. 282](#)]

Burma, 501 [Pg. 501 is part of [Doc. 220](#)], 557 [Pg. 557 is part of [Doc. 251](#)]

Burns, Robert L., 127 [Pg. 127 includes portions of [Doc. 54](#) and [Doc. 55](#)]

Byrd, Harry Flood, 445 [Pg. 445 is part of [Doc. 189](#)]

Byroade, Henry A., 224 [Pg. 224 is part of [Doc. 91](#)], 228–229 [Pgs. 228–229 include portions of [Doc. 91](#) and [Doc. 92](#)], 231–233 [Pg. 231 is part of [Doc. 92](#)], 237–239 [Pg. 237 is part of [Doc. 93](#)], 962 [Pg. 962 is part of [Doc. 416](#)]

Baghdad Pact, 38n [Pg. 38 includes portions of [Doc. 25](#) and [Doc. 26](#)], 50–51 [Pgs. 50–51 include portions of [Doc. 33](#), [Doc. 34](#), and [Doc. 35](#)], 75–76 [Pg. 75 is part of [Doc. 45](#)], 126–127 [Pgs. 126–127 include portions of [Doc. 54](#) and [Doc. 55](#)], 154–157 [Pgs. 154–157 include portions of [Doc. 63](#) and [Doc. 64](#)], 216 [Pg. 216 includes portions of [Doc. 90](#) and [Doc. 91](#)], 220–222 [Pg. 220 is part of [Doc. 91](#)], 226–227 [Pg. 226 is part of [Doc. 91](#)], 234–236 [Pgs. 234–236 include portions of [Doc. 92](#) and [Doc. 93](#)]

ESS Pact, 29–32 [Pgs. 29–32 include portions of [Doc. 21](#), [Doc. 22](#), and [Doc. 23](#)], 41–43 [Pgs. 41–43 include portions of [Doc. 27](#), [Doc. 28](#), and [Doc. 29](#)], 75–77 [Pgs. 75–77 include portions of [Doc. 45](#) and [Doc. 46](#)]

Cabell, Lt. Gen. Charles P., 162 [Pg. 162 is part of [Doc. 66](#)], 772 [Pg. 772 is part of [Doc. 329](#)]

Caccia, Sir Harold, 240 [Pg. 240 is part of [Doc. 94](#)], 243 [Pg. 243 is part of [Doc. 95](#)], 250 [Pg. 250 is part of [Doc. 99](#)], 429 [Pg. 429 includes portions of [Doc. 178](#) and [Doc. 179](#)], 464 [Pg. 464 is part of [Doc. 202](#)], 466 [Pg. 466 is part of [Doc. 203](#)], 508 [Pg. 508 is part of [Doc. 221](#)], 657 [Pg. 657 is part of [Doc. 276](#)], 661 [Pg. 661 includes portions of [Doc. 276](#) and [Doc. 277](#)], 1069 [Pg. 1069 is part of [Doc. 464](#)]

Capano, Carlo Perrone, 663 [Pg. 663 includes portions of [Doc. 278](#) and [Doc. 279](#)]

Caraway, Brig. Gen. Forrest, 198n [Pg. 198 is part of [Doc. 79](#)]

Carney, Adm. Robert B., 676–682 [Pgs. 676–682 include portions of [Doc. 286](#) and [Doc. 287](#)]

Cassady, Adm. John H., 8 [Pg. 8 includes portions of [Doc. 6](#) and [Doc. 7](#)], 25 [Pg. 25 includes portions of [Doc. 16](#) and [Doc. 17](#)], 52–53 [Pg. 52 is part of [Doc. 35](#)], 198 [Pg. 198 is part of [Doc. 79](#)], 205 [Pg. 205 is part of [Doc. 83](#)], 265–266 [Pgs. 265–266 include portions of [Doc. 107](#) and [Doc. 108](#)], 270 [Pg. 270 is part of [Doc. 111](#)], 273 [Pg. 273 is part of [Doc. 114](#)], 279 [Pg. 279 includes portions of [Doc. 117](#) and [Doc. 118](#)], 284 [Pg. 284 is part of [Doc. 122](#)], 292–293 [Pgs. 292–293 include portions of [Doc. 124](#) and [Doc. 125](#)], 301 [Pg. 301 is part of [Doc. 130](#)]

Cassilly, Thomas A., 910 [Pg. 910 includes portions of [Doc. 392](#) and [Doc. 393](#)]

Cattani, Attilio, 584 [Pg. 584 is part of [Doc. 262](#)], 663 [Pg. 663 includes portions of [Doc. 278](#) and [Doc. 279](#)], 666–668 [Pgs. 666–668 include portions of [Doc. 279](#), [Doc. 280](#), and [Doc. 281](#)], 945 [Pg. 945 is part of [Doc. 407](#)]

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 315 [Pg. 315 includes portions of [Doc. 134](#) and [Doc. 135](#)]

Ceylon, 233 [Pg. 233 is part of [Doc. 92](#)], 509 [Pg. 509 is part of [Doc. 222](#)]

Chadirchi, Kamil, 1000 [Pg. 1000 is part of [Doc. 435](#)]

Chamoun, Camille, 125 [Pg. 125 is part of [Doc. 53](#)], 474n [Pg. 474 includes portions of [Doc. 204](#) and [Doc. 205](#)], 484–485 [Pgs. 484–485 include portions of [Doc. 210](#) and [Doc. 211](#)], 621 [Pg. 621 is part of [Doc. 270](#)], 640 [Pg. 640 is part of [Doc. 270](#)]

Chapin, Selden:

Baghdad Pact, 169–170 [Pgs. 169–170 include portions of [Doc. 67](#) and [Doc. 68](#)], 273–274 [Pg. 273 is part of [Doc. 114](#)], 279–281 [Pgs. 279–281 include portions of [Doc. 117](#), [Doc. 118](#), and [Doc. 119](#)],

285–293 [Pgs. 285–293 include portions of [Doc. 122](#), [Doc. 123](#), [Doc. 124](#), and [Doc. 125](#)], 318–322 [Pgs. 318–322 include portions of [Doc. 136](#), [Doc. 137](#), [Doc. 138](#), and [Doc. 139](#)], 334 [Pg. 334 is part of [Doc. 145](#)], 365 [Pg. 365 is part of [Doc. 155](#)], 763–768 [Pgs. 763–768 include portions of [Doc. 324](#), [Doc. 325](#), and [Doc. 326](#)], 775–776 [Pgs. 775–776 include portions of [Doc. 330](#), [Doc. 331](#), and [Doc. 332](#)], 778–780 [Pgs. 778–780 include portions of [Doc. 332](#), [Doc. 333](#), and [Doc. 334](#)], 786–789 [Pgs. 786–789 include portions of [Doc. 337](#), [Doc. 338](#), [Doc. 339](#), [Doc. 340](#), and [Doc. 341](#)]

Iran, 759 [Pg. 759 includes portions of [Doc. 321](#) and [Doc. 322](#)], 880–881 [Pgs. 880–881 include portions of [Doc. 381](#), [Doc. 382](#), and [Doc. 383](#)], 939 [Pg. 939 is part of [Doc. 404](#)], 951–953 [Pgs. 951–953 include portions of [Doc. 409](#), [Doc. 410](#), and [Doc. 411](#)]

Baghdad Pact participation, 763–768 [Pgs. 763–768 include portions of [Doc. 324](#), [Doc. 325](#), and [Doc. 326](#)], 775–776 [Pgs. 775–776 include portions of [Doc. 330](#), [Doc. 331](#), and [Doc. 332](#)], 778–780 [Pgs. 778–780 include portions of [Doc. 332](#), [Doc. 333](#), and [Doc. 334](#)], 786–789 [Pgs. 786–789 include portions of [Doc. 337](#), [Doc. 338](#), [Doc. 339](#), [Doc. 340](#), and [Doc. 341](#)]

United States, relations with, 746 [Pg. 746 is part of [Doc. 314](#)], 757–758 [Pgs. 757–758 include portions of [Doc. 320](#) and [Doc. 321](#)], 763–764 [Pg. 763 is part of [Doc. 324](#)], 778–780 [Pgs. 778–780 include portions of [Doc. 332](#), [Doc. 333](#), and [Doc. 334](#)], 845–846 [Pgs. 845–846 include portions of [Doc. 363](#) and [Doc. 364](#)], 853 [Pg. 853 includes portions of [Doc. 368](#) and [Doc. 369](#)], 873 [Pg. 873 is part of [Doc. 379](#)], 881–882 [Pgs. 881–882 include portions of [Doc. 382](#) and [Doc. 383](#)], 959–960 [Pg. 959 is part of [Doc. 414](#)], 962–963 [Pg. 962 is part of [Doc. 416](#)]

Oil resources, 317 [Pg. 317 is part of [Doc. 136](#)], 843 [Pg. 843 is part of [Doc. 362](#)], 873 [Pg. 873 is part of [Doc. 379](#)], 881–882 [Pgs. 881–882 include portions of [Doc. 382](#) and [Doc. 383](#)]

Suez crisis, 842–844 [Pgs. 842–844 include portions of [Doc. 362](#) and [Doc. 363](#)]

China, People's Republic of, 237 [Pg. 237 is part of [Doc. 93](#)], 397 [Pg. 397 is part of [Doc. 167](#)], 433 [Pg. 433 is part of [Doc. 182](#)], 557 [Pg. 557 is part of [Doc. 251](#)], 634 [Pg. 634 is part of [Doc. 270](#)], 858 [Pg. 858 is part of [Doc. 372](#)]

Clock, Philip, 910 [Pg. 910 includes portions of [Doc. 392](#) and [Doc. 393](#)]

Colley, Dwight T., 723–725 [Pg. 723 is part of [Doc. 303](#)]

Colombia, 501 [Pg. 501 is part of [Doc. 220](#)]

Commerce, U.S. Department of, 592–593 [Pg. 592 is part of [Doc. 265](#)]

Commonwealth, Pakistani membership, 319ⁿ [Pg. 319 is part of [Doc. 137](#)]

Congress, U.S. (see also [Eisenhower Doctrine](#)):

Baghdad Pact, 100 [Pg. 100 is part of [Doc. 47](#)], 250–251 [Pgs. 250–251 include portions of [Doc. 99](#) and [Doc. 100](#)], 270 [Pg. 270 is part of [Doc. 111](#)], 275 [Pg. 275 is part of [Doc. 115](#)], 294 [Pg. 294 is part of [Doc. 126](#)], 333 [Pg. 333 is part of [Doc. 145](#)], 336 [Pg. 336 is part of [Doc. 145](#)], 339 [Pg. 339 is part of [Doc. 146](#)], 361 [Pg. 361 is part of [Doc. 153](#)], 370 [Pg. 370 is part of [Doc. 158](#)], 376 [Pg. 376 includes portions of [Doc. 159](#) and [Doc. 160](#)], 389 [Pg. 389 is part of [Doc. 162](#)], 396 [Pg. 396 includes portions of [Doc. 166](#) and [Doc. 167](#)], 400 [Pg. 400 is part of [Doc. 169](#)], 415 [Pg. 415 is part of [Doc. 175](#)], 659 [Pg. 659 is part of [Doc. 276](#)], 675 [Pg. 675 is part of [Doc. 285](#)]

Eisenhower Doctrine. See [Middle East resolution](#) below.

Fulbright Act (P.L. 584), 984 [Pg. 984 is part of [Doc. 427](#)]

House Committee on Government Operations, 884 [Pg. 884 includes portions of [Doc. 385](#) and [Doc. 386](#)], 895 [Pg. 895 is part of [Doc. 391](#)]

House Joint Resolution 117, 452 [Pg. 452 includes portions of [Doc. 193](#) and [Doc. 194](#)], 935 [Pg. 935 is part of [Doc. 402](#)]

Iran, U.S. aid to, 756–757 [Pgs. 756–757 include portions of [Doc. 320](#) and [Doc. 321](#)], 777 [Pg. 777 is part of [Doc. 332](#)], 803 [Pg. 803 is part of [Doc. 349](#)], 884 [Pg. 884 includes portions of [Doc. 385](#) and [Doc. 386](#)], 895 [Pg. 895 is part of [Doc. 391](#)]

Middle East Charter proposal, 380–381 [Pg. 380 is part of [Doc. 160](#)]

Middle East resolution (P.L. 85–7), 445–447 [Pgs. 445–447 include portions of [Doc. 189](#), [Doc. 190](#), and [Doc. 191](#)], 452–453 [Pgs. 452–453 include portions of [Doc. 193](#) and [Doc. 194](#)]

Mutual Security Act of 1954, 447 [Pg. 447 is part of [Doc. 191](#)], 457 [Pg. 457 is part of [Doc. 195](#)], 644 [Pg. 644 is part of [Doc. 270](#)]

Senate Joint Resolution 19, 445–446 [Pgs. 445–446 include portions of [Doc. 189](#), [Doc. 190](#), and [Doc. 191](#)]

Smith–Mundt Act (P.L. 402), 984 [Pg. 984 is part of [Doc. 427](#)]

U.S. military aid, 101 [Pg. 101 is part of [Doc. 47](#)], 103 [Pg. 103 includes portions of [Doc. 48](#) and [Doc. 49](#)], 159–160 [Pg. 159 is part of [Doc. 66](#)], 756–757 [Pgs. 756–757 include portions of [Doc. 320](#) and [Doc. 321](#)], 898 [Pg. 898 is part of [Doc. 391](#)]

Constantinople Convention of 1888, 629 [Pg. 629 is part of [Doc. 270](#)]

Cook, Gen. Orval R., 975–976 [Pgs. 975–976 include portions of [Doc. 423](#), [Doc. 424](#), and [Doc. 425](#)]

Corbett, Jack C., 460n [Pg. 460 includes portions of [Doc. 197](#) and [Doc. 198](#)], 863–864 [Pgs. 863–864 include portions of [Doc. 374](#) and [Doc. 375](#)]

Cottman, James S., Jr., 240 [Pg. 240 is part of [Doc. 94](#)], 243 [Pg. 243 is part of [Doc. 95](#)]

Coulson, Sir John E., 217 [Pg. 217 is part of [Doc. 91](#)], 470n [Pg. 470 is part of [Doc. 203](#)], 504–511 [Pgs. 504–511 include portions of [Doc. 221](#) and [Doc. 222](#)], 513–514 [Pg. 513 is part of [Doc. 222](#)]

Crawford, William A., 754n [Pg. 754 includes portions of [Doc. 318](#) and [Doc. 319](#)], 782n [Pg. 782 includes portions of [Doc. 335](#) and [Doc. 336](#)], 839n [Pg. 839 includes portions of [Doc. 359](#) and [Doc. 360](#)], 840n [Pg. 840 includes portions of [Doc. 360](#) and [Doc. 361](#)]

Crowl, R. Bernard, 714 [Pg. 714 is part of [Doc. 301](#)], 743n [Pg. 743 is part of [Doc. 313](#)], 755n [Pg. 755 includes portions of [Doc. 319](#) and [Doc. 320](#)], 776n [Pg. 776 includes portions of [Doc. 331](#) and [Doc. 332](#)]

Cumming, Hugh S., Jr., 937–938 [Pgs. 937–938 include portions of [Doc. 402](#) and [Doc. 403](#)]

Cutler, Robert, 441 [Pg. 441 includes portions of [Doc. 186](#) and [Doc. 187](#)], 539 [Pg. 539 includes portions of [Doc. 239](#) and [Doc. 240](#)], 563 [Pg. 563 includes portions of [Doc. 253](#) and [Doc. 254](#)], 651 [Pg. 651 includes portions of [Doc. 272](#) and [Doc. 273](#)], 686 [Pg. 686 is part of [Doc. 290](#)], 891 [Pg. 891 includes portions of [Doc. 389](#) and [Doc. 390](#)], 893 [Pg. 893 is part of [Doc. 391](#)], 896–898 [Pg. 896 is part of [Doc. 391](#)], 935–936 [Pg. 935 is part of [Doc. 402](#)]

Cyprus, 62 [Pg. 62 is part of [Doc. 42](#)], 67 [Pg. 67 is part of [Doc. 43](#)], 71–72 [Pg. 71 is part of [Doc. 44](#)], 122 [Pg. 122 is part of [Doc. 51](#)], 177 [Pg. 177 includes portions of [Doc. 71](#) and [Doc. 72](#)], 290 [Pg. 290 is part of [Doc. 124](#)], 309 [Pg. 309 is part of [Doc. 132](#)], 317 [Pg. 317 is part of [Doc. 136](#)], 643 [Pg. 643 is part of [Doc. 270](#)]

Cyr, Leo G., 216 [Pg. 216 includes portions of [Doc. 90](#) and [Doc. 91](#)], 228 [Pg. 228 includes portions of [Doc. 91](#) and [Doc. 92](#)]

Czechoslovakia, 421 [Pg. 421 is part of [Doc. 178](#)]

Dabney, Maj. Gen. John A., 975 [Pg. 975 includes portions of [Doc. 423](#) and [Doc. 424](#)]

al-Daftari, Ali Mumtaz, 585–587 [Pgs. 585–587 include portions of [Doc. 262](#), [Doc. 263](#), [Doc. 264](#), and [Doc. 265](#)]

Daghestani, Maj. Gen. Ghazi, 257 [Pg. 257 is part of [Doc. 101](#)], 1036–1038 [Pgs. 1036–1038 include portions of [Doc. 452](#) and [Doc. 453](#)]

Daud, Mohammed, 491–492 [Pgs. 491–492 include portions of [Doc. 215](#) and [Doc. 216](#)]

Davis, Adm. Arthur C., 70n [Pg. 70 includes portions of [Doc. 43](#) and [Doc. 44](#)], 98–102 [Pgs. 98–102 include portions of [Doc. 47](#) and [Doc. 48](#)]

De Rege, Giuseppe, 664 [Pg. 664 is part of [Doc. 279](#)], 667 [Pg. 667 is part of [Doc. 280](#)]

Dean, P.H., 464 [Pg. 464 is part of [Doc. 202](#)], 466 [Pg. 466 is part of [Doc. 203](#)]

Defense, U.S. Department of, 13n [Pg. 13 is part of [Doc. 10](#)], 40n [Pg. 40 includes portions of [Doc. 26](#) and [Doc. 27](#)], 207–211 [Pgs. 207–211 include portions of [Doc. 83](#), [Doc. 84](#), [Doc. 85](#), and [Doc. 86](#)], 366 [Pg. 366 is part of [Doc. 156](#)], 448n [Pg. 448 is part of [Doc. 192](#)], 613–616 [Pg. 613 is part of [Doc. 267](#)], 956n [Pg. 956 includes portions of [Doc. 412](#) and [Doc. 413](#)]

Baghdad Pact, 63–65 [Pgs. 63–65 include portions of [Doc. 42](#) and [Doc. 43](#)], 69 [Pg. 69 is part of [Doc. 43](#)], 98 [Pg. 98 is part of [Doc. 47](#)], 267 [Pg. 267 includes portions of [Doc. 108](#) and [Doc. 109](#)], 294 [Pg. 294 is part of [Doc. 126](#)], 314 [Pg. 314 is part of [Doc. 134](#)], 331 [Pg. 331 includes portions of [Doc. 144](#) and [Doc. 145](#)], 372–374 [Pgs. 372–374 include portions of [Doc. 158](#) and [Doc. 159](#)], 390 [Pg. 390 is part of [Doc. 163](#)], 440 [Pg. 440 includes portions of [Doc. 185](#) and [Doc. 186](#)], 540 [Pg. 540 is part of [Doc. 241](#)]

Eisenhower Doctrine, 440 [Pg. 440 includes portions of [Doc. 185](#) and [Doc. 186](#)], 475–477 [Pgs. 475–477 include portions of [Doc. 205](#), [Doc. 206](#), and [Doc. 207](#)], 535 [Pg. 535 is part of [Doc. 238](#)]

Iran, 678–679 [Pg. 678 is part of [Doc. 286](#)], 684 [Pg. 684 is part of [Doc. 289](#)], 696–697 [Pgs. 696–697 include portions of [Doc. 291](#) and

[Doc. 292](#)], 708 [Pg. 708 includes portions of [Doc. 296](#) and [Doc. 297](#)], 739–740 [Pgs. 739–740 include portions of [Doc. 310](#) and [Doc. 311](#)], 794 [Pg. 794 is part of [Doc. 344](#)], 896 [Pg. 896 is part of [Doc. 391](#)], 908–910 [Pgs. 908–910 include portions of [Doc. 392](#) and [Doc. 393](#)]

Iraq, 121 [Pg. 121 is part of [Doc. 51](#)], 1011 [Pg. 1011 is part of [Doc. 436](#)], 1014ⁿ [Pg. 1014 includes portions of [Doc. 438](#) and [Doc. 439](#)]

Regional defense, 52–53 [Pg. 52 is part of [Doc. 35](#)], 63–74 [Pgs. 63–74 include portions of [Doc. 42](#), [Doc. 43](#), and [Doc. 44](#)], 98–103 [Pgs. 98–103 include portions of [Doc. 47](#), [Doc. 48](#), and [Doc. 49](#)], 130 [Pg. 130 is part of [Doc. 56](#)], 145 [Pg. 145 is part of [Doc. 60](#)], 632–633 [Pg. 632 is part of [Doc. 270](#)]

State–Defense Working Group, 52–53 [Pg. 52 is part of [Doc. 35](#)], 63–74 [Pgs. 63–74 include portions of [Doc. 42](#), [Doc. 43](#), and [Doc. 44](#)], 98–103 [Pgs. 98–103 include portions of [Doc. 47](#), [Doc. 48](#), and [Doc. 49](#)], 127–129 [Pgs. 127–129 include portions of [Doc. 54](#), [Doc. 55](#), and [Doc. 56](#)], 208 [Pg. 208 is part of [Doc. 84](#)]

DeSeabra, A. José, 584 [Pg. 584 is part of [Doc. 262](#)], 945 [Pg. 945 is part of [Doc. 407](#)]

Development Loan Fund (DLF), 644–645 [Pg. 644 is part of [Doc. 270](#)], 662 [Pg. 662 includes portions of [Doc. 277](#) and [Doc. 278](#)]

Dewey, Thomas E., 479 [Pg. 479 is part of [Doc. 209](#)], 481 [Pg. 481 is part of [Doc. 209](#)]

Dickson, Air Marshal Sir William, 257 [Pg. 257 is part of [Doc. 101](#)], 265 [Pg. 265 includes portions of [Doc. 107](#) and [Doc. 108](#)]

Dillon, C. Douglas, 482 [Pg. 482 is part of [Doc. 210](#)], 558ⁿ [Pg. 558 is part of [Doc. 252](#)], 617ⁿ [Pg. 617 is part of [Doc. 268](#)], 661–663 [Pgs. 661–663 include portions of [Doc. 276](#), [Doc. 277](#), [Doc. 278](#), and [Doc. 279](#)], 667–668 [Pgs. 667–668 include portions of [Doc. 280](#) and [Doc. 281](#)], 920ⁿ [Pg. 920 includes portions of [Doc. 393](#) and [Doc. 394](#)], 921ⁿ [Pg. 921 includes portions of [Doc. 394](#) and [Doc. 395](#)],

949n [Pg. 949 is part of [Doc. 409](#)], 953 [Pg. 953 includes portions of [Doc. 410](#) and [Doc. 411](#)], 956 [Pg. 956 includes portions of [Doc. 412](#) and [Doc. 413](#)]n

Dixon, Ben F., 19n [Pg. 19 is part of [Doc. 13](#)], 20n [Pg. 20 includes portions of [Doc. 13](#) and [Doc. 14](#)], 40n [Pg. 40 includes portions of [Doc. 26](#) and [Doc. 27](#)], 59n [Pg. 59 includes portions of [Doc. 39](#) and [Doc. 40](#)], 134n [Pg. 134 is part of [Doc. 59](#)], 177n [Pg. 177 includes portions of [Doc. 71](#) and [Doc. 72](#)], 207n [Pg. 207 includes portions of [Doc. 83](#) and [Doc. 84](#)], 234 [Pg. 234 includes portions of [Doc. 92](#) and [Doc. 93](#)], 244n [Pg. 244 includes portions of [Doc. 95](#) and [Doc. 96](#)], 284n [Pg. 284 is part of [Doc. 122](#)], 312n [Pg. 312 is part of [Doc. 134](#)], 684n [Pg. 684 is part of [Doc. 289](#)], 696n [Pg. 696 includes portions of [Doc. 291](#) and [Doc. 292](#)], 698n [Pg. 698 is part of [Doc. 293](#)], 743n [Pg. 743 is part of [Doc. 313](#)], 745n [Pg. 745 is part of [Doc. 314](#)]

Baghdad Pact, 115–116 [Pg. 115 is part of [Doc. 51](#)]

Near East:

Soviet policy toward, 216 [Pg. 216 includes portions of [Doc. 90](#) and [Doc. 91](#)], 228 [Pg. 228 includes portions of [Doc. 91](#) and [Doc. 92](#)]

U.S. military aid to, 120–121 [Pg. 120 is part of [Doc. 51](#)]

Regional defense, 63n [Pg. 63 includes portions of [Doc. 42](#) and [Doc. 43](#)], 112 [Pg. 112 is part of [Doc. 51](#)], 127 [Pg. 127 includes portions of [Doc. 54](#) and [Doc. 55](#)], 135 [Pg. 135 is part of [Doc. 60](#)]

Dorman, John, 583n [Pg. 583 is part of [Doc. 261](#)], 1069 [Pg. 1069 is part of [Doc. 464](#)]

Duke, Sir Charles Beresford, 37 [Pg. 37 is part of [Doc. 25](#)]

Dulles, Allen W., 214 [Pg. 214 is part of [Doc. 88](#)], 340–341 [Pg. 340 is part of [Doc. 147](#)], 393 [Pg. 393 is part of [Doc. 165](#)], 440–441 [Pgs. 440–441 include portions of [Doc. 185](#), [Doc. 186](#), and [Doc. 187](#)], 535 [Pg. 535 is part of [Doc. 238](#)], 537–538 [Pg. 537 is part of [Doc. 239](#)], 1012–1014 [Pgs. 1012–1014 include

portions of [Doc. 437](#), [Doc. 438](#), and [Doc. 439](#)], 1058 [Pg. 1058 includes portions of [Doc. 458](#), [Doc. 459](#), and [Doc. 460](#)]

Baghdad Pact, 27 [Pg. 27 includes portions of [Doc. 18](#) and [Doc. 19](#)], 214 [Pg. 214 is part of [Doc. 88](#)], 251–252 [Pgs. 251–252 include portions of [Doc. 100](#) and [Doc. 101](#)], 780–781 [Pgs. 780–781 include portions of [Doc. 333](#), [Doc. 334](#), and [Doc. 335](#)], 785 [Pg. 785 is part of [Doc. 337](#)]

Iran, 702 [Pg. 702 is part of [Doc. 295](#)], 733 [Pg. 733 includes portions of [Doc. 307](#) and [Doc. 308](#)], 747–748 [Pgs. 747–748 include portions of [Doc. 314](#), [Doc. 315](#), and [Doc. 316](#)], 780–781 [Pgs. 780–781 include portions of [Doc. 333](#), [Doc. 334](#), and [Doc. 335](#)], 785 [Pg. 785 is part of [Doc. 337](#)]

Dulles, John Foster, 62–63 [Pgs. 62–63 include portions of [Doc. 42](#) and [Doc. 43](#)], 368n [Pg. 368 is part of [Doc. 157](#)], 730n [Pg. 730 is part of [Doc. 305](#)], 970n [Pg. 970 includes portions of [Doc. 420](#) and [Doc. 421](#)]

Algerian conflict, 655 [Pg. 655 is part of [Doc. 274](#)], 660–661 [Pgs. 660–661 include portions of [Doc. 276](#) and [Doc. 277](#)]

Arab–Israeli dispute, 10 [Pg. 10 is part of [Doc. 8](#)], 18 [Pg. 18 is part of [Doc. 12](#)], 167 [Pg. 167 is part of [Doc. 66](#)], 170–172 [Pgs. 170–172 include portions of [Doc. 68](#) and [Doc. 69](#)], 201–202 [Pg. 201 is part of [Doc. 81](#)], 470–471 [Pg. 470 is part of [Doc. 203](#)], 561 [Pg. 561 is part of [Doc. 253](#)], 654–656 [Pgs. 654–656 include portions of [Doc. 274](#) and [Doc. 275](#)], 659–660 [Pg. 659 is part of [Doc. 276](#)], 1029–1030 [Pgs. 1029–1030 include portions of [Doc. 445](#) and [Doc. 446](#)]

August 1955 speech, 62 [Pg. 62 is part of [Doc. 42](#)], 579 [Pg. 579 is part of [Doc. 260](#)], 615–616 [Pg. 615 is part of [Doc. 267](#)], 627–628 [Pg. 627 is part of [Doc. 270](#)], 659 [Pg. 659 is part of [Doc. 276](#)]

Baghdad Pact and, 9 [Pg. 9 is part of [Doc. 8](#)], 153 [Pg. 153 is part of [Doc. 62](#)], 180n [Pg. 180 includes

portions of [Doc. 74](#) and [Doc. 75](#)], 181n [Pg. 181 includes portions of [Doc. 76](#) and [Doc. 77](#)], 240–241 [Pg. 240 is part of [Doc. 94](#)]

Baghdad Pact, 10 [Pg. 10 is part of [Doc. 8](#)], 16–18 [Pgs. 16–18 include portions of [Doc. 11](#) and [Doc. 12](#)], 20–21 [Pgs. 20–21 include portions of [Doc. 13](#), [Doc. 14](#), and [Doc. 15](#)], 23n [Pg. 23 is part of [Doc. 16](#)], 29 [Pg. 29 includes portions of [Doc. 21](#) and [Doc. 22](#)], 45 [Pg. 45 is part of [Doc. 30](#)], 48 [Pg. 48 includes portions of [Doc. 32](#) and [Doc. 33](#)], 207n [Pg. 207 includes portions of [Doc. 83](#) and [Doc. 84](#)], 211 [Pg. 211 includes portions of [Doc. 85](#) and [Doc. 86](#)], 270 [Pg. 270 is part of [Doc. 111](#)], 1033 [Pg. 1033 includes portions of [Doc. 448](#) and [Doc. 449](#)]

Arab–Israeli dispute and, 9 [Pg. 9 is part of [Doc. 8](#)], 153 [Pg. 153 is part of [Doc. 62](#)], 180n [Pg. 180 includes portions of [Doc. 74](#) and [Doc. 75](#)], 181n [Pg. 181 includes portions of [Doc. 76](#) and [Doc. 77](#)], 240–241 [Pg. 240 is part of [Doc. 94](#)]

Iranian participation, 163–164 [Pg. 163 is part of [Doc. 66](#)], 169–170 [Pgs. 169–170 include portions of [Doc. 67](#) and [Doc. 68](#)], 773–775 [Pgs. 773–775 include portions of [Doc. 330](#) and [Doc. 331](#)], 780–784 [Pgs. 780–784 include portions of [Doc. 333](#), [Doc. 334](#), [Doc. 335](#), [Doc. 336](#), and [Doc. 337](#)], 784–786 [Pgs. 784–786 include portions of [Doc. 336](#), [Doc. 337](#), and [Doc. 338](#)], 808–809 [Pg. 808 is part of [Doc. 352](#)], 822 [Pg. 822 is part of [Doc. 357](#)]

Jordanian participation, 176–177 [Pgs. 176–177 include portions of [Doc. 70](#), [Doc. 71](#), and [Doc. 72](#)], 180n [Pg. 180 includes portions of [Doc. 74](#) and [Doc. 75](#)], 181n [Pg. 181 includes portions of [Doc. 76](#) and [Doc. 77](#)], 207n [Pg. 207 includes portions of [Doc. 83](#) and [Doc. 84](#)], 214 [Pg. 214 is part of [Doc. 88](#)]

U.S. economic aid to and, 241–242 [Pg. 241 is part of [Doc. 94](#)], 467–468 [Pg. 467 is part of [Doc. 203](#)]

U.S. participation, 19–20 [Pgs. 19–20 include portions of [Doc. 13](#) and [Doc. 14](#)], 216 [Pg. 216 includes portions of [Doc. 90](#) and [Doc. 91](#)], 220 [Pg. 220 is part of [Doc. 91](#)], 261n [Pg. 261 is part of [Doc. 104](#)], 268–270 [Pgs. 268–270 include portions of [Doc. 110](#) and [Doc. 111](#)], 275–276 [Pg. 275 is part of [Doc. 115](#)], 327 [Pg. 327 is part of [Doc. 143](#)], 330–331 [Pgs. 330–331 include portions of [Doc. 143](#), [Doc. 144](#), and [Doc. 145](#)], 369–371 [Pgs. 369–371 include portions of [Doc. 157](#) and [Doc. 158](#)], 387 [Pg. 387 includes portions of [Doc. 161](#) and [Doc. 162](#)], 391 [Pg. 391 is part of [Doc. 164](#)], 394 [Pg. 394 is part of [Doc. 165](#)], 539 [Pg. 539 includes portions of [Doc. 239](#) and [Doc. 240](#)]

Arab–Israeli dispute and, 141 [Pg. 141 is part of [Doc. 60](#)], 152 [Pg. 152 is part of [Doc. 61](#)], 220 [Pg. 220 is part of [Doc. 91](#)], 706 [Pg. 706 is part of [Doc. 296](#)], 800 [Pg. 800 is part of [Doc. 348](#)]

British position, 205 [Pg. 205 is part of [Doc. 83](#)], 243–245 [Pgs. 243–245 include portions of [Doc. 95](#) and [Doc. 96](#)], 250–251 [Pgs. 250–251 include portions of [Doc. 99](#) and [Doc. 100](#)], 429 [Pg. 429 includes portions of [Doc. 178](#) and [Doc. 179](#)]

Coordination, 128 [Pg. 128 is part of [Doc. 55](#)], 282 [Pg. 282 includes portions of [Doc. 120](#) and [Doc. 121](#)], 284–285 [Pgs. 284–285 include portions of [Doc. 122](#) and [Doc. 123](#)]

Defense Department position, 267 [Pg. 267 includes portions of [Doc. 108](#) and [Doc. 109](#)], 294–295 [Pgs. 294–295 include portions of [Doc. 126](#) and [Doc. 127](#)]

Iranian position, 797 [Pg. 797 includes portions of [Doc. 345](#) and [Doc. 346](#)]

Israeli security guarantee and, 174–175 [Pg. 174 is part of [Doc. 70](#)], 240–241 [Pg. 240 is part of [Doc. 94](#)], 370–371 [Pg. 370 is part of [Doc. 158](#)], 390 [Pg. 390 is part of [Doc. 163](#)], 399–400 [Pg. 399 is part of [Doc. 169](#)], 674–675 [Pgs. 674–675 include portions of [Doc. 284](#) and [Doc. 285](#)]

Saudi position, 657 [Pg. 657 is part of [Doc. 276](#)], 659–660 [Pg. 659 is part of [Doc. 276](#)]

Bandung Conference, 43–44 [Pgs. 43–44 include portions of [Doc. 28](#) and [Doc. 29](#)]

Bermuda Conference, 462–474 [Pgs. 462–474 include portions of [Doc. 199](#), [Doc. 200](#), [Doc. 201](#), [Doc. 202](#), [Doc. 203](#), [Doc. 204](#), and [Doc. 205](#)], 547 [Pg. 547 is part of [Doc. 246](#)]

Egypt, 43–44 [Pgs. 43–44 include portions of [Doc. 28](#) and [Doc. 29](#)], 46–48 [Pgs. 46–48 include portions of [Doc. 31](#), [Doc. 32](#), and [Doc. 33](#)], 159 [Pg. 159 is part of [Doc. 66](#)], 163–164 [Pg. 163 is part of [Doc. 66](#)], 166 [Pg. 166 is part of [Doc. 66](#)], 200 [Pg. 200 includes portions of [Doc. 80](#) and [Doc. 81](#)], 202–203 [Pgs. 202–203 include portions of [Doc. 81](#) and [Doc. 82](#)], 244 [Pg. 244 includes portions of [Doc. 95](#) and [Doc. 96](#)], 270 [Pg. 270 is part of [Doc. 111](#)], 780–782 [Pgs. 780–782 include portions of [Doc. 333](#), [Doc. 334](#), [Doc. 335](#), and [Doc. 336](#)]

Egyptian–Syrian–Saudi (ESS) Pact, 45 [Pg. 45 is part of [Doc. 30](#)]

Eisenhower Doctrine, 395–398 [Pgs. 395–398 include portions of [Doc. 165](#), [Doc. 166](#), [Doc. 167](#), and [Doc. 168](#)], 410 [Pg. 410 is part of [Doc. 171](#)], 412–413 [Pgs. 412–413 include portions of [Doc. 171](#), [Doc. 172](#), and [Doc. 173](#)], 415–416 [Pg. 415 is part of [Doc. 175](#)], 419 [Pg.

419 includes portions of [Doc. 176](#) and [Doc. 177](#)], 430–437 [Pgs. 430–437 include portions of [Doc. 180](#), [Doc. 181](#), [Doc. 182](#), and [Doc. 183](#)], 445–447 [Pgs. 445–447 include portions of [Doc. 189](#), [Doc. 190](#), and [Doc. 191](#)]

Richards mission, 447 [Pg. 447 is part of [Doc. 191](#)], 452n [Pg. 452 includes portions of [Doc. 193](#) and [Doc. 194](#)], 453n [Pg. 453 is part of [Doc. 194](#)], 454–457 [Pgs. 454–457 include portions of [Doc. 194](#) and [Doc. 195](#)], 474–475 [Pgs. 474–475 include portions of [Doc. 204](#), [Doc. 205](#), and [Doc. 206](#)], 478 [Pg. 478 includes portions of [Doc. 207](#) and [Doc. 208](#)], 484 [Pg. 484 includes portions of [Doc. 210](#) and [Doc. 211](#)], 486–488 [Pgs. 486–488 include portions of [Doc. 212](#), [Doc. 213](#), and [Doc. 214](#)], 490–491 [Pgs. 490–491 include portions of [Doc. 215](#) and [Doc. 216](#)], 493–495 [Pgs. 493–495 include portions of [Doc. 217](#), [Doc. 218](#), and [Doc. 219](#)], 519–525 [Pgs. 519–525 include portions of [Doc. 224](#), [Doc. 225](#), [Doc. 226](#), [Doc. 227](#), [Doc. 228](#), [Doc. 229](#), and [Doc. 230](#)], 533–538 [Pgs. 533–538 include portions of [Doc. 236](#), [Doc. 237](#), [Doc. 238](#), and [Doc. 239](#)]

Illness, 322n [Pg. 322 includes portions of [Doc. 138](#) and [Doc. 139](#)]

Iran:

Soviet bloc, relations with, 750n [Pg. 750 includes portions of [Doc. 316](#) and [Doc. 317](#)], 754–755 [Pgs. 754–755 include portions of [Doc. 318](#), [Doc. 319](#), and [Doc. 320](#)], 759–761 [Pgs. 759–761 include portions of [Doc. 321](#), [Doc. 322](#), and [Doc. 323](#)]

United States, relations with, 883 [Pg. 883 is part of [Doc. 384](#)], 920n [Pg. 920 includes portions of [Doc. 393](#) and [Doc. 394](#)], 945 [Pg. 945 is part of [Doc. 407](#)]

U.S. economic aid to, 241–242 [Pg. 241 is part of [Doc. 94](#)], 776–778 [Pgs. 776–778 include portions of

[Doc. 331](#), [Doc. 332](#), and [Doc. 333](#)], 798–799 [Pgs. 798–799 include portions of [Doc. 346](#), [Doc. 347](#), and [Doc. 348](#)], 808–811 [Pg. 808 is part of [Doc. 352](#)], 851–853 [Pgs. 851–853 include portions of [Doc. 367](#), [Doc. 368](#), and [Doc. 369](#)], 859–861 [Pgs. 859–861 include portions of [Doc. 372](#), [Doc. 373](#), and [Doc. 374](#)], 946–948 [Pgs. 946–948 include portions of [Doc. 407](#) and [Doc. 408](#)], 956–958 [Pgs. 956–958 include portions of [Doc. 412](#) and [Doc. 413](#)]

U.S. military aid to, 700 [Pg. 700 includes portions of [Doc. 293](#) and [Doc. 294](#)], 732 [Pg. 732 is part of [Doc. 306](#)], 739 [Pg. 739 is part of [Doc. 310](#)], 745–747 [Pgs. 745–747 include portions of [Doc. 314](#) and [Doc. 315](#)], 753 [Pg. 753 is part of [Doc. 318](#)], 755–757 [Pgs. 755–757 include portions of [Doc. 319](#), [Doc. 320](#), and [Doc. 321](#)], 759–760 [Pgs. 759–760 include portions of [Doc. 321](#) and [Doc. 322](#)], 800–802 [Pgs. 800–802 include portions of [Doc. 348](#) and [Doc. 349](#)], 894–898 [Pg. 894 is part of [Doc. 391](#)], 943–944 [Pg. 943 is part of [Doc. 406](#)], 949 [Pg. 949 is part of [Doc. 409](#)]

U.S. policy toward, 841 [Pg. 841 is part of [Doc. 361](#)], 847 [Pg. 847 is part of [Doc. 365](#)], 889–890 [Pgs. 889–890 include portions of [Doc. 388](#) and [Doc. 389](#)]

Iraq, 160 [Pg. 160 is part of [Doc. 66](#)], 1029–1037 [Pgs. 1029–1037 include portions of [Doc. 445](#), [Doc. 446](#), [Doc. 447](#), [Doc. 448](#), [Doc. 449](#), [Doc. 450](#), [Doc. 451](#), and [Doc. 452](#)]

U.S. military aid to, 174 [Pg. 174 is part of [Doc. 70](#)], 242 [Pg. 242 is part of [Doc. 94](#)], 251–252 [Pgs. 251–252 include portions of [Doc. 100](#) and [Doc. 101](#)], 366 [Pg. 366 is part of [Doc. 156](#)], 469 [Pg. 469 is part of [Doc. 203](#)], 971 [Pg. 971 includes portions of [Doc. 422](#) and [Doc. 423](#)], 976–977 [Pgs. 976–977 include portions of [Doc. 424](#), [Doc. 425](#), and [Doc. 426](#)], 1011–1012 [Pgs. 1011–1012 include portions of [Doc. 436](#), [Doc. 437](#), and [Doc. 438](#)], 1036–1039 [Pgs. 1036–1039 include portions of [Doc.](#)

[452](#), [Doc. 453](#), and [Doc. 454](#)], 1069 [Pg. 1069 is part of [Doc. 464](#)]

Karachi statement, 304–305 [Pg. 304 is part of [Doc. 131](#)]

Lloyd, correspondence with, 1011 [Pg. 1011 is part of [Doc. 436](#)], 1068–1069 [Pgs. 1068–1069 include portions of [Doc. 462](#), [Doc. 463](#), and [Doc. 464](#)]

Macmillan, correspondence with, 205–207 [Pgs. 205–207 include portions of [Doc. 83](#) and [Doc. 84](#)]

Middle East Development Organization, 586 [Pg. 586 includes portions of [Doc. 263](#) and [Doc. 264](#)], 618 [Pg. 618 includes portions of [Doc. 268](#) and [Doc. 269](#)]

Near East:

Soviet bloc policy toward, 172–173 [Pg. 172 is part of [Doc. 69](#)], 175–176 [Pgs. 175–176 include portions of [Doc. 70](#) and [Doc. 71](#)], 200–201 [Pgs. 200–201 include portions of [Doc. 80](#) and [Doc. 81](#)], 583 [Pg. 583 is part of [Doc. 261](#)], 652–654 [Pg. 652 is part of [Doc. 274](#)], 941–943 [Pgs. 941–943 include portions of [Doc. 405](#) and [Doc. 406](#)]

U.S.–British cooperation, 132 [Pg. 132 includes portions of [Doc. 56](#) and [Doc. 57](#)], 134 [Pg. 134 is part of [Doc. 59](#)], 298–299 [Pgs. 298–299 include portions of [Doc. 128](#), [Doc. 129](#), and [Doc. 130](#)], 399–401 [Pgs. 399–401 include portions of [Doc. 169](#) and [Doc. 170](#)], 462 [Pg. 462 includes portions of [Doc. 199](#) and [Doc. 200](#)], 464–473 [Pgs. 464–473 include portions of [Doc. 202](#), [Doc. 203](#), and [Doc. 204](#)], 539 [Pg. 539 includes portions of [Doc. 239](#) and [Doc. 240](#)], 547–548 [Pgs. 547–548 include portions of [Doc. 246](#) and [Doc. 247](#)], 550n [Pg. 550 is part of [Doc. 247](#)], 797 [Pg. 797 includes portions of [Doc. 345](#) and [Doc. 346](#)]

U.S. economic aid to, 308 [Pg. 308 is part of [Doc. 132](#)], 584–585 [Pgs. 584–585 include portions of [Doc. 262](#) and [Doc. 263](#)], 661–669 [Pgs. 661–669 include portions of [Doc. 276](#), [Doc. 277](#), [Doc. 278](#), [Doc. 279](#), [Doc. 280](#), [Doc. 281](#), and [Doc. 282](#)]

U.S. military aid to, 159–163 [Pg. 159 is part of [Doc. 66](#)], 165–166 [Pg. 165 is part of [Doc. 66](#)], 170 [Pg. 170 is part of [Doc. 68](#)], 174 [Pg. 174 is part of [Doc. 70](#)], 207 [Pg. 207 includes portions of [Doc. 83](#) and [Doc. 84](#)], 211–213 [Pgs. 211–213 include portions of [Doc. 85](#), [Doc. 86](#), and [Doc. 87](#)]

U.S. policy toward, 264 [Pg. 264 includes portions of [Doc. 105](#), [Doc. 106](#), and [Doc. 107](#)], 308 [Pg. 308 is part of [Doc. 132](#)], 367 [Pg. 367 is part of [Doc. 156](#)], 376 [Pg. 376 includes portions of [Doc. 159](#) and [Doc. 160](#)], 391 [Pg. 391 is part of [Doc. 164](#)], 393–394 [Pg. 393 is part of [Doc. 165](#)], 441 [Pg. 441 includes portions of [Doc. 186](#) and [Doc. 187](#)]

Oil resources, 308–309 [Pg. 308 is part of [Doc. 132](#)], 464–465 [Pg. 464 is part of [Doc. 202](#)], 539 [Pg. 539 includes portions of [Doc. 239](#) and [Doc. 240](#)], 547–548 [Pgs. 547–548 include portions of [Doc. 246](#) and [Doc. 247](#)], 550ⁿ [Pg. 550 is part of [Doc. 247](#)], 555–556 [Pgs. 555–556 include portions of [Doc. 249](#), [Doc. 250](#), and [Doc. 251](#)], 558 [Pg. 558 is part of [Doc. 252](#)], 585–586 [Pgs. 585–586 include portions of [Doc. 262](#), [Doc. 263](#), and [Doc. 264](#)], 617 [Pg. 617 is part of [Doc. 268](#)]

Pakistan, 556–557 [Pgs. 556–557 include portions of [Doc. 250](#) and [Doc. 251](#)], 559–563 [Pgs. 559–563 include portions of [Doc. 253](#) and [Doc. 254](#)]

Regional defense, 21–22 [Pgs. 21–22 include portions of [Doc. 14](#) and [Doc. 15](#)], 46–48 [Pgs. 46–48 include portions of [Doc. 31](#), [Doc. 32](#), and [Doc. 33](#)], 51 [Pg. 51 includes portions of [Doc. 34](#) and [Doc. 35](#)],

132 [Pg. 132 includes portions of [Doc. 56](#) and [Doc. 57](#)], 134 [Pg. 134 is part of [Doc. 59](#)]

Saudi Arabia, 159–160 [Pg. 159 is part of [Doc. 66](#)], 170 [Pg. 170 is part of [Doc. 68](#)], 214 [Pg. 214 is part of [Doc. 88](#)], 254 [Pg. 254 is part of [Doc. 101](#)], 446 [Pg. 446 includes portions of [Doc. 189](#), [Doc. 190](#), and [Doc. 191](#)], 538 [Pg. 538 is part of [Doc. 239](#)], 561–562 [Pg. 561 is part of [Doc. 253](#)], 1023 [Pg. 1023 includes portions of [Doc. 442](#) and [Doc. 443](#)], 1033 [Pg. 1033 includes portions of [Doc. 448](#) and [Doc. 449](#)]

Shah of Iran, correspondence with, 808–811 [Pg. 808 is part of [Doc. 352](#)]

Suez crisis, 471 [Pg. 471 is part of [Doc. 203](#)], 844 [Pg. 844 includes portions of [Doc. 362](#) and [Doc. 363](#)]

Syria, 160 [Pg. 160 is part of [Doc. 66](#)], 658 [Pg. 658 is part of [Doc. 276](#)]

Dunn, Milner L., 889n [Pg. 889 is part of [Doc. 388](#)]

Durand Line, 277 [Pg. 277 is part of [Doc. 116](#)], 300 [Pg. 300 is part of [Doc. 130](#)]

Eakens, Robert H.S., 711 [Pg. 711 is part of [Doc. 299](#)], 712n [Pg. 712 includes portions of [Doc. 299](#) and [Doc. 300](#)], 723 [Pg. 723 is part of [Doc. 303](#)], 738n [Pg. 738 includes portions of [Doc. 308](#) and [Doc. 309](#)]

Eban, Abba, 9–10 [Pg. 9 is part of [Doc. 8](#)], 363–364 [Pgs. 363–364 include portions of [Doc. 153](#) and [Doc. 154](#)], 537 [Pg. 537 is part of [Doc. 239](#)]

Ebtehaj, Abol Hasan, 727–729 [Pgs. 727–729 include portions of [Doc. 304](#) and [Doc. 305](#)], 776n [Pg. 776 includes portions of [Doc. 331](#) and [Doc. 332](#)], 777n [Pg. 777 is part of [Doc. 332](#)], 819 [Pg. 819 is part of [Doc. 356](#)], 845–846 [Pgs. 845–846 include portions of [Doc. 363](#) and [Doc. 364](#)], 848–849 [Pgs. 848–849 include portions of [Doc. 365](#) and [Doc. 366](#)], 851–854 [Pgs. 851–854 include portions of [Doc. 367](#), [Doc. 368](#), [Doc. 369](#), and [Doc. 370](#)], 880 [Pg. 880 includes

portions of [Doc. 381](#) and [Doc. 382](#)], 912 [Pg. 912 is part of [Doc. 393](#)], 915 [Pg. 915 is part of [Doc. 393](#)], 929 [Pg. 929 is part of [Doc. 399](#)]

Eddleman, Lt. Gen. Clyde D., 669–670 [Pgs. 669–670 include portions of [Doc. 281](#), [Doc. 282](#), and [Doc. 283](#)]

Eden, Sir Anthony, 21–22 [Pgs. 21–22 include portions of [Doc. 14](#) and [Doc. 15](#)], 52 [Pg. 52 is part of [Doc. 35](#)], 201 [Pg. 201 is part of [Doc. 81](#)], 243–244 [Pgs. 243–244 include portions of [Doc. 95](#) and [Doc. 96](#)], 290 [Pg. 290 is part of [Doc. 124](#)], 299–300 [Pgs. 299–300 include portions of [Doc. 129](#) and [Doc. 130](#)], 797 [Pg. 797 includes portions of [Doc. 345](#) and [Doc. 346](#)], 798n [Pg. 798 includes portions of [Doc. 346](#) and [Doc. 347](#)], 992n [Pg. 992 includes portions of [Doc. 429](#) and [Doc. 430](#)]

Baghdad Pact, 46 [Pg. 46 includes portions of [Doc. 31](#) and [Doc. 32](#)], 48–49 [Pgs. 48–49 include portions of [Doc. 32](#) and [Doc. 33](#)], 152 [Pg. 152 is part of [Doc. 61](#)], 205 [Pg. 205 is part of [Doc. 83](#)], 240 [Pg. 240 is part of [Doc. 94](#)], 242–243 [Pgs. 242–243 include portions of [Doc. 94](#) and [Doc. 95](#)], 249–250 [Pgs. 249–250 include portions of [Doc. 98](#) and [Doc. 99](#)], 253 [Pg. 253 is part of [Doc. 101](#)], 262–264 [Pgs. 262–264 include portions of [Doc. 105](#), [Doc. 106](#), and [Doc. 107](#)]

Edgerton, Glen E., 845n [Pg. 845 includes portions of [Doc. 363](#) and [Doc. 364](#)]

Effendi, Mohammad, 24 [Pg. 24 is part of [Doc. 16](#)]

Egypt (see also [Egyptian–Syrian–Saudi? \(ESS\) Pact](#); Suez crisis; *Egypt and Egyptian subheadings under other subjects*):

Alternate pipeline proposals, 516–517 [Pg. 516 is part of [Doc. 223](#)], 555 [Pg. 555 includes portions of [Doc. 249](#) and [Doc. 250](#)]

Aqaba Gulf, 562 [Pg. 562 is part of [Doc. 253](#)]

Arab States, relations with, 75 [Pg. 75 is part of [Doc. 45](#)], 78 [Pg. 78 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 81 [Pg. 81 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 85 [Pg. 85 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 186 [Pg. 186 is part of [Doc. 78](#)], 328 [Pg. 328 is part of [Doc. 143](#)], 596–597 [Pg. 596 is part of [Doc. 266](#)]

British military aid to, 119 [Pg. 119 is part of [Doc. 51](#)]

Economic situation, 222 [Pg. 222 is part of [Doc. 91](#)], 427 [Pg. 427 is part of [Doc. 178](#)], 625 [Pg. 625 is part of [Doc. 270](#)]

Iran, relations with, 876 [Pg. 876 is part of [Doc. 381](#)]

Iraq, relations with, 124 [Pg. 124 includes portions of [Doc. 52](#) and [Doc. 53](#)], 998 [Pg. 998 is part of [Doc. 435](#)], 1007 [Pg. 1007 is part of [Doc. 435](#)], 1022–1023 [Pgs. 1022–1023 include portions of [Doc. 442](#) and [Doc. 443](#)], 1032 [Pg. 1032 includes portions of [Doc. 447](#) and [Doc. 448](#)], 1056 [Pg. 1056 is part of [Doc. 458](#)]

Jordan, relations with, 221 [Pg. 221 is part of [Doc. 91](#)], 421 [Pg. 421 is part of [Doc. 178](#)], 518–519 [Pgs. 518–519 include portions of [Doc. 224](#) and [Doc. 225](#)]

Kuwait, relations with, 507 [Pg. 507 is part of [Doc. 221](#)]

Lebanon, relations with, 362 [Pg. 362 is part of [Doc. 153](#)], 426 [Pg. 426 is part of [Doc. 178](#)]

Neutralism, 17 [Pg. 17 is part of [Doc. 12](#)], 113 [Pg. 113 is part of [Doc. 51](#)], 189 [Pg. 189 is part of [Doc. 78](#)]

Political situation, 105 [Pg. 105 is part of [Doc. 49](#)], 507 [Pg. 507 is part of [Doc. 221](#)], 512–513 [Pg. 512 is part of [Doc. 222](#)], 594 [Pg. 594 includes portions of [Doc. 265](#) and [Doc. 266](#)], 599 [Pg. 599 is part of [Doc. 266](#)], 610–611 [Pg. 610 is part of [Doc. 266](#)]

Pushtunistan dispute, 57 [Pg. 57 is part of [Doc. 38](#)], 59 [Pg. 59 includes portions of [Doc. 39](#) and [Doc. 40](#)]

Regional defense, role in, 29–30 [Pgs. 29–30 include portions of [Doc. 21](#) and [Doc. 22](#)], 46–48 [Pgs. 46–48 include portions of [Doc. 31](#), [Doc. 32](#), and [Doc. 33](#)]

Saudi Arabia, relations with, 23 [Pg. 23 is part of [Doc. 16](#)], 255–256 [Pg. 255 is part of [Doc. 101](#)], 290 [Pg. 290 is part of [Doc.](#)

[124](#)], 362 [Pg. 362 is part of [Doc. 153](#)], 394 [Pg. 394 is part of [Doc. 165](#)], 421–422 [Pg. 421 is part of [Doc. 178](#)]

Soviet bloc military aid to, 136 [Pg. 136 is part of [Doc. 60](#)], 165–166 [Pg. 165 is part of [Doc. 66](#)], 170 [Pg. 170 is part of [Doc. 68](#)], 179 [Pg. 179 includes portions of [Doc. 73](#) and [Doc. 74](#)], 202–203 [Pgs. 202–203 include portions of [Doc. 81](#) and [Doc. 82](#)], 231 [Pg. 231 is part of [Doc. 92](#)], 383 [Pg. 383 is part of [Doc. 161](#)], 421 [Pg. 421 is part of [Doc. 178](#)], 602 [Pg. 602 is part of [Doc. 266](#)], 652–654 [Pg. 652 is part of [Doc. 274](#)]

Arab–Israeli dispute and, 181 [Pg. 181 includes portions of [Doc. 76](#) and [Doc. 77](#)], 186–187 [Pg. 186 is part of [Doc. 78](#)], 627 [Pg. 627 is part of [Doc. 270](#)], 1029 [Pg. 1029 is part of [Doc. 445](#)]

Arab States positions, 598 [Pg. 598 is part of [Doc. 266](#)], 608 [Pg. 608 is part of [Doc. 266](#)]

Baghdad Pact and, 91 [Pg. 91 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 159 [Pg. 159 is part of [Doc. 66](#)], 163–164 [Pg. 163 is part of [Doc. 66](#)], 185 [Pg. 185 is part of [Doc. 78](#)], 202 [Pg. 202 is part of [Doc. 81](#)], 229 [Pg. 229 is part of [Doc. 92](#)], 270 [Pg. 270 is part of [Doc. 111](#)], 402 [Pg. 402 is part of [Doc. 170](#)], 404 [Pg. 404 is part of [Doc. 170](#)], 406 [Pg. 406 is part of [Doc. 170](#)], 780–782 [Pgs. 780–782 include portions of [Doc. 333](#), [Doc. 334](#), [Doc. 335](#), and [Doc. 336](#)], 785 [Pg. 785 is part of [Doc. 337](#)], 787 [Pg. 787 is part of [Doc. 338](#)], 822 [Pg. 822 is part of [Doc. 357](#)]

British position, 106 [Pg. 106 is part of [Doc. 49](#)], 229–230 [Pg. 229 is part of [Doc. 92](#)], 253 [Pg. 253 is part of [Doc. 101](#)], 471 [Pg. 471 is part of [Doc. 203](#)]

Iraqi position, 160 [Pg. 160 is part of [Doc. 66](#)], 1029 [Pg. 1029 is part of [Doc. 445](#)], 1041 [Pg. 1041 is part of [Doc. 455](#)]

Middle East Charter proposal and, 379 [Pg. 379 is part of [Doc. 160](#)], 384 [Pg. 384 is part of [Doc. 161](#)]

National Intelligence Estimates, 182–183 [Pgs. 182–183 include portions of [Doc. 77](#) and [Doc. 78](#)], 185–189 [Pg. 185 is part of [Doc. 78](#)], 595 [Pg. 595 is part of [Doc. 266](#)]

Soviet position, 163 [Pg. 163 is part of [Doc. 66](#)], 200 [Pg. 200 includes portions of [Doc. 80](#) and [Doc. 81](#)]

U.S. aid and, 146 [Pg. 146 is part of [Doc. 60](#)], 186 [Pg. 186 is part of [Doc. 78](#)], 229 [Pg. 229 is part of [Doc. 92](#)], 634 [Pg. 634 is part of [Doc. 270](#)]

U.S. sanctions, 173 [Pg. 173 is part of [Doc. 69](#)], 193 [Pg. 193 is part of [Doc. 78](#)]

Soviet bloc, relations with, 136–137 [Pg. 136 is part of [Doc. 60](#)], 189 [Pg. 189 is part of [Doc. 78](#)], 237 [Pg. 237 is part of [Doc. 93](#)], 296 [Pg. 296 is part of [Doc. 127](#)], 357 [Pg. 357 is part of [Doc. 151](#)], 421 [Pg. 421 is part of [Doc. 178](#)], 511–512 [Pg. 511 is part of [Doc. 222](#)], 595 [Pg. 595 is part of [Doc. 266](#)], 603–605 [Pg. 603 is part of [Doc. 266](#)]

Sudan, relations with, 86 [Pg. 86 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 184 [Pg. 184 is part of [Doc. 78](#)], 188 [Pg. 188 is part of [Doc. 78](#)], 194 [Pg. 194 is part of [Doc. 78](#)], 255 [Pg. 255 is part of [Doc. 101](#)], 641 [Pg. 641 is part of [Doc. 270](#)]

Suez crisis (see also [United Kingdom, relations with below](#)), 308 [Pg. 308 is part of [Doc. 132](#)], 311 [Pg. 311 is part of [Doc. 133](#)], 498–499 [Pg. 498 is part of [Doc. 220](#)], 516–517 [Pg. 516 is part of [Doc. 223](#)], 555 [Pg. 555 includes portions of [Doc. 249](#) and [Doc. 250](#)], 604–605 [Pg. 604 is part of [Doc. 266](#)], 611 [Pg. 611 is part of [Doc. 266](#)], 646 [Pg. 646 is part of [Doc. 270](#)]

Syria, relations with, 123 [Pg. 123 is part of [Doc. 52](#)], 598 [Pg. 598 is part of [Doc. 266](#)], 636 [Pg. 636 is part of [Doc. 270](#)], 1008 [Pg. 1008 is part of [Doc. 435](#)]

Turkey, relations with, 17 [Pg. 17 is part of [Doc. 12](#)], 43 [Pg. 43 includes portions of [Doc. 28](#) and [Doc. 29](#)]

United Kingdom, relations with (see also [Suez crisis above](#)), 255 [Pg. 255 is part of [Doc. 101](#)], 549 [Pg. 549 is part of [Doc. 247](#)]

Anglo–Egyptian Suez Canal Zone Base Agreement, 1954, 11 [Pg. 11 is part of [Doc. 9](#)], 14 [Pg. 14 is part of [Doc. 10](#)], 36 [Pg. 36 is part of [Doc. 24](#)], 67 [Pg. 67 is part of [Doc. 43](#)], 80 [Pg. 80 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 85 [Pg. 85 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 93 [Pg. 93 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 95 [Pg. 95 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 255 [Pg. 255 is part of [Doc. 101](#)]

United States, relations with, 39 [Pg. 39 is part of [Doc. 26](#)], 43–44 [Pgs. 43–44 include portions of [Doc. 28](#) and [Doc. 29](#)], 46–48 [Pgs. 46–48 include portions of [Doc. 31](#), [Doc. 32](#), and [Doc. 33](#)], 85–87 [Pg. 85 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 123 [Pg. 123 is part of [Doc. 52](#)], 212 [Pg. 212 includes portions of [Doc. 86](#) and [Doc. 87](#)], 348 [Pg. 348 is part of [Doc. 148](#)], 395 [Pg. 395 includes portions of [Doc. 165](#) and [Doc. 166](#)], 426 [Pg. 426 is part of [Doc. 178](#)], 518 [Pg. 518 is part of [Doc. 224](#)], 521 [Pg. 521 includes portions of [Doc. 226](#) and [Doc. 227](#)], 610 [Pg. 610 is part of [Doc. 266](#)]

Baghdad Pact, 4–5 [Pgs. 4–5 include portions of [Doc. 3](#), [Doc. 4](#), and [Doc. 5](#)], 50–51 [Pgs. 50–51 include portions of [Doc. 33](#), [Doc. 34](#), and [Doc. 35](#)], 82 [Pg. 82 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 89 [Pg. 89 is part of [Doc. 46](#)]

U.S.–British policy toward, 221–222 [Pg. 221 is part of [Doc. 91](#)], 231 [Pg. 231 is part of [Doc. 92](#)], 243–244 [Pgs. 243–244 include portions of [Doc. 95](#) and [Doc. 96](#)], 249 [Pg. 249 is part of [Doc. 98](#)], 251 [Pg. 251 is part of [Doc. 100](#)], 254 [Pg. 254 is part of [Doc.](#)

[101](#)], 507 [Pg. 507 is part of [Doc. 221](#)], 511–513 [Pg. 511 is part of [Doc. 222](#)]

U.S. economic aid to, 85 [Pg. 85 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 347 [Pg. 347 is part of [Doc. 148](#)], 423 [Pg. 423 is part of [Doc. 178](#)], 513 [Pg. 513 is part of [Doc. 222](#)]

Aswan Dam, 184 [Pg. 184 is part of [Doc. 78](#)], 188 [Pg. 188 is part of [Doc. 78](#)], 194 [Pg. 194 is part of [Doc. 78](#)], 227–229 [Pgs. 227–229 include portions of [Doc. 91](#) and [Doc. 92](#)], 232–233 [Pg. 232 is part of [Doc. 92](#)], 241 [Pg. 241 is part of [Doc. 94](#)], 244 [Pg. 244 includes portions of [Doc. 95](#) and [Doc. 96](#)], 248 [Pg. 248 is part of [Doc. 97](#)], 262 [Pg. 262 is part of [Doc. 105](#)], 300 [Pg. 300 is part of [Doc. 130](#)], 304 [Pg. 304 is part of [Doc. 131](#)], 634 [Pg. 634 is part of [Doc. 270](#)]

Soviet bloc military aid and, 229 [Pg. 229 is part of [Doc. 92](#)], 634 [Pg. 634 is part of [Doc. 270](#)]

U.S. military aid to, 14 [Pg. 14 is part of [Doc. 10](#)], 49 [Pg. 49 is part of [Doc. 33](#)], 68 [Pg. 68 is part of [Doc. 43](#)], 96 [Pg. 96 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 132 [Pg. 132 includes portions of [Doc. 56](#) and [Doc. 57](#)], 146 [Pg. 146 is part of [Doc. 60](#)], 186 [Pg. 186 is part of [Doc. 78](#)], 349 [Pg. 349 is part of [Doc. 148](#)]

U.S. policy toward, 378–379 [Pg. 378 is part of [Doc. 160](#)], 401 [Pg. 401 includes portions of [Doc. 169](#) and [Doc. 170](#)], 404 [Pg. 404 is part of [Doc. 170](#)], 477–478 [Pgs. 477–478 include portions of [Doc. 206](#), [Doc. 207](#), and [Doc. 208](#)]

Isolation policies (see also [U.S.–British policy toward](#) above), 350 [Pg. 350 is part of [Doc. 148](#)], 384 [Pg. 384 is part of [Doc. 161](#)], 401 [Pg. 401 includes portions of [Doc. 169](#) and [Doc. 170](#)], 477–478 [Pgs. 477–478 include portions of [Doc. 206](#), [Doc. 207](#), and [Doc. 208](#)], 500 [Pg. 500 is part of [Doc. 220](#)], 507 [Pg. 507 is part of [Doc. 221](#)], 511–513 [Pg. 511 is part of [Doc.](#)

[222](#)], 614 [Pg. 614 is part of [Doc. 267](#)], 636–637 [Pg. 636 is part of [Doc. 270](#)]

Egyptian–Syrian–Saudi (ESS) Pact, 23 [Pg. 23 is part of [Doc. 16](#)], 32–33 [Pgs. 32–33 include portions of [Doc. 22](#) and [Doc. 23](#)], 55ⁿ [Pg. 55 includes portions of [Doc. 36](#) and [Doc. 37](#)], 62 [Pg. 62 is part of [Doc. 42](#)], 76 [Pg. 76 is part of [Doc. 45](#)], 86 [Pg. 86 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 88 [Pg. 88 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 123–124 [Pgs. 123–124 include portions of [Doc. 52](#) and [Doc. 53](#)], 186 [Pg. 186 is part of [Doc. 78](#)], 234 [Pg. 234 includes portions of [Doc. 92](#) and [Doc. 93](#)]

Baghdad Pact and, 23 [Pg. 23 is part of [Doc. 16](#)], 27–28 [Pgs. 27–28 include portions of [Doc. 18](#), [Doc. 19](#), and [Doc. 20](#)], 30–31 [Pg. 30 is part of [Doc. 22](#)], 33–34 [Pg. 33 is part of [Doc. 23](#)], 36 [Pg. 36 is part of [Doc. 24](#)], 75 [Pg. 75 is part of [Doc. 45](#)], 81 [Pg. 81 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 87 [Pg. 87 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 113 [Pg. 113 is part of [Doc. 51](#)], 221 [Pg. 221 is part of [Doc. 91](#)], 296 [Pg. 296 is part of [Doc. 127](#)]

British position, 29ⁿ [Pg. 29 includes portions of [Doc. 21](#) and [Doc. 22](#)], 39ⁿ [Pg. 39 is part of [Doc. 26](#)], 108–109 [Pg. 108 is part of [Doc. 49](#)], 113–114 [Pg. 113 is part of [Doc. 51](#)], 142 [Pg. 142 is part of [Doc. 60](#)], 178 [Pg. 178 includes portions of [Doc. 72](#) and [Doc. 73](#)]

U.S. position, 34 [Pg. 34 is part of [Doc. 23](#)], 36 [Pg. 36 is part of [Doc. 24](#)], 38–43 [Pgs. 38–43 include portions of [Doc. 25](#), [Doc. 26](#), [Doc. 27](#), [Doc. 28](#), and [Doc. 29](#)], 45 [Pg. 45 is part of [Doc. 30](#)], 76–77 [Pgs. 76–77 include portions of [Doc. 45](#) and [Doc. 46](#)], 133 [Pg. 133 includes portions of [Doc. 57](#) and [Doc. 58](#)], 142 [Pg. 142 is part of [Doc. 60](#)], 178–179 [Pgs. 178–179 include portions of [Doc. 72](#), [Doc. 73](#), and [Doc. 74](#)], 378 [Pg. 378 is part of [Doc. 160](#)]

Eichelberger, James M., 278 [Pg. 278 is part of [Doc. 117](#)]

Eilts, Hermann F., 553 [Pg. 553 includes portions of [Doc. 247](#), [Doc. 248](#), and [Doc. 249](#)], 1029 [Pg. 1029 is part of [Doc. 445](#)], 1030ⁿ [Pg. 1030 includes portions of [Doc. 445](#) and [Doc. 446](#)], 1031ⁿ [Pg. 1031 includes portions of [Doc. 446](#) and [Doc. 447](#)], 1032ⁿ [Pg. 1032 includes portions of [Doc. 447](#) and [Doc. 448](#)], 1033ⁿ [Pg. 1033 includes portions of [Doc. 448](#) and [Doc. 449](#)], 1034ⁿ [Pg. 1034 includes portions of [Doc. 450](#) and [Doc. 451](#)]

Eisenhower, Dwight D., 132 [Pg. 132 includes portions of [Doc. 56](#) and [Doc. 57](#)], 243–244 [Pgs. 243–244 include portions of [Doc. 95](#) and [Doc. 96](#)], 264 [Pg. 264 includes portions of [Doc. 105](#), [Doc. 106](#), and [Doc. 107](#)], 303 [Pg. 303 is part of [Doc. 131](#)], 340–342 [Pg. 340 is part of [Doc. 147](#)], 415 [Pg. 415 is part of [Doc. 175](#)], 446 [Pg. 446 includes portions of [Doc. 189](#), [Doc. 190](#), and [Doc. 191](#)], 464–465 [Pg. 464 is part of [Doc. 202](#)], 895 [Pg. 895 is part of [Doc. 391](#)], 1023 [Pg. 1023 includes portions of [Doc. 442](#) and [Doc. 443](#)]

Baghdad Pact, 214 [Pg. 214 is part of [Doc. 88](#)], 249 [Pg. 249 is part of [Doc. 98](#)], 250n [Pg. 250 is part of [Doc. 99](#)], 259 [Pg. 259 includes portions of [Doc. 102](#) and [Doc. 103](#)], 270 [Pg. 270 is part of [Doc. 111](#)], 298n [Pg. 298 includes portions of [Doc. 128](#) and [Doc. 129](#)], 361n [Pg. 361 is part of [Doc. 153](#)], 372 [Pg. 372 includes portions of [Doc. 158](#) and [Doc. 159](#)], 390 [Pg. 390 is part of [Doc. 163](#)], 673–674 [Pgs. 673–674 include portions of [Doc. 283](#), [Doc. 284](#), and [Doc. 285](#)]

Bermuda Conference, 462–474 [Pgs. 462–474 include portions of [Doc. 199](#), [Doc. 200](#), [Doc. 201](#), [Doc. 202](#), [Doc. 203](#), [Doc. 204](#), and [Doc. 205](#)], 547 [Pg. 547 is part of [Doc. 246](#)]

Eden, correspondence with, 249 [Pg. 249 is part of [Doc. 98](#)]

Eisenhower Doctrine, 322–324 [Pgs. 322–324 include portions of [Doc. 138](#), [Doc. 139](#), [Doc. 140](#), and [Doc. 141](#)], 395–396 [Pgs. 395–396 include portions of [Doc. 165](#), [Doc. 166](#), and [Doc. 167](#)], 419 [Pg. 419 includes portions of [Doc. 176](#) and [Doc. 177](#)], 432–438 [Pgs. 432–438 include portions of [Doc. 182](#) and [Doc. 183](#)], 446–447 [Pgs. 446–447 include portions of [Doc. 189](#), [Doc. 190](#), and [Doc. 191](#)], 452 [Pg. 452 includes portions of [Doc. 193](#) and [Doc. 194](#)], 525–526 [Pgs. 525–526 include portions of [Doc. 229](#), [Doc. 230](#), and [Doc. 231](#)]

Iran, 686–687 [Pg. 686 is part of [Doc. 290](#)], 698 [Pg. 698 is part of [Doc. 293](#)], 700 [Pg. 700 includes portions of [Doc. 293](#) and [Doc. 294](#)], 734n [Pg. 734 is part of [Doc. 308](#)], 804 [Pg. 804 is part of [Doc. 349](#)], 839–840 [Pgs. 839–840 include portions of [Doc. 359](#), [Doc. 360](#), and [Doc. 361](#)], 854 [Pg. 854 includes portions of [Doc. 369](#) and [Doc. 370](#)], 861–863 [Pgs. 861–863 include portions of [Doc. 374](#) and [Doc. 375](#)], 893–895 [Pg. 893 is part of [Doc. 391](#)], 898–900 [Pgs. 898–900

include portions of [Doc. 391](#) and [Doc. 392](#)], 935 [Pg. 935 is part of [Doc. 402](#)]

Iraq, 970 [Pg. 970 includes portions of [Doc. 420](#) and [Doc. 421](#)], 1014n [Pg. 1014 includes portions of [Doc. 438](#) and [Doc. 439](#)], 1024–1028 [Pg. 1024 is part of [Doc. 444](#)]

Near East:

Soviet bloc, relations with, 414 [Pg. 414 is part of [Doc. 174](#)], 839–840 [Pgs. 839–840 include portions of [Doc. 359](#), [Doc. 360](#), and [Doc. 361](#)]

U.S. military aid to, 686 [Pg. 686 is part of [Doc. 290](#)], 802 [Pg. 802 is part of [Doc. 349](#)], 804 [Pg. 804 is part of [Doc. 349](#)], 893–895 [Pg. 893 is part of [Doc. 391](#)], 898–899 [Pg. 898 is part of [Doc. 391](#)]

Shah of Iran, correspondence with, 840 [Pg. 840 includes portions of [Doc. 360](#) and [Doc. 361](#)], 854–855 [Pgs. 854–855 include portions of [Doc. 369](#) and [Doc. 370](#)], 861–863 [Pgs. 861–863 include portions of [Doc. 374](#) and [Doc. 375](#)]

Regional defense, 54 [Pg. 54 is part of [Doc. 36](#)], 129n [Pg. 129 includes portions of [Doc. 55](#) and [Doc. 56](#)], 132 [Pg. 132 includes portions of [Doc. 56](#) and [Doc. 57](#)], 687 [Pg. 687 is part of [Doc. 290](#)], 935 [Pg. 935 is part of [Doc. 402](#)]

U.S.–British cooperation, 462 [Pg. 462 includes portions of [Doc. 199](#) and [Doc. 200](#)], 464–465 [Pg. 464 is part of [Doc. 202](#)], 473 [Pg. 473 includes portions of [Doc. 203](#) and [Doc. 204](#)], 797 [Pg. 797 includes portions of [Doc. 345](#) and [Doc. 346](#)], 798n [Pg. 798 includes portions of [Doc. 346](#) and [Doc. 347](#)]

Eisenhower Doctrine (*see also* U.S. military aid to *under individual countries*), 322–324 [Pgs. 322–324 include portions of [Doc. 138](#), [Doc. 139](#), [Doc. 140](#), and [Doc. 141](#)], 395–398 [Pgs. 395–398 include portions of [Doc. 165](#), [Doc. 166](#), [Doc. 167](#), and [Doc. 168](#)], 400 [Pg. 400 is part of [Doc. 169](#)],

410–413 [Pgs. 410–413 include portions of [Doc. 171](#), [Doc. 172](#), and [Doc. 173](#)], 415–416 [Pg. 415 is part of [Doc. 175](#)], 419 [Pg. 419 includes portions of [Doc. 176](#) and [Doc. 177](#)], 430–439 [Pgs. 430–439 include portions of [Doc. 180](#), [Doc. 181](#), [Doc. 182](#), [Doc. 183](#), and [Doc. 184](#)], 579 [Pg. 579 is part of [Doc. 260](#)], 582 [Pg. 582 is part of [Doc. 260](#)], 609 [Pg. 609 is part of [Doc. 266](#)], 623 [Pg. 623 is part of [Doc. 270](#)], 644 [Pg. 644 is part of [Doc. 270](#)], 997 [Pg. 997 includes portions of [Doc. 433](#), [Doc. 434](#), and [Doc. 435](#)], 1067 [Pg. 1067 is part of [Doc. 462](#)]

Afghani position, 491–492 [Pgs. 491–492 include portions of [Doc. 215](#) and [Doc. 216](#)]

Arab–Israeli dispute and, 455 [Pg. 455 is part of [Doc. 195](#)], 470 [Pg. 470 is part of [Doc. 203](#)], 654–656 [Pgs. 654–656 include portions of [Doc. 274](#) and [Doc. 275](#)]

Baghdad Pact and, 448–451 [Pg. 448 is part of [Doc. 192](#)], 456 [Pg. 456 is part of [Doc. 195](#)], 456–457 [Pg. 456 is part of [Doc. 195](#)], 466–467 [Pg. 466 is part of [Doc. 203](#)], 475 [Pg. 475 includes portions of [Doc. 205](#) and [Doc. 206](#)], 494–495 [Pgs. 494–495 include portions of [Doc. 217](#), [Doc. 218](#), and [Doc. 219](#)], 539 [Pg. 539 includes portions of [Doc. 239](#) and [Doc. 240](#)], 943 [Pg. 943 is part of [Doc. 406](#)]

British–French discussions, 430–431 [Pgs. 430–431 include portions of [Doc. 180](#) and [Doc. 181](#)]

Congressional Middle East resolution, 445–447 [Pgs. 445–447 include portions of [Doc. 189](#), [Doc. 190](#), and [Doc. 191](#)], 452–453 [Pgs. 452–453 include portions of [Doc. 193](#) and [Doc. 194](#)], 953 [Pg. 953 includes portions of [Doc. 410](#) and [Doc. 411](#)]

Defense Department position, 440 [Pg. 440 includes portions of [Doc. 185](#) and [Doc. 186](#)], 475–477 [Pgs. 475–477 include portions of [Doc. 205](#), [Doc. 206](#), and [Doc. 207](#)], 535 [Pg. 535 is part of [Doc. 238](#)]

Egyptian position, 440–441 [Pgs. 440–441 include portions of [Doc. 185](#), [Doc. 186](#), and [Doc. 187](#)], 523 [Pg. 523 is part of [Doc. 228](#)]

Ethiopian position, 520–521 [Pgs. 520–521 include portions of [Doc. 226](#) and [Doc. 227](#)]

Greek position, 528–529 [Pgs. 528–529 include portions of [Doc. 233](#) and [Doc. 234](#)]

Iranian position, 488–489 [Pgs. 488–489 include portions of [Doc. 213](#) and [Doc. 214](#)], 876 [Pg. 876 is part of [Doc. 381](#)], 878 [Pg. 878 is part of [Doc. 381](#)], 890 [Pg. 890 is part of [Doc. 389](#)], 902 [Pg. 902 is part of [Doc. 392](#)], 922 [Pg. 922 includes portions of [Doc. 395](#) and [Doc. 396](#)], 930 [Pg. 930 is part of [Doc. 399](#)]

Iraqi position, 441 [Pg. 441 includes portions of [Doc. 186](#) and [Doc. 187](#)], 474 [Pg. 474 includes portions of [Doc. 204](#) and [Doc. 205](#)], 493–494 [Pgs. 493–494 include portions of [Doc. 217](#) and [Doc. 218](#)], 597–598 [Pg. 597 is part of [Doc. 266](#)], 1043–1045 [Pgs. 1043–1045 include portions of [Doc. 455](#) and [Doc. 456](#)]

Israeli position, 441 [Pg. 441 includes portions of [Doc. 186](#) and [Doc. 187](#)], 529–530 [Pgs. 529–530 include portions of [Doc. 233](#), [Doc. 234](#), and [Doc. 235](#)], 537 [Pg. 537 is part of [Doc. 239](#)]

Jordanian position, 440 [Pg. 440 includes portions of [Doc. 185](#) and [Doc. 186](#)], 478 [Pg. 478 includes portions of [Doc. 207](#) and [Doc. 208](#)], 521 [Pg. 521 includes portions of [Doc. 226](#) and [Doc. 227](#)], 524 [Pg. 524 is part of [Doc. 229](#)], 597 [Pg. 597 is part of [Doc. 266](#)]

Lebanese position, 441 [Pg. 441 includes portions of [Doc. 186](#) and [Doc. 187](#)], 484–485 [Pgs. 484–485 include portions of [Doc. 210](#) and [Doc. 211](#)], 537–538 [Pg. 537 is part of [Doc. 239](#)], 597–598 [Pg. 597 is part of [Doc. 266](#)]

Military planning, 431 [Pg. 431 is part of [Doc. 181](#)], 448–450 [Pg. 448 is part of [Doc. 192](#)], 459–460 [Pgs. 459–460 include portions of [Doc. 196](#), [Doc. 197](#), and [Doc. 198](#)], 475–477 [Pgs. 475–477 include portions of [Doc. 205](#), [Doc. 206](#), and [Doc. 207](#)], 539 [Pg. 539 includes portions of [Doc. 239](#) and [Doc. 240](#)], 553 [Pg. 553 includes portions of [Doc. 247](#), [Doc. 248](#), and [Doc. 249](#)], 633 [Pg. 633 is part of [Doc. 270](#)]

Organization proposal, 474–475 [Pgs. 474–475 include portions of [Doc. 204](#), [Doc. 205](#), and [Doc. 206](#)]

Pakistani position, 490–491 [Pgs. 490–491 include portions of [Doc. 215](#) and [Doc. 216](#)]

Regional defense and, 448–451 [Pg. 448 is part of [Doc. 192](#)]

Richards Mission, 439 [Pg. 439 includes portions of [Doc. 183](#) and [Doc. 184](#)], 441 [Pg. 441 includes portions of [Doc. 186](#) and [Doc. 187](#)], 446–457 [Pgs. 446–457 include portions of [Doc. 189](#), [Doc. 190](#), [Doc. 191](#), [Doc. 192](#), [Doc. 193](#), [Doc. 194](#), and [Doc. 195](#)], 459–460 [Pgs. 459–460 include portions of [Doc. 196](#), [Doc. 197](#), and [Doc. 198](#)], 466–467 [Pg. 466 is part of [Doc. 203](#)], 477–481 [Pgs. 477–481 include portions of [Doc. 206](#), [Doc. 207](#), [Doc. 208](#), and [Doc. 209](#)], 508 [Pg. 508 is part of [Doc. 221](#)], 518–519 [Pgs. 518–519 include portions of [Doc. 224](#) and [Doc. 225](#)], 1039 [Pg. 1039 includes portions of [Doc. 453](#) and [Doc. 454](#)]

Country visit reports, 484–496 [Pgs. 484–496 include portions of [Doc. 210](#), [Doc. 211](#), [Doc. 212](#), [Doc. 213](#), [Doc. 214](#), [Doc. 215](#), [Doc. 216](#), [Doc. 217](#), [Doc. 218](#), [Doc. 219](#), and [Doc. 220](#)], 519–521 [Pgs. 519–521 include portions of [Doc. 224](#), [Doc. 225](#), [Doc. 226](#), and [Doc. 227](#)], 523 [Pg. 523 is part of [Doc. 228](#)], 528–539 [Pgs. 528–539 include portions of [Doc. 233](#), [Doc. 234](#), [Doc. 235](#), [Doc. 236](#), [Doc. 237](#), [Doc. 238](#), [Doc. 239](#), and [Doc. 240](#)], 922–931 [Pgs. 922–931 include portions of [Doc. 395](#), [Doc. 396](#), [Doc. 397](#), [Doc. 398](#), and [Doc. 399](#)], 1041–1047 [Pgs. 1041–1047 include portions of [Doc. 455](#) and [Doc. 456](#)], 1067 [Pg. 1067 is part of [Doc. 462](#)]

Saudi position, 450 [Pg. 450 is part of [Doc. 192](#)], 474 [Pg. 474 includes portions of [Doc. 204](#) and [Doc. 205](#)], 478 [Pg. 478 includes portions of [Doc. 207](#) and [Doc. 208](#)], 495–496 [Pgs. 495–496 include portions of [Doc. 218](#), [Doc. 219](#), and [Doc. 220](#)], 597 [Pg. 597 is part of [Doc. 266](#)]

Soviet reactions, 419 [Pg. 419 includes portions of [Doc. 176](#) and [Doc. 177](#)], 440–441 [Pgs. 440–441 include portions of [Doc. 185](#), [Doc. 186](#), and [Doc. 187](#)], 449–450 [Pg. 449 is part of [Doc. 192](#)]

Sudanese position, 523 [Pg. 523 is part of [Doc. 228](#)]

Syrian position, 440–441 [Pgs. 440–441 include portions of [Doc. 185](#), [Doc. 186](#), and [Doc. 187](#)], 518 [Pg. 518 is part of [Doc. 224](#)]

Turkish position, 462 [Pg. 462 includes portions of [Doc. 199](#) and [Doc. 200](#)], 487–488 [Pgs. 487–488 include portions of [Doc. 212](#), [Doc. 213](#), and [Doc. 214](#)]

Yemeni position, 519 [Pg. 519 includes portions of [Doc. 224](#) and [Doc. 225](#)]

Elbrick, C. Burke, 70n [Pg. 70 includes portions of [Doc. 43](#) and [Doc. 44](#)], 98n [Pg. 98 is part of [Doc. 47](#)], 102–103 [Pgs. 102–103 include portions of [Doc. 47](#), [Doc. 48](#), and [Doc. 49](#)], 112 [Pg. 112 is part of [Doc. 51](#)], 366 [Pg. 366 is part of [Doc. 156](#)], 376 [Pg. 376 includes portions of [Doc. 159](#) and [Doc. 160](#)], 430n [Pg. 430 includes portions of [Doc. 180](#) and [Doc. 181](#)], 464 [Pg. 464 is part of [Doc. 202](#)], 466 [Pg. 466 is part of [Doc. 203](#)], 584 [Pg. 584 is part of [Doc. 262](#)], 663 [Pg. 663 includes portions of [Doc. 278](#) and [Doc. 279](#)], 945 [Pg. 945 is part of [Doc. 407](#)]

Elburz Line (*see also Near East: Regional defense*), 260 [Pg. 260 is part of [Doc. 103](#)], 274 [Pg. 274 is part of [Doc. 114](#)], 281 [Pg. 281 is part of [Doc. 119](#)], 293 [Pg. 293 is part of [Doc. 125](#)], 893–895 [Pg. 893 is part of [Doc. 391](#)], 904 [Pg. 904 is part of [Doc. 392](#)], 927 [Pg. 927 is part of [Doc. 398](#)], 935 [Pg. 935 is part of [Doc. 402](#)]

Elliott, Col. Frank B., 135 [Pg. 135 is part of [Doc. 60](#)], 971n [Pg. 971 includes portions of [Doc. 422](#) and [Doc. 423](#)]

Emami, Djamal, 765 [Pg. 765 is part of [Doc. 325](#)]

Engle, James B., 663n [Pg. 663 includes portions of [Doc. 278](#) and [Doc. 279](#)], 664 [Pg. 664 is part of [Doc. 279](#)]

Entezam, Abdullah, 729 [Pg. 729 includes portions of [Doc. 304](#) and [Doc. 305](#)], 775–776 [Pgs. 775–776 include portions of [Doc. 330](#), [Doc. 331](#), and [Doc. 332](#)], 778 [Pg. 778 includes portions of [Doc. 332](#) and [Doc. 333](#)]

Eqbal, Manoutchehr, 913–914 [Pg. 913 is part of [Doc. 393](#)]

Ernst, Roger, 63n [Pg. 63 includes portions of [Doc. 42](#) and [Doc. 43](#)], 103 [Pg. 103 includes portions of [Doc. 48](#) and [Doc. 49](#)], 112 [Pg. 112 is part of [Doc. 51](#)], 116 [Pg. 116 is part of [Doc. 51](#)], 118 [Pg. 118 is part of [Doc. 51](#)], 120 [Pg. 120 is part of [Doc. 51](#)], 127 [Pg. 127 includes portions of [Doc. 54](#) and [Doc. 55](#)]

Esenbel, Melih, 673–674 [Pgs. 673–674 include portions of [Doc. 283](#), [Doc. 284](#), and [Doc. 285](#)]

Eshkol, David, 529 [Pg. 529 includes portions of [Doc. 233](#) and [Doc. 234](#)]

Eshraqi, 922 [Pg. 922 includes portions of [Doc. 395](#) and [Doc. 396](#)]

Ethiopia, 66 [Pg. 66 is part of [Doc. 43](#)], 378 [Pg. 378 is part of [Doc. 160](#)], 520–521 [Pgs. 520–521 include portions of [Doc. 226](#) and [Doc. 227](#)], 535 [Pg. 535 is part of [Doc. 238](#)], 641 [Pg. 641 is part of [Doc. 270](#)]

Eveland, 234 [Pg. 234 includes portions of [Doc. 92](#) and [Doc. 93](#)]

Export–Import Bank, 307 [Pg. 307 includes portions of [Doc. 131](#) and [Doc. 132](#)], 347 [Pg. 347 is part of [Doc. 148](#)], 665 [Pg. 665 is part of [Doc. 279](#)]

Iran, 236 [Pg. 236 is part of [Doc. 93](#)], 242 [Pg. 242 is part of [Doc. 94](#)], 692 [Pg. 692 is part of [Doc. 291](#)], 751 [Pg. 751 is part of [Doc. 317](#)], 777 [Pg. 777 is part of [Doc. 332](#)], 790–791 [Pg. 790 is part of [Doc. 342](#)], 845–846 [Pgs. 845–846 include portions of [Doc. 363](#) and [Doc. 364](#)], 849 [Pg. 849 is part of [Doc. 366](#)], 851–854 [Pgs. 851–854 include portions of [Doc. 367](#), [Doc. 368](#), [Doc. 369](#), and [Doc. 370](#)], 863–865 [Pgs. 863–865 include portions of [Doc. 374](#) and [Doc. 375](#)], 874 [Pg. 874 includes portions of [Doc. 380](#) and [Doc. 381](#)], 877 [Pg. 877 is part of [Doc. 381](#)]

Faisal ibn al–Aziz ibn Abd al–Rahman al–Faisal al Saud, 23 [Pg. 23 is part of [Doc. 16](#)], 223 [Pg. 223 is part of [Doc. 91](#)]

Faisal II, King of Iraq, 61n [Pg. 61 is part of [Doc. 41](#)], 987 [Pg. 987 is part of [Doc. 428](#)], 999 [Pg. 999 is part of [Doc. 435](#)], 1058 [Pg. 1058 includes portions of [Doc. 458](#), [Doc. 459](#), and [Doc. 460](#)]

Farsi and Arabi Islands, 867 [Pg. 867 is part of [Doc. 376](#)], 869 [Pg. 869 is part of [Doc. 377](#)], 894 [Pg. 894 is part of [Doc. 391](#)], 942 [Pg. 942 is part of [Doc. 406](#)]

Favretti, Luciano, 663 [Pg. 663 includes portions of [Doc. 278](#) and [Doc. 279](#)]

Fawzi, Mahmoud, 5–6 [Pgs. 5–6 include portions of [Doc. 4](#) and [Doc. 5](#)], 15 [Pg. 15 is part of [Doc. 11](#)], 23 [Pg. 23 is part of [Doc. 16](#)], 154–157 [Pgs. 154–157 include portions of [Doc. 63](#) and [Doc. 64](#)], 221–222 [Pg. 221 is part of [Doc. 91](#)]

Felt, Adm. Harry D., 553 [Pg. 553 includes portions of [Doc. 247](#), [Doc. 248](#), and [Doc. 249](#)], 648 [Pg. 648 is part of [Doc. 271](#)]

Fina, Thomas, 937n [Pg. 937 includes portions of [Doc. 402](#) and [Doc. 403](#)]

Finn, Richard, 327n [Pg. 327 is part of [Doc. 143](#)]

Fitzgeorge–Balfour, Col. Victor, 103 [Pg. 103 includes portions of [Doc. 48](#) and [Doc. 49](#)], 112 [Pg. 112 is part of [Doc. 51](#)], 114 [Pg. 114 is part of [Doc. 51](#)], 120 [Pg. 120 is part of [Doc. 51](#)], 135 [Pg. 135 is part of [Doc. 60](#)], 145–146 [Pg. 145 is part of [Doc. 60](#)]

FitzGerald, Dennis A., 663 [Pg. 663 includes portions of [Doc. 278](#) and [Doc. 279](#)], 772 [Pg. 772 is part of [Doc. 329](#)], 805 [Pg. 805 is part of [Doc. 350](#)]

Flemming, Arthur S., 165 [Pg. 165 is part of [Doc. 66](#)], 169 [Pg. 169 includes portions of [Doc. 67](#) and [Doc. 68](#)], 340 [Pg. 340 is part of [Doc. 147](#)], 342 [Pg. 342 is part of [Doc. 147](#)], 442 [Pg. 442 is part of [Doc. 187](#)]

Foreign Operations Administration (FOA), 696–697 [Pgs. 696–697 include portions of [Doc. 291](#) and [Doc. 292](#)], 708 [Pg. 708 includes portions of [Doc.](#)

[296](#) and [Doc. 297](#)], [732](#) [Pg. 732 is part of [Doc. 306](#)], [743](#) [Pg. 743 is part of [Doc. 313](#)], [751](#) [Pg. 751 is part of [Doc. 317](#)]

Foruhar, Qolam Hosein, [160–161](#) [Pg. 160 is part of [Doc. 66](#)], [851n](#) [Pg. 851 includes portions of [Doc. 367](#) and [Doc. 368](#)], [873](#) [Pg. 873 is part of [Doc. 379](#)], [883n](#) [Pg. 883 is part of [Doc. 384](#)], [916](#) [Pg. 916 is part of [Doc. 393](#)]

France (see also [Algerian conflict](#); *France and French subheadings under other subjects*; Suez crisis; Tripartite Declaration of 1950), [172](#) [Pg. 172 is part of [Doc. 69](#)], [350](#) [Pg. 350 is part of [Doc. 148](#)], [378](#) [Pg. 378 is part of [Doc. 160](#)], [381–382](#) [Pg. 381 is part of [Doc. 160](#)], [424](#) [Pg. 424 is part of [Doc. 178](#)], [535](#) [Pg. 535 is part of [Doc. 238](#)], [594](#) [Pg. 594 includes portions of [Doc. 265](#) and [Doc. 266](#)], [596](#) [Pg. 596 is part of [Doc. 266](#)], [624](#) [Pg. 624 is part of [Doc. 270](#)], [642](#) [Pg. 642 is part of [Doc. 270](#)], [668](#) [Pg. 668 includes portions of [Doc. 280](#) and [Doc. 281](#)], [896](#) [Pg. 896 is part of [Doc. 391](#)]

Alternate pipeline proposals, [465](#) [Pg. 465 is part of [Doc. 202](#)], [517](#) [Pg. 517 is part of [Doc. 223](#)], [558](#) [Pg. 558 is part of [Doc. 252](#)]

Frechtling, Louis E., [696n](#) [Pg. 696 includes portions of [Doc. 291](#) and [Doc. 292](#)], [743n](#) [Pg. 743 is part of [Doc. 313](#)]

French, Rodney, [863](#) [Pg. 863 includes portions of [Doc. 374](#) and [Doc. 375](#)]

Fritzlan, A. David, [2n](#) [Pg. 2 includes portions of [Doc. 1](#) and [Doc. 2](#)], [13n](#) [Pg. 13 is part of [Doc. 10](#)], [40n](#) [Pg. 40 includes portions of [Doc. 26](#) and [Doc. 27](#)], [316n](#) [Pg. 316 includes portions of [Doc. 135](#) and [Doc. 136](#)]

Fulbright, J. William, [445–446](#) [Pgs. 445–446 include portions of [Doc. 189](#), [Doc. 190](#), and [Doc. 191](#)]

Gailani, [1045](#) [Pg. 1045 is part of [Doc. 456](#)]

Gallman, Waldemar J.:

Baghdad Pact, [7–8](#) [Pgs. 7–8 include portions of [Doc. 6](#) and [Doc. 7](#)], [11–12](#) [Pg. 11 is part of [Doc. 9](#)], [19n](#) [Pg. 19 is part of [Doc. 13](#)],

35–36 [Pg. 35 is part of [Doc. 24](#)], 179–180 [Pgs. 179–180 include portions of [Doc. 73](#), [Doc. 74](#), and [Doc. 75](#)], 203–205 [Pgs. 203–205 include portions of [Doc. 81](#), [Doc. 82](#), and [Doc. 83](#)], 215 [Pg. 215 is part of [Doc. 89](#)], 244n [Pg. 244 includes portions of [Doc. 95](#) and [Doc. 96](#)], 245n [Pg. 245 is part of [Doc. 96](#)], 988–989 [Pgs. 988–989 include portions of [Doc. 428](#) and [Doc. 429](#)]

Council meetings, 199–200 [Pgs. 199–200 include portions of [Doc. 80](#) and [Doc. 81](#)], 252–258 [Pgs. 252–258 include portions of [Doc. 100](#), [Doc. 101](#), and [Doc. 102](#)]

Military planning meetings, 259–260 [Pgs. 259–260 include portions of [Doc. 102](#) and [Doc. 103](#)]

Preliminary staff talks, 965–966 [Pgs. 965–966 include portions of [Doc. 417](#) and [Doc. 418](#)]

U.S. participation, 271 [Pg. 271 is part of [Doc. 112](#)], 279 [Pg. 279 includes portions of [Doc. 117](#) and [Doc. 118](#)], 321 [Pg. 321 is part of [Doc. 138](#)], 325–326 [Pgs. 325–326 include portions of [Doc. 141](#) and [Doc. 142](#)], 334 [Pg. 334 is part of [Doc. 145](#)], 353–354 [Pg. 353 is part of [Doc. 150](#)], 996–997 [Pgs. 996–997 include portions of [Doc. 433](#), [Doc. 434](#), and [Doc. 435](#)]

Eisenhower Doctrine, 474n [Pg. 474 includes portions of [Doc. 204](#) and [Doc. 205](#)]

Iraq, 966–967 [Pgs. 966–967 include portions of [Doc. 418](#) and [Doc. 419](#)], 990–992 [Pgs. 990–992 include portions of [Doc. 429](#) and [Doc. 430](#)], 995–997 [Pgs. 995–997 include portions of [Doc. 432](#), [Doc. 433](#), [Doc. 434](#), and [Doc. 435](#)], 1013 [Pg. 1013 is part of [Doc. 438](#)]

United States, relations with, 977–979 [Pgs. 977–979 include portions of [Doc. 425](#), [Doc. 426](#), and [Doc. 427](#)], 1029–1034 [Pgs. 1029–1034 include portions of [Doc. 445](#), [Doc. 446](#), [Doc. 447](#), [Doc. 448](#), [Doc. 449](#), [Doc. 450](#), and [Doc. 451](#)], 1036 [Pg. 1036 is part of [Doc. 452](#)]

U.S. military aid to, 964–965 [Pgs. 964–965 include portions of [Doc. 417](#) and [Doc. 418](#)], 967–970 [Pgs. 967–970 include portions of [Doc. 418](#), [Doc. 419](#), [Doc. 420](#), and [Doc. 421](#)], 971n [Pg. 971 includes portions of [Doc. 422](#) and [Doc. 423](#)], 975–976 [Pgs. 975–976 include portions of [Doc. 423](#), [Doc. 424](#), and [Doc. 425](#)], 988 [Pg. 988 includes portions of [Doc. 428](#) and [Doc. 429](#)], 991–992 [Pgs. 991–992 include portions of [Doc. 429](#) and [Doc. 430](#)], 993n [Pg. 993 includes portions of [Doc. 430](#) and [Doc. 431](#)], 1015–1017 [Pgs. 1015–1017 include portions of [Doc. 439](#), [Doc. 440](#), and [Doc. 441](#)], 1039n [Pg. 1039 includes portions of [Doc. 453](#) and [Doc. 454](#)], 1040n [Pg. 1040 is part of [Doc. 454](#)], 1060–1061 [Pgs. 1060–1061 include portions of [Doc. 461](#) and [Doc. 462](#)]

Gardener, Sir John, 26n [Pg. 26 is part of [Doc. 17](#)], 28n [Pg. 28 includes portions of [Doc. 19](#) and [Doc. 20](#)]

Gardner, Warner W., 723 [Pg. 723 is part of [Doc. 303](#)], 725 [Pg. 725 is part of [Doc. 303](#)]

Garran, Isham Peter, 575–576 [Pgs. 575–576 include portions of [Doc. 257](#), [Doc. 258](#), and [Doc. 259](#)]

Garvey, T.W., 464 [Pg. 464 is part of [Doc. 202](#)]

Geneva Conference, 129 [Pg. 129 includes portions of [Doc. 55](#) and [Doc. 56](#)], 135–136 [Pg. 135 is part of [Doc. 60](#)], 173 [Pg. 173 is part of [Doc. 69](#)], 433 [Pg. 433 is part of [Doc. 182](#)], 775 [Pg. 775 includes portions of [Doc. 330](#) and [Doc. 331](#)]

George, Walter F., 270 [Pg. 270 is part of [Doc. 111](#)], 275 [Pg. 275 is part of [Doc. 115](#)], 464 [Pg. 464 is part of [Doc. 202](#)], 466 [Pg. 466 is part of [Doc. 203](#)]

Geren, Paul F., 37n [Pg. 37 is part of [Doc. 25](#)], 38n [Pg. 38 includes portions of [Doc. 25](#) and [Doc. 26](#)], 216 [Pg. 216 includes portions of [Doc. 90](#) and [Doc. 91](#)], 228 [Pg. 228 includes portions of [Doc. 91](#) and [Doc. 92](#)]

Germany, Federal Republic of, 616 [Pg. 616 is part of [Doc. 267](#)], 643 [Pg. 643 is part of [Doc. 270](#)]

Ghana, 557 [Pg. 557 is part of [Doc. 251](#)]

Ghods–Nakhai, 257–258 [Pgs. 257–258 include portions of [Doc. 101](#) and [Doc. 102](#)]

Glantz, Herbert, 937n [Pg. 937 includes portions of [Doc. 402](#) and [Doc. 403](#)]

Gleason, S. Everett, 54–55 [Pgs. 54–55 include portions of [Doc. 36](#) and [Doc. 37](#)], 158–171 [Pgs. 158–171 include portions of [Doc. 65](#), [Doc. 66](#), [Doc. 67](#), and [Doc. 68](#)], 200–203 [Pgs. 200–203 include portions of [Doc. 80](#), [Doc. 81](#), and [Doc. 82](#)], 307–309 [Pgs. 307–309 include portions of [Doc. 131](#) and [Doc. 132](#)], 441–442 [Pgs. 441–442 include portions of [Doc. 186](#) and [Doc. 187](#)], 573 [Pg. 573 is part of [Doc. 256](#)], 685–688 [Pgs. 685–688 include portions of [Doc. 289](#) and [Doc. 290](#)], 769–770 [Pgs. 769–770 include portions of [Doc. 327](#) and [Doc. 328](#)], 801–804 [Pgs. 801–804 include portions of [Doc. 348](#) and [Doc. 349](#)], 850–851 [Pgs. 850–851 include portions of [Doc. 367](#) and [Doc. 368](#)], 857n [Pg. 857 includes portions of [Doc. 371](#) and [Doc. 372](#)], 892–899 [Pgs. 892–899 include portions of [Doc. 390](#) and [Doc. 391](#)], 934–937 [Pgs. 934–937 include portions of [Doc. 401](#), [Doc. 402](#), and [Doc. 403](#)]

Glubb, Lt. Gen. John B., 238 [Pg. 238 is part of [Doc. 93](#)], 290 [Pg. 290 is part of [Doc. 124](#)], 427 [Pg. 427 is part of [Doc. 178](#)]

Goksenin, 353 [Pg. 353 is part of [Doc. 150](#)]

Goodman, Seymour, 937n [Pg. 937 includes portions of [Doc. 402](#) and [Doc. 403](#)]

Goodpaster, Brig. Gen. Andrew J., 258 [Pg. 258 includes portions of [Doc. 101](#) and [Doc. 102](#)], 340 [Pg. 340 is part of [Doc. 147](#)], 414 [Pg. 414 is part of [Doc. 174](#)], 415 [Pg. 415 is part of [Doc. 175](#)], 446 [Pg. 446 includes portions of [Doc. 189](#), [Doc. 190](#), and [Doc. 191](#)], 464 [Pg. 464 is part of [Doc. 202](#)], 466 [Pg. 466 is part of [Doc. 203](#)], 992n [Pg. 992 includes portions of [Doc. 429](#) and [Doc. 430](#)], 1014n [Pg. 1014 includes portions of [Doc. 438](#) and [Doc. 439](#)]

Gordon, Robert L., 129*n* [Pg. 129 includes portions of [Doc. 55](#) and [Doc. 56](#)]

Gordon, Thomas S., 438 [Pg. 438 is part of [Doc. 183](#)]

Gork, Haydar, Baghdad Pact, 176*n* [Pg. 176 includes portions of [Doc. 70](#) and [Doc. 71](#)], 369 [Pg. 369 includes portions of [Doc. 157](#) and [Doc. 158](#)], 371 [Pg. 371 is part of [Doc. 158](#)], 449 [Pg. 449 is part of [Doc. 192](#)]

Gray, Gordon, 261*n* [Pg. 261 is part of [Doc. 104](#)], 268*n* [Pg. 268 is part of [Doc. 110](#)], 314 [Pg. 314 is part of [Doc. 134](#)], 329 [Pg. 329 is part of [Doc. 143](#)], 372*n* [Pg. 372 includes portions of [Doc. 158](#) and [Doc. 159](#)], 412 [Pg. 412 includes portions of [Doc. 171](#) and [Doc. 172](#)], 798–799 [Pgs. 798–799 include portions of [Doc. 346](#), [Doc. 347](#), and [Doc. 348](#)], 803–804 [Pg. 803 is part of [Doc. 349](#)]

Greece, 62 [Pg. 62 is part of [Doc. 42](#)], 93 [Pg. 93 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 115 [Pg. 115 is part of [Doc. 51](#)], 177 [Pg. 177 includes portions of [Doc. 71](#) and [Doc. 72](#)], 528–529 [Pgs. 528–529 include portions of [Doc. 233](#) and [Doc. 234](#)], 616 [Pg. 616 is part of [Doc. 267](#)], 643 [Pg. 643 is part of [Doc. 270](#)]

Green, Theodore F., 439 [Pg. 439 includes portions of [Doc. 183](#) and [Doc. 184](#)], 445 [Pg. 445 is part of [Doc. 189](#)]

Greene, Joseph N., Jr., 366 [Pg. 366 is part of [Doc. 156](#)], 393 [Pg. 393 is part of [Doc. 165](#)]

Gregory, Clark S., 846 [Pg. 846 is part of [Doc. 364](#)], 926 [Pg. 926 is part of [Doc. 398](#)]

Gromyko, Andrei A., 942 [Pg. 942 is part of [Doc. 406](#)]

Gruenther, Gen. Alfred M., 419 [Pg. 419 includes portions of [Doc. 176](#) and [Doc. 177](#)]

Gulf of Aqaba. See [Aqaba Gulf](#).

Hagerty, James C., 240 [Pg. 240 is part of [Doc. 94](#)], 243 [Pg. 243 is part of [Doc. 95](#)], 463*n* [Pg. 463 includes portions of [Doc. 200](#) and [Doc. 201](#)], 464 [Pg. 464 is part of [Doc. 202](#)], 466 [Pg. 466 is part of [Doc. 203](#)]

Halim, Sayyid Mustafa Ben, 486 [Pg. 486 is part of [Doc. 212](#)], 531 [Pg. 531 is part of [Doc. 235](#)]

Halleck, Charles A., 437 [Pg. 437 includes portions of [Doc. 182](#) and [Doc. 183](#)]

Hallett, Nez C., Jr., 993n [Pg. 993 includes portions of [Doc. 430](#) and [Doc. 431](#)], 1012n [Pg. 1012 includes portions of [Doc. 437](#) and [Doc. 438](#)]

Hammarskjöld, Dag, 287 [Pg. 287 is part of [Doc. 124](#)], 433 [Pg. 433 is part of [Doc. 182](#)], 644 [Pg. 644 is part of [Doc. 270](#)]

Hannah, Norman B., 745n [Pg. 745 is part of [Doc. 314](#)], 750n [Pg. 750 includes portions of [Doc. 316](#) and [Doc. 317](#)], 759n [Pg. 759 includes portions of [Doc. 321](#) and [Doc. 322](#)], 770n [Pg. 770 includes portions of [Doc. 327](#) and [Doc. 328](#)], 773n [Pg. 773 is part of [Doc. 330](#)], 782n [Pg. 782 includes portions of [Doc. 335](#) and [Doc. 336](#)], 790n [Pg. 790 is part of [Doc. 342](#)], 797n [Pg. 797 includes portions of [Doc. 345](#) and [Doc. 346](#)], 805n [Pg. 805 is part of [Doc. 350](#)], 813n [Pg. 813 includes portions of [Doc. 353](#) and [Doc. 354](#)], 816n [Pg. 816 includes portions of [Doc. 355](#) and [Doc. 356](#)], 820n [Pg. 820 is part of [Doc. 357](#)], 821n [Pg. 821 is part of [Doc. 357](#)], 837n [Pg. 837 is part of [Doc. 359](#)], 838n [Pg. 838 is part of [Doc. 359](#)], 839n [Pg. 839 includes portions of [Doc. 359](#) and [Doc. 360](#)], 840n [Pg. 840 includes portions of [Doc. 360](#) and [Doc. 361](#)], 847n [Pg. 847 is part of [Doc. 365](#)], 859n [Pg. 859 includes portions of [Doc. 372](#) and [Doc. 373](#)], 861n [Pg. 861 is part of [Doc. 374](#)], 871n [Pg. 871 includes portions of [Doc. 377](#) and [Doc. 378](#)], 890n [Pg. 890 is part of [Doc. 389](#)]

Iran, 752–754 [Pgs. 752–754 include portions of [Doc. 317](#), [Doc. 318](#), and [Doc. 319](#)], 785 [Pg. 785 is part of [Doc. 337](#)], 812–813 [Pgs. 812–813 include portions of [Doc. 353](#) and [Doc. 354](#)], 868 [Pg. 868 includes portions of [Doc. 376](#) and [Doc. 377](#)]

Hannah, Col. Thomas R., 975–976 [Pgs. 975–976 include portions of [Doc. 423](#), [Doc. 424](#), and [Doc. 425](#)], 987–988 [Pgs. 987–988 include portions of [Doc. 428](#) and [Doc. 429](#)], 994–995 [Pgs. 994–995 include portions of [Doc. 431](#), [Doc. 432](#), and [Doc. 433](#)]

Harding, Field Marshal Sir John, 21 [Pg. 21 includes portions of [Doc. 14](#) and [Doc. 15](#)]

Hardy, Porter, Jr., 884 [Pg. 884 includes portions of [Doc. 385](#) and [Doc. 386](#)], 895 [Pg. 895 is part of [Doc. 391](#)]

Hare, Raymond A., 46n [Pg. 46 includes portions of [Doc. 31](#) and [Doc. 32](#)], 278 [Pg. 278 is part of [Doc. 117](#)], 555n [Pg. 555 includes portions of [Doc. 249](#) and [Doc. 250](#)], 785 [Pg. 785 is part of [Doc. 337](#)]

Harkins, Maj. Gen., 707 [Pg. 707 is part of [Doc. 296](#)], 709–710 [Pgs. 709–710 include portions of [Doc. 297](#) and [Doc. 298](#)]

Harlow, Bryce N., 447 [Pg. 447 is part of [Doc. 191](#)]

Harriman, Averell, 176 [Pg. 176 includes portions of [Doc. 70](#) and [Doc. 71](#)]

Hart, Parker T., 38n [Pg. 38 includes portions of [Doc. 25](#) and [Doc. 26](#)]

Harvey, Constance, 664 [Pg. 664 is part of [Doc. 279](#)]

Hasan, Maj. Burhan Qasab, 601 [Pg. 601 is part of [Doc. 266](#)]

Hashim, Ibrahim, 212 [Pg. 212 includes portions of [Doc. 86](#) and [Doc. 87](#)]

Hassouna, Abdel Khalek, 652 [Pg. 652 is part of [Doc. 274](#)], 654–656 [Pgs. 654–656 include portions of [Doc. 274](#) and [Doc. 275](#)]

Hawrani, Akram, 87 [Pg. 87 is part of [Doc. 46](#)]

Heath, Donald B., 124–125 [Pgs. 124–125 include portions of [Doc. 52](#) and [Doc. 53](#)]

Hedayat, Lt. Gen. Abdullah, 293 [Pg. 293 is part of [Doc. 125](#)], 866 [Pg. 866 is part of [Doc. 376](#)], 913–914 [Pg. 913 is part of [Doc. 393](#)]

Hekmat, 727 [Pg. 727 is part of [Doc. 304](#)]

Henderson, Loy, 366 [Pg. 366 is part of [Doc. 156](#)], 368n [Pg. 368 is part of [Doc. 157](#)], 377 [Pg. 377 is part of [Doc. 160](#)], 383n [Pg. 383 is part of [Doc. 161](#)], 393 [Pg. 393 is part of [Doc. 165](#)], 676 [Pg. 676 is part of [Doc. 286](#)], 709 [Pg. 709 includes portions of [Doc. 297](#) and [Doc. 298](#)], 730 [Pg. 730 is part of [Doc. 305](#)]

Baghdad Pact:

Council meeting, 265–266 [Pgs. 265–266 include portions of [Doc. 107](#) and [Doc. 108](#)], 270 [Pg. 270 is part of [Doc. 111](#)], 273 [Pg. 273 is part of [Doc. 114](#)], 285–292 [Pgs. 285–292 include portions of [Doc. 122](#), [Doc. 123](#), [Doc. 124](#), and [Doc. 125](#)], 300–302 [Pg. 300 is part of [Doc. 130](#)]

U.S. aid and, 280–281 [Pgs. 280–281 include portions of [Doc. 118](#) and [Doc. 119](#)], 291 [Pg. 291 is part of [Doc. 124](#)], 299 [Pg. 299 includes portions of [Doc. 129](#) and [Doc. 130](#)]

U.S. participation, 279–280 [Pgs. 279–280 include portions of [Doc. 117](#), [Doc. 118](#), and [Doc. 119](#)], 282–286 [Pgs. 282–286 include portions of [Doc. 120](#), [Doc. 121](#), [Doc. 122](#), [Doc. 123](#), and [Doc. 124](#)], 291 [Pg. 291 is part of [Doc. 124](#)], 301–302 [Pg. 301 is part of [Doc. 130](#)], 312 [Pg. 312 is part of [Doc. 134](#)], 387–389 [Pgs. 387–389 include portions of [Doc. 161](#) and [Doc. 162](#)], 553–554 [Pgs. 553–554 include portions of [Doc. 247](#), [Doc. 248](#), and [Doc. 249](#)]

Eisenhower Doctrine, 410 [Pg. 410 is part of [Doc. 171](#)], 412 [Pg. 412 includes portions of [Doc. 171](#) and [Doc. 172](#)], 534 [Pg. 534 includes portions of [Doc. 237](#) and [Doc. 238](#)], 537 [Pg. 537 is part of [Doc. 239](#)], 539 [Pg. 539 includes portions of [Doc. 239](#) and [Doc. 240](#)], 543 [Pg. 543 includes portions of [Doc. 242](#) and [Doc. 243](#)]

Oil resources, 543–544 [Pgs. 543–544 include portions of [Doc. 242](#), [Doc. 243](#), and [Doc. 244](#)], 548–553 [Pgs. 548–553 include portions of [Doc. 247](#), [Doc. 248](#), and [Doc. 249](#)]

U.S.–British cooperation, 543–544 [Pgs. 543–544 include portions of [Doc. 242](#), [Doc. 243](#), and [Doc. 244](#)], 548–553 [Pgs. 548–553 include portions of [Doc. 247](#), [Doc. 248](#), and [Doc. 249](#)]

Hensel, H. Struve, 739–740 [Pgs. 739–740 include portions of [Doc. 310](#) and [Doc. 311](#)], 743 [Pg. 743 is part of [Doc. 313](#)]

Herter, Christian A., 459–460 [Pgs. 459–460 include portions of [Doc. 196](#), [Doc. 197](#), and [Doc. 198](#)], 496 [Pg. 496 includes portions of [Doc. 219](#) and [Doc. 220](#)], 497n [Pg. 497 is part of [Doc. 220](#)], 524n [Pg. 524 is part of [Doc. 229](#)], 543–544 [Pgs. 543–544 include portions of [Doc. 242](#), [Doc. 243](#), and [Doc. 244](#)], 559 [Pg. 559 is part of [Doc. 253](#)], 1039–1040 [Pgs. 1039–1040 include portions of [Doc. 453](#) and [Doc. 454](#)], 1058–1059 [Pgs. 1058–1059 include portions of [Doc. 458](#), [Doc. 459](#), and [Doc. 460](#)]

Eisenhower Doctrine, 525–527 [Pgs. 525–527 include portions of [Doc. 229](#), [Doc. 230](#), [Doc. 231](#), and [Doc. 232](#)], 529–530 [Pgs. 529–530 include portions of [Doc. 233](#), [Doc. 234](#), and [Doc. 235](#)], 534 [Pg. 534 includes portions of [Doc. 237](#) and [Doc. 238](#)], 537 [Pg. 537 is part of [Doc. 239](#)]

Oil resources, 458–459 [Pgs. 458–459 include portions of [Doc. 196](#) and [Doc. 197](#)], 496 [Pg. 496 includes portions of [Doc. 219](#) and [Doc. 220](#)], 543–544 [Pgs. 543–544 include portions of [Doc. 242](#), [Doc. 243](#), and [Doc. 244](#)], 932–933 [Pgs. 932–933 include portions of [Doc. 400](#) and [Doc. 401](#)], 937 [Pg. 937 includes portions of [Doc. 402](#) and [Doc. 403](#)]

Hildreth, Horace A., 56–57 [Pgs. 56–57 include portions of [Doc. 37](#) and [Doc. 38](#)], 60–61 [Pgs. 60–61 include portions of [Doc. 40](#) and [Doc. 41](#)], 277 [Pg. 277 is part of [Doc. 116](#)], 321 [Pg. 321 is part of [Doc. 138](#)]

Hill, George H., Jr., 723–726 [Pgs. 723–726 include portions of [Doc. 303](#) and [Doc. 304](#)]

Hoar, 279 [Pg. 279 includes portions of [Doc. 117](#) and [Doc. 118](#)]

Holland, Henry, 479–481 [Pg. 479 is part of [Doc. 209](#)]

Hollister, John B., 208 [Pg. 208 is part of [Doc. 84](#)], 793–796 [Pgs. 793–796 include portions of [Doc. 343](#) and [Doc. 344](#)], 798 [Pg. 798 includes portions of [Doc. 346](#) and [Doc. 347](#)], 856–857 [Pgs. 856–857 include portions of [Doc. 371](#) and [Doc.](#)

[372](#)], 859 [Pg. 859 includes portions of [Doc. 372](#) and [Doc. 373](#)], 884 [Pg. 884 includes portions of [Doc. 385](#) and [Doc. 386](#)], 895 [Pg. 895 is part of [Doc. 391](#)]

Holman, Eugene, 482 [Pg. 482 is part of [Doc. 210](#)]

Holmes, Henry A., 709 [Pg. 709 includes portions of [Doc. 297](#) and [Doc. 298](#)]

Home, Lord, 467 [Pg. 467 is part of [Doc. 203](#)]

Hood, Viscount Samuel, 1069 [Pg. 1069 is part of [Doc. 464](#)]

Hooper, Robin William John, 7–8 [Pgs. 7–8 include portions of [Doc. 6](#) and [Doc. 7](#)]

Hoover, Herbert, Jr., 9 [Pg. 9 is part of [Doc. 8](#)], 62n [Pg. 62 is part of [Doc. 42](#)], 134n [Pg. 134 is part of [Doc. 59](#)], 330n [Pg. 330 includes portions of [Doc. 143](#) and [Doc. 144](#)], 367n [Pg. 367 is part of [Doc. 156](#)], 368n [Pg. 368 is part of [Doc. 157](#)], 410n [Pg. 410 is part of [Doc. 171](#)], 618 [Pg. 618 includes portions of [Doc. 268](#) and [Doc. 269](#)], 755n [Pg. 755 includes portions of [Doc. 319](#) and [Doc. 320](#)], 773n [Pg. 773 is part of [Doc. 330](#)]

Baghdad Pact, 38–41 [Pgs. 38–41 include portions of [Doc. 25](#), [Doc. 26](#), [Doc. 27](#), and [Doc. 28](#)], 58–60 [Pgs. 58–60 include portions of [Doc. 39](#), [Doc. 40](#), and [Doc. 41](#)], 133 [Pg. 133 includes portions of [Doc. 57](#) and [Doc. 58](#)], 177–178 [Pgs. 177–178 include portions of [Doc. 71](#), [Doc. 72](#), and [Doc. 73](#)], 180–182 [Pgs. 180–182 include portions of [Doc. 74](#), [Doc. 75](#), [Doc. 76](#), [Doc. 77](#), and [Doc. 78](#)], 198 [Pg. 198 is part of [Doc. 79](#)], 211 [Pg. 211 includes portions of [Doc. 85](#) and [Doc. 86](#)], 243 [Pg. 243 is part of [Doc. 95](#)], 250n [Pg. 250 is part of [Doc. 99](#)], 769–770 [Pgs. 769–770 include portions of [Doc. 327](#) and [Doc. 328](#)]

U.S. participation, 263n [Pg. 263 is part of [Doc. 105](#)], 312 [Pg. 312 is part of [Doc. 134](#)], 324 [Pg. 324 includes portions of [Doc. 140](#) and [Doc. 141](#)], 325n [Pg. 325 includes portions of [Doc. 141](#) and [Doc. 142](#)], 331 [Pg. 331 includes portions of [Doc. 144](#) and [Doc. 145](#)], 338–339 [Pg. 338 is part of [Doc. 146](#)], 797 [Pg. 797 includes portions of [Doc. 345](#) and [Doc. 346](#)]

Egyptian–Syrian–Saudi (ESS) Pact, 27–28 [Pgs. 27–28 include portions of [Doc. 18](#), [Doc. 19](#), and [Doc. 20](#)], 38–40 [Pgs. 38–40 include portions of [Doc. 25](#), [Doc. 26](#), and [Doc. 27](#)], 142 [Pg. 142 is part of [Doc. 60](#)], 178–179 [Pgs. 178–179 include portions of [Doc. 72](#), [Doc. 73](#), and [Doc. 74](#)]

Eisenhower Doctrine, 322–323 [Pgs. 322–323 include portions of [Doc. 138](#), [Doc. 139](#), and [Doc. 140](#)], 398 [Pg. 398 is part of [Doc. 168](#)], 412 [Pg. 412 includes portions of [Doc. 171](#) and [Doc. 172](#)], 415–416 [Pg. 415 is part of [Doc. 175](#)]

Iran, 711–712 [Pgs. 711–712 include portions of [Doc. 299](#) and [Doc. 300](#)], 723–726 [Pgs. 723–726 include portions of [Doc. 303](#) and [Doc. 304](#)], 738 [Pg. 738 includes portions of [Doc. 308](#) and [Doc. 309](#)], 770 [Pg. 770 includes portions of [Doc. 327](#) and [Doc. 328](#)], 772 [Pg. 772 is part of [Doc. 329](#)], 844–845 [Pgs. 844–845 include portions of [Doc. 362](#), [Doc. 363](#), and [Doc. 364](#)]

Soviet bloc, relations with, 806–807 [Pg. 806 is part of [Doc. 351](#)], 827–828 [Pgs. 827–828 include portions of [Doc. 357](#) and [Doc. 358](#)], 837 [Pg. 837 is part of [Doc. 359](#)], 839 [Pg. 839 includes portions of [Doc. 359](#) and [Doc. 360](#)]

U.S. economic aid to, 241 [Pg. 241 is part of [Doc. 94](#)], 790 [Pg. 790 is part of [Doc. 342](#)], 805 [Pg. 805 is part of [Doc. 350](#)], 813–814 [Pgs. 813–814 include portions of [Doc. 353](#) and [Doc. 354](#)], 820 [Pg. 820 is part of [Doc. 357](#)], 826–827 [Pg. 826 is part of [Doc. 357](#)], 848 [Pg. 848 includes portions of [Doc. 365](#) and [Doc. 366](#)], 849ⁿ [Pg. 849 is part of [Doc. 366](#)], 856 [Pg. 856 is part of [Doc. 371](#)]

U.S. military aid to, 686–687 [Pg. 686 is part of [Doc. 290](#)], 696–697 [Pgs. 696–697 include portions of [Doc. 291](#) and [Doc. 292](#)], 698 [Pg. 698 is part of [Doc. 293](#)], 700 [Pg. 700 includes portions of [Doc. 293](#) and [Doc. 294](#)], 701 [Pg. 701 is part of [Doc. 294](#)]ⁿ, 702 [Pg. 702 is part

of [Doc. 295](#)], 708 [Pg. 708 includes portions of [Doc. 296](#) and [Doc. 297](#)], 742–744 [Pgs. 742–744 include portions of [Doc. 312](#) and [Doc. 313](#)], 747 [Pg. 747 includes portions of [Doc. 314](#) and [Doc. 315](#)], 826–827 [Pg. 826 is part of [Doc. 357](#)]

Near East:

U.S. military aid to, 211 [Pg. 211 includes portions of [Doc. 85](#) and [Doc. 86](#)], 366 [Pg. 366 is part of [Doc. 156](#)], 802 [Pg. 802 is part of [Doc. 349](#)], 992–994 [Pgs. 992–994 include portions of [Doc. 429](#), [Doc. 430](#), [Doc. 431](#), and [Doc. 432](#)], 1014–1015 [Pgs. 1014–1015 include portions of [Doc. 438](#), [Doc. 439](#), and [Doc. 440](#)], 1021–1022 [Pg. 1021 is part of [Doc. 442](#)]

U.S. policy toward, 324ⁿ [Pg. 324 includes portions of [Doc. 140](#) and [Doc. 141](#)], 343 [Pg. 343 is part of [Doc. 148](#)], 351–352 [Pgs. 351–352 include portions of [Doc. 148](#) and [Doc. 149](#)], 393–394 [Pg. 393 is part of [Doc. 165](#)], 441 [Pg. 441 includes portions of [Doc. 186](#) and [Doc. 187](#)]

Oil resources, 310–311 [Pg. 310 is part of [Doc. 133](#)], 316 [Pg. 316 includes portions of [Doc. 135](#) and [Doc. 136](#)], 417–419 [Pgs. 417–419 include portions of [Doc. 175](#), [Doc. 176](#), and [Doc. 177](#)], 442–444 [Pgs. 442–444 include portions of [Doc. 187](#) and [Doc. 188](#)], 711–712 [Pgs. 711–712 include portions of [Doc. 299](#) and [Doc. 300](#)], 723–726 [Pgs. 723–726 include portions of [Doc. 303](#) and [Doc. 304](#)], 738 [Pg. 738 includes portions of [Doc. 308](#) and [Doc. 309](#)]

Regional defense, 13–14 [Pg. 13 is part of [Doc. 10](#)], 54 [Pg. 54 is part of [Doc. 36](#)], 59–60 [Pgs. 59–60 include portions of [Doc. 39](#), [Doc. 40](#), and [Doc. 41](#)], 63 [Pg. 63 includes portions of [Doc. 42](#) and [Doc. 43](#)], 99 [Pg. 99 is part of [Doc. 47](#)], 102 [Pg. 102 includes portions of [Doc. 47](#) and [Doc. 48](#)], 129ⁿ [Pg. 129 includes portions of [Doc. 55](#) and [Doc. 56](#)], 153 [Pg. 153 is part of [Doc. 62](#)], 683 [Pg. 683 is part of [Doc. 288](#)], 706 [Pg. 706 is part of [Doc. 296](#)]

U.S.–British talks, 103–112 [*Pgs. 103–112 include portions of [Doc. 48](#), [Doc. 49](#), [Doc. 50](#), and [Doc. 51](#)*], 117 [*Pg. 117 is part of [Doc. 51](#)*], 121–122 [*Pg. 121 is part of [Doc. 51](#)*], 127 [*Pg. 127 includes portions of [Doc. 54](#) and [Doc. 55](#)*], 130 [*Pg. 130 is part of [Doc. 56](#)*], 132–133 [*Pgs. 132–133 include portions of [Doc. 56](#), [Doc. 57](#), and [Doc. 58](#)*], 135–151 [*Pg. 135 is part of [Doc. 60](#)*]

Suez crisis, 340–342 [*Pg. 340 is part of [Doc. 147](#)*], 351–352 [*Pgs. 351–352 include portions of [Doc. 148](#) and [Doc. 149](#)*], 442 [*Pg. 442 is part of [Doc. 187](#)*], 844–845 [*Pgs. 844–845 include portions of [Doc. 362](#), [Doc. 363](#), and [Doc. 364](#)*]

Hope, O.P., 464 [*Pg. 464 is part of [Doc. 202](#)*]

Houston, Edward, 863 [*Pg. 863 includes portions of [Doc. 374](#) and [Doc. 375](#)*]

Howe, Fisher, 282*n* [*Pg. 282 includes portions of [Doc. 120](#) and [Doc. 121](#)*], 323–324 [*Pgs. 323–324 include portions of [Doc. 139](#), [Doc. 140](#), and [Doc. 141](#)*], 534*n* [*Pg. 534 includes portions of [Doc. 237](#) and [Doc. 238](#)*], 535 [*Pg. 535 is part of [Doc. 238](#)*], 537 [*Pg. 537 is part of [Doc. 239](#)*], 890 *n* [*Pg. 890 is part of [Doc. 389](#)*]

Howison, John M., 559 [*Pg. 559 is part of [Doc. 253](#)*]

Hoyer Millar, Frederick, 464 [*Pg. 464 is part of [Doc. 202](#)*], 466 [*Pg. 466 is part of [Doc. 203](#)*]

Hughes, Rowland R., 208 [*Pg. 208 is part of [Doc. 84](#)*], 803–804 [*Pg. 803 is part of [Doc. 349](#)*]

Humphrey, George M., 160–161 [*Pg. 160 is part of [Doc. 66](#)*], 164 [*Pg. 164 is part of [Doc. 66](#)*], 167 [*Pg. 167 is part of [Doc. 66](#)*], 208 [*Pg. 208 is part of [Doc. 84](#)*], 308–309 [*Pg. 308 is part of [Doc. 132](#)*], 340–342 [*Pg. 340 is part of [Doc. 147](#)*], 686 [*Pg. 686 is part of [Doc. 290](#)*]

Iran, 686 [*Pg. 686 is part of [Doc. 290](#)*], 776 [*Pg. 776 includes portions of [Doc. 331](#) and [Doc. 332](#)*], 777*n* [*Pg. 777 is part of [Doc. 332](#)*],

804 [Pg. 804 is part of [Doc. 349](#)], 850 [Pg. 850 is part of [Doc. 367](#)],
896–898 [Pg. 896 is part of [Doc. 391](#)]

Hungarian revolution, 411 [Pg. 411 is part of [Doc. 171](#)], 414 [Pg. 414 is part
of [Doc. 174](#)], 432–433 [Pg. 432 is part of [Doc. 182](#)]

Husain, A., 559 [Pg. 559 is part of [Doc. 253](#)]

Hussein, Ahmad, 653 [Pg. 653 is part of [Doc. 274](#)]

Hussein, King (*see also* [Jordan](#)), 37–38 [Pgs. 37–38 include portions of
[Doc. 25](#) and [Doc. 26](#)], 212 [Pg. 212 includes portions of [Doc. 86](#) and [Doc. 87](#)],
218–219 [Pg. 218 is part of [Doc. 91](#)], 263 [Pg. 263 is part of [Doc. 105](#)], 524 [Pg.
524 is part of [Doc. 229](#)], 621 [Pg. 621 is part of [Doc. 270](#)]

Ide, Carter, 863 [Pg. 863 includes portions of [Doc. 374](#) and [Doc. 375](#)]

Idris I, King, 486 [Pg. 486 is part of [Doc. 212](#)]

India, 63 [Pg. 63 includes portions of [Doc. 42](#) and [Doc. 43](#)], 92–93 [Pg. 92 is part
of [Doc. 46](#)], 224 [Pg. 224 is part of [Doc. 91](#)], 239 [Pg. 239 is part of [Doc. 93](#)], 406
[Pg. 406 is part of [Doc. 170](#)], 616 [Pg. 616 is part of [Doc. 267](#)], 643 [Pg. 643 is
part of [Doc. 270](#)], 810 [Pg. 810 is part of [Doc. 352](#)]

Pakistan, relations with (*see also* [Kashmir dispute](#)), 83–
84 [Pg. 83 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 95*n* [Pg. 95 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 389
[Pg. 389 is part of [Doc. 162](#)], 404 [Pg. 404 is part of [Doc. 170](#)], 490
[Pg. 490 is part of [Doc. 215](#)]

United States, relations with, 297 [Pg. 297 includes portions of
[Doc. 127](#) and [Doc. 128](#)], 301 [Pg. 301 is part of [Doc. 130](#)], 303–305
[Pg. 303 is part of [Doc. 131](#)], 389 [Pg. 389 is part of [Doc. 162](#)], 393
[Pg. 393 is part of [Doc. 165](#)], 400 [Pg. 400 is part of [Doc. 169](#)], 1022
[Pg. 1022 is part of [Doc. 442](#)]

Indonesia, 501 [Pg. 501 is part of [Doc. 220](#)]

Interdepartmental Committee on Certain U.S. Aid Programs. *See*
[Prochnow Committee](#).

Interior, U.S. Department of the, 574–575 [Pgs. 574–575 include portions of [Doc. 257](#) and [Doc. 258](#)], 592–593 [Pg. 592 is part of [Doc. 265](#)]

International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), 347 [Pg. 347 is part of [Doc. 148](#)], 395 [Pg. 395 includes portions of [Doc. 165](#) and [Doc. 166](#)], 665 [Pg. 665 is part of [Doc. 279](#)]

Iran, 695 [Pg. 695 is part of [Doc. 291](#)], 777 [Pg. 777 is part of [Doc. 332](#)], 845–846 [Pgs. 845–846 include portions of [Doc. 363](#) and [Doc. 364](#)], 848–849 [Pgs. 848–849 include portions of [Doc. 365](#) and [Doc. 366](#)], 852–854 [Pgs. 852–854 include portions of [Doc. 368](#), [Doc. 369](#), and [Doc. 370](#)], 864–865 [Pg. 864 is part of [Doc. 375](#)], 874 [Pg. 874 includes portions of [Doc. 380](#) and [Doc. 381](#)], 877 [Pg. 877 is part of [Doc. 381](#)]

International Cooperation Administration (ICA), 284 [Pg. 284 is part of [Doc. 122](#)], 416 [Pg. 416 is part of [Doc. 175](#)], 491 [Pg. 491 includes portions of [Doc. 215](#) and [Doc. 216](#)], 492 [Pg. 492 is part of [Doc. 216](#)], 776n [Pg. 776 includes portions of [Doc. 331](#) and [Doc. 332](#)], 848 [Pg. 848 includes portions of [Doc. 365](#) and [Doc. 366](#)], 851n [Pg. 851 includes portions of [Doc. 367](#) and [Doc. 368](#)], 896 [Pg. 896 is part of [Doc. 391](#)], 951 [Pg. 951 includes portions of [Doc. 409](#) and [Doc. 410](#)], 953–954 [Pgs. 953–954 include portions of [Doc. 410](#), [Doc. 411](#), and [Doc. 412](#)], 956n [Pg. 956 includes portions of [Doc. 412](#) and [Doc. 413](#)]

International Court of Justice (ICJ), 496 [Pg. 496 includes portions of [Doc. 219](#) and [Doc. 220](#)], 562 [Pg. 562 is part of [Doc. 253](#)], 630 [Pg. 630 is part of [Doc. 270](#)]

Iran (see also [Baghdad Pact](#); Iranian subheadings under other subjects; Oil resources: Alternate pipeline proposals):

Bahrein, relations with, 281 [Pg. 281 is part of [Doc. 119](#)], 766 [Pg. 766 includes portions of [Doc. 325](#) and [Doc. 326](#)], 768 [Pg. 768 is part of [Doc. 326](#)], 772–773 [Pgs. 772–773 include portions of [Doc. 329](#) and [Doc. 330](#)], 822 [Pg. 822 is part of [Doc. 357](#)], 824 [Pg. 824 is part of [Doc. 357](#)], 939–940 [Pgs. 939–940 include portions of [Doc. 404](#) and [Doc. 405](#)]

Economic situation, 110 [Pg. 110 is part of [Doc. 49](#)], 223 [Pg. 223 is part of [Doc. 91](#)], 241 [Pg. 241 is part of [Doc. 94](#)], 311 [Pg. 311 is part of [Doc. 133](#)], 716–717 [Pg. 716 is part of [Doc. 302](#)], 828–829 [Pgs. 828–829 include portions of [Doc. 357](#) and [Doc. 358](#)], 832–834 [Pg. 832 is part of [Doc. 358](#)], 870 [Pg. 870 is part of [Doc. 377](#)], 876–877 [Pg. 876 is part of [Doc. 381](#)], 903 [Pg. 903 is part of [Doc. 392](#)], 928–929 [Pgs. 928–929 include portions of [Doc. 398](#) and [Doc. 399](#)]

Egypt, relations with, 876 [Pg. 876 is part of [Doc. 381](#)]

Internal security, 213 [Pg. 213 is part of [Doc. 87](#)], 678 [Pg. 678 is part of [Doc. 286](#)], 693 [Pg. 693 is part of [Doc. 291](#)], 733–738 [Pgs. 733–738 include portions of [Doc. 307](#), [Doc. 308](#), and [Doc. 309](#)], 736 [Pg. 736 is part of [Doc. 308](#)], 770–772 [Pgs. 770–772 include portions of [Doc. 327](#), [Doc. 328](#), and [Doc. 329](#)], 771 [Pg. 771 is part of [Doc. 328](#)], 799 [Pg. 799 includes portions of [Doc. 347](#) and [Doc. 348](#)], 803 [Pg. 803 is part of [Doc. 349](#)], 902 [Pg. 902 is part of [Doc. 392](#)]

Middle East Charter proposal, 393 [Pg. 393 is part of [Doc. 165](#)]

Neutralism, 683 [Pg. 683 is part of [Doc. 288](#)], 684 [Pg. 684 is part of [Doc. 289](#)], 692 [Pg. 692 is part of [Doc. 291](#)], 926 [Pg. 926 is part of [Doc. 398](#)], 928 [Pg. 928 includes portions of [Doc. 398](#) and [Doc. 399](#)]

Oil resources, 308 [Pg. 308 is part of [Doc. 132](#)], 311 [Pg. 311 is part of [Doc. 133](#)], 498 [Pg. 498 is part of [Doc. 220](#)], 677 [Pg. 677 is part of [Doc. 286](#)], 691–695 [Pg. 691 is part of [Doc. 291](#)], 775–778 [Pgs. 775–778 include portions of [Doc. 330](#), [Doc. 331](#), [Doc. 332](#), and [Doc. 333](#)], 790 [Pg. 790 is part of [Doc. 342](#)], 828–829 [Pgs. 828–829 include portions of [Doc. 357](#) and [Doc. 358](#)], 847 [Pg. 847 is part of [Doc. 365](#)], 876–877 [Pg. 876 is part of [Doc. 381](#)], 903 [Pg. 903 is part of [Doc. 392](#)], 920–922 [Pgs. 920–922 include portions of [Doc. 393](#), [Doc. 394](#), [Doc. 395](#), and [Doc. 396](#)]

Italian agreement, 920–922 [Pgs. 920–922 include portions of [Doc. 393](#), [Doc. 394](#), [Doc. 395](#), and [Doc. 396](#)],

932–934 [Pgs. 932–934 include portions of [Doc. 400](#), [Doc. 401](#), and [Doc. 402](#)], 937–938 [Pgs. 937–938 include portions of [Doc. 402](#) and [Doc. 403](#)], 941 [Pg. 941 includes portions of [Doc. 405](#) and [Doc. 406](#)], 945–946 [Pgs. 945–946 include portions of [Doc. 407](#) and [Doc. 408](#)]

Political situation, 875 [Pg. 875 is part of [Doc. 381](#)], 878–881 [Pgs. 878–881 include portions of [Doc. 381](#), [Doc. 382](#), and [Doc. 383](#)], 905–906 [Pg. 905 is part of [Doc. 392](#)], 952–953 [Pgs. 952–953 include portions of [Doc. 410](#) and [Doc. 411](#)]

Baghdad Pact and, 110 [Pg. 110 is part of [Doc. 49](#)], 262 [Pg. 262 is part of [Doc. 105](#)], 296 [Pg. 296 is part of [Doc. 127](#)], 778–780 [Pgs. 778–780 include portions of [Doc. 332](#), [Doc. 333](#), and [Doc. 334](#)], 783–784 [Pgs. 783–784 include portions of [Doc. 336](#) and [Doc. 337](#)]

Internal security and, 734 [Pg. 734 is part of [Doc. 308](#)], 770–771 [Pgs. 770–771 include portions of [Doc. 327](#) and [Doc. 328](#)], 902 [Pg. 902 is part of [Doc. 392](#)]

Mossadeq, fall of, 136 [Pg. 136 is part of [Doc. 60](#)], 690 [Pg. 690 is part of [Doc. 291](#)], 818 [Pg. 818 is part of [Doc. 356](#)], 841 [Pg. 841 is part of [Doc. 361](#)], 917–918 [Pg. 917 is part of [Doc. 393](#)]

Shah control of, 84 [Pg. 84 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 137 [Pg. 137 is part of [Doc. 60](#)], 690–691 [Pg. 690 is part of [Doc. 291](#)], 726–729 [Pgs. 726–729 include portions of [Doc. 303](#), [Doc. 304](#), and [Doc. 305](#)], 751 [Pg. 751 is part of [Doc. 317](#)], 816–818 [Pgs. 816–818 include portions of [Doc. 355](#) and [Doc. 356](#)], 817 [Pg. 817 is part of [Doc. 356](#)], 871 [Pg. 871 includes portions of [Doc. 377](#) and [Doc. 378](#)], 902 [Pg. 902 is part of [Doc. 392](#)], 911 [Pg. 911 is part of [Doc. 393](#)], 928 [Pg. 928 includes portions of [Doc. 398](#) and [Doc. 399](#)], 940–941 [Pgs. 940–941 include portions of [Doc. 404](#), [Doc. 405](#), and [Doc. 406](#)]

Tudeh movement, suppression of, 84 [Pg. 84 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 92 [Pg. 92 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 105 [Pg. 105 is part of [Doc. 49](#)], 818 [Pg. 818 is part of [Doc. 356](#)], 902 [Pg. 902 is part of [Doc. 392](#)]

U.S. aid and, 715–717 [Pg. 715 is part of [Doc. 302](#)], 736–737 [Pg. 736 is part of [Doc. 308](#)], 747–748 [Pgs. 747–748 include portions of [Doc. 314](#), [Doc. 315](#), and [Doc. 316](#)], 776 [Pg. 776 includes portions of [Doc. 331](#) and [Doc. 332](#)], 778–780 [Pgs. 778–780 include portions of [Doc. 332](#), [Doc. 333](#), and [Doc. 334](#)], 790 [Pg. 790 is part of [Doc. 342](#)], 812 [Pg. 812 is part of [Doc. 353](#)], 818–819 [Pg. 818 is part of [Doc. 356](#)], 903–904 [Pg. 903 is part of [Doc. 392](#)]

U.S. reform encouragement, 695 [Pg. 695 is part of [Doc. 291](#)], 737 [Pg. 737 is part of [Doc. 308](#)], 819 [Pg. 819 is part of [Doc. 356](#)], 907 [Pg. 907 is part of [Doc. 392](#)]

U.S. study of Shah, 910–920 [Pgs. 910–920 include portions of [Doc. 392](#), [Doc. 393](#), and [Doc. 394](#)]

Saudi Arabia, relations with, 867 [Pg. 867 is part of [Doc. 376](#)], 869 [Pg. 869 is part of [Doc. 377](#)], 894 [Pg. 894 is part of [Doc. 391](#)], 942 [Pg. 942 is part of [Doc. 406](#)]

Soviet bloc, relations with, 107 [Pg. 107 is part of [Doc. 49](#)], 802 [Pg. 802 is part of [Doc. 349](#)], 919 [Pg. 919 is part of [Doc. 393](#)], 942 [Pg. 942 is part of [Doc. 406](#)], 952–953 [Pgs. 952–953 include portions of [Doc. 410](#) and [Doc. 411](#)],

Four–power guarantee offer, 797 [Pg. 797 includes portions of [Doc. 345](#) and [Doc. 346](#)], 801 [Pg. 801 includes portions of [Doc. 348](#) and [Doc. 349](#)], 806–807 [Pg. 806 is part of [Doc. 351](#)]

Shah’s Moscow visit, 273 [Pg. 273 is part of [Doc. 114](#)], 748–750 [Pgs. 748–750 include portions of [Doc. 315](#), [Doc. 316](#), and [Doc. 317](#)], 753–755 [Pgs. 753–755

include portions of [Doc. 318](#), [Doc. 319](#), and [Doc. 320](#)], 759–761 [Pgs. 759–761 include portions of [Doc. 321](#), [Doc. 322](#), and [Doc. 323](#)], 820–821 [Pg. 820 is part of [Doc. 357](#)], 823–825 [Pg. 823 is part of [Doc. 357](#)], 827–828 [Pgs. 827–828 include portions of [Doc. 357](#) and [Doc. 358](#)], 837–841 [Pgs. 837–841 include portions of [Doc. 359](#), [Doc. 360](#), and [Doc. 361](#)], 869 [Pg. 869 is part of [Doc. 377](#)], 912 [Pg. 912 is part of [Doc. 393](#)], 926 [Pg. 926 is part of [Doc. 398](#)]

Soviet aid, 273–274 [Pg. 273 is part of [Doc. 114](#)], 822 [Pg. 822 is part of [Doc. 357](#)], 824 [Pg. 824 is part of [Doc. 357](#)], 850 [Pg. 850 is part of [Doc. 367](#)], 904 [Pg. 904 is part of [Doc. 392](#)], 951 [Pg. 951 includes portions of [Doc. 409](#) and [Doc. 410](#)]

Soviet–Iranian agreement, 1954, 733 [Pg. 733 includes portions of [Doc. 307](#) and [Doc. 308](#)], 748 [Pg. 748 includes portions of [Doc. 315](#) and [Doc. 316](#)], 751 [Pg. 751 is part of [Doc. 317](#)], 774 [Pg. 774 is part of [Doc. 330](#)], 876 [Pg. 876 is part of [Doc. 381](#)]

Turkey, relations with, 705 [Pg. 705 is part of [Doc. 296](#)], 760–761 [Pgs. 760–761 include portions of [Doc. 322](#) and [Doc. 323](#)], 764 [Pg. 764 is part of [Doc. 324](#)], 766 [Pg. 766 includes portions of [Doc. 325](#) and [Doc. 326](#)]

United Kingdom, relations with, 84 [Pg. 84 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 151 [Pg. 151 is part of [Doc. 60](#)], 901 [Pg. 901 is part of [Doc. 392](#)], 913 [Pg. 913 is part of [Doc. 393](#)], 918 [Pg. 918 is part of [Doc. 393](#)]

Bahrein, 281 [Pg. 281 is part of [Doc. 119](#)], 766 [Pg. 766 includes portions of [Doc. 325](#) and [Doc. 326](#)], 768 [Pg. 768 is part of [Doc. 326](#)], 772–773 [Pgs. 772–773 include portions of [Doc. 329](#) and [Doc. 330](#)], 822 [Pg. 822 is part of [Doc. 357](#)], 824 [Pg. 824 is part of [Doc. 357](#)], 939–940 [Pgs. 939–940 include portions of [Doc. 404](#) and [Doc. 405](#)], 961 [Pg. 961 is part of [Doc. 415](#)]

Oil industry, 80 [Pg. 80 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 143 [Pg. 143 is part of [Doc. 60](#)], 223 [Pg. 223 is part of [Doc. 91](#)], 677 [Pg. 677 is part of [Doc. 286](#)], 684 [Pg. 684 is part of [Doc. 289](#)], 690 [Pg. 690 is part of [Doc. 291](#)], 695 [Pg. 695 is part of [Doc. 291](#)], 876 [Pg. 876 is part of [Doc. 381](#)]

United States, relations with, 95 [Pg. 95 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 321 [Pg. 321 is part of [Doc. 138](#)], 678 [Pg. 678 is part of [Doc. 286](#)], 697–700 [Pgs. 697–700 include portions of [Doc. 292](#), [Doc. 293](#), and [Doc. 294](#)], 790–791 [Pg. 790 is part of [Doc. 342](#)], 818 [Pg. 818 is part of [Doc. 356](#)], 901 [Pg. 901 is part of [Doc. 392](#)]

Oil companies, 143 [Pg. 143 is part of [Doc. 60](#)], 274 [Pg. 274 is part of [Doc. 114](#)], 695 [Pg. 695 is part of [Doc. 291](#)], 711–713 [Pgs. 711–713 include portions of [Doc. 299](#) and [Doc. 300](#)], 723–726 [Pgs. 723–726 include portions of [Doc. 303](#) and [Doc. 304](#)], 738 [Pg. 738 includes portions of [Doc. 308](#) and [Doc. 309](#)], 815–816 [Pgs. 815–816 include portions of [Doc. 355](#) and [Doc. 356](#)], 868–871 [Pgs. 868–871 include portions of [Doc. 376](#), [Doc. 377](#), and [Doc. 378](#)], 873 [Pg. 873 is part of [Doc. 379](#)], 881–885 [Pgs. 881–885 include portions of [Doc. 382](#), [Doc. 383](#), [Doc. 384](#), [Doc. 385](#), and [Doc. 386](#)], 920–922 [Pgs. 920–922 include portions of [Doc. 393](#), [Doc. 394](#), [Doc. 395](#), and [Doc. 396](#)], 926 [Pg. 926 is part of [Doc. 398](#)], 932–934 [Pgs. 932–934 include portions of [Doc. 400](#), [Doc. 401](#), and [Doc. 402](#)], 937–938 [Pgs. 937–938 include portions of [Doc. 402](#) and [Doc. 403](#)], 941 [Pg. 941 includes portions of [Doc. 405](#) and [Doc. 406](#)], 945–946 [Pgs. 945–946 include portions of [Doc. 407](#) and [Doc. 408](#)]

U.S. economic aid to (see also [U.S. military aid to below](#)), 281 [Pg. 281 is part of [Doc. 119](#)], 715 [Pg. 715 is part of [Doc. 302](#)], 717–719 [Pg. 717 is part of [Doc. 302](#)], 751 [Pg. 751 is part of [Doc. 317](#)], 792 [Pg. 792 includes portions of [Doc. 342](#) and [Doc. 343](#)], 811–814 [Pgs. 811–814 include portions of [Doc. 352](#), [Doc. 353](#), and [Doc. 354](#)], 854–857 [Pgs. 854–857 include portions of [Doc. 369](#),

[Doc. 370](#), [Doc. 371](#), and [Doc. 372](#)], 946–948 [Pgs. 946–948 include portions of [Doc. 407](#) and [Doc. 408](#)], 956–959 [Pgs. 956–959 include portions of [Doc. 412](#), [Doc. 413](#), and [Doc. 414](#)]

Baghdad Pact adherence and, 164 [Pg. 164 is part of [Doc. 66](#)], 227 [Pg. 227 is part of [Doc. 91](#)], 236 [Pg. 236 is part of [Doc. 93](#)], 241–242 [Pg. 241 is part of [Doc. 94](#)], 247 [Pg. 247 is part of [Doc. 97](#)], 252 [Pg. 252 includes portions of [Doc. 100](#) and [Doc. 101](#)], 266 [Pg. 266 is part of [Doc. 108](#)], 304 [Pg. 304 is part of [Doc. 131](#)], 469 [Pg. 469 is part of [Doc. 203](#)], 774 [Pg. 774 is part of [Doc. 330](#)], 790 [Pg. 790 is part of [Doc. 342](#)], 808–809 [Pg. 808 is part of [Doc. 352](#)], 820–823 [Pg. 820 is part of [Doc. 357](#)], 826 [Pg. 826 is part of [Doc. 357](#)], 860–861 [Pgs. 860–861 include portions of [Doc. 373](#) and [Doc. 374](#)], 925 [Pg. 925 is part of [Doc. 397](#)]

Congressional criticism, 884 [Pg. 884 includes portions of [Doc. 385](#) and [Doc. 386](#)], 895 [Pg. 895 is part of [Doc. 391](#)]

Eisenhower Doctrine and, 923 [Pg. 923 is part of [Doc. 396](#)], 930–931 [Pg. 930 is part of [Doc. 399](#)]

JCS position, 792–793 [Pgs. 792–793 include portions of [Doc. 342](#), [Doc. 343](#), and [Doc. 344](#)], 802 [Pg. 802 is part of [Doc. 349](#)]

NSC discussions, 802 [Pg. 802 is part of [Doc. 349](#)], 891 [Pg. 891 includes portions of [Doc. 389](#) and [Doc. 390](#)], 904 [Pg. 904 is part of [Doc. 392](#)], 906 [Pg. 906 is part of [Doc. 392](#)]

Oil revenues and, 241 [Pg. 241 is part of [Doc. 94](#)], 691–692 [Pg. 691 is part of [Doc. 291](#)], 695 [Pg. 695 is part of [Doc. 291](#)], 776–778 [Pgs. 776–778 include portions of [Doc. 331](#), [Doc. 332](#), and [Doc. 333](#)], 790 [Pg. 790 is part of [Doc. 342](#)], 791 [Pg. 791 is part of [Doc. 342](#)],

798 [Pg. 798 includes portions of [Doc. 346](#) and [Doc. 347](#)], 800 [Pg. 800 is part of [Doc. 348](#)], 804–805 [Pgs. 804–805 include portions of [Doc. 349](#) and [Doc. 350](#)], 810 [Pg. 810 is part of [Doc. 352](#)], 812 [Pg. 812 is part of [Doc. 353](#)], 845–846 [Pgs. 845–846 include portions of [Doc. 363](#) and [Doc. 364](#)], 848–849 [Pgs. 848–849 include portions of [Doc. 365](#) and [Doc. 366](#)], 851–854 [Pgs. 851–854 include portions of [Doc. 367](#), [Doc. 368](#), [Doc. 369](#), and [Doc. 370](#)], 863–865 [Pgs. 863–865 include portions of [Doc. 374](#) and [Doc. 375](#)], 874 [Pg. 874 includes portions of [Doc. 380](#) and [Doc. 381](#)], 957 [Pg. 957 is part of [Doc. 413](#)]

Political situation and, 717 [Pg. 717 is part of [Doc. 302](#)], 736–737 [Pg. 736 is part of [Doc. 308](#)], 790 [Pg. 790 is part of [Doc. 342](#)], 812 [Pg. 812 is part of [Doc. 353](#)]

Prochnow Committee report, 828–836 [Pgs. 828–836 include portions of [Doc. 357](#) and [Doc. 358](#)], 872 [Pg. 872 is part of [Doc. 378](#)], 887–888 [Pg. 887 is part of [Doc. 387](#)]

U.S. military aid to (*see also* Baghdad Pact: Iranian participation: U.S. military aid and; Baghdad Pact: U.S. military aid and; U.S. economic aid to *above*), 166 [Pg. 166 is part of [Doc. 66](#)], 676–677 [Pg. 676 is part of [Doc. 286](#)], 702 [Pg. 702 is part of [Doc. 295](#)], 710 [Pg. 710 is part of [Doc. 298](#)], 714 [Pg. 714 is part of [Doc. 301](#)], 742–744 [Pgs. 742–744 include portions of [Doc. 312](#) and [Doc. 313](#)], 803–804 [Pg. 803 is part of [Doc. 349](#)], 866–868 [Pgs. 866–868 include portions of [Doc. 376](#) and [Doc. 377](#)], 959–960 [Pg. 959 is part of [Doc. 414](#)], 962–963 [Pg. 962 is part of [Doc. 416](#)]

Congressional approval, 756–757 [Pgs. 756–757 include portions of [Doc. 320](#) and [Doc. 321](#)]

Defense Department position, 678–679 [Pg. 678 is part of [Doc. 286](#)], 684–685 [Pgs. 684–685 include portions of [Doc. 289](#) and [Doc. 290](#)], 739–740 [Pgs. 739–

740 include portions of [Doc. 310](#) and [Doc. 311](#)], 752–753 [Pgs. 752–753 include portions of [Doc. 317](#) and [Doc. 318](#)], 762–763 [Pgs. 762–763 include portions of [Doc. 323](#) and [Doc. 324](#)], 794 [Pg. 794 is part of [Doc. 344](#)], 908–910 [Pgs. 908–910 include portions of [Doc. 392](#) and [Doc. 393](#)]

Defense support, 677 [Pg. 677 is part of [Doc. 286](#)], 693 [Pg. 693 is part of [Doc. 291](#)], 710 [Pg. 710 is part of [Doc. 298](#)], 720–722 [Pg. 720 is part of [Doc. 302](#)], 738 [Pg. 738 includes portions of [Doc. 308](#) and [Doc. 309](#)]

Eisenhower Doctrine and, 489 [Pg. 489 is part of [Doc. 214](#)], 902 [Pg. 902 is part of [Doc. 392](#)], 904 [Pg. 904 is part of [Doc. 392](#)], 906 [Pg. 906 is part of [Doc. 392](#)], 925 [Pg. 925 is part of [Doc. 397](#)], 927–931 [Pgs. 927–931 include portions of [Doc. 398](#) and [Doc. 399](#)], 943 [Pg. 943 is part of [Doc. 406](#)]

ICA position, 793–796 [Pgs. 793–796 include portions of [Doc. 343](#) and [Doc. 344](#)], 798 [Pg. 798 includes portions of [Doc. 346](#) and [Doc. 347](#)]

Infrastructure, 149 [Pg. 149 is part of [Doc. 60](#)], 740–741 [Pgs. 740–741 include portions of [Doc. 310](#) and [Doc. 311](#)], 794 [Pg. 794 is part of [Doc. 344](#)], 799 [Pg. 799 includes portions of [Doc. 347](#) and [Doc. 348](#)], 856 [Pg. 856 is part of [Doc. 371](#)], 860 [Pg. 860 is part of [Doc. 373](#)], 909 [Pg. 909 is part of [Doc. 392](#)], 925 [Pg. 925 is part of [Doc. 397](#)], 930 [Pg. 930 is part of [Doc. 399](#)], 944 [Pg. 944 is part of [Doc. 406](#)], 949–951 [Pgs. 949–951 include portions of [Doc. 409](#) and [Doc. 410](#)], 953–956 [Pgs. 953–956 include portions of [Doc. 410](#), [Doc. 411](#), [Doc. 412](#), and [Doc. 413](#)]

Internal security, 213 [Pg. 213 is part of [Doc. 87](#)], 349 [Pg. 349 is part of [Doc. 148](#)], 678 [Pg. 678 is part of [Doc. 286](#)], 693 [Pg. 693 is part of [Doc. 291](#)], 736 [Pg. 736 is part of [Doc. 308](#)], 771 [Pg. 771 is part of [Doc. 328](#)],

799 [Pg. 799 includes portions of [Doc. 347](#) and [Doc. 348](#)],
803 [Pg. 803 is part of [Doc. 349](#)], 962 [Pg. 962 is part of
[Doc. 416](#)]

JCS position, 678–682 [Pgs. 678–682 include
portions of [Doc. 286](#) and [Doc. 287](#)], 685 [Pg. 685 includes
portions of [Doc. 289](#) and [Doc. 290](#)], 731–732 [Pgs. 731–
732 include portions of [Doc. 305](#) and [Doc. 306](#)], 857–859
[Pgs. 857–859 include portions of [Doc. 371](#), [Doc. 372](#), and
[Doc. 373](#)]

McClure Plan, 680 [Pg. 680 includes portions of [Doc.
286](#) and [Doc. 287](#)]

NSC policies, 801–802 [Pgs. 801–802 include
portions of [Doc. 348](#) and [Doc. 349](#)], 891–899 [Pgs. 891–
899 include portions of [Doc. 389](#), [Doc. 390](#), and [Doc. 391](#)],
904 [Pg. 904 is part of [Doc. 392](#)], 906–910 [Pgs. 906–
910 include portions of [Doc. 392](#) and [Doc. 393](#)], 935–936
[Pg. 935 is part of [Doc. 402](#)]

OCB reports, 751–754 [Pgs. 751–754 include
portions of [Doc. 317](#), [Doc. 318](#), and [Doc. 319](#)]

Oil revenues and, 677 [Pg. 677 is part of [Doc. 286](#)],
693–694 [Pg. 693 is part of [Doc. 291](#)], 715 [Pg. 715 is
part of [Doc. 302](#)], 800 [Pg. 800 is part of [Doc. 348](#)], 896
[Pg. 896 is part of [Doc. 391](#)]

Political situation and, 715–716 [Pg. 715 is part of
[Doc. 302](#)], 747–748 [Pgs. 747–748 include portions of
[Doc. 314](#), [Doc. 315](#), and [Doc. 316](#)], 776 [Pg. 776 includes
portions of [Doc. 331](#) and [Doc. 332](#)]

Prochnow Committee report, 828–836 [Pgs.
828–836 include portions of [Doc. 357](#) and [Doc. 358](#)], 857–
859 [Pgs. 857–859 include portions of [Doc. 371](#), [Doc. 372](#),
and [Doc. 373](#)], 872 [Pg. 872 is part of [Doc. 378](#)], 887–

889 [Pgs. 887–889 include portions of [Doc. 387](#) and [Doc. 388](#)], 909 [Pg. 909 is part of [Doc. 392](#)]

Public opinion, 227 [Pg. 227 is part of [Doc. 91](#)]

Regional defense role and, 51 [Pg. 51 includes portions of [Doc. 34](#) and [Doc. 35](#)], 94 [Pg. 94 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 145 [Pg. 145 is part of [Doc. 60](#)], 365 [Pg. 365 is part of [Doc. 155](#)], 677–681 [Pgs. 677–681 include portions of [Doc. 286](#) and [Doc. 287](#)], 683 [Pg. 683 is part of [Doc. 288](#)], 687–688 [Pg. 687 is part of [Doc. 290](#)], 693–694 [Pg. 693 is part of [Doc. 291](#)], 704 [Pg. 704 is part of [Doc. 296](#)], 707 [Pg. 707 is part of [Doc. 296](#)], 732 [Pg. 732 is part of [Doc. 306](#)], 745 [Pg. 745 is part of [Doc. 314](#)], 769 [Pg. 769 is part of [Doc. 327](#)]

Shah U.S. visit and, 678 [Pg. 678 is part of [Doc. 286](#)]

Soviet bloc military aid to Egypt and, 186 [Pg. 186 is part of [Doc. 78](#)], 188 [Pg. 188 is part of [Doc. 78](#)]

Soviet–Iranian relations and, 759–760 [Pgs. 759–760 include portions of [Doc. 321](#) and [Doc. 322](#)], 904 [Pg. 904 is part of [Doc. 392](#)]

Training program, 678–679 [Pg. 678 is part of [Doc. 286](#)], 681–682 [Pg. 681 is part of [Doc. 287](#)], 688 [Pg. 688 is part of [Doc. 290](#)], 694 [Pg. 694 is part of [Doc. 291](#)], 696–701 [Pgs. 696–701 include portions of [Doc. 291](#), [Doc. 292](#), [Doc. 293](#), and [Doc. 294](#)], 703 [Pg. 703 is part of [Doc. 296](#)], 707–709 [Pgs. 707–709 include portions of [Doc. 296](#), [Doc. 297](#), and [Doc. 298](#)], 720 [Pg. 720 is part of [Doc. 302](#)], 739–741 [Pgs. 739–741 include portions of [Doc. 310](#) and [Doc. 311](#)], 756 [Pg. 756 is part of [Doc. 320](#)], 764 [Pg. 764 is part of [Doc. 324](#)], 794 [Pg. 794 is part of [Doc. 344](#)]

Tripartite Declaration and, 146 [Pg. 146 is part of [Doc. 60](#)]

U.S. military aid to Turkey and, 161 [Pg. 161 is part of [Doc. 66](#)], 962 [Pg. 962 is part of [Doc. 416](#)]

U.S. policy statements, 678–680 [Pgs. 678–680 include portions of [Doc. 286](#) and [Doc. 287](#)]

U.S. policy toward, 678–681 [Pgs. 678–681 include portions of [Doc. 286](#) and [Doc. 287](#)], 684–696 [Pgs. 684–696 include portions of [Doc. 289](#), [Doc. 290](#), [Doc. 291](#), and [Doc. 292](#)], 737 [Pg. 737 is part of [Doc. 308](#)], 769–770 [Pgs. 769–770 include portions of [Doc. 327](#) and [Doc. 328](#)], 847–848 [Pgs. 847–848 include portions of [Doc. 365](#) and [Doc. 366](#)], 850–851 [Pgs. 850–851 include portions of [Doc. 367](#) and [Doc. 368](#)], 886–910 [Pgs. 886–910 include portions of [Doc. 387](#), [Doc. 388](#), [Doc. 389](#), [Doc. 390](#), [Doc. 391](#), [Doc. 392](#), and [Doc. 393](#)], 932–937 [Pgs. 932–937 include portions of [Doc. 400](#), [Doc. 401](#), [Doc. 402](#), and [Doc. 403](#)]

Prochnow Committee report, 828–836 [Pgs. 828–836 include portions of [Doc. 357](#) and [Doc. 358](#)], 857–859 [Pgs. 857–859 include portions of [Doc. 371](#), [Doc. 372](#), and [Doc. 373](#)], 871–872 [Pgs. 871–872 include portions of [Doc. 377](#) and [Doc. 378](#)]

Iraq (see also [Baghdad Pact](#); *Iraqi subheadings under other subjects*; [Oil resources: Alternate pipeline proposals](#)):

Arab League Collective Security Pact, 33 [Pg. 33 is part of [Doc. 23](#)]

British military aid to (see also [U.S.–British cooperation under U.S. military aid to below](#)), 131–132 [Pgs. 131–132 include portions of [Doc. 56](#) and [Doc. 57](#)], 147–148 [Pg. 147 is part of [Doc. 60](#)], 151 [Pg. 151 is part of [Doc. 60](#)], 249 [Pg. 249 is part of [Doc. 98](#)], 469 [Pg. 469 is part of [Doc. 203](#)], 1040 [Pg. 1040

is part of [Doc. 454](#)], 1068–1069 [Pgs. 1068–1069 include portions of [Doc. 462](#), [Doc. 463](#), and [Doc. 464](#)]

Economic situation, 223 [Pg. 223 is part of [Doc. 91](#)], 989 [Pg. 989 is part of [Doc. 429](#)], 1053–1054 [Pg. 1053 is part of [Doc. 458](#)], 1064 [Pg. 1064 is part of [Doc. 462](#)]

Oil revenues, 311 [Pg. 311 is part of [Doc. 133](#)], 493–494 [Pgs. 493–494 include portions of [Doc. 217](#) and [Doc. 218](#)], 603 [Pg. 603 is part of [Doc. 266](#)], 1002–1004 [Pg. 1002 is part of [Doc. 435](#)], 1028 [Pg. 1028 is part of [Doc. 444](#)], 1031 [Pg. 1031 includes portions of [Doc. 446](#) and [Doc. 447](#)], 1044 [Pg. 1044 is part of [Doc. 456](#)], 1045 [Pg. 1045 is part of [Doc. 456](#)], 1049–1051 [Pg. 1049 is part of [Doc. 458](#)], 1054 [Pg. 1054 is part of [Doc. 458](#)]

Egypt, relations with, 124 [Pg. 124 includes portions of [Doc. 52](#) and [Doc. 53](#)], 998 [Pg. 998 is part of [Doc. 435](#)], 1007 [Pg. 1007 is part of [Doc. 435](#)], 1022–1023 [Pgs. 1022–1023 include portions of [Doc. 442](#) and [Doc. 443](#)], 1032 [Pg. 1032 includes portions of [Doc. 447](#) and [Doc. 448](#)], 1056 [Pg. 1056 is part of [Doc. 458](#)]

France, relations with, 499 [Pg. 499 is part of [Doc. 220](#)], 504–505 [Pg. 504 is part of [Doc. 221](#)], 1007 [Pg. 1007 is part of [Doc. 435](#)], 1055 [Pg. 1055 is part of [Doc. 458](#)]

Internal security, 213 [Pg. 213 is part of [Doc. 87](#)], 979–986 [Pgs. 979–986 include portions of [Doc. 426](#) and [Doc. 427](#)], 1038 [Pg. 1038 is part of [Doc. 453](#)], 1042 [Pg. 1042 is part of [Doc. 455](#)], 1044 [Pg. 1044 is part of [Doc. 456](#)], 1065–1066 [Pg. 1065 is part of [Doc. 462](#)]

Jordan, relations with, 234 [Pg. 234 includes portions of [Doc. 92](#) and [Doc. 93](#)], 239 [Pg. 239 is part of [Doc. 93](#)], 350 [Pg. 350 is part of [Doc. 148](#)], 427 [Pg. 427 is part of [Doc. 178](#)], 514 [Pg. 514 is part of [Doc. 222](#)], 560 [Pg. 560 is part of [Doc. 253](#)], 598 [Pg. 598 is part of

[Doc. 266](#)], 989 [Pg. 989 is part of [Doc. 429](#)], 998 [Pg. 998 is part of [Doc. 435](#)], 1008 [Pg. 1008 is part of [Doc. 435](#)]

Lebanon, relations with, 92 [Pg. 92 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 989 [Pg. 989 is part of [Doc. 429](#)]

Pakistan, relations with, 643 [Pg. 643 is part of [Doc. 270](#)]

Political situation, 498–499 [Pg. 498 is part of [Doc. 220](#)], 979–980 [Pgs. 979–980 include portions of [Doc. 426](#) and [Doc. 427](#)], 984–985 [Pg. 984 is part of [Doc. 427](#)], 988 [Pg. 988 includes portions of [Doc. 428](#) and [Doc. 429](#)], 996 [Pg. 996 is part of [Doc. 433](#)], 1044 [Pg. 1044 is part of [Doc. 456](#)], 1057–1058 [Pgs. 1057–1058 include portions of [Doc. 458](#), [Doc. 459](#), and [Doc. 460](#)]

Baghdad Pact and, 15–16 [Pgs. 15–16 include portions of [Doc. 11](#) and [Doc. 12](#)], 275 [Pg. 275 is part of [Doc. 115](#)], 296 [Pg. 296 is part of [Doc. 127](#)], 328 [Pg. 328 is part of [Doc. 143](#)], 369–370 [Pgs. 369–370 include portions of [Doc. 157](#) and [Doc. 158](#)], 394 [Pg. 394 is part of [Doc. 165](#)], 402 [Pg. 402 is part of [Doc. 170](#)], 990 [Pg. 990 is part of [Doc. 429](#)], 991 [Pg. 991 is part of [Doc. 429](#)], 996–997 [Pgs. 996–997 include portions of [Doc. 433](#), [Doc. 434](#), and [Doc. 435](#)]

British position, 105 [Pg. 105 is part of [Doc. 49](#)], 220 [Pg. 220 is part of [Doc. 91](#)], 237 [Pg. 237 is part of [Doc. 93](#)], 262 [Pg. 262 is part of [Doc. 105](#)], 514 [Pg. 514 is part of [Doc. 222](#)], 995 [Pg. 995 includes portions of [Doc. 432](#) and [Doc. 433](#)]

National Intelligence Estimates, 600 [Pg. 600 is part of [Doc. 266](#)], 997–1004 [Pgs. 997–1004 include portions of [Doc. 433](#), [Doc. 434](#), and [Doc. 435](#)], 1048–1049 [Pgs. 1048–1049 include portions of [Doc. 457](#) and [Doc. 458](#)], 1051–1053 [Pg. 1051 is part of [Doc. 458](#)]

Suez crisis and, 1012–1014 [Pgs. 1012–1014 include portions of [Doc. 437](#), [Doc. 438](#), and [Doc. 439](#)], 1050–1051 [Pg. 1050 is part of [Doc. 458](#)]

U.S. policy, 341 [Pg. 341 is part of [Doc. 147](#)], 639–640 [Pg. 639 is part of [Doc. 270](#)], 991–992 [Pgs. 991–992 include portions of [Doc. 429](#) and [Doc. 430](#)], 1062–1063 [Pg. 1062 is part of [Doc. 462](#)]

Saudi Arabia, relations with, 81 [Pg. 81 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 87 [Pg. 87 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 222 [Pg. 222 is part of [Doc. 91](#)], 346 [Pg. 346 is part of [Doc. 148](#)], 425 [Pg. 425 is part of [Doc. 178](#)], 538 [Pg. 538 is part of [Doc. 239](#)], 998 [Pg. 998 is part of [Doc. 435](#)], 1007–1008 [Pg. 1007 is part of [Doc. 435](#)], 1025–1026 [Pg. 1025 is part of [Doc. 444](#)], 1033 [Pg. 1033 includes portions of [Doc. 448](#) and [Doc. 449](#)], 1045 [Pg. 1045 is part of [Doc. 456](#)]

Soviet bloc, relations with, 300 [Pg. 300 is part of [Doc. 130](#)], 966–967 [Pgs. 966–967 include portions of [Doc. 418](#) and [Doc. 419](#)], 1010 [Pg. 1010 is part of [Doc. 435](#)], 1042 [Pg. 1042 is part of [Doc. 455](#)]

Syria, relations with, 88 [Pg. 88 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 514 [Pg. 514 is part of [Doc. 222](#)], 998 [Pg. 998 is part of [Doc. 435](#)], 1004 [Pg. 1004 is part of [Doc. 435](#)], 1017 [Pg. 1017 includes portions of [Doc. 440](#) and [Doc. 441](#)], 1022–1023 [Pgs. 1022–1023 include portions of [Doc. 442](#) and [Doc. 443](#)]

Syria takeover proposals, 76 [Pg. 76 is part of [Doc. 45](#)], 82 [Pg. 82 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 92 [Pg. 92 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 112 [Pg. 112 is part of [Doc. 51](#)], 126 [Pg. 126 is part of [Doc. 54](#)], 173 [Pg. 173 is part of [Doc. 69](#)], 189–190 [Pg. 189 is part of [Doc. 78](#)], 192–193 [Pg. 192 is part of [Doc. 78](#)], 224 [Pg. 224 is part of [Doc. 91](#)], 350 [Pg. 350 is part of [Doc. 148](#)], 1008–1009 [Pg. 1008 is part of [Doc. 435](#)]

Soviet policy and, 91 [Pg. 91 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 160 [Pg. 160 is part of [Doc. 66](#)], 188–190 [Pg. 188 is part of [Doc. 78](#)], 359 [Pg. 359 is part of [Doc. 151](#)]

Turkey, relations with, 2 [Pg. 2 includes portions of [Doc. 1](#) and [Doc. 2](#)], 51–52 [Pgs. 51–52 include portions of [Doc. 34](#) and [Doc. 35](#)], 112 [Pg. 112 is part of [Doc. 51](#)]

United Kingdom, relations with (see also [U.S.–British cooperation under U.S. military aid to below](#)), 91–92 [Pg. 91 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 1004 [Pg. 1004 is part of [Doc. 435](#)]

Baghdad Pact and, 82 [Pg. 82 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 218 [Pg. 218 is part of [Doc. 91](#)], 968–969 [Pg. 968 is part of [Doc. 420](#)], 988 [Pg. 988 includes portions of [Doc. 428](#) and [Doc. 429](#)]

Base and transit rights, 46 [Pg. 46 includes portions of [Doc. 31](#) and [Doc. 32](#)], 80 [Pg. 80 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 82 [Pg. 82 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 85 [Pg. 85 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 95 [Pg. 95 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 977–978 [Pgs. 977–978 include portions of [Doc. 425](#) and [Doc. 426](#)], 988 [Pg. 988 includes portions of [Doc. 428](#) and [Doc. 429](#)], 1004 [Pg. 1004 is part of [Doc. 435](#)], 1006 [Pg. 1006 is part of [Doc. 435](#)]

Decline in British influence and, 408 [Pg. 408 is part of [Doc. 170](#)], 421 [Pg. 421 is part of [Doc. 178](#)], 611 [Pg. 611 is part of [Doc. 266](#)], 1012–1014 [Pgs. 1012–1014 include portions of [Doc. 437](#), [Doc. 438](#), and [Doc. 439](#)], 1049–1051 [Pg. 1049 is part of [Doc. 458](#)], 1055 [Pg. 1055 is part of [Doc. 458](#)]

United States, relations with, 973 [Pg. 973 is part of [Doc. 423](#)], 977–979 [Pgs. 977–979 include portions of [Doc. 425](#), [Doc. 426](#), and [Doc. 427](#)], 1010 [Pg. 1010 is part of [Doc. 435](#)], 1024–1037 [Pgs. 1024–1037 include portions of [Doc. 444](#), [Doc. 445](#), [Doc. 446](#), [Doc. 447](#), [Doc. 448](#), [Doc. 449](#), [Doc. 450](#), [Doc. 451](#), and [Doc. 452](#)], 1054–1055 [Pg. 1054 is part of [Doc. 458](#)]

U.S. economic aid to, 266 [Pg. 266 is part of [Doc. 108](#)], 347 [Pg. 347 is part of [Doc. 148](#)], 423 [Pg. 423 is part of [Doc. 178](#)], 468

[Pg. 468 is part of [Doc. 203](#)], 595 [Pg. 595 is part of [Doc. 266](#)], 640 [Pg. 640 is part of [Doc. 270](#)], 983 [Pg. 983 is part of [Doc. 427](#)], 1045 [Pg. 1045 is part of [Doc. 456](#)], 1068 [Pg. 1068 includes portions of [Doc. 462](#), [Doc. 463](#), and [Doc. 464](#)]

U.S. military aid to (see also Baghdad Pact: U.S. military aid and), 51 [Pg. 51 includes portions of [Doc. 34](#) and [Doc. 35](#)], 90 [Pg. 90 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 149 [Pg. 149 is part of [Doc. 60](#)], 366 [Pg. 366 is part of [Doc. 156](#)], 423 [Pg. 423 is part of [Doc. 178](#)], 427 [Pg. 427 is part of [Doc. 178](#)], 640 [Pg. 640 is part of [Doc. 270](#)], 975–977 [Pgs. 975–977 include portions of [Doc. 423](#), [Doc. 424](#), [Doc. 425](#), and [Doc. 426](#)], 987–988 [Pgs. 987–988 include portions of [Doc. 428](#) and [Doc. 429](#)], 1036–1037 [Pg. 1036 is part of [Doc. 452](#)], 1068 [Pg. 1068 includes portions of [Doc. 462](#), [Doc. 463](#), and [Doc. 464](#)]

Air force, 1014–1016 [Pgs. 1014–1016 include portions of [Doc. 438](#), [Doc. 439](#), and [Doc. 440](#)], 1018–1019 [Pg. 1018 is part of [Doc. 441](#)], 1020n [Pg. 1020 is part of [Doc. 441](#)], 1038–1040 [Pgs. 1038–1040 include portions of [Doc. 453](#) and [Doc. 454](#)], 1064–1065 [Pg. 1064 is part of [Doc. 462](#)]

Amounts, 209 [Pg. 209 is part of [Doc. 84](#)], 271 [Pg. 271 is part of [Doc. 112](#)], 276 [Pg. 276 is part of [Doc. 115](#)]

Baghdad Pact and, 35 [Pg. 35 is part of [Doc. 24](#)], 82 [Pg. 82 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 94 [Pg. 94 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 96 [Pg. 96 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 133 [Pg. 133 includes portions of [Doc. 57](#) and [Doc. 58](#)], 174 [Pg. 174 is part of [Doc. 70](#)], 192 [Pg. 192 is part of [Doc. 78](#)], 195 [Pg. 195 is part of [Doc. 78](#)], 209 [Pg. 209 is part of [Doc. 84](#)], 225 [Pg. 225 is part of [Doc. 91](#)], 243 [Pg. 243 is part of [Doc. 95](#)], 249–252 [Pgs. 249–252 include portions of [Doc. 98](#), [Doc. 99](#), [Doc. 100](#), and [Doc. 101](#)], 337 [Pg. 337 is part of [Doc. 145](#)], 349 [Pg. 349 is part of [Doc. 148](#)]

British position, 162 [Pg. 162 is part of [Doc. 66](#)]

Eisenhower Doctrine, 493–494 [*Pgs. 493–494 include portions of [Doc. 217](#) and [Doc. 218](#)*], 1046–1047 [*Pg. 1046 is part of [Doc. 456](#)*], 1067 [*Pg. 1067 is part of [Doc. 462](#)*]

Internal security, 213 [*Pg. 213 is part of [Doc. 87](#)*], 983–986 [*Pg. 983 is part of [Doc. 427](#)*], 1038 [*Pg. 1038 is part of [Doc. 453](#)*], 1042 [*Pg. 1042 is part of [Doc. 455](#)*], 1065–1066 [*Pg. 1065 is part of [Doc. 462](#)*]

JCS position, 971–975 [*Pgs. 971–975 include portions of [Doc. 422](#), [Doc. 423](#), and [Doc. 424](#)*], 1020n [*Pg. 1020 is part of [Doc. 441](#)*]

Political situation and, 991–992 [*Pgs. 991–992 include portions of [Doc. 429](#) and [Doc. 430](#)*], 1016 [*Pg. 1016 is part of [Doc. 440](#)*], 1042 [*Pg. 1042 is part of [Doc. 455](#)*]

Radar, 366 [*Pg. 366 is part of [Doc. 156](#)*], 1014–1016 [*Pgs. 1014–1016 include portions of [Doc. 438](#), [Doc. 439](#), and [Doc. 440](#)*], 1020n [*Pg. 1020 is part of [Doc. 441](#)*]

Soviet bloc military aid to Egypt and, 160 [*Pg. 160 is part of [Doc. 66](#)*], 186 [*Pg. 186 is part of [Doc. 78](#)*], 188 [*Pg. 188 is part of [Doc. 78](#)*]

Syrian political situation and, 1021–1023 [*Pgs. 1021–1023 include portions of [Doc. 442](#) and [Doc. 443](#)*]

U.S.–British cooperation, 120–122 [*Pg. 120 is part of [Doc. 51](#)*], 128 [*Pg. 128 is part of [Doc. 55](#)*], 131–132 [*Pgs. 131–132 include portions of [Doc. 56](#) and [Doc. 57](#)*], 145 [*Pg. 145 is part of [Doc. 60](#)*], 147–148 [*Pg. 147 is part of [Doc. 60](#)*], 151 [*Pg. 151 is part of [Doc. 60](#)*], 242 [*Pg. 242 is part of [Doc. 94](#)*], 250–252 [*Pgs. 250–252 include portions of [Doc. 99](#), [Doc. 100](#), and [Doc. 101](#)*], 469 [*Pg. 469 is part of [Doc. 203](#)*], 514 [*Pg. 514 is part of [Doc.](#)*

[222](#)], 640 [Pg. 640 is part of [Doc. 270](#)], 964–965 [Pgs. 964–965 include portions of [Doc. 417](#) and [Doc. 418](#)], 967 [Pg. 967 includes portions of [Doc. 418](#) and [Doc. 419](#)], 968n [Pg. 968 is part of [Doc. 420](#)], 968–971 [Pgs. 968–971 include portions of [Doc. 420](#), [Doc. 421](#), [Doc. 422](#), and [Doc. 423](#)], 992–995 [Pgs. 992–995 include portions of [Doc. 429](#), [Doc. 430](#), [Doc. 431](#), [Doc. 432](#), and [Doc. 433](#)], 1011–1012 [Pgs. 1011–1012 include portions of [Doc. 436](#), [Doc. 437](#), and [Doc. 438](#)], 1058–1061 [Pgs. 1058–1061 include portions of [Doc. 458](#), [Doc. 459](#), [Doc. 460](#), [Doc. 461](#), and [Doc. 462](#)], 1064 [Pg. 1064 is part of [Doc. 462](#)]

U.S. policy toward, 984 [Pg. 984 is part of [Doc. 427](#)], 1061–1068 [Pgs. 1061–1068 include portions of [Doc. 461](#), [Doc. 462](#), [Doc. 463](#), and [Doc. 464](#)], 1065 [Pg. 1065 is part of [Doc. 462](#)]

Israel (see also [Arab–Israeli dispute](#); *Israeli subheadings under other subjects*; Suez crisis):

Alternate pipeline proposals, 318 [Pg. 318 includes portions of [Doc. 136](#) and [Doc. 137](#)], 348 [Pg. 348 is part of [Doc. 148](#)], 465 [Pg. 465 is part of [Doc. 202](#)], 479–481 [Pg. 479 is part of [Doc. 209](#)], 515 [Pg. 515 includes portions of [Doc. 222](#) and [Doc. 223](#)], 517 [Pg. 517 is part of [Doc. 223](#)], 562 [Pg. 562 is part of [Doc. 253](#)]

Aqaba Gulf, 562 [Pg. 562 is part of [Doc. 253](#)], 629–630 [Pg. 629 is part of [Doc. 270](#)]

Banat Yaqub, 307–308 [Pgs. 307–308 include portions of [Doc. 131](#) and [Doc. 132](#)]

British military aid to, 120 [Pg. 120 is part of [Doc. 51](#)]

Economic situation, 603 [Pg. 603 is part of [Doc. 266](#)]

France, relations with, 90 [Pg. 90 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 114 [Pg. 114 is part of [Doc. 51](#)], 120 [Pg. 120 is part of [Doc. 51](#)], 146 [Pg. 146 is part of [Doc. 60](#)], 606 [Pg. 606 is part of [Doc. 266](#)], 624 [Pg. 624 is

part of [Doc. 270](#)], 627 [Pg. 627 is part of [Doc. 270](#)], 642 [Pg. 642 is part of [Doc. 270](#)]

Jewish immigration, 561 [Pg. 561 is part of [Doc. 253](#)], 628 [Pg. 628 is part of [Doc. 270](#)]

Military capabilities, 602 [Pg. 602 is part of [Doc. 266](#)]

Political situation, 105 [Pg. 105 is part of [Doc. 49](#)]

Soviet bloc, relations with, 105 [Pg. 105 is part of [Doc. 49](#)], 186 [Pg. 186 is part of [Doc. 78](#)], 233 [Pg. 233 is part of [Doc. 92](#)], 364 [Pg. 364 is part of [Doc. 154](#)], 561 [Pg. 561 is part of [Doc. 253](#)], 620 [Pg. 620 is part of [Doc. 270](#)], 628 [Pg. 628 is part of [Doc. 270](#)]

Turkey, relations with, 3 [Pg. 3 includes portions of [Doc. 2](#) and [Doc. 3](#)], 81–82 [Pg. 81 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 354 [Pg. 354 is part of [Doc. 150](#)]

United Kingdom, relations with, 230 [Pg. 230 is part of [Doc. 92](#)]

United States, relations with, 3–4 [Pgs. 3–4 include portions of [Doc. 2](#), [Doc. 3](#), and [Doc. 4](#)], 9–10 [Pg. 9 is part of [Doc. 8](#)], 91 [Pg. 91 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 172 [Pg. 172 is part of [Doc. 69](#)], 222 [Pg. 222 is part of [Doc. 91](#)], 621–622 [Pg. 621 is part of [Doc. 270](#)]

Eisenhower Doctrine, 522 [Pg. 522 is part of [Doc. 227](#)], 524–526 [Pgs. 524–526 include portions of [Doc. 229](#), [Doc. 230](#), and [Doc. 231](#)], 529–530 [Pgs. 529–530 include portions of [Doc. 233](#), [Doc. 234](#), and [Doc. 235](#)]

Security guarantee proposal (see also [Israeli security guarantee and](#) under Baghdad Pact: U.S. participation), 62 [Pg. 62 is part of [Doc. 42](#)], 90–91 [Pg. 90 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 101 [Pg. 101 is part of [Doc. 47](#)], 114 [Pg. 114 is part of [Doc. 51](#)], 144 [Pg. 144 is part of [Doc. 60](#)], 175–176 [Pgs. 175–176 include

portions of [Doc. 70](#) and [Doc. 71](#)], 186 [Pg. 186 is part of [Doc. 78](#)], 197 [Pg. 197 is part of [Doc. 78](#)], 364 [Pg. 364 is part of [Doc. 154](#)], 370 [Pg. 370 is part of [Doc. 158](#)], 382 [Pg. 382 is part of [Doc. 160](#)]

Suez crisis and, 349 [Pg. 349 is part of [Doc. 148](#)], 364 [Pg. 364 is part of [Doc. 154](#)], 370 [Pg. 370 is part of [Doc. 158](#)], 382 [Pg. 382 is part of [Doc. 160](#)], 423 [Pg. 423 is part of [Doc. 178](#)], 426 [Pg. 426 is part of [Doc. 178](#)]

U.S. economic aid to, 307–308 [Pgs. 307–308 include portions of [Doc. 131](#) and [Doc. 132](#)], 347 [Pg. 347 is part of [Doc. 148](#)], 423 [Pg. 423 is part of [Doc. 178](#)], 581 [Pg. 581 is part of [Doc. 260](#)], 625 [Pg. 625 is part of [Doc. 270](#)], 628–629 [Pg. 628 is part of [Doc. 270](#)], 645 [Pg. 645 is part of [Doc. 270](#)]

U.S. military aid to, 68 [Pg. 68 is part of [Doc. 43](#)], 90 [Pg. 90 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 93 [Pg. 93 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 146 [Pg. 146 is part of [Doc. 60](#)], 186 [Pg. 186 is part of [Doc. 78](#)], 197 [Pg. 197 is part of [Doc. 78](#)], 201 [Pg. 201 is part of [Doc. 81](#)], 349 [Pg. 349 is part of [Doc. 148](#)], 423 [Pg. 423 is part of [Doc. 178](#)]

Italy, 115 [Pg. 115 is part of [Doc. 51](#)], 584–585 [Pgs. 584–585 include portions of [Doc. 262](#) and [Doc. 263](#)], 616 [Pg. 616 is part of [Doc. 267](#)], 643 [Pg. 643 is part of [Doc. 270](#)], 661–662 [Pgs. 661–662 include portions of [Doc. 276](#), [Doc. 277](#), and [Doc. 278](#)], 870 [Pg. 870 is part of [Doc. 377](#)]

Iranian oil agreement, 920–922 [Pgs. 920–922 include portions of [Doc. 393](#), [Doc. 394](#), [Doc. 395](#), and [Doc. 396](#)], 932–934 [Pgs. 932–934 include portions of [Doc. 400](#), [Doc. 401](#), and [Doc. 402](#)], 937–938 [Pgs. 937–938 include portions of [Doc. 402](#) and [Doc. 403](#)], 941 [Pg. 941 includes portions of [Doc. 405](#) and [Doc. 406](#)], 945–946 [Pgs. 945–946 include portions of [Doc. 407](#) and [Doc. 408](#)]

Jabr, Salih, 1004 [Pg. 1004 is part of [Doc. 435](#)], 1029–1034 [Pgs. 1029–1034 include portions of [Doc. 445](#), [Doc. 446](#), [Doc. 447](#), [Doc. 448](#), [Doc. 449](#), [Doc. 450](#), and [Doc. 451](#)]

al–Jaburi, Salih Sa’ib, 1043 [Pg. 1043 is part of [Doc. 455](#)]

Jackson, William, 340n [Pg. 340 is part of [Doc. 147](#)], 850 [Pg. 850 is part of [Doc. 367](#)]

Ja’far, Dhia, 1043 [Pg. 1043 is part of [Doc. 455](#)]

Jamali, Muhammed Fadhil, 49 [Pg. 49 is part of [Doc. 33](#)], 220 [Pg. 220 is part of [Doc. 91](#)], 1000 [Pg. 1000 is part of [Doc. 435](#)], 1004 [Pg. 1004 is part of [Doc. 435](#)], 1029–1037 [Pgs. 1029–1037 include portions of [Doc. 445](#), [Doc. 446](#), [Doc. 447](#), [Doc. 448](#), [Doc. 449](#), [Doc. 450](#), [Doc. 451](#), and [Doc. 452](#)]

Japan, 433 [Pg. 433 is part of [Doc. 182](#)], 671–672 [Pg. 671 is part of [Doc. 283](#)]

Javits, Jacob, 396 [Pg. 396 includes portions of [Doc. 166](#) and [Doc. 167](#)]

Jawdat Al–Ayyubi, Ali, 1029–1034 [Pgs. 1029–1034 include portions of [Doc. 445](#), [Doc. 446](#), [Doc. 447](#), [Doc. 448](#), [Doc. 449](#), [Doc. 450](#), and [Doc. 451](#)], 1058 [Pg. 1058 includes portions of [Doc. 458](#), [Doc. 459](#), and [Doc. 460](#)]

Jennings, Brewster, 443–444 [Pg. 443 is part of [Doc. 188](#)]

Jernegan, John D., 2n [Pg. 2 includes portions of [Doc. 1](#) and [Doc. 2](#)], 3n [Pg. 3 includes portions of [Doc. 2](#) and [Doc. 3](#)], 4n [Pg. 4 includes portions of [Doc. 3](#) and [Doc. 4](#)], 9n [Pg. 9 is part of [Doc. 8](#)], 13n [Pg. 13 is part of [Doc. 10](#)], 27n [Pg. 27 includes portions of [Doc. 18](#) and [Doc. 19](#)], 43n [Pg. 43 includes portions of [Doc. 28](#) and [Doc. 29](#)], 46n [Pg. 46 includes portions of [Doc. 31](#) and [Doc. 32](#)], 58n [Pg. 58 is part of [Doc. 39](#)], 59n [Pg. 59 includes portions of [Doc. 39](#) and [Doc. 40](#)], 70n [Pg. 70 includes portions of [Doc. 43](#) and [Doc. 44](#)], 98n [Pg. 98 is part of [Doc. 47](#)], 129n [Pg. 129 includes portions of [Doc. 55](#) and [Doc. 56](#)], 153n [Pg. 153 is part of [Doc. 62](#)], 696n [Pg. 696 includes portions of [Doc. 291](#) and [Doc. 292](#)], 701n [Pg. 701 is part of [Doc. 294](#)], 702n [Pg. 702 is part of [Doc. 295](#)], 730n [Pg. 730 is part of [Doc. 305](#)], 743n [Pg. 743 is part of [Doc. 313](#)], 773n [Pg. 773 is part of [Doc. 330](#)]

Iran, 676–680 [Pgs. 676–680 include portions of [Doc. 286](#) and [Doc. 287](#)], 684–685 [Pgs. 684–685 include portions of [Doc. 289](#) and [Doc. 290](#)], 713 [Pg. 713 is part of [Doc. 300](#)], 742 [Pg. 742 is part of [Doc.](#)

[312](#)], 750n [Pg. 750 includes portions of [Doc. 316](#) and [Doc. 317](#)], 770–771 [Pgs. 770–771 include portions of [Doc. 327](#) and [Doc. 328](#)]

Regional defense, 63n [Pg. 63 includes portions of [Doc. 42](#) and [Doc. 43](#)], 103 [Pg. 103 includes portions of [Doc. 48](#) and [Doc. 49](#)], 106–107 [Pg. 106 is part of [Doc. 49](#)], 110–111 [Pgs. 110–111 include portions of [Doc. 49](#) and [Doc. 50](#)], 127 [Pg. 127 includes portions of [Doc. 54](#) and [Doc. 55](#)]

Johnson, Charles E., 1061n [Pg. 1061 includes portions of [Doc. 461](#) and [Doc. 462](#)]

Johnson, Lyndon B., 416 [Pg. 416 is part of [Doc. 175](#)], 435 [Pg. 435 is part of [Doc. 182](#)], 437 [Pg. 437 includes portions of [Doc. 182](#) and [Doc. 183](#)]

Johnston, Eric, 15 [Pg. 15 is part of [Doc. 11](#)], 250–251 [Pgs. 250–251 include portions of [Doc. 99](#) and [Doc. 100](#)], 628 [Pg. 628 is part of [Doc. 270](#)]

Johnston plan, 228 [Pg. 228 includes portions of [Doc. 91](#) and [Doc. 92](#)], 250–251 [Pgs. 250–251 include portions of [Doc. 99](#) and [Doc. 100](#)], 258 [Pg. 258 includes portions of [Doc. 101](#) and [Doc. 102](#)], 628 [Pg. 628 is part of [Doc. 270](#)]

Joint Chiefs of Staff, 171 [Pg. 171 is part of [Doc. 68](#)], 246–247 [Pg. 246 is part of [Doc. 97](#)], 302 [Pg. 302 is part of [Doc. 130](#)], 416 [Pg. 416 is part of [Doc. 175](#)], 448n [Pg. 448 is part of [Doc. 192](#)], 539 [Pg. 539 includes portions of [Doc. 239](#) and [Doc. 240](#)], 592 [Pg. 592 is part of [Doc. 265](#)]

Baghdad Pact, 142 [Pg. 142 is part of [Doc. 60](#)], 145 [Pg. 145 is part of [Doc. 60](#)], 169 [Pg. 169 includes portions of [Doc. 67](#) and [Doc. 68](#)], 260 [Pg. 260 is part of [Doc. 103](#)], 299–302 [Pgs. 299–302 include portions of [Doc. 129](#) and [Doc. 130](#)], 780 [Pg. 780 includes portions of [Doc. 333](#) and [Doc. 334](#)], 785 [Pg. 785 is part of [Doc. 337](#)]

U.S. participation, 72–74 [Pg. 72 is part of [Doc. 44](#)], 100–101 [Pg. 100 is part of [Doc. 47](#)], 258 [Pg. 258 includes portions of [Doc. 101](#) and [Doc. 102](#)], 261 [Pg. 261 is part of [Doc. 104](#)], 264–265 [Pgs. 264–265 include portions of [Doc. 105](#), [Doc. 106](#), [Doc. 107](#), and [Doc. 108](#)],

275 [Pg. 275 is part of [Doc. 115](#)], 327–330 [Pgs. 327–330 include portions of [Doc. 143](#) and [Doc. 144](#)], 361–363 [Pgs. 361–363 include portions of [Doc. 153](#) and [Doc. 154](#)], 373n [Pg. 373 is part of [Doc. 159](#)], 390 [Pg. 390 is part of [Doc. 163](#)], 416 [Pg. 416 is part of [Doc. 175](#)], 553–555 [Pgs. 553–555 include portions of [Doc. 247](#), [Doc. 248](#), [Doc. 249](#), and [Doc. 250](#)]

Regional defense, 8 [Pg. 8 includes portions of [Doc. 6](#) and [Doc. 7](#)], 52–53 [Pg. 52 is part of [Doc. 35](#)], 65 [Pg. 65 is part of [Doc. 43](#)], 70–74 [Pgs. 70–74 include portions of [Doc. 43](#) and [Doc. 44](#)], 98–102 [Pgs. 98–102 include portions of [Doc. 47](#) and [Doc. 48](#)], 119 [Pg. 119 is part of [Doc. 51](#)], 130 [Pg. 130 is part of [Doc. 56](#)], 309 [Pg. 309 is part of [Doc. 132](#)], 648–649 [Pgs. 648–649 include portions of [Doc. 271](#) and [Doc. 272](#)], 683 [Pg. 683 is part of [Doc. 288](#)]

State Department–JCS meetings, 246–248 [Pg. 246 is part of [Doc. 97](#)], 264–265 [Pgs. 264–265 include portions of [Doc. 105](#), [Doc. 106](#), [Doc. 107](#), and [Doc. 108](#)], 299–302 [Pgs. 299–302 include portions of [Doc. 129](#) and [Doc. 130](#)], 327–330 [Pgs. 327–330 include portions of [Doc. 143](#) and [Doc. 144](#)], 553–555 [Pgs. 553–555 include portions of [Doc. 247](#), [Doc. 248](#), [Doc. 249](#), and [Doc. 250](#)], 648–649 [Pgs. 648–649 include portions of [Doc. 271](#) and [Doc. 272](#)], 669–670 [Pgs. 669–670 include portions of [Doc. 281](#), [Doc. 282](#), and [Doc. 283](#)]

U.S. military aid to Near East, 161 [Pg. 161 is part of [Doc. 66](#)], 247–248 [Pg. 247 is part of [Doc. 97](#)], 678–682 [Pgs. 678–682 include portions of [Doc. 286](#) and [Doc. 287](#)], 685 [Pg. 685 includes portions of [Doc. 289](#) and [Doc. 290](#)], 731–732 [Pgs. 731–732 include portions of [Doc. 305](#) and [Doc. 306](#)], 857–859 [Pgs. 857–859 include portions of [Doc. 371](#), [Doc. 372](#), and [Doc. 373](#)], 971–975 [Pgs. 971–975 include portions of [Doc. 422](#), [Doc. 423](#), and [Doc. 424](#)], 1020n [Pg. 1020 is part of [Doc. 441](#)]

Joint Strategic Plans Committee, Documents, J.C.S. 2099/513, “Scope of Mutual Defense Assistance Program for Iraq,” 971–975 [Pgs. 971–975 include portions of [Doc. 422](#), [Doc. 423](#), and [Doc. 424](#)]

Jones, G. Lewis, Jr., 5–6 [Pgs. 5–6 include portions of [Doc. 4](#) and [Doc. 5](#)], 15–16 [Pgs. 15–16 include portions of [Doc. 11](#) and [Doc. 12](#)]

Jones, J. Jefferson, III, 216 [Pg. 216 includes portions of [Doc. 90](#) and [Doc. 91](#)], 228 [Pg. 228 includes portions of [Doc. 91](#) and [Doc. 92](#)], 234 [Pg. 234 includes portions of [Doc. 92](#) and [Doc. 93](#)], 448n [Pg. 448 is part of [Doc. 192](#)], 559 [Pg. 559 is part of [Doc. 253](#)], 617n [Pg. 617 is part of [Doc. 268](#)], 940n [Pg. 940 includes portions of [Doc. 404](#) and [Doc. 405](#)], 941n [Pg. 941 includes portions of [Doc. 405](#) and [Doc. 406](#)], 956n [Pg. 956 includes portions of [Doc. 412](#) and [Doc. 413](#)]

Jones, John Wesley, 393 [Pg. 393 is part of [Doc. 165](#)]

Jones, Owen T., 458n [Pg. 458 is part of [Doc. 196](#)], 848n [Pg. 848 includes portions of [Doc. 365](#) and [Doc. 366](#)], 849 [Pg. 849 is part of [Doc. 366](#)], 851n [Pg. 851 includes portions of [Doc. 367](#) and [Doc. 368](#)], 853–854 [Pgs. 853–854 include portions of [Doc. 368](#), [Doc. 369](#), and [Doc. 370](#)], 859n [Pg. 859 includes portions of [Doc. 372](#) and [Doc. 373](#)], 871 [Pg. 871 includes portions of [Doc. 377](#) and [Doc. 378](#)], 946 [Pg. 946 includes portions of [Doc. 407](#) and [Doc. 408](#)]

Jones, Peter, 202 [Pg. 202 is part of [Doc. 81](#)]

Jones, Raymond, 863 [Pg. 863 includes portions of [Doc. 374](#) and [Doc. 375](#)]

Jordan (*see also* *Jordanian subheadings under other subjects*), 33 [Pg. 33 is part of [Doc. 23](#)], 181 [Pg. 181 includes portions of [Doc. 76](#) and [Doc. 77](#)], 603 [Pg. 603 is part of [Doc. 266](#)]

Egypt, relations with, 218–219 [Pg. 218 is part of [Doc. 91](#)], 221 [Pg. 221 is part of [Doc. 91](#)], 254 [Pg. 254 is part of [Doc. 101](#)], 421 [Pg. 421 is part of [Doc. 178](#)], 518–519 [Pgs. 518–519 include portions of [Doc. 224](#) and [Doc. 225](#)], 600 [Pg. 600 is part of [Doc. 266](#)]

Iraq, relations with, 203 [Pg. 203 includes portions of [Doc. 81](#) and [Doc. 82](#)], 234 [Pg. 234 includes portions of [Doc. 92](#) and [Doc. 93](#)], 239 [Pg. 239 is part of [Doc. 93](#)], 350 [Pg. 350 is part of [Doc. 148](#)], 427 [Pg. 427 is part of [Doc. 178](#)], 514 [Pg. 514 is part of [Doc. 222](#)], 560 [Pg. 560 is part of [Doc. 253](#)], 598 [Pg. 598 is part of [Doc. 266](#)], 989

[Pg. 989 is part of [Doc. 429](#)], 998 [Pg. 998 is part of [Doc. 435](#)], 1008 [Pg. 1008 is part of [Doc. 435](#)]

Pakistan, relations with, 37 [Pg. 37 is part of [Doc. 25](#)], 559–560 [Pg. 559 is part of [Doc. 253](#)]

Political situation, 218–219 [Pg. 218 is part of [Doc. 91](#)], 254–256 [Pg. 254 is part of [Doc. 101](#)], 262–263 [Pg. 262 is part of [Doc. 105](#)], 296 [Pg. 296 is part of [Doc. 127](#)], 426–428 [Pg. 426 is part of [Doc. 178](#)], 524 [Pg. 524 is part of [Doc. 229](#)], 600 [Pg. 600 is part of [Doc. 266](#)], 1048 [Pg. 1048 includes portions of [Doc. 457](#) and [Doc. 458](#)]

Iraqi position, 989 [Pg. 989 is part of [Doc. 429](#)], 1008 [Pg. 1008 is part of [Doc. 435](#)], 1032–1033 [Pgs. 1032–1033 include portions of [Doc. 447](#), [Doc. 448](#), and [Doc. 449](#)], 1044 [Pg. 1044 is part of [Doc. 456](#)]

Palestinians, 88 [Pg. 88 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 105 [Pg. 105 is part of [Doc. 49](#)], 212 [Pg. 212 includes portions of [Doc. 86](#) and [Doc. 87](#)], 214 [Pg. 214 is part of [Doc. 88](#)], 218–219 [Pg. 218 is part of [Doc. 91](#)], 254 [Pg. 254 is part of [Doc. 101](#)], 560–561 [Pg. 560 is part of [Doc. 253](#)], 600 [Pg. 600 is part of [Doc. 266](#)]

Saudi Arabia, relations with, 87 [Pg. 87 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 218 [Pg. 218 is part of [Doc. 91](#)], 255–256 [Pg. 255 is part of [Doc. 101](#)], 256 [Pg. 256 is part of [Doc. 101](#)], 421 [Pg. 421 is part of [Doc. 178](#)], 598 [Pg. 598 is part of [Doc. 266](#)], 1032 [Pg. 1032 includes portions of [Doc. 447](#) and [Doc. 448](#)]

Soviet bloc, relations with, 346 [Pg. 346 is part of [Doc. 148](#)], 359 [Pg. 359 is part of [Doc. 151](#)], 421 [Pg. 421 is part of [Doc. 178](#)], 428 [Pg. 428 is part of [Doc. 178](#)]

Syria, relations with, 421 [Pg. 421 is part of [Doc. 178](#)], 426 [Pg. 426 is part of [Doc. 178](#)], 518–519 [Pgs. 518–519 include portions of [Doc. 224](#) and [Doc. 225](#)], 600 [Pg. 600 is part of [Doc. 266](#)]

United Kingdom, relations with, 88 [Pg. 88 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 91 [Pg. 91 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 104 [Pg. 104 is part of [Doc. 49](#)], 217–218 [Pg. 217 is part of [Doc. 91](#)], 221 [Pg. 221 is part of [Doc. 91](#)], 231–232 [Pg. 231 is part of [Doc. 92](#)], 290 [Pg. 290 is part of [Doc. 124](#)], 427 [Pg. 427 is part of [Doc. 178](#)]

Anglo–Jordanian Treaty, 45 [Pg. 45 is part of [Doc. 30](#)], 67 [Pg. 67 is part of [Doc. 43](#)], 89 [Pg. 89 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 113 [Pg. 113 is part of [Doc. 51](#)], 218 [Pg. 218 is part of [Doc. 91](#)], 359 [Pg. 359 is part of [Doc. 151](#)], 421 [Pg. 421 is part of [Doc. 178](#)], 428 [Pg. 428 is part of [Doc. 178](#)]

Baghdad Pact and, 48 [Pg. 48 includes portions of [Doc. 32](#) and [Doc. 33](#)], 111 [Pg. 111 includes portions of [Doc. 49](#) and [Doc. 50](#)], 113 [Pg. 113 is part of [Doc. 51](#)], 230 [Pg. 230 is part of [Doc. 92](#)]

British withdrawal, 234 [Pg. 234 includes portions of [Doc. 92](#) and [Doc. 93](#)], 238–239 [Pg. 238 is part of [Doc. 93](#)], 346 [Pg. 346 is part of [Doc. 148](#)], 359 [Pg. 359 is part of [Doc. 151](#)], 421 [Pg. 421 is part of [Doc. 178](#)], 508 [Pg. 508 is part of [Doc. 221](#)]

Military aid, 38ⁿ [Pg. 38 includes portions of [Doc. 25](#) and [Doc. 26](#)], 95 [Pg. 95 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 119 [Pg. 119 is part of [Doc. 51](#)], 122 [Pg. 122 is part of [Doc. 51](#)], 203 [Pg. 203 includes portions of [Doc. 81](#) and [Doc. 82](#)], 218 [Pg. 218 is part of [Doc. 91](#)] Templer visit, 211–212 [Pgs. 211–212 include portions of [Doc. 85](#), [Doc. 86](#), and [Doc. 87](#)], 218 [Pg. 218 is part of [Doc. 91](#)]

United States, relations with, 2–3 [Pgs. 2–3 include portions of [Doc. 1](#), [Doc. 2](#), and [Doc. 3](#)], 37 [Pg. 37 is part of [Doc. 25](#)], 85 [Pg. 85 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 621 [Pg. 621 is part of [Doc. 270](#)]

U.S. economic aid to, 346 [Pg. 346 is part of [Doc. 148](#)], 366 [Pg. 366 is part of [Doc. 156](#)], 423 [Pg. 423 is part of [Doc. 178](#)], 524

[Pg. 524 is part of [Doc. 229](#)], 527 [Pg. 527 is part of [Doc. 232](#)], 560 [Pg. 560 is part of [Doc. 253](#)], 595 [Pg. 595 is part of [Doc. 266](#)], 615 [Pg. 615 is part of [Doc. 267](#)]

U.S. military aid to, 37–38 [Pgs. 37–38 include portions of [Doc. 25](#) and [Doc. 26](#)], 346 [Pg. 346 is part of [Doc. 148](#)], 349 [Pg. 349 is part of [Doc. 148](#)], 518–519 [Pgs. 518–519 include portions of [Doc. 224](#) and [Doc. 225](#)]

U.S. policy toward, 378–379 [Pg. 378 is part of [Doc. 160](#)], 639 [Pg. 639 is part of [Doc. 270](#)]

Jordan River Development Plan (Johnston plan), 228 [Pg. 228 includes portions of [Doc. 91](#) and [Doc. 92](#)], 250–251 [Pgs. 250–251 include portions of [Doc. 99](#) and [Doc. 100](#)], 258 [Pg. 258 includes portions of [Doc. 101](#) and [Doc. 102](#)], 628 [Pg. 628 is part of [Doc. 270](#)]

Justice, U.S. Department of, 593n [Pg. 593 is part of [Doc. 265](#)], 711n [Pg. 711 is part of [Doc. 299](#)]

Kalijarvi, Thorsten V., 576 [Pg. 576 includes portions of [Doc. 258](#) and [Doc. 259](#)], 889 [Pg. 889 is part of [Doc. 388](#)], 890n [Pg. 890 is part of [Doc. 389](#)]

Karamanlis, Constantine, 528 [Pg. 528 is part of [Doc. 233](#)]

Kashmir dispute, 109 [Pg. 109 is part of [Doc. 49](#)], 118 [Pg. 118 is part of [Doc. 51](#)], 253 [Pg. 253 is part of [Doc. 101](#)], 277 [Pg. 277 is part of [Doc. 116](#)], 288–289 [Pg. 288 is part of [Doc. 124](#)], 291 [Pg. 291 is part of [Doc. 124](#)], 300 [Pg. 300 is part of [Doc. 130](#)]

Kelley, Rear Adm. Thomas, 443 [Pg. 443 is part of [Doc. 188](#)]

Kennedy, Donald D., 956n [Pg. 956 includes portions of [Doc. 412](#) and [Doc. 413](#)]

Kerr, Peyton, 846 [Pg. 846 is part of [Doc. 364](#)]

Keyser, C. Dirck, 937n [Pg. 937 includes portions of [Doc. 402](#) and [Doc. 403](#)]

al-Khalidi, Awni, 256 [Pg. 256 is part of [Doc. 101](#)]

Khalil, Hashim, 303 [Pg. 303 is part of [Doc. 131](#)], 1017 [Pg. 1017 includes portions of [Doc. 440](#) and [Doc. 441](#)], 1029–1034 [Pgs. 1029–1034 include portions of [Doc. 445](#), [Doc. 446](#), [Doc. 447](#), [Doc. 448](#), [Doc. 449](#), [Doc. 450](#), and [Doc. 451](#)], 1038 [Pg. 1038 is part of [Doc. 453](#)]

Khrushchev, Nikita, 253 [Pg. 253 is part of [Doc. 101](#)], 290 [Pg. 290 is part of [Doc. 124](#)], 838 [Pg. 838 is part of [Doc. 359](#)], 941 [Pg. 941 includes portions of [Doc. 405](#) and [Doc. 406](#)]

Khuri, Faris al-, 87 [Pg. 87 is part of [Doc. 46](#)]

Kirk, Roger, 265 [Pg. 265 includes portions of [Doc. 107](#) and [Doc. 108](#)], 278 [Pg. 278 is part of [Doc. 117](#)]

Kitchen, Jeffrey C., 20n [Pg. 20 includes portions of [Doc. 13](#) and [Doc. 14](#)], 181n [Pg. 181 includes portions of [Doc. 76](#) and [Doc. 77](#)], 676n [Pg. 676 is part of [Doc. 286](#)], 680n [Pg. 680 includes portions of [Doc. 286](#) and [Doc. 287](#)], 698n [Pg. 698 is part of [Doc. 293](#)], 702 [Pg. 702 is part of [Doc. 295](#)], 709n [Pg. 709 includes portions of [Doc. 297](#) and [Doc. 298](#)], 797n [Pg. 797 includes portions of [Doc. 345](#) and [Doc. 346](#)], 799n [Pg. 799 includes portions of [Doc. 347](#) and [Doc. 348](#)], 805n [Pg. 805 is part of [Doc. 350](#)], 816–819 [Pgs. 816–819 include portions of [Doc. 355](#) and [Doc. 356](#)]

Knowland, William F., 396–397 [Pgs. 396–397 include portions of [Doc. 166](#) and [Doc. 167](#)], 416 [Pg. 416 is part of [Doc. 175](#)], 435 [Pg. 435 is part of [Doc. 182](#)], 445 [Pg. 445 is part of [Doc. 189](#)]

Koegler, George, 711–713 [Pgs. 711–713 include portions of [Doc. 299](#) and [Doc. 300](#)]

Kohler, Foy D., 272 [Pg. 272 is part of [Doc. 113](#)]

Koprulu, Mehmet Fuat, 272 [Pg. 272 is part of [Doc. 113](#)]

Kunna, Khalil, 1000 [Pg. 1000 is part of [Doc. 435](#)], 1043 [Pg. 1043 is part of [Doc. 455](#)]

Kuwait, 106 [Pg. 106 is part of [Doc. 49](#)], 136–138 [Pg. 136 is part of [Doc. 60](#)], 151 [Pg. 151 is part of [Doc. 60](#)], 223 [Pg. 223 is part of [Doc. 91](#)], 229 [Pg. 229 is part of [Doc. 92](#)], 498–499 [Pg. 498 is part of [Doc. 220](#)], 507 [Pg. 507 is part of [Doc. 221](#)]

United Kingdom, relations with, 137 [Pg. 137 is part of [Doc. 60](#)], 552 [Pg. 552 is part of [Doc. 247](#)], 601 [Pg. 601 is part of [Doc. 266](#)]

Kuwaitly. See [al-Quwatli, Shukri](#).

Langley, James, 559 [Pg. 559 is part of [Doc. 253](#)]

Laskey, Denis S., 399 [Pg. 399 is part of [Doc. 169](#)], 464 [Pg. 464 is part of [Doc. 202](#)], 1069 [Pg. 1069 is part of [Doc. 464](#)]

Lathram, L. Wade, 284n [Pg. 284 is part of [Doc. 122](#)], 528n [Pg. 528 is part of [Doc. 233](#)], 529n [Pg. 529 includes portions of [Doc. 233](#) and [Doc. 234](#)], 530n [Pg. 530 includes portions of [Doc. 234](#) and [Doc. 235](#)], 532n [Pg. 532 includes portions of [Doc. 235](#) and [Doc. 236](#)]

Lavrentyev, Anatoliy I., 773 [Pg. 773 is part of [Doc. 330](#)], 774n [Pg. 774 is part of [Doc. 330](#)]

Law of the Sea Conference, 547 [Pg. 547 is part of [Doc. 246](#)]

Lawford, Valentine, 913 [Pg. 913 is part of [Doc. 393](#)]

Lawson, Edward B., 10n [Pg. 10 is part of [Doc. 8](#)]

Lay, James S., Jr., 297 [Pg. 297 includes portions of [Doc. 127](#) and [Doc. 128](#)], 298n [Pg. 298 includes portions of [Doc. 128](#) and [Doc. 129](#)], 325n [Pg. 325 includes portions of [Doc. 141](#) and [Doc. 142](#)], 420n [Pg. 420 includes portions of [Doc. 177](#) and [Doc. 178](#)], 440 [Pg. 440 includes portions of [Doc. 185](#) and [Doc. 186](#)], 680n [Pg. 680 includes portions of [Doc. 286](#) and [Doc. 287](#)], 689 [Pg. 689 is part of [Doc. 291](#)], 841 [Pg. 841 is part of [Doc. 361](#)], 900–901 [Pg. 900 is part of [Doc. 392](#)]

Leary, Col. Byron V., 345 [Pg. 345 is part of [Doc. 148](#)]

Lebanon (*see also Lebanese subheadings under other subjects*), 92 [Pg. 92 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 318 [Pg. 318 includes portions of [Doc. 136](#) and [Doc. 137](#)], 362 [Pg. 362 is part of [Doc. 153](#)], 426 [Pg. 426 is part of [Doc. 178](#)], 603 [Pg. 603 is part of [Doc. 266](#)], 989 [Pg. 989 is part of [Doc. 429](#)]

Political situation, 105 [Pg. 105 is part of [Doc. 49](#)], 402 [Pg. 402 is part of [Doc. 170](#)], 421 [Pg. 421 is part of [Doc. 178](#)], 640 [Pg. 640 is part of [Doc. 270](#)]

Saudi Arabia, relations with, 55ⁿ [Pg. 55 includes portions of [Doc. 36](#) and [Doc. 37](#)], 87 [Pg. 87 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 1032 [Pg. 1032 includes portions of [Doc. 447](#) and [Doc. 448](#)]

Soviet bloc, relations with, 421 [Pg. 421 is part of [Doc. 178](#)]

United Kingdom, relations with, 85 [Pg. 85 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 119 [Pg. 119 is part of [Doc. 51](#)]

United States, relations with, 13–14 [Pg. 13 is part of [Doc. 10](#)], 17 [Pg. 17 is part of [Doc. 12](#)], 378 [Pg. 378 is part of [Doc. 160](#)], 380 [Pg. 380 is part of [Doc. 160](#)], 423 [Pg. 423 is part of [Doc. 178](#)], 485 [Pg. 485 is part of [Doc. 211](#)], 595 [Pg. 595 is part of [Doc. 266](#)], 641 [Pg. 641 is part of [Doc. 270](#)]

U.S. military aid to, 17 [Pg. 17 is part of [Doc. 12](#)], 68 [Pg. 68 is part of [Doc. 43](#)], 186 [Pg. 186 is part of [Doc. 78](#)], 204ⁿ [Pg. 204 is part of [Doc. 82](#)], 423 [Pg. 423 is part of [Doc. 178](#)], 485 [Pg. 485 is part of [Doc. 211](#)], 641 [Pg. 641 is part of [Doc. 270](#)]

West, relations with, 88 [Pg. 88 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 424 [Pg. 424 is part of [Doc. 178](#)], 598–600 [Pg. 598 is part of [Doc. 266](#)]

Lemnitzer, Gen. Lyman L., 162 [Pg. 162 is part of [Doc. 66](#)]

Leonhart, William, 576–577 [Pgs. 576–577 include portions of [Doc. 258](#), [Doc. 259](#), and [Doc. 260](#)], 891ⁿ [Pg. 891 includes portions of [Doc. 389](#) and [Doc. 390](#)]

Libya, 33 [Pg. 33 is part of [Doc. 23](#)], 72–73 [Pg. 72 is part of [Doc. 44](#)], 221 [Pg. 221 is part of [Doc. 91](#)], 233 [Pg. 233 is part of [Doc. 92](#)], 378 [Pg. 378 is part of [Doc. 160](#)], 426 [Pg. 426 is part of [Doc. 178](#)], 486–487 [Pgs. 486–487 include portions of [Doc. 212](#) and [Doc. 213](#)], 670 [Pg. 670 includes portions of [Doc. 282](#) and [Doc. 283](#)]

Eisenhower Doctrine, 486–487 [Pgs. 486–487 include portions of [Doc. 212](#) and [Doc. 213](#)], 530–532 [Pgs. 530–532 include portions of [Doc. 234](#), [Doc. 235](#), and [Doc. 236](#)], 535 [Pg. 535 is part of [Doc. 238](#)]

United Kingdom, relations with, 221 [Pg. 221 is part of [Doc. 91](#)], 263 [Pg. 263 is part of [Doc. 105](#)]

Lincoln, Francis, 863 [Pg. 863 includes portions of [Doc. 374](#) and [Doc. 375](#)]

Lister, Ernest A., 216 [Pg. 216 includes portions of [Doc. 90](#) and [Doc. 91](#)], 228 [Pg. 228 includes portions of [Doc. 91](#) and [Doc. 92](#)], 278 [Pg. 278 is part of [Doc. 117](#)]

Lloyd, Selwyn, 235 [Pg. 235 is part of [Doc. 93](#)], 240–243 [Pgs. 240–243 include portions of [Doc. 94](#) and [Doc. 95](#)], 250–252 [Pgs. 250–252 include portions of [Doc. 99](#), [Doc. 100](#), and [Doc. 101](#)], 263 [Pg. 263 is part of [Doc. 105](#)], 464–465 [Pg. 464 is part of [Doc. 202](#)], 470–471 [Pg. 470 is part of [Doc. 203](#)], 550n [Pg. 550 is part of [Doc. 247](#)], 995 [Pg. 995 includes portions of [Doc. 432](#) and [Doc. 433](#)]

Baghdad Pact, 252–257 [Pgs. 252–257 include portions of [Doc. 100](#) and [Doc. 101](#)], 262 [Pg. 262 is part of [Doc. 105](#)], 463 [Pg. 463 includes portions of [Doc. 200](#) and [Doc. 201](#)], 466–469 [Pg. 466 is part of [Doc. 203](#)]

Bermuda Conference, 462–474 [Pgs. 462–474 include portions of [Doc. 199](#), [Doc. 200](#), [Doc. 201](#), [Doc. 202](#), [Doc. 203](#), [Doc. 204](#), and [Doc. 205](#)], 547 [Pg. 547 is part of [Doc. 246](#)]

Dulles, correspondence with, 1011 [Pg. 1011 is part of [Doc. 436](#)], 1068–1069 [Pgs. 1068–1069 include portions of [Doc. 462](#), [Doc. 463](#), and [Doc. 464](#)]

Near East, U.S.–British cooperation, 399–401 [Pgs. 399–401 include portions of [Doc. 169](#) and [Doc. 170](#)], 462 [Pg. 462 includes portions of [Doc. 199](#) and [Doc. 200](#)], 464–473 [Pgs. 464–473 include portions of [Doc. 202](#), [Doc. 203](#), and [Doc. 204](#)], 550n [Pg. 550 is part of [Doc. 247](#)], 797 [Pg. 797 includes portions of [Doc. 345](#) and [Doc. 346](#)]

Long, E.T., 666n [Pg. 666 includes portions of [Doc. 279](#) and [Doc. 280](#)], 667 [Pg. 667 is part of [Doc. 280](#)]

Lord, Arthur, 863–864 [Pgs. 863–864 include portions of [Doc. 374](#) and [Doc. 375](#)], 865n [Pg. 865 is part of [Doc. 375](#)]

Luce, Clare Booth, 232 [Pg. 232 is part of [Doc. 92](#)]

Lucet, Charles E., 470n [Pg. 470 is part of [Doc. 203](#)]

Lynn, James A., 889n [Pg. 889 is part of [Doc. 388](#)]

MacArthur, Douglas, II, 240 [Pg. 240 is part of [Doc. 94](#)], 243 [Pg. 243 is part of [Doc. 95](#)], 275 [Pg. 275 is part of [Doc. 115](#)], 278 [Pg. 278 is part of [Doc. 117](#)], 322–324 [Pgs. 322–324 include portions of [Doc. 138](#), [Doc. 139](#), [Doc. 140](#), and [Doc. 141](#)], 340n [Pg. 340 is part of [Doc. 147](#)], 366 [Pg. 366 is part of [Doc. 156](#)], 377 [Pg. 377 is part of [Doc. 160](#)], 393 [Pg. 393 is part of [Doc. 165](#)], 399 [Pg. 399 is part of [Doc. 169](#)], 1014n [Pg. 1014 includes portions of [Doc. 438](#) and [Doc. 439](#)]

Baghdad Pact, 265–267 [Pgs. 265–267 include portions of [Doc. 107](#), [Doc. 108](#), and [Doc. 109](#)], 282–283 [Pgs. 282–283 include portions of [Doc. 120](#) and [Doc. 121](#)]

Macmillan, Harold S., 141 [Pg. 141 is part of [Doc. 60](#)], 152 [Pg. 152 is part of [Doc. 61](#)], 177 [Pg. 177 includes portions of [Doc. 71](#) and [Doc. 72](#)], 181n [Pg. 181 includes portions of [Doc. 76](#) and [Doc. 77](#)], 203 [Pg. 203 includes portions of [Doc. 81](#) and [Doc. 82](#)], 205–207 [Pgs. 205–207 include portions of [Doc. 83](#) and [Doc. 84](#)], 214 [Pg. 214 is part of [Doc. 88](#)], 462–474 [Pgs. 462–474 include portions of [Doc. 199](#), [Doc. 200](#), [Doc. 201](#), [Doc. 202](#), [Doc. 203](#), [Doc. 204](#), and [Doc. 205](#)], 574 [Pg. 574 is part of [Doc. 257](#)]

Macomber, William B., 323 [Pg. 323 includes portions of [Doc. 139](#) and [Doc. 140](#)], 464 [Pg. 464 is part of [Doc. 202](#)], 466 [Pg. 466 is part of [Doc. 203](#)], 479–481 [Pg. 479 is part of [Doc. 209](#)], 808n [Pg. 808 is part of [Doc. 352](#)], 946n [Pg. 946 includes portions of [Doc. 407](#) and [Doc. 408](#)]

Magistrati, Massimo, 584 [Pg. 584 is part of [Doc. 262](#)], 663 [Pg. 663 includes portions of [Doc. 278](#) and [Doc. 279](#)], 945 [Pg. 945 is part of [Doc. 407](#)]

Mahdi, Saleh, 585–586 [Pgs. 585–586 include portions of [Doc. 262](#), [Doc. 263](#), and [Doc. 264](#)]

al–Majali, Haza, 212 [Pg. 212 includes portions of [Doc. 86](#) and [Doc. 87](#)]

Makins, Roger M., 146–147 [Pg. 146 is part of [Doc. 60](#)], 205 [Pg. 205 is part of [Doc. 83](#)], 1011 [Pg. 1011 is part of [Doc. 436](#)]

Baghdad Pact, 108–110 [Pg. 108 is part of [Doc. 49](#)], 112–113 [Pg. 112 is part of [Doc. 51](#)], 116–117 [Pg. 116 is part of [Doc. 51](#)], 139–140 [Pg. 139 is part of [Doc. 60](#)], 143–144 [Pg. 143 is part of [Doc. 60](#)], 150–151 [Pg. 150 is part of [Doc. 60](#)], 240 [Pg. 240 is part of [Doc. 94](#)], 243 [Pg. 243 is part of [Doc. 95](#)], 303 [Pg. 303 is part of [Doc. 131](#)], 305–306 [Pg. 305 is part of [Doc. 131](#)]

U.S. participation, 115 [Pg. 115 is part of [Doc. 51](#)], 128 [Pg. 128 is part of [Doc. 55](#)], 141–142 [Pg. 141 is part of [Doc. 60](#)], 152 [Pg. 152 is part of [Doc. 61](#)], 263n [Pg. 263 is part of [Doc. 105](#)]

Regional defense, 103–122 [Pgs. 103–122 include portions of [Doc. 48](#), [Doc. 49](#), [Doc. 50](#), and [Doc. 51](#)], 130 [Pg. 130 is part of [Doc. 56](#)], 135 [Pg. 135 is part of [Doc. 60](#)], 137 [Pg. 137 is part of [Doc. 60](#)]

Malik, Charles, 13 [Pg. 13 is part of [Doc. 10](#)], 16–18 [Pgs. 16–18 include portions of [Doc. 11](#) and [Doc. 12](#)], 27 [Pg. 27 includes portions of [Doc. 18](#) and [Doc. 19](#)], 657 [Pg. 657 is part of [Doc. 276](#)]

Mallory, Lester D., 37–38 [Pgs. 37–38 include portions of [Doc. 25](#) and [Doc. 26](#)], 111 [Pg. 111 includes portions of [Doc. 49](#) and [Doc. 50](#)], 181 [Pg. 181 includes

portions of [Doc. 76](#) and [Doc. 77](#)]

Mann, Gerald, 479 [Pg. 479 is part of [Doc. 209](#)], 617n [Pg. 617 is part of [Doc. 268](#)]

Mann, Thomas C., 670 [Pg. 670 includes portions of [Doc. 282](#) and [Doc. 283](#)], 672 [Pg. 672 is part of [Doc. 283](#)]

Mansfield, Mike, 270 [Pg. 270 is part of [Doc. 111](#)], 275–276 [Pg. 275 is part of [Doc. 115](#)], 282–283 [Pgs. 282–283 include portions of [Doc. 120](#) and [Doc. 121](#)], 445 [Pg. 445 is part of [Doc. 189](#)]

Marshall Plan, 661–662 [Pgs. 661–662 include portions of [Doc. 276](#), [Doc. 277](#), and [Doc. 278](#)], 665–666 [Pgs. 665–666 include portions of [Doc. 279](#) and [Doc. 280](#)]

Martin, Joseph W., Jr., 416 [Pg. 416 is part of [Doc. 175](#)], 437 [Pg. 437 includes portions of [Doc. 182](#) and [Doc. 183](#)]

Massay, Barbara, 480–481 [Pg. 480 is part of [Doc. 209](#)]

Masters, Col. J., 63n [Pg. 63 includes portions of [Doc. 42](#) and [Doc. 43](#)]

Mathews, Elbert G., 51n [Pg. 51 includes portions of [Doc. 34](#) and [Doc. 35](#)], 70n [Pg. 70 includes portions of [Doc. 43](#) and [Doc. 44](#)], 98n [Pg. 98 is part of [Doc. 47](#)], 351n [Pg. 351 includes portions of [Doc. 148](#) and [Doc. 149](#)], 367n [Pg. 367 is part of [Doc. 156](#)], 376n [Pg. 376 includes portions of [Doc. 159](#) and [Doc. 160](#)], 393 [Pg. 393 is part of [Doc. 165](#)], 448n [Pg. 448 is part of [Doc. 192](#)], 452n [Pg. 452 includes portions of [Doc. 193](#) and [Doc. 194](#)], 454n [Pg. 454 includes portions of [Doc. 194](#) and [Doc. 195](#)], 553 [Pg. 553 includes portions of [Doc. 247](#), [Doc. 248](#), and [Doc. 249](#)]

Near East:

Soviet policy toward, 216 [Pg. 216 includes portions of [Doc. 90](#) and [Doc. 91](#)], 228 [Pg. 228 includes portions of [Doc. 91](#) and [Doc. 92](#)], 234 [Pg. 234 includes portions of [Doc. 92](#) and [Doc. 93](#)], 278–279 [Pgs. 278–279 include portions of [Doc. 117](#) and [Doc. 118](#)]

U.S. military aid to, 366 [Pg. 366 is part of [Doc. 156](#)]

Oil resources, 497ⁿ [Pg. 497 is part of [Doc. 220](#)], 504–507 [Pg. 504 is part of [Doc. 221](#)], 543 [Pg. 543 includes portions of [Doc. 242](#) and [Doc. 243](#)], 545 [Pg. 545 includes portions of [Doc. 244](#) and [Doc. 245](#)], 548 [Pg. 548 is part of [Doc. 247](#)]

Regional defense, 63ⁿ [Pg. 63 includes portions of [Doc. 42](#) and [Doc. 43](#)], 103 [Pg. 103 includes portions of [Doc. 48](#) and [Doc. 49](#)], 112 [Pg. 112 is part of [Doc. 51](#)], 127 [Pg. 127 includes portions of [Doc. 54](#) and [Doc. 55](#)], 135 [Pg. 135 is part of [Doc. 60](#)]

U.S.–British cooperation, 504–507 [Pg. 504 is part of [Doc. 221](#)], 509 [Pg. 509 is part of [Doc. 222](#)], 513–514 [Pg. 513 is part of [Doc. 222](#)], 543 [Pg. 543 includes portions of [Doc. 242](#) and [Doc. 243](#)], 545 [Pg. 545 includes portions of [Doc. 244](#) and [Doc. 245](#)], 548 [Pg. 548 is part of [Doc. 247](#)]

Matlock, Clifford C., 926 [Pg. 926 is part of [Doc. 398](#)]

Mattei, Enrico, 938 [Pg. 938 is part of [Doc. 403](#)]

McCardle, Carl W., 393 [Pg. 393 is part of [Doc. 165](#)]

McCaul, Lt. Gen. Verne J., 669 [Pg. 669 includes portions of [Doc. 281](#) and [Doc. 282](#)]

McClanahan, Grant, 543 [Pg. 543 includes portions of [Doc. 242](#) and [Doc. 243](#)], 545 [Pg. 545 includes portions of [Doc. 244](#) and [Doc. 245](#)]

McClure, Brig. Gen., 248 [Pg. 248 is part of [Doc. 97](#)], 293 [Pg. 293 is part of [Doc. 125](#)], 680 [Pg. 680 includes portions of [Doc. 286](#) and [Doc. 287](#)], 704 [Pg. 704 is part of [Doc. 296](#)], 706 [Pg. 706 is part of [Doc. 296](#)], 730 [Pg. 730 is part of [Doc. 305](#)]

McCormack, John W., 435–437 [Pgs. 435–437 include portions of [Doc. 182](#) and [Doc. 183](#)]

McGhee, George, 671 [Pg. 671 is part of [Doc. 283](#)]

McNeil, W.J., 98 [Pg. 98 is part of [Doc. 47](#)], 414 [Pg. 414 is part of [Doc. 174](#)]

Meany, George, 301 [Pg. 301 is part of [Doc. 130](#)]

Mehbud, Ahmad, 869–870 [Pg. 869 is part of [Doc. 377](#)], 882 [Pg. 882 is part of [Doc. 383](#)]

Meir, Golda, 529 [Pg. 529 includes portions of [Doc. 233](#) and [Doc. 234](#)]

Memminger, Robert B., 332n [Pg. 332 is part of [Doc. 145](#)], 338n [Pg. 338 is part of [Doc. 146](#)], 393 [Pg. 393 is part of [Doc. 165](#)], 448n [Pg. 448 is part of [Doc. 192](#)], 1029–1034 [Pgs. 1029–1034 include portions of [Doc. 445](#), [Doc. 446](#), [Doc. 447](#), [Doc. 448](#), [Doc. 449](#), [Doc. 450](#), and [Doc. 451](#)]

Menderes, Adnan, 354 [Pg. 354 is part of [Doc. 150](#)], 487 [Pg. 487 includes portions of [Doc. 212](#) and [Doc. 213](#)], 959 [Pg. 959 is part of [Doc. 414](#)], 965 [Pg. 965 includes portions of [Doc. 417](#) and [Doc. 418](#)]

Baghdad Pact, 2n [Pg. 2 includes portions of [Doc. 1](#) and [Doc. 2](#)], 61n [Pg. 61 is part of [Doc. 41](#)], 203–204 [Pgs. 203–204 include portions of [Doc. 81](#) and [Doc. 82](#)], 274 [Pg. 274 is part of [Doc. 114](#)], 300 [Pg. 300 is part of [Doc. 130](#)], 320–321 [Pgs. 320–321 include portions of [Doc. 137](#) and [Doc. 138](#)], 333 [Pg. 333 is part of [Doc. 145](#)], 353–354 [Pg. 353 is part of [Doc. 150](#)], 673–675 [Pgs. 673–675 include portions of [Doc. 283](#), [Doc. 284](#), and [Doc. 285](#)]

Merchant, Livingston T., 216 [Pg. 216 includes portions of [Doc. 90](#) and [Doc. 91](#)], 228 [Pg. 228 includes portions of [Doc. 91](#) and [Doc. 92](#)], 240 [Pg. 240 is part of [Doc. 94](#)], 243 [Pg. 243 is part of [Doc. 95](#)]

Metline. See [Oil resources: Alternate pipeline proposals](#).

Metzger, Stanley D., 460n [Pg. 460 includes portions of [Doc. 197](#) and [Doc. 198](#)], 671 [Pg. 671 is part of [Doc. 283](#)]

Middle East. See [Near East](#).

Middle East Development Organization proposal, 586–587 [Pgs. 586–587 include portions of [Doc. 263](#), [Doc. 264](#), and [Doc. 265](#)], 618 [Pg. 618 includes portions of [Doc. 268](#) and [Doc. 269](#)]

Middle East Doctrine. See [Eisenhower Doctrine](#).

Middle East Emergency Committee (MEEC), 315–316 [Pgs. 315–316 include portions of [Doc. 134](#), [Doc. 135](#), and [Doc. 136](#)], 465 [Pg. 465 is part of [Doc. 202](#)]

Mikoyan, Anastas, 273 [Pg. 273 is part of [Doc. 114](#)]

Mills, Sheldon T., 492 [Pg. 492 is part of [Doc. 216](#)]

Minnich, L. Arthur, 432n [Pg. 432 is part of [Doc. 182](#)]

Mirza, Maj. Gen. Iskander, 60–61 [Pgs. 60–61 include portions of [Doc. 40](#) and [Doc. 41](#)], 318n [Pg. 318 includes portions of [Doc. 136](#) and [Doc. 137](#)], 319–321 [Pgs. 319–321 include portions of [Doc. 137](#) and [Doc. 138](#)], 328 [Pg. 328 is part of [Doc. 143](#)], 333 [Pg. 333 is part of [Doc. 145](#)], 354 [Pg. 354 is part of [Doc. 150](#)]

Mishaal, Prince, 24 [Pg. 24 is part of [Doc. 16](#)]

Mohamed V, Sultan of Morocco, 533–534 [Pgs. 533–534 include portions of [Doc. 236](#), [Doc. 237](#), and [Doc. 238](#)]

Moline, Edwin G., 443 [Pg. 443 is part of [Doc. 188](#)], 460n [Pg. 460 includes portions of [Doc. 197](#) and [Doc. 198](#)]

Mollet, Guy, 262–263 [Pg. 262 is part of [Doc. 105](#)]

Molotov, Vyacheslav M., 200 [Pg. 200 includes portions of [Doc. 80](#) and [Doc. 81](#)], 789 [Pg. 789 includes portions of [Doc. 339](#), [Doc. 340](#), and [Doc. 341](#)], 797n [Pg. 797 includes portions of [Doc. 345](#) and [Doc. 346](#)], 806 [Pg. 806 is part of [Doc. 351](#)]

Monaghan, T.E., 482 [Pg. 482 is part of [Doc. 210](#)]

Monckton of Benchley, 1st Viscount, 279–281 [Pgs. 279–281 include portions of [Doc. 117](#), [Doc. 118](#), and [Doc. 119](#)], 290–292 [Pgs. 290–292 include portions of [Doc. 124](#) and [Doc. 125](#)]

Moose, James S., Jr., 25–26 [Pgs. 25–26 include portions of [Doc. 16](#) and [Doc. 17](#)], 28n [Pg. 28 includes portions of [Doc. 19](#) and [Doc. 20](#)], 32–34 [Pgs. 32–34 include portions of [Doc. 22](#) and [Doc. 23](#)], 35n [Pg. 35 is part of [Doc. 24](#)], 38n [Pg. 38 includes portions of [Doc. 25](#) and [Doc. 26](#)]

Morgan, Thomas E., 447 [Pg. 447 is part of [Doc. 191](#)]

Morocco (see also North Africa), 172–173 [Pg. 172 is part of [Doc. 69](#)], 533–535 [Pgs. 533–535 include portions of [Doc. 236](#), [Doc. 237](#), and [Doc. 238](#)], 624 [Pg. 624 is part of [Doc. 270](#)], 1007 [Pg. 1007 is part of [Doc. 435](#)], 1034 [Pg. 1034 includes portions of [Doc. 450](#) and [Doc. 451](#)]

Morris, Brewster H., 464 [Pg. 464 is part of [Doc. 202](#)]

Morris, Willie, 135 [Pg. 135 is part of [Doc. 60](#)], 217 [Pg. 217 is part of [Doc. 91](#)], 229 [Pg. 229 is part of [Doc. 92](#)], 234 [Pg. 234 includes portions of [Doc. 92](#) and [Doc. 93](#)], 239–240 [Pgs. 239–240 include portions of [Doc. 93](#) and [Doc. 94](#)], 243 [Pg. 243 is part of [Doc. 95](#)], 504 [Pg. 504 is part of [Doc. 221](#)], 507–509 [Pgs. 507–509 include portions of [Doc. 221](#) and [Doc. 222](#)], 575–576 [Pgs. 575–576 include portions of [Doc. 257](#), [Doc. 258](#), and [Doc. 259](#)], 1069 [Pg. 1069 is part of [Doc. 464](#)]

Mossadeq, Mohammed, 136 [Pg. 136 is part of [Doc. 60](#)], 690 [Pg. 690 is part of [Doc. 291](#)], 818 [Pg. 818 is part of [Doc. 356](#)], 841 [Pg. 841 is part of [Doc. 361](#)], 878 [Pg. 878 is part of [Doc. 381](#)], 911 [Pg. 911 is part of [Doc. 393](#)], 916–918 [Pg. 916 is part of [Doc. 393](#)], 929 [Pg. 929 is part of [Doc. 399](#)]

Mouser, Grant E., III, 949n [Pg. 949 is part of [Doc. 409](#)], 954 [Pg. 954 includes portions of [Doc. 411](#) and [Doc. 412](#)], 956n [Pg. 956 includes portions of [Doc. 412](#) and [Doc. 413](#)]

al–Mufti, Said, 212 [Pg. 212 includes portions of [Doc. 86](#) and [Doc. 87](#)]

Murchison, Clint, 479–480 [Pg. 479 is part of [Doc. 209](#)]

Murphy, Robert D., 62n [Pg. 62 is part of [Doc. 42](#)], 70n [Pg. 70 includes portions of [Doc. 43](#) and [Doc. 44](#)], 98n [Pg. 98 is part of [Doc. 47](#)], 129n [Pg. 129 includes portions of [Doc. 55](#) and [Doc. 56](#)], 302 [Pg. 302 is part of [Doc. 130](#)], 383n [Pg. 383 is part of [Doc. 161](#)], 550n [Pg. 550 is part of [Doc. 247](#)], 617n [Pg. 617 is part of [Doc. 268](#)], 663 [Pg. 663 includes portions of [Doc. 278](#) and [Doc. 279](#)], 890n [Pg. 890 is part of [Doc. 389](#)], 949n [Pg. 949 is part of [Doc. 409](#)], 1014n [Pg. 1014 includes portions of [Doc. 438](#) and [Doc. 439](#)]

Arab–Israeli dispute, 246–247 [Pg. 246 is part of [Doc. 97](#)]

Baghdad Pact, 2–5 [Pgs. 2–5 include portions of [Doc. 1](#), [Doc. 2](#), [Doc. 3](#), [Doc. 4](#), and [Doc. 5](#)], 51 [Pg. 51 includes portions of [Doc. 34](#) and [Doc. 35](#)], 115–116 [Pg. 115 is part of [Doc. 51](#)], 265–266 [Pgs. 265–266 include portions of [Doc. 107](#) and [Doc. 108](#)], 301 [Pg. 301 is part of [Doc. 130](#)], 327–329 [Pg. 327 is part of [Doc. 143](#)], 540 [Pg. 540 is part of [Doc. 241](#)], 542–543 [Pgs. 542–543 include portions of [Doc. 241](#), [Doc. 242](#), and [Doc. 243](#)]

Eisenhower Doctrine, 398 [Pg. 398 is part of [Doc. 168](#)], 410–412 [Pgs. 410–412 include portions of [Doc. 171](#) and [Doc. 172](#)], 475 [Pg. 475 includes portions of [Doc. 205](#) and [Doc. 206](#)], 534 [Pg. 534 includes portions of [Doc. 237](#) and [Doc. 238](#)], 536 [Pg. 536 is part of [Doc. 238](#)], 539 [Pg. 539 includes portions of [Doc. 239](#) and [Doc. 240](#)]

Near East:

U.S. military aid to, 366 [Pg. 366 is part of [Doc. 156](#)], 750 [Pg. 750 includes portions of [Doc. 316](#) and [Doc. 317](#)]

U.S. policy toward, 368–369 [Pgs. 368–369 include portions of [Doc. 157](#) and [Doc. 158](#)], 377 [Pg. 377 is part of [Doc. 160](#)], 393–394 [Pg. 393 is part of [Doc. 165](#)], 466 [Pg. 466 is part of [Doc. 203](#)]

Regional defense, 51–53 [Pgs. 51–53 include portions of [Doc. 34](#) and [Doc. 35](#)], 103 [Pg. 103 includes portions of [Doc. 48](#) and [Doc. 49](#)], 106–107 [Pg. 106 is part of [Doc. 49](#)], 110 [Pg. 110 is part of [Doc.](#)

49], 112 [Pg. 112 is part of [Doc. 51](#)], 114 [Pg. 114 is part of [Doc. 51](#)], 127 [Pg. 127 includes portions of [Doc. 54](#) and [Doc. 55](#)], 135 [Pg. 135 is part of [Doc. 60](#)], 330 [Pg. 330 includes portions of [Doc. 143](#) and [Doc. 144](#)], 540 [Pg. 540 is part of [Doc. 241](#)], 648–649 [Pgs. 648–649 include portions of [Doc. 271](#) and [Doc. 272](#)], 669–670 [Pgs. 669–670 include portions of [Doc. 281](#), [Doc. 282](#), and [Doc. 283](#)]

Muscat (*see also* Persian Gulf states), 224 [Pg. 224 is part of [Doc. 91](#)], 500 [Pg. 500 is part of [Doc. 220](#)], 549 [Pg. 549 is part of [Doc. 247](#)], 551–552 [Pg. 551 is part of [Doc. 247](#)], 595 [Pg. 595 is part of [Doc. 266](#)], 610 [Pg. 610 is part of [Doc. 266](#)], 638 [Pg. 638 is part of [Doc. 270](#)]

Mustapha, Hassan, 1017–1019 [Pgs. 1017–1019 include portions of [Doc. 440](#) and [Doc. 441](#)], 1021–1023 [Pgs. 1021–1023 include portions of [Doc. 442](#) and [Doc. 443](#)], 1039n [Pg. 1039 includes portions of [Doc. 453](#) and [Doc. 454](#)]

Naim, 491 [Pg. 491 includes portions of [Doc. 215](#) and [Doc. 216](#)]

Naser, Ali Asqar, 946–947 [Pgs. 946–947 include portions of [Doc. 407](#) and [Doc. 408](#)]

Nash, Frank, 633 [Pg. 633 is part of [Doc. 270](#)]

Nasser, Gamal Abd'al (*see also* Egypt; *Egyptian subheadings under other subjects*), 23 [Pg. 23 is part of [Doc. 16](#)], 86 [Pg. 86 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 106 [Pg. 106 is part of [Doc. 49](#)], 113 [Pg. 113 is part of [Doc. 51](#)], 202–203 [Pgs. 202–203 include portions of [Doc. 81](#) and [Doc. 82](#)], 235 [Pg. 235 is part of [Doc. 93](#)], 238 [Pg. 238 is part of [Doc. 93](#)], 243–244 [Pgs. 243–244 include portions of [Doc. 95](#) and [Doc. 96](#)], 255–256 [Pg. 255 is part of [Doc. 101](#)], 440–441 [Pgs. 440–441 include portions of [Doc. 185](#), [Doc. 186](#), and [Doc. 187](#)], 507 [Pg. 507 is part of [Doc. 221](#)], 511–513 [Pg. 511 is part of [Doc. 222](#)]

Baghdad Pact, 15–16 [Pgs. 15–16 include portions of [Doc. 11](#) and [Doc. 12](#)], 50–51 [Pgs. 50–51 include portions of [Doc. 33](#), [Doc. 34](#), and [Doc. 35](#)], 75 [Pg. 75 is part of [Doc. 45](#)], 113 [Pg. 113 is part of [Doc. 51](#)], 226 [Pg. 226 is part of [Doc. 91](#)], 253–254 [Pg. 253 is part of [Doc. 101](#)]

ESS Pact, 29–30 [Pgs. 29–30 include portions of [Doc. 21](#) and [Doc. 22](#)], 41–42 [Pgs. 41–42 include portions of [Doc. 27](#) and [Doc. 28](#)], 75–76 [Pg. 75 is part of [Doc. 45](#)]

National Intelligence Estimates (see also Special National Intelligence Estimates):

NIE 30–2–57, 594–611 [Pgs. 594–611 include portions of [Doc. 265](#) and [Doc. 266](#)]

NIE 30–4–55, 182–197 [Pgs. 182–197 include portions of [Doc. 77](#) and [Doc. 78](#)], 215 [Pg. 215 is part of [Doc. 89](#)], 594n [Pg. 594 includes portions of [Doc. 265](#) and [Doc. 266](#)]

NIE 30–54, 77n [Pg. 77 includes portions of [Doc. 45](#) and [Doc. 46](#)]

NIE 30–55, 77–97 [Pgs. 77–97 include portions of [Doc. 45](#) and [Doc. 46](#)]

NIE 31–54, 686 [Pg. 686 is part of [Doc. 290](#)]

NIE 34–54, 874n [Pg. 874 includes portions of [Doc. 380](#) and [Doc. 381](#)]

NIE 34–57, 874–880 [Pgs. 874–880 include portions of [Doc. 380](#), [Doc. 381](#), and [Doc. 382](#)], 893 [Pg. 893 is part of [Doc. 391](#)], 935 [Pg. 935 is part of [Doc. 402](#)]

NIE 36–54, 594n [Pg. 594 includes portions of [Doc. 265](#) and [Doc. 266](#)]

NIE 36.2–56, 426 [Pg. 426 is part of [Doc. 178](#)], 429 [Pg. 429 includes portions of [Doc. 178](#) and [Doc. 179](#)], 997–1010 [Pgs. 997–1010 include portions of [Doc. 433](#), [Doc. 434](#), and [Doc. 435](#)]

NIE 36.2–57, 1048–1058 [Pgs. 1048–1058 include portions of [Doc. 457](#), [Doc. 458](#), [Doc. 459](#), and [Doc. 460](#)], 1062 [Pg. 1062 is part of [Doc. 462](#)]

NIE 36.6–56, 429 [Pg. 429 includes portions of [Doc. 178](#) and [Doc. 179](#)]

National Security Council:

Actions:

No. 1266, 686 [Pg. 686 is part of [Doc. 290](#)]

No. 2290, 979 [Pg. 979 includes portions of [Doc. 426](#) and [Doc. 427](#)]

No. 1304, 687–688 [Pg. 687 is part of [Doc. 290](#)]

No. 1394, 55 [Pg. 55 includes portions of [Doc. 36](#) and [Doc. 37](#)], 158 [Pg. 158 includes portions of [Doc. 65](#) and [Doc. 66](#)]

No. 1435, 770 [Pg. 770 includes portions of [Doc. 327](#) and [Doc. 328](#)]

No. 1447, 168 [Pg. 168 includes portions of [Doc. 66](#) and [Doc. 67](#)], 169 [Pg. 169 includes portions of [Doc. 67](#) and [Doc. 68](#)]

No. 1452, 171 [Pg. 171 is part of [Doc. 68](#)]

No. 1518, 804 [Pg. 804 is part of [Doc. 349](#)]

No. 1550, 423 [Pg. 423 is part of [Doc. 178](#)]

No. 1597, 309 [Pg. 309 is part of [Doc. 132](#)]

No, 1615, 850–851 [Pgs. 850–851 include portions of [Doc. 367](#) and [Doc. 368](#)]

No. 1624, 892 [Pg. 892 includes portions of [Doc. 390](#) and [Doc. 391](#)], 934 [Pg. 934 includes portions of [Doc. 401](#) and [Doc. 402](#)]

No. 1667, 899 [Pg. 899 is part of [Doc. 391](#)], 934 [Pg. 934 includes portions of [Doc. 401](#) and [Doc. 402](#)], 935n [Pg. 935 is part of [Doc. 402](#)], 936 [Pg. 936 is part of [Doc. 402](#)]

No. 1753, 573 [Pg. 573 is part of [Doc. 256](#)], 934 [Pg. 934 includes portions of [Doc. 401](#) and [Doc. 402](#)]

No. 1770, 908n [Pg. 908 is part of [Doc. 392](#)], 936–937 [Pgs. 936–937 include portions of [Doc. 402](#) and [Doc. 403](#)]

No. 1771, 573 [Pg. 573 is part of [Doc. 256](#)]

Alternate pipeline proposals, 563 [Pg. 563 includes portions of [Doc. 253](#) and [Doc. 254](#)], 574 [Pg. 574 is part of [Doc. 257](#)], 576–577 [Pgs. 576–577 include portions of [Doc. 258](#), [Doc. 259](#), and [Doc. 260](#)]

Arab–Israeli dispute, 165 [Pg. 165 is part of [Doc. 66](#)], 167 [Pg. 167 is part of [Doc. 66](#)], 170–171 [Pg. 170 is part of [Doc. 68](#)]

Baghdad Pact, 27 [Pg. 27 includes portions of [Doc. 18](#) and [Doc. 19](#)], 159–161 [Pg. 159 is part of [Doc. 66](#)], 163–164 [Pg. 163 is part of [Doc. 66](#)], 169–170 [Pgs. 169–170 include portions of [Doc. 67](#) and [Doc. 68](#)], 295–298 [Pgs. 295–298 include portions of [Doc. 126](#), [Doc. 127](#), [Doc. 128](#), and [Doc. 129](#)], 324–325 [Pgs. 324–325 include portions of [Doc. 140](#), [Doc. 141](#), and [Doc. 142](#)], 329 [Pg. 329 is part of [Doc. 143](#)], 333 [Pg. 333 is part of [Doc. 145](#)]

Documents:

NSC 5401, 442 [Pg. 442 is part of [Doc. 187](#)]

NSC 5402/1, 678–689 [Pgs. 678–689 include portions of [Doc. 286](#), [Doc. 287](#), [Doc. 288](#), [Doc. 289](#), [Doc. 290](#), and [Doc. 291](#)]

NSC 5409, 70 [Pg. 70 includes portions of [Doc. 43](#) and [Doc. 44](#)]

NSC 5428, 1 [Pg. 1 is part of [Doc. 1](#)], 48–49 [Pgs. 48–49 include portions of [Doc. 32](#) and [Doc. 33](#)], 51 [Pg. 51 includes portions of [Doc. 34](#) and [Doc. 35](#)], 53–54 [Pgs. 53–54 include portions of [Doc. 35](#) and [Doc. 36](#)], 69–70 [Pgs. 69–70 include portions of [Doc. 43](#) and [Doc. 44](#)], 158–168 [Pgs. 158–168 include portions of [Doc. 65](#), [Doc. 66](#), and [Doc. 67](#)], 169 [Pg. 169 includes portions of [Doc. 67](#) and [Doc. 68](#)], 212–213 [Pgs. 212–213 include portions of [Doc. 86](#) and [Doc. 87](#)], 298 [Pg. 298 includes portions of [Doc. 128](#) and [Doc. 129](#)], 307 [Pg. 307 includes portions of [Doc. 131](#) and [Doc. 132](#)], 420 [Pg. 420 includes portions of [Doc. 177](#) and [Doc. 178](#)], 441 [Pg. 441 includes portions of [Doc. 186](#) and [Doc. 187](#)], 573 [Pg. 573 is part of [Doc. 256](#)], 577–582 [Pgs. 577–582 include portions of [Doc. 259](#) and [Doc. 260](#)], 612–616 [Pg. 612 is part of [Doc. 267](#)], 1061 [Pg. 1061 includes portions of [Doc. 461](#) and [Doc. 462](#)]

Progress Report, 420–429 [Pgs. 420–429 include portions of [Doc. 177](#), [Doc. 178](#), and [Doc. 179](#)], 441 [Pg. 441 includes portions of [Doc. 186](#) and [Doc. 187](#)]

NSC 5504, 70 [Pg. 70 includes portions of [Doc. 43](#) and [Doc. 44](#)], 689–696 [Pgs. 689–696 include portions of [Doc. 291](#) and [Doc. 292](#)], 769 [Pg. 769 is part of [Doc. 327](#)], 837–838 [Pg. 837 is part of [Doc. 359](#)], 850 [Pg. 850 is part of [Doc. 367](#)], 892 [Pg. 892 includes portions of [Doc. 390](#) and [Doc. 391](#)], 901 [Pg. 901 is part of [Doc. 392](#)], 934 [Pg. 934 includes portions of [Doc. 401](#) and [Doc. 402](#)]

NSC 5510/1, 70 [Pg. 70 includes portions of [Doc. 43](#) and [Doc. 44](#)]

NSC 5703, 886–899 [Pgs. 886–899 include portions of [Doc. 387](#), [Doc. 388](#), [Doc. 389](#), [Doc. 390](#), and [Doc. 391](#)], 935 [Pg. 935 is part of [Doc. 402](#)]

NSC 5703/1, 900–910 [Pgs. 900–910 include portions of [Doc. 392](#) and [Doc. 393](#)], 935–937 [Pgs. 935–937 include portions of [Doc. 402](#) and [Doc. 403](#)]

Progress Report, 940–941 [Pgs. 940–941 include portions of [Doc. 404](#), [Doc. 405](#), and [Doc. 406](#)]

NSC 5722, 587–594 [Pgs. 587–594 include portions of [Doc. 264](#), [Doc. 265](#), and [Doc. 266](#)], 617–618 [Pgs. 617–618 include portions of [Doc. 268](#) and [Doc. 269](#)]

NSC 5502, 573 [Pg. 573 is part of [Doc. 256](#)], 663 [Pg. 663 includes portions of [Doc. 278](#) and [Doc. 279](#)]

Near East:

Regional defense, 52 [Pg. 52 is part of [Doc. 35](#)], 54 [Pg. 54 is part of [Doc. 36](#)]

U.S. military aid to, 158–164 [Pgs. 158–164 include portions of [Doc. 65](#) and [Doc. 66](#)], 166–168 [Pgs. 166–168 include portions of [Doc. 66](#) and [Doc. 67](#)], 170 [Pg. 170 is part of [Doc. 68](#)]

U.S. policy toward 440–441, 662–663 [Pgs. 662–663 include portions of [Doc. 277](#), [Doc. 278](#), and [Doc. 279](#)], 683–688 [Pgs. 683–688 include portions of [Doc. 288](#), [Doc. 289](#), and [Doc. 290](#)], 769–770 [Pgs. 769–770 include portions of [Doc. 327](#) and [Doc. 328](#)], 789 [Pg. 789 includes portions of [Doc. 339](#), [Doc. 340](#), and [Doc. 341](#)], 801–804 [Pgs. 801–804 include portions of [Doc. 348](#) and [Doc. 349](#)], 892–899 [Pgs. 892–899 include portions of

[Doc. 390](#) and [Doc. 391](#)], 934–937 [Pgs. 934–937 include portions of [Doc. 401](#), [Doc. 402](#), and [Doc. 403](#)]

Meetings:

231st, Jan. 13, 1955, 685–688 [Pgs. 685–688 include portions of [Doc. 289](#) and [Doc. 290](#)]

239th, Mar. 3, 1955, 27 [Pg. 27 includes portions of [Doc. 18](#) and [Doc. 19](#)]

247th, May 5, 1955, 54–55 [Pgs. 54–55 include portions of [Doc. 36](#) and [Doc. 37](#)], 733 [Pg. 733 includes portions of [Doc. 307](#) and [Doc. 308](#)]

258th, Sept. 8, 1955, 769–770 [Pgs. 769–770 include portions of [Doc. 327](#) and [Doc. 328](#)]

260th, Oct. 6, 1955, 158–168 [Pgs. 158–168 include portions of [Doc. 65](#), [Doc. 66](#), and [Doc. 67](#)]

261st, Oct. 13, 1955, 169–171 [Pgs. 169–171 include portions of [Doc. 67](#) and [Doc. 68](#)], 789 [Pg. 789 includes portions of [Doc. 339](#), [Doc. 340](#), and [Doc. 341](#)]

267th, Nov. 21, 1955, 200–203 [Pgs. 200–203 include portions of [Doc. 80](#), [Doc. 81](#), and [Doc. 82](#)]

271st, Dec. 22, 1955, 214 [Pg. 214 is part of [Doc. 88](#)]

276th, Feb. 9, 1956, 801–804 [Pgs. 801–804 include portions of [Doc. 348](#) and [Doc. 349](#)]

289th, June 28, 1956, 307–309 [Pgs. 307–309 include portions of [Doc. 131](#) and [Doc. 132](#)]

299th, Oct. 4, 1956, 850–851 [Pgs. 850–851 include portions of [Doc. 367](#) and [Doc. 368](#)]

309th, Jan. 11, 1957, 440–441 [Pgs. 440–441 include portions of [Doc. 185](#), [Doc. 186](#), and [Doc. 187](#)]

310th, Jan. 24, 1957, 441–442 [Pgs. 441–442 include portions of [Doc. 186](#) and [Doc. 187](#)]

312th, Feb. 7, 1957, 892–899 [Pgs. 892–899 include portions of [Doc. 390](#) and [Doc. 391](#)]

327th, June 20, 1957, 1058 [Pg. 1058 includes portions of [Doc. 458](#), [Doc. 459](#), and [Doc. 460](#)]

331st, July 18, 1957, 573 [Pg. 573 is part of [Doc. 256](#)]

334th, Aug. 8, 1957, 934–937 [Pgs. 934–937 include portions of [Doc. 401](#), [Doc. 402](#), and [Doc. 403](#)]

352d, Jan. 24, 1958, 573 [Pg. 573 is part of [Doc. 256](#)], 663 [Pg. 663 includes portions of [Doc. 278](#) and [Doc. 279](#)]

Planning Board, 295–297 [Pgs. 295–297 include portions of [Doc. 126](#), [Doc. 127](#), and [Doc. 128](#)]

Saudi Arabia, 214 [Pg. 214 is part of [Doc. 88](#)]

Soviet bloc military aid to Egypt, 159–160 [Pg. 159 is part of [Doc. 66](#)], 163–166 [Pg. 163 is part of [Doc. 66](#)], 200–203 [Pgs. 200–203 include portions of [Doc. 80](#), [Doc. 81](#), and [Doc. 82](#)]

Near East (see also Arab States; individual countries; [Oil resources](#); [Regional defense](#)):

Decline of British influence, 201 [Pg. 201 is part of [Doc. 81](#)], 383 [Pg. 383 is part of [Doc. 161](#)], 420–421 [Pgs. 420–421 include portions of [Doc. 177](#) and [Doc. 178](#)], 579 [Pg. 579 is part of [Doc. 260](#)], 641–642 [Pg. 641 is part of [Doc. 270](#)], 1019 [Pg. 1019 is part of [Doc. 441](#)]

Baghdad Pact and, 270 [Pg. 270 is part of [Doc. 111](#)], 295 [Pg. 295 includes portions of [Doc. 126](#) and [Doc. 127](#)], 326 [Pg. 326 is part of [Doc. 142](#)], 330–331 [Pgs. 330–331 include portions of [Doc. 143](#), [Doc. 144](#), and [Doc. 145](#)], 378 [Pg. 378 is part of [Doc. 160](#)], 388 [Pg. 388 is part of [Doc. 162](#)], 393 [Pg. 393 is part of [Doc. 165](#)], 408 [Pg. 408 is part of [Doc. 170](#)], 426 [Pg. 426 is part of [Doc. 178](#)], 1050 [Pg. 1050 is part of [Doc. 458](#)]

U.S. participation, 320–321 [Pgs. 320–321 include portions of [Doc. 137](#) and [Doc. 138](#)], 326 [Pg. 326 is part of [Doc. 142](#)], 328 [Pg. 328 is part of [Doc. 143](#)], 335–336 [Pg. 335 is part of [Doc. 145](#)], 338–339 [Pg. 338 is part of [Doc. 146](#)], 368 [Pg. 368 is part of [Doc. 157](#)], 402 [Pg. 402 is part of [Doc. 170](#)], 404 [Pg. 404 is part of [Doc. 170](#)]

Iraqi political situation and, 1012–1014 [Pgs. 1012–1014 include portions of [Doc. 437](#), [Doc. 438](#), and [Doc. 439](#)], 1051 [Pg. 1051 is part of [Doc. 458](#)]

Soviet influence and, 383 [Pg. 383 is part of [Doc. 161](#)], 421 [Pg. 421 is part of [Doc. 178](#)], 594 [Pg. 594 includes portions of [Doc. 265](#) and [Doc. 266](#)], 596 [Pg. 596 is part of [Doc. 266](#)]

Economic situation, 602–603 [Pg. 602 is part of [Doc. 266](#)], 624–626 [Pg. 624 is part of [Doc. 270](#)]

French role, 78 [Pg. 78 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 80 [Pg. 80 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 90 [Pg. 90 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 114 [Pg. 114 is part of [Doc. 51](#)], 1019 [Pg. 1019 is part of [Doc. 441](#)]

Iraqi–Egyptian rivalry, 4 [Pg. 4 includes portions of [Doc. 3](#) and [Doc. 4](#)], 17 [Pg. 17 is part of [Doc. 12](#)], 20 [Pg. 20 includes portions of [Doc. 13](#) and [Doc. 14](#)], 30 [Pg. 30 is part of [Doc. 22](#)], 49 [Pg. 49 is part of [Doc. 33](#)], 78 [Pg. 78 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 217 [Pg. 217 is part of [Doc.](#)

[91](#)], 220–221 [Pg. 220 is part of [Doc. 91](#)], 226 [Pg. 226 is part of [Doc. 91](#)], 228 [Pg. 228 includes portions of [Doc. 91](#) and [Doc. 92](#)], 235 [Pg. 235 is part of [Doc. 93](#)], 424–425 [Pg. 424 is part of [Doc. 178](#)]

Political situation, 104–105 [Pg. 104 is part of [Doc. 49](#)], 218 [Pg. 218 is part of [Doc. 91](#)], 255–256 [Pg. 255 is part of [Doc. 101](#)], 300 [Pg. 300 is part of [Doc. 130](#)], 601 [Pg. 601 is part of [Doc. 266](#)]

Soviet bloc, relations with (see also [Regional defense](#)), 216–234 [Pgs. 216–234 include portions of [Doc. 90](#), [Doc. 91](#), [Doc. 92](#), and [Doc. 93](#)], 287–292 [Pgs. 287–292 include portions of [Doc. 124](#) and [Doc. 125](#)], 308–309 [Pg. 308 is part of [Doc. 132](#)], 384 [Pg. 384 is part of [Doc. 161](#)], 415 [Pg. 415 is part of [Doc. 175](#)], 422–423 [Pg. 422 is part of [Doc. 178](#)], 425 [Pg. 425 is part of [Doc. 178](#)], 941–942 [Pgs. 941–942 include portions of [Doc. 405](#) and [Doc. 406](#)], 942–943 [Pg. 942 is part of [Doc. 406](#)]

Baghdad Pact and, 105 [Pg. 105 is part of [Doc. 49](#)], 184–185 [Pg. 184 is part of [Doc. 78](#)], 194 [Pg. 194 is part of [Doc. 78](#)], 196 [Pg. 196 is part of [Doc. 78](#)], 206 [Pg. 206 is part of [Doc. 83](#)], 278–279 [Pgs. 278–279 include portions of [Doc. 117](#) and [Doc. 118](#)], 328 [Pg. 328 is part of [Doc. 143](#)], 374–375 [Pg. 374 is part of [Doc. 159](#)], 401 [Pg. 401 includes portions of [Doc. 169](#) and [Doc. 170](#)], 406 [Pg. 406 is part of [Doc. 170](#)]

Decline of British influence and, 383 [Pg. 383 is part of [Doc. 161](#)], 387 [Pg. 387 includes portions of [Doc. 161](#) and [Doc. 162](#)], 421 [Pg. 421 is part of [Doc. 178](#)], 594 [Pg. 594 includes portions of [Doc. 265](#) and [Doc. 266](#)], 596 [Pg. 596 is part of [Doc. 266](#)]

National Intelligence Estimates, 355–360 [Pgs. 355–360 include portions of [Doc. 151](#) and [Doc. 152](#)], 594 [Pg. 594 includes portions of [Doc. 265](#) and [Doc. 266](#)], 596 [Pg. 596 is part of [Doc. 266](#)], 606–608 [Pg. 606 is part of [Doc. 266](#)], 610 [Pg. 610 is part of [Doc. 266](#)]

Soviet note, *Sept. 3, 1957*, 583 [Pg. 583 is part of [Doc. 261](#)]

Suez crisis and, 355–357 [Pg. 355 is part of [Doc. 151](#)], 359 [Pg. 359 is part of [Doc. 151](#)], 383 [Pg. 383 is part of [Doc. 161](#)], 385–386 [Pg. 385 is part of [Doc. 161](#)]

Trade relations, 104 [Pg. 104 is part of [Doc. 49](#)], 185 [Pg. 185 is part of [Doc. 78](#)], 232 [Pg. 232 is part of [Doc. 92](#)], 614 [Pg. 614 is part of [Doc. 267](#)], 626 [Pg. 626 is part of [Doc. 270](#)], 634–635 [Pg. 634 is part of [Doc. 270](#)], 646 [Pg. 646 is part of [Doc. 270](#)]

U.S. position, 352 [Pg. 352 is part of [Doc. 149](#)], 614 [Pg. 614 is part of [Doc. 267](#)], 631–635 [Pg. 631 is part of [Doc. 270](#)]

Strategic importance, 107 [Pg. 107 is part of [Doc. 49](#)], 200–201 [Pgs. 200–201 include portions of [Doc. 80](#) and [Doc. 81](#)], 620 [Pg. 620 is part of [Doc. 270](#)]

United States, relations with:

Military bases (*see also* Baghdad Pact: U.S. participation; *individual countries*), 310n [Pg. 310 is part of [Doc. 133](#)], 450 [Pg. 450 is part of [Doc. 192](#)], 614 [Pg. 614 is part of [Doc. 267](#)]

Trade relations, 646–647 [Pg. 646 is part of [Doc. 270](#)]

U.S.–British cooperation, 201 [Pg. 201 is part of [Doc. 81](#)], 216–234 [Pgs. 216–234 include portions of [Doc. 90](#), [Doc. 91](#), [Doc. 92](#), and [Doc. 93](#)], 298–299 [Pgs. 298–299 include portions of [Doc. 128](#), [Doc. 129](#), and [Doc. 130](#)], 350 [Pg. 350 is part of [Doc. 148](#)], 387–388 [Pgs. 387–388 include portions of [Doc. 161](#) and [Doc. 162](#)], 391–392 [Pg. 391 is part of [Doc. 164](#)], 399–401 [Pgs. 399–401 include portions of [Doc. 169](#) and [Doc. 170](#)], 424 [Pg. 424 is part of [Doc. 178](#)], 556 [Pg.

556 includes portions of [Doc. 250](#) and [Doc. 251](#)], 642 [Pg. 642 is part of [Doc. 270](#)], 659 [Pg. 659 is part of [Doc. 276](#)]

Bermuda Conference, 462–474 [Pgs. 462–474 include portions of [Doc. 199](#), [Doc. 200](#), [Doc. 201](#), [Doc. 202](#), [Doc. 203](#), [Doc. 204](#), and [Doc. 205](#)], 547 [Pg. 547 is part of [Doc. 246](#)]

Eisenhower–Eden talks, 797 [Pg. 797 includes portions of [Doc. 345](#) and [Doc. 346](#)], 798n [Pg. 798 includes portions of [Doc. 346](#) and [Doc. 347](#)], 800 [Pg. 800 is part of [Doc. 348](#)]

Oil resources access, 217–218 [Pg. 217 is part of [Doc. 91](#)], 223–224 [Pg. 223 is part of [Doc. 91](#)], 237 [Pg. 237 is part of [Doc. 93](#)], 262 [Pg. 262 is part of [Doc. 105](#)], 460–461 [Pgs. 460–461 include portions of [Doc. 197](#) and [Doc. 198](#)], 496–515 [Pgs. 496–515 include portions of [Doc. 219](#), [Doc. 220](#), [Doc. 221](#), [Doc. 222](#), and [Doc. 223](#)], 539 [Pg. 539 includes portions of [Doc. 239](#) and [Doc. 240](#)], 543–545 [Pgs. 543–545 include portions of [Doc. 242](#), [Doc. 243](#), [Doc. 244](#), and [Doc. 245](#)], 547–553 [Pgs. 547–553 include portions of [Doc. 246](#), [Doc. 247](#), [Doc. 248](#), and [Doc. 249](#)], 572 [Pg. 572 includes portions of [Doc. 254](#) and [Doc. 255](#)]

U.S.–British–Soviet talks proposal, 173 [Pg. 173 is part of [Doc. 69](#)]

U.S. economic aid to (see also [Eisenhower Doctrine](#)), 213 [Pg. 213 is part of [Doc. 87](#)], 232 [Pg. 232 is part of [Doc. 92](#)], 238 [Pg. 238 is part of [Doc. 93](#)], 380–381 [Pg. 380 is part of [Doc. 160](#)], 385 [Pg. 385 is part of [Doc. 161](#)], 584–585 [Pgs. 584–585 include portions of [Doc. 262](#) and [Doc. 263](#)], 615 [Pg. 615 is part of [Doc. 267](#)], 625–626 [Pg. 625 is part of [Doc. 270](#)], 644–645 [Pg. 644 is part of [Doc. 270](#)], 661–669 [Pgs. 661–669 include portions of [Doc. 276](#), [Doc. 277](#), [Doc. 278](#), [Doc. 279](#), [Doc. 280](#), [Doc. 281](#), and [Doc. 282](#)]

U.S. evacuation plans, 302 [Pg. 302 is part of [Doc. 130](#)], 428–429 [Pgs. 428–429 include portions of [Doc. 178](#) and [Doc. 179](#)]

U.S. military aid to (see also [Eisenhower Doctrine](#); [Tripartite Declaration of 1950](#); U.S. military aid headings under Baghdad Pact and Regional defense), 164–165 [Pg. 164 is part of [Doc. 66](#)], 207–210 [Pgs. 207–210 include portions of [Doc. 83](#) and [Doc. 84](#)], 259 [Pg. 259 includes portions of [Doc. 102](#) and [Doc. 103](#)], 381 [Pg. 381 is part of [Doc. 160](#)], 385 [Pg. 385 is part of [Doc. 161](#)], 615 [Pg. 615 is part of [Doc. 267](#)], 632 [Pg. 632 is part of [Doc. 270](#)]

U.S. policy toward (see also [Eisenhower Doctrine](#); National Security Council: Documents: NSC 5428), 62–63 [Pgs. 62–63 include portions of [Doc. 42](#) and [Doc. 43](#)], 258–259 [Pgs. 258–259 include portions of [Doc. 101](#), [Doc. 102](#), and [Doc. 103](#)], 307–308 [Pgs. 307–308 include portions of [Doc. 131](#) and [Doc. 132](#)], 340–351 [Pgs. 340–351 include portions of [Doc. 147](#), [Doc. 148](#), and [Doc. 149](#)], 573 [Pg. 573 is part of [Doc. 256](#)]

British position, 164–165 [Pg. 164 is part of [Doc. 66](#)], 381–382 [Pg. 381 is part of [Doc. 160](#)]

British–French roles, 381–382 [Pg. 381 is part of [Doc. 160](#)], 387 [Pg. 387 includes portions of [Doc. 161](#) and [Doc. 162](#)]

Middle East Charter proposal, 368–369 [Pgs. 368–369 include portions of [Doc. 157](#) and [Doc. 158](#)], 376–382 [Pgs. 376–382 include portions of [Doc. 159](#) and [Doc. 160](#)], 384–385 [Pg. 384 is part of [Doc. 161](#)], 387 [Pg. 387 includes portions of [Doc. 161](#) and [Doc. 162](#)], 391–394 [Pgs. 391–394 include portions of [Doc. 164](#) and [Doc. 165](#)], 400 [Pg. 400 is part of [Doc. 169](#)]

Middle East Staff Study, 619–647 [Pg. 619 is part of [Doc. 270](#)], 649–651 [Pgs. 649–651 include portions of

[Doc. 271](#), [Doc. 272](#), and [Doc. 273](#)], 662 [Pg. 662 includes portions of [Doc. 277](#) and [Doc. 278](#)]

National Intelligence Estimates, 594–611 [Pgs. 594–611 include portions of [Doc. 265](#) and [Doc. 266](#)], 608–609 [Pg. 608 is part of [Doc. 266](#)]

OCB report, 420–429 [Pgs. 420–429 include portions of [Doc. 177](#), [Doc. 178](#), and [Doc. 179](#)], 441 [Pg. 441 includes portions of [Doc. 186](#) and [Doc. 187](#)]

Omega policy, 264 [Pg. 264 includes portions of [Doc. 105](#), [Doc. 106](#), and [Doc. 107](#)]

Propaganda, 381 [Pg. 381 is part of [Doc. 160](#)], 511 [Pg. 511 is part of [Doc. 222](#)], 538 [Pg. 538 is part of [Doc. 239](#)]

Reevaluation proposals, 51–54 [Pgs. 51–54 include portions of [Doc. 34](#), [Doc. 35](#), and [Doc. 36](#)], 165 [Pg. 165 is part of [Doc. 66](#)], 167 [Pg. 167 is part of [Doc. 66](#)], 212–213 [Pgs. 212–213 include portions of [Doc. 86](#) and [Doc. 87](#)], 298 [Pg. 298 includes portions of [Doc. 128](#) and [Doc. 129](#)], 420 [Pg. 420 includes portions of [Doc. 177](#) and [Doc. 178](#)], 441 [Pg. 441 includes portions of [Doc. 186](#) and [Doc. 187](#)], 577–582 [Pgs. 577–582 include portions of [Doc. 259](#) and [Doc. 260](#)], 612–616 [Pg. 612 is part of [Doc. 267](#)], 662–663 [Pgs. 662–663 include portions of [Doc. 277](#), [Doc. 278](#), and [Doc. 279](#)]

Soviet policy and, 382 [Pg. 382 is part of [Doc. 160](#)], 383–387 [Pgs. 383–387 include portions of [Doc. 161](#) and [Doc. 162](#)]

Suez crisis, 340–345 [Pgs. 340–345 include portions of [Doc. 147](#) and [Doc. 148](#)], 351–352 [Pgs. 351–352 include portions of [Doc. 148](#) and [Doc. 149](#)], 383 [Pg. 383 is part of [Doc. 161](#)]

U.S.–Soviet agreement, 213 [Pg. 213 is part of [Doc. 87](#)]

Near East Arms Coordinating Committee (NEACC), 147 [Pg. 147 is part of [Doc. 60](#)], 471 [Pg. 471 is part of [Doc. 203](#)]

Nehru, Jawaharlal, 236 [Pg. 236 is part of [Doc. 93](#)], 277 [Pg. 277 is part of [Doc. 116](#)], 300 [Pg. 300 is part of [Doc. 130](#)], 303–305 [Pg. 303 is part of [Doc. 131](#)], 389 [Pg. 389 is part of [Doc. 162](#)], 400 [Pg. 400 is part of [Doc. 169](#)], 404 [Pg. 404 is part of [Doc. 170](#)], 643 [Pg. 643 is part of [Doc. 270](#)], 1022 [Pg. 1022 is part of [Doc. 442](#)]

Netherlands, 558 [Pg. 558 is part of [Doc. 252](#)]

Neutralism, 289 [Pg. 289 is part of [Doc. 124](#)], 303–304 [Pg. 303 is part of [Doc. 131](#)], 614 [Pg. 614 is part of [Doc. 267](#)], 622–623 [Pg. 622 is part of [Doc. 270](#)], 633–635 [Pg. 633 is part of [Doc. 270](#)], 649 [Pg. 649 includes portions of [Doc. 271](#) and [Doc. 272](#)], 683 [Pg. 683 is part of [Doc. 288](#)], 810 [Pg. 810 is part of [Doc. 352](#)]

Newsom, David D., 133n [Pg. 133 includes portions of [Doc. 57](#) and [Doc. 58](#)], 174–175 [Pg. 174 is part of [Doc. 70](#)], 177n [Pg. 177 includes portions of [Doc. 71](#) and [Doc. 72](#)], 198n [Pg. 198 is part of [Doc. 79](#)], 244n [Pg. 244 includes portions of [Doc. 95](#) and [Doc. 96](#)], 268n [Pg. 268 is part of [Doc. 110](#)], 295n [Pg. 295 includes portions of [Doc. 126](#) and [Doc. 127](#)], 303 [Pg. 303 is part of [Doc. 131](#)], 331n [Pg. 331 includes portions of [Doc. 144](#) and [Doc. 145](#)], 332n [Pg. 332 is part of [Doc. 145](#)], 474n [Pg. 474 includes portions of [Doc. 204](#) and [Doc. 205](#)], 478n [Pg. 478 includes portions of [Doc. 207](#) and [Doc. 208](#)], 585 [Pg. 585 includes portions of [Doc. 262](#) and [Doc. 263](#)], 586 [Pg. 586 includes portions of [Doc. 263](#) and [Doc. 264](#)], 976n [Pg. 976 includes portions of [Doc. 424](#) and [Doc. 425](#)], 1014 [Pg. 1014 includes portions of [Doc. 438](#) and [Doc. 439](#)], 1021 [Pg. 1021 is part of [Doc. 442](#)], 1038n [Pg. 1038 is part of [Doc. 453](#)], 1039n [Pg. 1039 includes portions of [Doc. 453](#) and [Doc. 454](#)], 1058n [Pg. 1058 includes portions of [Doc. 458](#), [Doc. 459](#), and [Doc. 460](#)]

Near East:

Soviet policy toward, 234 [Pg. 234 includes portions of [Doc. 92](#) and [Doc. 93](#)]

U.S. military aid to, 1023 [Pg. 1023 includes portions of [Doc. 442](#) and [Doc. 443](#)]

U.S.–British discussions, 504–507 [Pg. 504 is part of [Doc. 221](#)], 509–511 [Pg. 509 is part of [Doc. 222](#)]

Nixon, Richard M., 159 [Pg. 159 is part of [Doc. 66](#)], 163–164 [Pg. 163 is part of [Doc. 66](#)], 166 [Pg. 166 is part of [Doc. 66](#)], 169 [Pg. 169 includes portions of [Doc. 67](#) and [Doc. 68](#)], 214 [Pg. 214 is part of [Doc. 88](#)], 520 [Pg. 520 is part of [Doc. 226](#)]

Nolting, Frederick E., Jr., 700–701 [Pgs. 700–701 include portions of [Doc. 293](#) and [Doc. 294](#)], 708 [Pg. 708 includes portions of [Doc. 296](#) and [Doc. 297](#)]

Noon, Malik Firoz Khan, 320 [Pg. 320 includes portions of [Doc. 137](#) and [Doc. 138](#)], 449 [Pg. 449 is part of [Doc. 192](#)]

North Africa (see also [Algerian conflict](#)), 350 [Pg. 350 is part of [Doc. 148](#)], 501 [Pg. 501 is part of [Doc. 220](#)], 557 [Pg. 557 is part of [Doc. 251](#)]

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 103 [Pg. 103 includes portions of [Doc. 48](#) and [Doc. 49](#)], 106–107 [Pg. 106 is part of [Doc. 49](#)], 139 [Pg. 139 is part of [Doc. 60](#)], 171–172 [Pgs. 171–172 include portions of [Doc. 68](#) and [Doc. 69](#)], 467–468 [Pg. 467 is part of [Doc. 203](#)]

Baghdad Pact and, 29 [Pg. 29 includes portions of [Doc. 21](#) and [Doc. 22](#)], 102 [Pg. 102 includes portions of [Doc. 47](#) and [Doc. 48](#)], 116 [Pg. 116 is part of [Doc. 51](#)], 132–133 [Pgs. 132–133 include portions of [Doc. 56](#), [Doc. 57](#), and [Doc. 58](#)], 141 [Pg. 141 is part of [Doc. 60](#)], 145 [Pg. 145 is part of [Doc. 60](#)], 296 [Pg. 296 is part of [Doc. 127](#)], 321 [Pg. 321 is part of [Doc. 138](#)], 328 [Pg. 328 is part of [Doc. 143](#)], 371 [Pg. 371 is part of [Doc. 158](#)], 374 [Pg. 374 is part of [Doc. 159](#)], 660 [Pg. 660 is part of [Doc. 276](#)]

Turkish role, 83 [Pg. 83 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 209 [Pg. 209 is part of [Doc. 84](#)], 213 [Pg. 213 is part of [Doc. 87](#)]

Office of Defense Mobilization, 592 [Pg. 592 is part of [Doc. 265](#)]

Ogburn, Charlton, Jr., 216 [Pg. 216 includes portions of [Doc. 90](#) and [Doc. 91](#)], 227–228 [Pgs. 227–228 include portions of [Doc. 91](#) and [Doc. 92](#)]

Ohly, John H., 265–266 [Pgs. 265–266 include portions of [Doc. 107](#) and [Doc. 108](#)], 755n [Pg. 755 includes portions of [Doc. 319](#) and [Doc. 320](#)]

Oil resources (*see also* Economic situation [Pg. 40 includes portions of [Doc. 26](#) and [Doc. 27](#)] *under individual countries*), 162 [Pg. 162 is part of [Doc. 66](#)], 200 [Pg. 200 includes portions of [Doc. 80](#) and [Doc. 81](#)], 351 [Pg. 351 includes portions of [Doc. 148](#) and [Doc. 149](#)], 599 [Pg. 599 is part of [Doc. 266](#)]

Alternate pipeline proposals, 316–318 [Pgs. 316–318 include portions of [Doc. 135](#), [Doc. 136](#), and [Doc. 137](#)], 347 [Pg. 347 is part of [Doc. 148](#)], 417–419 [Pgs. 417–419 include portions of [Doc. 175](#), [Doc. 176](#), and [Doc. 177](#)], 443–444 [Pg. 443 is part of [Doc. 188](#)], 458–459 [Pgs. 458–459 include portions of [Doc. 196](#) and [Doc. 197](#)], 482–484 [Pgs. 482–484 include portions of [Doc. 210](#) and [Doc. 211](#)], 515–517 [Pgs. 515–517 include portions of [Doc. 222](#) and [Doc. 223](#)], 545–546 [Pgs. 545–546 include portions of [Doc. 244](#) and [Doc. 245](#)], 555–556 [Pgs. 555–556 include portions of [Doc. 249](#), [Doc. 250](#), and [Doc. 251](#)]

Arab positions, 568–570 [Pg. 568 is part of [Doc. 254](#)], 591 [Pg. 591 is part of [Doc. 265](#)]

Baghdad Pact and, 317 [Pg. 317 is part of [Doc. 136](#)], 570–571 [Pg. 570 is part of [Doc. 254](#)]

Interior Department report, 574–575 [Pgs. 574–575 include portions of [Doc. 257](#) and [Doc. 258](#)]

Iranian position, 843 [Pg. 843 is part of [Doc. 362](#)], 882 [Pg. 882 is part of [Doc. 383](#)], 885 [Pg. 885 is part of [Doc. 386](#)], 926 [Pg. 926 is part of [Doc. 398](#)]

Iraqi position, 569–570 [Pg. 569 is part of [Doc. 254](#)], 572 [Pg. 572 includes portions of [Doc. 254](#) and [Doc. 255](#)],

585–586 [Pgs. 585–586 include portions of [Doc. 262](#), [Doc. 263](#), and [Doc. 264](#)]

Israel, 318 [Pg. 318 includes portions of [Doc. 136](#) and [Doc. 137](#)], 348 [Pg. 348 is part of [Doc. 148](#)], 465 [Pg. 465 is part of [Doc. 202](#)], 479–481 [Pg. 479 is part of [Doc. 209](#)], 515 [Pg. 515 includes portions of [Doc. 222](#) and [Doc. 223](#)], 517 [Pg. 517 is part of [Doc. 223](#)], 562 [Pg. 562 is part of [Doc. 253](#)]

Loss of interest, 617–618 [Pgs. 617–618 include portions of [Doc. 268](#) and [Doc. 269](#)], 646 [Pg. 646 is part of [Doc. 270](#)], 656 [Pg. 656 includes portions of [Doc. 274](#) and [Doc. 275](#)]

National Intelligence Estimate, 596 [Pg. 596 is part of [Doc. 266](#)], 604–605 [Pg. 604 is part of [Doc. 266](#)]

NSC discussion, 563–572 [Pgs. 563–572 include portions of [Doc. 253](#), [Doc. 254](#), and [Doc. 255](#)], 576–577 [Pgs. 576–577 include portions of [Doc. 258](#), [Doc. 259](#), and [Doc. 260](#)], 587–594 [Pgs. 587–594 include portions of [Doc. 264](#), [Doc. 265](#), and [Doc. 266](#)], 616 [Pg. 616 is part of [Doc. 267](#)]

Saudi position, 570 [Pg. 570 is part of [Doc. 254](#)]

U.S.–British discussions, 143 [Pg. 143 is part of [Doc. 60](#)], 460–461 [Pgs. 460–461 include portions of [Doc. 197](#) and [Doc. 198](#)], 464–465 [Pg. 464 is part of [Doc. 202](#)], 502 [Pg. 502 is part of [Doc. 220](#)], 546 [Pg. 546 is part of [Doc. 245](#)], 558 [Pg. 558 is part of [Doc. 252](#)], 572 [Pg. 572 includes portions of [Doc. 254](#) and [Doc. 255](#)]

Buraimi dispute and, 214 [Pg. 214 is part of [Doc. 88](#)]

Iraqi political situation and, 262 [Pg. 262 is part of [Doc. 105](#)]

Profit-sharing agreements, 670–673 [Pgs. 670–673 include portions of [Doc. 282](#), [Doc. 283](#), and [Doc. 284](#)]

Soviet relations with the Near East and, 172–173 [Pg. 172 is part of [Doc. 69](#)], 308–309 [Pg. 308 is part of [Doc. 132](#)], 323 [Pg. 323 includes portions of [Doc. 139](#) and [Doc. 140](#)], 356–358 [Pg. 356 is part of [Doc. 151](#)], 421 [Pg. 421 is part of [Doc. 178](#)]

Suez crisis planning, 315–318 [Pgs. 315–318 include portions of [Doc. 134](#), [Doc. 135](#), [Doc. 136](#), and [Doc. 137](#)], 340–342 [Pg. 340 is part of [Doc. 147](#)], 347–348 [Pg. 347 is part of [Doc. 148](#)], 351 [Pg. 351 includes portions of [Doc. 148](#) and [Doc. 149](#)], 501 [Pg. 501 is part of [Doc. 220](#)]

Syrian pipeline sabotage, 358 [Pg. 358 is part of [Doc. 151](#)], 385 [Pg. 385 is part of [Doc. 161](#)], 397 [Pg. 397 is part of [Doc. 167](#)], 417 [Pg. 417 includes portions of [Doc. 175](#) and [Doc. 176](#)], 421 [Pg. 421 is part of [Doc. 178](#)], 461 [Pg. 461 is part of [Doc. 198](#)], 575–576 [Pgs. 575–576 include portions of [Doc. 257](#), [Doc. 258](#), and [Doc. 259](#)]

U.S.–British talks, 217–218 [Pg. 217 is part of [Doc. 91](#)], 223–224 [Pg. 223 is part of [Doc. 91](#)], 237 [Pg. 237 is part of [Doc. 93](#)], 262 [Pg. 262 is part of [Doc. 105](#)], 460–461 [Pgs. 460–461 include portions of [Doc. 197](#) and [Doc. 198](#)], 496–515 [Pgs. 496–515 include portions of [Doc. 219](#), [Doc. 220](#), [Doc. 221](#), [Doc. 222](#), and [Doc. 223](#)], 539 [Pg. 539 includes portions of [Doc. 239](#) and [Doc. 240](#)], 543–545 [Pgs. 543–545 include portions of [Doc. 242](#), [Doc. 243](#), [Doc. 244](#), and [Doc. 245](#)], 547–553 [Pgs. 547–553 include portions of [Doc. 246](#), [Doc. 247](#), [Doc. 248](#), and [Doc. 249](#)], 575–576 [Pgs. 575–576 include portions of [Doc. 257](#), [Doc. 258](#), and [Doc. 259](#)]

U.S.–Iranian relations and, 143 [Pg. 143 is part of [Doc. 60](#)], 274 [Pg. 274 is part of [Doc. 114](#)], 695 [Pg. 695 is part of [Doc. 291](#)], 711–713 [Pgs. 711–713 include portions of [Doc. 299](#) and [Doc. 300](#)], 723–726 [Pgs. 723–726 include portions of [Doc. 303](#) and [Doc. 304](#)], 738 [Pg. 738 includes portions of [Doc. 308](#) and [Doc. 309](#)], 815–816 [Pgs. 815–816 include portions of [Doc. 355](#) and [Doc. 356](#)], 868–871 [Pgs. 868–871 include portions of [Doc. 376](#), [Doc. 377](#), and [Doc. 378](#)],

873 [Pg. 873 is part of [Doc. 379](#)], 881–885 [Pgs. 881–885 include portions of [Doc. 382](#), [Doc. 383](#), [Doc. 384](#), [Doc. 385](#), and [Doc. 386](#)], 926 [Pg. 926 is part of [Doc. 398](#)]

Italian agreement, 920–922 [Pgs. 920–922 include portions of [Doc. 393](#), [Doc. 394](#), [Doc. 395](#), and [Doc. 396](#)], 932–934 [Pgs. 932–934 include portions of [Doc. 400](#), [Doc. 401](#), and [Doc. 402](#)], 937–938 [Pgs. 937–938 include portions of [Doc. 402](#) and [Doc. 403](#)], 941 [Pg. 941 includes portions of [Doc. 405](#) and [Doc. 406](#)], 945–946 [Pgs. 945–946 include portions of [Doc. 407](#) and [Doc. 408](#)]

U.S. policy, 310–311 [Pg. 310 is part of [Doc. 133](#)], 344 [Pg. 344 is part of [Doc. 148](#)], 373 [Pg. 373 is part of [Doc. 159](#)], 620 [Pg. 620 is part of [Doc. 270](#)], 645–646 [Pg. 645 is part of [Doc. 270](#)]

U.S.–Saudi relations and, 190–191 [Pg. 190 is part of [Doc. 78](#)], 193 [Pg. 193 is part of [Doc. 78](#)], 223 [Pg. 223 is part of [Doc. 91](#)], 238 [Pg. 238 is part of [Doc. 93](#)], 300 [Pg. 300 is part of [Doc. 130](#)], 637 [Pg. 637 is part of [Doc. 270](#)], 645 [Pg. 645 is part of [Doc. 270](#)]

Western European dependence on, 308–309 [Pg. 308 is part of [Doc. 132](#)], 340–342 [Pg. 340 is part of [Doc. 147](#)], 356–357 [Pg. 356 is part of [Doc. 151](#)], 516 [Pg. 516 is part of [Doc. 223](#)], 565 [Pg. 565 is part of [Doc. 254](#)], 617 [Pg. 617 is part of [Doc. 268](#)]

Oman (*see also* Muscat), 583 [Pg. 583 is part of [Doc. 261](#)], 595 [Pg. 595 is part of [Doc. 266](#)], 610 [Pg. 610 is part of [Doc. 266](#)]

Onassis, Aristotle, 555n [Pg. 555 includes portions of [Doc. 249](#) and [Doc. 250](#)], 556 [Pg. 556 includes portions of [Doc. 250](#) and [Doc. 251](#)]

Operations Coordinating Board (OCB), 420–429 [Pgs. 420–429 include portions of [Doc. 177](#), [Doc. 178](#), and [Doc. 179](#)], 441 [Pg. 441 includes portions of [Doc. 186](#) and [Doc. 187](#)], 742 [Pg. 742 is part of [Doc. 312](#)], 750–754 [Pgs. 750–754 include portions of [Doc. 316](#), [Doc. 317](#), [Doc. 318](#), and [Doc. 319](#)], 798 [Pg. 798 includes portions of [Doc. 346](#) and [Doc. 347](#)], 840–841 [Pgs. 840–841 include portions of [Doc. 360](#) and [Doc. 361](#)], 850 [Pg. 850 is part of [Doc. 367](#)], 979–

986 [Pgs. 979–986 include portions of [Doc. 426](#) and [Doc. 427](#)], 1061–1068 [Pgs. 1061–1068 include portions of [Doc. 461](#), [Doc. 462](#), [Doc. 463](#), and [Doc. 464](#)]

Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), 662 [Pg. 662 includes portions of [Doc. 277](#) and [Doc. 278](#)], 668 [Pg. 668 includes portions of [Doc. 280](#) and [Doc. 281](#)]

Ortiz, Nestor, 671 [Pg. 671 is part of [Doc. 283](#)]

Ortona, Egidio, 663 [Pg. 663 includes portions of [Doc. 278](#) and [Doc. 279](#)]

el–Pachachi, Nadhim, 1043 [Pg. 1043 is part of [Doc. 455](#)]

Page, Howard D., 318 [Pg. 318 includes portions of [Doc. 136](#) and [Doc. 137](#)], 417–419 [Pgs. 417–419 include portions of [Doc. 175](#), [Doc. 176](#), and [Doc. 177](#)], 815–816 [Pgs. 815–816 include portions of [Doc. 355](#) and [Doc. 356](#)]

Pahlavi, Mohamed Reza Shah (see also [Iran](#)), 242 [Pg. 242 is part of [Doc. 94](#)], 684 [Pg. 684 is part of [Doc. 289](#)], 692 [Pg. 692 is part of [Doc. 291](#)], 706 [Pg. 706 is part of [Doc. 296](#)], 842–844 [Pgs. 842–844 include portions of [Doc. 362](#) and [Doc. 363](#)], 910–920 [Pgs. 910–920 include portions of [Doc. 392](#), [Doc. 393](#), and [Doc. 394](#)], 961 [Pg. 961 is part of [Doc. 415](#)]

Alternate pipeline proposals, 317 [Pg. 317 is part of [Doc. 136](#)], 843 [Pg. 843 is part of [Doc. 362](#)], 882 [Pg. 882 is part of [Doc. 383](#)], 885 [Pg. 885 is part of [Doc. 386](#)]

Baghdad Pact, 293 [Pg. 293 is part of [Doc. 125](#)]

Iranian participation, 170 [Pg. 170 is part of [Doc. 68](#)], 219 [Pg. 219 is part of [Doc. 91](#)], 241 [Pg. 241 is part of [Doc. 94](#)], 729–730 [Pgs. 729–730 include portions of [Doc. 304](#) and [Doc. 305](#)], 745 [Pg. 745 is part of [Doc. 314](#)], 758 [Pg. 758 is part of [Doc. 321](#)], 778–780 [Pgs. 778–780 include portions of [Doc. 332](#), [Doc. 333](#), and [Doc. 334](#)], 788 [Pg. 788 is part of [Doc. 339](#)], 808–809 [Pg. 808 is part of [Doc. 352](#)]

U.S. participation, 273 [Pg. 273 is part of [Doc. 114](#)], 321 [Pg. 321 is part of [Doc. 138](#)], 333 [Pg. 333 is part of [Doc. 145](#)], 365 [Pg. 365 is part of [Doc. 155](#)]

Dulles, correspondence with, 808–811 [Pg. 808 is part of [Doc. 352](#)]

Eisenhower, correspondence with, 840 [Pg. 840 includes portions of [Doc. 360](#) and [Doc. 361](#)], 854–855 [Pgs. 854–855 include portions of [Doc. 369](#) and [Doc. 370](#)], 861–863 [Pgs. 861–863 include portions of [Doc. 374](#) and [Doc. 375](#)]

Eisenhower Doctrine, 488–489 [Pgs. 488–489 include portions of [Doc. 213](#) and [Doc. 214](#)], 926–928 [Pgs. 926–928 include portions of [Doc. 398](#) and [Doc. 399](#)]

Oil companies, 869–871 [Pgs. 869–871 include portions of [Doc. 377](#) and [Doc. 378](#)], 881–882 [Pgs. 881–882 include portions of [Doc. 382](#) and [Doc. 383](#)], 884–885 [Pgs. 884–885 include portions of [Doc. 385](#) and [Doc. 386](#)]

Political situation in Iran, 110 [Pg. 110 is part of [Doc. 49](#)], 136 [Pg. 136 is part of [Doc. 60](#)], 296 [Pg. 296 is part of [Doc. 127](#)], 734 [Pg. 734 is part of [Doc. 308](#)], 747–748 [Pgs. 747–748 include portions of [Doc. 314](#), [Doc. 315](#), and [Doc. 316](#)], 875 [Pg. 875 is part of [Doc. 381](#)], 878–879 [Pg. 878 is part of [Doc. 381](#)], 881 [Pg. 881 includes portions of [Doc. 382](#) and [Doc. 383](#)]

Role in, 84 [Pg. 84 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 137 [Pg. 137 is part of [Doc. 60](#)], 690–691 [Pg. 690 is part of [Doc. 291](#)], 726–729 [Pgs. 726–729 include portions of [Doc. 303](#), [Doc. 304](#), and [Doc. 305](#)], 751 [Pg. 751 is part of [Doc. 317](#)], 816–818 [Pgs. 816–818 include portions of [Doc. 355](#) and [Doc. 356](#)], 817 [Pg. 817 is part of [Doc. 356](#)], 871 [Pg. 871 includes portions of [Doc. 377](#) and [Doc. 378](#)], 902 [Pg. 902 is part of [Doc. 392](#)], 911 [Pg. 911 is part of [Doc. 393](#)], 928 [Pg. 928 includes portions of [Doc. 398](#) and

[Doc. 399](#)], 940–941 [Pgs. 940–941 include portions of [Doc. 404](#), [Doc. 405](#), and [Doc. 406](#)]

Soviet Union, 273–274 [Pg. 273 is part of [Doc. 114](#)], 773n [Pg. 773 is part of [Doc. 330](#)], 774n [Pg. 774 is part of [Doc. 330](#)], 951–953 [Pgs. 951–953 include portions of [Doc. 409](#), [Doc. 410](#), and [Doc. 411](#)]

Moscow visit, 748–750 [Pgs. 748–750 include portions of [Doc. 315](#), [Doc. 316](#), and [Doc. 317](#)], 753–755 [Pgs. 753–755 include portions of [Doc. 318](#), [Doc. 319](#), and [Doc. 320](#)], 759–761 [Pgs. 759–761 include portions of [Doc. 321](#), [Doc. 322](#), and [Doc. 323](#)], 820–821 [Pg. 820 is part of [Doc. 357](#)], 823–825 [Pg. 823 is part of [Doc. 357](#)], 827–828 [Pgs. 827–828 include portions of [Doc. 357](#) and [Doc. 358](#)], 837–841 [Pgs. 837–841 include portions of [Doc. 359](#), [Doc. 360](#), and [Doc. 361](#)], 869 [Pg. 869 is part of [Doc. 377](#)], 912 [Pg. 912 is part of [Doc. 393](#)], 926 [Pg. 926 is part of [Doc. 398](#)]

U.S. economic aid, 808–813 [Pgs. 808–813 include portions of [Doc. 352](#), [Doc. 353](#), and [Doc. 354](#)], 854–855 [Pgs. 854–855 include portions of [Doc. 369](#) and [Doc. 370](#)], 861–862 [Pg. 861 is part of [Doc. 374](#)]

U.S. military aid, 81 [Pg. 81 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 677 [Pg. 677 is part of [Doc. 286](#)], 697 [Pg. 697 is part of [Doc. 292](#)], 702 [Pg. 702 is part of [Doc. 295](#)], 708 [Pg. 708 includes portions of [Doc. 296](#) and [Doc. 297](#)], 710 [Pg. 710 is part of [Doc. 298](#)], 729–730 [Pgs. 729–730 include portions of [Doc. 304](#) and [Doc. 305](#)], 745 [Pg. 745 is part of [Doc. 314](#)], 747 [Pg. 747 includes portions of [Doc. 314](#) and [Doc. 315](#)], 758–759 [Pgs. 758–759 include portions of [Doc. 321](#) and [Doc. 322](#)], 763n [Pg. 763 is part of [Doc. 324](#)], 778–780 [Pgs. 778–780 include portions of [Doc. 332](#), [Doc. 333](#), and [Doc. 334](#)], 825 [Pg. 825 is part of [Doc. 357](#)], 866–868 [Pgs. 866–868 include portions of [Doc. 376](#) and [Doc. 377](#)], 927–928 [Pgs. 927–928 include portions of [Doc. 398](#) and [Doc. 399](#)], 959–960 [Pg. 959 is part of [Doc. 414](#)], 962–963 [Pg. 962 is part of [Doc. 416](#)]

U.S. visit, 678 [Pg. 678 is part of [Doc. 286](#)], 697–700 [Pgs. 697–700 include portions of [Doc. 292](#), [Doc. 293](#), and [Doc. 294](#)], 702 [Pg. 702 is part of [Doc. 295](#)]

Pakistan (see also [Baghdad Pact](#); Pakistani subheadings under other subjects; Pushtunistan dispute), 2 [Pg. 2 includes portions of [Doc. 1](#) and [Doc. 2](#)], 37 [Pg. 37 is part of [Doc. 25](#)], 142 [Pg. 142 is part of [Doc. 60](#)], 277 [Pg. 277 is part of [Doc. 116](#)], 300 [Pg. 300 is part of [Doc. 130](#)], 557 [Pg. 557 is part of [Doc. 251](#)], 559–560 [Pg. 559 is part of [Doc. 253](#)], 643 [Pg. 643 is part of [Doc. 270](#)]

India, relations with (see also [Kashmir dispute](#)), 83–84 [Pg. 83 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 95n [Pg. 95 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 389 [Pg. 389 is part of [Doc. 162](#)], 404 [Pg. 404 is part of [Doc. 170](#)], 490 [Pg. 490 is part of [Doc. 215](#)]

United Kingdom, relations with (see also [U.S.–British cooperation](#) under U.S. military aid to below), 131–132 [Pgs. 131–132 include portions of [Doc. 56](#) and [Doc. 57](#)], 705 [Pg. 705 is part of [Doc. 296](#)]

United States, relations with, 95 [Pg. 95 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 304–305 [Pg. 304 is part of [Doc. 131](#)], 393 [Pg. 393 is part of [Doc. 165](#)], 467 [Pg. 467 is part of [Doc. 203](#)], 556–557 [Pgs. 556–557 include portions of [Doc. 250](#) and [Doc. 251](#)], 559–563 [Pgs. 559–563 include portions of [Doc. 253](#) and [Doc. 254](#)]

U.S. military aid to (see also [Baghdad Pact](#): U.S. military aid and), 60 [Pg. 60 includes portions of [Doc. 40](#) and [Doc. 41](#)], 68 [Pg. 68 is part of [Doc. 43](#)], 92 [Pg. 92 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 146 [Pg. 146 is part of [Doc. 60](#)], 161 [Pg. 161 is part of [Doc. 66](#)], 163 [Pg. 163 is part of [Doc. 66](#)], 166 [Pg. 166 is part of [Doc. 66](#)], 209 [Pg. 209 is part of [Doc. 84](#)], 213 [Pg. 213 is part of [Doc. 87](#)], 236 [Pg. 236 is part of [Doc. 93](#)], 247–248 [Pg. 247 is part of [Doc. 97](#)], 687 [Pg. 687 is part of [Doc. 290](#)]

Baghdad Pact and, 51 [Pg. 51 includes portions of [Doc. 34](#) and [Doc. 35](#)], 61 [Pg. 61 is part of [Doc. 41](#)], 94–

95 [Pg. 94 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 192 [Pg. 192 is part of [Doc. 78](#)], 195 [Pg. 195 is part of [Doc. 78](#)], 226 [Pg. 226 is part of [Doc. 91](#)], 250ⁿ [Pg. 250 is part of [Doc. 99](#)], 337 [Pg. 337 is part of [Doc. 145](#)], 349 [Pg. 349 is part of [Doc. 148](#)], 362 [Pg. 362 is part of [Doc. 153](#)]

Eisenhower Doctrine and, 490–491 [Pgs. 490–491 include portions of [Doc. 215](#) and [Doc. 216](#)]

Soviet bloc military aid to Egypt and, 186 [Pg. 186 is part of [Doc. 78](#)], 188 [Pg. 188 is part of [Doc. 78](#)]

U.S.–British cooperation, 121–122 [Pg. 121 is part of [Doc. 51](#)], 128 [Pg. 128 is part of [Doc. 55](#)], 131–132 [Pgs. 131–132 include portions of [Doc. 56](#) and [Doc. 57](#)], 147–149 [Pg. 147 is part of [Doc. 60](#)]

Palestine. See [Arab–Israeli dispute](#).

Parsce, Gabriele, 664 [Pg. 664 is part of [Doc. 279](#)]

Pate, Gen. Randolph M., 258 [Pg. 258 includes portions of [Doc. 101](#) and [Doc. 102](#)], 299 [Pg. 299 includes portions of [Doc. 129](#) and [Doc. 130](#)], 414 [Pg. 414 is part of [Doc. 174](#)], 553 [Pg. 553 includes portions of [Doc. 247](#), [Doc. 248](#), and [Doc. 249](#)]

Patterson, Lt. Col. J., 63ⁿ [Pg. 63 includes portions of [Doc. 42](#) and [Doc. 43](#)]

Pella, Giuseppe, 584–585 [Pgs. 584–585 include portions of [Doc. 262](#) and [Doc. 263](#)], 663–665 [Pgs. 663–665 include portions of [Doc. 278](#) and [Doc. 279](#)], 945–946 [Pgs. 945–946 include portions of [Doc. 407](#) and [Doc. 408](#)]

Perkins, George W., 176–177 [Pgs. 176–177 include portions of [Doc. 70](#), [Doc. 71](#), and [Doc. 72](#)]

Perron, Ernest, 912 [Pg. 912 is part of [Doc. 393](#)]

Persia. See [Iran](#).

Persian Gulf states (*see also individual countries; Persian Gulf conflicts under Saudi Arabia: United Kingdom, relations with*), 107 [Pg. 107 is part of [Doc. 49](#)], 118 [Pg. 118 is part of [Doc. 51](#)], 139 [Pg. 139 is part of [Doc. 60](#)], 191 [Pg. 191 is part of [Doc. 78](#)], 311 [Pg. 311 is part of [Doc. 133](#)], 424 [Pg. 424 is part of [Doc. 178](#)]

British interests in (*see also [Buraimi dispute](#) below*), 67 [Pg. 67 is part of [Doc. 43](#)], 78 [Pg. 78 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 85 [Pg. 85 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 192 [Pg. 192 is part of [Doc. 78](#)], 230 [Pg. 230 is part of [Doc. 92](#)], 254 [Pg. 254 is part of [Doc. 101](#)], 509–510 [Pg. 509 is part of [Doc. 222](#)], 550 [Pg. 550 is part of [Doc. 247](#)], 601 [Pg. 601 is part of [Doc. 266](#)], 611 [Pg. 611 is part of [Doc. 266](#)], 624 [Pg. 624 is part of [Doc. 270](#)]

Buraimi dispute, 172 [Pg. 172 is part of [Doc. 69](#)], 191 [Pg. 191 is part of [Doc. 78](#)], 214 [Pg. 214 is part of [Doc. 88](#)], 224 [Pg. 224 is part of [Doc. 91](#)], 233 [Pg. 233 is part of [Doc. 92](#)], 254 [Pg. 254 is part of [Doc. 101](#)], 265 [Pg. 265 includes portions of [Doc. 107](#) and [Doc. 108](#)], 340–341 [Pg. 340 is part of [Doc. 147](#)], 399 [Pg. 399 is part of [Doc. 169](#)], 428 [Pg. 428 is part of [Doc. 178](#)], 499–500 [Pg. 499 is part of [Doc. 220](#)], 504–507 [Pg. 504 is part of [Doc. 221](#)], 548–549 [Pg. 548 is part of [Doc. 247](#)], 552 [Pg. 552 is part of [Doc. 247](#)], 638 [Pg. 638 is part of [Doc. 270](#)]

Farsi and Arabi Islands, 867 [Pg. 867 is part of [Doc. 376](#)], 869 [Pg. 869 is part of [Doc. 377](#)], 894 [Pg. 894 is part of [Doc. 391](#)], 942 [Pg. 942 is part of [Doc. 406](#)]

Political situation, 138 [Pg. 138 is part of [Doc. 60](#)], 421 [Pg. 421 is part of [Doc. 178](#)], 601 [Pg. 601 is part of [Doc. 266](#)]

Persons, Maj. Gen. Wilton B., 447 [Pg. 447 is part of [Doc. 191](#)]

Petroleum. *See* [Oil resources](#).

Phleger, Herman, 366 [Pg. 366 is part of [Doc. 156](#)], 376 [Pg. 376 includes portions of [Doc. 159](#) and [Doc. 160](#)], 383ⁿ [Pg. 383 is part of [Doc. 161](#)], 398 [Pg. 398 is part of [Doc. 168](#)], 410 [Pg. 410 is part of [Doc. 171](#)], 412 [Pg. 412 includes

portions of [Doc. 171](#) and [Doc. 172](#)], 443–444 [Pg. 443 is part of [Doc. 188](#)], 464 [Pg. 464 is part of [Doc. 202](#)], 466 [Pg. 466 is part of [Doc. 203](#)], 712–713 [Pgs. 712–713 include portions of [Doc. 299](#) and [Doc. 300](#)]

Suez crisis, 340–341 [Pg. 340 is part of [Doc. 147](#)], 393 [Pg. 393 is part of [Doc. 165](#)], 395 [Pg. 395 includes portions of [Doc. 165](#) and [Doc. 166](#)], 471 [Pg. 471 is part of [Doc. 203](#)]

Pineau, Christian, 661 [Pg. 661 includes portions of [Doc. 276](#) and [Doc. 277](#)]

Pirnia, 922 [Pg. 922 includes portions of [Doc. 395](#) and [Doc. 396](#)]

Powers, Col. George T., 3 [Pg. 3 includes portions of [Doc. 2](#) and [Doc. 3](#)rd], 103 [Pg. 103 includes portions of [Doc. 48](#) and [Doc. 49](#)], 112 [Pg. 112 is part of [Doc. 51](#)], 127 [Pg. 127 includes portions of [Doc. 54](#) and [Doc. 55](#)]

Prochnow Committee, 828–836 [Pgs. 828–836 include portions of [Doc. 357](#) and [Doc. 358](#)], 857–859 [Pgs. 857–859 include portions of [Doc. 371](#), [Doc. 372](#), and [Doc. 373](#)], 886 [Pg. 886 is part of [Doc. 387](#)], 893 [Pg. 893 is part of [Doc. 391](#)], 909 [Pg. 909 is part of [Doc. 392](#)], 934 [Pg. 934 includes portions of [Doc. 401](#) and [Doc. 402](#)]

Proctor, Carolyn J., 390n [Pg. 390 is part of [Doc. 163](#)], 395n [Pg. 395 includes portions of [Doc. 165](#) and [Doc. 166](#)]

Pushtunistan dispute, 57 [Pg. 57 is part of [Doc. 38](#)], 59 [Pg. 59 includes portions of [Doc. 39](#) and [Doc. 40](#)], 63 [Pg. 63 includes portions of [Doc. 42](#) and [Doc. 43](#)], 83–84 [Pg. 83 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 89 [Pg. 89 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 188 [Pg. 188 is part of [Doc. 78](#)], 191 [Pg. 191 is part of [Doc. 78](#)], 253 [Pg. 253 is part of [Doc. 101](#)], 288–289 [Pg. 288 is part of [Doc. 124](#)], 378 [Pg. 378 is part of [Doc. 160](#)]

Qatar (*see also* Persian Gulf states), 552 [Pg. 552 is part of [Doc. 247](#)]

al-Qazzaz, Said, 1043 [Pg. 1043 is part of [Doc. 455](#)]

Quarles, Donald A., 466 [Pg. 466 is part of [Doc. 203](#)], 1059n [Pg. 1059 is part of [Doc. 460](#)]

Quraishi, 257–258 [Pgs. 257–258 include portions of [Doc. 101](#) and [Doc. 102](#)]

al–Quwatli, Shukri, 538 [Pg. 538 is part of [Doc. 239](#)]

Radford, Adm. Arthur W., 98*n* [Pg. 98 is part of [Doc. 47](#)], 165–166 [Pg. 165 is part of [Doc. 66](#)], 171 [Pg. 171 is part of [Doc. 68](#)], 246–247 [Pg. 246 is part of [Doc. 97](#)], 302 [Pg. 302 is part of [Doc. 130](#)], 308 [Pg. 308 is part of [Doc. 132](#)], 412 [Pg. 412 includes portions of [Doc. 171](#) and [Doc. 172](#)], 413*n* [Pg. 413 includes portions of [Doc. 172](#) and [Doc. 173](#)], 414–416 [Pgs. 414–416 include portions of [Doc. 174](#) and [Doc. 175](#)]

Baghdad Pact, 258 [Pg. 258 includes portions of [Doc. 101](#) and [Doc. 102](#)], 261 [Pg. 261 is part of [Doc. 104](#)], 264–265 [Pgs. 264–265 include portions of [Doc. 105](#), [Doc. 106](#), [Doc. 107](#), and [Doc. 108](#)], 294 [Pg. 294 is part of [Doc. 126](#)], 299 [Pg. 299 includes portions of [Doc. 129](#) and [Doc. 130](#)], 301–302 [Pg. 301 is part of [Doc. 130](#)], 327–329 [Pg. 327 is part of [Doc. 143](#)], 361–363 [Pgs. 361–363 include portions of [Doc. 153](#) and [Doc. 154](#)], 373*n* [Pg. 373 is part of [Doc. 159](#)], 416 [Pg. 416 is part of [Doc. 175](#)], 553–554 [Pgs. 553–554 include portions of [Doc. 247](#), [Doc. 248](#), and [Doc. 249](#)], 780 [Pg. 780 includes portions of [Doc. 333](#) and [Doc. 334](#)], 785 [Pg. 785 is part of [Doc. 337](#)]

Iran, 731–732 [Pgs. 731–732 include portions of [Doc. 305](#) and [Doc. 306](#)], 780 [Pg. 780 includes portions of [Doc. 333](#) and [Doc. 334](#)], 785 [Pg. 785 is part of [Doc. 337](#)], 792–793 [Pgs. 792–793 include portions of [Doc. 342](#), [Doc. 343](#), and [Doc. 344](#)], 801–803 [Pgs. 801–803 include portions of [Doc. 348](#) and [Doc. 349](#)], 850 [Pg. 850 is part of [Doc. 367](#)], 857–859 [Pgs. 857–859 include portions of [Doc. 371](#), [Doc. 372](#), and [Doc. 373](#)], 894 [Pg. 894 is part of [Doc. 391](#)], 898 [Pg. 898 is part of [Doc. 391](#)]

Near East, U.S. military aid to, 161–163 [Pg. 161 is part of [Doc. 66](#)], 165–167 [Pg. 165 is part of [Doc. 66](#)], 247–248 [Pg. 247 is part of [Doc. 97](#)], 258 [Pg. 258 includes portions of [Doc. 101](#) and [Doc. 102](#)], 275–276 [Pg. 275 is part of [Doc. 115](#)], 329 [Pg. 329 is part of [Doc. 143](#)], 731–732 [Pgs. 731–732 include portions of [Doc. 305](#) and [Doc. 306](#)], 801–803 [Pgs. 801–803 include portions of [Doc. 348](#) and [Doc. 349](#)], 857–859 [Pgs. 857–859 include portions of [Doc. 371](#), [Doc.](#)

[372](#), and [Doc. 373](#)], [894](#) [Pg. 894 is part of [Doc. 391](#)], [898](#) [Pg. 898 is part of [Doc. 391](#)], [987–988](#) [Pgs. 987–988 include portions of [Doc. 428](#) and [Doc. 429](#)], [1020n](#) [Pg. 1020 is part of [Doc. 441](#)]

Regional defense, [52–53](#) [Pg. 52 is part of [Doc. 35](#)], [70–74](#) [Pgs. 70–74 include portions of [Doc. 43](#) and [Doc. 44](#)], [99](#) [Pg. 99 is part of [Doc. 47](#)], [127](#) [Pg. 127 includes portions of [Doc. 54](#) and [Doc. 55](#)], [133](#) [Pg. 133 includes portions of [Doc. 57](#) and [Doc. 58](#)], [274](#) [Pg. 274 is part of [Doc. 114](#)], [309](#) [Pg. 309 is part of [Doc. 132](#)], [330](#) [Pg. 330 includes portions of [Doc. 143](#) and [Doc. 144](#)], [683](#) [Pg. 683 is part of [Doc. 288](#)], [687](#) [Pg. 687 is part of [Doc. 290](#)], [935](#) [Pg. 935 is part of [Doc. 402](#)]

Elburz line, [274](#) [Pg. 274 is part of [Doc. 114](#)], [893](#) [Pg. 893 is part of [Doc. 391](#)], [895](#) [Pg. 895 is part of [Doc. 391](#)], [927](#) [Pg. 927 is part of [Doc. 398](#)], [935](#) [Pg. 935 is part of [Doc. 402](#)]

Rahim, Kemal Abdel, [652](#) [Pg. 652 is part of [Doc. 274](#)]

Ramsden, C.O.I., [464](#) [Pg. 464 is part of [Doc. 202](#)]

Randall, Col. Carey A., [414](#) [Pg. 414 is part of [Doc. 174](#)]

Rathbone, J., [443–444](#) [Pg. 443 is part of [Doc. 188](#)], [482](#) [Pg. 482 is part of [Doc. 210](#)], [546](#) [Pg. 546 is part of [Doc. 245](#)]

Rayburn, Sam, [436](#) [Pg. 436 is part of [Doc. 182](#)], [446](#) [Pg. 446 includes portions of [Doc. 189](#), [Doc. 190](#), and [Doc. 191](#)]

Raymond, John M., [617n](#) [Pg. 617 is part of [Doc. 268](#)]

Regional defense (see also [Near East](#)), [330](#) [Pg. 330 includes portions of [Doc. 143](#) and [Doc. 144](#)], [579](#) [Pg. 579 is part of [Doc. 260](#)], [632–633](#) [Pg. 632 is part of [Doc. 270](#)]

Afghan role in, [706](#) [Pg. 706 is part of [Doc. 296](#)]

Arab–Israeli dispute and, 17 [Pg. 17 is part of [Doc. 12](#)], 31 [Pg. 31 is part of [Doc. 22](#)], 47 [Pg. 47 is part of [Doc. 32](#)], 52 [Pg. 52 is part of [Doc. 35](#)], 67–68 [Pg. 67 is part of [Doc. 43](#)], 90–91 [Pg. 90 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 114 [Pg. 114 is part of [Doc. 51](#)], 153 [Pg. 153 is part of [Doc. 62](#)], 155–157 [Pgs. 155–157 include portions of [Doc. 63](#) and [Doc. 64](#)], 163 [Pg. 163 is part of [Doc. 66](#)]

Arab League role, 13–14 [Pg. 13 is part of [Doc. 10](#)], 16 [Pg. 16 includes portions of [Doc. 11](#) and [Doc. 12](#)], 24 [Pg. 24 is part of [Doc. 16](#)], 124 [Pg. 124 includes portions of [Doc. 52](#) and [Doc. 53](#)], 226–227 [Pg. 226 is part of [Doc. 91](#)]

British position, 113–114 [Pg. 113 is part of [Doc. 51](#)], 118–119 [Pg. 118 is part of [Doc. 51](#)], 121 [Pg. 121 is part of [Doc. 51](#)], 140 [Pg. 140 is part of [Doc. 60](#)], 161–162 [Pg. 161 is part of [Doc. 66](#)], 291 [Pg. 291 is part of [Doc. 124](#)]

British role (see also [U.S.–British talks](#) and U.S.–British–Turkish discussions *below*), 63–64 [Pgs. 63–64 include portions of [Doc. 42](#) and [Doc. 43](#)], 66–67 [Pg. 66 is part of [Doc. 43](#)], 71 [Pg. 71 is part of [Doc. 44](#)], 78–79 [Pg. 78 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 93–94 [Pg. 93 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 98–99 [Pg. 98 is part of [Doc. 47](#)], 105–106 [Pg. 105 is part of [Doc. 49](#)], 107 [Pg. 107 is part of [Doc. 49](#)], 114 [Pg. 114 is part of [Doc. 51](#)], 132 [Pg. 132 includes portions of [Doc. 56](#) and [Doc. 57](#)], 150 [Pg. 150 is part of [Doc. 60](#)]

Egyptian role, 29–30 [Pgs. 29–30 include portions of [Doc. 21](#) and [Doc. 22](#)], 46–48 [Pgs. 46–48 include portions of [Doc. 31](#), [Doc. 32](#), and [Doc. 33](#)], 66–68 [Pg. 66 is part of [Doc. 43](#)], 79 [Pg. 79 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 86–87 [Pg. 86 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 113–114 [Pg. 113 is part of [Doc. 51](#)], 140 [Pg. 140 is part of [Doc. 60](#)]

Eisenhower Doctrine and, 448–451 [Pg. 448 is part of [Doc. 192](#)]

Elburz line, 260 [Pg. 260 is part of [Doc. 103](#)], 274 [Pg. 274 is part of [Doc. 114](#)], 281 [Pg. 281 is part of [Doc. 119](#)], 293 [Pg. 293 is part of [Doc. 125](#)], 893–895 [Pg. 893 is part of [Doc. 391](#)], 904 [Pg. 904 is

part of [Doc. 392](#)], 927 [Pg. 927 is part of [Doc. 398](#)], 935 [Pg. 935 is part of [Doc. 402](#)]

Ethiopian role, 66 [Pg. 66 is part of [Doc. 43](#)]

French position, 90 [Pg. 90 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 92 [Pg. 92 is part of [Doc. 46](#)]

High-level planning survey proposals, 536 [Pg. 536 is part of [Doc. 238](#)], 541–542 [Pgs. 541–542 include portions of [Doc. 241](#) and [Doc. 242](#)]

Indian position, 92–93 [Pg. 92 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 109 [Pg. 109 is part of [Doc. 49](#)], 450 [Pg. 450 is part of [Doc. 192](#)]

Iranian position, 260 [Pg. 260 is part of [Doc. 103](#)], 280 [Pg. 280 includes portions of [Doc. 118](#) and [Doc. 119](#)], 293 [Pg. 293 is part of [Doc. 125](#)]

Iranian role (*see also* Iran: U.S. military aid to), 62 [Pg. 62 is part of [Doc. 42](#)], 66–67 [Pg. 66 is part of [Doc. 43](#)], 72 [Pg. 72 is part of [Doc. 44](#)], 84 [Pg. 84 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 99–100 [Pg. 99 is part of [Doc. 47](#)], 118 [Pg. 118 is part of [Doc. 51](#)], 140 [Pg. 140 is part of [Doc. 60](#)], 161–162 [Pg. 161 is part of [Doc. 66](#)], 643 [Pg. 643 is part of [Doc. 270](#)], 732 [Pg. 732 is part of [Doc. 306](#)]

U.S.–British–Turkish talks, 677 [Pg. 677 is part of [Doc. 286](#)], 679–681 [Pgs. 679–681 include portions of [Doc. 286](#) and [Doc. 287](#)], 683 [Pg. 683 is part of [Doc. 288](#)], 684 [Pg. 684 is part of [Doc. 289](#)], 687 [Pg. 687 is part of [Doc. 290](#)], 694 [Pg. 694 is part of [Doc. 291](#)], 703–704 [Pg. 703 is part of [Doc. 296](#)]

Zagros line, 51 [Pg. 51 includes portions of [Doc. 34](#) and [Doc. 35](#)], 110 [Pg. 110 is part of [Doc. 49](#)], 247 [Pg. 247 is part of [Doc. 97](#)], 281 [Pg. 281 is part of [Doc. 119](#)], 677 [Pg. 677 is part of [Doc. 286](#)], 680 [Pg. 680 includes portions of [Doc. 286](#) and [Doc. 287](#)], 692 [Pg. 692 is part of

[Doc. 291](#)], 704 [Pg. 704 is part of [Doc. 296](#)], 706–707 [Pg. 706 is part of [Doc. 296](#)], 796 [Pg. 796 is part of [Doc. 344](#)], 835 [Pg. 835 is part of [Doc. 358](#)], 893 [Pg. 893 is part of [Doc. 391](#)], 904 [Pg. 904 is part of [Doc. 392](#)]n, 935 [Pg. 935 is part of [Doc. 402](#)]

Iraqi role, 62 [Pg. 62 is part of [Doc. 42](#)], 66–67 [Pg. 66 is part of [Doc. 43](#)], 82–83 [Pg. 82 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 99 [Pg. 99 is part of [Doc. 47](#)], 118–119 [Pg. 118 is part of [Doc. 51](#)], 162 [Pg. 162 is part of [Doc. 66](#)], 975 [Pg. 975 includes portions of [Doc. 423](#) and [Doc. 424](#)], 987 [Pg. 987 is part of [Doc. 428](#)], 1057 [Pg. 1057 is part of [Doc. 458](#)]

Israeli position, 79 [Pg. 79 is part of [Doc. 46](#)]

Israeli role, 68 [Pg. 68 is part of [Doc. 43](#)], 93 [Pg. 93 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 118 [Pg. 118 is part of [Doc. 51](#)]

Jordanian role, 66–68 [Pg. 66 is part of [Doc. 43](#)], 71 [Pg. 71 is part of [Doc. 44](#)], 99 [Pg. 99 is part of [Doc. 47](#)], 118 [Pg. 118 is part of [Doc. 51](#)]

Lebanese role, 67–68 [Pg. 67 is part of [Doc. 43](#)], 90 [Pg. 90 is part of [Doc. 46](#)]

Middle East military representative proposals, 632–633 [Pg. 632 is part of [Doc. 270](#)], 648–649 [Pgs. 648–649 include portions of [Doc. 271](#) and [Doc. 272](#)], 669–670 [Pgs. 669–670 include portions of [Doc. 281](#), [Doc. 282](#), and [Doc. 283](#)]

National Intelligence Estimate, 77–97 [Pgs. 77–97 include portions of [Doc. 45](#) and [Doc. 46](#)]

NSC discussions, 54–55 [Pgs. 54–55 include portions of [Doc. 36](#) and [Doc. 37](#)]

Nuclear weapons, 260 [Pg. 260 is part of [Doc. 103](#)], 291 [Pg. 291 is part of [Doc. 124](#)]

Pakistani role, 66 [Pg. 66 is part of [Doc. 43](#)], 72 [Pg. 72 is part of [Doc. 44](#)], 74 [Pg. 74 is part of [Doc. 44](#)], 83–84 [Pg. 83 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 101–102 [Pgs. 101–102 include portions of [Doc. 47](#) and [Doc. 48](#)], 118 [Pg. 118 is part of [Doc. 51](#)], 121 [Pg. 121 is part of [Doc. 51](#)]

Saudi role, 67–68 [Pg. 67 is part of [Doc. 43](#)]

South African role, 66 [Pg. 66 is part of [Doc. 43](#)], 94n [Pg. 94 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 222 [Pg. 222 is part of [Doc. 91](#)]

Soviet position, 79–80 [Pg. 79 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 91 [Pg. 91 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 155–156 [Pgs. 155–156 include portions of [Doc. 63](#) and [Doc. 64](#)]

State–Defense working group, 52 [Pg. 52 is part of [Doc. 35](#)], 63–74 [Pgs. 63–74 include portions of [Doc. 42](#), [Doc. 43](#), and [Doc. 44](#)], 98–103 [Pgs. 98–103 include portions of [Doc. 47](#), [Doc. 48](#), and [Doc. 49](#)], 127–129 [Pgs. 127–129 include portions of [Doc. 54](#), [Doc. 55](#), and [Doc. 56](#)], 208 [Pg. 208 is part of [Doc. 84](#)]

Syrian role, 67–68 [Pg. 67 is part of [Doc. 43](#)], 90 [Pg. 90 is part of [Doc. 46](#)]

Turkish position, 96 [Pg. 96 is part of [Doc. 46](#)]

Turkish role, 67 [Pg. 67 is part of [Doc. 43](#)], 72 [Pg. 72 is part of [Doc. 44](#)], 74 [Pg. 74 is part of [Doc. 44](#)], 83 [Pg. 83 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 101–102 [Pgs. 101–102 include portions of [Doc. 47](#) and [Doc. 48](#)], 118 [Pg. 118 is part of [Doc. 51](#)], 192 [Pg. 192 is part of [Doc. 78](#)], 643 [Pg. 643 is part of [Doc. 270](#)]

U.S.–British cooperation, 94–95 [Pg. 94 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 134 [Pg. 134 is part of [Doc. 59](#)], 139 [Pg. 139 is part of [Doc. 60](#)], 246–247 [Pg. 246 is part of [Doc. 97](#)], 265 [Pg. 265 includes portions of [Doc. 107](#) and [Doc. 108](#)], 309 [Pg. 309 is part of [Doc. 132](#)]

U.S.–British talks, 21–22 [Pgs. 21–22 include portions of [Doc. 14](#) and [Doc. 15](#)], 52–54 [Pgs. 52–54 include portions of [Doc. 35](#) and [Doc.](#)

36], 64 [Pg. 64 is part of [Doc. 43](#)], 73 [Pg. 73 is part of [Doc. 44](#)], 103–122 [Pgs. 103–122 include portions of [Doc. 48](#), [Doc. 49](#), [Doc. 50](#), and [Doc. 51](#)], 128 [Pg. 128 is part of [Doc. 55](#)], 132–151 [Pgs. 132–151 include portions of [Doc. 56](#), [Doc. 57](#), [Doc. 58](#), [Doc. 59](#), and [Doc. 60](#)]

U.S.–British–Turkish talks, 8 [Pg. 8 includes portions of [Doc. 6](#) and [Doc. 7](#)], 21–22 [Pgs. 21–22 include portions of [Doc. 14](#) and [Doc. 15](#)], 52 [Pg. 52 is part of [Doc. 35](#)], 56 [Pg. 56 includes portions of [Doc. 37](#) and [Doc. 38](#)], 107 [Pg. 107 is part of [Doc. 49](#)], 111 [Pg. 111 includes portions of [Doc. 49](#) and [Doc. 50](#)], 117–120 [Pg. 117 is part of [Doc. 51](#)], 122 [Pg. 122 is part of [Doc. 51](#)], 145 [Pg. 145 is part of [Doc. 60](#)], 677 [Pg. 677 is part of [Doc. 286](#)], 679–681 [Pgs. 679–681 include portions of [Doc. 286](#) and [Doc. 287](#)], 683 [Pg. 683 is part of [Doc. 288](#)], 684 [Pg. 684 is part of [Doc. 289](#)], 687 [Pg. 687 is part of [Doc. 290](#)], 694 [Pg. 694 is part of [Doc. 291](#)], 703–704 [Pg. 703 is part of [Doc. 296](#)]

U.S. economic aid and, 102 [Pg. 102 includes portions of [Doc. 47](#) and [Doc. 48](#)]

U.S. military aid and (see also [U.S. military aid](#) under individual countries), 64 [Pg. 64 is part of [Doc. 43](#)], 73 [Pg. 73 is part of [Doc. 44](#)], 91 [Pg. 91 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 94 [Pg. 94 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 96 [Pg. 96 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 102–103 [Pgs. 102–103 include portions of [Doc. 47](#), [Doc. 48](#), and [Doc. 49](#)], 105–106 [Pg. 105 is part of [Doc. 49](#)], 128–129 [Pgs. 128–129 include portions of [Doc. 55](#) and [Doc. 56](#)], 146–147 [Pg. 146 is part of [Doc. 60](#)]

U.S.–Soviet relations and, 449–450 [Pg. 449 is part of [Doc. 192](#)]

Western base rights and, 79 [Pg. 79 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 95 [Pg. 95 is part of [Doc. 46](#)]

Zagros line, 51 [Pg. 51 includes portions of [Doc. 34](#) and [Doc. 35](#)], 66 [Pg. 66 is part of [Doc. 43](#)], 109–110 [Pg. 109 is part of [Doc. 49](#)], 118 [Pg. 118 is part of [Doc. 51](#)], 281 [Pg. 281 is part of [Doc. 119](#)], 677 [Pg. 677 is part of [Doc. 286](#)], 680 [Pg. 680 includes portions of

[Doc. 286](#) and [Doc. 287](#)], 692 [Pg. 692 is part of [Doc. 291](#)], 704 [Pg. 704 is part of [Doc. 296](#)], 706–707 [Pg. 706 is part of [Doc. 296](#)], 835 [Pg. 835 is part of [Doc. 358](#)], 904n [Pg. 904 is part of [Doc. 392](#)], 935 [Pg. 935 is part of [Doc. 402](#)], 987 [Pg. 987 is part of [Doc. 428](#)]

Iranian public opinion, 247 [Pg. 247 is part of [Doc. 97](#)], 796 [Pg. 796 is part of [Doc. 344](#)], 893 [Pg. 893 is part of [Doc. 391](#)]

Reinhardt, G. Frederick, 537 [Pg. 537 is part of [Doc. 239](#)], 553 [Pg. 553 includes portions of [Doc. 247](#), [Doc. 248](#), and [Doc. 249](#)], 663 [Pg. 663 includes portions of [Doc. 278](#) and [Doc. 279](#)]

Reuther, Walter, 301 [Pg. 301 is part of [Doc. 130](#)]

Riad, Gen. Mahmoud, 15 [Pg. 15 is part of [Doc. 11](#)]

Richards, Arthur L., 840n [Pg. 840 includes portions of [Doc. 360](#) and [Doc. 361](#)]

Richards, James P. (see also [Richards Mission](#)), 430 [Pg. 430 includes portions of [Doc. 180](#) and [Doc. 181](#)]

Richards Mission (see also [Eisenhower Doctrine](#)), 439 [Pg. 439 includes portions of [Doc. 183](#) and [Doc. 184](#)], 441 [Pg. 441 includes portions of [Doc. 186](#) and [Doc. 187](#)], 446–457 [Pgs. 446–457 include portions of [Doc. 189](#), [Doc. 190](#), [Doc. 191](#), [Doc. 192](#), [Doc. 193](#), [Doc. 194](#), and [Doc. 195](#)], 459–460 [Pgs. 459–460 include portions of [Doc. 196](#), [Doc. 197](#), and [Doc. 198](#)], 466–467 [Pg. 466 is part of [Doc. 203](#)], 477–481 [Pgs. 477–481 include portions of [Doc. 206](#), [Doc. 207](#), [Doc. 208](#), and [Doc. 209](#)], 508 [Pg. 508 is part of [Doc. 221](#)], 518–519 [Pgs. 518–519 include portions of [Doc. 224](#) and [Doc. 225](#)], 1039 [Pg. 1039 includes portions of [Doc. 453](#) and [Doc. 454](#)]

Country visit reports, 484–496 [Pgs. 484–496 include portions of [Doc. 210](#), [Doc. 211](#), [Doc. 212](#), [Doc. 213](#), [Doc. 214](#), [Doc. 215](#), [Doc. 216](#), [Doc. 217](#), [Doc. 218](#), [Doc. 219](#), and [Doc. 220](#)], 519–521 [Pgs. 519–521 include portions of [Doc. 224](#), [Doc. 225](#), [Doc. 226](#), and [Doc. 227](#)], 523 [Pg. 523 is part of [Doc. 228](#)], 528–539 [Pgs. 528–539 include portions

of [Doc. 233](#), [Doc. 234](#), [Doc. 235](#), [Doc. 236](#), [Doc. 237](#), [Doc. 238](#), [Doc. 239](#), and [Doc. 240](#)], 922–931 [Pgs. 922–931 include portions of [Doc. 395](#), [Doc. 396](#), [Doc. 397](#), [Doc. 398](#), and [Doc. 399](#)], 1041–1047 [Pgs. 1041–1047 include portions of [Doc. 455](#) and [Doc. 456](#)], 1067 [Pg. 1067 is part of [Doc. 462](#)]

Ridgway, Gen. Matthew B., 704 [Pg. 704 is part of [Doc. 296](#)]

Robertson, Reuben B., Jr., 448 [Pg. 448 is part of [Doc. 192](#)], 469 [Pg. 469 is part of [Doc. 203](#)], 803–804 [Pg. 803 is part of [Doc. 349](#)], 894 [Pg. 894 is part of [Doc. 391](#)]

Robertson, Walter S., 340–341 [Pg. 340 is part of [Doc. 147](#)], 412 [Pg. 412 includes portions of [Doc. 171](#) and [Doc. 172](#)], 669 [Pg. 669 includes portions of [Doc. 281](#) and [Doc. 282](#)]

Rockwell, Stuart W., 332n [Pg. 332 is part of [Doc. 145](#)], 366 [Pg. 366 is part of [Doc. 156](#)], 448n [Pg. 448 is part of [Doc. 192](#)], 515n [Pg. 515 includes portions of [Doc. 222](#) and [Doc. 223](#)], 553 [Pg. 553 includes portions of [Doc. 247](#), [Doc. 248](#), and [Doc. 249](#)], 585 [Pg. 585 includes portions of [Doc. 262](#) and [Doc. 263](#)], 664 [Pg. 664 is part of [Doc. 279](#)], 673–674 [Pgs. 673–674 include portions of [Doc. 283](#), [Doc. 284](#), and [Doc. 285](#)], 1068n [Pg. 1068 includes portions of [Doc. 462](#), [Doc. 463](#), and [Doc. 464](#)], 1069 [Pg. 1069 is part of [Doc. 464](#)]

Roosevelt, Kermit, 278 [Pg. 278 is part of [Doc. 117](#)], 535 [Pg. 535 is part of [Doc. 238](#)], 537 [Pg. 537 is part of [Doc. 239](#)]

Rose, Michael, 211–212 [Pgs. 211–212 include portions of [Doc. 85](#), [Doc. 86](#), and [Doc. 87](#)]

Rountree, William M., 207n [Pg. 207 includes portions of [Doc. 83](#) and [Doc. 84](#)], 216 [Pg. 216 includes portions of [Doc. 90](#) and [Doc. 91](#)], 244n [Pg. 244 includes portions of [Doc. 95](#) and [Doc. 96](#)], 268n [Pg. 268 is part of [Doc. 110](#)], 284n [Pg. 284 is part of [Doc. 122](#)], 294n [Pg. 294 is part of [Doc. 126](#)], 338n [Pg. 338 is part of [Doc. 146](#)], 351n [Pg. 351 includes portions of [Doc. 148](#) and [Doc. 149](#)], 367n [Pg. 367 is part of [Doc. 156](#)], 369 [Pg. 369 includes portions of [Doc. 157](#) and [Doc. 158](#)], 383n [Pg. 383 is part of [Doc. 161](#)], 430n [Pg. 430 includes portions of [Doc. 180](#) and [Doc. 181](#)], 458n [Pg. 458 is part of [Doc. 196](#)], 460n [Pg. 460

includes portions of [Doc. 197](#) and [Doc. 198](#)], 474n [Pg. 474 includes portions of [Doc. 204](#) and [Doc. 205](#)], 478n [Pg. 478 includes portions of [Doc. 207](#) and [Doc. 208](#)], 521n [Pg. 521 includes portions of [Doc. 226](#) and [Doc. 227](#)], 524n [Pg. 524 is part of [Doc. 229](#)], 548n [Pg. 548 is part of [Doc. 247](#)], 657 [Pg. 657 is part of [Doc. 276](#)], 797n [Pg. 797 includes portions of [Doc. 345](#) and [Doc. 346](#)], 799n [Pg. 799 includes portions of [Doc. 347](#) and [Doc. 348](#)], 805n [Pg. 805 is part of [Doc. 350](#)], 844n [Pg. 844 includes portions of [Doc. 362](#) and [Doc. 363](#)], 883n [Pg. 883 is part of [Doc. 384](#)], 956n [Pg. 956 includes portions of [Doc. 412](#) and [Doc. 413](#)], 976n [Pg. 976 includes portions of [Doc. 424](#) and [Doc. 425](#)], 993n [Pg. 993 includes portions of [Doc. 430](#) and [Doc. 431](#)], 1038n [Pg. 1038 is part of [Doc. 453](#)], 1039n [Pg. 1039 includes portions of [Doc. 453](#) and [Doc. 454](#)]

Arab–Israeli dispute, 1019–1020 [Pg. 1019 is part of [Doc. 441](#)]

Baghdad Pact, 225–227 [Pg. 225 is part of [Doc. 91](#)], 243 [Pg. 243 is part of [Doc. 95](#)], 265–266 [Pgs. 265–266 include portions of [Doc. 107](#) and [Doc. 108](#)], 282 [Pg. 282 includes portions of [Doc. 120](#) and [Doc. 121](#)], 303–306 [Pg. 303 is part of [Doc. 131](#)], 312–314 [Pg. 312 is part of [Doc. 134](#)], 331–337 [Pgs. 331–337 include portions of [Doc. 144](#) and [Doc. 145](#)], 363–364 [Pgs. 363–364 include portions of [Doc. 153](#) and [Doc. 154](#)], 391–392 [Pg. 391 is part of [Doc. 164](#)], 468 [Pg. 468 is part of [Doc. 203](#)], 536 [Pg. 536 is part of [Doc. 238](#)]

U.S. participation, 371–372 [Pgs. 371–372 include portions of [Doc. 158](#) and [Doc. 159](#)], 463 [Pg. 463 includes portions of [Doc. 200](#) and [Doc. 201](#)], 538 [Pg. 538 is part of [Doc. 239](#)], 540–543 [Pgs. 540–543 include portions of [Doc. 241](#), [Doc. 242](#), and [Doc. 243](#)], 1035 [Pg. 1035 is part of [Doc. 451](#)]

Eisenhower Doctrine, 410 [Pg. 410 is part of [Doc. 171](#)], 412 [Pg. 412 includes portions of [Doc. 171](#) and [Doc. 172](#)], 484–496 [Pgs. 484–496 include portions of [Doc. 210](#), [Doc. 211](#), [Doc. 212](#), [Doc. 213](#), [Doc. 214](#), [Doc. 215](#), [Doc. 216](#), [Doc. 217](#), [Doc. 218](#), [Doc. 219](#), and [Doc. 220](#)], 519–521 [Pgs. 519–521 include portions of [Doc. 224](#), [Doc. 225](#), [Doc. 226](#), and [Doc. 227](#)], 523 [Pg. 523 is part of [Doc. 228](#)], 528–538 [Pgs. 528–538 include portions of [Doc. 233](#), [Doc. 234](#), [Doc. 235](#), [Doc. 236](#), [Doc. 237](#), [Doc. 238](#), and [Doc. 239](#)]

Iran, 726–729 [Pgs. 726–729 include portions of [Doc. 303](#), [Doc. 304](#), and [Doc. 305](#)], 733–734 [Pgs. 733–734 include portions of [Doc. 307](#) and [Doc. 308](#)], 748–750 [Pgs. 748–750 include portions of [Doc. 315](#), [Doc. 316](#), and [Doc. 317](#)], 815–816 [Pgs. 815–816 include portions of [Doc. 355](#) and [Doc. 356](#)], 837–839 [Pgs. 837–839 include portions of [Doc. 359](#) and [Doc. 360](#)], 920n [Pg. 920 includes portions of [Doc. 393](#) and [Doc. 394](#)], 939–940 [Pgs. 939–940 include portions of [Doc. 404](#) and [Doc. 405](#)]

U.S. aid to, 240–242 [Pg. 240 is part of [Doc. 94](#)], 715–719 [Pg. 715 is part of [Doc. 302](#)], 719–722 [Pg. 719 is part of [Doc. 302](#)], 729–731 [Pgs. 729–731 include portions of [Doc. 304](#), [Doc. 305](#), and [Doc. 306](#)], 848–849 [Pgs. 848–849 include portions of [Doc. 365](#) and [Doc. 366](#)], 949–951 [Pgs. 949–951 include portions of [Doc. 409](#) and [Doc. 410](#)]

U.S. policy toward, 840–841 [Pgs. 840–841 include portions of [Doc. 360](#) and [Doc. 361](#)], 847–848 [Pgs. 847–848 include portions of [Doc. 365](#) and [Doc. 366](#)], 890–891 [Pgs. 890–891 include portions of [Doc. 389](#) and [Doc. 390](#)]

Iraq, 514 [Pg. 514 is part of [Doc. 222](#)], 1021–1023 [Pgs. 1021–1023 include portions of [Doc. 442](#) and [Doc. 443](#)], 1024 [Pg. 1024 is part of [Doc. 444](#)], 1029–1035 [Pgs. 1029–1035 include portions of [Doc. 445](#), [Doc. 446](#), [Doc. 447](#), [Doc. 448](#), [Doc. 449](#), [Doc. 450](#), and [Doc. 451](#)]

Near East:

Soviet policy toward, 228 [Pg. 228 includes portions of [Doc. 91](#) and [Doc. 92](#)], 583 [Pg. 583 is part of [Doc. 261](#)], 652 [Pg. 652 is part of [Doc. 274](#)], 748–750 [Pgs. 748–750 include portions of [Doc. 315](#), [Doc. 316](#), and [Doc. 317](#)], 837–839 [Pgs. 837–839 include portions of [Doc. 359](#) and [Doc. 360](#)]

U.S. military aid to, 366 [Pg. 366 is part of [Doc. 156](#)], 719–722 [Pg. 719 is part of [Doc. 302](#)], 729–731 [Pgs. 729–731 include portions of [Doc. 304](#), [Doc. 305](#), and [Doc. 306](#)], 949–951 [Pgs. 949–951 include portions of [Doc. 409](#) and [Doc. 410](#)], 1021–1023 [Pgs. 1021–1023 include portions of [Doc. 442](#) and [Doc. 443](#)]

U.S. policy toward, 222 [Pg. 222 is part of [Doc. 91](#)], 224 [Pg. 224 is part of [Doc. 91](#)], 247 [Pg. 247 is part of [Doc. 97](#)], 368 [Pg. 368 is part of [Doc. 157](#)], 376–382 [Pgs. 376–382 include portions of [Doc. 159](#) and [Doc. 160](#)], 391 [Pg. 391 is part of [Doc. 164](#)], 393–394 [Pg. 393 is part of [Doc. 165](#)], 1017 [Pg. 1017 includes portions of [Doc. 440](#) and [Doc. 441](#)], 1019 [Pg. 1019 is part of [Doc. 441](#)]

Oil resources, 316–318 [Pgs. 316–318 include portions of [Doc. 135](#), [Doc. 136](#), and [Doc. 137](#)], 417 [Pg. 417 includes portions of [Doc. 175](#) and [Doc. 176](#)], 419 [Pg. 419 includes portions of [Doc. 176](#) and [Doc. 177](#)], 443–444 [Pg. 443 is part of [Doc. 188](#)], 464 [Pg. 464 is part of [Doc. 202](#)], 480 [Pg. 480 is part of [Doc. 209](#)], 496–508 [Pgs. 496–508 include portions of [Doc. 219](#), [Doc. 220](#), and [Doc. 221](#)], 539 [Pg. 539 includes portions of [Doc. 239](#) and [Doc. 240](#)], 575–576 [Pgs. 575–576 include portions of [Doc. 257](#), [Doc. 258](#), and [Doc. 259](#)], 617–618 [Pgs. 617–618 include portions of [Doc. 268](#) and [Doc. 269](#)], 670–672 [Pgs. 670–672 include portions of [Doc. 282](#) and [Doc. 283](#)], 815 [Pg. 815 is part of [Doc. 355](#)], 920n [Pg. 920 includes portions of [Doc. 393](#) and [Doc. 394](#)]

Pakistan, 559 [Pg. 559 is part of [Doc. 253](#)]

Regional defense, 541–542 [Pgs. 541–542 include portions of [Doc. 241](#) and [Doc. 242](#)], 669–670 [Pgs. 669–670 include portions of [Doc. 281](#), [Doc. 282](#), and [Doc. 283](#)]

Suez crisis, 316–318 [Pgs. 316–318 include portions of [Doc. 135](#), [Doc. 136](#), and [Doc. 137](#)], 340–342 [Pg. 340 is part of [Doc. 147](#)]

U.S.–British cooperation, 464 [Pg. 464 is part of [Doc. 202](#)], 466 [Pg. 466 is part of [Doc. 203](#)], 468 [Pg. 468 is part of [Doc. 203](#)], 496–511 [Pgs. 496–511 include portions of [Doc. 219](#), [Doc. 220](#), [Doc. 221](#), and [Doc. 222](#)], 513–514 [Pg. 513 is part of [Doc. 222](#)], 539 [Pg. 539 includes portions of [Doc. 239](#) and [Doc. 240](#)]

Rowan, Sir Leslie, 240 [Pg. 240 is part of [Doc. 94](#)], 243 [Pg. 243 is part of [Doc. 95](#)]

Rowntree, Henry, 863 [Pg. 863 includes portions of [Doc. 374](#) and [Doc. 375](#)]

Rubottom, Roy R., Jr., 670 [Pg. 670 includes portions of [Doc. 282](#) and [Doc. 283](#)], 672 [Pg. 672 is part of [Doc. 283](#)]

Russell, Francis H., 46n [Pg. 46 includes portions of [Doc. 31](#) and [Doc. 32](#)], 216 [Pg. 216 includes portions of [Doc. 90](#) and [Doc. 91](#)], 226–227 [Pg. 226 is part of [Doc. 91](#)], 233–234 [Pgs. 233–234 include portions of [Doc. 92](#) and [Doc. 93](#)], 278 [Pg. 278 is part of [Doc. 117](#)], 785 [Pg. 785 is part of [Doc. 337](#)], 971n [Pg. 971 includes portions of [Doc. 422](#) and [Doc. 423](#)]

Russell, Richard B., 435–436 [Pg. 435 is part of [Doc. 182](#)]

Rutherford, Robert, 671 [Pg. 671 is part of [Doc. 283](#)], 673 [Pg. 673 includes portions of [Doc. 283](#) and [Doc. 284](#)]

Saccio, L.J., 884 [Pg. 884 includes portions of [Doc. 385](#) and [Doc. 386](#)]

al–Said, Nuri, 19 [Pg. 19 is part of [Doc. 13](#)], 170 [Pg. 170 is part of [Doc. 68](#)], 235 [Pg. 235 is part of [Doc. 93](#)], 287–288 [Pg. 287 is part of [Doc. 124](#)], 569 [Pg. 569 is part of [Doc. 254](#)], 621 [Pg. 621 is part of [Doc. 270](#)], 966–967 [Pgs. 966–967 include portions of [Doc. 418](#) and [Doc. 419](#)], 1012–1014 [Pgs. 1012–1014 include portions of [Doc. 437](#), [Doc. 438](#), and [Doc. 439](#)], 1054 [Pg. 1054 is part of [Doc. 458](#)], 1058 [Pg. 1058 includes portions of [Doc. 458](#), [Doc. 459](#), and [Doc. 460](#)]

Arab–Israeli dispute, 288 [Pg. 288 is part of [Doc. 124](#)], 989 [Pg. 989 is part of [Doc. 429](#)], 1041 [Pg. 1041 is part of [Doc. 455](#)], 1044 [Pg. 1044 is part of [Doc. 456](#)]

Baghdad Pact, 2*n* [Pg. 2 includes portions of [Doc. 1](#) and [Doc. 2](#)], 12 [Pg. 12 is part of [Doc. 9](#)], 23*n* [Pg. 23 is part of [Doc. 16](#)], 61*n* [Pg. 61 is part of [Doc. 41](#)], 203–204 [Pgs. 203–204 include portions of [Doc. 81](#) and [Doc. 82](#)], 225 [Pg. 225 is part of [Doc. 91](#)], 705 [Pg. 705 is part of [Doc. 296](#)], 965–966 [Pgs. 965–966 include portions of [Doc. 417](#) and [Doc. 418](#)], 1005 [Pg. 1005 is part of [Doc. 435](#)]

Council meetings, 199 [Pg. 199 is part of [Doc. 80](#)], 252 [Pg. 252 includes portions of [Doc. 100](#) and [Doc. 101](#)], 255–257 [Pg. 255 is part of [Doc. 101](#)], 287–289 [Pg. 287 is part of [Doc. 124](#)]

Egyptian position, 7–8 [Pgs. 7–8 include portions of [Doc. 6](#) and [Doc. 7](#)], 11 [Pg. 11 is part of [Doc. 9](#)], 157 [Pg. 157 is part of [Doc. 64](#)]

U.S. participation, 19 [Pg. 19 is part of [Doc. 13](#)], 141 [Pg. 141 is part of [Doc. 60](#)], 179–180 [Pgs. 179–180 include portions of [Doc. 73](#), [Doc. 74](#), and [Doc. 75](#)], 271 [Pg. 271 is part of [Doc. 112](#)], 300 [Pg. 300 is part of [Doc. 130](#)], 333–334 [Pg. 333 is part of [Doc. 145](#)], 353–354 [Pg. 353 is part of [Doc. 150](#)], 371 [Pg. 371 is part of [Doc. 158](#)], 987 [Pg. 987 is part of [Doc. 428](#)]

Eisenhower Doctrine, 474 [Pg. 474 includes portions of [Doc. 204](#) and [Doc. 205](#)], 493 [Pg. 493 is part of [Doc. 217](#)], 1044–1045 [Pg. 1044 is part of [Doc. 456](#)]

Political situation in Iraq, 237 [Pg. 237 is part of [Doc. 93](#)], 296 [Pg. 296 is part of [Doc. 127](#)], 341 [Pg. 341 is part of [Doc. 147](#)], 394 [Pg. 394 is part of [Doc. 165](#)], 514 [Pg. 514 is part of [Doc. 222](#)], 984–985 [Pg. 984 is part of [Doc. 427](#)], 988 [Pg. 988 includes portions of [Doc. 428](#) and [Doc. 429](#)], 990–991 [Pg. 990 is part of [Doc. 429](#)], 998–1000 [Pg. 998 is part of [Doc. 435](#)], 1044 [Pg. 1044 is part of [Doc. 456](#)], 1051–1052 [Pg. 1051 is part of [Doc. 458](#)]

U.S. military aid to Iraq, 964–965 [Pgs. 964–965 include portions of [Doc. 417](#) and [Doc. 418](#)], 971 [Pg. 971 includes portions of

[Doc. 422](#) and [Doc. 423](#)], 987 [Pg. 987 is part of [Doc. 428](#)], 1011 [Pg. 1011 is part of [Doc. 436](#)], 1039n [Pg. 1039 includes portions of [Doc. 453](#) and [Doc. 454](#)], 1046 [Pg. 1046 is part of [Doc. 456](#)]

Salim, Maj. Salah, 11 [Pg. 11 is part of [Doc. 9](#)], 26 [Pg. 26 is part of [Doc. 17](#)], 31 [Pg. 31 is part of [Doc. 22](#)], 41 [Pg. 41 includes portions of [Doc. 27](#) and [Doc. 28](#)], 49 [Pg. 49 is part of [Doc. 33](#)]

Saltonstall, Leverett, 445 [Pg. 445 is part of [Doc. 189](#)]

Samarrai, Faiq, 1000 [Pg. 1000 is part of [Doc. 435](#)]

Samuel, Ian, 217 [Pg. 217 is part of [Doc. 91](#)], 224 [Pg. 224 is part of [Doc. 91](#)], 229 [Pg. 229 is part of [Doc. 92](#)], 232 [Pg. 232 is part of [Doc. 92](#)], 234 [Pg. 234 includes portions of [Doc. 92](#) and [Doc. 93](#)], 237 [Pg. 237 is part of [Doc. 93](#)], 240 [Pg. 240 is part of [Doc. 94](#)], 243 [Pg. 243 is part of [Doc. 95](#)]

Sarraj, Col. Abd Al–Hamid, 428 [Pg. 428 is part of [Doc. 178](#)], 1031 [Pg. 1031 includes portions of [Doc. 446](#) and [Doc. 447](#)]

Saud, ibn Abd al–Aziz, King (see also [Saudi Arabia](#)), 81 [Pg. 81 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 142 [Pg. 142 is part of [Doc. 60](#)], 340–341 [Pg. 340 is part of [Doc. 147](#)], 346 [Pg. 346 is part of [Doc. 148](#)], 368 [Pg. 368 is part of [Doc. 157](#)], 378 [Pg. 378 is part of [Doc. 160](#)], 474 [Pg. 474 includes portions of [Doc. 204](#) and [Doc. 205](#)], 495 [Pg. 495 includes portions of [Doc. 218](#) and [Doc. 219](#)], 557 [Pg. 557 is part of [Doc. 251](#)], 621 [Pg. 621 is part of [Doc. 270](#)], 630 [Pg. 630 is part of [Doc. 270](#)], 895 [Pg. 895 is part of [Doc. 391](#)]

Arab unity, 595 [Pg. 595 is part of [Doc. 266](#)], 600 [Pg. 600 is part of [Doc. 266](#)], 637 [Pg. 637 is part of [Doc. 270](#)]

U.S. visit, 446 [Pg. 446 includes portions of [Doc. 189](#), [Doc. 190](#), and [Doc. 191](#)], 450 [Pg. 450 is part of [Doc. 192](#)], 505 [Pg. 505 is part of [Doc. 221](#)], 538 [Pg. 538 is part of [Doc. 239](#)], 1023 [Pg. 1023 includes portions of [Doc. 442](#) and [Doc. 443](#)]

Saudi Arabia (see also Egyptian–Syrian–Saudi (ESS) Pact; *Saudi subheadings under other subjects*):

Aqaba Gulf, 495–496 [Pgs. 495–496 include portions of [Doc. 218](#), [Doc. 219](#), and [Doc. 220](#)], 557–558 [Pgs. 557–558 include portions of [Doc. 251](#) and [Doc. 252](#)], 561–563 [Pgs. 561–563 include portions of [Doc. 253](#) and [Doc. 254](#)], 630 [Pg. 630 is part of [Doc. 270](#)], 637–638 [Pg. 637 is part of [Doc. 270](#)]

Arab unity, 595 [Pg. 595 is part of [Doc. 266](#)], 600 [Pg. 600 is part of [Doc. 266](#)], 637 [Pg. 637 is part of [Doc. 270](#)]

Economic situation, 223 [Pg. 223 is part of [Doc. 91](#)], 311 [Pg. 311 is part of [Doc. 133](#)]

Egypt, relations with, 23 [Pg. 23 is part of [Doc. 16](#)], 290 [Pg. 290 is part of [Doc. 124](#)], 362 [Pg. 362 is part of [Doc. 153](#)], 394 [Pg. 394 is part of [Doc. 165](#)], 421–422 [Pg. 421 is part of [Doc. 178](#)]

France, relations with, 499 [Pg. 499 is part of [Doc. 220](#)], 504–505 [Pg. 504 is part of [Doc. 221](#)]

Iran, relations with, 867 [Pg. 867 is part of [Doc. 376](#)], 869 [Pg. 869 is part of [Doc. 377](#)], 894 [Pg. 894 is part of [Doc. 391](#)], 942 [Pg. 942 is part of [Doc. 406](#)]

Iraq, relations with, 81 [Pg. 81 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 87 [Pg. 87 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 222 [Pg. 222 is part of [Doc. 91](#)], 346 [Pg. 346 is part of [Doc. 148](#)], 425 [Pg. 425 is part of [Doc. 178](#)], 538 [Pg. 538 is part of [Doc. 239](#)], 998 [Pg. 998 is part of [Doc. 435](#)], 1007–1008 [Pg. 1007 is part of [Doc. 435](#)], 1025–1026 [Pg. 1025 is part of [Doc. 444](#)], 1033 [Pg. 1033 includes portions of [Doc. 448](#) and [Doc. 449](#)], 1045 [Pg. 1045 is part of [Doc. 456](#)]

Jordan, relations with, 87 [Pg. 87 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 218 [Pg. 218 is part of [Doc. 91](#)], 255–256 [Pg. 255 is part of [Doc. 101](#)], 256 [Pg. 256 is part of [Doc. 101](#)], 421 [Pg. 421 is part of [Doc. 178](#)], 598 [Pg. 598 is part of [Doc. 266](#)], 1032 [Pg. 1032 includes portions of [Doc. 447](#) and [Doc. 448](#)]

Lebanon, relations with, 55*n* [Pg. 55 includes portions of [Doc. 36](#) and [Doc. 37](#)], 87 [Pg. 87 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 1032 [Pg. 1032 includes portions of [Doc. 447](#) and [Doc. 448](#)]

Pakistan, relations with, 557 [Pg. 557 is part of [Doc. 251](#)], 643 [Pg. 643 is part of [Doc. 270](#)]

Political situation, 106 [Pg. 106 is part of [Doc. 49](#)], 136–138 [Pg. 136 is part of [Doc. 60](#)], 224 [Pg. 224 is part of [Doc. 91](#)], 498–499 [Pg. 498 is part of [Doc. 220](#)]

Pushtunistan dispute, 57 [Pg. 57 is part of [Doc. 38](#)], 59 [Pg. 59 includes portions of [Doc. 39](#) and [Doc. 40](#)]

Soviet bloc, relations with, 159–160 [Pg. 159 is part of [Doc. 66](#)], 170 [Pg. 170 is part of [Doc. 68](#)], 190 [Pg. 190 is part of [Doc. 78](#)], 296 [Pg. 296 is part of [Doc. 127](#)], 421 [Pg. 421 is part of [Doc. 178](#)], 600 [Pg. 600 is part of [Doc. 266](#)], 898 [Pg. 898 is part of [Doc. 391](#)]

Syria, relations with, 87 [Pg. 87 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 256 [Pg. 256 is part of [Doc. 101](#)]

United Kingdom, relations with, 223 [Pg. 223 is part of [Doc. 91](#)], 499 [Pg. 499 is part of [Doc. 220](#)], 547 [Pg. 547 is part of [Doc. 246](#)]

Buraimi dispute, 172 [Pg. 172 is part of [Doc. 69](#)], 191 [Pg. 191 is part of [Doc. 78](#)], 214 [Pg. 214 is part of [Doc. 88](#)], 224 [Pg. 224 is part of [Doc. 91](#)], 233 [Pg. 233 is part of [Doc. 92](#)], 254 [Pg. 254 is part of [Doc. 101](#)], 265 [Pg. 265 includes portions of [Doc. 107](#) and [Doc. 108](#)], 340–341 [Pg. 340 is part of [Doc. 147](#)], 399 [Pg. 399 is part of [Doc. 169](#)], 428 [Pg. 428 is part of [Doc. 178](#)], 499–500 [Pg. 499 is part of [Doc. 220](#)], 552 [Pg. 552 is part of [Doc. 247](#)], 638 [Pg. 638 is part of [Doc. 270](#)]

British position, 504–507 [Pg. 504 is part of [Doc. 221](#)], 548–549 [Pg. 548 is part

of [Doc. 247](#)]

Persian Gulf conflicts, 120 [Pg. 120 is part of [Doc. 51](#)], 172 [Pg. 172 is part of [Doc. 69](#)], 500 [Pg. 500 is part of [Doc. 220](#)], 504 [Pg. 504 is part of [Doc. 221](#)], 544–545 [Pgs. 544–545 include portions of [Doc. 243](#), [Doc. 244](#), and [Doc. 245](#)], 547 [Pg. 547 is part of [Doc. 246](#)], 551–552 [Pg. 551 is part of [Doc. 247](#)], 624 [Pg. 624 is part of [Doc. 270](#)], 638 [Pg. 638 is part of [Doc. 270](#)]

United States, relations with, 160 [Pg. 160 is part of [Doc. 66](#)], 340 [Pg. 340 is part of [Doc. 147](#)], 346 [Pg. 346 is part of [Doc. 148](#)], 350 [Pg. 350 is part of [Doc. 148](#)], 405 [Pg. 405 is part of [Doc. 170](#)], 595 [Pg. 595 is part of [Doc. 266](#)], 600 [Pg. 600 is part of [Doc. 266](#)], 616 [Pg. 616 is part of [Doc. 267](#)], 637–638 [Pg. 637 is part of [Doc. 270](#)]

Baghdad Pact, 297 [Pg. 297 includes portions of [Doc. 127](#) and [Doc. 128](#)], 368 [Pg. 368 is part of [Doc. 157](#)], 389 [Pg. 389 is part of [Doc. 162](#)], 1026–1027 [Pg. 1026 is part of [Doc. 444](#)], 1035 [Pg. 1035 is part of [Doc. 451](#)]

Buraimi dispute, 340–341 [Pg. 340 is part of [Doc. 147](#)]

Dhahran airfield, 87 [Pg. 87 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 173 [Pg. 173 is part of [Doc. 69](#)], 190 [Pg. 190 is part of [Doc. 78](#)], 193 [Pg. 193 is part of [Doc. 78](#)], 213 [Pg. 213 is part of [Doc. 87](#)], 233 [Pg. 233 is part of [Doc. 92](#)], 238 [Pg. 238 is part of [Doc. 93](#)], 297 [Pg. 297 includes portions of [Doc. 127](#) and [Doc. 128](#)], 310 [Pg. 310 is part of [Doc. 133](#)], 346 [Pg. 346 is part of [Doc. 148](#)], 349 [Pg. 349 is part of [Doc. 148](#)], 421 [Pg. 421 is part of [Doc. 178](#)], 423 [Pg. 423 is part of [Doc. 178](#)], 427 [Pg. 427 is part of [Doc. 178](#)]

Oil companies, 190–191 [Pg. 190 is part of [Doc. 78](#)], 193 [Pg. 193 is part of [Doc. 78](#)], 223 [Pg. 223 is part

of [Doc. 91](#)], 238 [Pg. 238 is part of [Doc. 93](#)], 300 [Pg. 300 is part of [Doc. 130](#)], 637 [Pg. 637 is part of [Doc. 270](#)], 645 [Pg. 645 is part of [Doc. 270](#)]

Saud visit, 446 [Pg. 446 includes portions of [Doc. 189](#), [Doc. 190](#), and [Doc. 191](#)], 450 [Pg. 450 is part of [Doc. 192](#)], 505 [Pg. 505 is part of [Doc. 221](#)], 538 [Pg. 538 is part of [Doc. 239](#)], 1023 [Pg. 1023 includes portions of [Doc. 442](#) and [Doc. 443](#)]

U.S. economic aid to, 347 [Pg. 347 is part of [Doc. 148](#)], 496 [Pg. 496 includes portions of [Doc. 219](#) and [Doc. 220](#)], 645 [Pg. 645 is part of [Doc. 270](#)]

U.S. military aid to, 3n [Pg. 3 includes portions of [Doc. 2](#) and [Doc. 3](#)], 68 [Pg. 68 is part of [Doc. 43](#)], 159–160 [Pg. 159 is part of [Doc. 66](#)], 170 [Pg. 170 is part of [Doc. 68](#)], 186 [Pg. 186 is part of [Doc. 78](#)], 190 [Pg. 190 is part of [Doc. 78](#)], 349 [Pg. 349 is part of [Doc. 148](#)], 423 [Pg. 423 is part of [Doc. 178](#)], 427 [Pg. 427 is part of [Doc. 178](#)], 895 [Pg. 895 is part of [Doc. 391](#)], 898 [Pg. 898 is part of [Doc. 391](#)]

British position, 120 [Pg. 120 is part of [Doc. 51](#)], 146–147 [Pg. 146 is part of [Doc. 60](#)]

U.S. policy toward, 368–369 [Pgs. 368–369 include portions of [Doc. 157](#) and [Doc. 158](#)], 378 [Pg. 378 is part of [Doc. 160](#)], 380 [Pg. 380 is part of [Doc. 160](#)], 394 [Pg. 394 is part of [Doc. 165](#)], 474–475 [Pgs. 474–475 include portions of [Doc. 204](#), [Doc. 205](#), and [Doc. 206](#)]

Savut, Ilhan, 303 [Pg. 303 is part of [Doc. 131](#)], 306 [Pg. 306 is part of [Doc. 131](#)]

Schwartz, Harry H., 295n [Pg. 295 includes portions of [Doc. 126](#) and [Doc. 127](#)]

Scott, Walter K., 70n [Pg. 70 includes portions of [Doc. 43](#) and [Doc. 44](#)], 98n [Pg. 98 is part of [Doc. 47](#)], 742 [Pg. 742 is part of [Doc. 312](#)]

Seager, Cedric, 279 [Pg. 279 includes portions of [Doc. 117](#) and [Doc. 118](#)], 291 [Pg. 291 is part of [Doc. 124](#)]

Seitz, Maj. Gen. J.F.R., 866–868 [Pgs. 866–868 include portions of [Doc. 376](#) and [Doc. 377](#)], 926 [Pg. 926 is part of [Doc. 398](#)], 931 [Pg. 931 is part of [Doc. 399](#)], 954 [Pg. 954 includes portions of [Doc. 411](#) and [Doc. 412](#)], 959 [Pg. 959 is part of [Doc. 414](#)]

Selassie, Haile, 520 [Pg. 520 is part of [Doc. 226](#)]

Selby, Richard, 457n [Pg. 457 is part of [Doc. 195](#)]

Selim, Dr., 15 [Pg. 15 is part of [Doc. 11](#)]

al-Shabandar, Moussa, 175–176 [Pgs. 175–176 include portions of [Doc. 70](#) and [Doc. 71](#)], 303 [Pg. 303 is part of [Doc. 131](#)], 305–306 [Pg. 305 is part of [Doc. 131](#)], 369–371 [Pgs. 369–371 include portions of [Doc. 157](#) and [Doc. 158](#)], 1017–1024 [Pgs. 1017–1024 include portions of [Doc. 440](#), [Doc. 441](#), [Doc. 442](#), [Doc. 443](#), and [Doc. 444](#)], 1029–1034 [Pgs. 1029–1034 include portions of [Doc. 445](#), [Doc. 446](#), [Doc. 447](#), [Doc. 448](#), [Doc. 449](#), [Doc. 450](#), and [Doc. 451](#)]

Sharett, Moshe, 10n [Pg. 10 is part of [Doc. 8](#)], 187 [Pg. 187 is part of [Doc. 78](#)], 201 [Pg. 201 is part of [Doc. 81](#)]

Sharja, 552 [Pg. 552 is part of [Doc. 247](#)]

Shaw, John F., 265 [Pg. 265 includes portions of [Doc. 107](#) and [Doc. 108](#)], 545n [Pg. 545 includes portions of [Doc. 244](#) and [Doc. 245](#)], 558n [Pg. 558 is part of [Doc. 252](#)], 617n [Pg. 617 is part of [Doc. 268](#)], 670n [Pg. 670 includes portions of [Doc. 282](#) and [Doc. 283](#)], 671 [Pg. 671 is part of [Doc. 283](#)]

Sheikdoms. *See* Persian Gulf states.

Shenfield, Hale, 863 [Pg. 863 includes portions of [Doc. 374](#) and [Doc. 375](#)]

Shepard, D.A., 482 [Pg. 482 is part of [Doc. 210](#)]

Sherwood, Sidney, 863 [Pg. 863 includes portions of [Doc. 374](#) and [Doc. 375](#)]

Shuckburgh, Evelyn, 217–227 [Pg. 217 is part of [Doc. 91](#)], 229–240 [Pgs. 229–240 include portions of [Doc. 92](#), [Doc. 93](#), and [Doc. 94](#)], 243 [Pg. 243 is part of [Doc. 95](#)]

Shuqayr, Gen. Shawkat, 33 [Pg. 33 is part of [Doc. 23](#)], 87 [Pg. 87 is part of [Doc. 46](#)]

Silver, Rabbi, 270 [Pg. 270 is part of [Doc. 111](#)]

Sisco, Joseph J., 366 [Pg. 366 is part of [Doc. 156](#)], 393 [Pg. 393 is part of [Doc. 165](#)]

Smith, Gerard C., 648 [Pg. 648 is part of [Doc. 271](#)], 663 [Pg. 663 includes portions of [Doc. 278](#) and [Doc. 279](#)]

Smith, H. Alexander, 435 [Pg. 435 is part of [Doc. 182](#)]

Smith, Harry, 863 [Pg. 863 includes portions of [Doc. 374](#) and [Doc. 375](#)]

Smith, James H., Jr., 953–954 [Pgs. 953–954 include portions of [Doc. 410](#), [Doc. 411](#), and [Doc. 412](#)]

Smith, Rufus Barr, 40n [Pg. 40 includes portions of [Doc. 26](#) and [Doc. 27](#)], 848n [Pg. 848 includes portions of [Doc. 365](#) and [Doc. 366](#)], 883n [Pg. 883 is part of [Doc. 384](#)]

Sobeloff, 176 [Pg. 176 includes portions of [Doc. 70](#) and [Doc. 71](#)]

South Africa, 22 [Pg. 22 is part of [Doc. 15](#)], 66 [Pg. 66 is part of [Doc. 43](#)], 94n [Pg. 94 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 115 [Pg. 115 is part of [Doc. 51](#)], 141 [Pg. 141 is part of [Doc. 60](#)]

Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), 150 [Pg. 150 is part of [Doc. 60](#)], 196 [Pg. 196 is part of [Doc. 78](#)], 213 [Pg. 213 is part of [Doc. 87](#)], 236 [Pg. 236 is part of [Doc. 93](#)], 253 [Pg. 253 is part of [Doc. 101](#)], 277 [Pg. 277 is part of [Doc. 116](#)], 303 [Pg. 303 is part of [Doc. 131](#)], 467–468 [Pg. 467 is part of [Doc. 203](#)]

Baghdad Pact and, 132–133 [Pgs. 132–133 include portions of [Doc. 56](#), [Doc. 57](#), and [Doc. 58](#)], 141 [Pg. 141 is part of [Doc. 60](#)], 321 [Pg. 321 is part of [Doc. 138](#)], 328 [Pg. 328 is part of [Doc. 143](#)], 371 [Pg. 371 is part of [Doc. 158](#)], 374 [Pg. 374 is part of [Doc. 159](#)]

Iranian membership, 331 [Pg. 331 includes portions of [Doc. 144](#) and [Doc. 145](#)], 336 [Pg. 336 is part of [Doc. 145](#)]

Soviet bloc. See Regional defense; *Soviet bloc and U.S.–Soviet subheadings under other subjects.*

Special National Intelligence Estimates (see also National Intelligence Estimates):

SNIE 11–9–56, 429 [Pg. 429 includes portions of [Doc. 178](#) and [Doc. 179](#)]

SNIE 11–10–56, 355–360 [Pgs. 355–360 include portions of [Doc. 151](#) and [Doc. 152](#)], 429 [Pg. 429 includes portions of [Doc. 178](#) and [Doc. 179](#)]

SNIE 30–3–55, 187n [Pg. 187 is part of [Doc. 78](#)], 191n [Pg. 191 is part of [Doc. 78](#)]

SNIE 30–6–56, 429 [Pg. 429 includes portions of [Doc. 178](#) and [Doc. 179](#)]

SNIE 30–7–56, 401–409 [Pgs. 401–409 include portions of [Doc. 169](#) and [Doc. 170](#)], 429 [Pg. 429 includes portions of [Doc. 178](#) and [Doc. 179](#)]

SNIE 36–7–56, 429 [Pg. 429 includes portions of [Doc. 178](#) and [Doc. 179](#)]

Sprague, Mansfield D., 475–476 [Pgs. 475–476 include portions of [Doc. 205](#) and [Doc. 206](#)], 541 [Pg. 541 is part of [Doc. 241](#)], 663 [Pg. 663 includes portions of [Doc. 278](#) and [Doc. 279](#)]

Staats, Elmer B., 420n [Pg. 420 includes portions of [Doc. 177](#) and [Doc. 178](#)]

Stabler, Wells, 652 [Pg. 652 is part of [Doc. 274](#)]

Stambaugh, Lynn U., 845 [Pg. 845 includes portions of [Doc. 363](#) and [Doc. 364](#)], 863–864 [Pgs. 863–864 include portions of [Doc. 374](#) and [Doc. 375](#)]

Stassen, Harold E., 162 [Pg. 162 is part of [Doc. 66](#)], 165–166 [Pg. 165 is part of [Doc. 66](#)], 696 [Pg. 696 includes portions of [Doc. 291](#) and [Doc. 292](#)], 700 [Pg. 700 includes portions of [Doc. 293](#) and [Doc. 294](#)], 708–709 [Pgs. 708–709 include portions of [Doc. 296](#), [Doc. 297](#), and [Doc. 298](#)], 732 [Pg. 732 is part of [Doc. 306](#)], 739–741 [Pgs. 739–741 include portions of [Doc. 310](#) and [Doc. 311](#)]

State Department:

State–Defense Working Group (see also Near East: Regional defense), 52 [Pg. 52 is part of [Doc. 35](#)], 63–74 [Pgs. 63–74 include portions of [Doc. 42](#), [Doc. 43](#), and [Doc. 44](#)], 98–103 [Pgs. 98–103 include portions of [Doc. 47](#), [Doc. 48](#), and [Doc. 49](#)], 127–129 [Pgs. 127–129 include portions of [Doc. 54](#), [Doc. 55](#), and [Doc. 56](#)], 208 [Pg. 208 is part of [Doc. 84](#)]

State–JCS meetings, 246–248 [Pg. 246 is part of [Doc. 97](#)], 264–265 [Pgs. 264–265 include portions of [Doc. 105](#), [Doc. 106](#), [Doc. 107](#), and [Doc. 108](#)], 299–302 [Pgs. 299–302 include portions of [Doc. 129](#) and [Doc. 130](#)], 327–330 [Pgs. 327–330 include portions of [Doc. 143](#) and [Doc. 144](#)]. 553–555 [Pgs. 553–555 include portions of [Doc. 247](#), [Doc. 248](#), [Doc. 249](#), and [Doc. 250](#)], 648–649 [Pgs. 648–649 include portions of [Doc. 271](#) and [Doc. 272](#)]. 669–670 [Pgs. 669–670 include portions of [Doc. 281](#), [Doc. 282](#), and [Doc. 283](#)]

Stebinger, Arnold, 933 [Pg. 933 includes portions of [Doc. 400](#) and [Doc. 401](#)]

Stelle, Charles C., 940 [Pg. 940 includes portions of [Doc. 404](#) and [Doc. 405](#)], 954–956 [Pgs. 954–956 include portions of [Doc. 411](#), [Doc. 412](#), and [Doc. 413](#)]

Stevens, Eli, 448n [Pg. 448 is part of [Doc. 192](#)], 542–543 [Pgs. 542–543 include portions of [Doc. 241](#), [Doc. 242](#), and [Doc. 243](#)], 553 [Pg. 553 includes portions of [Doc. 247](#), [Doc. 248](#), and [Doc. 249](#)], 1012n [Pg. 1012 includes portions of [Doc. 437](#) and [Doc. 438](#)]

Stevens, Francis, 868 [Pg. 868 includes portions of [Doc. 376](#) and [Doc. 377](#)], 884–885 [Pgs. 884–885 include portions of [Doc. 385](#) and [Doc. 386](#)], 921–922 [Pgs. 921–922 include portions of [Doc. 394](#), [Doc. 395](#), and [Doc. 396](#)], 926 [Pg. 926 is part of [Doc. 398](#)]

Stevens, Sir Roger Bentham, 280 [Pg. 280 includes portions of [Doc. 118](#) and [Doc. 119](#)]

Stevenson, Adlai, 663 [Pg. 663 includes portions of [Doc. 278](#) and [Doc. 279](#)]

Stewart, Hugh, 315 [Pg. 315 includes portions of [Doc. 134](#) and [Doc. 135](#)]

Stewart, R.S., 738 [Pg. 738 includes portions of [Doc. 308](#) and [Doc. 309](#)]

Sturgill, Roger G., 412–413 [Pgs. 412–413 include portions of [Doc. 171](#), [Doc. 172](#), and [Doc. 173](#)]

Stutesman, John H., 20*n* [Pg. 20 includes portions of [Doc. 13](#) and [Doc. 14](#)], 676*n* [Pg. 676 is part of [Doc. 286](#)], 684*n* [Pg. 684 is part of [Doc. 289](#)], 698 *n* [Pg. 698 is part of [Doc. 293](#)], 703 *n* [Pg. 703 is part of [Doc. 296](#)], 910 [Pg. 910 includes portions of [Doc. 392](#) and [Doc. 393](#)]

Sudan, 191 [Pg. 191 is part of [Doc. 78](#)], 221 [Pg. 221 is part of [Doc. 91](#)], 237 [Pg. 237 is part of [Doc. 93](#)], 347 [Pg. 347 is part of [Doc. 148](#)], 378 [Pg. 378 is part of [Doc. 160](#)], 422 [Pg. 422 is part of [Doc. 178](#)], 523 [Pg. 523 is part of [Doc. 228](#)], 535 [Pg. 535 is part of [Doc. 238](#)], 641 [Pg. 641 is part of [Doc. 270](#)], 1034 [Pg. 1034 includes portions of [Doc. 450](#) and [Doc. 451](#)]

Egypt, relations with, 86 [Pg. 86 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 184 [Pg. 184 is part of [Doc. 78](#)], 188 [Pg. 188 is part of [Doc. 78](#)], 194 [Pg. 194 is part of [Doc. 78](#)], 221 [Pg. 221 is part of [Doc. 91](#)], 641 [Pg. 641 is part of [Doc. 270](#)]

Suez Canal. *See* Egypt; Oil resources; Suez crisis.

Suez crisis (*see also* Near East: Decline in British influence):

Arab–Israeli dispute and, 422 [Pg. 422 is part of [Doc. 178](#)]

Arms embargo, 471 [Pg. 471 is part of [Doc. 203](#)]

Baghdad Pact and, 318*n* [Pg. 318 includes portions of [Doc. 136](#) and [Doc. 137](#)], 319*n* [Pg. 319 is part of [Doc. 137](#)], 328 [Pg. 328 is part of [Doc. 143](#)], 330–331 [Pgs. 330–331 include portions of [Doc. 143](#), [Doc. 144](#), and [Doc. 145](#)], 394 [Pg. 394 is part of [Doc. 165](#)], 633 [Pg. 633 is part of [Doc. 270](#)], 1050 [Pg. 1050 is part of [Doc. 458](#)]

U.S. participation, 335–336 [Pg. 335 is part of [Doc. 145](#)], 338 [Pg. 338 is part of [Doc. 146](#)], 374–375 [Pg. 374 is part of [Doc. 159](#)], 394 [Pg. 394 is part of [Doc. 165](#)], 399 [Pg. 399 is part of [Doc. 169](#)], 407 [Pg. 407 is part of [Doc. 170](#)], 1026 [Pg. 1026 is part of [Doc. 444](#)]

Disruption of oil delivery, 308 [Pg. 308 is part of [Doc. 132](#)], 311 [Pg. 311 is part of [Doc. 133](#)], 358 [Pg. 358 is part of [Doc. 151](#)], 385 [Pg. 385 is part of [Doc. 161](#)], 397 [Pg. 397 is part of [Doc. 167](#)], 417 [Pg. 417 includes portions of [Doc. 175](#) and [Doc. 176](#)], 421 [Pg. 421 is part of [Doc. 178](#)], 461 [Pg. 461 is part of [Doc. 198](#)], 565 [Pg. 565 is part of [Doc. 254](#)]

Iranian position, 842–845 [Pgs. 842–845 include portions of [Doc. 362](#), [Doc. 363](#), and [Doc. 364](#)], 847 [Pg. 847 is part of [Doc. 365](#)], 876 [Pg. 876 is part of [Doc. 381](#)], 901 [Pg. 901 is part of [Doc. 392](#)]

Iraqi reactions, 1049–1051 [Pg. 1049 is part of [Doc. 458](#)]

Oil resources planning, 315–318 [Pgs. 315–318 include portions of [Doc. 134](#), [Doc. 135](#), [Doc. 136](#), and [Doc. 137](#)], 340–342 [Pg. 340 is part of [Doc. 147](#)], 347–348 [Pg. 347 is part of [Doc. 148](#)], 351–352 [Pgs. 351–352 include portions of [Doc. 148](#) and [Doc. 149](#)], 442 [Pg. 442 is part of [Doc. 187](#)]

Soviet intervention threats, 320*n* [Pg. 320 includes portions of [Doc. 137](#) and [Doc. 138](#)], 422 [Pg. 422 is part of [Doc. 178](#)], 428 [Pg. 428 is part of [Doc. 178](#)], 608 [Pg. 608 is part of [Doc. 266](#)]

Soviet policy toward the Near East and, 355–357 [Pg. 355 is part of [Doc. 151](#)], 359 [Pg. 359 is part of [Doc. 151](#)], 414 [Pg. 414 is part of [Doc. 174](#)], 420 [Pg. 420 includes portions of [Doc. 177](#) and [Doc. 178](#)], 620–621 [Pg. 620 is part of [Doc. 270](#)]

Tripartite Declaration and, 470n [Pg. 470 is part of [Doc. 203](#)]

U.S. policy toward the Near East and, 340–345 [Pgs. 340–345 include portions of [Doc. 147](#) and [Doc. 148](#)], 350–352 [Pgs. 350–352 include portions of [Doc. 148](#) and [Doc. 149](#)], 383 [Pg. 383 is part of [Doc. 161](#)], 385 [Pg. 385 is part of [Doc. 161](#)], 394 [Pg. 394 is part of [Doc. 165](#)], 414 [Pg. 414 is part of [Doc. 174](#)], 422–423 [Pg. 422 is part of [Doc. 178](#)], 425–426 [Pg. 425 is part of [Doc. 178](#)], 608 [Pg. 608 is part of [Doc. 266](#)], 623–624 [Pg. 623 is part of [Doc. 270](#)]

U.S.–Egyptian relations and, 348–349 [Pg. 348 is part of [Doc. 148](#)], 395 [Pg. 395 includes portions of [Doc. 165](#) and [Doc. 166](#)], 423 [Pg. 423 is part of [Doc. 178](#)]

U.S.–Israeli relations and, 349 [Pg. 349 is part of [Doc. 148](#)], 364 [Pg. 364 is part of [Doc. 154](#)], 370 [Pg. 370 is part of [Doc. 158](#)], 382 [Pg. 382 is part of [Doc. 160](#)], 423 [Pg. 423 is part of [Doc. 178](#)], 426 [Pg. 426 is part of [Doc. 178](#)]

Suhrawardy, Hussain, 277 [Pg. 277 is part of [Doc. 116](#)], 319–320 [Pgs. 319–320 include portions of [Doc. 137](#) and [Doc. 138](#)], 556–557 [Pgs. 556–557 include portions of [Doc. 250](#) and [Doc. 251](#)], 559–563 [Pgs. 559–563 include portions of [Doc. 253](#) and [Doc. 254](#)]

Suwaidi, Tawfiq, 1029–1034 [Pgs. 1029–1034 include portions of [Doc. 445](#), [Doc. 446](#), [Doc. 447](#), [Doc. 448](#), [Doc. 449](#), [Doc. 450](#), and [Doc. 451](#)]

Swihart, James, 543 [Pg. 543 includes portions of [Doc. 242](#) and [Doc. 243](#)], 545 [Pg. 545 includes portions of [Doc. 244](#) and [Doc. 245](#)]

Syria (see also [Egyptian–Syrian–Saudi](#) (ESS) Pact; Syrian subheadings under other subjects):

Alternate pipeline proposals, 318 [Pg. 318 includes portions of [Doc. 136](#) and [Doc. 137](#)]

Economic situation, 311 [Pg. 311 is part of [Doc. 133](#)], 427 [Pg. 427 is part of [Doc. 178](#)]

Egypt, relations with, 123 [Pg. 123 is part of [Doc. 52](#)], 598 [Pg. 598 is part of [Doc. 266](#)], 636 [Pg. 636 is part of [Doc. 270](#)], 1008 [Pg. 1008 is part of [Doc. 435](#)]

France, relations with, 92 [Pg. 92 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 192 [Pg. 192 is part of [Doc. 78](#)]

Iraq, relations with, 88 [Pg. 88 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 514 [Pg. 514 is part of [Doc. 222](#)], 998 [Pg. 998 is part of [Doc. 435](#)], 1004 [Pg. 1004 is part of [Doc. 435](#)], 1017 [Pg. 1017 includes portions of [Doc. 440](#) and [Doc. 441](#)], 1022–1023 [Pgs. 1022–1023 include portions of [Doc. 442](#) and [Doc. 443](#)]

Iraqi takeover proposals, 76 [Pg. 76 is part of [Doc. 45](#)], 82–83 [Pg. 82 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 88 [Pg. 88 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 92 [Pg. 92 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 112 [Pg. 112 is part of [Doc. 51](#)], 126 [Pg. 126 is part of [Doc. 54](#)], 173 [Pg. 173 is part of [Doc. 69](#)], 189–190 [Pg. 189 is part of [Doc. 78](#)], 192–193 [Pg. 192 is part of [Doc. 78](#)], 224 [Pg. 224 is part of [Doc. 91](#)], 350 [Pg. 350 is part of [Doc. 148](#)], 1008–1009 [Pg. 1008 is part of [Doc. 435](#)]

Soviet policy and, 91 [Pg. 91 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 160 [Pg. 160 is part of [Doc. 66](#)], 188–190 [Pg. 188 is part of [Doc. 78](#)], 359 [Pg. 359 is part of [Doc. 151](#)]

Jordan, relations with, 421 [Pg. 421 is part of [Doc. 178](#)], 426 [Pg. 426 is part of [Doc. 178](#)], 518–519 [Pgs. 518–519 include portions of [Doc. 224](#) and [Doc. 225](#)], 600 [Pg. 600 is part of [Doc. 266](#)]

Kuwait, relations with, 507 [Pg. 507 is part of [Doc. 221](#)]

Pipelines, 308 [Pg. 308 is part of [Doc. 132](#)], 311 [Pg. 311 is part of [Doc. 133](#)], 498–499 [Pg. 498 is part of [Doc. 220](#)], 603 [Pg. 603 is part of [Doc. 266](#)], 605 [Pg. 605 is part of [Doc. 266](#)], 611 [Pg. 611 is part of [Doc. 266](#)], 646 [Pg. 646 is part of [Doc. 270](#)]

Sabotage, 358 [Pg. 358 is part of [Doc. 151](#)], 385 [Pg. 385 is part of [Doc. 161](#)], 397 [Pg. 397 is part of [Doc. 167](#)], 417 [Pg. 417 includes portions of [Doc. 175](#) and [Doc. 176](#)], 421 [Pg. 421 is part of [Doc. 178](#)], 461 [Pg. 461 is part of [Doc. 198](#)], 575–576 [Pgs. 575–576 include portions of [Doc. 257](#), [Doc. 258](#), and [Doc. 259](#)], 1028 [Pg. 1028 is part of [Doc. 444](#)], 1031 [Pg. 1031 includes portions of [Doc. 446](#) and [Doc. 447](#)], 1045 [Pg. 1045 is part of [Doc. 456](#)], 1049–1051 [Pg. 1049 is part of [Doc. 458](#)]

Political situation (see also [Iraqi takeover proposals](#) above), 78 [Pg. 78 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 136 [Pg. 136 is part of [Doc. 60](#)], 160 [Pg. 160 is part of [Doc. 66](#)], 175 [Pg. 175 is part of [Doc. 70](#)], 243 [Pg. 243 is part of [Doc. 95](#)], 426 [Pg. 426 is part of [Doc. 178](#)], 514 [Pg. 514 is part of [Doc. 222](#)], 538 [Pg. 538 is part of [Doc. 239](#)], 575–576 [Pgs. 575–576 include portions of [Doc. 257](#), [Doc. 258](#), and [Doc. 259](#)], 599–601 [Pg. 599 is part of [Doc. 266](#)], 1068 [Pg. 1068 includes portions of [Doc. 462](#), [Doc. 463](#), and [Doc. 464](#)]

Baghdad Pact and, 87–88 [Pg. 87 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 204 [Pg. 204 is part of [Doc. 82](#)], 327–328 [Pg. 327 is part of [Doc. 143](#)]

Iraqi position, 975 [Pg. 975 includes portions of [Doc. 423](#) and [Doc. 424](#)], 989 [Pg. 989 is part of [Doc. 429](#)], 1008 [Pg. 1008 is part of [Doc. 435](#)], 1018 [Pg. 1018 is part of [Doc. 441](#)], 1021–1028 [Pgs. 1021–1028 include portions of [Doc. 442](#), [Doc. 443](#), and [Doc. 444](#)], 1031 [Pg. 1031 includes portions of [Doc. 446](#) and [Doc. 447](#)], 1044 [Pg. 1044 is part of [Doc. 456](#)], 1056 [Pg. 1056 is part of [Doc. 458](#)]

National Intelligence Estimates, 594 [Pg. 594 includes portions of [Doc. 265](#) and [Doc. 266](#)], 599 [Pg. 599 is part of [Doc. 266](#)], 610–611 [Pg. 610 is part of [Doc. 266](#)]

Saudi role, 255–256 [Pg. 255 is part of [Doc. 101](#)], 1008 [Pg. 1008 is part of [Doc. 435](#)]

Soviet role, 91 [Pg. 91 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 105 [Pg. 105 is part of [Doc. 49](#)], 190 [Pg. 190 is part of [Doc. 78](#)], 428 [Pg. 428 is part of [Doc. 178](#)], 583 [Pg. 583 is part of [Doc. 261](#)], 942 [Pg. 942 is part of [Doc. 406](#)]

Saudi Arabia, relations with, 87 [Pg. 87 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 1025–1026 [Pg. 1025 is part of [Doc. 444](#)]

Soviet bloc, relations with, 105 [Pg. 105 is part of [Doc. 49](#)], 296 [Pg. 296 is part of [Doc. 127](#)], 358 [Pg. 358 is part of [Doc. 151](#)], 379 [Pg. 379 is part of [Doc. 160](#)], 402 [Pg. 402 is part of [Doc. 170](#)], 406 [Pg. 406 is part of [Doc. 170](#)], 421 [Pg. 421 is part of [Doc. 178](#)], 595 [Pg. 595 is part of [Doc. 266](#)], 598 [Pg. 598 is part of [Doc. 266](#)], 1018 [Pg. 1018 is part of [Doc. 441](#)]

U.S. position, 634 [Pg. 634 is part of [Doc. 270](#)], 637 [Pg. 637 is part of [Doc. 270](#)], 652–654 [Pg. 652 is part of [Doc. 274](#)], 658 [Pg. 658 is part of [Doc. 276](#)]

Soviet bloc military aid to, 170 [Pg. 170 is part of [Doc. 68](#)], 189 [Pg. 189 is part of [Doc. 78](#)], 358 [Pg. 358 is part of [Doc. 151](#)], 383 [Pg. 383 is part of [Doc. 161](#)], 421 [Pg. 421 is part of [Doc. 178](#)], 602 [Pg. 602 is part of [Doc. 266](#)], 627 [Pg. 627 is part of [Doc. 270](#)], 634 [Pg. 634 is part of [Doc. 270](#)]

Turkey, relations with, 83 [Pg. 83 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 359 [Pg. 359 is part of [Doc. 151](#)]

United Kingdom, relations with, 85 [Pg. 85 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 119 [Pg. 119 is part of [Doc. 51](#)], 192 [Pg. 192 is part of [Doc. 78](#)]

United States, relations with, 68 [Pg. 68 is part of [Doc. 43](#)], 170 [Pg. 170 is part of [Doc. 68](#)], 186 [Pg. 186 is part of [Doc. 78](#)], 347 [Pg. 347 is part of [Doc. 148](#)], 349 [Pg. 349 is part of [Doc. 148](#)], 610 [Pg. 610 is part of [Doc. 266](#)]

U.S. policy toward, 378–379 [Pg. 378 is part of [Doc. 160](#)], 477–478 [Pgs. 477–478 include portions of [Doc. 206](#), [Doc. 207](#), and [Doc. 208](#)], 614 [Pg. 614 is part of [Doc. 267](#)], 637 [Pg. 637 is part of [Doc. 270](#)]

Taleqani, 922–923 [Pgs. 922–923 include portions of [Doc. 395](#) and [Doc. 396](#)]

Taqizadeh, Seyed Hasan, 765 [Pg. 765 is part of [Doc. 325](#)]

Taylor, Gen. Maxwell D., 162 [Pg. 162 is part of [Doc. 66](#)], 258 [Pg. 258 includes portions of [Doc. 101](#) and [Doc. 102](#)], 328 [Pg. 328 is part of [Doc. 143](#)], 414 [Pg. 414 is part of [Doc. 174](#)], 648 [Pg. 648 is part of [Doc. 271](#)], 960 [Pg. 960 is part of [Doc. 414](#)]

Taylor, Philip, 870 [Pg. 870 is part of [Doc. 377](#)]

Templer, Gen. Sir Gerald, 211–212 [Pgs. 211–212 include portions of [Doc. 85](#), [Doc. 86](#), and [Doc. 87](#)], 214 [Pg. 214 is part of [Doc. 88](#)], 642 [Pg. 642 is part of [Doc. 270](#)]

Thacher, Nicholas G., 40n [Pg. 40 includes portions of [Doc. 26](#) and [Doc. 27](#)]

Thrace, 106 [Pg. 106 is part of [Doc. 49](#)]

Timmons, B.E.L., 664 [Pg. 664 is part of [Doc. 279](#)]

Torbert, H.G., Jr., 584 [Pg. 584 is part of [Doc. 262](#)], 664 [Pg. 664 is part of [Doc. 279](#)], 945 [Pg. 945 is part of [Doc. 407](#)]

Treasury, U.S. Department of the, 592–593 [Pg. 592 is part of [Doc. 265](#)], 776n [Pg. 776 includes portions of [Doc. 331](#) and [Doc. 332](#)], 851n [Pg. 851 includes portions of [Doc. 367](#) and [Doc. 368](#)]

Trevelyan, Humphrey, 219 [Pg. 219 is part of [Doc. 91](#)], 543–545 [Pgs. 543–545 include portions of [Doc. 242](#), [Doc. 243](#), [Doc. 244](#), and [Doc. 245](#)], 548–549 [Pg. 548 is part of [Doc. 247](#)]

Tripartite Declaration of 1950, 90–91 [Pg. 90 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 119 [Pg. 119 is part of [Doc. 51](#)], 123 [Pg. 123 is part of [Doc. 52](#)], 146 [Pg. 146 is part of [Doc. 60](#)], 197 [Pg. 197 is part of [Doc. 78](#)], 246 [Pg. 246 is part of [Doc. 97](#)], 411 [Pg. 411 is part of [Doc. 171](#)], 422 [Pg. 422 is part of [Doc. 178](#)], 470–471 [Pg. 470 is part of [Doc. 203](#)], 508 [Pg. 508 is part of [Doc. 221](#)], 580 [Pg. 580 is part of [Doc. 260](#)]

Tucker, Col. Henry P., 198*n* [Pg. 198 is part of [Doc. 79](#)]

Tunisia (*see also* North Africa), 532–533 [Pgs. 532–533 include portions of [Doc. 235](#), [Doc. 236](#), and [Doc. 237](#)], 535 [Pg. 535 is part of [Doc. 238](#)], 557 [Pg. 557 is part of [Doc. 251](#)], 624 [Pg. 624 is part of [Doc. 270](#)], 1034 [Pg. 1034 includes portions of [Doc. 450](#) and [Doc. 451](#)]

Turkey (*see also* Baghdad Pact; Oil resources: Alternate pipeline proposals; *Turkish subheadings under other subjects*), 43 [Pg. 43 includes portions of [Doc. 28](#) and [Doc. 29](#)], 83 [Pg. 83 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 142 [Pg. 142 is part of [Doc. 60](#)], 177 [Pg. 177 includes portions of [Doc. 71](#) and [Doc. 72](#)], 181 [Pg. 181 includes portions of [Doc. 76](#) and [Doc. 77](#)], 203 [Pg. 203 includes portions of [Doc. 81](#) and [Doc. 82](#)], 300–301 [Pg. 300 is part of [Doc. 130](#)], 330 [Pg. 330 includes portions of [Doc. 143](#) and [Doc. 144](#)], 359 [Pg. 359 is part of [Doc. 151](#)], 393 [Pg. 393 is part of [Doc. 165](#)], 705 [Pg. 705 is part of [Doc. 296](#)]

Iran, relations with, 705 [Pg. 705 is part of [Doc. 296](#)], 760–761 [Pgs. 760–761 include portions of [Doc. 322](#) and [Doc. 323](#)], 764 [Pg. 764 is part of [Doc. 324](#)], 766 [Pg. 766 includes portions of [Doc. 325](#) and [Doc. 326](#)]

Iraq, relations with, 2 [Pg. 2 includes portions of [Doc. 1](#) and [Doc. 2](#)], 51–52 [Pgs. 51–52 include portions of [Doc. 34](#) and [Doc. 35](#)], 112 [Pg. 112 is part of [Doc. 51](#)]

Israel, relations with, 3 [Pg. 3 includes portions of [Doc. 2](#) and [Doc. 3](#)], 81–82 [Pg. 81 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 354 [Pg. 354 is part of

[Doc. 150](#)]

United States, relations with, 95 [Pg. 95 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 172 [Pg. 172 is part of [Doc. 69](#)], 227 [Pg. 227 is part of [Doc. 91](#)], 237 [Pg. 237 is part of [Doc. 93](#)], 272 [Pg. 272 is part of [Doc. 113](#)]

U.S. military aid to (see also Baghdad Pact: U.S. military aid and), 51 [Pg. 51 includes portions of [Doc. 34](#) and [Doc. 35](#)], 60 [Pg. 60 includes portions of [Doc. 40](#) and [Doc. 41](#)], 62 [Pg. 62 is part of [Doc. 42](#)], 64 [Pg. 64 is part of [Doc. 43](#)], 68 [Pg. 68 is part of [Doc. 43](#)], 146 [Pg. 146 is part of [Doc. 60](#)], 161–162 [Pg. 161 is part of [Doc. 66](#)], 186 [Pg. 186 is part of [Doc. 78](#)], 196 [Pg. 196 is part of [Doc. 78](#)], 209 [Pg. 209 is part of [Doc. 84](#)], 213 [Pg. 213 is part of [Doc. 87](#)], 362 [Pg. 362 is part of [Doc. 153](#)], 366 [Pg. 366 is part of [Doc. 156](#)], 487–488 [Pgs. 487–488 include portions of [Doc. 212](#), [Doc. 213](#), and [Doc. 214](#)]

U.S.–British regional defense talks, 8 [Pg. 8 includes portions of [Doc. 6](#) and [Doc. 7](#)], 21–22 [Pgs. 21–22 include portions of [Doc. 14](#) and [Doc. 15](#)], 52 [Pg. 52 is part of [Doc. 35](#)], 56 [Pg. 56 includes portions of [Doc. 37](#) and [Doc. 38](#)], 107 [Pg. 107 is part of [Doc. 49](#)], 111 [Pg. 111 includes portions of [Doc. 49](#) and [Doc. 50](#)], 117–120 [Pg. 117 is part of [Doc. 51](#)], 122 [Pg. 122 is part of [Doc. 51](#)], 145 [Pg. 145 is part of [Doc. 60](#)], 677 [Pg. 677 is part of [Doc. 286](#)], 679–681 [Pgs. 679–681 include portions of [Doc. 286](#) and [Doc. 287](#)], 683 [Pg. 683 is part of [Doc. 288](#)], 684 [Pg. 684 is part of [Doc. 289](#)], 687 [Pg. 687 is part of [Doc. 290](#)], 694 [Pg. 694 is part of [Doc. 291](#)], 703–704 [Pg. 703 is part of [Doc. 296](#)]

Turko–Iraqi pact. See [Baghdad Pact](#).

Twining, Gen. Nathan F., 258 [Pg. 258 includes portions of [Doc. 101](#) and [Doc. 102](#)], 299 [Pg. 299 includes portions of [Doc. 129](#) and [Doc. 130](#)], 414 [Pg. 414 is part of [Doc. 174](#)], 536 [Pg. 536 is part of [Doc. 238](#)], 539–543 [Pgs. 539–543 include portions of [Doc. 239](#), [Doc. 240](#), [Doc. 241](#), [Doc. 242](#), and [Doc. 243](#)], 553–554 [Pgs. 553–554 include portions of [Doc. 247](#), [Doc. 248](#), and [Doc. 249](#)], 648 [Pg. 648 is part of [Doc. 271](#)]

Uganda, 641 [Pg. 641 is part of [Doc. 270](#)]

U.N. Emergency Force (UNEF), 328 [Pg. 328 is part of [Doc. 143](#)], 344–345 [Pg. 344 is part of [Doc. 148](#)], 352 [Pg. 352 is part of [Doc. 149](#)], 385–386 [Pg. 385 is part of [Doc. 161](#)], 397 [Pg. 397 is part of [Doc. 167](#)], 472 [Pg. 472 is part of [Doc. 203](#)], 615 [Pg. 615 is part of [Doc. 267](#)], 627 [Pg. 627 is part of [Doc. 270](#)], 629 [Pg. 629 is part of [Doc. 270](#)], 644 [Pg. 644 is part of [Doc. 270](#)]

U.N. Palestine Conciliation Commission, 345 [Pg. 345 is part of [Doc. 148](#)], 644 [Pg. 644 is part of [Doc. 270](#)]

U.N. Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees (UNRWA), 346–347 [Pg. 346 is part of [Doc. 148](#)], 386 [Pg. 386 is part of [Doc. 161](#)], 606 [Pg. 606 is part of [Doc. 266](#)], 616 [Pg. 616 is part of [Doc. 267](#)], 627–628 [Pg. 627 is part of [Doc. 270](#)], 644 [Pg. 644 is part of [Doc. 270](#)]

U.N. Truce Supervisory Organization (UNTSO), 386 [Pg. 386 is part of [Doc. 161](#)], 627 [Pg. 627 is part of [Doc. 270](#)], 644 [Pg. 644 is part of [Doc. 270](#)]

Unger, Leonard, 63*n* [Pg. 63 includes portions of [Doc. 42](#) and [Doc. 43](#)], 102*n* [Pg. 102 includes portions of [Doc. 47](#) and [Doc. 48](#)], 127 [Pg. 127 includes portions of [Doc. 54](#) and [Doc. 55](#)]

United Kingdom (*see also* Arab–Israeli dispute: Alpha Operation; Baghdad Pact; *British, United Kingdom, and U.S.–British subheadings under other subjects*; Suez crisis; Tripartite Declaration of 1950):

Soviet bloc, relations with, 290 [Pg. 290 is part of [Doc. 124](#)], 299–300 [Pgs. 299–300 include portions of [Doc. 129](#) and [Doc. 130](#)]

United States, relations with, 172 [Pg. 172 is part of [Doc. 69](#)], 797 [Pg. 797 includes portions of [Doc. 345](#) and [Doc. 346](#)], 896–898 [Pg. 896 is part of [Doc. 391](#)]

United Nations (*see also* U.N. Emergency Force; U.N. Palestine Conciliation Commission; U.N. Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees; U.N. Truce Supervisory Organization), 9

[Pg. 9 is part of [Doc. 8](#)], 287 [Pg. 287 is part of [Doc. 124](#)], 288–289 [Pg. 288 is part of [Doc. 124](#)], 419 [Pg. 419 includes portions of [Doc. 176](#) and [Doc. 177](#)], 629 [Pg. 629 is part of [Doc. 270](#)]

Arab–Israeli dispute, 167 [Pg. 167 is part of [Doc. 66](#)], 187 [Pg. 187 is part of [Doc. 78](#)], 246 [Pg. 246 is part of [Doc. 97](#)], 287 [Pg. 287 is part of [Doc. 124](#)], 289 [Pg. 289 is part of [Doc. 124](#)], 345–346 [Pg. 345 is part of [Doc. 148](#)], 386–387 [Pgs. 386–387 include portions of [Doc. 161](#) and [Doc. 162](#)], 395 [Pg. 395 includes portions of [Doc. 165](#) and [Doc. 166](#)], 425 [Pg. 425 is part of [Doc. 178](#)], 644 [Pg. 644 is part of [Doc. 270](#)]

Arms embargo proposals, 382 [Pg. 382 is part of [Doc. 160](#)], 386 [Pg. 386 is part of [Doc. 161](#)]

Palestine resolutions, 82 [Pg. 82 is part of [Doc. 46](#)], 140 [Pg. 140 is part of [Doc. 60](#)], 175 [Pg. 175 is part of [Doc. 70](#)], 191 [Pg. 191 is part of [Doc. 78](#)], 288 [Pg. 288 is part of [Doc. 124](#)], 346 [Pg. 346 is part of [Doc. 148](#)], 608 [Pg. 608 is part of [Doc. 266](#)], 620 [Pg. 620 is part of [Doc. 270](#)]

Palestinian refugees, 346–347 [Pg. 346 is part of [Doc. 148](#)], 350 [Pg. 350 is part of [Doc. 148](#)], 386 [Pg. 386 is part of [Doc. 161](#)], 606 [Pg. 606 is part of [Doc. 266](#)], 627–628 [Pg. 627 is part of [Doc. 270](#)], 644 [Pg. 644 is part of [Doc. 270](#)]

Suez crisis, 343–345 [Pg. 343 is part of [Doc. 148](#)], 347 [Pg. 347 is part of [Doc. 148](#)], 352 [Pg. 352 is part of [Doc. 149](#)], 357 [Pg. 357 is part of [Doc. 151](#)], 385 [Pg. 385 is part of [Doc. 161](#)], 394 [Pg. 394 is part of [Doc. 165](#)], 422 [Pg. 422 is part of [Doc. 178](#)], 471 [Pg. 471 is part of [Doc. 203](#)]

Urguplu, Ali Suat Fuat Hayri, 657 [Pg. 657 is part of [Doc. 276](#)], 660 [Pg. 660 is part of [Doc. 276](#)]

U.S. Information Agency (USIA), 310–311 [Pg. 310 is part of [Doc. 133](#)], 315 [Pg. 315 includes portions of [Doc. 134](#) and [Doc. 135](#)], 737 [Pg. 737 is part of [Doc. 308](#)], 984 [Pg. 984 is part of [Doc. 427](#)]

Valluy, Adm., 247 [Pg. 247 is part of [Doc. 97](#)]

Van Dusen, William, 671 [Pg. 671 is part of [Doc. 283](#)], 883n [Pg. 883 is part of [Doc. 384](#)]

Van Fleet, Gen. James A., 708 [Pg. 708 includes portions of [Doc. 296](#) and [Doc. 297](#)]

Van Rensselaer, Bernard S., 895n [Pg. 895 is part of [Doc. 391](#)], 896n [Pg. 896 is part of [Doc. 391](#)]

Venezuela, 442 [Pg. 442 is part of [Doc. 187](#)], 501 [Pg. 501 is part of [Doc. 220](#)]

Vershinin, 943n [Pg. 943 is part of [Doc. 406](#)]

Voroshilov, Kliment Yefremovich, 273 [Pg. 273 is part of [Doc. 114](#)], 748 [Pg. 748 includes portions of [Doc. 315](#) and [Doc. 316](#)], 838 [Pg. 838 is part of [Doc. 359](#)]

Vosuq, 922 [Pg. 922 includes portions of [Doc. 395](#) and [Doc. 396](#)]

Wadsworth, George E., 23–25 [Pgs. 23–25 include portions of [Doc. 16](#) and [Doc. 17](#)], 519 [Pg. 519 includes portions of [Doc. 224](#) and [Doc. 225](#)]

Waggoner, Edward L., 417 [Pg. 417 includes portions of [Doc. 175](#) and [Doc. 176](#)]

Wagner, Capt., 278 [Pg. 278 is part of [Doc. 117](#)]

Wallner, Woodruff, 975 [Pg. 975 includes portions of [Doc. 423](#) and [Doc. 424](#)]

Walmsley, Walter N., 464 [Pg. 464 is part of [Doc. 202](#)]

Warren, Avra M., 44n [Pg. 44 is part of [Doc. 29](#)], 55–56 [Pgs. 55–56 include portions of [Doc. 36](#), [Doc. 37](#), and [Doc. 38](#)], 321 [Pg. 321 is part of [Doc. 138](#)], 330

[Pg. 330 includes portions of [Doc. 143](#) and [Doc. 144](#)], 334 [Pg. 334 is part of [Doc. 145](#)]

Watson, Adam, 504–513 [Pgs. 504–513 include portions of [Doc. 221](#) and [Doc. 222](#)]

Waugh, Samuel C., 713 [Pg. 713 is part of [Doc. 300](#)], 738 [Pg. 738 includes portions of [Doc. 308](#) and [Doc. 309](#)]

Western Europe (*see also* Oil resources planning under Suez crisis), 186 [Pg. 186 is part of [Doc. 78](#)]

Oil dependence, 308–309 [Pg. 308 is part of [Doc. 132](#)], 340–342 [Pg. 340 is part of [Doc. 147](#)], 348 [Pg. 348 is part of [Doc. 148](#)], 351–352 [Pgs. 351–352 include portions of [Doc. 148](#) and [Doc. 149](#)], 356–357 [Pg. 356 is part of [Doc. 151](#)], 516 [Pg. 516 is part of [Doc. 223](#)], 565 [Pg. 565 is part of [Doc. 254](#)], 617 [Pg. 617 is part of [Doc. 268](#)]

Soviet bloc, relations with, 356–357 [Pg. 356 is part of [Doc. 151](#)]

White, Gen. Thomas D., 648 [Pg. 648 is part of [Doc. 271](#)], 669 [Pg. 669 includes portions of [Doc. 281](#) and [Doc. 282](#)]

Whiteley, Gen., 247 [Pg. 247 is part of [Doc. 97](#)], 301 [Pg. 301 is part of [Doc. 130](#)]

Whitney, John Hay, 463–464 [Pgs. 463–464 include portions of [Doc. 200](#), [Doc. 201](#), and [Doc. 202](#)], 466 [Pg. 466 is part of [Doc. 203](#)], 544–545 [Pgs. 544–545 include portions of [Doc. 243](#), [Doc. 244](#), and [Doc. 245](#)], 656 [Pg. 656 includes portions of [Doc. 274](#) and [Doc. 275](#)]

Wilcox, Francis O., 366 [Pg. 366 is part of [Doc. 156](#)], 376 [Pg. 376 includes portions of [Doc. 159](#) and [Doc. 160](#)], 383n [Pg. 383 is part of [Doc. 161](#)], 393 [Pg. 393 is part of [Doc. 165](#)]

Wiley, Alexander, 439 [Pg. 439 includes portions of [Doc. 183](#) and [Doc. 184](#)], 445 [Pg. 445 is part of [Doc. 189](#)]

Wilkins, Fraser, 152n [Pg. 152 is part of [Doc. 61](#)], 178n [Pg. 178 includes portions of [Doc. 72](#) and [Doc. 73](#)], 198n [Pg. 198 is part of [Doc. 79](#)], 216 [Pg. 216 includes portions of [Doc. 90](#) and [Doc. 91](#)], 228 [Pg. 228 includes portions of [Doc. 91](#) and [Doc. 92](#)], 234 [Pg. 234 includes portions of [Doc. 92](#) and [Doc. 93](#)], 265 [Pg. 265 includes portions of [Doc. 107](#) and [Doc. 108](#)], 295n [Pg. 295 includes portions of [Doc. 126](#) and [Doc. 127](#)], 328 [Pg. 328 is part of [Doc. 143](#)], 366 [Pg. 366 is part of [Doc. 156](#)], 393 [Pg. 393 is part of [Doc. 165](#)], 410n [Pg. 410 is part of [Doc. 171](#)], 466 [Pg. 466 is part of [Doc. 203](#)], 535 [Pg. 535 is part of [Doc. 238](#)], 537 [Pg. 537 is part of [Doc. 239](#)], 940 [Pg. 940 includes portions of [Doc. 404](#) and [Doc. 405](#)]

Oil resources, 504–505 [Pg. 504 is part of [Doc. 221](#)], 543 [Pg. 543 includes portions of [Doc. 242](#) and [Doc. 243](#)], 545 [Pg. 545 includes portions of [Doc. 244](#) and [Doc. 245](#)], 548 [Pg. 548 is part of [Doc. 247](#)]

U.S.–British discussions, 464 [Pg. 464 is part of [Doc. 202](#)], 466 [Pg. 466 is part of [Doc. 203](#)], 509 [Pg. 509 is part of [Doc. 222](#)], 513 [Pg. 513 is part of [Doc. 222](#)], 545 [Pg. 545 includes portions of [Doc. 244](#) and [Doc. 245](#)], 548 [Pg. 548 is part of [Doc. 247](#)]

Wilkinson, Burke, 896n [Pg. 896 is part of [Doc. 391](#)]

Williams, Murat W., 443 [Pg. 443 is part of [Doc. 188](#)], 863–864 [Pgs. 863–864 include portions of [Doc. 374](#) and [Doc. 375](#)], 949n [Pg. 949 is part of [Doc. 409](#)], 956n [Pg. 956 includes portions of [Doc. 412](#) and [Doc. 413](#)]

Williamson, Col. E.W., 971n [Pg. 971 includes portions of [Doc. 422](#) and [Doc. 423](#)]

Willson, Clifford, 1023 [Pg. 1023 includes portions of [Doc. 442](#) and [Doc. 443](#)]

Wilson, Charles E., 53 [Pg. 53 is part of [Doc. 35](#)], 412 [Pg. 412 includes portions of [Doc. 171](#) and [Doc. 172](#)], 413n [Pg. 413 includes portions of [Doc. 172](#) and [Doc. 173](#)], 414–415 [Pgs. 414–415 include portions of [Doc. 174](#) and [Doc. 175](#)], 440 [Pg. 440 includes portions of [Doc. 185](#) and [Doc. 186](#)], 732n [Pg. 732 is part of [Doc. 306](#)], 792 [Pg. 792 includes portions of [Doc. 342](#) and [Doc. 343](#)]

Baghdad Pact, 161 [Pg. 161 is part of [Doc. 66](#)], 164 [Pg. 164 is part of [Doc. 66](#)], 261 [Pg. 261 is part of [Doc. 104](#)], 745 [Pg. 745 is part of [Doc. 314](#)], 781–782 [Pgs. 781–782 include portions of [Doc. 334](#), [Doc. 335](#), and [Doc. 336](#)], 785 [Pg. 785 is part of [Doc. 337](#)]

U.S. participation, 267 [Pg. 267 includes portions of [Doc. 108](#) and [Doc. 109](#)], 270 [Pg. 270 is part of [Doc. 111](#)], 294 [Pg. 294 is part of [Doc. 126](#)], 297–298 [Pgs. 297–298 include portions of [Doc. 127](#), [Doc. 128](#), and [Doc. 129](#)], 324–325 [Pgs. 324–325 include portions of [Doc. 140](#), [Doc. 141](#), and [Doc. 142](#)], 333 [Pg. 333 is part of [Doc. 145](#)], 361 [Pg. 361 is part of [Doc. 153](#)], 372–373 [Pgs. 372–373 include portions of [Doc. 158](#) and [Doc. 159](#)], 390 [Pg. 390 is part of [Doc. 163](#)], 440 [Pg. 440 includes portions of [Doc. 185](#) and [Doc. 186](#)]

Near East, U.S. military aid to, 162 [Pg. 162 is part of [Doc. 66](#)], 166 [Pg. 166 is part of [Doc. 66](#)], 168 [Pg. 168 includes portions of [Doc. 66](#) and [Doc. 67](#)], 208 [Pg. 208 is part of [Doc. 84](#)], 680 [Pg. 680 includes portions of [Doc. 286](#) and [Doc. 287](#)], 700 [Pg. 700 includes portions of [Doc. 293](#) and [Doc. 294](#)], 731 [Pg. 731 includes portions of [Doc. 305](#) and [Doc. 306](#)], 745 [Pg. 745 is part of [Doc. 314](#)], 753 [Pg. 753 is part of [Doc. 318](#)], 761–762 [Pgs. 761–762 include portions of [Doc. 322](#) and [Doc. 323](#)], 857 [Pg. 857 includes portions of [Doc. 371](#) and [Doc. 372](#)], 936 [Pg. 936 is part of [Doc. 402](#)]

Wilson, Evan, 216 [Pg. 216 includes portions of [Doc. 90](#) and [Doc. 91](#)], 228 [Pg. 228 includes portions of [Doc. 91](#) and [Doc. 92](#)], 234 [Pg. 234 includes portions of [Doc. 92](#) and [Doc. 93](#)], 543 [Pg. 543 includes portions of [Doc. 242](#) and [Doc. 243](#)], 545 [Pg. 545 includes portions of [Doc. 244](#) and [Doc. 245](#)], 548 [Pg. 548 is part of [Doc. 247](#)]

Withers, Charles D., 448ⁿ [Pg. 448 is part of [Doc. 192](#)], 559 [Pg. 559 is part of [Doc. 253](#)]

World Bank. See International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

Wright, Sir Michael Robert, 256 [Pg. 256 is part of [Doc. 101](#)], 280 [Pg. 280 includes portions of [Doc. 118](#) and [Doc. 119](#)]

Yasin, Sheikh Yusuf, 496 [Pg. 496 includes portions of [Doc. 219](#) and [Doc. 220](#)]

Yazdenpenah, Gen. Morteza, 962 [Pg. 962 is part of [Doc. 416](#)]

Yemen (*see also* Persian Gulf states), 20 [Pg. 20 includes portions of [Doc. 13](#) and [Doc. 14](#)], 33 [Pg. 33 is part of [Doc. 23](#)], 378–379 [Pg. 378 is part of [Doc. 160](#)], 424 [Pg. 424 is part of [Doc. 178](#)], 519 [Pg. 519 includes portions of [Doc. 224](#) and [Doc. 225](#)], 536 [Pg. 536 is part of [Doc. 238](#)], 595 [Pg. 595 is part of [Doc. 266](#)], 601 [Pg. 601 is part of [Doc. 266](#)], 610 [Pg. 610 is part of [Doc. 266](#)], 638–639 [Pg. 638 is part of [Doc. 270](#)]

Soviet bloc, relations with, 421 [Pg. 421 is part of [Doc. 178](#)], 510 [Pg. 510 is part of [Doc. 222](#)], 536 [Pg. 536 is part of [Doc. 238](#)]

United Kingdom, relations with, 510–511 [Pg. 510 is part of [Doc. 222](#)]

Yugoslavia, 93 [Pg. 93 is part of [Doc. 46](#)]

Zagros Line (*see also* Near East: Regional defense), 51 [Pg. 51 includes portions of [Doc. 34](#) and [Doc. 35](#)], 66 [Pg. 66 is part of [Doc. 43](#)], 109–110 [Pg. 109 is part of [Doc. 49](#)], 118 [Pg. 118 is part of [Doc. 51](#)], 247 [Pg. 247 is part of [Doc. 97](#)], 281 [Pg. 281 is part of [Doc. 119](#)], 677 [Pg. 677 is part of [Doc. 286](#)], 680 [Pg. 680 includes portions of [Doc. 286](#) and [Doc. 287](#)], 692 [Pg. 692 is part of [Doc. 291](#)], 704 [Pg. 704 is part of [Doc. 296](#)], 706–707 [Pg. 706 is part of [Doc. 296](#)], 796 [Pg. 796 is part of [Doc. 344](#)], 835 [Pg. 835 is part of [Doc. 358](#)], 893 [Pg. 893 is part of [Doc. 391](#)], 904ⁿ [Pg. 904 is part of [Doc. 392](#)], 935 [Pg. 935 is part of [Doc. 402](#)], 987 [Pg. 987 is part of [Doc. 428](#)]

Zahedi, Maj. Gen. Fazollah, 690–691 [Pg. 690 is part of [Doc. 291](#)], 726–728 [Pgs. 726–728 include portions of [Doc. 303](#) and [Doc. 304](#)], 817 [Pg. 817 is part of [Doc. 356](#)], 911 [Pg. 911 is part of [Doc. 393](#)], 915 [Pg. 915 is part of [Doc. 393](#)]

Zellerbach, James D., 584–585 [Pgs. 584–585 include portions of [Doc. 262](#) and [Doc. 263](#)], 661ⁿ [Pg. 661 includes portions of [Doc. 276](#) and [Doc. 277](#)], 920–

921 [*Pgs. 920–921 include portions of [Doc. 393](#), [Doc. 394](#), and [Doc. 395](#)], 945 [*Pg. 945 is part of [Doc. 407](#)*]*

Zorlu, Fatin, 176–177 [*Pgs. 176–177 include portions of [Doc. 70](#), [Doc. 71](#), and [Doc. 72](#)], 673–674 [*Pgs. 673–674 include portions of [Doc. 283](#), [Doc. 284](#), and [Doc. 285](#)*]*