In the convulsion of nationalism that followed Nasser’s seizure of the Suez Canal, the Egyptian dictator made many wild statements that were contrary to all logic and reason. [Gamal Abdel Nasser] One of them was that he would finance the building of the High Aswan Dam with profits from canal traffic since the West had withdrawn its offer of aid for the project. He mentioned a figure of $100,000,000 a year.

In the first place, net canal revenues approach only about a third of that sum. His picture of Egypt sitting back and raking in millions in tolls without effort or know-how in the operation of his “nationalized” property is a false one. And the dozens of nations that depend upon the waterway—including the U. S.—for transport, must view the situation in a true light. For Europe and Britain, particularly, uninterrupted Suez service is a matter of economic lifeblood.

The Suez Canal is a monumental business enterprise. It demands sound administration, constant upkeep and continuous modernization as does any profitable business or industry. This has been in the hands of a private corporation for a century. Nasser is a military man and those helping him run the junta government of Egypt are military men. It is extremely doubtful if the administrative and engineering experience necessary to the profitable operation of the waterway is available to him.

Traffic through Suez in 1955 amounted to 118,500,000 tons of cargo compared with 49,000,000 tons through Panama, its closest competitor as an international public utility. Not a pound of that cargo—predominantly oil and petroleum products northbound to European countries—could have moved through Suez without the expert guidance of one of the 200 ship pilots who ride its length aboard vessels. They are for the most part Europeans—British, French, Belgian and even American, with only a handful of Egyptians.

Qualifications for a Suez pilot’s license are, or have been over the years, almost unbelievably strict. Nasser could, of course, relax conditions or even allow shipmasters to guide their own vessels through the channels but it isn’t likely foreign shipping interests would permit their ships to face possible damages and pay jacked-up tolls as well.

In all his glib talk about profits, Nasser assumes that this maritime highway running through his front yard is just water confined in a channel. It is much more. It requires a miracle of maintenance and constant expansion. Since 1869, it has been widened from 177 feet to 510 feet and deepened from 26 feet to 46 feet. Before Nasser’s seizure plans had been made for further deepening to accommodate bigger tankers and dry-cargo vessels. Unless he wants to see his property deteriorate to uselessness, that work must go on. Under inept direction, a French engineer says, the canal would be “silted up full” in ten years. Is there any doubt that the hysterical Egyptian leader would fail at such a dull and exacting task? It is unspectacular and would pay no dividends in personal power to this man-in-a-hurry, Nasser.

Mossadegh of Iran couldn’t operate the oil wells he “nationalized.” It is pure fantasy to believe this new anti-West dictator could do any better with the Suez Canal. Brandishing armed force in Nasser’s neighborhood may have a salutary effect. It may not. But it is clear and unmistakable that the Western states cannot afford to adopt a soft policy toward any nationalistic seizure that would jeopardize proper maintenance of the Suez lifeline. Their stake is too big.