CIA Chief’s Query On Aid To Shah of Iran (1955)
| Arash Norouzi The Mossadegh Project | February 3, 2026 |
CIA Director Allen Welsh Dulles sent this letter about Iran to Herbert Hoover, Jr. in 1955. Under Secretary of State Hoover had acquired his position after helping to successfully negotiate the
Iran Oil Consortium Agreement
in 1954. Dulles
oversaw Operation Ajax, the 1953 covert operation that consolidated the absolute rule of the
Shah.
Both operations were twin victories for the United States. Now the question was the right amount of military assistance to grant the Shah, lest another “Mossadeq-type government” take over.
SECRET
1 July 1955
The Honorable Herbert Hoover, Jr.
Under Secretary of State
Department of State
Washington 25, D. C.
Dear Mr. Hoover:
[LARGE AREA EXCISED]
receive some clarification of the US attitude toward military aid and that the position of our new Ambassador [Selden Chapin] may be seriously prejudiced from the outset if he is unable to provide
satisfactory assurances of US interest in strengthening Iran militarily.
We recognize that the aid issue is a complicated one. Iran’s ability to absorb and effectively utilize large quantities of aid is still uncertain, and it may be impossible to firm up a realistic long-range aid program at any early date.
Nevertheless, the Shah is a sensitive and mercurial individual
who occupies a critical role in maintenance of Iran’s stability. While it is not within my competence to pass judgements on the diplomatic and military considerations involved in the aid issue, it is our intelligence appraisal, based
[several excised words] on an analysis of the over-all situation in Iran, that failure to provide the Shah with a reasonably precise statement of the role we hope Iran will play in regional defense
preparations, and with some tangible evidence of our good faith, may have the following adverse consequences:
(a) The Shah may conclude that the US has no serious intention of developing Iran’s capabilities for defense against possible Soviet attack. This would be a serious blow to the Shah’s morale, adversely affecting not only his interest in
participation in regional defense activities but also his determination to strengthen his country internally.
(b) Iranian political and popular opinion would tend to interpret the Shah’s failure to obtain satisfaction from the US on the military aid issue as an indication that US interest in the future of Iran and US support for the Shah
himself were diminishing. This would encourage the revival of anti-regime extremist elements and might facilitate the eventual reemergence of another Mossadeq-type government backed by fanatical nationalist elements and the Communists.
[Dr. Mohammad Mossadegh]
This matter was discussed briefly in the OCB meeting [Operations Coordinating Board] somewhat along the above lines and as Deputy Secretary of Defense Anderson was not present at that meeting, I am sending him a copy of this letter. [Robert B. Anderson]
Sincerely,
Allen W. Dulles
Director
cc: Hon. Robert Anderson
NE/e/ [excised] (25 June 1955)
Rewritten: ONE/SK:AWD:hea
1 - DCI
1 - Reading
1 - C/NEA
1 - NE/4
1 - ER
• [Transcribed and annotated by Arash Norouzi]
• Declassified by the Central Intelligence Agency on May 23, 2003.
This transcript merges both of these CIA files:
click here and here.
Routing slips with additional remarks below.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP
[undated]
Sherman Kent to Allen Dulles
Abbot Smith and I have read your letter talked it over with [excised] (our Middle East staffer). All of us felt that its emphasis was slightly askew. We suggest something milder along the lines of
the attached. [Abbot Emerson Smith]
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP
June 27
From the Director to Sherman Kent
Mr. Kent:
The Director would like your comments on the attached letter when he returns from New York tomorrow.
H. A.
Related links:
Sherman Kent to Allen Dulles on Iran’s “Serious Financial Problems” (CIA, June 1961)
Herbert Hoover, Jr. to Foreign Minister Entezam on Iran Oil Consortium | Oct. 28, 1954
John Foster Dulles Hails Coup Regime and “US-Iranian Friendship” | October 22, 1953
MOSSADEGH t-shirts — “If I sit silently, I have sinned”
