These times are crueler to optimists than to anyone else and there is no point in letting optimism run away with us in evaluating the early reports of a new upset in Iran. The dispatches say that the Mossadegh Government has fallen. They say that Mossadegh himself is a prisoner. They say that elements friendly to the Shah are in command at least for the moment. They say the Shah is returning from his brief exile in Italy and is in a confident mood.

We know from earlier dispatches that Mossadegh has been friendlier with the Communist or pro-Communist Tudeh party in recent weeks. As the pressure against his regime from monarchist, traditionalist and religious forces increased, the weeping would-be dictator bent more and more toward those Iranians who appeared to nourish affection for the Kremlin. [How so? We need details.] Iran has oil and it is an outlet on the Indian Ocean. These things in Soviet hands would hurt the West.

The first tentative conclusion — at least the thing the West will hope first to be able to believe — is thus that the overthrow of Mossadegh means at least a reorientation of the Iranian powers-that-be away from any coquetry with Moscow. We are at the point now where we can find comfort in any situation, however puzzling otherwise, if it includes a plain setback for Soviet machinations in the world-wide cold war.

But outside of these possible anti-Soviet meanings, what is there in the Iranian coup for westerners? Apparently the new strong man Zahedi is strenuously nationalistic. [Fazlollah Zahedi] We know he was in the Cabinet which authorized the expropriation of the Anglo-Persian oil facilities. He has a record of distaste for the British. His nationalism would on form make him suspicious of other foreigners, like Americans.

On the other hand, he has announced sweeping welfare gains as one of his early services for the people. These gains will cost money. Iran’s one important source of money is the revived oil industry. Zahedi is said to be a “realist.” Should he prove to be securely in power, would his “realism” move him toward some kind of practical accommodation on the oil matter?

Would a just settlement of the Iranian oil claims — and the Iranian position in the oil quarrel has been by no means devoid of justice — would a just oil settlement lead to wider Iranian reorientation toward the West? Could the watching world then see in Iran what it has seen in East Germany — that strong peoples will fight Kremlin imperialism at the risk of their own lives and in lonely self-reliance? How would the Kremlin react to such a show?

Of these things, no one can tell at this point. At this point the need is for more evidence and the indicated attitude is one of hope, surely, but not of overconfidence.