Nor was it mere coincidence that the CIA discovered communist plots where America’s core corporations possessed, or wished to possess, substantial holdings of natural resources. When, in 1953, an anticolonial Iranian nationalist movement led by Mohammed Mossadegh challenged the power of the shah and seized the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, the CIA secretly channeled millions of dollars to army officers dedicated to returning the shah to power; once their objective had been fulfilled, generous access to Iranian oil was granted to Gulf, Texaco, Mobil, and Standard Oil of New Jersey. That same year, Guatemala’s duly elected President, Jacobo Arbenz Guzman, initiated a program of land reform that included confiscation of the United Fruit Company’s plantations; the CIA then bankrolled right-wing revolutionaries who, in 1954, helped by CIA pilots and aircraft supplied by Nicaraguan dictator Anastasio Somoza, ultimately spared United Fruit so dismal a fate. Also in 1954, the United States became quietly involved in Indochina, another area rich in natural resources. In the battles that raged between the French colonial army and the Vietminh, America furnished euphemistically titled “technical advisers,” CIA pilots, and 70 percent of the French military budget. Once the French were decisively defeated, President Eisenhower—fearful that the popular Ho Chi Minh, now in control of the northern part of Vietnam, would win a general election—refused to sign the Geneva Accords. He arranged instead for Ngo Dinh Diem, a staunch anticommunist in exile, to return from the United States to become Premier of South Vietnam. In 1965, when civil war in the Dominican Republic threatened American sugar plantations, Lyndon Johnson sent in 30,000 marines.

That relations with Iran, Vietnam, and Central America became less than cordial in subsequent decades may have had something to do with America’s unflinching eagerness during this era to use foreign policy in the service of the core American corporation.

Yes, Saddam was brutal, and the Iraqi people are better off without him. But America often turns a blind eye to brutal tyrants. During the Cold War we helped despicably brutal regimes—the Shah, Mobutu, Somoza, Greek colonels, Korean generals, Pinochet, Marcos, the mujahideen. We advised them, trained their death squads, schooled and equipped their torture specialists, and helped them squirrel away their vast wealth. Not so many years ago we helped the Taliban in its war with the Soviet Union. We funneled aid to Saddam Hussein himself when he was battling Iran. Even now, as we fight against terrorism, we ignore repression in nations whose cooperation we need—Russia, Uzbekistan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Indonesia, the Philippines, and China.