Averell Harriman In Iran (July 19, 1951)
| Arash Norouzi |
W. Averell Harriman arrived in Iran on July 15, 1951 as the special representative of U.S. President Harry S. Truman. In these reports from July 19, he emphasized the great popularity of Premier Mossadegh, and the importance of direct talks between Iran and Britain to solve the oil crisis.
888.2553/7–1951: Telegram
No. 43
The Special Assistant to the President (Harriman) to the Department of State1
Tehran, July 19, 1951—noon.
TOP SECRETPRIORITY
276. From Harriman for the President and Secretary. [Harry Truman and Sec. of State Dean Acheson] No distribution except as directed by Secretary’s office. Grady had five friendly Iran political
figures1 to dinner Tuesday night which gave me an informal opportunity to explain the economic consequences of [the] oil shut-down and necessity of working out
arrangements in some form with [the] British. [July 17th] They appeared to agree that a solution with [the] British should be reached. They also said that the opportunity provided by my presence must
not be lost. On other hand, they pointed out that they had little influence on Mosadeq at [the] moment and that he had captured popular emotion and widespread support. [Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh]
Wednesday morning Ala, Minister of Court, present Tuesday night, called on me. [Hossein Ala] We had a long and frank discussion. He explained the Shah’s position, saying that he realized the issues
at stake and yet could not safely take any direct action. The country is so strongly behind Mosadeq that no other individual could now obtain popular approval of a deal with British. He believes every effort must be made to persuade
Mosadeq to be reasonable. Ala said that even Mosadeq could not repudiate the nine point
Nationalization Law but could interpret the
points liberally and make additions. In any event British political influence in Iran affairs must be stopped both by oil officials and the British Governement. He referred to “shooting trips” by [the] Military Attaché which in fact
were for purpose of contacting tribal leaders.
I told him I had come to [the] conclusion that [the] only way to break [the] impasse was through government to government (British-Iran) discussions and suggested the advisability of a member of [the] British Cabinet coming to Tehran
while I was still here.
I said I was sure his government could attain its political objectives as above, but the oil deal would be difficult considering Mosadeq’s rigidity. In answer to his question I pointed out [the] new operating company of Iran registry
owned by [the] British and perhaps other previous customers (consisting mostly of European subsidiaries of
AIOC held solely or jointly with other international oil companies)
could be organized to act for a fee as [an] agent to Iran National Oil Company for operation of [the] oil fields and refinery. Also a long-term contract with AIOC for [the] sale of oil might be made at [a] substantial discount from
[the] market. I told him bluntly that whatever the form of arrangement the oil companies in total would have to obtain [the] equivalent of 50 percent of the net receipts. This point we discussed at considerable length. I believe he
understands clearly [the] reasons and indicated that [the] Iran Government’s objective should be to sell [the] largest volume of oil possible to produce maximum income regardless of percentages.
Wednesday afternoon I was invited to meet separately the Presidents of [the] Senate and of Majlis with a group of members of both Houses. At [a] meeting with [the] Senators over half of [the] membership, about 35, were present.
Following several cordial and flowery speeches of welcome and expressions of respect for President Truman, I spoke at some length. After expressing US great interest in Iran and President Truman’s personal concern over [the] present
controversy and free world solidarity, I presented forceably the economic dangers of [the] loss of their oil industry. I told them now that they had attained their political objectives through nationalization laws they must combine
reason with enthusiasm and protect their oil income as a basis for economic development. From [the] questions that followed I gained [the] impression that they understood [the] implications of what I had said. Individuals expressed
privately to me their concern that the government was being too rigid and had made [a] mistake in rejecting [the] oil company’s last proposal out of hand. Several asked for further personal talks.
[The] Majlis group consisted of about [a] dozen. Most of them made speeches to me of [a] cordial but general nature. I said much the same as I had to [the] Senate. The meeting was more formal and I could not appraise their reaction
except for feeling that they all hoped that in some manner my mission would be successful. I am seeing Ala Thursday morning and [the] Shah in [the] afternoon. Also the mixed oil commission is calling on me later. I plan to see
Mosadeq [the] following day. I hope that some
influence will by then have been brought to bear on him from my various talks. My objective will be to induce him to agree to immediate governement to government talks with [the] British and acquiesce to a British Cabinet Minister’s
visit to Tehran. If he should agree, regarding which I am not at present optimistic, he cannot make rigid conditions of prior acceptance by [the] British of his nine points nor can the British insist on observance of [the]
Hague Court
recommendations.
If [the] British Minister—preferably, I think, Gaitskell—would come without a fixed formula but with latitude to negotiate he might well be able to work out an acceptable deal, or at least a modus vivendi which could serve as a basis
for a final agreement. [Hugh Gaitskell]
Harriman
• Note: Bracketed text added and abbreviations removed from original for better readability. [Annotations by Arash Norouzi]
• Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Iran, 1951–1954, Volume X (1989)
1 “Presumably this is the same group referred to in
footnote 2, Document 18.”
— U.S. State Department Office of the Historian
888.2553/7–1951: Telegram
No. 44
The Special Assistant to the President (Harriman) to the Department of State1
Tehran, July 19, 1951—4 p.m.
TOP SECRETPRIORITY
Tehran, July 19, 1951—4 p.m.
285. From Harriman for the President and Secretary. No distribution except as directed by the Secretary’s office. I have reported by separate telegram
the general course of my discussions with Iranians. [supra] It might be useful to outline to you some of the basic elements of the situation which I have found and which must be taken into account in
my efforts to work out some solution.
There is complete unanimity of opinion among qualified American officials that Mosadeq is strongly supported by [a] very large majority of Iranian people, and no Iranian program has ever been backed to the extent of his program to
eliminate British influence in Iran and nationalize the oil industry. In whipping up public emotions on this issue, however, Mosadeq has created an atmosphere which has made it possible for extreme elements, both right and Communist,
to establish [a] situation under which it is practically impossible for him substantially to retreat. While it is generally believed that
Mosadeq is the only man who could make deal of any
kind with the British without it resulting in strong opposition and violence, he cannot conclude an agreement which he could not square with the nine points of the
nationalization law.
Mosadeq’s rigidity thus results as much from practical political factors as from his emotionalism. There is [a] chance that he can be convinced to some extent upon the practical realities on the oil company operation, and that his
emotions can to [a] degree be tempered with realism. It is more unlikely, however, that he can be convinced that the political aspects of the problem would permit him to seek an amicable settlement with the British which would appear
to involve concessions on his part.
From my conversation with the Shah and Ala, it is clear that they believe the Shah cannot now afford to replace Mosadeq and install a more amenable government, and US officials question his current power to do so in any event.
[Court Minister Hossein Ala] Under the circumstances the less talk by the British and ourselves about [a] possible change in government, the better. If [a] dangerous crisis is to be avoided we must
try to deal with Mosadeq, and every effort should be made to find [a] solution which will protect basic British interests, but which will not admit that the nine points of the nationalization law are not being adhered to. Rather,
results might be achieved through interpretation of [the] law and perhaps additional legislation.
The most encouraging factor that I can report at this time is that there is growing feeling among responsible Iranians that opportunity of settlement provided by my presence should not be lost.
Harriman
• Note: Bracketed text added and abbreviations removed from original for better readability. [Annotations by Arash Norouzi]
• Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Iran, 1951–1954, Volume X (1989)
Related links:
An Evaluation of the Significance of the National Front Movement in Iran (CIA, July 1, 1952)
Harriman Faces Tough Task Solving Iranian Oil Dispute | July 15, 1951
US Company Offers 2,500 US Technicians To Iran To Operate Oil Industry (CIA, July 1951)
MOSSADEGH t-shirts — “If I sit silently, I have sinned”
