Dr. Mossadeq, even when he is as bed-ridden as he claims to be, is never at a loss for a stratagem to meet any threat to his position as Prime Minister of Persia. With his extraordinary faculty for playing on the chords of Persian national sentiment, and wooing the support of the general populace, he has weathered many storms in home and external policy which, by Western standards, should long ago have destroyed him as a political force. He has, so far, survived the oil dispute with Britain and, during this long and critical period, he has succeeded in outmanoeuvring the Opposition in the Majlis—the representative lower House of Parliament. Not only did he manage to reduce the Majlis to a state of impotence after he had secured a vote of plenary powers to deal with the situation which he had him self created in the oil dispute, but he has also, it seems, got the upper hand in his struggle for power with the Shah.

The strength of Dr. Mossadeq’s popular support is evident in the success of his latest bold venture in holding a referendum for the dissolution of the Majlis which, although Constitutionally operative, has been made unworkable by the Mossadeq tactics. Whatever may be the outcome of the Constitutional objections which have been raised against the referendum, the fact is that Dr. Mossadeq is in the practical position to exercise dictatorial powers. Up to this point, various financial expedients, the proceeds of the sale of a relatively small amount of the disputed oil abroad and a vigorous restriction of imports have combined to prevent a really dangerous economic crisis in Persia. Dr. Mossadeq has persisted in his intransigent course despite the rejection of his request for United States monetary aid in June, when President Eisenhower informed him that it would not be fair to the American taxpayer “for the U.S. Government to finance Persia while Persia did nothing to help itself by coming to a reasonable agreement leading to world marketing of its oil.” It is conjectural how long the thread of economic ruin can be staved off. [This quote is completely made up! It only captures the gyst, but not the words, of the original message.]

The international significance of this peculiar internal situation in Persia has to be considered in the light of the fact that Dr. Mossadeq, for the time being at least, has eliminated any serious challenge from rivals to leadership of the Government. It is notable that the new Soviet regime is making a new effort for friendly relations with Persia, which means, of course, another attempt to extend Russian influence and Russian commercial interests. Since the war, Persia has been able to resist Russian infiltration because of Anglo-American support, and the oil dispute does not mean that the Persians are disposed to accept any alternative foreign interests. Dr. Mossadeq may still hope, however, to play the East off against the West, or vice versa, if he thinks he can gain some advantage in that dangerous game, especially to save something from the wreck of the Persian oil industry.