It has been possible to predict the fall of Iran’s weeping Premier Mossadegh ever since he took up his intransigent stand regarding the nationalization of the British-owned Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. This is not because it is still impossible to defy Britain and survive but because it is still impossible to defy mathematics.

The only way Mossadegh’s desperate gamble might have succeeded was to have the support of the United States or at least of American oil interests. Failing this, the world market for Iran’s oil was effectively cut off and approximately half the nation’s revenue slowly dried up.

At the outset of the nationalization storm following the assassination of Gen. Razmara American policy toward Iran was so confused and obscure it doubtless contributed to Mossadegh’s meteoric rise to power. [Premier Ali Razmara] But the failure of the Harriman mission made it clear that this country had no intention of undercutting the British to win the cheers of Middle East nationalists. [Averell Harriman played mediator in July-August 1951]

Russia was no help, for the disintegration of Iran’s oil-dependent economy was entirely to her liking and the Iranian distrust of Russia is no less intense than the feeling against Britain. Mossadegh’s downfall came when he sought, and was refused by the Shah, the War Ministry post which controls the army. As Iran’s economic plight worsened the army was the sole key to public submission to an increasingly unstable government.

So 77-year-old Ahmed Qavam, the “strong man” Premier who defied the Soviets in the Azerbaijan crisis of 1946, returns to power amid talk of a possible settlement of the oil dispute. [Ahmad Ghavam] On his record Qavam is Rightist and as pro-British as a Persian politician can safely be. But Persian politicians are notably unpredictable and we shall wait and see.