At this distance from Iran, one may be inclined to put too much reliance on the surface manifestations—the coups and counter coups—and assume that things are going better or worse for the West, accordingly. One is entranced by the melodrama—the shah’s unsuccessful bid through the palace guards to oust Mossadegh and seize power; the shah’s flight when Mossadegh and his mobs counter-attacked; the army and police routing Mossadegh, and the shah’s triumphant return.

All these developments, bloody and comic, make first rate reading. But they do not progress into any promise of permanence. A question the young shah now faces, before he can retrieve Iran’s oil revenues, is what to do with Mossadegh? Does he dare to hang him?

The truth seems to be, contrary to statements by the shah’s new premier, General Zahedi, [Fazlollah Zahedi] that the mobs would tear old “Mossy” to pieces if they could get at him, that the Iranian masses still believe he is their champion against the oil imperialists of the West. He is the only powerful symbol of nationalism, that great and grim force, that has arisen in Iran. Though he is one of Iran’s richest landholders, and thus should be among the hated few, he came to power as the No. 1 revolutionary. He acquired among the people a reputation for integrity and courage. Though he has seemed, recently, to be playing games with the Communist Tudeh party, his hatred of the Soviet Union has been a matter of record for many years. [Name one such “game”]

Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlevi, his escutcheon slightly tarnished by his headlong flight from danger, has returned and branded Mossadegh a traitor. The sick but durable ex-premier will be tried by parliament for his acts while premier, and by the supreme court for his revolutionary actions, which could lead to a sentence of death, after the shah had signed an order replacing him as premier.

But the decision as to whether he should be executed will lie with the shah and his new premier, General Zahedi. Both would be relieved, one assumes, should Mossadegh die in prison. But they have waited a long time for Mossy's death, and he will not oblige. With the government foundering for, the lack of finances, they may have to decide Mossadegh’s fate promptly.

What is certain in all this is that the real sickness of Iran, aside from the oil question which was a manifestation of the illness, has not been settled by the shah’s victory. It is not even certain that the shah and the army will be powerful enough to break the oil stalemate while the intolerable poverty of workers and peasants remains unrelieved. They must show the people an apparent “victory” over the British in any oil deal, or the Tehran mobs will rush screaming to the palace again.