Nothing could do more damage to the British case for negotiation in the dispute between the Persian Government and the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company than the premature dispatch of troops to the oilfields to “protect” British interests. The dispute concerns a breach of contract by the Persian Government and is essentially a case that calls for settlement by civil law. It would be impossible at this stage to justify military intervention, and any threat to resort to force if the Persians do not concede our claims would at once lay us open to the charge of interfering with the sovereignty of an independent State. It would also make a reasonable settlement later many times more difficult. The United States Government, which is not directly concerned in the oil dispute, but which is vitally interested in the stability of the Middle East, has been consulted and is clearly reluctant to support a policy of sending British troops to Persia now. If the Persian Administration were in danger of breaking down, with a consequent threat to the lives of British subjects and the safety of plant and equipment in the oilfields, it would be a different matter. But that has not happened yet ; and if the Persian situation does deteriorate, as it may, we shall need the support of other nations in such measures to ensure security as we may be compelled to undertake. It would be worse than folly to forfeit that support in advance by acting in a manner that could all too easily be construed as an attempt to force our will on the Persian Government in order to serve our own interests. We cannot at the moment count even on the full support of the Commonwealth for military intervention. Sir Mohammad Zafrullah Khan, the Foreign Minister of Pakistan, has declared that Pakistan’s sympathies are “with Persia” on the question of nationalising oil. He has expressed the hope, however, that “an honourable solution and agreement” will be reached, and it may be that the good offices of Pakistan one of Persia’s most influential neighbours can play a part in helping to bring about a negotiated settlement. The United States Government has already urged the Persian Government not to be precipitate in rushing its nationalisation law into effect, and there is no doubt that we can count on American goodwill in counselling the Persians to show moderation and respect for international obligations These are assets that we cannot afford to throw away by ourselves acting precipitately.

It does not in the least follow that there is nothing to be done but wring our hands and wait while Persian hot heads try to steal the fruits of British enterprise. Dr Mossadeq’s position is obscure, but a Prime Minister who has retired behind armed guards in his Parliament House because he is afraid of fanatics in his own capital cannot be said to show much confidence in his ability to control events. [His predecessor, Premier Razmara, was assassinated less than two months before this editorial. Even the Shah was targeted for assassination in 1949] It is one thing to have a nationalization law passed by a Government which has the means of administering a nationalised industry ; it is quite a different matter for a weak Government with little in the way of technical resources to try to make nationalisation work. The secretary of the Majlis Committee, which is supposed to “arrange” nationalisation, has threatened British technicians with the revocation of their permits to reside in Persia. Suppose we declared in our turn that we would decline to co-operate in running the oil industry unless the Persian Government was prepared to negotiate a reasonable settlement of our claims? Would Dr Mossadeq’s Government really be ready to commit suicide by throwing the oil industry into chaos and losing the revenue from oil? The United States Government would certainly discourage American help in pulling Persia’s chestnuts out of the fire. Would Dr Mossadeq turn to Moscow? The price would be to hand over power to the illegal but well-organised Tudeh party, which would give short shrift to the landlords and whom the Persian Majlis largely represents. Right-wing Persian nationalists can count on the Tudeh party’s support for dispossessing the British in the oilfields, but if they regard “nationalisation” as a convenient substitute for overdue social reforms they can also count before long on being dispossessed themselves. And without revenue from the oilfelds they would soon be in a critical position. We have some strong cards in our hands. It should be no part of our policy to bolster an almost feudal class with money from our oil enterprise, but we can explain to the Persians how much they have to hope for in social advancement from a generous partnership in oil. And we can give the utmost publicity to our case throughout the Middle East. Mr Morrison has made clear that we do not oppose nationalisation as such—we want a working partnership. It should still be possible to achieve one. [Foreign Secretary Herbert Morrison]