Premier Mohammed Mossadegh, who a few months ago secured a remarkable victory over the British government with his tears and protestations, achieved another triumph last Monday with defiance and ultimatums and proved himself a man not only of many weapons but with a remarkable aptitude in using them.

Threat of Mob Rule

The lean and aquiline Persian leader wrested from the Iranian Senate, over considerable opposition, dictatorial powers for a period of six months. He did this on a threat of resigning and leaving the country to mob rule—rule by the same mob which had restored him to office only a few days previously and contrary to the wishes of the Shah.

Such an achievement is remarkable enough in itself, but the background of it makes it of critical importance to the western world. We cannot afford to lose Iran to the Soviets, for it outflanks both Turkey and Pakistan. We cannot afford, through adhering to a fixed position based on pride, prejudice or profit, to allow Iran to become a keystone in the Communist structure in the Near East. We are, it would seem, in danger of doing this.

Trained Fighters

Mossadegh returned to power as the nationalist leader, the champion of the cause of Persia for the Persians. He was, and is still believed to be, a strong opponent of Communism. He achieved office, however, as a result of rioting and street violence of which the Observer of London, a newspaper of considerable reputation, remarked, “The riots were extremely massive and well-organized affairs and the mobs who went back to the charge after being dispersed by fire showed a discipline and persistence which are provided only by a stiffening of trained street-fighting cadres. There is only one organization which can be credited with the authorship of this performance: the Communist Tudeh Party.”

So it would appear that Mossadegh, the enemy of the Communists, nonetheless owes his position to them, and it was prophesied that before long the Communist Party would be the power in the land, with Mossadegh its victim as well as its instrument. Then came his demand for dictatorial powers. And there is reason to believe that Mossadegh intends to use these powers to quell the same Communist mobs who helped him to office. If so he emerges as the arch-strategist of the Middle East.

Behind all this struggle, of course, lies the issue of Iranian oil. Since the seizure of the British refineries the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. has clamped an oil embargo on Iran. No oil is to be shipped in any tankers from the country, whose major source of revenue is oil. The object is to plunge Iran into such economic chaos that Mossadegh must come to terms with the British. This is economic warfare of the most direct kind, and it is not our intention to go into the pros and cons of the matter, which have been the subject of many thousands of words already.

Communist Ascendance

What has emerged from the British embargo is not only the hoped-for financial draining of the country but Communist side by side with it an increase in the ascendance in the power of the Communist Tudeh Party. In short, the British oil interests are not operating in a situation where the Iranians have no alternative and so must surrender. They have an alternative, which is to throw in their lot with Russia. This might readily be accomplished by the Communist Tudeh Party, which has already provided a remarkable demonstration of its power.

The question arises, then, of whether the long-term interests of the western world are best served by continuing the oil embargo, thus running the risk of a Communist coup as Iran becomes increasingly desperate, or whether a wiser course might not be to ease the embargo and reopen negotiations with Mossadegh. He himself has suggested that talks on compensation for the seized British refineries might be undertaken.

Complete Change

Conferences are currently under way between United States and British officials on the Iranian problem. It is reported that there is an understanding between the two that the best way to block the intrigues of the Communist Tudeh Party might be to strengthen the hand of Mossadegh. This would call for a complete change in British policy. But the British have survived largely as a result of the basic realism of their policies through the years. They may yet be persuaded to resolve their quarrel with Mossadegh over oil in order to ally themselves with him in the larger battle against Communism. From such an alliance a firmer friendship with Iran might develop than that based on oil contracts and royalties.