U.S. House of Representatives Report (1977)
| The Mossadegh Project | April 3, 2026 |
The following is excerpted from a 96 page report The Status of Human Rights in Selected Countries and the U.S. Response.
THE STATUS OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN SELECTED COUNTRIES AND THE U.S. RESPONSE
PREPARED FOR THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
BY THE
FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND NATIONAL DEFENSE DIVISION, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS
JULY 25, 1977
Prepared for the use of the
Committee on International Relations
IRAN*
PREFACE
Human rights, as discussed in this paper, refer to those rights which the U.N. Charter seeks to promote and which have been given further identification in numerous U.N. resolutions and treaties, including the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, adopted by the U.N. General Assembly in 1948. These rights have been given special attention in recent congressional legislation, Section 116(a) of the International Development and Food Assistance Act of 1975 (Public Law
94—161), and sections 301(a) and 406(b) (2) (A) of the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976 (Public Law 94-329) refer to the goal of promotion of “increased observance of internationally recognized
human rights by all countries.” In addition, they identify as among “gross violations of internationally recognized human rights”, “torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment, prolonged detention without charges,
or trial, or other flagrant denials of the right to life, liberty, or the security of person.* * *”
SUMMARY
Iran is one of the oldest nations on earth, yet social heterogeneity has traditionally frustrated efforts to achieve effective political unity. For over 20 years the current Shah of Iran has pursued a policy of social and economic
modernization aimed at making Iran a 20th century country. While the Shah’s program has produced social and economic change beneficial to the Iranian people, the authoritarian methods employed by the Shah to maintain absolute control
over the country have severely limited civil and political liberties. Excesses within this system of control have sometimes led to personal injury and even death to those who challenged the Shah’s control. Over this period of time, U.S.
policy has been supportive of the Shah for a combination of economic, security, and geopolitical reasons. That support has in recent years entailed large sales of modern military equipment to Iran. Those sales, combined with a greater
congressional interest in the relationship of human rights to U.S. foreign policy, have increasingly focused congressional attention on restrictions on human rights in Iran.
HISTORY
Iran is one of the oldest countries in the world, dating back over 25 centuries to the ancient Persian Empire. For much of recent history, however, internal disunity resulting from social heterogeneity has severely weakened the
country. This, among other factors, has led to a history of foreign interventions in Iranian affairs.
The current Iranian dynasty dates from 1923, when an Iranian army officer, Reza Khan, deposed his predecessor. [Reza Shah Pahlavi deposed the Qajar monarch, Ahmad Shah] Reza Khan’s authoritarian rule
suppressed Iran’s competing tribal factions by disarming them, eliminating their leadership, and imposing territorial restrictions on them. The Shah’s rule, while autocratic, brought a period of political and economic stability to Iran.
But in 1941, the Shah’s pro-German posture provoked a British and Soviet invasion. The Shah was forced to abdicate in favor of his son, Shah Muhammad Reza Pahlevi. [Mohammad Reza Pahlavi] The new
Shah, under British and American influence, initially endorsed a more liberal political climate for the country. A series of elected governments ruled Iran through the 1940’s and into the 1950’s.
A person who does not enter the new political party and does not believe in the three cardinal principles which I referred to will have only two choices. He is either an individual who belongs to an illegal organization, or is related
to the outlawed Tudeh Party, or in other words is a traitor. Such an individual belongs in Iranian prison or if he desires, he can leave the country tomorrow, without even paying exit fees and can go anywhere he likes, because he is not
an Iranian, he has no nation, and his activities are illegal and punishable according to the law. 1
1 International Commission of Jurists. Human Rights and the Legal System in Iran. Two reports by William J. Butler, Esq., and Prof. Georges Levasseur. Geneva, Switzerland, March 1976. p. 7.
HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE SHAH’S REGIME
The question of human rights in Iran is the source of heated disagreement between the Shah’s regime and its critics. In testimony before the Subcommittee on International Organizations of the House Committee on International Relations
on September 8, 1976, one noted critic of the regime, and a former political prisoner, Reza Baraheni, cataloged some of the charges against the regime:
Thousands of men and women have been summarily executed during the last 23 years. More than 300,000 people have been in and out of prison during the last 19 years of the existence of SAVAK; an average of 1,500 people are arrested every
month. In one instance alone, American-trained counter-insurgency troops of the Iranian Army and SAVAK killed more than 6,000 people on June 5, 1963. According to
Amnesty International’s Annual Report
for 1974-75: The total number of political prisoners has been reported at times throughout the year (1975) to be anything from 25,000 to 100,000. Martin Ennals, Secretary General of Amnesty International reports in his
introduction to the above book: “The Shah of Iran retains his benevolent image despite the highest rate of death penalties in the world, no valid system of civilian courts and a history of torture which is beyond belief.” 2
The Shah has replied to such charges claiming that his opponents’ estimates of the numbers of political prisoners are grossly exaggerated and that such prisoners are in any case either Marxists or terrorists. In May 1975, appearing on
an American television show, the Shah dismissed such charges as “purely communistic propaganda” and said that those in prison were “not even political prisoners because they are all terrorists.” He said that some of them “have come out
in the streets with their machineguns, with hand grenades—they have even killed children 2 or 3 or 5 years old. You can believe me when I say we don’t have even 3,000 people in jail * * * and a terrorist should not expect better
treatment than what they are getting in my country.” 3 [Meet the Press, May 18, 1975]
U.S. POLICY
Since World War II successive U.S. administrations have considered Iran to be of economic and strategic importance to U.S. interests and have valued the Shah as a stable, anti-Communist ally. A recent congressional report
5 has summarized Iran’s importance to the United States in these terms:
It is a large, populous, resource-rich country located on the periphery of the Soviet Union and between the Near East and South Asia;
In testimony before the Subcommittee on International
Organizations of the House Committee on International Relations on September 8, 1976, U.S. Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Alfred L. Atherton, described as “a matter of public record” the U.S. “interest in
our bilateral relations with Iran, and the ways in which Iranian policies are congruent with and supportive of ours in the Middle East, in South Asia and globally.” The Assistant Secretary also urged that the question of political and
civil rights in Iran be examined “in the perspective of Iran’s historical experience and in the context of human rights in Iran in their broadest sense.” His testimony emphasized the Shah’s social and economic programs, the problems
posed by terrorist activities which have claimed the lives of Americans in Iran, and the difficulty of verifying many of the charges lodged against the Shah’s regime by its opponents.
CONGRESSIONAL ACTION
Although individual Congressmen have in the past expressed their concern about violation of human rights in Iran, the hearings in 1976 under the auspices of the House Committee on International Relations are the first concerted effort
by Congress systematically to examine the question. On August 4, 1976, the Subcommittee on International Organizations heard testimony from William J. Butler, coauthor of a
report for
the International Commission of Jurists on human rights in Iran. The subcommittee also received a written submission from Amnesty International which corroborated the ICJ findings. On September 8, 1976, the subcommittee heard testimony
from Assistant Secretary of State Alfred L. Atherton, who described the official U.S. position regarding human rights in Iran. The Department of State representative was followed by Prof. Reza Baraheni, a former political prisoner in
Iran and honorary chairman of the Committee for Artistic and Intellectual Freedom in Iran. Professor Baraheni discussed political oppression in Iran, including his own experiences as a political prisoner of the Iranian Government.
UPDATE*
There are continuing reports of Government suppression of political dissent, and harsh treatment of suspects and prisoners. While the
Carter administration has not
publicly pressured the Iranian Government on human rights, some sources have speculated that the new administration’s focus on the issue was at least partly responsible for the Shah’s action of pardoning or commuting the sentences
of over 1,000 Iranians in February 1977. [President Jimmy Carter]
*Prepared by Stanley E. Sloan, analyst in European affairs. Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress.
In August 1953, following a confrontation between the nationalistic government of Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadeq and the international oil companies operating in Iran, the Shah deposed Mossadeq with the support of the wealthy Iranian
elite and the Iranian Army and reportedly with the clandestine assistance of the U.S. Government. [Dr. Mohammad Mossadegh was targeted and overthrown by the CIA and British MI6 in collaboration with Iranian
factions]
The Shah apparently had decided that in order to modernize the country and eliminate traditional foreign interference in Iranian affairs, he would have to impose an authoritarian system on the country. He declared martial law and
carefully manipulated the operation of the Government which, at least in theory, remained founded on the 1906 Iranian Constitution. In 1957, martial law was discontinued, but the Shah then formed the National Intelligence and Security
Organization (SAVAK) to detect and eliminate antiregime activities. SAVAK has the combined functions of a police and intelligence organization with some judicial powers. It operates inside and outside of Iran. Its powers are virtually
limitless within the Iranian polity — SAVAK’s chief answers only to the Shah.
The Shah’s system of control throughout the 1950’s has been described as “loose authoritarianism,” within which a degree of free speech and political activity was tolerated. The Shah faced opposition, however, from both the left and
right, ranging from Communist cells and student groups to ultraconservative religious extremists. In the early 1960’s, a crescendo of antiregime activity, including kidnapings, [sic] assassinations,
and proteststrikes, was forcibly suppressed by SAVAK and the army. Since that time, the Shah has evolved a political system which does not tolerate dissent. In 1975, the Shah removed even the pretense of multiple parties, creating a
single party devoted exclusively to the maintenance of the Shah’s regime. [Rastakhiz Party] The Shah explained the situation in these words:
Ironically, just as the year 1963 marked the turn toward severe and occasionally brutal repression of political and civil liberties in Iran, it was also the year in which the Shah inaugurated a far-reaching program of social and
economic reform, the so-called “White Revolution.” That program has since improved health, education, and economic circumstances of the Iranian people, and in fact was designed to expand some personal rights, particularly for women. It
is also ironic to note that the social and economic reforms (particularly the land-redistribution program) hit hardest at the very wealthy class which had helped bring the Shah to power.
A dispassionate survey of the human rights situation in Iran published by the respected International Commission of Jurists in March 1976 credits the Shah’s regime for producing social and economic change of benefits to the Iranian
people.4 But the report also validates many of the claims made by the Shah’s critics. In summary, the report concludes that:
Iran’s one-party political system “is a severe limitation on the freedom of association and freedom of expression”; 4
2 Statement by Reza Baraheni on the Violation of Human Rights in Iran in the Subcommittee on International Organizations of the Congress of the United States. Sept. 8, 1976.
3 New York Times, May 19, 1975, p. 2. *
4 International Commission of Jurists.
Human Rights and the
Legal System in Iran. Two reports by William J. Butler, Esq., and Prof. Georges Levasseur. Geneva, Switzerland, March 1976.
Penalties for dissent and Government control and/or censorship of the press and media are “serious limitations on freedom of the press and freedom ofspeech”
Arrest and detention procedures for political prisoners “deprive such persons of their right to be brought before an independent examining magistrate”;
“There is abundant evidence showing the systematic use of impermissible methods of psychological and physical torture of political suspects during interrogation.”;
and
Political suspects, tried before Military Tribunals, are deprived of “accepted standards of due process of law.”
The flow of oil from the Persian Gulf is vital to the economies of Western Europe and Japan and to a lesser extent the United States itself;
A hostile presence or political instability in Iran or the lower gulf region could threaten accessto this oil; and
U.S. trade with and investment in Iran is large and growing.
The United States is not currently providing economic or military aid in the form of loans or grants to Iran. Direct economic assistance to Iran was terminated in 1969.
6 In fiscal years 1971-75 (inclusive), 3
according to figures published by the U.S. Agency for International Development, the United States spent an average of $1.6 million per year on economic assistance to Iran, consisting almost entirely of expenditures for the Peace Corps
presence there. In the same time period, military assistance in the form of loans and grants averaged $3.22 million per year. Such assistance, however, was terminated in 1974. “Security assistance” to Iran now takes the form of sales
on a cash basis, with sales of $1,293 billion in fiscal year 1976 and an estimated $1.2 billion in fiscal year 1977. 7 It is this high volume of sales
of sophisticated military equipment that has focused increased congressional attention on United States-Iranian relations.
5 U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance. U.S. Military Sales to Iran; a staff report. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office. 1976, p. 49.
6 Atherton testimony, Sept. 8, 1976. Addendum to statement, point 6.
In a related congressional development, on August 1, 1976, the Foreign Assistance Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations issued a report
8 strongly critical of the level of U.S. weapons sales to Iran. The report noted that Iran is and will remain an extremely important country to the
United States and its allies because of its geographical location and oil. But the report warned that the arms sales and the necessary followup arrangements could lead to increasing entanglement in Iranian affairs and possibly end
up dragging the United States into a military conflict in the region.
7 Atherton testimony. Sept. 8. 1976. Addendum to statement, point 5.
8 U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance. U.S. Military Sales to Iran, op cit.
*Update provided by subcommittee staff.
• [Transcribed and annotated by Arash Norouzi]
Related links:
IRAN: Amnesty International | Annual Report (1974-1975)
The Shah of Iran’s 1964 U.S. Visit, Protesters Crash UCLA Event (PHOTOS)
Queens College Yields To Anti-Iran Sit-In | New York Daily News, Feb. 18, 1977
MOSSADEGH t-shirts — “If I sit silently, I have sinned”
