Premier Mossadegh appeared to have so much popular support in Iran that the ability of the Shah and his supporters to make good their seizure of power cannot be taken for granted. Their first attempt last Saturday failed. The second succeeded only with a good deal of bloodshed and it is not yet certain that Mossadegh’s fanatical backers and their Communist allies are unable to counter-attack.

There can be little doubt that the revolution against the wily and unreasonable Mossadegh, if it sticks, should prove an advantage to the West. Mossadegh had proved himself completely unwilling to reach a fair settlement of the oil controversy with Britain.

Lacking such a settlement, Iran was doomed to an economic stagnation which put its stability under constant peril. Mossadegh had become dangerously tolerant of the Communist-led Tudeh party, which might have taken him over or succeeded to his power. Apparently it was this flirtation with the Communists that led the young Shah at last to dismiss Mossadegh — a dismissal which regrettably could be enforced only by violence. [The CIA forced the Shah to dismiss Mossadegh, who was never in cahoots with the Tudeh Party]

If the West can hope that the Shah and his premier, Gen. Zahedi, will consolidate their power, it must recognize that the greatest obstacle to that outcome might be too close an identification of the new regime with the West. Given the force of Iranian nationalism, the first task of any government which is to have a solid popular base must be to prove its independence from foreign control. For this reason it may be fortunate rather than otherwise that Gen. Zahedi has an anti-British record, having been imprisoned by the British during World War II. [Fazlollah Zahedi]

A sturdy national independence, however, is not necessarily incompatible with the capacity to deal realistically with the practical problem of getting Iranian oil flowing again, and putting the country on a better economic footing. It can be hoped that the new regime will work in that direction once it secures its position.

Certainly it can be no worse in this respect than Mossadegh. But this is a problem for the Iranians themselves to work out, and a Western attempt to realize its hopes by over-eager intervention would be a dangerous mistake. Any possible pretext for Soviet adventures must be avoided, and the Shah’s government must be given a chance to prove to the Iranian people that it represents them rather than any foreign interests. If the new government foreshadows only a prolonged struggle for power, it will be to Western interests to isolate that struggle and reduce its international complications as much as possible. Let us hope that nothing will be done, either by the West or by the Russians, to prevent the Iranians from solving their own internal problem.