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7 October 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: **SE-33**: Prospects for Survival of Mossadeq Regime in Iran

BACKGROUND

1. This estimate, requested by the NSC Senior Staff, was initiated on 2 October on a crash basis. It focuses primarily on the possible replacement of Mossadeq by Kashani - admittedly only one aspect of the Iranian situation insofar as it affects US security interests. The agency representatives concur that SE-33 cannot be considered an adequate substitute for a full-scale NIE on Iran.

SUBSTANCE

2. O-2 reserved the right to raise at the IAC meeting its belief that paragraph 6, Consequences of the Assumption of Power by Kashani, was beyond the scope of this paper -- particularly in view of the estimate that Kashani was not likely to seek to overthrow Mossadeq and was not likely to succeed if he did make such an attempt.

From the nature of requests for this estimate I feel that the subject of this paragraph is the one upon which our consumers most desire our best thought.

3. As far as we have been able to ascertain, no objections will be raised to the present text in the IAC meeting.

SHERMAN KEWT
Assistant Director
National Estimates

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