Text of Bill to Protect Oil Works (June 1951)
| Arash Norouzi The Mossadegh Project | July 2, 2025 |
To prevent malicious tampering with the infrastructure of the newly
nationalized oil industry
in Abadan, an Anti-Sabotage Bill was introduced in Iran’s lower house of Parliament on June 21, 1951. Under this proposed law, those who aided or abetted such crimes would receive punishment equal to the perpetrators, up to and
including the death penalty.
This took place as British tankers were ordered to refuse to sign receipts acknowledging the oil belonged to the National Iranian Oil Company, which the British regarded as stolen property.
Meanwhile, Iran was charging that certain high level
Anglo-Iranian Oil Company personnel were destroying incriminating
company documents, now considered Iranian possessions. To avoid possible prosecution, AIOC General Manager Eric Drake and Information Chief Philip Stockil fled Iran — Drake to Basra, Iraq and Stockil to Paris, France. Both men had been
accused of forms of sabotage, and the home of AIOC Chief Representative Richard Seddon, which contained incriminating documents, had recently been raided.
Also in the background was the menacing presence of the British war cruiser H.M.S. Mauritius, lying in wait outside Abadan in case of emergency. The threat of invasion by armed British paratroopers remained as well, and Iran registered
its sharp objections against both.
Naturally, the Labor government found the Anti-Sabotage bill highly alarming. In the House of Commons on June 26th, Foreign Secretary Herbert Morrison
called the bill a “disquieting
development”, warning:
“If the Persian Government persist in these measures they would leave the Company with no alternative but to bring operations at Abadan to a stop within a matter of days.”
The British worried that even a random mishap or technical issue might land a British oil worker in military court, or that a Briton might be falsely blamed for any incidents. Basil Jackson, AIOC’s Vice Chairman, told the press that if
the law passed, the British would evacuate, for it “would place our staff in jeopardy of being arrested on trumped-up charges.” Iran, however, wanted them to stay on the job as employees of NIOC.
Disturbed by all this, on June 27th, U.S. Sec. of State Dean Acheson issued a stern
press statement
condemning Iran for the “atmosphere of threat and fear” surrounding the beleaguered oil workers.
On June 30, Morrison sent an urgent note to Foreign Minister Bagher Kazemi which “rejected in advance” any pending sabotage charges.
On July 1st, Iran withdrew the Anti-Sabotage Bill.
One U.S. scholar
contextualized Iran’s actions this way:
“The proposed law against sabotage in the oil industry, which was not adopted, was intended to discourage terroristic elements which in some cases have been financed and encouraged by foreign powers. We in America have had similar laws in time of crisis from the 18th century to the present.”
After the bill was dropped, journalist Kingsbury Smith
reported from Tehran,
“Mossadegh claims that the anti-sabotage law actually was directed against the Communists and has reiterated his desire to see a continued flow of oil to the west.”
The Iranian Embassy in London stated July 2nd that the withdrawn bill was solely intended for “forestalling possible destructive machinations of internal and external extreme elements, and was not at all directed against the employees of the former oil company.”
• British Foreign Office | IRAN 1951-1954
• Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) Archive
Text of the Anti-Sabotage Bill
Drafted June 21, 1951
For one year from the date of approval of the law, any person engaging treacherously or with evil intent in activities in connection with the operation of the Iranian national oil industry, resulting in cutting oil pipelines or
rendering unserviceable refineries or facilities for the transport of oil, or causing fire in oil wells, or oil storage tanks, or causing destruction of railway lines, tunnels, bridges and rolling-stock, shall be condemned to penalties
ranging from temporary imprisonment with hard labor to capital punishment.
The same penalties are applicable to the instigators and accomplices as to those actually committing the crime. Offenses shall be dealt with by military courts.
• Translated from Persian, as quoted from in newspapers. An alternate version that circulated, worded slightly differently, threatened penalties on: “anyone engaging treacherously or with ill intent in activities in connection with the operation of the Iranian national oil industry, resulting in cutting of oil pipelines, rendering unserviceable refineries or facilities for transport of oil, causing fire in wells or storage tanks, or aiding and abetting such acts.”
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
TOP SECRET
NEAR EAST
4. Iran allegedly aiming sabotage law at Communists:
[excised box to the left]
The Iranian Foreign Minister has told the US Ambassador that the contemplated oil sabotage law is aimed at Communists, not at the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. He pointed out further that the law had not been passed. Ambassador Grady
says other Iranians have made statements along similar lines, and sees evidence of a more conciliatory attitude on the part of Mossadeq and his group. [Bagher Kazemi to Henry Grady]
Comment: Since Abadan refinery manager Drake has already been publicly accused of sabotage by a member of the Iranian commission taking over the oil installations, it seems unlikely that the sabotage law is being contemplated
solely as a damper for Communist activities. [Eric Drake] Furthermore, whatever the original motives may have been, the Iranians could always use it against Anglo-Iranian Oil Company employees if they
so desired.
While the Iranian Prime Minister and his followers may be beginning to fear the consequences of their recent actions, there are few concrete indications that this fear is being translated into a more conciliatory attitude. Even if Iran
should modify or withdraw its anti-sabotage law, such action would hardly allay British suspicions.
The Prime Minister’s
message of
28 June to President Truman restates at length the Iranian position and makes a bid for US support. The message does not, however, show any sign that Iran is willing to modify its demands.
• Declassified by the Central Intelligence Agency on March 14, 2019.
Click here for PDF of original document.
[Transcribed and annotated by Arash Norouzi]
Related links:
Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. Threatens: Don’t Buy Iranian Oil (Sept. 1951)
Tension In Iran Eased By Dropping Of Sabotage Law | June 29, 1951
Persia (Anglo-Iranian Oil Company) | House of Commons, July 5, 1951
MOSSADEGH t-shirts — “If I sit silently, I have sinned”
