1945. Hoover arrived [in] London from Tehran [the] morning [of] November 4 and reviewed [the] Iranian oil problem with [the] Ambassador and Embassy staff. [Herbert Hoover, Jr.] At [the] invitation [of the] Foreign Office, Hoover and Embassy officials attended [an] afternoon meeting with Pierson Dixon, Chairman and R. Allen, [of the] Foreign Office, also Maude [sic] and Butler [of the] Ministry [of] Fuel and Power; Rowan and Armstrong [of the] Treasury; Fraser, Jackson and Gass [of] AIOC.¹

[John Redcliffe-Maud and Victor S. Butler; Leslie Rowan and William Armstrong; William Fraser, Basil Jackson and Neville Gass of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company]

Hoover’s statement summarizing [his] experience [in] Tehran stressed [the] continued complexity [of the] situation and Persian confusion regarding [the] appropriate course [of] action. He warned against expecting rapid progress on determining useful specific proposals. [The] Basic point of emphasis was [the] intensity of Iranian feeling against AIOC which Hoover said precluded, in his and Ambassador Henderson’s judgment, [a] solution providing for re-entry [of] AIOC into [the] Iranian oil industry except as [a] minority member of [a] consortium. [Amb. Loy Henderson] On [the] positive side was [the] fact [that the] Persian desire for settlement [is] strong and they have [a] great appreciation [of the] seriousness [of] their position.

After [an] introduction on [the] foregoing lines, [a] paraphrase [of] Tehran’s 1022 November 2 [was] distributed. Reaction thereto [is] obviously preliminary but one of general disappointment. More considered views [are] expected [at the] meeting [of] November 5. [The] Gist of [the] British comment was on [the] inconclusive and confused nature of [the] paper. They strongly restated their position [that] diplomatic relations should be established [at the] soonest and prior to any negotiations. In this connection they expressed pleasure [with the] Secretary’s statement² and Hoover emphasized Ambassador Henderson’s efforts [in] this regard. [John Foster Dulles] Dixon said [a] simultaneous agreement on “principles” and [a] resumption [of] relations as in [the] memorandum [were] not in accord [with] British views. [They] Had in mind going back and then seeing what could be done [to] get [the] company back. Fraser said [a] consideration of [a] solution starting from [the] premise [that] AIOC must be removed or reduced to [a] minority position because of unproved charges [of] misconduct set [a] bad precedent for elsewhere [in the] Middle East. He too had thought [the] correct approach was for Britain and Iran [to] be friends again and then talk about [the] oil matter which [was] responsible for [the] disturbed relations.

Hoover explained that [the] Iranian paper [was] only [a] starting point and could be substantially changed in many respects. In his opinion what was required at [the] outset was some kind of general statement regarding principles from both governments. Details [on] compensation, management, price, off-take, etc., [are] to be left to technical negotiators.

[The] British wondered whether [the] statement [was] sufficiently indefinite to be acceptable and yet leave open questions of [whether the] consortium, practical management by foreigners, etc., would be possible.

Hoover [is] meeting Eden at lunch today and will resume meeting with [the] government and AIOC this afternoon with smaller meetings contemplated thereafter. [Anthony Eden]

ALDRICH