Smith Agrees Premier Willing To Deal With U.S.
| Arash Norouzi The Mossadegh Project | May 8, 2017 |
The first document below, though uncredited, was written by the CIA’s Deputy Director for Intelligence Loftus Becker. It’s excerpted from the beginning of a 3-page, 14 point CIA document covering a range of dull foreign policy
and internal matters.
The Iran notes are of interest, however, for, coming days after the
30 Tir pro-Mossadegh uprising in Tehran, they portray
a far less negative impression of Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh — whom they apparently perceived as both rational and in control. This despite the fact that the agency had already been pinning its hopes on a royalist military coup
of some sort. Thanks to their critical planning and assistance, the CIA helped achieve this outcome a year later.
Official Diary
Wednesday, 30 July 1952
1. At the Deputies’ meeting [I, Loftus Becker] expressed to the Director [Walter Bedell Smith] that after study of the cables from Iran I had concluded that Mossadeq was “crazy like a fox.” I disagree with reports indicating that there was any real possibility of settling the situation through action by the Shah or a military coup at this time. It seemed to me that the National Front was the only organization capable of controlling the situation in Iran and even in his most recent statements Mossadeq had indicated a willingness to deal directly with the U.S. The Director indicated that he was in agreement with these views, but we concluded generally that they had been covered in the various O/NE memoranda which we had disseminated. I later expressed the same views to Sherman Kent [pioneering CIA official, former O.S.S. and Yale history professor] and left it to his discretion as to whether or not O/NE could profitably make a further contribution in this situation. [ONE = Office of National Estimates]
• [Annotations by Arash Norouzi]
• Date: July 30, 1952. Declassified by the Central Intelligence Agency on September 12, 2000.
104. Minutes of Director of Central Intelligence Smith’s Meeting [Walter Bedell Smith]
Washington, July 30, 1952.
PRESENT
General Smith, Messrs. Dulles, Wisner, Becker, Hedden, Col. White, Mr. Long
[Director Walter Bedell Smith, Deputy Director for Plans Allen Dulles, Assistant Director for Policy Coordination, Directorate of Plans Frank Wisner, Deputy Director for Intelligence
Loftus Becker, Special Assistant to the Director Stuart Hedden, Deputy Director for Administration Col. Lawrence Kermit White, Assistant to the Director Robert E. Long]
[Omitted here is discussion of matters unrelated to Iran.]
[Mr. Dulles:] c. Referred to a memorandum prepared by DD/I [Loftus Becker] on the British attitude on the Iran situation, noting that our intelligence people feel that the British attitude is a bit
too defeatist and that in fact there is some nationalism left in the National Front. [“not found”] Mr. Becker observed that in his view Mossadeq, far from being unbalanced, is “crazy like a fox”. The
Director [Smith] noted that Mossadeq and the National Front are the only anti-Communist forces left in Iran. In his view, given the lack of a strong military figure around whom a coup might be
engineered, the only real chance for forestalling Communist moves lay in a change in dynasty, something which might be brought about by letting the stronger tribal leaders have a whack at the royal power.
[Omitted here is discussion of matters unrelated to Iran.]
• Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Iran, 1951–1954 (2017)
• “Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Intelligence, Job 80B01676R, Box 23, Folder 10, Minutes of Deputies’ Meetings. Top Secret; Security Information. Drafted by Long.” [Robert E. Long] — U.S. State
Department Office of the Historian
Related links:
Highlights of the Mossadeq Trial | CIA Memo (Nov. 1953)
Hopes Wrecked In Persia | The Advocate, July 24, 1952
Iran Can’t Afford Luxury of Hostility | Jan. 29, 1952 editorial
MOSSADEGH t-shirts — “If I sit silently, I have sinned”
