State Dept./CIA on Tudeh Party (Jan. 1953)
| Arash Norouzi The Mossadegh Project | April 17, 2025 |
“The major Communist objective in Iran appears to be to get control of the Iranian Government by constitutional means.”
Communism In the Free World was a 569-page overview of Communist activities in 30 countries.
Dated January 1953, it was a collaborative effort by the U.S. State Department and the CIA.
The 21-page section on Iran, one of the more comprehensive studies of its kind, is shown here.
• U.S. State Department Documents | IRAN
• CIA Documents on Iran, Mossadegh, 1953 Coup
COMMUNISM IN IRAN: OBJECTIVES, TACTICS, AND CAPABILITIES
COMMUNISM IN THE FREE WORLD:
CAPABILITIES OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY, IRAN
OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Foreword ... ii
I. Objectives
II. Tactics
III. Capabilities
ASSETS
I. Numerical Strength
II. Electoral Strength
III. Military Strength and Organization for Violent Action
IV. Government Policy Toward Communism
V. Communist Influence in Labor
VI. Communist Influence in Social, Cultural, and Professional organizations
VII. Communist Infiltration into Government
VIII. Communist Influence on Public Opinion Formation
IX. Communist Infiltration of Non-Communist Political Parties
X. Communist Propaganda Media
XI. Financial Condition
XII. Soviet-Satellite Official Assets
XIII. Communist International Organizations
XIV. Communist Communication Network
This paper is one of thirty evaluations of the capabilities of Communist Parties in the countries of the free world. It is divided into two parts: (1) an analysis of the objectives, tactics, and capabilities of the party; and (2) a
compilation of the specific “assets” of the party drawn up on the basis of an exhaustive checklist provided by the Central Intelligence Agency.
The first part of the paper focuses on the actual current major objectives of the party; the specific tactics employed to carry them out; and the capability of the party to achieve its objectives assessed in the light of both past and
present performance.
The second section of the paper is designed to supplement the evaluative portion of the paper by both itemizing the organizational potential and material assets of the party and, at the same time, providing an index to areas of
Communist activity where information is inadequate, unreliable, or absent. The data presented in the section on “Assets” should not be treated as definitive; they are rather the best available to the Department at the present time.
COMMUNISM IN IRAN: OBJECTIVES, TACTICS, AND CAPABILITIES
The major Communist objective in Iran appears to be to get control of the Iranian Government by constitutional means. Communism is represented organizationally in Iran by the Tudeh (Masses) Party, which emerged into public life in 1943
as a coalition of Iranian Liberals and Communists. The Tudeh Party was declared illegal in February 1949 but has been maintained since then clandestinely and has operated overtly through a variety of front organizations, of which the
“Peace Partisans” and “The Society to Combat Imperialism” are the most prominent.
In moving toward its primary objective of getting control of the government through constitutional means, the
Tudeh Party appears to have the following concurrent
high priority intermediate goals: (1) legalization of the Tudeh Party; (2) replacement of
Mosadeq as Prime Minister;
[Dr. Mohammad Mossadegh] (3) control of the key Ministries of Defense, Interior, and Justice; (4) control of the Majlis (lower house of Parliament), if necessary by a coalition group; (5)
neutralization or elimination of the Shah; (6) neutralization
or elimination of the traditional governing groups; (7) transfer of the management of factories and services to union organizations; (6) confiscation of large landholdings for distribution to peasants, thereby neutralizing or eliminating
large landlords; (9) neutralization or conversion of intellectuals ; (10) elimination of all Western political influence; especially that of the US; (11) neutralization of UN influence; and (12) establishment of closer cooperation,
especially in the economic field, with the Soviet Union.
These objectives are set primarily to increase the capability of the Tudeh Party to exercise political power both through the ballot and the mechanisms of mass demonstrations, riots, and intimidation, employed to undermine public
confidence in the authorities. Although the elimination of all Western, especially US influence, in Iran would fulfill a Soviet foreign policy requirement, the alleged threat to Iran arising from that source provides the Tudeh Party
currently with one of its most valuable tools in seeking non-Communist cooperation.
The current top priority short-term Tudeh goal appears to be to utilize its Communist-educated, disciplined, devoted, and effective organization to expand its influence in non-Communist circles. The degree of concentration on other
objectives is opportunistic. For instance, the government’s decree increasing the peasants’ share of agricultural production was utilized by the Tudeh Party to arouse support for its goal of confiscation of large landholdings;
similarly, the ineptitude and ineffectiveness of the Ministry of Labor in protecting workers has been repeatedly used by the Tudeh Party to destroy non-Tudeh unions and strengthen its own. Tudeh leadership has shown great flexibility
and alertness in exploiting opportunities for advancing its objectives as they arise.
There are no significant incompatabilities among these short-term Communist objectives, which are designed to destroy the capacity of the present governing groups to prevent ultimate Communist control of the entire bureaucracy and the
army. Incompatabilities are likely to become apparent only after these short-term objectives have been achieved and the ultimate Tudeh objectives are exposeds (1) the complete Sovietization of Iran, including (a) neutralization of the
middle class, (b) establishment of a single political party, (c) imposition of police rule, and (d) replacement of the current curriculum in schools, colleges, etc., by the curriculum used in the USSR; and (2) transformation of Iran
into a Soviet Satellite state.
If the Tudeh believes it can muster an overwhelming preponderance of force, it might rapidly shift its strategy of achieving control through constitutional means to achieving it through a coup d’etat. Failure of such an attempt would
result in the destruction of the organization and. the indefinite postponement of success by legal means. We have no evidence to indicate that this shift in tactics is likely in the immediate future, although serious dis- affection in
the armed forces or simultaneous tribal and urban disturbances throughout the country could present an opportunity. The obstacles to movement which winter snows and spring floods present in the mountainous tribal areas make disturbances
there unlikely in any case before May.
The underlying strategic policy of the Tudeh Party is threefold: (1) it is designed to build up a direct following among all social groups; (2) it attempts to enter working arrangements with or gain covert control of non-Communist
political groups; and (3) it attempts to weaken by subversion and intimidation non-Communist political and social groups. Since the Tudeh Party is illegal, its efforts to build up a hard-core following are largely covert, although its
activities through front organizations and its newspapers are, in effect, overt. The Tudeh Party carries on its propaganda wherever there is an opportunity and in the manner best suited to the receptive capacity of the target. Emphasis
is placed upon factors and grievances which affect the immediate personal lives of the particular audience and therefore varies in accordance with their background, prejudices, and aspirations.
The bulk of the membership appears to be in urban centers, where the industrial and educational life of the country and governmental machinery are concentrated and where ease of communication and association facilitate organization.
The Tudeh Party is apparently also attempting through sports clubs to establish a body of young men highly trained in the technique of street fighting to supplement the unorganized bands of thugs who have participated prominently in
past Tudeh demonstrations. There is no evidence that an effective para-military organization as yet exists.
Given the economic and social conditions in Iran since 1945, it is probable that the Tudeh Party would have made more progress in the postwar period if non-Communist National Front groups had not emerged with objectives which in many
respects duplicated those of the Tudeh Party. Tudeh propaganda promises a higher standard of living for 90 percent of the Iranian population, “social justice,” “national independence,” and cultural autonomy. All of these objectives
have very broad popular appeal in Iran. Furthermore, the experiences of Iranian students abroad, as well as both Western and Soviet propaganda during and since World War II, encouraged Iranians, especially in urban centers, to expect
and demand improvements in their economic and social conditions, but did not make clear alternative methods for achieving these.
Primarily through its newspapers and pamphlets and through discussion at cell meetings, the Tudeh Party, aided by radio propaganda from the USSR, has kept up a continuous barrage of criticism designed to destroy public confidence in
the ability and good intentions of the governing groups in Iran. The members of the party are engaged actively in collecting damaging information. There is a sufficient basis of truth in the Tudeh accusations of official injustice,
disloyalty, and incompetence to provide confidence among hearers in the exaggerations and untruths disseminated. Furthermore, by claiming credit for improvements in the working conditions of various groups of laborers, and by providing
financial aid for Tudeh demonstrators injured or under arrest, the party has established sufficiently convincing evidence of its claims that it constitutes the only effective defense against “exploitation.” In a country where official
promises have remained traditionally unfulfilled, these small positive Tudeh actions have been effective, especially in urban areas.
Tudeh activity in Iran has been greatly aided since March 1951 by the controversy over
oil nationalization, which led to a
concentration of resentment against the UK. Under the guise of patriotic support for the national struggle to free Iran from alleged British control, the Tudeh has been able to gain experience in the use of mass demonstration and has
provided some of its members with practical experience in street fighting and the use of slogans.
The party has also been aided by the activities of ultra-conservative Moslem leaders, such as the Majlis President, Mullah Kashani, whose agitation for the return to Islamic principles arouses misgivings in the Assyrian, Armenian, and
Jewish minority groups. [Ayatollah Kashani] Furthermore, sections of these minority groups were among the most active collaborators with Soviet officials during the Allied occupation of Iran. Their
inability to emigrate and their fear of Soviet persecution
in the event of another Soviet invasion of Iran encourage especially the younger people among them to join in Tudeh activities in the hope of ultimate personal gain or safety. The Tudeh Party has also been aided by the revolutionary
policies and propaganda of the National Front group which, though less extreme, has seriously weakened the power of the traditional governing groups in Iran.
Conditions governing foreign trade have also aided the Tudeh Party. The limited and costly transportation system in Iran makes exporters in the northern regions particularly vulnerable to attractive commercial offers from the Soviet
Union. The proximity of those areas to the USSR and the fear of another Soviet invasion also incline merchants in the north to cooperate with the Soviet Trade Delegation and, indirectly, the Tudeh Party.
The major propaganda line which the Tudeh Party employs to build up local support is that the present governing groups are unwilling and unable to establish and carry out policies which will improve the lot of the Iranian masses. It
therefore argues that only through the united action of the people under the guidance of the party can a program of reform be executed which will provide the people with necessities and assure them social justice, health, education,
and opportunity for self-advancement.
In moving toward its major current objective of replacing the government, the party utilizes its front organizations, such as the Peace Partisans, to discredit the West, especially the US, in the hope of forcing the government to
weaken its position by rejecting aid from the US. It uses its trade unions to discredit the Ministry of Labor and to frustrate by strikes and repeated complaints official attempts to maintain some degree of stability in industrial
enterprises. In the same way, the great variety of front organizations which relate to practically every phase of activity in Iran are used to hamper whatever steps the government may take toward orderly reform and to spread and
increase popular distrust and dissatisfaction with officials and government organizations.
New members of the Tudeh Party are recruited by personal solicitation of old members after a thorough period of investigation. The new recruit’s interest is usually based upon some personal grievance which Tudeh promises to remove. The
recruit’s active interest is maintained by a sense of purpose, of comradeship, of membership in a secret, exclusive organization, and of conviction that in the end he will be on top and his enemies destroyed. We have littled detailed
information about the financing of the party, beyond the fact that members pay dues, that some profits are derived from the sale of newspapers and publications, and that some is derived from Communists abroad and indirectly from foreign
commercial transactions.
Before the Tudeh Party was declared illegal, the composition of its directing committee was well known. It was composed of Iranians with various degrees of Soviet training. They are now dispersed, some in Europe, some in the USSR, but
is is probable that some are in hiding in Iran and that they continue to direct policies there. The extent of direction from Soviet or satellite sources is not known, but it is probably significant. Control or influence in
non-Communist organizations (excluding fronts) is achieved by infiltration or bribery.
The characteristic Iranian emphasis on individualism promotes disunity in organizations and so facilitates the acquisition of key posts by any determined minority acting as a unit. As a matter of policy, the Tudeh Party appears to
prefer that the most prominent posts be filled by non-Communists, so long as the voting power and ideological direction remain in Tudeh hands.
The Tudeh Party has been greatly handicapped in its efforts to obtain control by constitutional means by the fact that it is illegal and that the elections have never been free. It therefore resorted in the 1952 elections to the
following devices: (1) supporting candidates proposed by front organizations; (2) bribing or making deals with candidates supported by either Mosadeq or Kashani. Support for front candidates was not only urged by Tudeh newspapers,
but was promoted by instructions delivered in Tudeh cell meetings. In order to obtain Majlis representation, the Tudeh is now expressing its willingness to join with any political group. So far, however, the disadvantages to
non-Communists of such association appear to have prevented the success of this tactic. It is possible, should the National Front group leaders come into conflict over, say, the succession to Mosadeq, that some leader might accept the
collaboration of the Tudeh Party. But at the present time the prospects are that any resort to such collaboration would unite the remaining non-Communist opposition and assure them the victory.
In the absence of much more serious disaffection in the army, simultaneous uprisings by various elements throughout the country, or some unexpected Soviet action, it is not believed that the Tudeh Party has the ability to get control
of the Iranian Government by force. The ability of the Tudeh Party to achieve its major current objective of gaining control through legal methods will be in inverse proportion to the effectiveness of the present government in
relieving traditional economic and social pressures on the bulk of the population and meeting the aspirations of the younger educated groups who provide an important element of National Front support. Tudeh leaders at present probably
feel that they have no alternative than to bide their time while consolidating their strength, knowing that any non-Communist government will be forced by continued financial and political difficulties to adopt strong regulatory
measures which will increase strife between the “haves” and the “have nots.” If the National Front government is unable to meet the mounting pressures, it is probable that Tudeh will receive added strength and will obtain effective
representation in the Majlis through elections and pressure on deputies.
The ability of the Tudeh Party to exploit opportunities favorable to its current goal of gaining control of the Iranian Government stems primarily from four factors: (1) it is the only united and disciplined political party; (2) it has
developed the techniques of the controlled use of mass demonstrations, strikes, riots, and intimidation for political purposes; (3) its policy of opposition to or evasion of established authority strikes a sympathetic chord with most
Iranians who are acquainted from personal experience with social, political, and economic injustices; and (4) the centralization in Tehran of control over governmental machinery provides Tudeh with a compact, crucial target. Because of
these factors the Tudeh Party is likely to increase in power, unless it represents a clear political threat to a non-Communist government which would then try to destroy it. At the present time, the existence of an active Tudeh Party is
politically advantageous to Mosadeq in conducting both his internal and foreign policies.
Under those circumstances, it is probable that the Tudeh Party will be permitted to continue to operate through front organizations. It will attempt to further Soviet policy by discrediting and, if possible, forcing the rejection of
US aid to Iran. The party may be expected to pursue its efforts to hamper the government's attempts at reform by complaining that actions taken are too slow or too limited and by publicizing instances of dishonesty or incompetence. It
will also persist in using Tudeh unions to disrupt industrial and transportation operations.
The disunity of the non-Communist forces in Iran and their internal jealousies and conflicts will facilitate the expansion of Tudeh power and influence, despite the relatively small membership in the Tudeh Party. However, with patience
and persistence, a non-Communist government can, with outside assistance, gradually improve the conditions which now provide the Tudeh Party with its major sources of support. Barring some unexpected development such as a political
disintegration of the National Front, a serious crop failure, an unfavorable export market, or an abrupt change in Soviet tactics, the probability is that Tudeh strength in Iran will not increase proportionately more than non-Communist
strength through 1953.
I. NUMERICAL STRENGTH
The current estimate of card-carrying members of the Communist Tudeh Party in Iran is from 20,000 to 35,000, with an estimated hardcore of 1,000. The membership may be roughly estimated at 8,000 in Tehran, 5,000 in the Azerbaijan area,
4,000 in the Caspian region, 1,000 in Isfahan, and 3,000 in the-Abadan area. The hard-core membership derives principally from industrial and transport workers, students, teachers, professional men, and government employees. Members
of organizations controlled by the Communists may be estimated at from 60,000 to 80,000; those in non-Communist organizations which have been infiltrated by the Tudeh Party, 160,000; and the total controlled or strongly influenced by
the Tudeh Party at from 170,000 to a maximum of 400,000, or from 1 to 2.3 percent of the estimated population. The party’s members and followers may be estimated in the major cities at 30,000 in Tehran, 20,000 in Azerbaijan, 10,000 in
the Caspian region, 4,000 in Isfahan, and 12,000 in the Abadan area.
The bulk of the party members and sympathizers come from among skilled and unskilled workers, peasants, teachers, students, minor government employees, professional men, Kurds and religious minorities (Assyrians, Armenians, and Jews).
The individuals are of all ages, with an estimated average membership in the party of three to seven years. Possibly 4,000 members-of the party have been active for over five years, with the “hard-core” members, who are in the 25 to 35
year age group, active for an estimated period of five to seven years. The quality of the “hard-core” leadership is believed to range from average to good. No information is available regarding the annual turnover of membership.
The number of Tudeh sympathizers is extremely variable, depending upon specific issues raised and concurrent circumstances at a given time. This fact, combined with the covert character of most Tudeh activities, makes estimates of
Tudeh membership and following open to question. Although the general trend has been toward in- creased membership, the party's following appears to have dropped sharply following the re-conquest of Azerbaijan in December 1946, and
the banning of the Tudeh Party in February 1949. On both of these occasions, the party tightened up its membership requirements, and the stricter policy also contributed to the drop in adherents.
Rigged elections, as well as the illegal status of the Tudeh Party, make estimates of electoral strength of doubtful reliability. The Tehran elections, alone, provide a reasonable basis for estimates. There the Tudeh and supporter vote
totalled 28,841, or roughly one-quarter of the over-all vote. All successful candidates supported the National Front government. Of the 80 nationally elected representatives, 6 from Azerbaijan (4 from Tabriz) are alleged to have
Communist connections. It is probable that some urban centers, such as Isfahan, the proportion of votes from Tudeh members and sympathizers was also roughly one-quarter. Current major Tudeh objectives and tactics are (1) to increase
the party following to support its own candidates if the ban is lifted, otherwise to support “front” candidates or non-Communists who are amenable to bribery; (2) to plug simultaneously for free elections.
The current Tudeh policy appears to be to refrain from armed insurrection, but to fight back vigorously if attacked by other groups or the police. In recent cases of violent demonstrations, the estimated numbers of Tudeh followers
involved ranges from 100 to 5,000. The number which could be brought out now for violent demonstrations under the most favorable conditions is estimated at a minimum of 35,000, a maximum of 200,000. The maximum number of party members
capable of leading violent demonstrations in key places probably does not exceed 500. On the basis of speculation, the party is probably capable of directing violent demonstrations in Tehran, Tabriz, the Caspian area, Isfahan, and the
Abadan area. Quality of leadership is probably average to good, and equipment is believed to include small arms and home-made bombs as well as knives, clubs, etc.
Tudeh sources claimed that 120,000 participated in the 1945 attempt to set up separate Kurdish and Azerbaijan governments under the protection of the Soviet Army; however, the actual force was probably not more than 50,000. There have
been no reports that effective Tudeh paramilitary organizations exist. The party has relied upon groups of miscellaneous thugs in violent demonstrations. It is believed to be training young men for street fighting, but no organized
units are known to exist as yet. The maximum force available throughout Iran now for armed insurrection is estimated at 200,000, but the number would depend on the issue involved and other circumstances. The quality of leadership would
probably be good. The supply of available weapons and ammunition is probably inadequate now to equip potential manpower.
No current plans or proposals for creating or activating a military resistance organization in case of war are known. In case of an East-West war, it is probable that Iran would lose its independence in a matter of days. Under Soviet
occupation or domination, practically all able-bodied men and, to a lesser extent, women, would probably ultimately be mobilized to support the USSR in its resistance to the West. This number can be roughly estimated at a maximum of
1,000,000. Leadership, arms, and equipment would have to be provided by the USSR.
The Tudeh Party and its labor front, the Central United Council of Trade Unions (CUCTU), were declared illegal in February 1919. Since then they have been operating largely clandestinely, but also overtly under the cloak of many front
organizations. Tudeh activities are hampered by (1) the governmental imposition of martial law in the Tehran and Abadan areas; (2) a new press law which provides means of suppressing Tudeh publications; (3) new decrees forbidding the
carrying of weapons and the holding of meetings without police permission; and (1) failure to weaken significantly the repressive potential of the police and army. The government has the means to suppress Tudeh and its front
organizations effectively, but is unlikely to do so as long as (1) the existence of the Tudeh threat is politically advantageous in carrying out internal and foreign policies and (2) the Tudeh is regarded as presenting no clear and
crucial threat to the maintenance of power by a non-Communist government.
The Communist Party, however, has exhibited impressive ability to circumvent repression in Iran. This record has been achieved largely as the result of (1) a skillful, organizational set-up whereby even its own members know only a few
within the organization; (2) skillful direction of overt activities on the part of Communist groups; (3) skillful use of front organizations; (1) the parallel revolutionary and anti-Western propaganda and activities of the National
Front (now in control of the government); (5) the lack of concerted effort by the government to repress Communist activities; (6) bribery of government officials; and (7) infiltration among officials within the Ministry of justice and
prisons. Although the government has declared martial law in Tehran and Abadan-Khorramshar (oil industry area), Communist organizational activity continues uninterrupted. Repressive action by the government, such as imposition of
martial law, does have positive results, particularly in reducing the occurrence of demonstrations. In the field of press publication, however, repressive action does not appear to be very effective. Government efforts to combat
Communist organization of labor usually takes the ineffective form of trying to persuade the workers to join non-Communist organizations which are led by known government “stooges” or by men who are not trusted by the workers.
The National Front government is currently encouraging non-Communist groups, such as the Pan-Iranists, SOMKA, [SUMKA] and the Workers’ Party, to clash in street fights with Communist-led demonstrators,
and the police in each clash tend to act as a shield for these non-Communist groups. It should be kept in mind also that the existence of a genuine Communist “menace” in Iran is a useful factor in any government’s efforts to obtain
foreign economic aid and therefore it is probable that Prime Minister Mosadeq is not sincerely desirous of eliminating Communist activity in Iran. Tudeh front organizations, of which the most prominent are the Peace Partisans, the
Society to Combat Imperialism, the Tudeh Youth Organization, and the Tudeh Women’s Organization, are unhampered in their organizations. Their activities are controlled by the provisions of martial law and their utility to the Tudeh is
primarily through the appearance of their members at mass demonstrations. Their propaganda parrots the lines set by Moscow.
The size of the Tudeh “underground” organization in Iran is estimated to be at a minimum 20,000, maximum 35,000, with concentration in Tehran, Isfahan, Azerbaijan, the Caspian region, and the Abadan area. The efficiency appears to be
considerable in view of the success with which security is maintained. Communications appear to offer no difficulties.
The number of Communists in key industries in Iran is estimated to vary from 5 to 25 percent of the total labor force in such industries. There are an estimated 6,000 in the following categories; railway workers, 1,000 — many in key
operational positions; communications unknown, but believed to be significant; arms plants and arsenals, 200 in the Tehran area; oil workers, 3,000 to 5,000; bus and trick drivers, 1,000 in a strong Tudeh unit.
A. Youth
Less than 200 individuals participate in top policy-making bodies in Iran. None is known to be Communist and perhaps not more than six to ten can be regarded as potentially sympathetic to Communism. However, any estimates must be
treated with reserve as the willingness of non-Communists to cooperate with Communists would depend upon the specific issue and concurrent circumstances. Furthermore, bribery and pressure may lead to cooperation on either side. The
highest estimates of Tudeh infiltration in the armed services are 1500 in the army, 600 air force, 110 gendarmerie, and none navy. Sympathizers may number 5,000 or more, depending upon the specific issue involved and circumstances. The
potentialities of infiltration do not differ greatly from those among Iranians outside the armed forces. The extent of Tudeh influence in top levels is believed to be negligible at the present time.
It is estimated that the number of Communists and sympathizers actively engaged in trying to mold public opinion numbers from 20,000 to 35,000, with a potential audience of 3,000,000 to 5,000,000 depending upon the issue raised. The
number of persons strongly influenced by the Communists regardless of the issue is estimated at a minimum of 170,000 and a maximum of 400,000. The influence on ostensibly non-Communist efforts to mold public opinion cannot be estimated
with any precision as most newspapers and publications at times espouse causes encouraged by the Communists and accept material for publication from all sources.
Although there is undoubtedly some Communist infiltration of these groups, adequate information is not available to make an estimate. Furthermore, the effectiveness of Tudeh influence would depend upon the specific issue involved and
concurrent circumstances. Almost identical Tudeh and National Front attitudes on some issues make it virtually impossible to determine what influence is Tudeh and what is non-Tudeh. Under such circumstances, Tudeh potential is high but
its influence appears at the present time to be slight.
The principal current propaganda media in Iran are newspapers and publications and instruction in Tudeh cells, effectively supplemented by numerous broadcasts from Soviet radio stations in Persian, Turki (Azerbaijani), and Kurdish.
Of the 27 Tudeh publications now appearing, the principal ones are Besuye Ayandeh, a Tehran daily morning paper with an estimated circulation of 6,000 to 8,000; Shahbaz, a daily evening Tehran paper with an estimated
circulation of 3,000; Farhangian, a weekly publication with an estimated circulation of 7,000; and Dehqanan Iran, a weekly publication with an estimated circulation of 2,000. These are all published in Tehran by the
Haghsh Jehan press, [Naghsh Jehan] which is supplied by TASS via the Soviet Embassy with world-wide news coverage, and probably also with newsprint. The quality of the press appears to be
adequate despite mobster raids by partisans of the National Front. It is probable that the presses which print the clandestine Tudeh papers and publications are located in the provincial centers and in Tehran, perhaps in some satellite
Legation.
The major source of Tudeh revenue appears to be from membership dues and sales of publications, although no precise information is available. Considerable aid comes from Soviet-Iranian trade through private deals and some from
Communist organizations abroad, but no figures are available. Most commercial deals with orbit countries are carried on by official government agencies, but detailed information is lacking. The Tudeh Party appears to have adequate
funds, although reports indicate the necessity for continuous pressure on members to pay their dues and increase sales.
The following diplomatic personnel including and above the rank of attache are officially listed in Iran: USSR - 25; Czech — 3; Rummanian — 11; Polish — 1; and Hungarian — b. The total for all five countries is officially set at 37,
but the actual staffs including service workers is probably nearer 150. All are currently located in Tehran, except for the temporary movements of members of the Soviet Trade Delegation and the trips of various officers to and from the
Soviet Union, usually via Pahlavi or Tabriz. The principal sections of the Soviet Embassy are (1) diplomatic, (2) consulate-general, (3) trade delagation, (4) VOKS, (5) Soviet hospital, (6) TASS, and (7) information and cultural
services. It is estimated that the number of persons engaged in propaganda activities is between 50 and 100.
None of the Communist international organizations have installations in Iran at the present time; nor have ary of them held congresses or conferences there. Fifteen Iranians attended the Moscow Economic Conference in 1952 and five
Iranian Communists attended the 19th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party the same year. There is some evidence that the Tudeh Party has received funds from Communist organizations abroad although information regarding the amounts
is unavailable. There is also some evidence that Iranian Communists sent some funds to aid Egyptian Communists and North Korean war casualties, although, again, the amounts are unknown.
Tehran is the center for all Tudeh communications activity in Iran. Sub-centers appear to exist in Isfahan, Abadan or Ahwaz, Tabriz, Resht, and Meshed. The courier system, probably operating through the Tudeh truckers union, appears to
be very effective. International terminals appear to be Paris, Berlin, Vienna, Warsaw, Geneva, Zurich, and Prague, and communications seem to be effective. It is assumed that the Soviet and, satellite missions in Tehran provide pouch
service as well as radio communications through their own services.
The membership in the Tudeh Central United Council of Trade Unions is estimated at 6,000, although the clandestine nature of this operation raises some doubt of the estimate. The number of active, dues-paying members of Communist
unions at least equals and probably exceeds the total number of workers belonging to non-Communist trade unions. However, only 1/10 of the total industrial workers, and only 1/30 of the total workers in professional services and
distribution trades are organized. Communist influence is exerted through factory councils set up under the sponsorship of the Ministry of Labor. In many cases Tudeh members are in control. The extent of their influence is indicated by
the fact that the government postponed the 1952 annual congress for elections of the workers’ representatives on the High Labor Council for fear of possible Tudeh control. Tudeh unions do not have decisive control of the labor force in
any key industry.
The strongest Tudeh unions are among railway workers, especially at the hub of traffic, Tehran. The railway is the principal distributing agency for imports and exports and for the movement of internal fuel supplies to substations.
Another strong union is that of bus and truck drivers. Provincial areas are entirely dependent upon these services for merchandise and passenger traffic. In Tehran, especially, Tudeh unions among the workers at the silo where the city’s
grain supply is stored, and among the bakers who prepare the city’s daily bread supply, present a potential threat.
The affiliations of these unions are not in all cases confirmed, but all are believed to be associated with the Communist-dominated WFTU.
The principal Tudeh youth organizations are the Tudeh Youth Organization and the Iranian Democratic Youth Club, which serves as the Youth Organizations front. The estimated membership is 4,000 to 6,000, mostly in Tehran. There are no
other youth organizations as such in Iran, although youths do have an opportunity to engage in organized activities in the schools and colleges and in political activity through the following National Front associated organizations:
(1) the Pan-Iranists, (2) SOMKA (National Socialists), and (3) the Workers’ Party. The Tudeh Youth Organization is affiliated with the World Federation of Democratic Youth and appears to be well led. It often works through the
Democratic Youth Club to avoid arrest and its members have, along with the Communist-front Society to Combat Imperialism, been in the forefront of Tudeh demonstrations. The Tudeh Youth Organization is considered to be a school for
training young members to become members of the Tudeh Party itself. The party enjoins TYO members to “struggle for peace” and strengthen their contacts with the masses. Membership is open to youths 12-23 years of age. Therefore, the
Tudeh Youth Organization could potentially include the bulk of students from the fifth grade up to and including college levels. Unless the non-Communist government can meet adequately the aspirations of young Iranians for employment
and opportunities, an increase of members in the Tudeh Youth Organization is probable.
B. Students
The principal Tudeh organizations among students are: (1) Iranian Students’ Organization, (2) Students’ Organization of Tehran University, (3) Society of Jewish Students of Tehran University, (4) Students Organization of Tabriz
University, (5) Tudeh Association of Higher Normal School Graduates, (6) Tudeh Association of Primary Normal School Graduates, (7) General Council of the Faculty of Science Students’ Organization, and (8) Karaj Faculty Tudeh
Organization. The estimated strength in various centers is 2,000 in Tehran, 500 in Tabriz, and 100 in Shiraz. In demonstrations at Tehran University, Communists have been able to get support from as much as 1/3 of the student body. In
early 1952, it was estimated that 30 percent of the secondary school teachers were affiliated with Tudeh. There are no comparable organizations in the universities and these are believed to be affiliated with the World Federation of
Democratic Youth and the International Union of Students. They also have contacts with the Iranian Students Organization In Paris.
The leadership appears to be good. The major current objectives are to (1) lead strikes at the universities; (2) campaign for a reduction in tuition fees, entrance requirements, and graduation or passing marks; (3) campaign for various
popular issues affecting the welfare of students; and (4) attempt to organize a conference of students of the Near and Middle East. At Tehran. University, expansion and action capabilities appear to be favorable, though probably less
so than six months ago, since the government is beginning to exhibit more interest in controlling demonstrations, weeding out Tudeh students and professors and encouraging aggressive non-Communist organizations to counteract Tudeh
demonstrations. Principal Tudeh organizations among women are the Iranian Women’s Organization and the Society for the Protection of Children. Membership figures are unavailable. These groups are associated with the Women’s
International Democratic Federation and the International Preparatory Commission for the Protection of Children. These groups agitate for women’s rights; spread Communist ideology among women, girls and children; and exploit the
humanitarian appeals inherent in any child-welfare program. The Iranian Women’s Organization is unlikely to play a large role except under a Communist government, but the Protection of Children program appears to have favorable
prospects.
D. Racial, Religious, Nationality Minorities [should be C.]
The organizations which Tudeh has established to work among minorities are principally the following:
1) Armenian
(a) Progressive (youth organization)
(b) Armenian Cultural Tudeh Organization
(c) Church Women’s Union
(d) Armenian Communist Party
(2) Azerbaijani
(a) Azerbaijan Democrat Party
(b) The Azerbaijan Society
(3) Kurds
(a) Kurdish Democrat Party
(4) Jews
(a) Society of Jewish Students of Tehran University.
Membership in the Armenian groups is estimated at 80 to 200, principally in Tehran; in the Azerbaijani groups at 20,000, principally in Azerbaijan; in the Kurdish group at 4,000, principally in Azerbaijan. Membership of the Jewish
group is unknown, but small. The Armenian group is opposed by the majority of Armenians, but appears to have considerable potential for terrorist activities. There is no organized opposition to the other groups except from the
government. The leaders of these groups are not known, nor their international affiliations, if any.
The objectives of these groups appear to be:
(1) Armenian: to organize the entire Armenian Community to participate actively in Tudeh plans.
(2) Azerbaijani: (a) The Azerbaijan Society to act as a front in Tehran for the Democrat Party, (b) the latter to carry out subversive activities comparable to those being undertaken by Tudeh outside of
Azerbaijan. Principal current theme is cultural and political autonomy for Azerbaijan.
(3) Kurds: to conduct similar subversive activities in north-western Azerbaijan appealing for Kurdish cultural and political autonomy.
(4) Jewish: Unknown.
Capabilities for expansion and action among all of these groups appear to be good. The grievances toward the central government among the Azerbaijanis and Kurds are such that the presence in those areas of strong military establishments
is probably the only deterrent to a general uprising today.
E. Sports Groups
The Tudeh sports organizations are the Tudeh Mountaineers League, the Tudeh Wrestlers League, the Tudeh Swimmers League, and the Tudeh Basketball Players Association. The membership is probably small and unimportant from the point of
view of sports, but significant in providing training for street fighters and expanding contacts. In view of the increasing general interest in sports in Iran, the capabilities of these groups for expansion are good.
F. Cultural Groups
The principal Tudeh organizations are the Artists League, the Armenian Cultural Tudeh Organization, and the Society for Combatting Illiteracy. There are no competing organizations. The illiteracy program is the most effective since it
reaches people unaffected by the regular school system through lack of opportunity or means to attend. The objective in organizing these groups is probably to provide additional targets for propaganda, but the illiteracy program has,
in addition, the purpose of teaching Tudeh members or potential recruits to read and write so they can understand written orders and submit written reports and begin to read Communist literature. The capabilities of the Artists League
appear limited, but those of the Armenian group are probably favorable among younger Armenians, and those of the Illiteracy Society are likely to be very favorable and an increasingly effective Tudeh tactic.
C. Professional Groups [should be G.]
The principal Tudeh organizations among professionals are (1) The Iranian Society of Democratic Lawyers, (2) The Judicial Society of Iran, (3) Union of Teacher Training College Graduates (4) Tudeh Medical Assistants Union, (5) Tudeh
Union of Government Employees, and (6) National Association of Democratic Journalists. The membership is unknown but probably small. There are no effective non-Communist organizations in these fields, although the Communist membership
is probably numerically a small proportion of the total employment. The jurists group is probably well-led and is affiliated with the International Association of Democratic Jurists (IADJ).
Tudeh objectives through the legal groups appear to be to assure support for the Communist line regarding (1) international law, (2) the role of the UN in establishing peace, and (3) the “correct” interpretation of Iranian laws and the
constitution. The teachers, organization is designed to spread the party line and add to the embarrassments of the government; that of the government employees, to facilitate Tudeh infiltration and eventual take-over; and that in the
press, to enlist sympathetic Tudeh treatment in the press and support Tudeh’s opposition to any restrictive official actions or legislation. The capabilities for expansion and action in all of these fields appear to be good.
H. “Peace” and Other Organizations Supporting Pro-Soviet, Pro-Satellite and Anti-Western Programs
The principal “peace” and anti-Western Tudeh front organizations are (1) The Iranian Association for Peace, which has 10,000 to 15,000 dues-paying members concentrated in Tehran and Tabriz, although 900,000 signatures have been claimed
by the organization; (2) The Free Iran Society, membership unknown, but concentrated in Tehran; (3) The Iran--Soviet Cultural Relations Society, with an estimated membership of 500, also concentrated in Tehran; and (4) The National
Society for Combatting Imperialism in Iran with an estimated membership of 15,000, concentrated in Tehran, Abadan, Khorramshar, Isfahan, and Resht.
The “Peace” group has no effective opposition and has been very successful in attracting support from all classes. It is believed to provide the headquarters for overt Tudeh activities. The Free Iran Society is actively opposed by the
Tehran Chamber of Commerce and the Cultural Society by the Iran-America Relations Society, although there is some overlapping of membership. The anti-imperialist group is effectively opposed only by National Front groups. The direction
of the associations appears to be generally very good and the Peace Partisans and cultural groups are affiliated with the international Communist fronts, the former with the International Partisans of Peace Movement, and the latter with
the Soviet VOKS organization.
The current objectives of these Communist organizations appear to be as follows: for the Peace Partisans, to urge all Tudeh members to join the front and to recruit membership from all classes, especially from those who would not join
Tudeh or other more obviously Communist-controlled groups; for the Free Iran Society, to band together businessmen and small industrialists and to obtain an embargo against foreign, especially US, imports; for the Cultural Society, to
serve as a propaganda tool for VOKS, directed primarily toward younger Iranian intellectuals; for the anti-Imperialist group, to capitalize on the oil dispute between the UK and Iran and on the xenophobic atmosphere prevailing in the
country to destroy Western influence. This organization has been used as the principal agency for conducting mass demonstrations.
The capabilities for expansion and action of these organizations appear to be as follows: the Peace Partisans apparently have reached the peak of their ability to expand rapidly. However, a war scare would enhance the capability greatly.
Aggressive action against its headquarters and demonstrations by groups adhering to the National Front, such as Pan-Iranists and SOMKA, aided by the police, has tended to reduce the field of activity. For the Free Iran Society, prospects
appear to be limited because imports are being reduced by exchange shortages. For the Cultural Society, prospects are fairly good since the fact that it is ostensibly an Iranian Society permits the USSR to circumvent the Iranian
Government's decree forbidding activity by foreign information centers outside Tehran. For the anti Imperialists, the prospects will vary with the intensity of the UK-Iran oil controversy. The government has recently severely limited
the freedom of this group to hold demonstrations.
No adequate information is available to provide the basis for a reliable estimate of the degree of Tudeh infiltration of non-Communist organizations.
The National Police Force consists of approximately 20,000 men. The force is undoubtedly penetrated by Communists but the percentage is probably not very high as the police are notoriously susceptible, in any event, to bribery. The
little information available concerning influence at the top indicates that penetration has not been accomplished.
There is no reliable information on Tudeh penetration in the administrations of nationalized industries, but there may be 60 to 100 Communists among them, with sympathizers numbering perhaps 300, depending upon the specific issue.
Their influence is of varying significance, but not yet controlling in any instance.
So far as is known neither the Soviet nor satellite missions publish overt propaganda, although they all assist in the importation of publications from abroad in Russian, Persian, and Turki. Furthermore, Soviet newspapers such as
Pravda, and a great variety of cheap Soviet books are available in quantity in the bookshops and newsstands of Tehran and provincial cities. No information is available on the financial assets of importers.
Internal broadcasting facilities in Iran are controlled by the government and do not appear to be either controlled or influenced at the present time by Communists. It was reported in 1952 that there was a clandestine station in Tehran
making infrequent broadcasts. The Communist radio programs, which are believed to have a significant listening public, come from the USSR. Radio Moscow broadcasts half-hour programs in Persian four times daily; Radio Baku gives programs
in Persian three times daily; Radio Tashkent beams half-hour programs in Persian twice daily; and Radio Democrat (Azerbaijan) has programs seven hours a week in each language — Persian, Turki, and Kurdish. It is the last station which
is most vicious in its propaganda and which has probably the most effective impact on Iranians.
The Soviet Hospital in Tehran has a staff of about 20 Soviet doctors and nurses. It is well-run, but fees are high and there is no free clinic. Exhibits of Soviet films, paintings, etc. are periodic and shown either by invitation at
the Soviet Embassy or at the Irano-Soviet Cultural Society. The Soviet Embassy has claimed that 100,000 people in Tehran read Russian, although the actual number is probably nearer 50,000. The Iran-Soviet Cultural Society has an
estimated membership of 500, mostly in Tehran, and provides the principal machinery for the dissemination of overt propaganda among the upper classes of Iran.
Soviet domination and active operation of the Caspian Sea Fisheries under a concession due to expire January 31, 1953 provides the USSR with an invaluable means of unrestricted communication between Iran and the USSR, as well as the
opportunity of supporting Soviet personnel and conducting activities in the Caspian area.
The closest contacts are believed to be with the USSR, which serves as the principal source of instructions, literature, and newsprint. France is the principal headquarters for overseas activity among Iranian students, and Egypt is the
main recipient of Iranian Communist donations and propaganda support.
The principal recent non-Soviet or satellite foreign emissaries have come from Italy, Egypt, Syria, and Lebanon. In 1952, Pietro Nenni, leader of the Italian Socialist Party and vice-President of the World Council of Peace Partisans
visited Tehran; in 1951, Yusuf Hilmi, Secretary-General of the Egyptian Peace Partisans came from Cairo with the declared objective of organizing a “conference of peace supporters to be attended by Middle, Near Eastern, and North
African delegates.” And Munim Ghazali, Secretary of the General Students’ Organization of Egypt arrived, probably for the same purpose. Also in 1951, Arif al Din, Secretary of the Syrian Communist Party, visited Tehran; and in the same
year ‘Abd-al-Riaz, Hashimi and Mustafa al-Aria, well known members of the Lebanese Communist Party, came to Iran.
• Declassified January 20, 2007
[Annotated and transcribed by Arash Norouzi]
• Source: Communism In the Free World (Jan. 1953), pgs. 238-258
Related links:
The Communist Danger in Persia | Britain’s 1952 Report to U.S.
Amb. Loy Henderson Talks Compensating Britain With Mossadegh | Jan. 28, 1953
National Intelligence Digest | CIA on Iran, Oil (Nov. 1952)
MOSSADEGH t-shirts — “If I sit silently, I have sinned”
